Skip to main content
bioRxiv
  • Home
  • About
  • Submit
  • ALERTS / RSS
Advanced Search
New Results

A signal detection theoretic demonstration of hiring rate asymmetries in competitive academic job markets

Michael Miuccio, Ka-yuet Liu, Hakwan Lau, Megan A. K. Peters
doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/061200
Michael Miuccio
1Department of Psychology, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, 90095-1563, United States
  • Find this author on Google Scholar
  • Find this author on PubMed
  • Search for this author on this site
Ka-yuet Liu
2Department of Sociology, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, 90095 United States
3California Center of Population Research, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, 90095, United States
  • Find this author on Google Scholar
  • Find this author on PubMed
  • Search for this author on this site
Hakwan Lau
1Department of Psychology, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, 90095-1563, United States
4Brain Research Institute, University of California Los Angeles Los Angeles, California, 90095, United States
  • Find this author on Google Scholar
  • Find this author on PubMed
  • Search for this author on this site
Megan A. K. Peters
1Department of Psychology, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, 90095-1563, United States
  • Find this author on Google Scholar
  • Find this author on PubMed
  • Search for this author on this site
  • Abstract
  • Full Text
  • Info/History
  • Metrics
  • Supplementary material
  • Preview PDF
Loading

Abstract

To get a faculty job, graduating doctoral students have to substantially outperform their peers, given the competitive nature of the academic job market. In an ideal, meritocratic world, factors such as prestige of degree-granting university ought not to play a substantial role. However, it has recently been reported that top-ranked universities produced about 2–6 times more faculty than did universities that were ranked lower (Clauset, Arbesman, and Larremore 2015), necessitating un-meritocratic factors: how could students from top-ranked universities be six times more productive than their peers from lower-ranked universities? Here we present a signal detection model to demonstrate that substantially higher rates of faculty production need not require substantially (and unrealistically) higher levels of student productivity. Instead, it is a high hiring threshold due to keen competition that causes small difference in average student productivity between universities to result in manifold differences in placement rates. Under this framework, the previously reported results are compatible with a purely meritocratic system. As a simple proof of concept, we examined the association between university ranking and the impact factors of students publications from a small selected sample of psychology departments in the U.S. The results are in agreement with our theoretical model. Whereas these results do not necessarily mean that the actual faculty hiring market is purely meritocratic, they highlight the difficulty in empirically demonstrating that it is not so.

Copyright 
The copyright holder for this preprint is the author/funder, who has granted bioRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. All rights reserved. No reuse allowed without permission.
Back to top
PreviousNext
Posted February 16, 2017.
Download PDF

Supplementary Material

Email

Thank you for your interest in spreading the word about bioRxiv.

NOTE: Your email address is requested solely to identify you as the sender of this article.

Enter multiple addresses on separate lines or separate them with commas.
A signal detection theoretic demonstration of hiring rate asymmetries in competitive academic job markets
(Your Name) has forwarded a page to you from bioRxiv
(Your Name) thought you would like to see this page from the bioRxiv website.
CAPTCHA
This question is for testing whether or not you are a human visitor and to prevent automated spam submissions.
Share
A signal detection theoretic demonstration of hiring rate asymmetries in competitive academic job markets
Michael Miuccio, Ka-yuet Liu, Hakwan Lau, Megan A. K. Peters
bioRxiv 061200; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/061200
Reddit logo Twitter logo Facebook logo LinkedIn logo Mendeley logo
Citation Tools
A signal detection theoretic demonstration of hiring rate asymmetries in competitive academic job markets
Michael Miuccio, Ka-yuet Liu, Hakwan Lau, Megan A. K. Peters
bioRxiv 061200; doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/061200

Citation Manager Formats

  • BibTeX
  • Bookends
  • EasyBib
  • EndNote (tagged)
  • EndNote 8 (xml)
  • Medlars
  • Mendeley
  • Papers
  • RefWorks Tagged
  • Ref Manager
  • RIS
  • Zotero
  • Tweet Widget
  • Facebook Like
  • Google Plus One

Subject Area

  • Scientific Communication and Education
Subject Areas
All Articles
  • Animal Behavior and Cognition (4237)
  • Biochemistry (9147)
  • Bioengineering (6786)
  • Bioinformatics (24020)
  • Biophysics (12137)
  • Cancer Biology (9544)
  • Cell Biology (13795)
  • Clinical Trials (138)
  • Developmental Biology (7642)
  • Ecology (11715)
  • Epidemiology (2066)
  • Evolutionary Biology (15517)
  • Genetics (10650)
  • Genomics (14332)
  • Immunology (9492)
  • Microbiology (22856)
  • Molecular Biology (9103)
  • Neuroscience (49028)
  • Paleontology (355)
  • Pathology (1484)
  • Pharmacology and Toxicology (2572)
  • Physiology (3848)
  • Plant Biology (8337)
  • Scientific Communication and Education (1472)
  • Synthetic Biology (2296)
  • Systems Biology (6196)
  • Zoology (1302)