RT Journal Article SR Electronic T1 The Evolution of covert Signaling JF bioRxiv FD Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory SP 132407 DO 10.1101/132407 A1 Paul E. Smaldino A1 Thomas J. Flamson A1 Richard McElreath YR 2017 UL http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2017/04/30/132407.abstract AB Human sociality depends upon the benefits of mutual aid and extensive communication. However, mutual aid is made difficult by the problems of coordinating diverse norms and preferences, and communication is harried by substantial ambiguity in meaning. Here we demonstrate that these two facts can work together to allow cooperation to develop, by the strategic use of deliberately ambiguous signals: covert signaling. Covert signaling is the transmission of information that is accurately received by its intended audience but obscured when perceived by others. Such signals may allow coordination and enhanced cooperation while also avoiding the alienation or hostile reactions of individuals with different preferences. Although the empirical literature has identified potential mechanisms of covert signaling, such as encryption in humor, there is to date no formal theory of its dynamics. We introduce a novel mathematical model to assess the conditions under which a covert signaling strategy will evolve, as well as how signaling strategies coevolve with receiver attitudes. We show that covert signaling plausibly serves an important function in facilitating within-group cooperative assortment by allowing individuals to pair up with similar group members when possible and to get along with dissimilar ones when necessary. This mechanism has broad implications for theories of signaling and cooperation, humor, social identity, political psychology, and the evolution of human cultural complexity.