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The Evolution of Power and the Divergence of Cooperative Norms

Michael D. Makowsky, Paul E. Smaldino
doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/004416
Michael D. Makowsky
1Center for Advanced Modeling in the Social, Behavioral, and Health Sciences, Department of Emergency Medicine, Johns Hopkins University, 5801 Smith Ave, Suite 3220, Davis Building, Baltimore, MD 21209 USA
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Paul E. Smaldino
1Center for Advanced Modeling in the Social, Behavioral, and Health Sciences, Department of Emergency Medicine, Johns Hopkins University, 5801 Smith Ave, Suite 3220, Davis Building, Baltimore, MD 21209 USA
2Department of Anthropology, University of California, Davis, 1 Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616 USA
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Abstract

We consider a model of multilevel selection and the evolution of institutions that distribute power in the form of influence in a group’s collective interactions with other groups. In the absence of direct group-level interactions, groups with the most cooperative members will outcompete less cooperative groups, while within any group the least cooperative members will be the most successful. Introducing group-level interactions, however, such as raiding or warfare, changes the selective landscape for groups. Our model suggests that as the global population becomes more integrated and the rate of intergroup conflict increases, selection increasingly favors unequally distributed power structures, where individual influence is weighted by acquired resources. The advantage to less democratic groups rests in their ability to facilitate selection for cooperative strategies – involving cooperation both among themselves and with outsiders – in order to produce the resources necessary to fuel their success in inter-group conflicts, while simultaneously selecting for leaders (and corresponding collective behavior) who are unburdened with those same prosocial norms. The coevolution of cooperative social norms and institutions of power facilitates the emergence of a leadership class of the selfish and has implications for theories of inequality, structures of governance, non-cooperative personality traits, and hierarchy. Our findings suggest an amendment to the well-known doctrine of multilevel selection that “Selfishness beats altruism within groups. Altruistic groups beat selfish groups.” In an interconnected world, altruistic groups led by selfish individuals can beat them both.

Footnotes

  • ↵* We thank Robert Axelrod, Robert Axtell, Brett Calcott, Joshua Epstein, Richard McElreath, Peter Richerson, Matthew Zimmerman, workshop participants from the Institute for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Society at Chapman University, and conference participants at ASREC 2013 for comments. This project was supported by a Joshua Epstein’s NIH Director’s Pioneer Award (DP1OD003874). Java Code for the model is available from the authors upon request.

Copyright 
The copyright holder for this preprint is the author/funder, who has granted bioRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. It is made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license.
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Posted January 29, 2015.
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The Evolution of Power and the Divergence of Cooperative Norms
Michael D. Makowsky, Paul E. Smaldino
bioRxiv 004416; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/004416
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The Evolution of Power and the Divergence of Cooperative Norms
Michael D. Makowsky, Paul E. Smaldino
bioRxiv 004416; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/004416

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