Evaluation of risk in human interpersonal negotiations

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Abstract

Interacting with others to negotiate how we want to distribute resources is an important part of our life. Considering that not all of our requests are granted, the outcomes of such interactions are, by their nature probabilistic, therefore risky. Here, we propose a cognitive model for evaluation of risk in human interpersonal negotiations based on computational model-based analyses of the proposer behavior in the Ultimatum Game. We asked our participants (acting as proposers) to choose between binary offers covering a wide range of monetary splits, while their opponents accepted or rejected these probabilistically, in relation to their valuation of social-reward distributions. We provide quantitative evidence to suggest that people make dynamic adjustments while evaluating risks during interpersonal negotiations, based on multidimensional inferences they make about their opponents such as opponent's inferred relative prosociality interacting with one's own risk attitude, highlighting differences between risk processing in social and non-social contexts.

Authors' Significance Statement

Humans are capable of developing sophisticated strategies before entering into a negotiation. This study describes a cognitive/computational mechanism underlying how people evaluate the risk inherent in such uncertain social situations where their terms may be accepted or rejected depending on how the others value them. Surprisingly, despite its everyday and socio-political importance, evaluation of risk in human interpersonal negotiations has not previously been studied using a cognitive/computational framework. In an ecologically valid experimental design, we provide quantitative evidence that people have a dynamic risk-preference in such social interactions, which is influenced by both the mental models they construct about their opponents and their own value-based risk attitude.

Introduction

Using the optimal strategy in non-social and social contexts is a key challenge of our everyday life, and from a broader perspective it is closely linked to our survival/fitness. Negotiating with others over terms which might result in fair, unfair or hyper-fair resource distributions is an important aspect of human social interactions(1-4). A common psychological observation would suggest that the optimal strategy in negotiation situations (e.g. in the Ultimatum Game(1, 3), or in the Prisoner's Dilemma(5)) should involve considering how others will perceive the extent of our cooperative/competitive intensions by simulating their valuation processes. However, as our knowledge of other people's state of mind is limited, we might misjudge their response, therefore our terms will not always be accepted. In other words, the outcomes of such social interactions are inherently risky. This suggests that risk perception should be a cardinal aspect of these social interactions too, in the same way it is for economic decision-making under uncertainty(6). However, cognitive models of how risk is evaluated in social interactive decision-making have not previously been studied and, in particular, it is not known whether similar approaches to risk are used in non-social and social situations.

Previous theoretical work has laid the foundations of how risk may emerge naturally in social interactions(7). In their work, Press and Dyson demonstrated that it is possible to sustain mutual cooperation even when resources are distributed unfairly between two individuals. Using the example of a simple social economic game (i.e. Prisoner's Dilemma), they demonstrated that in order to sustain mutual cooperation under unfair conditions, the player (i.e. he) who is aiming to establish favourable terms for himself still needs to give enough incentive to his opponent (i.e. she). This means that the player needs to have a good understanding of the opponent's underlying value function to predict at which stage she might change her strategy to stop cooperating. In this context, human social interactions have an intrinsic element of risk; whereby one side setting the terms of the cooperation needs to consider the risk associated with the other's rejection possibility (as in the Ultimatum Game rejection behaviour). Additionally, with any move that he makes towards maximising his own payoff by offering conditions that are not in harmony with the valuation of the opponent, he will get into an even riskier domain where the opponent's defection probability would increase. Taken together, these conditions seem to suggest a negotiation scenario in which a player who is interested in maximizing his payoff needs to make value-based decisions in a social context, while incorporating the risk associated with his opponent's defection/rejection possibility (e.g. the Balloon Analogue Task(8) in value-based; or

106 the proposer behaviour in the Ultimatum Game(3) in social decision-making domains), but this has not
107 been studied neither experimentally nor quantitatively.

108 In this study, we designed an experimental setting to probe these decision-making processes in order to
109 construct a formal cognitive/computational model of how risk is evaluated in social interactions. To do
110 so, we focused on people's Ultimatum giving behaviour, using this common behavioural economic
111 measure as an experimental probe of interpersonal negotiations. We sought to reveal the context
112 dependent aspects of risk-preferences between non-social and social settings, while aiming to identify
113 socially congruent variables which determine one's risk attitude in interpersonal negotiations.

114 In order to construct a cognitive/computational model of risk perception in social interactions, we asked
115 our participants to: (i) learn the underlying value functions of two distinct computerised agents with
116 different Social Value Orientations (SVOs[1,2]; one prosocial, the other one individualistic; categorically
117 defined with respect to their degree of prosociality) in a social learning session by observing their
118 Ultimatum acceptance preferences (see Fig. 1 and legends for the experimental design), and (ii) transfer
119 this information to make value-based decisions by choosing between two Ultimatum offers to those
120 agents in a social interactive context, while negotiating to maximise their monetary outcomes.



121

122 **Fig. 1. Details of experimental paradigms. In total participants completed 700 trials: 100 trials in task A, 360 trials in task B**
123 **and 240 trials in task C. (A) Outline of the baseline risk decision-making task, where participants' risk perception in a non-**
124 **social context was evaluated. (B) Participants completed two observational social-learning sessions (represented by the**
125 **schematic blue eye observing the Ultimatum Game interaction), where they were asked to predict the Ultimatum**
126 **acceptance preferences of two social agents with different Social Value Orientations (SVO) who were responding to offers**
127 **coming from different anonymous individuals, blue: individualistic; orange: prosocial agent (colour coding is consistent in all**
128 **of the subsequent figures). (C) Following the observational social-learning sessions, participants completed a social decision-**
129 **making experiment in which they were asked to give Ultimatum offers to those social agents from a binary selection. (D)**
130 **Outline of the control social decision-making task administered to an independent cohort, in which the social agents'**
131 **acceptance probabilities (shown inside square brackets) were given explicitly alongside Ultimatum offers. All tasks were self-**
132 **paced.**

Assuming that the optimal strategy in social decision-making should follow similar principles with that of value-based risk decision-making, we tested two competing hypotheses with computational modelling. In the first family of models, we tested the prediction that participants should integrate the inferred acceptance probability of their opponents (which is transformed by a non-linear probability weighting function) with their potential self-reward magnitudes and make their decisions with respect to the expected value difference between two options. In alternative models, we also considered the possibility that people's risk preferences in social interactions may be better captured by [power or mean-variance] utility functions which are commonly reported in the literature(9), where modulated self-reward magnitudes are integrated with opponent's inferred acceptance probability (see Materials and Methods for mathematical definitions). Finally, in order to test the prediction that risk perception may be modulated differently in non-social and social contexts, we used a probabilistic value-based risk decision-making paradigm as a control condition (Fig. 1). Our *a priori* prediction was that, unlike a rigid risk preference seen throughout value-based contexts, people should have a dynamic risk attitude in social contexts, which allows them to adapt to the changing characteristics of their opponents in different interpersonal negotiation scenarios.

Results

Social Learning Session. Participants were able to predict the Ultimatum acceptance preferences of social agents with different SVOs ~ 70% correctly. Prediction accuracy was significantly higher than random guessing for both of the social agents (Fig. 2A; t-tests from 0.5; all $t>22$; $p<0.001$, Bonferroni corrected). Participants were able to predict the decisions of the prosocial agent significantly more frequently than the individualistic agent ($t=-9.94$; $p<0.001$), which may be due to the fact that we had higher percentage of prosocial individuals in this cohort (n=29 vs n=5 individualistic participants according to the categorical classification of the SVO Triple Dominance Measure(10) which penalises inconsistent responses). Although participant's SVO as measured by the Triple Dominance Measure correlated negatively with the predictive accuracy for either of the opponents ($-.16< r(49) <-.13$), these correlations were not significant (all $p> 0.27$). Participants' prediction accuracy closely followed the subjective valuation of the social agents: predictive accuracy was low around the indifference point of agents' subjective valuations ($\tilde{v} = 0$) and it increased whenever the subjective valuation of agents was either very negative or positive (Fig. 2B).



Fig. 2. Summary of results from the observational social-learning session. (A) Participants' prediction accuracy was significantly higher than random guessing and higher for the prosocial agent relative to the individualistic agent (* P<0.001, error bars show SEM). (B) Prediction accuracy followed the subjective valuation of the social agents, irrespective of their SVOs. (C) Encoded value functions were highly significantly correlated with social agents' actual value functions (r>.97, P<0.001), and these had non-linear properties. (D) Participants SVOs calculated on the basis of their decisions in the learning sessions were distributed significantly differently than their SVOs measured by the Triple Dominance Measure (*D*>0.60, P<0.001), suggesting they actively made decision which are not in accordance with their SVOs to learn about these social agents.**

The decisions of the computerised social agents were generated by a model which was derived from the SVO framework(1) (also see Materials and Methods). We fitted the same model to participants' predictions in the learning session to estimate their inference of their opponents' value function ($\tilde{q}_A$). The encoded value functions estimated from the learning session ($\tilde{q}_A$) correlated highly significantly with agents' actual value functions (q_A; all r(49)> .97, all p<0.001, Bonferroni corrected, see Fig. 2C); and the learning model had highly significantly better fitting relative to a model, with the same number of parameters but makes random predictions, in terms of –log likelihood values (t-test from 0.69; all t<-81, all p<0.001, Bonferroni corrected) for both of the social agents, and had pseudo-R^2 values ($\bar{R}^2$; adjusted for the sample size and the number of free parameters(11, 12)) 0.233 and 0.378 for the individualistic and the prosocial agents, respectively. McFadden (1974) suggests that $\bar{R}^2$ values between 0.20 and 0.40 indicate highly desirable model fitting. Plots of the encoded value functions against the actual value functions revealed that these had non-linear properties (Fig. 2C). This model also had better fitting relative to two alternative reinforcement learning models which were fitted to the partcipants' behaviour in the learning sessions (see Materials and Methods, all $F_{2,147}$>168, all p<0.001, Bonferroni corrected)

The comparison between participants' SVO in degrees as measured by the SVO Slider Measure(2) and based on their decisions in the learning sessions suggested that participants should actively be making decisions to predict the choices of social agents which were not in accordance with their own SVO (i.e. not choosing for oneself; 2-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, all $D>0.62$; all $p<0.001$, Bonferroni corrected; see Fig. 2D). Similarly, the distribution of participants' calculated SVO based on their predictions in the learning sessions were also significantly different between the individualistic and prosocial agents ($D= 0.28$; $p=0.03$), suggesting that participants relied on different selections to learn about their opponents' underlying value functions.

We were also interested in understanding participants' affective reaction to these social agents. In order to address this issue, after each learning session, we asked our participants to rate the imagined personalities of these social agents on a number of different domains. These questions were related to social constructs such as the SVOs of these social agents and how much our participants would like them in real life. These items showed that the prosocial agent was rated consistently higher relative to the individualistic agent, which conforms to the general intuition that prosocial individuals would be regarded more positively in real life (2x4 Multivariate ANOVA showing main effect of agent $F_{3,294}=3.01$, $p=0.03$ and main effect of the interaction term $F_{3,294}=10.163$, $p<0.001$; see Fig. S1A). Particularly the participants' responses to Q3 in which we asked how many people they know in real-life who behave similarly to the computerised agents whose decisions they observed, suggests that our experimental manipulation successfully mimicked interactions with real human opponents (1-sample t-test relative to 0 (i.e. computerised agents' decisions do not resemble any people that I know); all $t>13$; all $p<.001$, Bonferroni corrected).

Social Decision-Making. Upon completion of the learning sessions, our participants progressed with the social decision making experiment(s), where they interacted with these social agents by giving them Ultimatum offers for 120 trials each (see Fig. 1C for task screen).

After each social decision-making block, participants were asked to rate how much weight they put on inferred acceptance probabilities and/or their self-reward magnitudes on a scale from 0 to 10. Here, a rating of 0 would refer to making decisions only based on inferred acceptance probabilities; a rating of 10 would refer to relying solely on self-reward magnitudes and 5 would mean their equally weighted integration. In accordance with our predicted value-based social decision-making model (i.e. making offers based on their expected value difference), our participants reported that they considered both

the other's inferred acceptance probability ($\tilde{q}_A$) and how much they would win if their offer is accepted (i.e. self-reported integration weights were significantly different than relying on either self-reward magnitudes or encoded acceptance probabilities; all p<0.001, Bonferroni corrected, see Fig. 3A). However, their self-reported integration of these decision variables while making their offers were also significantly suboptimal (i.e. participants reported putting more weight on inferred acceptance probability ($\tilde{q}_A$)) relative to optimal integration with equal weighting (all t>10.46; all p<0.001, Bonferroni corrected), whereas there were no significant differences between the integration weights reported for the prosocial and the individualistic agents suggesting that our proposed value-based social decision-making model should apply irrespective of opponents' SVO (also in Fig. 3A).



Fig. 3. Participants' self reported value integration and model selection in the social decision-making experiment. (A) In line with our proposed model, participants reported that they considered both their self-reward magnitudes and others' inferred acceptance probabilities. Mean of bars are highly significantly different than both 0 (only consider inferred acceptance probability, i.e. QL_A) and 10 (only consider self-reward magnitude, i.e. R_O; all P<0.001). Self-reported integration weights were comparable against the prosocial and the individualistic agents (n.s: not significant, error bars show SEM). (B) Model selection based on Bayesian posterior probability weights recommends Model 6 (longer bars indicate better fitting), which is based on a value-based decision-making model making use of the power utility function. (C) Participants' SVOs calculated on the basis of their decisions in the Ultimatum giving experiments were distributed significantly differently than the distribution of their actual SVOs in real-life (all *D*>0.26; all P≤0.056). These vectors of SVOs calculated based on chosen options were not correlated with participants' actual SVO as assessed by the Slider Measure (all P>0.32).

We selected between competing social decision-making models based on their Bayesian posterior probability weights given the data(13), by the following formula:

$$weight_i = \frac{\exp(-(BIC_i - BIC_{\min})/2)}{\sum_k \exp(-(BIC_k - BIC_{\min})/2)}$$

while considering each model's Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) value, which penalises for additional free parameters. Model fits revealed that the social decision-making model which is based on integration of inferred acceptance probability ($\tilde{q}_A$) with self-reward magnitudes modulated by an power utility parameter capturing participants' risk preferences was the best fitting model (Fig. 3B, a selection based on group-wise sum of BIC values also favours this model, see Fig. S2). In Social Decision Making Models 4 and 5, we used participants' self-reported weights and added a free parameter to allow unequally weighted integration of nonlinearly perceived probabilities and magnitudes respectively, but these models did not improve the fitting of the probability weighting function family of models any further. Bayesian posterior probability weights suggested that models which mainly relied on either reward magnitudes or inferred acceptance probabilities could not account for our participants' choice behaviour.

One might argue that our approach to modelling the social decision-making task neglects any learning which might be happening in parallel, during this stage. If learning continues to take place during the social decision-making period, the predictive accuracy of our model which considers the inferred acceptance probability ($\tilde{q}_A$) solely based on the learning session should gradually decay down the trials. In order to investigate this possibility, we segmented the trials in the social decision-making task into three temporal sections: early (1-40); middle (41-80); late (81-120) trials and compared the predictive accuracy of our model across these sections. This control analysis showed that model predictions were highly stable (all $F_{2,147} < 0.27$; all $p > 0.77$), and suggested that any additional learning which might take place during the decision-making period would not have a profound effect on inferred acceptance probabilities participants use to compute the expected value of offers.

Further analysis done by comparing participants' SVOs calculated based on their offers in the Ultimatum giving experiments and their SVOs measured by the Slider Measure suggested that these came from significantly different distributions (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests; all $D > 0.26$, $p \leq 0.056$, uncorrected; see Fig. 3C) and these vectors of SVOs calculated from the decision-making experiments were not correlated

with participants own SVO as obtained from the Slider Measure (-.141< r (49)<-.035, 0.32< p <0.81). In tandem, these results limit the possibility that in the social decision-making experiments participants performed using other cognitive models linked to the SVO framework that we did not consider here (including those which were based on reinforcement learning); and lends further support for our hypothesis that participants would use a cognitive model from the risk/value-based decision-making framework.

Modulation of risk in non-social and social settings. In order to evaluate whether risk perception is modulated differently between non-social and social contexts, we conducted a simple value-based risk decision-making experiment as a control condition before the learning sessions and established our participants' risk taking preference at the baseline (see Fig. 1A for the control task screen).

First, we conducted a model-free analysis on participant's choices by analysing the proportion of risky decisions made in each domain, focusing on the trials where participants were asked to choose between a low probability-high magnitude and a low magnitude-high probability option. This analysis revealed that the frequency of risky choices, after controlling for the number of trials meeting the criteria described above, was not significantly different across each domain (Fig. 4A; $F_{2,147}$=3.263, p=0.073, Bayes factor for group differences BF_{10}=0.516). The best fitting model to participants' choice behaviour in the value-based risk decision-making experiment, which also utilised the same power utility function as in the social decision-making experiment, had –log likelihood value of 0.242/trial and group-wise sum of BIC score 2699.



Fig. 4. Risk decision-making across non-social and social domains. (A) Proportion of risky decisions made in each domain was not significantly different (P=0.07). Parameter estimates modulating the participants gains (R_O) in each domain: (B) value-based risk decision-making; (C) Ultimatum giving against the Individualistic opponent; (D) Ultimatum giving against the Prosocial opponent. In B-D, upper panels show the power utility curves for risk-seeking preferences, whereas the lower panels show the risk-averse preferences. In B-D, thin lines with the same [R,G,B] colour coding specify each subject's power utility curve and thick lines in black, blue and orange colours show the population means for each domain, where we observed a pronounced risk aversion across all domains (P<.002, Bonferroni corrected).

By estimating the risk parameters separately for the value-based risk decision-making experiment (i.e. the non-social context) and the two Ultimatum giving experiments against different social agents (i.e. social context), we were able to show that on average our participants displayed a pronounced risk aversion in all domains (all p<0.002, Bonferroni corrected relative to risk neutrality $\rho = 1$, see Fig. 4B-D for power utility curves). These risk parameters estimated separately in each domain correlated highly significantly with the proportion of risky decisions the participants made in each domain, where parameter values higher than 1 indicate a risk-seeking preference (all r(49) > .71, all p<.001, Bonferroni corrected for pairwise comparisons).

The parameter estimates from the value-based experiment were correlated with the estimates from the social decision-making experiments (all r(49)>.40, all p<.004, Bonferroni corrected). However, risk parameters were not correlated within the social decision-making domain (r(49)=.22, p=.122), indicating that people may have an independent risk attitude in social interactions and these may be adaptive to the changing characteristics of their opponents. In the social decision-making domain, although our participants displayed a slightly more risk seeking tendency against the individualistic agent relative to the prosocial agent, this was not significantly higher (p=0.74, see Fig. S3), supporting our *a priori* prediction at the population level that people should not be acting in a consistently risk-seeking manner against one type of social agent.

Although inferred probabilities used in the social decision-making task reflects the true nature of social interactions in everyday life (i.e. one can never know the exact numerical values of the other's acceptance probabilities), it is important to point out that there were structural differences between the value-based risk decision-making experiment where the probabilities were given explicitly and the social decision-making experiment where the probabilities were experience-based (i.e. inferred) and learned during the course of the social learning experiment. In order to tease out the impact of such differences we conducted an additional control experiment in an independent cohort (n=19; 63.2% males; [mean±SD] age: 21.3±1.9; SVO:27.8±15.1), in which participants completed all the value-based decision-making and social-learning tasks as before, but were shown the opponents' acceptance probabilities

323 explicitly in the social decision-making sessions (Fig 1D). Although number of participants were lower in
324 the control experiment, the effect sizes to detect between-group differences were still high (based on
325 simple behavioural results reported in Fig 2A, main experiment Cohen's *d*=1.41; control experiment
326 Cohen's *d*=1.22).

327 Explicit presentation of other's acceptance probabilities lead to a number of differences. First of all, as
328 expected, the fitting of the model which best explained social decision-making in the main experiment
329 improved significantly (i.e. comparison between the main and control experiments (N=69), main effect
330 of probability type F(1,67)=36.573, p<.001 , pairwise comparisons with respect to each social agent: all
331 t>4.968, all p<.001, Bonferroni corrected). This is mostly due to relatively suboptimal expected value
332 difference computations which arise from the non-linear relationship between inferred and
333 explicit/actual acceptance probabilities observed in the main experiment cohort (see Fig 2C), which no
334 longer exists in the control experiment cohort due to explicit presentation of true acceptance
335 probabilities. However, this model was no longer the best fitting model in the control experiment either,
336 as a model analogous to the risk decision-making experiment (i.e. integrating explicit probabilities with
337 reward magnitudes modulated by an power utility parameter) had consistently lower group-wise sum of
338 BIC scores (main effect of model comparison F(1,36)=3.259, p=.079). Furthermore, in sharp contrast to
339 the findings of the main experiment, the risk parameters for social decision-making were significantly
340 correlated in the control experiment (r(18)=.55, p=.015). This suggests a positive linear relationship
341 between the risk parameters when the probabilities are given explicitly and overall, participant were
342 able to accumulate higher monetary earnings in this condition (main effect of explicit probabilities
343 (F(1,67)=3.231, p=.077), indicating a marginally more optimal, but not statistically significant, expected
344 value difference computation.

345 Next, we wanted to explain the "social" risk parameters estimated from our Ultimatum giving
346 experiments by a number of predictive parameters to evaluate the extent to which people's risk-
347 preferences are influenced by social variables describing degrees of prosociality. Our hypothesis was
348 that people's risk-preferences in social interactions should depend on their SVO; their inference about
349 the SVO of their opponents ($S\tilde{V}O$; also including one's uncertainty about this estimate); and the
350 interaction between their baseline risk perception in non-social settings and how prosocial they think
351 their opponent is relative to themselves. Here, the interaction term allows us to model the extent of
352 risk-seeking tendencies in social competitions; particularly in situations where people judge their
353 opponent is more prosocial than themselves, also considering their baseline attitude to uncertainty. To

investigate the accuracy of our hypothesis we constructed two multiple linear regression models with these predictive variables:

$$\rho^S = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * SVO + \beta_2 * S\tilde{V}O^S_\mu + \beta_3 * S\tilde{V}O^S_\sigma + \beta_4 * (\rho_R (S\tilde{V}O^S_\mu - SVO)) + \varepsilon$$

where ρ^S is the risk parameter estimated separately from the Ultimatum giving experiments and $S \in \{i, p\}$, defines whether the opponent is individualistic or prosocial. In this linear regression model ρ_R is the risk parameter estimated from the value-based risk decision-making experiment. Here, it is important to point out that participants' inferences about their opponent's SVO ($S\tilde{V}O^S$) depend on their encoded value function ($\tilde{q}_A$) from the learning sessions, which has a stochastic nature (i.e. a sigmoid function). In order to get the best estimate of the opponent's inferred SVO in degrees, we ran the learning model with each participant's estimated parameters through the learning stimuli 1000 times per participant per social agent and calculated the resulting SVOs in degrees (see Fig. S4A). We used both the mean (μ) and the standard deviation (σ) of the distribution of calculated SVOs from these 1000 simulations as the best estimate of opponent's inferred SVO and the participant's uncertainty about this estimate, and included these scalar values for each participant in our regression model (see Fig. S4B).

The statistical analysis of this model supported the prediction that there is a linear relationship between social risk parameters and the explanatory variables (R^2=.544 and .665, p<.001; for prosocial and individualistic agents, respectively). For robustness, we performed a leave-one-out cross-validation procedure and repeated the multiple linear regression analysis. Further analysis which was done on the regression coefficients by performing 1-sample t-tests from 0 suggested that the interaction term has the strongest influence on social risk parameters (all t(49)>8.25, all p<.001), whereas one's own SVO uniquely contributed to the risk attitude in a social interaction with an individualistic opponent (t(49)=3, p=.004; all Bonferroni corrected, set level for the p-value is 0.006 for 8 comparisons, see Fig.5).



Fig. 5. Parameter estimates $\{\beta_1 \ldots \beta_4\}$ from two leave-one-out cross-validated multiple linear regression models accounting for the social risk parameters (y-axis). Significant regression coefficients are denoted with asterix (P<.01, ***P<0.001; Bonferroni corrected; error bars show SEM of the coefficient estimates at the population level). Variables in the x-axis refer to those described in the main text, SVO: participants' Social Value Orientation; Inferred SVO: $\tilde{SVO}_\mu$; Uncertainty: $\tilde{SVO}_\sigma$; Risk x (Inferred SVO-Self SVO): $\rho_R * (\tilde{SVO}_\mu - SVO)$.**

In order to minimise the possibility that a significant linear relationship between social risk parameters and the explanatory variables proposed above may arise solely due to any estimation error, we implemented the same model, replacing the social risk parameters with the frequency of risky decisions made in each domain (as reported in Fig 4A). This complementary analysis also suggested a significant linear relationship between risky choice frequency and explanatory variables (R^2=.308 and .276, all p≤.005; for prosocial and individualistic agents, respectively). This complementary analysis showed overlapping effects of SVO and the interaction term on the frequency of risky decisions (see Fig S5 and legends).

If our theoretical approach to modelling participants' choice behaviour in the Ultimatum giving experiment is correct, participants' self-reported integration weights from Fig 3A (where relying more strongly on reward magnitudes rather than the opponents acceptance probability in the UG would relate to a risk-seeking tendency), the risk parameters (ρ) estimated from the Ultimatum giving experiments and the predictions of the model described above should line-up reasonably along the

396 diagonal of this 3 dimensional parameter space. Subsequent analysis conducted on these 3 variables
397 suggested that the predicted risk parameters were highly significantly correlated with both the
398 estimated risk parameters and the participants' self-reported weight for both of the agents (all
399 $r(49)>.419$, all $p<.002$, Bonferroni corrected, see Fig. S6 and legends), providing converging evidence in
400 support of our model.

401 **Response Times.** Visual inspection of response time (RT) histograms suggested that these have skewed
402 distribution violating the normality assumption. Following the recommendation of Whelan 2008 (14),
403 we analysed the distribution of RTs across three domains (i.e. risk decision-making, social learning and
404 social decision-making). Distributions were comparable within social learning and decision-making
405 domains (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests; all $D \geq 0.12$, all $p>.50$).

406 In a complementary analysis, we excluded data from 5 participants which were clear outliers. We
407 transformed the concatenated data using a Box-Cox transformation (15), implemented in MATLAB.
408 Overall, there was a significant main effect of experiment type (i.e. risk decision-making, social learning
409 and social decision-making) on RTs ($F(2,222)=22.623$, $p<.001$). Response times in the social decision-
410 making experiments were significantly longer than those in the social-learning experiments
411 ($t(178)=6.576$, $p<.001$), highlighting the suitability of the value-based risk model applied to the social
412 decision-making context, where we predicted that our participants should simulate the underlying value
413 functions of their opponents and integrate it with their self-reward magnitudes while they were making
414 Ultimatum offers. The RTs were comparable both within the social learning and decision-making
415 experiments between individualistic and prosocial agents (all $t(88)<.141$, all $p>.164$; also in Fig. 6).



Fig. 6. Response times across all experimental sessions. Response times between 3 domains were significantly different. Response times were longer in the social decision-making experiments relative to the social-learning experiments (* P<0.001). Across social-learning and social decision-making experiments, there were no significant differences between prosocial/individualistic conditions.**

Discussion:

In line with our prediction, our results suggest that in social interactions which may result in resource distributions between two individuals, people employ a cognitive model to evaluate the associated risks, which shares properties with well-established computational models concerning value-based decision-making under uncertainty(16-18). However, unlike risk decision-making paradigms in which probability and reward information is usually given explicitly(19-22), in social interactions people need to infer others' valuation processes (Fig. 2C) in order to make value-based decisions(23). Here, we showed that people's risk-preferences in social interactions is adaptive to the changing characteristics of their opponents, considering that risk parameters estimated in the same parameter space ($0 < \rho \leq 2$) but separately from each experiment were not correlated. Particularly, it is important to point out that with careful sequencing using an approach similar to a gradient decent, we were able to minimise the correlation between decision variables(24) over $2x10^6$< iterations, and we were able to make the face values of the reward distributions in the Ultimatum giving experiments the same for both of the opponents (i.e. prosocial/individualistic social agents, where the order of presentation was randomised for each subject and for each type of opponent), such that our participants needed to utilise their opponent's encoded value function to compute the expected value difference between two options only cued by the colour of the icon representing their opponents (Fig. 1C). This approach minimises the

438 possibility that within-subject differences in risk parameters (Fig. 4) could have been observed due
439 differences in the numerical components of the stimuli. In a control experiment, we further
440 demonstrated that having an independent risk attitude is unique to situations which mimic real-life
441 social decision-making, where people need to mentalise and infer their opponents' acceptance
442 probabilities.

443 In mainstream economics and finance, people's risk preference is often regarded as a hard-wired trait.
444 However, a number of recent studies have suggested that value-based decision parameters may be
445 subjected to influence after observing others' decisions which were performed in the same context(9,
446 25, 26), challenging this point of view. Here, by focusing on social interactions, we provide evidence to
447 suggest that even in the absence of observations of comparable decisions as used by these previous
448 studies (9, 25, 26), people's risk-preferences may be subject to change in a social context, depending on
449 the nature of the social interaction they are engaged in. While the impact of social framing on risk-
450 preferences has previously been investigated in the context of the trust game where outcome
451 probabilities were explicitly stated(27), to the best of our knowledge the present study is the first to
452 describe the computations underlying risk-preferences in human social interactions where outcome
453 probabilities were directly related to participants' inferences about the value functions of their
454 opponent.

455 It is important emphasise that our experimental design did not have any element of observing others'
456 risk-preferences. Instead, as we have shown, we anticipated that social context specific risk-preferences
457 should emerge naturally due to the fact that the outcomes of these social interactions were
458 probabilistic, as the paradigm reported by Press and Dyson would propose. We provide further evidence
459 for "social" risk perception by showing that in human interpersonal negotiations the change in risk
460 parameters may be adaptive, considering that in our multiple linear regression analyses (Fig. 5) we
461 showed an overarching and consistent pattern of significant contributions from key social variables
462 which predicts people's risk-preferences in the social context, irrespective of the SVO of their
463 opponents. Although designing two different computerised social agents increased our experimental
464 difficulty in terms of number of trials our participants needed to complete (t=700), it also allowed us to
465 reveal these overarching contributions which we think are cardinal for cognitive/computational models
466 of social interactions.

467 Here, it is worthwhile to comment on why we decided against the inclusion of a "competitive" agent
468 (based on the definition of Murphy et. al) in our experimental design. Previous studies with relatively

large sample sizes investigating Social Value Orientation in the population showed that the population density of competitive individuals are only around 9% (28). Furthermore, people with competitive SVO are driven by achieving superiority over the others, which limits them to only accept the offers that satisfy this superiority criterion, making their underlying value function not very suitable for probing risk perception in social interactions. Additionally, the inclusion of a "competitive" agent would require our participants to complete at least an additional 300 trials [across social learning and decision-making sessions], making it rather difficult to achieve in terms of feasibility. Considering that in our cohort participants' SVO and their inferences about the SVO of their opponents showed a healthy degree of variability, and focussing on each pairwise combination (n=100, see Fig. S7), we think our proposed model suitably meets the generalisability criteria to account for evaluation of risk in many different social interactions which would naturally occur in real-life.

One of the key findings of the current paper (Fig 5 and Fig S5) is that people's risk attitude in interpersonal negotiations is under the influence of their own degree of prosociality, as well as multidimensional mental models they construct about their opponents, over a prosociality space. One interpretation of the multiple linear regression analyses is that, keeping the contributions of all other social variables fixed, people's positive inferences about the SVOs of their opponents will decrease the value of their risk parameters; such that they would be likely to display risk-aversion. Additionally, our multiple linear regression model also predicts that, keeping the contribution of all other social variables fixed, people with higher SVO (e.g prosocial individuals) will have a significantly lower risk parameter against an individualistic opponent relative to the value of their risk parameter against a fellow prosocial opponent. Under these conditions, if the value of the social risk parameter converge to 1 (i.e. risk neutrality), this would mean that a prosocial individual would make a more optimal value integration against an individualistic opponent, while still maintaining a risk-seeking tendency against a prosocial opponent. On the other hand, highly significantly negative regression coefficients for the interaction term indicates that people would display risk-aversion in situations where they judge their opponent as more prosocial relative to themselves. While keeping the contributions of all other social variables fixed, when the value of the interaction term is increasing, significantly lower regression coefficients against a prosocial opponent will lead to smaller risk parameter values, indicating a risk-aversion, whereas the model predicts that people would show a tendency for risk-seeking attitude towards others whom they judge to be less prosocial than themselves. Thus, our results reveal that people's risk-preferences in social interactions are under the influence of a number predictive variables defining different aspect of the nature of a social encounter in terms of degrees of prosociality.

Our study also has implications for understanding the interactions in the Ultimatum Game, where the wide majority of the previous literature focused on responders' behaviour(3, 29-34). In our study, the participants were explicitly instructed to treat the binary options they were presented with like thoughts in their mind, such that they knew their opponents can only see the chosen offer, and can never know whether the unchosen option was better or worse. The structure of our experiment which allowed our participants to make offers from a binary selection complements previous Ultimatum Game studies where responders were commonly asked to make decisions about a single offer per trial. Under these conditions our proposed social decision-making model including an power utility term, was the best fitting model to subjects' choice behaviour (Fig. 3B), and our participants' self-reports also suggested that both the self-reward magnitudes and the others' inferred acceptance probabilities needed to be considered while making offers (Fig. 3A). To the best of our knowledge, the current study is also the first to address value computations underlying Ultimatum giving, and it provides evidence to suggest that proposers' do not solely rely on responders' acceptance probabilities, but make offers based on their expected value. Based on these findings, we recommend that future cluster(35) or hyper-scanning(36) studies of Ultimatum bargaining in neuroeconomics, should consider computational models which explicitly parametrize participants' risk-preferences.

Finally, although the social-learning session was not our main focus in this work, we showed behavioural computational evidence to suggest that our participants could suitably transfer the encoded value functions of others from one [learning] environment (i.e. observing social agents' responses to singular Ultimatum offers) to another environment in which they were asked to solve an optimal social decision problem (i.e. making Ultimatum offers from binary options). Thus, our behavioural study highlights the need for further research in three main streams, ideally involving functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI): (i) what are the regions involved with neural computations underlying how people transfer the encoded value functions of their opponents in social interactions; (ii) what are neural mechanisms responsible for tracking the value functions of opponents with different SVOs; and (iii) which brain regions encode the estimated trial-by-trial variability in the social risk parameters.

Author Contributions

E. Pulcu and M. Haruno developed the study concept. All authors contributed to the study design. Testing and data collection were performed by E.Pulcu. The first author performed the data analysis and interpretation under the supervision of M. Haruno. The first author drafted the manuscript, and M. Haruno provided critical revisions. All authors approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.

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Materials and Methods

Participants. In total 50 healthy individuals (54% males) who reported no history or current neurological or psychiatric disorders, or use of any psychotropic medication were recruited from the general population. The average age of this cohort was 31.5 (range: 20-56 years; STD=±9.49). On average the participants had 16 years of education (STD= 2.1 years) and reported annual income of 1.91 million Japanese Yen (STD=1.71 million Yen).

Procedure. The study took place in Center for Information and Neural Networks (CiNet) and it was approved by the CiNet Research Ethics Committee. Participants who met the inclusion criteria were given an appointment for the behavioural experiments. The testing session began by an explanation of the research procedures, followed by obtaining an informed consent. First, the participants completed a battery of questionnaires related to their demographic information and Social Value Orientation (SVO) in pen and paper format. After that they completed the value-based risk decision-making task which lasted for 100 trials (Fig. 1A). The amount of money participants won in the risk decision-making task was added to their performance related reimbursement. Then, the participants completed the learning sessions for both the individualistic and prosocial agents in which they were asked to predict whether the social agents will accept or reject the offers coming from other anonymous individuals. The participants were told that the social agents whose Ultimatum responses they needed to predict were two participants from a previous study conducted by our research group. In fact, they were computerised agents making decisions following an underlying value function (see below). Similar methodology is frequently used in behavioural studies conducted by other research groups (9, 37). The learning sessions contained 180 trials each and the order of these learning sessions was counterbalanced across participants. The participants won ¥25 for every correct prediction which was added to their performance based reimbursement amount. After completing the learning sessions, participants were asked to respond to various descriptive questions while considering the imagined personalities of these social agents (see Fig. S1). Finally, the participants completed the social decision-making experiments, for 120 trials against each social agent, in the same order they completed the learning sessions. In the Ultimatum giving experiment, participants obtained the monetary amount (R_O) in all of their accepted offers, which was added to their performance based reimbursement. All of the behavioural experiments were self-paced. All experiments took place in a comfortable room designated for testing purposes and all tasks were presented by PsychToolbox 3.0 running on MATLAB (MathWorks, Inc.).

Description of the computerised social agents. Two distinct computerised social agents, whose behaviours were guided by the way they computed the subjective value of the conditions they faced (which are in fact unfair, fair, and hyper-fair Ultimatum offers) were defined by a model from the social value orientation (SVO) framework, based on a model derived from a previous publication of our research group (1). Here the subjective value ($\tilde{v}$) of a condition is calculated as:

$$\tilde{v} = \alpha R_S - \delta R_O + \rho \left| R_S - R_O \right| \tag{1}$$

where R_S (always from the perspective of the social agents) and R_O depicts self and other's reward magnitude, respectively. The agents make decisions following a stochastic choice model where q_A is the probability of accepting a condition (38):

$$q_A = 1 / (1 + \exp^{(-\beta \tilde{v})}) \tag{2}$$

Here, β is the inverse temperature term, which gives the shape of the sigmoid function, based on our *a priori* assumption about the shape of the sigmoid function in humans, which should particularly be the case if the number of trials in the learning session approach to infinity; that is if the participants had the opportunity of observing the behaviour of the computerised social agents for a very long time.

The hyper-parameters defining the valuation of the agents, $\alpha, \delta, \rho, \beta$ were set to [1.096, 0.382,-2.512, 0.037] for the individualistic; and [1.368,-0.644,-3.798, 0.045] for the prosocial agent. The key difference between these two agents were that the prosocial agent valued conditions cooperatively, whereas the individualistic agent valued them competitively; and that the prosocial agent was more sensitive to the absolute value difference between the self and other's reward magnitude. We generated a vector of responses to 180 trials in the learning sessions by the defined model where the SVO of the social agents were calculated by the following formula derived from Murphy et al. 2011:

$$SVO^\circ = \arctan\left(\frac{(\sum R_O) / n_A - 50}{(\sum R_S) / n_A - 50}\right) \tag{3}$$

where n_A is the total number of accepted conditions. After extensive simulations to evaluate how agents would behave, a selection was made such that the SVO of the prosocial agent was 31.47° and the SVO of the individualistic agent was 12.36°; clearly falling into the categorical boundaries described by

611 Murphy et al., 2011. Therefore, these strategies were labelled as “prosocial” and “individualistic”
612 throughout this manuscript.

613 In order to make sure that the choice behaviour of these computerised agents will adequately mimic
614 decisions of real human participants we conducted an additional control experiment in which
615 participants in an independent cohort (n=40; age: 21±2.1; 60% males; SVO: 25.7±15.6) responded to
616 Ultimatum offers coming from different proposers as it was in the social learning sessions of the main
617 experiment. We simulated the choices of the computerised agents 100 times for each participant and
618 investigated the extent to which their decisions coincided with the decisions made by real humans. This
619 control experiment suggested that the behaviour of computerised agents would be well tolerated in the
620 main experiment, particularly considering that the offers being evaluated covered the indifference point
621 (i.e. expected value difference near 0) where the choices of the computerised agents and real human
622 participants would be random (~50% accept, see Fig S8 and legends). In addition to this numerical
623 analysis conducted in an independent cohort, it is important to point out that our participants were able
624 to identify at least ~4 people in their close circles whose decisions resembled the decisions made by the
625 computerised agents (see Fig S1, responses to Q3), suggesting that the behaviour of the computerised
626 agents in the main experiment was overall well tolerated.

627 **Social-learning.** There are a few models in the literature to account for how people learn during social
628 interactions (23, 39, 40). Due to the widely-known complexity of this process (41, 42), we did not focus
629 too much on specific models of social-learning by performing detailed trial-by-trial analyses here.
630 Previous studies suggested that using the UG as an environment to investigate how people learn other’s
631 social preferences is challenging due to the fact that the game structure has a strong non-monotonicity
632 (42). Nevertheless, the social learning experiments were still necessary in order model how inferred
633 probabilities are processed during the Ultimatum giving experiments, in which we anticipated that our
634 experimental setting will naturally reveal how our participants evaluate the risks associated with the
635 possibility of others rejecting their offers. Therefore, we modelled this first step based on the
636 assumption that learning occurs through successful simulation of other’s valuation model (43) (achieved
637 by model-free, reinforcement or Bayesian learning; or their weighted combination) such that as the
638 number of trials (t) approach to infinity, $\tilde{q}_A \rightarrow q_A \,|\, t \rightarrow \infty$, that is subjects inferred acceptance
639 probability ($\tilde{q}_A$) will fully converge to the social agent’s true acceptance probability (q_A). We confirmed
640 that social learning occurs suitably well by performing model-free analysis of the data from the learning

641 sessions and also by fitting the proposed valuation model of the social agents to the participants' choice
642 data to generate participants' inferred choice probability for each social agent ($\tilde{q}_A$; see Fig. 2).

643 Although the learning session was not our primary focus, we still wanted to compare the performance
644 of the social valuation model with two alternative Rescorla-Wagner models(44) which were fitted to
645 participants' choice behaviour in the learning sessions. In the alternative Model 1, the participant
646 updates his/her estimate of the social agent's overall acceptance probability on trial *t* in proportion to
647 the prediction errors(ε) on trial *t-1* on trial-by-trial basis:

648 $$\tilde{q}_{A(t+1)} = \tilde{q}_{A(t)} + \eta_{\tilde{q}_A} \varepsilon_{(t)} \quad (3)$$

649 where $\eta_{\tilde{q}_A}$ is the learning rate. In the alternative Model 2, each of social agent's parameters in the
650 described SVO model (Eq.1 and 2) is updated on trial-by-trial basis, for example:

651 $$\alpha_{(t+1)} = \alpha_{(t)} + \eta_{\alpha} \varepsilon_{(t)} \quad (4)$$

652 where η_{α} is the learning rate updating the value of the free-parameter α from trial t to *t*+1 . This second
653 model had 4 free parameters representing the learning rates by which participants updated each of the
654 parameters of the SVO-based valuation model (Eqs.1 and 2).

655 Model comparison for the learning session favoured the SVO-based valuation model, which had
656 significantly lower –log likelihood values relative to the reinforcement learning models (all $F_{2,147}$>168, all
657 p<0.001, Bonferroni corrected). Furthermore, close relationship observed between q_A and $\tilde{q}_A$ from the
658 SVO model, as well as model fitting metrics falling into the highly desirable range (11) suggest that the
659 present approach is suitable to obtain participants' inferred choice probabilities.

660 **Description of the control experiment and the reference probability weighting model.** Considering that
661 our social agents were designed to make choices following specified value functions, interacting with
662 them in the main experiment becomes a risky business. Consequently, we decided to select a value-
663 based risk decision-making task (Fig. 1A) as our control experiment. This selection enabled us to
664 understand whether people process risk in non-social and social contexts differently. We fitted various
665 computational models to participants' choice behaviour, as described below and in the following
666 sections.

In line with the previous literature(45), we assumed that people process uncertainty in probabilistic gambles nonlinearly. The probability weighting function, which was based on previous research (43, 46), is defined by the following formula:

$$\hat{p} = 2^{(-(-\log_2(p)^{\gamma_R})} \tag{5}$$

where γ_R>0 is the parameter accounting for ambiguity aversion (i.e. aversion to unknown probabilities, as in the resolution of the Ellsberg paradox). This reference model also allowed us to test whether our participants were more strongly influenced by risk or ambiguity during social decision making (see Eq. 15). The $\log_2$ function always crosses the p/p diagonal at 0.5 and in our point of view accurately captures the intuition that people should have a somewhat accurate perception of the 50/50 odds. Participants then compute the expected value of a gamble they face accordingly:

$$\pi = m * \hat{p} \tag{6}$$

where m is the reward magnitude, and make their choices in relation to the subjective value difference between each gamble (i.e. here, the difference between left and right options):

$$\Delta\tilde{\pi} = \pi_L - \pi_R \tag{7}$$

and trial-wise stochastic choice probabilities for each gamble are generated by a sigmoid function:

$$q_L = 1/(1+\exp^{(-\beta(\Delta\tilde{\pi}))}) \tag{8}$$

where $\beta > 0$, is the inverse temperature term adopted from thermodynamics and it determines the degree of stochasticity in participants' choices.

Description of the social decision-making models. In the main experiment, the participants were asked to make Ultimatum offers to these social agents. If the offer was accepted, the participant would receive the amount R_O, whereas if the offer is rejected both sides got nothing for that trial (as in a typical Ultimatum Game experiment).

Participants could complete the social decision-making tasks using a number of different strategies and here we considered 6 cognitive models with variable complexity, where our preferred model is based on simulating the social agents' choice probability for both the chosen and the unchosen options

modulated by a social risk parameter and computing the expected value difference by integrating self-reward magnitude information.

According to Model 1, the participant's decision value ($\Delta\tilde{v}$) is depends on the difference between social agent's inferred choice probability ($\tilde{q}_A$) associated with the offers on each side $\{L, R\}$, whereby participant makes decisions only considering other's acceptance probability (i.e. choosing the offer which they think is more likely to get accepted):

$$\Delta\tilde{v} = \tilde{q}^S_{A,L} - \tilde{q}^S_{A,R} \tag{9}$$

where $S \in \{i, p\}$, defining whether the opponent is individualistic or prosocial.

Due to the probabilistic nature of this decision-making, in Model 2, we hypothesised that the inferred acceptance probabilities could also undergo a similar probability weighting transformation as in the value-based risk decision-making task (Eq. 4). Thus, in Model 2 participants' decision value ($\Delta\tilde{v}$) is computed by the following two equations:

$$Q^S_{A,L} = 2^{(-(-\log_2(\tilde{q}^S_{A,L})^{\gamma^S})} \tag{10}$$

$$\Delta\tilde{v} = Q^S_{A,L} - Q^S_{A,R} \tag{11}$$

where $\gamma^S > 0$ is the parameter accounting for aversion to unknown probabilities in the social decision-making session, estimated separately for each social decision-making experiments (i.e. against different social agents). Here, the introduction of the ambiguity aversion parameter is critical and it allows us to evaluate differences between the modulation of probability weighting in social and non-social contexts.

In Model 3, we considered a more sophisticated value computation which also integrates participants' own payoff (R_O). This computation assumes that participants employ a cognitive model with a large degree of overlap with the previously defined risk decision-making model, whereby the participant can choose to make an offer with lower $Q^S_{A,R\sim L}$ if the overall expected value is higher.

$$\Delta\tilde{v} = (Q^S_{A,L} \cdot R_{O,L}) - (Q^S_{A,R} \cdot R_{O,R}) \tag{12}$$

After each social decision-making experiment, we asked participants to rate how much they considered other's acceptance probability, their own payoff, or both on a 0-to-10 scale (e.g. a rating of 5 meaning integration with equal weighting). In Model 4, we used this rating as a linear weighting information, where the weight parameter, w, takes a value in the normalised space (i.e. between 0 to 2) with 0.2 increments as it was directly derived from participants' own report on a 0-to-10 scale (e.g. w=1 meaning integration with equal weighting, w=0.4 meaning more weight is given to the self-reward magnitude, etc.). Here, the decision value is computed as follows:

$$\Delta\tilde{v} = (wQ^{S}_{A,L} \cdot (2-w)R_{O,L}) - (wQ^{S}_{A,R} \cdot (2-w)R_{O,R}) \tag{13}$$

In Model 5, we considered a different version of the Model 4 in which the weight parameter, w_f, is estimated freely in the normalised space (i.e. between 0 and 2) and the decision value is computed accordingly:

$$\Delta\tilde{v} = (w_f Q^{S}_{A,L} \cdot (2-w_f)R_{O,L}) - (w_f Q^{S}_{A,R} \cdot (2-w_f)R_{O,R}) \tag{14}$$

We also fitted two additional models to participants' choice behaviour (also including the decisions in the value-based risk decision-making task), which would account for their risk-preferences by revealing the curvature of the utility functions(9). In Model 6, the decision value is computed by the following formula for the power utility function:

$$\Delta\tilde{v} = \tilde{q}^{S}_{A,L} R^{\rho}_{O,L} - \tilde{q}^{S}_{A,R} R^{\rho}_{O,R} \tag{15}$$

where ρ is the utility parameter, $\rho > 1$ indicating a risk-seeking and $\rho < 1$ a risk-averse preference.

In Model 7, the decision value is based on the mean-variance utility function, which assumes that participants would make decisions in relation to the utility associated with each option:

$$\Delta\tilde{v} = (\tilde{q}^{S}_{A,L} R_{O,L} + \lambda R^{2}_{O,L} \tilde{q}^{S}_{A,L}(1-\tilde{q}^{S}_{A,L})) - (\tilde{q}^{S}_{A,R} R_{O,R} + \lambda R^{2}_{O,R} \tilde{q}^{S}_{A,R}(1-\tilde{q}^{S}_{A,R})) \tag{16}$$

where negative values of the λ account for risk-averse and positive values of the λ account for risk-seeking tendencies. Finally, as a baseline control condition we also investigated the fitness of a model which makes decisions based on self-value difference alone (i.e. Model 8; $\Delta\tilde{v} = R_{O,L} - R_{O,R}$).

At the very last step, choice probabilities under each model $M \in \{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8\}$ were generated by a sigmoid function:

$$Q_L^M = 1/(1+\exp^{(-\beta_S(\Delta\tilde{v}))}) \tag{17}$$

where $\beta_S > 0,$ is the inverse temperature term estimated separately for the social decision-making experiments.

We used a Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure to evaluate how well the proposed cognitive models explained our participants' choice behaviour. The free parameters were estimated using a non-linear optimization method over a numerical grid which covered whole parameter space, using MATLAB's (MathWorks, Inc.) *fmincon* function with random starts. We chose between competing models (47) in the social decision-making experiments by their Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) score which penalises more complex models with additional free parameters and Bayesian posterior probability weights as previously described in the main text.

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878 **Supplementary Figures and Legends:**



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880 **Fig. S1. Descriptive ratings participants made about social agents following the observational social-**
881 **learning sessions. (A) Participants responded to a number of questions while thinking about the**
882 **personality of these social agents (all rated on a Likert scale from 0 to 10).**

883 **Q1: How much do you think this person cares about the rewards to others?**

884 **Q2: How much would you like this person if you spent 1 hour with him/her in real-life?**

885 **Q3: How many people do you know in real-life who resembles this person?**

886 **Q4: How socially close do you feel towards those people that you know?**

887 **A fitted 4x2 MANOVA suggests there is a significant main effect of social agent (F=3.01, P=0.03) and a**
888 **significant effect of the interaction term (F=10.16, P<0.001).**

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

Fig. S2. (A) -Log likelihood values and (B) sum of BIC values for social decision-making models (shorter bars indicate better fitting).



Fig. S3. Risk parameters (ρ_i^p) estimated from the Ultimatum giving experiments against two different social agents with different SVOs were not significantly different (P=0.74, n.s: not significant).



Fig. S4. Distributions of opponents' inferred SVOs ($S\tilde{V}O$) based on simulations of the encoded value functions ($\tilde{q}_A$) from the social-learning sessions. (A) Distribution of resulting inferred SVOs for the whole cohort (i.e. distribution of means obtained from each subject's simulation) based on 1000 simulations of the encoded value functions per participant per social agent (i.e. prosocial and individualistic). These distributions were highly significantly different from each other (*D*=0.78, P<0.001), suggesting that participants were able to make distinct inferences about the SVO of their opponents. (B) Distribution of inferred SVOs in 1000 simulations from a single subject gives a normal distribution of inferred SVOs, of which the mean and the standard deviation were used as input variables for the multiple linear regression analysis. Here the true SVO of the prosocial agent was 31.5° falling close to the mean of this distribution (μ =30.77° ± 5.4).



Fig. S5. Parameter estimates $\{\beta_1 \ldots \beta_4\}$ from two leave-one-out cross-validated multiple linear regression models accounting for the frequency of risky decisions made in each domain (y-axis). Significant regression coefficients are denoted with asterix (*P<.05, **P≤.01, ***P<0.001; uncorrected; error bars show SEM of the coefficient estimates at the population level). Variables in the x-axis refer to those described in the main text, SVO: participants' Social Value Orientation; Inferred SVO: $\tilde{SVO}_\mu$; Uncertainty: $\tilde{SVO}_\sigma$; Risky Choice Frequency x (Inferred SVO-Self SVO): $p_{risky} * (\tilde{SVO}_\mu - SVO)$.



Fig. S6. 3D scatter plot with fitted planes through the least squares regression lines, summarise the relationship between the participants' self-reported integration weights (i.e. the vertical axis in both A and B; also identical to Fig 3A), estimated risk parameters in the Ultimatum giving experiments and the predictions of the multiple linear regression model. (C-D) Summaries of correlations between these variables, colour bar showing the correlation coefficients represented in the colour maps. Predicted values of the risk parameter (ρ) in the Ultimatum giving experiments correlated highly significantly with the actual parameter estimates and the participants' own self-reported integration weights (r>.419, p<.002, Bonferroni corrected). In vertical and horizontal axes, the Variable 1: Predicted (ρ); Variable 2: Estimated (ρ); Variable 3: Self-reported integration weight.



Fig. S7. Combinations of social interactions covered by the current study (n=100) with respect to participants' own (x-axis) and their inference of their opponents' SVO (y-axis). Markers with the same [R, G, B] colour coding refer to a single subject's data point and marker sizes are proportional to the uncertainty estimates ($\tilde{SVO}_{\sigma}$) which was included as an input variable in the multiple linear regression model described in the main text.



Fig S8. Summary results of a control experiment conducted in an independent cohort (n=40). Colour bar shows the percent of choices overlapping between the prosocial agent and human participants responding to Ultimatum offers (left panel); and the individualistic agent's choices overlapping with human participants (right panel). The decisions of the computerised agents were simulated 100 times for each participant and percent overlap was calculated accordingly. Considering that expected value difference ~0 range was covered with adequate number of trials across all experiments reported in this manuscript, where the choice behaviour would be stochastic, these results provide additional support to subjective ratings reported in Fig S3 (responses to Q3) that the behaviour of the computerised agents should be well tolerated by the participants in the main experiment.