Detailed description of the media used in Figure 1. We used four different types of media: (A) iron-supplemented casein medium (Casein + Fe). This medium does not require pyoverdine production to reach WT levels of growth yields as *pvdS* grows to similar levels as WT (Figure 1A). Elastase production is necessary for optimal growth in this medium to digest casein. Growth of the *lasR* mutant is severely impaired in this medium (Figure 1A). Similar media have been typically used in sociomicrobiology studies involving WT and lasR [1-3]. (B) iron-depleted CAA medium (CAA + Transferrin). This medium does not require elastase production to reach WT levels of growth yields as *lasR* grows to similar levels as WT (Figure 1B). However, iron depletion by addition of apo-transferrin causes pyoverdine production to be required for optimal growth levels as *pvdS*, which does not produce pyoverdine (Figure S2B, Figure S2F), has growth deficiency in this medium (Figure 1B). Similar media have been typically used in sociomicrobiology studies involving WT and pvdS [4-21]. (C) iron-depleted casein medium (Casein + Transferrin). We prepared a medium specifically designed to combine the requirement of both elastase and pyoverdine production. Elastase production is required in this medium as the sole carbon and nitrogen source is casein. Human apotransferrin is used to deplete the iron and consequently pyoverdine production is observed (Figure S2C, Figure S2G). The requirement of both elastase and pyoverdine for optimal growth in this medium is demonstrated by the fact that both *lasR* and *pvdS* monocultures show growth deficiencies (Figure 1C). (D) iron-supplemented CAA medium (CAA + Fe). This medium does not require either elastase or pyoverdine production for optimal growth as both amino acids and iron are provided. This is demonstrated by the fact that the growth levels of all three strains in monoculture are very similar in this medium, indicating that neither the *pvdS* and *lasR* genes (and therefore elastase and pyoverdine) are required to reach the optimal growth yields of the WT (Figure 1D).

In all the experiments in this study, OD_{600} , CFU/ml, total pyoverdine concentration (Abs₄₀₅), frequency measurements, and the passages to fresh media are taken at 48 hours after inoculation in all four types of media described above. This time point allows cultures to reach stationary phase in each of the four media.

Differences in growth yields for WT across the different media. We observed lower growth yields of the WT in the medium where only pyoverdine is required (Figure 1B), compared to conditions where the two traits are necessary (Figure 1C). A plausible explanation for this difference relies on the potential difference in iron content between the

two media; the casamino acids (CAA) used (BD, Ref: 223050) is low in iron according to both manufacturer and previous studies [22], whereas casein has iron-chelating capacity [23,24] and therefore is expected to have higher iron concentration. Thus, although all iron depleted media were supplemented with the same amount of transferrin (100 μ g/ml), the iron availability is expected to be lower in the media containing CAA than in the media containing casein. Indeed, we observed that the pyoverdine production per cell is higher in the medium where only pyoverdine is necessary than in conditions where both traits are required (see below, Figure S2 panels G and H), which is consistent with having different iron availability in the two media.



Figure S1 (Related to Figure 2). Relative fitness of *lasR* and *pvdS* in WT+*pvdS*+*lasR* triple cocultures calculated in respect to the rest of the population (as in Figure 2), or to only WT, or to only the other mutant. Relative fitness (*v*) of *lasR* (red circles in A, C, E, and G), or *pvdS* (blue squares in B, D, F, and H), calculated in respect to WT+*pvdS*, WT, and *pvdS* after 48 hours of incubation of WT+*pvdS*+*lasR* triple co-cultures in: (A and B) iron-supplemented casein medium (Casein + Fe), (C and D) iron-depleted casamino acids medium (CAA + Transferrin), (E and F) irondepleted casein medium (Casein + Transferrin), and (G and H) iron-supplemented casamino acids medium (CAA + Fe). Initial ratios of the strains in WT+*pvdS*+*lasR* triple co-culture are 8:1:1. Dotted lines indicate *v*=1. Relative fitness values above the dotted lines (*v*>1) indicate that the strain is cheating and below the dotted lines (*v*<1) indicate that the strain is being cheated. Onesample t-test was used to determine whether each dataset is significantly different than 1 (significance symbols are located above the dotted line when *v*>1 and below the dotted line when *v*≤1). Each data point indicates an individual biological replicate (N≥5) and horizontal lines indicate the means of each group. ns=not significant P>0.05, * P≤0.05, ** P≤0.01, *** P≤0.001.



Figure S2 (Related to Figures 1 and 2). Total and relative pyoverdine (PVD) concentrations in WT, *pvdS*, and *lasR* monocultures after 48 hours of incubation in different media. Total PVD concentrations (Abs₄₀₅) in **(A)** iron-supplemented casein medium, **(B)** iron-depleted CAA medium, **(C)** iron-depleted casein medium, **(D)** iron-supplemented CAA medium. Relative PVD concentrations (PVD concentration per cell, Abs₄₀₅/OD₆₀₀), **(E)** in iron-supplemented casein medium, **(F)** in iron-depleted CAA medium, **(G)** in iron-depleted casein medium, **(H)** in iron-supplemented CAA medium. (For comparisons, Kruskal-Wallis test with Dunn's correction was used; ns=not significant, P>0.05; for all experiments N=6; b.d.: below detection). The total PVD concentrations are similar in both iron-depleted CAA **(B)**, and iron-depleted casein **(F)** media however, in iron-depleted CAA media WT and *lasR* produce more PVD per cell (Abs₄₀₅/OD₆₀₀). This higher energy spent per cell in the production of PVD might contribute to the lower biomass observed in iron-depleted CAA media compared to iron-depleted casein media (Figure 1).

Methods for pyoverdine concentration: PVD concentration measurements are done after 48 hours of growth in 37°C shaker by centrifuging the cells at 14000 r.p.m. for 4 minutes (Eppendorf Centrifuge 5418) and collecting the supernatant, measuring their absorbance at 405nm (Abs₄₀₅) in optical cuvettes as 1:10 dilutions with PBS solutions in a Thermo Spectronic Helios δ spectrophotometer.



Figure S3 (Related to Figure 3). Decrease in population size caused by *pvdS* domination. (A) Effect of the initial frequency of *pvdS* in co-cultures with WT, on the overall growth yields of the population. Each blue square represents one short term competition (48 hours) in iron-depleted casein media (Casein + Transferrin). Initial frequencies of pvdS are shown in the 'X' axis (curve indicates the log regression of these short term competitions). Red diamonds show the OD₆₀₀ measurements and matching inoculum frequencies of pvdS mutant from different co-cultures of the 18th day of the experiment shown in Figure 3D. Mann-Whitney two-tailed test of OD₆₀₀ values of the cultures with 3% WT and 97% pvdS vs. 100% WT, P=0.1316; and OD₆₀₀ of the cultures with 2% WT and 98% pvdS vs 100% WT, P<0.05. This comparison allows us to conclude that at frequencies above 97% of *pvdS* a significant decrease in population densities is observed. Propagations of WT+pvdS (B), and WT+pvdS+lasR cultures (C) in iron-depleted casein media. 'X' axes show the days of propagation and 'Y' axes represent the frequency of each strain (the initial frequencies are shown at day 0). (B) Frequency changes of WT (purple bars) and pvdS (blue bars) in WT+pvdS co-cultures shown as stacked bars (N=6, Means ± SD) (right 'Y' axes) and the growth yields (CFUs/ml) of 6 biological replicates are shown as black lines (left 'Y' axes). (C) Frequency changes of WT (purple bars), pvdS (blue bars), and lasR (red bars) in WT+pvdS+lasR co-cultures shown as stacked bars (N=6, Means ± SD) (right 'Y' axes) and the growth yields (CFUs/ml) of 6 biological replicates are shown as black lines (left 'Y' axes).



Figure S4 (Related to Figures 3 and 4). Propagations of WT+*lasR* and WT+*pvdS*+*lasR* co-cultures in medium where none of the traits are required, iron-supplemented CAA medium (CAA + Fe). (A) WT and *lasR* co-culture initially mixed (9:1) in iron-supplemented CAA medium. (B) WT, *pvdS*, and *lasR* co-culture initially mixed (8:1:1) in iron-supplemented CAA medium. 'X' axes show the days of propagations to fresh media. 'Y' Axes show the growth yields as OD_{600} at each time point, each colored line indicates one propagated culture (N=6), dash lines indicate the monoculture WT growth yields in the same medium (mean=3.57, ±SD=0.357, N=6).



Figure S5 (Related to Figures 4 and 6). Frequency-dependent selection for *pvdS* **and** *lasR.* The change in relative fitness of either mutant in relation to their initial frequencies in co-culture with WT in iron-depleted or iron-supplemented casein media for *pvdS* (blue circles) or *lasR* (red squares), respectively. These results show that the cheating magnitudes of both mutants are frequency dependent, however, the effect of the initial frequency to their relative fitness values differ drastically. The cheating behavior of these two mutants is different, while *pvdS* cheats even at very high frequencies (~97%), *lasR* ceases to cheat at frequencies above ~85%. 'X' axis shows the frequencies of *pvdS* or *lasR* in the beginning of the competition with WT. 'Y' axis shows the relative fitness values of *pvdS* or *lasR* over WT after 48h of incubation. Lines indicate linear regressions; slopes of the lines are significantly different). Red and blue dots indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the corresponding lines. The gray dotted line indicates no change in relative fitness (no cheating, relative fitness=1).

Mathematical Model 1 - Simple 3-way public goods model

We define the fitness of a cooperator and two cheaters mixed in an environment where the two traits that these mutants cheat on are necessary as:

$$\omega_{coop} = \omega_0 + b_1 \left(1 - p_{ch1} \right) + b_2 \left(1 - p_{ch2} \right) - c_1 - c_2 \tag{1}$$

$$\omega_{ch1} = \omega_0 + b_1 (1 - p_{ch1}) + b_2 (1 - p_{ch2}) - c_2$$
(2)

$$\omega_{ch2} = \omega_0 + b_1 \left(1 - p_{ch1}\right) + b_2 \left(1 - p_{ch2}\right) - c_1 \tag{3}$$

The change in the mean fitness is given by:

$$\overline{\omega} = \sum_{i} p_{i}(t) \omega_{i} = \omega_{0+} p_{coop}(t) \omega_{coop} + p_{ch1}(t) \omega_{ch1} + p_{ch2}(t) \omega_{ch2}$$
(4)

$$= \omega_{0+} (b_1 - c_1) (1 - p_{ch1}(t)) + (b_2 - c_2) (1 - p_{ch2}(t))$$
(5)

As can be seen from the fitness definitions (equations (1), (2), and (3)) of these three players, the cheaters always have a higher fitness than the cooperator due to the costs (c_1 or c_2) saved. Assuming a homogeneous environment, and ignoring stochastic effects, the population changes according to the replicator equation system:

$$dp_{coop} / dt = p_{coop}(t) (\omega_{coop} - \overline{\omega}) = p_{coop}(t) (-c_1 p_{ch1}(t) - c_2 p_{ch2}(t))$$
(6)

$$dp_{ch1} / dt = p_{ch1}(t) (\omega_{ch1} - \overline{\omega}) = p_{ch1}(t) (c_1 (1 - p_{ch1}(t)) - c_2 p_{ch2}(t))$$
(7)

$$dp_{ch2}/dt = p_{ch2}(t) (\omega_{ch2} - \overline{\omega}) = p_{ch2}(t) (c_2 (1 - p_{ch2}(t)) - c_1 p_{ch1}(t))$$
(8)

As shown in Figure 5A, the predicted mean fitness ($\overline{\omega}$) and final frequencies of the different strains in the population assuming different c_1/c_2 ratios. It can be easily seen that cooperators will always go extinct, and that the two cheaters can only co-exist when $c_1 = c_2$.

Whenever $c_1 \neq c_2$, then the cheater that produces the more costly trait will lose. Therefore, the relation between c_1 and c_2 determines which cheater will dominate the population, independently of the benefits (b_1 and b_2) of these cooperative traits. On the other hand, the mean fitness, $\overline{\omega}$, is affected by the difference between *b* and *c* values of each trait.

We note that this theoretical analysis assumes infinite population, and the effects of fluctuating population size and of bottlenecks [25], which occur in the experimental populations at each passage, are beyond the scope of this simple model. Nevertheless, when full dominance of a cheater is predicted to occur, one would expect that, in a finite population, its yield will be lower than that of the WT monoculture and will be set by the values of the benefits b_1 or b_2 .

For the simulation of the four scenarios corresponding to the conditions in Figure 3 (Figure S6A-D), in panels (A) and (C), the cooperator for both traits (WT) and the cheater of the 1st cooperative trait compete ($p_{coop}(0) = 0.9$ and $p_{ch1}(0) = 0.1$), while the cheater of the 2nd cooperative trait is absent ($p_{ch2}(0)=0$), whereas in panels (B) and (D) all three strains compete $(p_{coop}(0) = 0.8 \text{ and } p_{ch1}(0) = p_{ch2}(0) = 0.1)$. In panels (A) and (B), only the 1st cooperative trait is necessary $(b_1 > c_1 > 0)$, whereas $b_2 = c_2 = 0)$, while in panels (C) and (D) both traits are required ($c_2 > c_1 > 0$ and $b_1 > b_2 > 0$). The mean fitness, $\overline{\omega}$, of the entire population (shown as black lines in Figure 7 and Figure S6) as is a function of b and c values which are the biomass gain due to benefiting from the cooperative action (b), and the energy spent to the cooperative action (c). The time scale of the simulations is arbitrary, but since the cumulative number of cell divisions depends on the environment, the simulated time was higher in the iron-supplemented casein media (Casein + Fe) than iron-depleted casein media (Casein + Transferrin) [26,27]. The cumulative number of cell divisions was estimated from the final number of cells in the competitions in Figure 2. For the same time period (48 hours after inoculation) the cumulative number of cell divisions was significantly higher in medium where only elastase was required (Casein + Fe) than in conditions when both traits are necessary (Casein + Transferrin) (Figure 1 and Figure 3). ω_0 , b_1 , and b_2 are chosen to reflect the growth yields in Figure 1.

Mathematical Model 2 - Simple 3-way public goods model including quorum sensing

We modelled the effect of quorum sensing (QS) on fitness equations by assuming a Hill function where the cost (c_1) and benefit (b_1) of the 1st cooperative trait are sharply reduced when the frequency the cheater for the 1st cooperative trait (p_{ch1}) reaches a given threshold value (*th*), as:

$$\omega_{coop} = \omega_0 + b_1 \left(1 - p_{ch1}\right) \left(1 / \left(1 + \left(p_{ch1} / th\right)^n\right)\right) + b_2 \left(1 - p_{ch2}\right) - c_1 \left(1 / \left(1 + \left(p_{ch1} / th\right)^n\right)\right) - c_2 \quad (9)$$

$$\omega_{ch1} = \omega_0 + b_1 \left(1 - p_{ch1}\right) \left(1 / \left(1 + \left(p_{ch1} / th\right)^n\right)\right) + b_2 \left(1 - p_{ch2}\right) - c_2 \tag{10}$$

$$\omega_{ch2} = \omega_0 + b_1 \left(1 - p_{ch1} \right) \left(1 / \left(1 + \left(p_{ch1} / th \right)^n \right) \right) + b_2 \left(1 - p_{ch2} \right) - c_1 \left(1 / \left(1 + \left(p_{ch1} / th \right)^n \right) \right)$$
(11)

The dynamics of mean fitness, which we also plot in the Figure 7, is given by:

$$\overline{\omega} = \omega_{0+} \left(\left(b_1 - c_1 \right) \left(1 - p_{ch1}(t) \right) / \left(1 / \left(1 + \left(p_{ch1} / th \right)^n \right) \right) \right) + \left(b_2 - c_2 \right) \left(1 - p_{ch2}(t) \right)$$
(12)

In this case, fixation of one mutant can only happen if $c_1 < c_2$. When $c_1 \ge c_2$, both cheaters can co-exist in the population (Figure 5B).

As shown in Figure 7, the simulations of the modified model including QS for the four experimental conditions used here predict accurately the frequency dynamics. Figure S6E-I represent the predictions, according to our model, of other possible scenarios with different relationships between the costs, which can be tested experimentally in the future.

Table S1	(Related to	Figures 5	and 7) -	Model	Parameters
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Symbols	Descriptions		
	a state stat		
C ₁	Cost of the 1 st cooperative trait		
C ₂	Cost of the 2 nd cooperative trait		
b ₁	Benefit gained from the 1 st cooperative trait		
b ₂	Benefit gained from the 2 nd cooperative trait		
ω	Fitness without the additional fitness effects of the cooperative traits (basal fitness)		
ω_{coop}	Fitness of the cooperator of the both cooperative traits		
ω _{ch1}	Fitness of the cheater of the 1 st cooperative trait		
ω _{ch2}	Fitness of the cheater of the 2 nd cooperative trait		
$\overline{\omega}$	Mean fitness of the entire population (A proxy for OD ₆₀₀ or CFUs/ml)		
p _{coop}	Frequency of the cooperator of the both cooperative traits in the entire population		
p _{ch1}	Frequency of the cheater of the 1 st cooperative trait in the entire population		
p _{ch2}	Frequency of the cheater of the 2 nd cooperative trait in the entire population		
	Parameters considered only in the model with QS (Mathematical Model 2)		
th	Quorum threshold (as a function of the non-QS strain frequency)		
n	Hill coefficient for the slope of the inhibition of the QS-regulated public good		

When only the cooperator of both cooperative traits (e.g. WT) and the cheater of the 2^{nd} cooperative trait (which is not regulated by QS, e.g. *pvdS*) are in competition, the cheater wins and reaches fixation as in the triple co-culture scenario. The results are the same whether the 1^{st} cooperative trait is regulated by QS, or not (Figure S6E); and the final mean fitness becomes:

$$\overline{\omega} = \omega_0 + b_1 - c_1 \tag{13}$$

When only two cheaters are in competition (1:1), the cheater that saves the greater cost (here, the cheater of the 2^{nd} cooperative trait since $c_2 > c_1$) wins the competition and reaches fixation regardless of QS regulation of the 1^{st} cooperative trait (Figure S6F), and the final mean fitness becomes:

$$\overline{\omega} = \omega_0 + b_1 - c_1 \tag{14}$$

When the cooperator of the both cooperative traits (e.g. WT) is competing with two mutants under conditions where the costs of both traits are equal ($c_1=c_2$), both cheaters increase in frequency until both of them reach 50% of the population (Figure S6G), similarly with or without QS regulation of the 1st cooperative trait, and the final mean fitness becomes:

$$\overline{\omega} = \omega_0 + \frac{1}{2} \left(b_1 + b_2 - c_1 - c_2 \right) \tag{15}$$

When the cooperator of the both cooperative traits (e.g. WT) is competing with two mutants under conditions where the $c_1 > c_2$, then the more drastic tragedy-inducing cheater becomes the winner of the 3-way competition. In this case, when the 1st cooperative is not regulated by QS, the cheater of the 1st cooperative trait wins the 3-way competition causing a drastic collapse (Figure S6H); and the final mean fitness becomes:

$$\overline{\omega} = \omega_0 + b_2 - c_2 \tag{16}$$

However, when the 1^{st} cooperative trait is regulated by QS, the cheater of the 1^{st} cooperative trait, while it still wins the competition, it only increases in frequency until the QS threshold (*th*=0.8) and thus, cannot reach fixation (Figure S6I); and the mean final fitness becomes:

$$\overline{\omega} = \omega_0 + (b_1 - c_1) (0.4) + (b_2 - c_2) (0.8)$$
(17)

As a result, the cooperator of the both cooperative traits (e.g. WT) persists in the population. Therefore, presumably, the population has a greater chance to recover if the

environmental conditions change. In conclusion, the QS regulation becomes relevant only under conditions where the mutant for the QS-regulated trait (here the cheater of the 1st cooperative trait) is not completely outcompeted.



Figure S6 (Related to Figures 5 and 7). Simulations of alternative scenarios by using Mathematical Model 1 and 2. (A), (B), (C), and (D) are the simulations of the four scenarios of Figure 3, as in Figure 7 but without quorum sensing regulation of the 1st cooperative trait. (E) Simulation with two strains, full cooperator (WT) + cheater for the 2nd cooperative trait, under conditions where both public goods are produced and $c_2 > c_1$. (F) Simulation with the two cheaters competing with each other, under conditions where both public goods are produced and $c_2 > c_1$. (G) Simulation for a 3-way competition with the cooperator of the both cooperative traits competing with two cheaters, under conditions where both public goods are produced and $c_2=c_1$. (H) and (I) are the simulation for a 3-way competition with the cooperator of the both cooperative traits competing with two cheaters, without and with quorum sensing regulation of the 1st cooperative trait, respectively, under conditions where both public goods are produced and $c_1 > c_2$. Axes are the same as in Figure 7. The values that are given to the parameters of the simulations are: (A) $p_{coop}(0)=0.9$, $p_{ch1}(0)=0.1$, pch2(0)=0, $c_1=0.01$, $b_1=3.4$, $c_2=0$, $b_2=0$, $\omega_0=0.2$; (B) $p_{coop}(0)=0.8$, $p_{ch1}(0)=0.1$, $p_{ch2}(0)=0.1$, $c_1=0.01$, $b_1=3.4$, $c_2=0$, $b_2=0$, $\omega_0=0.2$; (C) $p_{coop}(0)=0.9$, $p_{ch1}(0)=0.1, p_{ch2}(0)=0, c_1=0.01, b_1=1.5, c_2=0.025, b_2=0.25, \omega_0=0.1;$ (D) $p_{coop}(0)=0.8, p_{ch1}(0)=0.1, c_1=0.01, c_2=0.025, c_2=0.025, c_2=0.025, c_3=0.025, c_4=0.01;$ $p_{ch2}(0)=0.1, c_1=0.01, b_1=1.5, c_2=0.025, b_2=0.25, \omega_0=0.1;$ (E) $p_{coop}(0)=0.9, p_{ch1}(0)=0, p_{ch2}(0)=0.1, c_1=0.01, c_2=0.025, c_2=0.025, c_2=0.025, c_3=0.025, c_4=0.025, c_5=0.025, c_$ $c_1=0.01$, $b_1=1.5$, $c_2=0.025$, $b_2=0.25$, $\omega_0=0.1$. The results are the same regardless if the 1st is considered to be regulated by QS (n=30, th=0.8) or not (n=0, th=0); (F) $p_{coop}(0)=0$, $p_{ch1}(0)=0.5$, $p_{ch2}(0)=0.5$, $c_1=0.01$, $b_1=1.5$, $c_2=0.025$, $b_2=0.25$, $\omega_0=0.1$. The results are the same regardless if the 1^{st} is considered to be regulated by QS (n=30, th=0.8) or not (n=0, th=0); (G) $p_{coop}(0)=0.8$, $p_{ch1}(0)=0.1$, $p_{ch2}(0)=0.1$, $c_1=0.025$, $b_1=1.5$, $c_2=0.025$, $b_2=0.25$, $\omega_0=0.1$. The results were the same regardless if QS regulation for the 1^{st} cooperative trait is considered (*n*=30, *th*=0.8) or not (*n*=0, th=0); (H) $p_{coop}(0)=0.8$, $p_{ch1}(0)=0.1$, $p_{ch2}(0)=0.1$, $c_1=0.04$, $b_1=1.5$, $c_2=0.025$, $b_2=0.25$, $\omega_0=0.1$, n=0, th = 0; (I) same as in (H) except n=30 and th=0.8, as QS regulation is considered for the 1st cooperative trait. Note that the values of parameters used in these simulations are chosen to reflect approximately the relation between the values observed in Figure 1, Figure 2.

Supplementary Methods

Bacterial strains. The strains used in this study were Pseudomonas aeruginosa WT strain PA01, PA01 *lasR* mutant harboring a gentamycin resistant gene inserted in *lasR* (*lasR::GmR*) [28], and PA01 pvdS mutant harboring a gentamycin resistance gene replacing the pvdS coding sequence (Δ*pvdS::GmR*) [29]. As the WT and *lasR* strains (which are isogenic) come from a different source than the *pvdS* strain and in the light of the recent work by Harrison and colleagues describing the remarkable heterogeneity among lab strains typically used in P. aeruginosa sociomicrobiology studies [30], we constructed a new pvdS deletion mutant using the WT strain used in this study as background (isogenic also with the lasR mutant) (see detailed description for the construction of the $\Delta pvdS::StrR$ below). This allowed us to determine whether there is a difference between the *pvdS* and the other two strains (WT and *lasR* strains) and to assess if there are any possible effects on the phenotypes described in this study. As shown in Figure S7, the growth yields of the newly constructed mutant, $\Delta pvdS::StrR$, were not significantly different from the pvdS mutant used throughout our work (referred in Figure S7 as Δ*pvdS::GmR*) for any of the media used (Figure S7A-D). We have also determined the cheating capacity of the $\Delta pvdS::StrR$ against the WT, in the same conditions used in Figure 2 (Figure S7E-H). The cheating capacity of the Δ*pvd*S::StrR was not significantly different from the pvdS mutant used throughout our work (Figure S7). In agreement with the results presented throughout the present study both pvdS mutants increase in frequency in the media where pyoverdine is required but have no advantage against the WT in the media supplemented with iron. Moreover, $\Delta pvdS::StrR$ had no pyoverdine production in all four media as $\Delta pvdS::GmR$.

Construction of a $\Delta pvdS::StrR$ mutant. We constructed a *pvdS* mutant by allelic replacement [31] of the *pvdS* coding sequence by a cassette containing the genes *strA* and *strB*, conferring resistance to streptomycin in the WT strain used in this study. Briefly, the *strAB* cassette from pKNG101, and approximately 700bp of the sequences upstream and downstream from the *pvdS* coding sequence (from WT PAO1) were amplified using primers ORB338, ORB339, ORB340, ORB341, ORB342, and ORB360. These PCR products were restricted, ligated and cloned in the vector pUC18 as a unique fragment *pvdS(5')-strAB-pvdS(3')*. This fragment was then cloned in the suicide vector pKNG101 [31], replacing the *strAB* cassette originally present in the vector, using the primers ORB344 and ORB345, and generating the plasmid pOZ1. Then pOZ1 was introduced into the WT PAO1 strain by tri-

parental conjugation [32–34], using *E. coli* λ pir (lab stock) and the helper plasmid pRK2013 [34,35], causing the insertion of the entire pOZ1 at the *pvdS* locus by a single site-specific recombination. Then, cells where a second site-specific recombination event causing the excision of pOZ1 occurred, were selected by plating on medium containing sucrose (to counterselect the *sacB* gene carried by pOZ1) and streptomycin (to select recombinants harbouring the version of *pvdS* replaced by *strAB*). The resulting strains were checked to carry the right $\Delta pvdS::strAB$ construction by PCR with primers ORB367 and ORB368.

List of primers

ORB338ATAGGATCCGCAGGCAGAACAATTGCAGORB339ATAGGATCCTTGCAGCAGATGCCCTACORB340TATACTAGTAGGCATAGGCTTGGTTATGCORB341TATACTAGTCTGATCTTCAGATCCTCTACGCORB342AAAACTAGTCAACGTCACCCATCTCAGORB360TTTACTAGTGACAGTTGTTCCGACATGORB367CAGAGCGCTTTCCCATGATCGORB368CGCCGATTACGTCAGGCATC



Figure S7 (Related to Materials and Methods – Bacterial strains). The growth yields and cheating capacities of the newly constructed $\Delta pvdS::StrR$ mutant are not different from the $\Delta pvdS::GmR$ used in this study. (A), (B), (C), and (D) are the growth yields (OD₆₀₀) comparisons of the monocultures of pvdS mutant ($\Delta pvdS::GmR$) (blue squares) used in this study and the newly constructed pvdS mutant ($\Delta pvdS::StrR$) (green squares) in iron-supplemented casein (A), iron-depleted CAA (B), iron-depleted casein (C), and iron-supplemented CAA media (D). (E), (F), (G), and (H), are the relative fitness values of each mutant from the competitions between WT and $\Delta pvdS::GmR$ (blue squares) (with the initial frequencies of 9:1), and between WT and $\Delta pvdS::StrR$ (green squares) (with the initial frequencies of 9:1) in the same media as in (A), (B), (C), and (D), respectively.

Supplemental References:

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