



# 13     **Abstract**

14     Nearly 50 years after Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” we have not yet found predictive  
 15     tools to guide us towards sustainable management of common-pool resources (CPR). We often  
 16     have a good understanding of the qualitative relationships between the principal actors in  
 17     socioecological systems (SESs), but classical quantitative approaches require a tremendous  
 18     amount of data to understand the drivers of SESs sustainability. Here we show that qualitative  
 19     modelling approaches can provide important governance insights for SESs that are understood  
 20     but not quantified.

21     We used Loop Analysis to test the outcomes of different management regimes on a simple  
 22     nature-based tourism SES described by economic, social and environmental variables. We  
 23     tested the sustainability of different management scenarios on this system and we identified  
 24     the necessary conditions to achieve it.

25     We found that management regimes where property rights and responsibilities are shared  
 26     between different stakeholders are more likely to be successful. However, the system is  
 27     generally highly unstable and it is important to tune each strategy to each particular situation.

28     The conditions for sustainability found across the different systems tested were: a low  
 29     reinvestment rate of tourist revenues into new infrastructures and a low growth rate of the  
 30     environment. Management strategies based on maximum sustainable yield, which keep the  
 31     environment far from its carrying capacity, have less chance to be sustainable.

32     Qualitative models of SESs are powerful diagnostic tools; they can help identifying variables  
 33     that play an important role in determining socioecological sustainability in data-poor  
 34     circumstances and guide the design of efficient data collection programmes. Our results  
 35     highlight the importance of careful planning when designing management strategies for  
 36     nature-based tourism. The application of one-size-fits-all solutions to every situation is likely to

37 lead to the failure of the commons; however tourism-based SESs can be sustainable if  
38 management strategies are tuned to each particular case.

39 **Keywords:** common-pool resources, loop analysis, nature-based tourism, press-pulse  
40 dynamics, predictive conservation, sustainable development.

#### 41 **Vitae**

42 **Francesca Mancini:** Francesca is an early-career interdisciplinary conservation scientist. She  
43 uses computational methods to find sustainable management solutions to conservation issues.  
44 Francesca completed her bachelor degree in Biological Sciences at La Sapienza University of  
45 Rome. She obtained an MRes degree in Applied Marine and Fisheries Ecology at the University  
46 of Aberdeen, where she is currently doing a PhD on sustainable management of wildlife  
47 tourism.

48 **George M. Coghill:** George is SICSA Chair in System Modelling and Professor of Computing  
49 Science at the University of Aberdeen. His main research interests are in Model-based Systems  
50 & Qualitative Reasoning, Bio-inspired Computing, and Philosophy of Information & Modelling.  
51 His research is very interdisciplinary and he has applied it to areas across a spectrum from  
52 biology and medicine, to music and sociology. He is a Fellow of the Institution of Engineering  
53 and Technology.

54 **David Lusseau:** David is Professor of Behavioural Biology at the University of Aberdeen. He  
55 works at the intersection of life, formal, and social sciences to understand how individuals  
56 make decisions when uncertain and what the consequences of those decisions are for their  
57 lives and their contributions to others. He obtained his PhD at the University of Otago in 2003.  
58 He was elected Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society in 2009, the Royal Society of Biology in  
59 2016, and member of the Young Academy of Scotland in 2011. He currently serves on IUCN  
60 Species Survival Commission and IUCN Sustainable Use and Livelihoods Specialist Group.

# 61 1. Introduction

62 Natural resources are usually considered common-pool resources (CPRs): it is usually  
63 impossible or very costly to exclude individuals from using them and their use by one user  
64 reduces the quantity or the quality available to other users (Ostrom et al., 1999). There are  
65 two main approaches to dealing with the “commons dilemma”. The “panacea” approach  
66 applies simplified and general models to all situations. Advocates of this approach propose one  
67 particular governance structure as the only possible solution to the tragedy of the commons  
68 (Hardin, 1968). The other approach consists in deriving from empirical case studies the  
69 characteristics that enable sustainable governance (Ostrom, 1990). The first approach does not  
70 recognise the importance of the particular circumstances that characterise each different  
71 situation (Ostrom et al., 2007), while the second has to deal with all the issues associated with  
72 obtaining observations and data from these complex socioecological systems (SESs)(Hilborn  
73 and Ludwig, 1993). As a consequence of the limitations of these approaches, attempts to  
74 manage CPRs have often failed (Acheson, 2006).

75 Commons and their users form SESs, which are composed of different, relatively separable,  
76 subsystems that interact in a complex and, sometimes, unknown way (Ostrom, 2009). The  
77 inherent complexity of SESs requires an integrated approach to predict the outcomes of  
78 management strategies (Ostrom, 2007). However, we do not yet have analytical tools to  
79 accurately predict these outcomes (Agrawal, 2014), especially in data-poor circumstances.  
80 These systems are difficult to study empirically, because the scope for experimental work is  
81 limited and replication, control and randomisation are difficult to achieve (Hilborn and Ludwig,  
82 1993). Therefore, a simulation approach could offer insights on the outcomes of different  
83 management regimes. However, little is known about the relationships between the ecological  
84 and socio-economic components of these systems and, often, we cannot quantify important

85 variables in the model. Qualitative approaches have proven advantageous to model complex  
86 systems in data-poor circumstances (Metcalf et al., 2014).

87 Recreation is one of the cultural ecosystem services that the environment provides. Tourism is  
88 often a primary income for local communities, it can dominate national economies and play a  
89 key role in nations' macroeconomics (O'Connor et al., 2009). While nature-based tourism has  
90 been welcomed by conservation and environmental organisations as an eco-friendly  
91 alternative to other consumptive activities, such as hunting and fishing (Tisdell and Wilson,  
92 2002), there is growing evidence that nature-based tourism, if not managed properly, can have  
93 negative effects on the environment (Meletis and Campbell, 2007; Pirodda and Lusseau, 2015).  
94 Therefore, the issue of managing nature-based tourism becomes a CPR issue.

95 In this study, we tested the sustainability of management regimes on qualitative  
96 representations of nature-based tourism SESs using Loop Analysis (Puccia and Levins, 1985).  
97 SESs are subjected to press-pulse dynamics (Collins et al., 2011) and in order to understand  
98 what drives their sustainability we need to investigate their responses to both press and pulse  
99 perturbations. Pulse perturbations are sudden events, such as droughts or fire, which rapidly  
100 alter the state of the system, while press perturbations are sustained and slow, such as climate  
101 change or economic growth. A pulse event temporarily "shakes" the system, while a press  
102 disturbance slowly pushes it away from its current state. We define sustainability in terms of  
103 responses of the SES to pulse and press perturbations. For each different management  
104 strategy applied to a simple nature-based tourism system we asked three questions: 1) Does  
105 the system's equilibrium lose stability after a pulse perturbation? Stability is the ability of a  
106 system to return to its previous state after a perturbation. A stable system offers more  
107 predictability and reliability of management interventions, because it is less likely to shift to a  
108 different state after a sudden event. We assessed this property of the system using qualitative

109 stability criteria. 2) Under which conditions could the system remain stable? A sensitivity  
 110 analysis of the stability criteria can identify the key drivers of system's stability, in other words,  
 111 which components of the system could be modified to shift the system from being  
 112 dysfunctional and unstable to being functional and reliable. 3) How does the system behave  
 113 after a press perturbation? For example, during the development of a nature-based tourism  
 114 destination, how will the different components of this system respond to an increase in the  
 115 number of tourists using the area? If this positive press perturbation does not result in  
 116 environmental degradation, or a reduction in the number of users or in the tourism capital,  
 117 then the SES can maintain environmental quality, social justice and economic profitability, in  
 118 other words, triple bottom line (TBL) sustainability (Elkington, 1998). In this study, social  
 119 justice is intended as access to the resource by the community of users: if responses to press  
 120 perturbations predict that some users will be excluded from the resource we considered the  
 121 system to be unjust. For a system to be sustainable it needs to be stable to pulse perturbations  
 122 and have potential to keep TBL sustainability in presence of a press disturbance in any of its  
 123 components.

## 124 **2. Materials and Methods**

### 125 2.1. Property rights scenarios

126 In the resource management literature property is mainly considered as owned or affected by  
 127 private individuals, local communities or governments (Acheson, 2006; Hoffmann, 2013). In  
 128 this study we consider an open access scenario in which there are no rules governing property  
 129 rights, and scenarios where property rights are owned by a central authority or the local  
 130 community of users. In order to represent both marine and terrestrial systems, we do not  
 131 consider private property, which is often not possible in a marine context where boundaries  
 132 are difficult to define and wildlife is highly mobile. Some studies have highlighted the

133 importance of nesting and institutional variety in governance structures (Dietz et al., 2003),  
 134 showing how mixed strategies can determine the success of CPRs (Pirotta and Lusseau, 2015).  
 135 Following these studies we considered hybrid scenarios, where property rights are shared  
 136 between the users and a third party. Within these property rights regimes we also considered  
 137 different management tools.

138 The scenarios are represented as signed digraphs (Fig. 1). The nodes represent the variables in  
 139 the system. The links connecting the nodes represent the qualitative relationships between  
 140 the variables. Positive relationships (an increase in the first variable produces an increase in  
 141 the abundance of the second variable) are represented by links with an arrow-end, while the  
 142 links with a circle-end represent negative relationships. Links that start and end on the same  
 143 variable are called self-effects, and they represent self-regulation (e.g. density dependence) or  
 144 reliance on factors external to the modelled system.

145 *2.1.1. Open access-* This scenario (Fig. 1a) describes an unregulated system where access and  
 146 use of the resource are unregulated. This core model builds on previous work on sustainable  
 147 tourism by (Casagrandi and Rinaldi, 2002); the equations presented by Casagrandi and Rinaldi  
 148 were converted into a signed digraph and all the following scenarios are derived from this core  
 149 model by adding feedbacks representing governance structures. This simple model represents  
 150 all main system components: tourists (T), the capital (C), intended as structures available for  
 151 tourism activities, and the environment (E). The users of the resource are the tour operators  
 152 that offer, for example, wildlife watching trips or guided walks. In this model the resource  
 153 users are included in the variable C. All the links to the variable T (Fig. 1) represent the  
 154 attractiveness of the site; tourists are attracted by the presence of amenities and  
 155 environmental quality, while the attractiveness of the site decreases with overcrowding. The  
 156 infrastructure degrades and investment is needed to renew it. Tourists generate revenues that

are invested in new infrastructures. Tourism infrastructures, such as hotels, vehicles for wildlife or sightseeing tours, roads etc., negatively impact the environment as do the tourists (Casagrandi and Rinaldi, 2002). The environment is assumed to have a carrying capacity with density-dependence effects (Casagrandi and Rinaldi, 2002) and it is not assumed to be in pristine conditions in absence of tourism. Therefore the environment exploited by human activities is kept far from its carrying capacity and will exhibit a positive self-regulation. We do not assign magnitudes to the effects just described and, therefore, they can range from negligible, to very strong ones.

*2.1.2. State ownership* – We built different state-ownership property rights scenarios by adding a variable for state intervention (S) to the open access model (Fig. 1b). We developed three scenarios. State intervention is stimulated by a reduction in environmental quality in all the models and the state always implements measures to improve environmental quality. This negative loop between S and E represents an adaptive management strategy. The subsidies scenario (pink dashed line in Fig. 1b) represents a situation in which the state subsidises the industry to build new infrastructures. In the licensing scenario (blue dash-dotted line in Fig. 1b), the state holds property rights on the resource and limits the expansion of the infrastructure by issuing licences to a restricted number of users. In the access fee scenario (Fig. 1b, yellow dotted line), state intervention controls the number of tourists allowed in the area (e.g., entrance fee for a national park).

*2.1.3. User group ownership* – In these two scenarios (Fig. 1c) property rights are owned by the users' group, which becomes an explicit variable in the model, U. Users have the right to access, use and manage the resource, exclude other individuals from the resource and have alienation rights. The positive links from T to U and from U to C represent this alienation right; according to the flow of tourists, the users can decide to retain or sell their right to access, use

181 and manage the resource, thus increasing or decreasing the number of structures available to  
182 the tourists (for example the number of boats available for trips). In the second scenario the  
183 users also implement an adaptive management strategy, represented by the negative  
184 feedback loop between E and U (green dotted lines in Fig. 1c): a decrease in environmental  
185 quality stimulates an intervention from the users that will improve the health of the  
186 environment.

187 *2.1.4. Hybrid* – In the hybrid scenarios (Fig. 1d) property rights are shared between the users’  
188 group and a third party. The users still have access, use, exclusion and alienation rights, but the  
189 government (Fig. 1d, orange dotted lines) or an agency funded by the users (Fig. 1d, green  
190 dashed lines) is in charge of monitoring and managing environmental quality. The first model  
191 represents a situation where the government is required to monitor the environment, often  
192 because of international agreements on environmental quality. In the second model, the tour  
193 operators fund the environmental monitoring and management themselves, for example by  
194 paying an environmental agency.

## 195 2.2 Loop Analysis

196 Here we briefly describe the theory of Loop Analysis (Puccia and Levins, 1985). Model  
197 construction can start with the signed digraph (Fig.1). In the graph, a path is defined as a series  
198 of links starting at one variable and ending on another without crossing any variables twice  
199 while a set of links that starts and ends at the same variable is called a loop. Loops in the same  
200 system are defined as either conjunct or disjunct: two conjunct loops have at least one variable  
201 in common (in Fig.1a the self-loop of E and the loop between E and T), while two disjunct loops  
202 have no variables in common (in Fig.1a the self-loop of E and the loop between T and C). The  
203 qualitative relationships represented in the graph can be entered into a matrix:

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & \cdots & a_{1n} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ a_{n1} & \cdots & a_{nn} \end{bmatrix} \quad (1)$$

where element  $a_{ij}$  represents the effect of variable  $j$  on variable  $i$ . The matrix represents qualitative relationships (negative, positive or 0), without specifying the magnitude of the effects (Fig.1a).

### 2.2.1 Stability to pulse perturbations

Stability of loop models is assessed by examining the system's feedback. A feedback loop can be positive or negative according to the product of its links. The loop between T and C in Fig. 1a is positive ( $a_{CT} * a_{TC} = (+1) * (+1) = +1$ ) while the one between T and E is negative ( $a_{TE} * a_{ET} = (+1) * (-1) = -1$ ). A system adequately regulated by negative feedback is stable because after any perturbation, negative feedback will bring the system back to its original state. A system has multiple feedback paths of different lengths, called feedback levels: within an ecological system there will be feedback paths of length two, such as predator-prey relationships, and feedbacks of length three, such as two predators competing for the same prey. The feedback levels of a system range from 1 to the total number of variables and feedback at each level  $k$  is calculated as the sum of all the loops of length  $k$  plus the products of disjunct loops that have combined length  $k$ .

$$F_k = \sum_{m=1}^k (-1)^{m+1} L(m, k) \quad (2)$$

The notation  $L(m, k)$  means the product of  $m$  disjunct loops of combined length  $k$ . For example  $L(2, 4)$  means the product of two disjunct loops of combined length 4 (the product of two disjunct length-two loops or one self-loop multiplied by one length-three loop).  $m$  goes from 1 to a maximum of  $k$  because feedback at higher levels is composed of a combination of feedbacks at lower levels plus longer pathways and the number of disjunct loops  $m$  cannot exceed  $k$ . If  $k = 3$ ,  $m$  can go from 1 to 3 because the system can have one loop of length three,

227 two disjunct loops of combined length three, such as a self-loop and a length-two loop, and  
 228 three self-loops of combined length three, but it cannot have 4 disjunct loops of combined  
 229 length three. The term  $(-1)^{(m+1)}$  is a sign adjusting factor that tells us that if the number of  
 230 disjunct loops ( $m$ ) multiplied together is even, then their product is multiplied by -1. This is to  
 231 avoid that an even number of negative loops multiplied together give a positive feedback  
 232 term.

233 The first feedback level for the system described in Fig. 1a is given by the sum of all the self-  
 234 loops:

$$\begin{aligned} 235 \quad F_1 &= \sum_{m=1} (-1)^{(1+1)} * L(1, 1) \\ 236 \quad &= [1 * (-a_{TT})] + [1 * (-a_{CC})] + [1 * (a_{EE})] \\ 237 \quad &= -1 - 1 + 1 \\ 238 \quad &= -1 \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

239 The second feedback level for the system described in Fig. 1a is given by the sum of all the  
 240 length-two loops (the loops between T and C and between T and E) plus the products of all the  
 241 pairwise combinations of self-loops:

$$\begin{aligned} 242 \quad F_2 &= [\sum_{m=1} (-1)^{(1+1)} * L(1, 2)] + [\sum_{m=2} (-1)^{(2+1)} * L(2, 2)] \\ 243 \quad &= [1 * (a_{TC} * a_{CT}) + 1 * (a_{TE} * a_{ET})] + [-1 * (a_{EE}) * (-a_{TT}) + (-1) * (-a_{TT}) * (-a_{CC}) + (-1) * \\ 244 \quad &(-a_{CC}) * a_{EE}] \\ 245 \quad &= 1 - 1 + 1 + 1 - 1 \\ 246 \quad &= 1 \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

247 The third and last feedback level is given by the length-three loop (between E, T and C), plus  
 248 the products of all the combinations of disjunct length-one and length-two loops (for example  
 249 the self-loop of C and the loop between E and T) plus the product of the three self-loops:

$$\begin{aligned} 250 \quad F_3 &= [\sum_{m=1} (-1)^{(1+1)} * L(1, 3)] + [\sum_{m=2} (-1)^{(2+1)} * L(2, 3)] + [\sum_{m=3} (-1)^{(3+1)} * L(3, 3)] \\ 251 \quad &= [1 * (-a_{EC} * a_{TE} * a_{CT})] + [-1 * a_{EE} * (a_{TC} * a_{CT}) + (-1) * (-a_{CC}) * (a_{TE} * a_{ET})] + [1 * (-a_{TT}) \\ 252 \quad &* (-a_{CC}) * (a_{EE})] \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= -1 - 1 - 1 + 1 \\ &= -2 \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Loop Analysis considers two criteria for stability, the Routh-Hurwitz criteria (Hurwitz, 1895; Routh, 1877). The first criterion states that feedback at all levels is negative (Routh, 1877). According to this criterion the system described in Fig. 1a is unstable because  $F_2$  is positive (Eq. 4). The second criterion depends on feedback at lower levels of the system being stronger than feedback at higher levels. This is because a system dominated by higher-level feedback tends to overcorrect and any disturbance will be amplified through increasing oscillations. This second criterion is satisfied by the Hurwitz determinants (Hurwitz, 1895) being positive:

$$F_1 * F_2 + F_3 > 0. \tag{6}$$

Eq. 6 defines the second Hurwitz determinant, which is used as second condition for stability for loop models with three and four variables (Puccia and Levins, 1985). For the system in Fig. 1a the third Hurwitz determinant is  $(-1) * 1 + (-2) = -3$ . Hence, the open access system in Fig. 1a is unstable according to the both stability criteria. For loop models with five variables the formula for the third Hurwitz determinant applies:

$$-(F_1 * F_2 + F_3) * F_3 + (F_1 * F_4 + F_5) * F_1 > 0 \tag{7}$$

It is also possible to conduct a sensitivity analysis of each feedback level and Hurwitz determinant to each element in the matrix (Hosack et al., 2009). In other words, which direct effects in the system are crucial to obtain a negative feedback and a positive Hurwitz determinant? The procedure counts how many times each direct effect in the model appears in stabilising (negative for feedback levels, positive for Hurwitz determinants) and destabilising (positive for feedback levels, negative for Hurwitz determinants) elements (feedback cycles) in the calculation of Hurwitz determinants or feedback levels and divides it by the total number of feedback cycles in which the same direct effect appears. The index takes values from -1 to 1;

for sensitivities of feedback levels, values close to -1 indicate that the direct effect appears only in stabilising feedback cycles, a value of 0 indicates that the direct effect appears in the same number of stabilising and destabilising feedback cycles, while a value close to +1 indicates that the direct effect has a highly destabilising effect on the system. The opposite is true for sensitivities of Hurwitz determinants. For the feedback level calculated in Eq. 5, the direct effect  $a_{EE}$  appears in two feedback cycles, one negative or stabilising ( $-1 * (a_{EE}) * (a_{TC} * a_{CT})$ ) and one positive or destabilising ( $1 * (-a_{TT}) * (-a_{CC}) * (a_{EE})$ ). Therefore, the sensitivity index of the feedback at level three to the self-loop of E is:  $(1 - 1)/2 = 0$ . For a detailed description of this method see (Hosack et al., 2009).

For each of the systems described in section 2.1 we used the Routh-Hurwitz criteria to determine whether the system's equilibrium was stable or unstable to pulse perturbations. Given the qualitative nature of the relationships described in the models, equations 2, 6 and 7 may have uncertain results due to the sum of positive and negative quantities with no specified magnitude. For example, equation 4 could have a negative result if the magnitude of the negative feedback terms was bigger than the magnitude of the positive ones. We built 10000 quantitative matrices, drawing values for the relationships between variables from random uniform distributions ( $a_{ij} \sim U(0, 1)$ ) keeping the same sign pattern as the original qualitative model. This allowed us to explore different combinations of the relative strengths of the links in the system. In other words, we simulated 10000 different quantitative systems that could exist in the real world and asked how many of these could be stable. We repeated the stability analysis on these matrices and the proportion of quantitative systems that met the stability criteria was used as a measure of the system's potential for stability. Secondly, we conducted the sensitivity analysis (Hosack et al., 2009) of the stability criteria to identify which relationships in the system predominantly drive the scope for the system to achieve sustainability.

## 302 2.2.2 Responses to press perturbations

303 For any loop model with  $n$  variables there are  $n$  possible points of entry for a press  
 304 perturbation, one for each variable; a table of predictions can be built to show the direction of  
 305 the response of each variable to a press perturbation acting on itself or on any other variable.  
 306 The matrix of predictions is given by the adjoint of the system's matrix. Each prediction  
 307 represents the change in the equilibrium value (\*) of a variable  $X_j$  due to a change in the  
 308 parameter  $c$  that regulates the growth or the level of activity of a variable  $X_i$ .

$$309 \quad \frac{\partial X_j^*}{\partial c} = \frac{\sum_{i,j} \left( \frac{\partial X_i}{\partial c} \right) (p_{ij}) (F^{comp})}{F_n} \quad (5)$$

310 Each prediction is the result of the sum of all direct and indirect paths ( $p_{ij}$ ) from the perturbed  
 311 variable ( $X_i$ ) to the response variable ( $X_j$ ) multiplied by the direction of the change in the  
 312 perturbed variable  $\left( \frac{\partial X_i}{\partial c} \right)$  and by the feedback of their complementary subsystems (the  
 313 subsystems of variables and links not included in a given path;  $F^{comp}$ ), divided by the overall  
 314 feedback of the system ( $F_n$ ).

315 Each element in the sum can be positive, negative or 0 and the magnitudes of the effects are  
 316 not specified. Therefore, the prediction can have a certain degree of sign indeterminacy that  
 317 can range from completely undetermined to uncertain predictions. Each prediction in the  
 318 adjoint matrix can be weighted by the total number of cycles contributing to it, which is called  
 319 the absolute feedback; the ratio between the absolute value of each element of the adjoint  
 320 matrix and the corresponding value of absolute feedback gives the weighted-prediction matrix  
 321 (Dambacher et al., 2002). Weighted predictions are a measure of uncertainty and range from 0  
 322 to 1; values near 0 represent predictions that are highly indeterminate, while values of 1  
 323 indicate that the prediction is completely reliable in terms of its sign. For each of the  
 324 governance systems previously described, we used these predictions and their associated

325 uncertainty to investigate how a tourism SES under different management scenarios will  
326 respond to a press perturbation.

327 The R package “LoopAnalyst” (Dinno, 2013; R Core Team, 2015) was used for conducting  
328 stability analysis and producing prediction tables, while sensitivity analysis was conducted in  
329 MATLAB (version 8.3.0.532, release 2014a, The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts,  
330 United States). R and MATLAB code are available as online supporting information (Appendices  
331 A & B respectively).

### 332 **3. Results**

#### 333 3.1. Potential and conditions for stability to pulse perturbations

334 None of the systems was unconditionally stable (Table 1). The two users’ group ownership  
335 scenarios presented the highest potential for stability, followed by the open-access scenario;  
336 after a pulse perturbation, these systems have the highest chance to go back to their  
337 equilibrium state. A tourism SES under all the other scenarios has a good chance to be  
338 displaced from its equilibrium state after a small perturbation and either move to a different  
339 equilibrium, or present oscillatory instability (Levins, 1974; Puccia and Levins, 1985).

340 Sensitivity analysis showed that the self-effect of E was consistently destabilising in all the  
341 scenarios (Appendix C). The environment needs to be at or close to its carrying capacity, where  
342 its rate of change is at its minimal. The positive loop between T and C was also crucial in  
343 determining stability in all the scenarios (Appendix C). In order for the system to be stable,  
344 infrastructures should not be a strong attractor for tourists and only a small proportion of  
345 tourists’ revenues should be reinvested in building new infrastructure.

346 Some management strategies were destabilising for the system. In the subsidies scenario, the  
347 state intervention to subsidise the industry decreased potential for stability (Table C.2), while

348 in the other two state ownership scenarios, the limiting strategies put in place by the  
349 government (licences and access fee) stabilised the system by creating negative feedback  
350 (Tables C.3 and C.4). However, the second stability criteria was usually sensitive to these  
351 negative links (Tables C.3 and C.4); these strategies tend to create long negative feedbacks that  
352 can potentially overwhelm short ones, thus decreasing potential for stability.

353 In both the users' group ownership and the hybrid scenarios, the positive path from T to C  
354 through U, which represents the users' alienation right, was crucial in determining stability  
355 (Tables C.5, C.6, C.7 and C.8). These links add positive feedback to the system, which tends to  
356 move the system away from its equilibrium state after a perturbation; however, they also  
357 create positive long feedbacks that counterbalance negative short ones, thus decreasing the  
358 probability of oscillatory instability of the system after a perturbation (Puccia and Levins,  
359 1985).

360 The adaptive management strategy implemented by the government (state ownership and  
361 first hybrid scenarios; Tables C.2, C.3, C.4 and C.7), the users (second user group ownership  
362 scenario; Table C.6) or by the agency funded by the users (second hybrid scenario; Table C.8)  
363 to maintain environmental quality always increased the potential for stability.

### 364 3.2. Predictions and Triple Bottom Line sustainability

365 The open access scenario did not present any potential for TBL sustainability; most of the  
366 predictions (Table 2) showed negative responses of the variables to positive press  
367 perturbations to the system.

368 In the three state ownership scenarios, the environment did not respond to any press  
369 perturbation in the system, except for perturbations to S (Table 3). State intervention acted as  
370 a buffer of the environment, absorbing all the press perturbations that enter the system  
371 (Puccia and Levins, 1985). This result highlights the importance of an adaptive strategy to

372 natural resource management. Only the subsidies scenario was not compatible with the  
 373 concept of TBL sustainability, while a licencing scenario offered scope for the industry to grow  
 374 sustainably (Table 3). However, in this scenario, it is uncertain how the capital will respond to  
 375 an increase in the number of tourists. There are two ways T can influence C (Fig. 1b, blue dash-  
 376 dotted line): the direct effect is positive, while the indirect path is negative (an increase in T  
 377 has a negative effect on E, which will stimulate S to reduce C). When the direct positive  
 378 feedback cycle is stronger than the indirect negative one, the response of the capital will be  
 379 positive and TBL sustainability achievable. This condition is opposite to the conditions for  
 380 stability; among the simulated quantitative systems, most of the stable ones showed a  
 381 negative response of C to increases in T, even though positive responses were also possible  
 382 (Fig.D.1). This indicates that TBL sustainability is possible, but very difficult to achieve in a  
 383 licencing scenario. The same was true for the response of T to an increase in C in the “access  
 384 fee” scenario (Table 3). An expansion of infrastructure might degrade the environment, which  
 385 will lead the government to restrict the access to the area from the tourists by increasing the  
 386 access fee. If the tourists are strongly attracted by the infrastructure and the response of the  
 387 government is not too strong, the number of tourists might not decline, but the system will be  
 388 unstable to pulse perturbations.

389 Group property rights regimes, which showed higher resilience to pulse perturbations, had no  
 390 potential for TBL sustainability (Table 4). In the first scenario, there is a high number of  
 391 negative responses to positive inputs to the system. The second scenario showed a very high  
 392 degree of indeterminacy (values of weighted feedback  $< 0.5$  (Dambacher et al., 2003)) and  
 393 some negative responses, which means that TBL sustainability is not likely to be achieved.  
 394 In contrast, the two hybrid scenarios had predictions compatible with the concept of TBL  
 395 sustainability. There was only one negative response in the first scenario (Table 5): following

an increase in state intervention, the environment could degrade. This counter-intuitive response was uncertain (weighted feedback = 0.3; Table 5). Moreover, the conditions for this response to be positive were the same as the conditions for stability and this response was always positive in quantitatively stable systems (Fig.D.2a). The undetermined predictions of the response of users to an increase in the number of users could potentially be a problem for social justice. If the negative self-loops of T, C and U are weaker than the positive loop between T and C, then the number of users decreases, with a potential for monopolisation. This condition is never satisfied in stable systems, so the response of U to inputs to U is always positive in stable systems and TBL sustainability achieved (Fig.D.2b). The second scenario showed more uncertainty (Table 5). An increase in tourism structures gave an undetermined response of the capital itself. Conditions for this response to be positive were the same as conditions for stability and the capital always responded positively to positive inputs to the capital in quantitative stable systems (Fig.D.3a). The same was true for the response of the environment and users to an increase in users (Fig. D.3b & c) and the response of the environment to an increase in the management effort of the agency (Fig.D.3c). These responses were always positive in quantitative stable systems. Therefore, this scenario has the potential to be sustainable according to the TBL sustainability concept in presence of conditions for stability to pulse perturbations.

#### 4. Discussion

A qualitative approach to SESs modelling provided a way to test alternative governance structures and assess whether they would influence the sustainability of nature-based tourism. SESs are subjected to press-pulse dynamics (Collins et al., 2011) and in order to predict the outcomes of different management strategies we need to investigate their responses to both press and pulse perturbations. In order to be sustainable, a SES needs to be resilient to pulse

420 perturbations and, in presence of a press change, such as economic growth, the system needs  
421 to maintain TBL sustainability.

422 Here we showed that in instances when nature-based tourism systems can be considered  
423 exploiting a common good (Pirodda and Lusseau, 2015) then they are most likely to be  
424 unstable, regardless of the management strategy adopted. We confirm the results from  
425 previous studies (Casagrandi and Rinaldi, 2002) that showed that in open access tourism SESs,  
426 sustainability is often at risk because small perturbations can have dramatic effects. We  
427 generalise this finding to the main governance structures available for common goods. A small  
428 pulse perturbation can potentially drive the system away from its equilibrium and either move  
429 it to a new, unknown, state or cause oscillations. This is an unfavourable property, because it  
430 makes the SES, on which many livelihoods depend on, unreliable and vulnerable to any  
431 disturbance.

432 However, all the systems tested in this study had some potential for local stability to pulse  
433 perturbations, which means that by modifying some variables in the system, a reliable and  
434 resilient tourism SES is achievable. First, it is important to understand what attracts tourists to  
435 a site, because a strong demand for tourism infrastructures is very likely to lead to instability.  
436 Secondly, in order to maintain stability, a higher proportion of the tourism revenues should be  
437 invested in renewing old infrastructures, instead of investing in new ones. Thirdly, the  
438 exploited common resource needs to be maintained in a state where its rate of change is  
439 minimal; for example, keeping a wildlife population close to its carrying capacity. The self-  
440 enhancing effect that results from the resource being exploited to the point that it is far from  
441 its 'pristine' abundance/density strongly affects the resilience of the system. This result agrees  
442 with many studies that have discouraged the application of the Maximum Sustainable Yield  
443 (MSY) concept in the management of harvested populations and ecosystems, on the basis that

444 it would lead to extinction of some species instead of guaranteeing a sustainable use (Geček  
445 and Legović, 2012).

446 Some management scenarios exhibited higher potential for stability than others. However, this  
447 potential for stability to pulse perturbations did not always correspond to the potential for  
448 sustainable development of the industry. For instance, open access and user group ownership  
449 scenarios showed the highest potential for stability (Table 1), but they had no potential to  
450 achieve TBL sustainability (Tables 2 & 4). In open access commons, overexploitation of the  
451 resource happens because the perceived benefits of overuse are always higher than the  
452 perceived losses (Hardin, 1968) and users have no incentives to invest in the resource or  
453 conserve it for the future (Acheson, 2006). Therefore, without any regulation, a CPR is doomed  
454 to degradation and human activities to failure. Local knowledge of user groups can confer  
455 more resilience to user-managed SESs (Berkes et al., 2003), but it does not guarantee  
456 sustainable growth (Table 4) (Ostrom, 1990).

457 State ownership scenarios were very sensitive to pulse perturbations (Table 1), but two of  
458 them offered a better outlook for TBL sustainability. The licensing and the access fee scenario  
459 could potentially lead to a stable system that has scope for sustainable growth, but this  
460 outcome was possible only in a very narrow range of parameter space. Conditions for stability  
461 (Appendix C) contrasted with conditions for TBL sustainability (Table 3), therefore only a few  
462 quantitative stable systems had scope for sustainable growth (Fig. D.1). A high rate of  
463 investment of tourists' revenues into infrastructures would assure an increase in the tourism  
464 capital following an increased affluence of tourists, which is a good prediction in terms of  
465 economic viability of the industry and employment opportunities. However, this condition  
466 would make the system unstable, so vulnerable to any small perturbation. A negative response  
467 of the capital to an increase in the number of tourists could be a problem in terms of social

468 justice; a high number of tourists could result in a decrease in environmental quality, for  
 469 example due to littering, pollution or excessive disturbance on the wildlife. This would cause  
 470 the government to reduce the number of licenses available to the tour operators, which would  
 471 exclude some of them from the industry. These results indicate that it might be very difficult to  
 472 find a balance between all these conditions and design effective rules, for example deciding  
 473 how many licences should be issued or the price of the access fee (Acheson, 2006). Since  
 474 perfectly designed management strategies are rarely achieved, sustainable development in  
 475 SESs governed by centralised institutions is possible only by trading off some of the system's  
 476 robustness to pulse perturbations.

477 Nonetheless, locally user-defined market-based strategies can fail too. The alienation right,  
 478 represented in our models by the positive links between T, U and C (Fig. 1c & d), was highly  
 479 destabilising for the system (Appendix C). Introducing positive feedback into the system  
 480 contributed to destabilisation. Previous studies have suggested that simple strategies, where  
 481 the market or the government alone have complete control over the resource, often fail and  
 482 that a combination of different institutional arrangements creates better conditions for  
 483 sustainable governance (Dietz et al., 2003; Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Pirotta and Lusseau, 2015). We  
 484 showed that in a management regime where property rights and responsibilities are shared  
 485 between the users and a third party there is a good potential for sustainable development of  
 486 the industry (Table 5). In these strategies, users still retain their rights of access and use,  
 487 exclusion and alienation, but the management of the resource is left to the government (Fig.  
 488 1d, orange dotted lines) or an external agency funded by the users (Fig. 1d, green dashed  
 489 lines). These scenarios are very sensitive to pulse perturbations, which means that there is a  
 490 narrow range of parameter space where these systems can be sustainable and grow. However,  
 491 sustainability is achievable by careful tuning of the relative strengths of the relationships in  
 492 these systems. A nature-based tourism SES where there is a low demand for tourism

493 infrastructure, a low reinvestment rate of tourists' revenues into new infrastructure and a  
 494 healthy environment could be sustainable in presence of press-pulse dynamics under a hybrid  
 495 governance regime.

496 Using an integrated qualitative approach that takes into account economic profitability,  
 497 environmental quality and a form of social justice, we have identified which management  
 498 regimes have the highest potential for sustainability, and the conditions necessary for them to  
 499 achieve it. We agree with Ostrom's Law that one-size-fits-all solutions fail in most real  
 500 situations. This happens because SESs are highly unstable and sustainability is only possible in  
 501 very narrow regions of parameter space. We have showed that some management strategies  
 502 have higher potential for sustainability than others, but each strategy must be carefully tuned  
 503 to each particular situation. Although our models of a tourism-based system are extremely  
 504 simplified, they are representative of all the main components of Ostrom's conceptual map  
 505 (Ostrom, 2007): resource system, users, governance system and their interactions. More  
 506 detailed SESs can now be explored, by unpacking these highest-tier conceptual variables  
 507 (Ostrom, 2007). We propose that this qualitative approach can be a powerful diagnostic tool to  
 508 identify variables and their combinations that affect sustainability of different governance  
 509 systems in common-pool resource management.

## 510 **Acknowledgments**

511 This work was funded by the University of Aberdeen and Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) and  
 512 their support is gratefully acknowledged. We thank MASTS (the Marine Alliance for Science  
 513 and Technology for Scotland) for their role in funding this work and B. Leyshon and F. Manson  
 514 (SNH) for fruitful discussion.

## 515 **References**

516 Acheson, J.M., 2006. Institutional Failure in Resource Management. *Annu. Rev. Anthropol.* 35,

117–134. doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.35.081705.123238

Agarwal, A., 2014. Studying the commons, governing common-pool resource outcomes: Some concluding thoughts. *Environ. Sci. Policy* 36, 86–91. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2013.08.012

Berkes, F., Colding, J., Folke, C., 2003. Navigating social-ecological systems: building resilience for complexity and change. Cambridge University Press.

Casagrandi, R., Rinaldi, S., 2002. A Theoretical Approach to Tourism Sustainability. *Conserv. Ecol. Online* 6(1):13.

Collins, S.L., Carpenter, S.R., Swinton, S.M., Orenstein, D.E., Childers, D.L., Gragson, T.L., Grimm, N.B., Morgan, G.J., Harlan, S.L., Kaye, J.P., Knapp, A.K., Kofinas, G.P., Magnuson, J.J., McDowell, W.H., Melack, J.M., Ogden, L. a., Philip, R.G., Smith, M.D., Whitmer, A.C., 2011. An integrated conceptual framework for long-term social-ecological research. *Front. Ecol. Environ.* 9, 351–357. doi:10.1890/100068

Dambacher, J.M., Li, H.W., Rossignol, P. a., 2002. Relevance of community structure in assessing indeterminacy of ecological predictions. *Ecology* 83, 1372–1385. doi:10.1890/0012-9658(2002)083[1372:ROCSIA]2.0.CO;2

Dambacher, J.M., Li, H.W., Rossignol, P.A., 2003. Qualitative predictions in model ecosystems. *Ecol. Modell.* 161, 79–93. doi:10.1016/S0304-3800(02)00295-8

Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., Stern, P.C., 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. *Science* (80-. ). 302, 1907–1912. doi:10.1126/science.1091015

Dinno, A., 2013. LoopAnalyst: A collection of tools to conduct Levins’ Loop Analysis.

Elkington, J., 1998. Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business. New Society Publishers.

Geček, S., Legović, T., 2012. Impact of maximum sustainable yield on competitive community.

540 J. Theor. Biol. 307, 96–103. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.04.027

541 Hardin, G., 1968. The tragedy of the commons. *Science* (80-. ). 162, 1243–1248.

542 Hilborn, R., Ludwig, D., 1993. The limits of applied ecological research. *Ecol. Appl.* 3, 550–552.

543 Hoffmann, S., 2013. Property, possession and natural resource management: towards a

544 conceptual clarification. *J. Institutional Econ.* 9, 39–60. doi:10.1017/S1744137412000264

545 Hosack, G.R., Li, H.W., Rossignol, P. a., 2009. Sensitivity of system stability to model structure.

546 *Ecol. Modell.* 220, 1054–1062. doi:10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2009.01.033

547 Hurwitz, A., 1895. On The Conditions Under Which an Equation Has Only Roots With Negative

548 Real Parts. *Math. Annalen* 65, 273–284.

549 Levins, R., 1974. Discussion paper: The qualitative analysis of partially specified systems. *Ann.*

550 *N. Y. Acad. Sci.* 231, 123–128. doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.1974.tb20562.x

551 Meinzen-Dick, R., 2007. Beyond panaceas in water institutions. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.*

552 104, 15200–15205. doi:10.1073/pnas.0702296104

553 Meletis, Z. a., Campbell, L.M., 2007. Call It Consumption! Re-Conceptualizing Ecotourism as

554 Consumption and Consumptive. *Geogr. Compass* 1, 850–870. doi:10.1111/j.1749-

555 8198.2007.00048.x

556 Metcalf, S.J., Dambacher, J.M., Rogers, P., Loneragan, N., Gaughan, D.J., 2014. Identifying key

557 dynamics and ideal governance structures for successful ecological management.

558 *Environ. Sci. Policy* 37, 34–49. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2013.07.005

559 O'Connor, S., Campbell, R., Cortez, H., Knowles, T., 2009. Whale watching worldwide Tourism

560 numbers , expenditures and expanding economic benefits, a special report from the

561 International Fund for Animal Welfare. Yarmouth MA, USA.

562 Ostrom, E., 2009. A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems.

563 Science (80-. ). 325, 419–422. doi:10.1126/science.1172133

564 Ostrom, E., 2007. A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S.

565 A. 104, 15181–15187. doi:10.1073/pnas.0702288104

566 Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.

567 Cambridge university press.

568 Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C.B., Norgaard, R.B., Policansky, D., 1999. Revisiting the Commons:

569 Local Lessons, Global Challenges. Science (80-. ). 284, 278–282.

570 doi:10.1126/science.284.5412.278

571 Ostrom, E., Janssen, M.A., Anderies, J.M., 2007. Going beyond panaceas. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.

572 U. S. A. 104, 15176–15178. doi:10.1073/pnas.0701886104

573 Pirotta, E., Lusseau, D., 2015. Managing the wildlife tourism commons. Ecol. Appl. 25, 729–

574 741. doi:10.1890/14-0986.1

575 Puccia, C.J., Levins, R., 1985. Qualitative Modeling of Complex Systems: An Introduction to

576 Loop Analysis and Time Averaging. Harvard University Press.

577 R Core Team, 2015. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. R Found. Stat.

578 Comput. Vienna Austria.

579 Routh, E.J., 1877. A Treatise on the Stability of a Given State of Motion: Particularly Steady

580 Motion. Macmillan and Company.

581 Tisdell, C., Wilson, C., 2002. Ecotourism for the survival of sea turtles and other wildlife.

582 Biodivers. Conserv. 11, 1521–1538. doi:10.1023/A:1016833300425

583

584

## 585     **Figure captions**

586     Fig. 1. Signed digraph of all the scenarios tested. The nodes represent the variables in the  
 587     model. T: tourists; C: capital; E: environment; S: state intervention; U: users; A: external  
 588     agency. The links connecting the nodes represent the relationships between the variables:  
 589     arrow-ended links indicate positive relationships, circle-ended links represent negative  
 590     relationships. The links starting and terminating on the same variable represent self-effects. a)  
 591     Signed digraph of the open access scenario and its matrix representation. Each entry in the  
 592     matrix corresponds to a link in the graph. b) State ownership scenarios. The pink (dashed), blue  
 593     (dash-dotted) and yellow (dotted) links represent the three alternative scenarios, respectively,  
 594     subsidies, licencing and access fee. c) User group ownership scenarios. The first scenario is  
 595     represented by the black links, while the second scenario includes the green dotted links  
 596     representing the adaptive management of the environment. d) Hybrid scenarios. In the first  
 597     scenario the government intervenes to monitor and manage environmental quality (orange  
 598     dotted lines), in the second one users invest in an external agency to monitor and manage  
 599     environmental quality (green dashed lines). For detailed description of the models see text.

600

601 Table 1. Potential for stability for all the models expressed as the proportion of quantitatively  
602 specified systems that met all stability criteria

Model	Potential for stability
Open access	10.48%
Subsidies	4.24%
Licensing	7.98%
Access fee	7.17%
User group ownership 1	21.42%
User group ownership 2	18.72%
Hybrid 1	5%
Hybrid 2	2%

603

604

605 Table 2. Predictions of responses to press perturbations for the open access scenario. In  
 606 response to an increase in the column variable, the equilibrium value of the variable in the  
 607 corresponding row either increased (orange), decreased (purple/striped), or we could not  
 608 determine the response qualitatively (white). T: tourists; C: capital; E: environment

Responses	Inputs to		
	T	C	E
T			
C			
E			

609

610

Table 3. Predictions of responses to press perturbations for state ownership scenarios. The equilibrium value of the variable in the corresponding row either increased (orange), decreased (purple/striped), or was not affected (white, crossed) in response to an increase in the column variable. Some responses could not be determined qualitatively (white) and for ambiguous responses (shaded orange or purple/striped) we provide values of weighted feedback. Values of 0.5 give a sign determination that exceeds 90% (Dambacher, Li & Rossignol 2003). T: tourists; C: capital; E: environment; S: state intervention

Responses	Inputs to			
<i>Subsidies</i>	T	C	E	S
T				(0.3)
C				(0.3)
E				(0.5)
S				(0.5)
<i>Licensing</i>	T	C	E	S
T				
C				(0.3)
E				(0.5)
S				(0.5)
<i>Access fee</i>	T	C	E	S
T				
C				
E				(0.5)
S				(0.5)

618

619 Table 4. Predictions of responses to press perturbations for users' group ownership scenarios.




620 The equilibrium value of the variable in the corresponding row either increased (orange) or  
 621 decreased (purple/striped) in response to an increase in the column variable. Some responses  
 622 could not be determined qualitatively (white) and for ambiguous responses (shaded orange or  
 623 purple/striped) we provide values of weighted feedback. Values of 0.5 give a sign  
 624 determination that exceeds 90% (Dambacher, Li & Rossignol 2003). T: tourists; C: capital; E:  
 625 environment; U: users

Responses	Inputs to			
<i>Scenario 1</i>	T	C	E	U
T				
C				
E			(0.3)	
U				(0.5)
<i>Scenario 2</i>	T	C	E	U
T	(0.3)	(0.3)		(0.3)
C			(0.3)	(0.3)
E	(0.5)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.5)
U	(0.3)		(0.3)	(0.5)

626

Table 5. Predictions of responses to press perturbations for hybrid scenarios. The equilibrium value of the variable in the corresponding row either increased (orange), decreased (purple/striped), or was not affected (white, crossed) in response to an increase in the column variable. Some responses could not be determined qualitatively (white) and for ambiguous responses (shaded orange or purple/striped) we provide values of weighted feedback. Values of 0.5 give a sign determination that exceeds 90% (Dambacher, Li & Rossignol 2003). T: tourists, C: capital, E: environment, U: users, A: external agency

Responses	Inputs to				
<i>Scenario 1</i>	T	C	E	U	S
T					
C					
E					(0.3)
U					
S			(0.3)		(0.7)
<i>Scenario 2</i>	T	C	E	U	A
T					
C					
E					(0.3)
U					
A	(0.5)		(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.7)

**a****b****c****d**