

Density-dependent selection and the limits of relative fitness

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Abstract

Selection is commonly described by assigning constant relative fitness values to genotypes. Yet population density is often regulated by crowding. Relative fitness may then depend on density, and selection can change density when it acts on a density-regulating trait. When strong density-dependent selection acts on a density-regulating trait, selection is no longer describable by density-independent relative fitnesses, even in demographically stable populations. These conditions are met in most previous models of density-dependent selection (e.g. “ K -selection” in the logistic and Lotka-Volterra models), suggesting that density-independent relative fitnesses must be replaced with more ecologically explicit absolute fitnesses unless selection is weak. Here we show that density-independent relative fitnesses can also accurately describe strong density-dependent selection under some conditions. We develop a novel model of density-regulated population growth with three ecologically intuitive traits: fecundity, mortality, and competitive ability. Our model, unlike the logistic or Lotka-Volterra, incorporates a density-dependent juvenile “reproductive excess”, which largely decouples density-dependent selection from the regulation of density. We find that density-independent relative fitnesses accurately describe strong selection acting on any one trait, even fecundity, which is both density-regulating and subject to density-dependent selection. Pleiotropic interactions between these traits recovers the familiar K -selection behavior. In such cases, or when the population is maintained far from demographic equilibrium, our model offers a possible alternative to relative fitness.

(215 words)

24 Introduction

25 There are a variety of different measures of fitness, such as expected lifetime reproductive
26 ratio R_0 , intrinsic population growth rate r , equilibrium population density/carrying capacity
27 (often labeled “ K ”) (Benton and Grant, 2000), and invasion fitness (Metz et al., 1992). In
28 addition, “relative fitness” is widely used in evolutionary genetics, where the focus is on
29 relative genotypic frequencies (Barton et al., 2007, pp. 468). The justification of any measure
30 of fitness ultimately derives from how it is connected to the processes of birth and death
31 which drive selection (Metcalf and Pavard 2007; Doebeli et al. 2017; Charlesworth 1994, pp.
32 178). While such a connection is clear for absolute fitness measures like r or R_0 , relative
33 fitness has only weak justification from population ecology. It has even been proposed that
34 relative fitness be justified from measure theory, abandoning population biology altogether
35 (Wagner, 2010). Given the widespread use of relative fitness in evolutionary genetics, it
36 is important to understand its population ecological basis, both to clarify its domain of
37 applicability, and as part of the broader challenge of synthesizing ecology and evolution.

38 For haploids tracked in discrete time, the change in the abundance n_i of type i over a
39 time step can be expressed as $\Delta n_i = (W_i - 1)n_i$ where W_i is “absolute fitness” (i.e. the
40 abundance after one time step is $n'_i = W_i n_i$). The corresponding change in frequency is
41 $\Delta p_i = \left(\frac{W_i}{\bar{W}} - 1\right) p_i$, where $\bar{W} = \sum_i W_i p_i$. In continuous time, the Malthusian parameter r_i
42 replaces W_i and we have $\frac{dn_i}{dt} = r_i n_i$ and $\frac{dp_i}{dt} = (r_i - \bar{r})p_i$ (Crow et al., 1970). Note that
43 we can replace the W_i with any set of values proportional to the W_i without affecting the
44 ratio W_i/\bar{W} or Δp_i . These “relative fitness” values tell us how type frequencies change,
45 but give no information about the dynamics of total population density $N = \sum_i n_i$ (Barton
46 et al., 2007, pp. 468). Similarly in the continuous case, adding an arbitrary constant to the
47 Malthusian parameters r_i has no effect on $\frac{dp_i}{dt}$ (these would then be relative log fitnesses).

48 Relative fitness is often parameterized in terms of selection coefficients which represent

49 the advantages of different types relative to each other. For instance, in continuous time
50 $s = r_2 - r_1$ is the selection coefficient of type 2 relative to type 1. Assuming that only 2 and
51 1 are present, the change in frequency can be written as

$$\frac{dp_2}{dt} = sp_2(1 - p_2). \quad (1)$$

52 Thus, if r_1 and r_2 are constant, the frequency of the second type will grow logistically with
53 a constant rate parameter s . We then say that selection is independent of frequency and
54 density. The discrete time case is more complicated. Defining the selection coefficient by
55 $W_2 = (1 + s)W_1$, and again assuming 1 and 2 are the only types present, we have

$$\Delta p_2 = \frac{W_2 - W_1}{\bar{W}} p_2(1 - p_2) = \frac{s}{1 + sp_2} p_2(1 - p_2). \quad (2)$$

56 We will refer to both the continuous and discrete time selection equations (1) and (2) through-
57 out this paper, but the simpler continuous time case will be our point of comparison for the
58 rest of this section.

59 In a constant environment, and in the absence of crowding, r_i is a constant “intrinsic”
60 population growth rate. The interpretation of Eq. (1) is then simple: the selection coefficient
61 s is simply the difference in intrinsic growth rates. However, growth cannot continue at a
62 non-zero constant rate indefinitely: the population is not viable if $r_i < 0$, whereas $r_i > 0$ im-
63 plies endlessly increasing population density. Thus, setting aside unviable populations, the
64 increase in population density must be checked by crowding. This implies that the Malthu-
65 sian parameters r_i eventually decline to zero (e.g. Begon et al. 1990, pp. 203). Selection can
66 then be density-dependent, and indeed this is probably not uncommon, because crowded
67 and uncrowded conditions can favor very different traits (Travis et al., 2013). Eq. (1) is then
68 not a complete description of selection — it lacks an additional coupled equation describing
69 the dynamics of N , on which s in Eq. (1) now depends. In general we cannot simply spec-

70 ify the dynamics of N independently, because those ecological dynamics are coupled with
71 the evolutionary dynamics of type frequency (Travis et al., 2013). Thus, in the presence
72 of density-dependent selection, the simple procedure of assigning constant relative fitness
73 values to different types has to be replaced with an ecological description of absolute growth
74 rates. Note that frequency-dependent selection does not raise a similar problem, because a
75 complete description of selection still only requires us to model the type frequencies, not the
76 ecological variable N as well.

77 In practice, many population genetic models simply ignore density dependence and as-
78 sign a constant relative fitness to each type. Selection is typically interpreted as operating
79 through viability, but the ecological processes underlying the regulation of population den-
80 sity are frequently left unspecified (e.g. Gillespie 2010; Nagylaki et al. 1992; Ewens 2004).
81 Density either does not enter the model at all, or if finite-population size effects (“random
82 genetic drift”) are important, then N is typically assumed to have reached some fixed equi-
83 librium value (Fig. 1b; for some approaches to relaxing the constant N assumption in finite
84 populations, see Lambert et al. 2005; Parsons and Quince 2007; Chotibut and Nelson 2017;
85 Constable and McKane 2017).

86 A rather different picture emerges in more ecologically explicit studies of selection in
87 density-regulated populations. Following Fisher’s suggestion that evolution tends to in-
88 crease density in the long term (Fisher, 1930; Leon and Charlesworth, 1978; Lande et al.,
89 2009), as well as the influential concept of K -selection (specifically, the idea that selection
90 in crowded conditions favors greater equilibrium density; MacArthur 1962), many studies
91 of density-regulated growth have focused on the response of density to selection (Kostitzin,
92 1939; MacArthur and Wilson, 1967; Roughgarden, 1979; Christiansen, 2004). Indeed, both
93 N and s change during, and as a result of, adaptive sweeps in many of the most widely
94 used models of density-regulated population growth. The latter includes simple birth-death
95 (Kostitzin, 1939) and logistic models (Fig. 1a; MacArthur 1962; Roughgarden 1979; Boyce

96 1984), variants of these models using other functional forms for the absolute fitness penal-
97 ties of crowding (Kimura, 1978; Charlesworth, 1971; Lande et al., 2009; Nagylaki, 1979;
98 Lande et al., 2009), and the “ R^* rule” of resource competition theory (which states that the
99 type able to deplete a shared limiting consumable resource to the lowest equilibrium density
100 R^* excludes the others; Grover 1997). Density also changes in response to selection in the
101 Lotka-Volterra competition model, at least during a sweep (except in special cases; Gill 1974;
102 Smouse 1976; Mallet 2012).

103 The constant- N , constant- s description of selection also limits consideration of longer-
104 term aspects of the interplay between evolution and ecology such as population extinction and
105 trait evolution. A variety of approaches have been developed to address this in quantitative
106 genetics (Burger and Lynch, 1995; Engen et al., 2013), population genetics (Bertram et al.,
107 2017) and adaptive dynamics (Ferrière and Legendre, 2013; Dieckmann and Ferrière, 2004).
108 Although density-dependent selection is pertinent to these longer-term issues, our focus here
109 is the description of the time-dependent process by which selection changes allele frequencies.
110 This is particularly critical for making sense of evolution at the genetic level, for which we
111 now have abundant data.

112 In light of the complications arising from density-dependence, the assignment of density-
113 independent relative fitnesses has been justified as an approximation that holds when se-
114 lection is weak and N changes slowly (Kimura and Crow 1969; Ewens 2004, pp. 277;
115 Charlesworth 1994, Chap. 4). Under these conditions, s is approximately constant in Eq. (1),
116 at least for some number of generations. If s depends only on density, not frequency, this
117 approximate constancy can hold over entire selective sweeps (Otto and Day, 2011).

118 However, the preceding arguments do not imply that the constant relative fitness ideal-
119 ization of population genetics *only* applies when selection is weak and N is stable (or when
120 selection is actually density-independent). The idealization of assigning relative fitness val-
121 ues to genotypes is powerful, and so it is important to understand the specifics of when




Figure 1: Phase diagram for the densities of two types n_1 and n_2 undergoing selection. (a) The logistic model $\frac{dn_1}{dt} = r_1(1 - \frac{n_1+n_2}{K_1})n_1$ and $\frac{dn_2}{dt} = r_2(1 - \frac{n_1+n_2}{K_2})n_2$ with $r_1 = r_2$ and $K_2 > K_1$. (b) The constant- N , relative fitness description of selection.

122 and how it succeeds or fails when selection is not weak, or N is not stable. For instance,
 123 in wild *Drosophila*, strong seasonally-alternating selection happens concurrently with large
 124 “boom-bust” density cycles (Messer et al., 2016; Bergland et al., 2014). Are we compelled to
 125 switch to a more ecologically-detailed model of selection based on Malthusian parameters or
 126 birth/death rates in this important model system? And if we make this switch, how much
 127 ecological detail do we need?

128 Here we argue that the simplified models of density-regulated growth mentioned above
 129 are potentially misleading in their representation of the interplay between selection and den-
 130 sity. This ultimately derives from their failure to account for “reproductive excess”, that
 131 is, an excess of juveniles that experience stronger selection than their adult counterparts
 132 (Turner and Williamson, 1968). By allowing selection to be concentrated at a juvenile “bot-
 133 tleneck”, reproductive excess makes it possible for the density of adults to remain constant
 134 even under strong selection. Reproductive excess featured prominently in early debates

135 about the regulation of population density (e.g. Nicholson 1954), and also has a long history
136 in evolutionary theory, particularly related to Haldane’s “cost of selection” (Haldane, 1957;
137 Turner and Williamson, 1968). Additionally, reproductive excess is implicit in foundational
138 evolutionary-genetic models like the Wright-Fisher, where each generation involves the pro-
139 duction of an infinite number of zygotes, of which a constant number N are sampled to form
140 the next generation of adults. Likewise in the Moran model, a juvenile is always available to
141 replace a dead adult every iteration no matter how rapidly adults are dying, and as a result
142 N remains constant.

143 Nevertheless, studies of density-dependent selection rarely incorporate reproductive ex-
144 cess. This requires that we model a finite, density-dependent excess, which is substantially
145 more complicated than modeling either zero (e.g. logistic) or infinite (e.g. Wright-Fisher)
146 reproductive excess. Nei’s “competitive selection” model incorporated a finite reproductive
147 excess to help clarify the “cost of selection” (Nei, 1971; Nagylaki et al., 1992), but used an
148 unusual representation of competition based on pairwise interactions defined for at most two
149 different genotypes, and was also restricted to equal fertilities for each genotype.

150 In models with detailed age structure, it is often assumed that the density of a “crit-
151 ical age group” mediates the population’s response to crowding (Charlesworth, 1994, pp.
152 54). Reproductive excess is a special case corresponding to a critical pre-reproductive age
153 group. A central result of the theory of density-regulated age-structured populations is that
154 selection proceeds in the direction of increasing equilibrium density in the critical age group
155 (Charlesworth, 1994, pp. 148). This is a form of the classical K -selection ideas discussed
156 above, but restricted to the critical age group (juveniles, in this case). The interdepen-
157 dence of pre-reproductive selection and reproductive density is thus overlooked as a result
158 of focusing on density in the critical age group.

159 We re-evaluate the validity of the constant relative fitness description of selection in a
160 novel model of density-regulated population growth that has a finite reproductive excess.

161 Our model is inspired by the classic discrete-time lottery model, which was developed by
162 ecologists to study competition driven by territorial contests in reef fishes and plants (Sale,
163 1977; Chesson and Warner, 1981), and which has some similarities to the Wright-Fisher
164 model (Svardal et al., 2015). Each type is assumed to have three traits: fecundity b , mortality
165 d , and competitive ability c . In each iteration of the classic lottery model, each type produces
166 a large number of juveniles, such that N remains constant (infinite reproductive excess).
167 Competitive ability c affects the probability of winning a territory, and behaves like a pure
168 relative fitness trait. Thus, fitness involves a product of fertility and juvenile viability akin
169 to standard population genetic models of selection (e.g. Crow et al. 1970, pp. 185). We
170 relax the large-juvenile-number assumption of the lottery model to derive a variable-density
171 lottery with a finite, density-dependent reproductive excess.

172 The properties of density-dependent selection in our model are strikingly different from
173 the classical literature discussed above. The strong connection between crowding and selec-
174 tion for greater equilibrium density is broken: selection need not affect density at all. And
175 when it does, the density-independent discrete-time selection equation (2) is almost exact
176 even for strong selection, provided that any changes in density are driven only by selection
177 (as opposed to large deviations from demographic equilibrium), and that selection occurs on
178 only one of the traits b , c , or d . On the flip side, the constant relative fitness approximation
179 fails when strong selection acts concurrently on two or more of these traits, or when the
180 population is far from demographic equilibrium.

181 **Model**

182 **Assumptions and definitions**

183 We restrict our attention to asexual haploids, since it is then clearer how the properties
184 of selection are tied to the underlying population ecological assumptions. We assume that




Figure 2: One iteration of our model. Propagules are dispersed by adults at random (only those propagules landing on unoccupied territories are shown). Some territories may receive zero propagules. Lottery competition then occurs in each territory that receives more than one propagule (only illustrated in one territory). In a given territory, type i has probability proportional to $c_i x_i$ of winning the territory, where c_i measures competitive ability and x_i is the number of i propagules present. In the illustrated territory, more black propagules are present, but white is a stronger competitor and has a higher probability of winning. Adult deaths make new territories available for the next iteration (red crosses).

185 reproductively mature individuals (“adults”) require their own territory to survive and re-
 186 produce. All territories are identical, and the total number of territories is T . Time advances
 187 in discrete iterations, each representing the time from birth to reproductive maturity. In a
 188 given iteration, the number of adults of the i 'th type will be denoted by n_i , the total number
 189 of adults by $N = \sum_i n_i$, and the number of unoccupied territories by $U = T - N$. We assume
 190 that the n_i are large enough that stochastic fluctuations in the n_i (drift) can be ignored,
 191 with T also assumed large to allow for low type densities $n_i/T \ll 1$.

192 Each iteration, adults produce propagules which disperse at random, independently of
 193 distance from their parents, and independently of each other (undirected dispersal). We
 194 assume that each adult from type i produces b_i propagules on average, so that the mean

195 number of i propagules dispersing to unoccupied territories is $m_i = b_i n_i U/T$ (the factor U/T
196 represents the loss of those propagules landing on occupied territories). Random dispersal
197 is modeled using a Poisson distribution $p_i(x_i) = l_i^{x_i} e^{-l_i} / x_i!$ for the number x_i of i propagules
198 dispersing to any particular unoccupied territory, where $l_i = m_i/U$ is the mean propagule
199 density of type i per unoccupied territory. The total propagule density per unoccupied
200 territory will be denoted $L = \sum_i l_i$.

201 We assume that adults cannot be ousted by juveniles, so that recruitment to adulthood
202 occurs exclusively in unoccupied territories. When multiple propagules land on the same
203 unoccupied territory, the winner is determined by lottery competition: type i wins a territory
204 with probability $c_i x_i / \sum_i c_i x_i$, where c_i is a constant representing relative competitive ability
205 (Fig. 2). Since the expected fraction of unoccupied territories with propagule composition
206 x_1, \dots, x_G is $p_1(x_1) \cdots p_G(x_G)$ where G is the number of types present, and type i is expected
207 to win a proportion $c_i x_i / \sum_i c_i x_i$ of these, type i 's expected territorial acquisition is given by

$$\Delta_+ n_i = U \sum_{x_1, \dots, x_G} \frac{c_i x_i}{\sum_i c_i x_i} p_1(x_1) \cdots p_G(x_G). \quad (3)$$

208 Here the sum only includes territories with at least one propagule present. Note that $\Delta_+ n_i$
209 denotes the expected territorial acquisition. Fluctuations about $\Delta_+ n_i$ (i.e. drift) will not be
210 analyzed in this manuscript. Note that drift can become important if U is not sufficiently
211 large even though n_i and T are large (by assumption); we do not consider this scenario on
212 biological grounds, since it implies negligible population turnover.

213 Adult mortality occurs after lottery recruitment at a constant, type-specific per-capita
214 rate $d_i \geq 1$, and can affect adults recruited in the current iteration, such that the new
215 abundance at the end of the iteration is $(n_i + \Delta_+ n_i)/d_i$ (Fig. 2). In terms of absolute fitness,
216 this can be written as

$$W_i = \frac{1}{d_i} \left(1 + \frac{\Delta_+ n_i}{n_i} \right). \quad (4)$$

217 Here $\frac{\Delta_+ n_i}{n_i}$ is the per-capita rate of territorial acquisition, and $1/d_i$ is the fraction of type
218 i adults surviving to the next iteration. Note that our model of mortality differs from
219 the classic lottery model (Chesson and Warner, 1981), where mortality affects adults only
220 and occurs after propagule production but before juvenile recruitment. In the latter case,
221 selection on mortality exhibits some density-dependence, although this reflects the fact that
222 newly recruited adults are guaranteed to reproduce before dying, which is not interesting for
223 our purposes here. Our mortality model ensures that selection on d_i is density-independent,
224 allowing us to more clearly separate different sources of density-dependence and density
225 regulation.

226 Connection to the classic lottery model

227 In the classic lottery model (Chesson and Warner, 1981), unoccupied territories are assumed
228 to be saturated with propagules from every type ($l_i \rightarrow \infty$ for all i). From the law of large
229 numbers, the composition of propagules in each territory will not deviate appreciably from
230 the mean composition l_1, l_2, \dots, l_G . Type i is thus expected to win a proportion $c_i l_i / \sum_i c_i l_i$
231 of the U available territories,

$$\Delta_+ n_i = \frac{c_i l_i}{\sum_i c_i l_i} U = \frac{c_i l_i}{\bar{c} L} U, \quad (5)$$

232 where $\bar{c} = \sum_i c_i m_i / \sum_i m_i$ is the mean competitive ability for a randomly selected propagule.
233 Note that all unoccupied territories are filled in a single iteration of the classic lottery model,
234 whereas our more general model Eq. (3) allows for territories to be left unoccupied and hence
235 also accommodates low propagule densities.

236 Results

237 Analytical approximation of the variable-density lottery

238 Here we evaluate the expectation in Eq. (3) to better understand the dynamics of density-
 239 dependent lottery competition. Similarly to the classic lottery model, we replace the x_i ,
 240 which take different values in different territories, with “effective” mean values. However,
 241 since we want to allow for low propagule densities, we cannot simply replace the x_i with
 242 the means l_i as in the classic lottery. For a low density type, growth comes almost entirely
 243 from territories with $x_i = 1$, for which its mean density $l_i \ll 1$ is not representative. We
 244 therefore separate Eq. (3) into $x_i = 1$ and $x_i > 1$ components, taking care to ensure that the
 245 effective mean approximations for these components are consistent with each other (details
 246 in Appendix A). The resulting variable-density approximation only requires that there are
 247 no large discrepancies in competitive ability (i.e. we do not have $c_i/c_j \gg 1$ for any two
 248 types). We obtain

$$\Delta_+ n_i \approx \left[e^{-L} + (R_i + A_i) \frac{c_i}{\bar{c}} \right] l_i U, \quad (6)$$

249 where

$$R_i = \frac{\bar{c} e^{-l_i} (1 - e^{-(L-l_i)})}{c_i + \frac{\bar{c} L - c_i l_i}{L - l_i} \frac{L - 1 + e^{-L}}{1 - (1+L)e^{-L}}},$$

250 and

$$A_i = \frac{\bar{c} (1 - e^{-l_i})}{\frac{1 - e^{-l_i}}{1 - (1+l_i)e^{-l_i}} c_i l_i + \frac{\bar{c} L - c_i l_i}{L - l_i} \left(L \frac{1 - e^{-L}}{1 - (1+L)e^{-L}} - l_i \frac{1 - e^{-l_i}}{1 - (1+l_i)e^{-l_i}} \right)}.$$

251 Comparing Eq. (6) to Eq. (5), the classic lottery per-propagule success rate $c_i/\bar{c}L$ has
 252 been replaced by three separate terms. The first, e^{-L} , accounts for propagules which land
 253 alone on unoccupied territories; these propagules secure the territories without contest. The
 254 second, $R_i c_i/\bar{c}$, represents competitive victories on territories where only a single i propagule
 255 lands, together with at least one other propagule from a different type (this term dominates




Figure 3: Comparison of Eq. (6), the classic lottery model, and simulations. The vertical axis is per-propagule success rate for all propagules $\Delta_+ n_i / m_i$, and for the three separate components in Eq. (6). Two types are present with $c_1 = 1$, $c_2 = 1.5$ and $l_2 / l_1 = 0.1$. Simulations are conducted as follows: x_1, x_2 values are sampled $U = 10^5$ times from Poisson distributions with respective means l_1, l_2 , and the victorious type in each territory is then decided by random sampling weighted by the lottery win probabilities $c_i x_i / (c_1 x_1 + c_2 x_2)$. Dashed lines show the failure of the classic lottery model at low density.

256 the growth of a rare invader in a high density population and determines invasion fitness).
 257 The third term, $A_i c_i / \bar{c}$, represents competitive victories in territories where two or more i
 258 type propagules are present. The relative importance of these three terms varies with both
 259 the overall propagule density L and the relative propagule frequencies l_i / L . If $l_i \gg 1$ for all
 260 types, we recover the classic lottery model (only the $A_i c_i / \bar{c}$ term remains, and $A_i \rightarrow 1 / L$).

261 Fig. 3 shows that Eq. (6) and its components closely approximate simulations of our
 262 variable-density lottery model over a wide range of propagule densities. Two types are
 263 present, one of which is at low frequency. The growth of the low-frequency type relies
 264 crucially on the low-density competition term $R_i c_i / \bar{c}$. On the other hand, $R_i c_i / \bar{c}$ is negligible
 265 for the high-frequency type, which depends instead on high density territorial victories. Fig. 3
 266 also shows the breakdown of the classic lottery model at low propagule densities.

267 In the special case that all types are competitively equivalent (identical c_i), Eq. (6) takes
268 a simpler form,

$$\Delta_+ n_i = \frac{l_i}{L}(1 - e^{-L})U = \frac{b_i}{\bar{b}} \frac{1 - e^{-\bar{b}N/T}}{N}(T - N), \quad (7)$$

269 where we have used the fact that $L = \bar{b}N/T$ to make the dependence on b and N explicit (\bar{b}
270 is the population mean b). Eq. (7) happens to be exact even though it is a special case of the
271 approximation Eq. (6). This can be deduced directly from Eq. (3): $1 - e^{-L}$ is the fraction
272 of territories that receive at least one propagule under Poisson dispersal, $(1 - e^{-L})U$ is the
273 total number of such territories, and type i is expected to receive a fraction l_i/L of these.
274 By similar reasoning, the total number of territories acquired is given by

$$\Delta_+ N = (1 - e^{-L})U = (1 - e^{-\bar{b}N/T})(T - N). \quad (8)$$

275 This formula is also exact, but unlike Eq. (7), it also applies when the c_i differ between types.

276 **Density regulation and selection in the variable-density lottery**

277 Equipped with Eq. (6) we now outline the basic properties of the b , c and d traits. Adult
278 density N is regulated by the birth and mortality rates b and d ; b controls the fraction
279 of unoccupied territories that are contested (see Eq. (8)), while d controls adult mortality.
280 Competitive ability c does not enter Eq. (8), and therefore does not regulate total adult
281 density: c only affects the relative likelihood of winning a contested territory.

282 Selection in our variable-density lottery model is in general density-dependent, by which
283 we mean that the discrete-time selection factor $(W_2 - W_1)/\bar{W}$ from Eq. (2) may depend
284 on N . More specifically, as we show below, b - and c -selection are density-dependent, but
285 d -selection is not. Note that density-dependent selection is sometimes taken to mean a
286 qualitative change in which types are fitter than others at different densities (Travis et al.,
287 2013). While reversal in the order of fitnesses and co-existence driven by density-regulation

288 are possible in our variable-density lottery (a special case of the competition-colonization
289 trade-off; Levins and Culver 1971; Tilman 1994; Bolker and Pacala 1999), questions related
290 to co-existence are tangential to the aims of the current manuscript and will not be pursued
291 further here.

292 The strength of b -selection declines with increasing density. When types differ in b only
293 (b -selection), Eq. (6) simplifies to Eq. (7), and absolute fitness can be written as $W_i =$
294 $(1 + \frac{b_i}{b} f(\bar{b}, N))/d_i$ where $f(\bar{b}, N) = \frac{1 - e^{-\bar{b}N/T}}{N}(T - N)$ is a decreasing function of N . Thus,
295 the selection factor $\frac{W_2 - W_1}{W} = \frac{f(\bar{b}, N)}{1 + f(\bar{b}, N)} \frac{b_2 - b_1}{b}$ declines with increasing density: the advantage of
296 having greater b gets smaller the fewer territories there are to be claimed (Fig. 4).

297 In the case of c -selection, Eq. (6) implies that $W_2 - W_1$ is proportional to
298 $\frac{T - N}{T} [(R_2 + A_2)c_2 - (R_1 + A_1)c_1] / \bar{c}$. The strength of c -selection thus peaks at an interme-
299 diate density (Fig. 4), because most territories are claimed without contest at low density
300 ($R_1, R_2, A_1, A_2 \rightarrow 0$), whereas at high density few unoccupied territories are available to be
301 contested ($T - N \rightarrow 0$).

302 Selection on d is independent of density, because the density-dependent factor $1 + \frac{\Delta + n_i}{n_i}$
303 in Eq. (4) is the same for types that differ in d only.

304 **The response of density to selection; c -selection versus K -selection**

305 We now turn to the issue of how density changes as a consequence of selection in our variable-
306 density lottery, and in more familiar models of selection in density-regulated populations.
307 In the latter, selection under crowded conditions typically induces changes in equilibrium
308 density (see Introduction). In our variable-density lottery model, however, the competitive
309 ability trait c is not density-regulating, even though c contributes to fitness under crowded
310 conditions. Consequently, c -selection does not cause density to change. In this section we
311 compare this c -selection behavior with the previous literature, which we take to be exempli-
312 fied by MacArthur's K -selection argument (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967).




Figure 4: The density-dependence of selection in our variable-density lottery between an adaptive variant 2 and a wildtype variant 1 with at equal frequencies. Here $b_1 = 1$, $d_1 = 2$ and $c_1 = 1$. For b -selection we set $b_2 = b_1(1+\epsilon)$, and similarly for c and d , with $\epsilon = 0.1$. d -selection is density-independent, b -selection gets weaker with lower territorial availability, while c -selection initially increases with density as territorial contests become more important, but eventually also declines as available territories become scarce.

313 MacArthur considered two types (with densities n_1 and n_2) in a constant environment
314 subject to density-dependent growth,

$$\frac{dn_1}{dt} = f_1(n_1, n_2) \quad \frac{dn_2}{dt} = f_2(n_1, n_2). \quad (9)$$

315 The outcome of selection is determined by the relationship between the nullclines $f_1(n_1, n_2) =$
316 0 and $f_2(n_1, n_2) = 0$. Specifically, a type will be excluded if its nullcline is completely
317 contained in the region bounded by the other type's nullcline.

MacArthur used the four intersection points of the nullclines with the axes, defined by $f_1(K_{11}, 0) = 0$, $f_1(0, K_{12}) = 0$, $f_2(K_{21}, 0) = 0$ and $f_2(0, K_{22}) = 0$, to analyze each type's exclusion or persistence. Note that only K_{11} and K_{22} are equilibrium densities akin to the K parameter in the logistic model; the other intersection points, K_{12} and K_{21} , are related to competition between types. For instance, in the Lotka-Volterra competition model we have

$$\begin{aligned} f_1(n_1, n_2) &= r_1(1 - \alpha_{11}n_1 - \alpha_{12}n_2)n_1 \\ f_2(n_1, n_2) &= r_2(1 - \alpha_{22}n_1 - \alpha_{21}n_2)n_2 \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

318 where $\alpha_{11} = 1/K_{11}$ and $\alpha_{22} = 1/K_{22}$ measure competitive effects within types, while $\alpha_{12} =$
319 $1/K_{12}$ and $\alpha_{21} = 1/K_{21}$ measure competitive effects between types. Hence, "fitness is K "
320 in crowded populations (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967, pp. 149) in the sense that selection
321 either favors the ability to keep growing at ever higher densities (moving a type's own nullcline
322 outwards), or the ability to suppress the growth of competitors at lower densities (moving the
323 nullcline of competitors inwards; Gill 1974). However, even if the initial and final densities
324 of an adaptive sweep in the Lotka-Volterra model are the same, N nevertheless does change
325 transiently (Fig. 5a). Constant- N over a sweep only occurs for a highly restricted subset of
326 r and α values (Appendix B; Mallet 2012; Gill 1974; Smouse 1976).




Figure 5: Selection between types with identical equilibrium density but different inter-type competitive ability. (a) Lotka-Volterra competition (Eq. 10) with $r_1 = r_2 = 1$, $\alpha_{11} = \alpha_{22} = 1$, $\alpha_{12} = 0.9$ and $\alpha_{21} = 1.2$. Trajectories do not follow the line $N = K_{11} = K_{22}$. (b) Lottery competition (Eq. 6) with $b_1 = b_2 = 5$, $d_1 = d_2 = 1.1$ and $c_1/c_2 = 5$. The lottery model nullclines are defined by $W_1 = 1$ (lower nullcline) and $W_2 = 1$ respectively in Eq. (4). For the discrete-time Eq. (6), trajectories are the flow lines of the vector field obtained by evaluating the direction of the local changes in n_1 and n_2 ; these converge on the line $N = K_{11} = K_{22}$.

327 In contrast, density trajectories for c -selection in our variable-density lottery converge on
328 a line of constant equilibrium density (Fig. 5b). This means that once N reaches demographic
329 equilibrium, selective sweeps behave indistinguishably from a constant- N relative fitness
330 model (Fig. 1b). Thus, for c -sweeps in a constant environment, the selection factor ($W_2 -$
331 $W_1)/\bar{W}$ in Eq. (2) is density-independent. This uncoupling of density from c -selection arises
332 due to the presence of an excess of propagules which pay the cost of selection without affecting
333 adult density (Nei, 1971).

334 **Density-regulating traits under strong selection**

335 For density to matter in Eq. (2), selection must be density-dependent and density must be
336 changing. This can occur in a constant environment if selection acts on a density-regulating
337 trait. Consider the simple birth-death model (Kostitzin, 1939)

$$\frac{dn_i}{dt} = (b_i - \delta_i N)n_i, \quad (11)$$

338 where δ_i is per-capita mortality due to crowding. Starting from a type 1 population in
339 equilibrium, a variant with $\delta_2 = \delta_1(1 - \epsilon)$ has density-dependent selection coefficient $s =$
340 $\epsilon\delta_1 N$, which will change over the course of the sweep as N shifts from its initial type 1
341 equilibrium to a type 2 equilibrium. The equilibrium densities at the beginning and end of
342 the sweep are $N_{\text{initial}} = b_1/\delta_1$ and $N_{\text{final}} = b_1/(\delta_1(1 - \epsilon)) = N_{\text{initial}}/(1 - \epsilon)$ respectively, and
343 so $s_{\text{initial}} = \epsilon b_1$ and $s_{\text{final}} = s_{\text{initial}}/(1 - \epsilon)$. Consequently, substantial deviations from Eq. (1)
344 occur if there is sufficiently strong selection on δ (Fig. 6; Kimura 1978; Kimura and Crow
345 1969).

346 In our variable density lottery, b regulates density and is subject to density-dependent
347 selection, yet b -sweeps are qualitatively different from δ sweeps in the above example. Greater
348 b means not only that more propagules contest the available territories, but also that a greater




Figure 6: Change in the selection coefficient between the beginning and end of a sweep of a type that experiences proportionally $1 - \epsilon$ fewer crowding-induced deaths. The population is in demographic equilibrium at the start and end of the sweep.

349 fraction of unoccupied territories receive propagules. Together, the net density-dependent
 350 effect on b -selection is negligible: in a single-type equilibrium we have $W_i = 1$ and $b_i/\bar{b} = 1$,
 351 and hence the density-dependence factor $f(\bar{b}, N) = \frac{1 - e^{-\bar{b}N/T}}{N}(T - N)$ in Eq. (7) has the same
 352 value $d_i - 1$ at the beginning and end of a b -sweep (recall that $\frac{W_2 - W_1}{W} = \frac{f(\bar{b}, N)}{1 + f(\bar{b}, N)} \frac{b_2 - b_1}{\bar{b}}$ for
 353 b -selection). During the sweep there is some deviation in $f(\bar{b}, N)$, but this deviation is an
 354 order of magnitude smaller than for a δ -sweep (the density-dependent deviation in Fig. 6 is
 355 of order ϵ , whereas the analogous effect for a b -sweep in our variable-density lottery is only
 356 of order ϵ^2 ; see Appendix C for details). Since selection must already be strong for a δ -sweep
 357 to invalidate Eq. (1), the density-independent model applies almost exactly for equilibrium
 358 b -sweeps (Fig. 7).

359 However, if selection acts simultaneously on more than one trait in our variable-density
 360 lottery, then evolution in a density-regulating trait can drive changes in the strength of
 361 selection on another trait subject to density-dependent selection. For instance, if selection




Figure 7: Equilibrium b -sweeps behave as though selection is independent of density even though b -selection is density-dependent in general. Panel (b) shows the density-dependent selection factor $(W_2 - W_1)/\bar{W}$ predicted by Eq. (6) (solid line) compared to the same selection factor with the density-dependence term $f(\bar{b}, N)$ held constant at its initial value (dashed line).




Figure 8: Simultaneous selection on b and d induces density-dependence in the selection factor $(W_2 - W_1)/\bar{W}$. Panel (b) shows the predictions of Eq. (7) (solid line) versus the same with the density-dependence factor $f(\bar{b}, N)$ held constant at its initial value.

362 acts simultaneously on b and d , then $f(\bar{b}, N)$ changes value from $d_1 - 1$ to $d_2 - 1$ over a
 363 sweep. The dynamics of density will then affect the selection factor $(W_2 - W_1)/\bar{W}$ and cause
 364 deviations analogous to selection on δ in the continuous time case (Fig. 8).

365 Discussion

366 Summarizing the properties of selection in our variable-density lottery model: (i) c -selection
 367 is density-dependent, but c does not regulate density; (ii) d regulates density, but d -selection
 368 is density-independent; (iii) b regulates density and b -selection is density-dependent. Yet,
 369 despite the differences between b , c and d , selection in a constant environment that only
 370 involves one of these traits obeys the density-independent relative fitness description of se-
 371 lection almost exactly (that is, $(W_2 - W_1)/\bar{W}$ in Eq. (2) is approximately independent of
 372 density). This density-independence breaks down when strong selection acts on more than

373 one of b , c and d (Fig. 8). The c and d traits exemplify the two distinct directions in which
374 density and selection can interact: selection may depend on density, and density may change
375 in response to ongoing selection (Prout, 1980). The combination of both is necessary to
376 invalidate the constant- s approximation. Remarkably, the b trait demonstrates that the
377 combination is not sufficient; the density-dependence of b -selection effectively disappears
378 over equilibrium-to-equilibrium b -sweeps.

379 The distinctive properties of selection in the variable-density lottery arise from a repro-
380 ductive excess which appears when the number of propagules is greater than the number
381 of available territories. Then only $\approx 1/L$ of the juveniles contesting unoccupied territories
382 survive to adulthood. Unlike the role of adult density n_i in single-life-stage models, it is
383 the propagule densities l_i that represent the crowding that drives competition. Reproduc-
384 tive excess produces relative contests in which fitter types grow at the expense of others by
385 preferentially filling the available adult “slots”. The number of available slots can remain
386 fixed or change independently of selection at the juvenile stage. By ignoring reproductive
387 excess, single life-stage models are biased to have total population density be more sensi-
388 tive to ongoing selection. In this respect, the viability selection heuristics that are common
389 in population genetics (Gillespie, 2010, pp. 61) actually capture an important ecological
390 process without making the full leap to complex age-structured models.

391 Traits like b , c and d will often have pleiotropic interactions which mean that adaptive
392 sweeps will behave similarly to the familiar “ δ sweeps” (“Density regulating traits under
393 strong selection”). Thus, our analysis of the variable density lottery does not necessarily
394 imply that Eq. (1) and (2) should apply more broadly than previously thought. Rather,
395 b , c and d represent a possible set of idealized fitness components mediating the interplay
396 between selection and density in density-regulated populations. The conceptual distinctions
397 they highlight will hopefully be useful regardless of the biological realism of our variable
398 density lottery model.

399 Apart from familiar examples such as reef fishes (Chesson and Warner, 1981), many bi-
400 ological systems do not obviously satisfy the assumptions of our variable density lottery.
401 However, even if competition occurs primarily via consumable resource exploitation, spatial
402 localization of consumable resources (e.g. for plants due to restricted movement of nutrients
403 through soils) will tend to create territorial contests similar to the lottery model, where
404 resource competition only occurs locally and can be sensitive to contingencies such as the
405 timing of propagule arrival (Bolker and Pacala, 1999). In this case, resource competition is
406 effectively subsumed into a territorial competitive ability trait akin to c , which would likely
407 affect N much more weakly than suggested by the R^* rule (assuming no pleiotropic inter-
408 actions with b or d). Moreover, even in well-mixed populations, competition does not only
409 involve indirect exploitation of shared resources, but also direct interference. Interference
410 competition can dramatically alter the dynamics of resource exploitation (Case and Gilpin,
411 1974; Amarasekare, 2002), and is more likely than the exploitation of shared resource pools
412 to involve relative contests akin to c -selection. For instance, sexual selection can be viewed
413 as a form of relative interference competition between genotypes.

414 In the analysis presented here we have restricted our attention to selection in demo-
415 graphically stable populations. The largest deviations from the approximation of density-
416 independent selection (as represented by Eqs. (1) and (2)) will likely occur in populations
417 far from demographic equilibrium e.g. as a result of a temporally-variable environment. This
418 is because extremely strong selection is needed to change population density by an amount
419 comparable to environmental variability (see Fig. 6). By contrast, temporally-variable envi-
420 ronments can dramatically alter frequency trajectories for individual sweeps (e.g. Fig. 9.5 in
421 Otto and Day (2011); Fig. 5 in Mallet (2012)), as well as the long-term outcomes of selection
422 (Lande et al., 2009).

423 This suggests that in systems like the wild *Drosophila* example mentioned in the Intro-
424 duction, there may indeed be no choice but to abandon relative fitness. Our variable-density

425 lottery could provide a useful starting point for analyzing evolution in this and other far-
426 from-equilibrium situations for two reasons: 1) the b , c , d trait scheme neatly distinguishes
427 between different aspects of the interplay between density and selection; 2) lottery models in
428 general are mathematically similar to the Wright-Fisher model, which should facilitate the
429 analysis of genetic drift when N is unstable.

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544 **Appendix A: Growth equation derivation**

545 Here we derive Eq. (6). Following the notation in the main text, the Poisson distributions
546 for the x_i (or some subset of the x_i) will be denoted p , and we use P as a general shorthand
547 for the probability of particular outcomes. We denote the vector of propagule abundances
548 by $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_G)$ in a given territory, and the analogous vector of nonfocal abundances
549 by $\mathbf{x}_i = (x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \dots, x_G)$. The corresponding total propagule numbers are denoted
550 $X = \sum_j x_j$ and $X_i = X - x_i$.

551 Similar to the classic lottery model, our approximation involves replacing the x_i with
552 effective mean values. However, as discussed in the text preceding Eq. (6), it is important
553 to treat the $x_i = 1$ case separately when allowing for low propagule densities. We thus start
554 by separating the right hand side of Eq. (3) into three components

$$\Delta_+ n_i = \Delta_u n_i + \Delta_r n_i + \Delta_a n_i. \quad (12)$$

555 The relative magnitude of these components depends on the propagule densities l_i . The first

556 component, $\Delta_u n_i$, accounts for territories where only one focal propagule is present ($x_i = 1$
 557 and $x_j = 0$ for $j \neq i$; u stands for “uncontested”). The proportion of territories where this
 558 occurs is $l_i e^{-L}$, and so

$$\Delta_u n_i = U l_i e^{-L} = m_i e^{-L}. \quad (13)$$

559 The second component, $\Delta_r n_i$, accounts for territories where a single focal propagule is
 560 present along with at least one non-focal propagule (r stands for “rare”). The number of
 561 territories where this occurs is $U p_i(1) P(X_i \geq 1) = m_i e^{-l_i} (1 - e^{-(L-l_i)})$. Thus

$$\Delta_r n_i = m_i e^{-l_i} (1 - e^{-(L-l_i)}) \left\langle \frac{c_i}{c_i + \sum_{j \neq i} c_j x_j} \right\rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)}, \quad (14)$$

562 where $\langle \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)}$ denotes the expectation with respect to the conditional probability
 563 distribution $p(\mathbf{x}|x_i = 1, X_i \geq 1)$ of propagule abundances in those territories where exactly
 564 one focal propagule, and at least one non-focal propagule, landed.

565 The final contribution, $\Delta_a n_i$, accounts for territories where two or more focal propagules
 566 are present (a stands for “abundant”). Similar to Eq. (14), we have

$$\Delta_a n_i = U (1 - (1 + l_i) e^{-l_i}) \left\langle \frac{c_i x_i}{\sum_j c_j x_j} \right\rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)}. \quad (15)$$

567 To derive Eq. (6) we approximate the expectations in Eq. (14) and Eq. (15) by replacing
 568 x_i and the x_j with “effective” mean values as follows

$$\left\langle \frac{c_i}{c_i + \sum_{j \neq i} c_j x_j} \right\rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)} \approx \frac{c_i}{c_i + \sum_{j \neq i} c_j \langle x_j \rangle_r}. \quad (16)$$

569

$$\left\langle \frac{c_i x_i}{\sum_j c_j x_j} \right\rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)} \approx \frac{c_i \langle x_i \rangle_a}{\sum_j c_j \langle x_j \rangle_a}. \quad (17)$$

570 Here $\langle \rangle_r$ and $\langle \rangle_a$ are the effective means, which are defined in the following subsection.

571 **The effective means $\langle \rangle_r$ and $\langle \rangle_a$**

572 The decomposition Eq. (12) is exact and involves no additional assumptions. However this
573 decomposition complicates our approximation procedure because the separate components
574 in Eq. (12) must be approximated in a consistent manner.

575 To illustrate this consistency requirement, suppose that two identical types (same b , c
576 and d) are present, the first with small density $l_1 \ll 1$ and the second with large density
577 $l_2 \gg 1$. In this case, uncontested territories make up a negligible fraction of U ; the first
578 type's territorial acquisition is almost entirely due to $\Delta_r n_1$; and the second type's territorial
579 acquisition is almost entirely due to $\Delta_a n_2$. For consistency, the approximate per-capita
580 growth rates in (16) and (17) must be equal $\Delta_r n_1/m_1 = \Delta_a n_2/m_2$. Even small violations
581 of this consistency condition would mean exponential growth of one type relative to the
582 other. This behavior is pathological, because any single-type population can be arbitrarily
583 partitioned into identical rare and common subtypes. Thus, predicted growth or decline
584 would depend on an arbitrary assignment of rarity.

585 Suppose that we naively used the conditional distributions $p(\mathbf{x}|x_i = 1, X_i \geq 1)$ and
586 $p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)$ to calculate the effective means, such that $\langle \rangle_r = \langle \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)}$ and $\langle \rangle_a =$
587 $\langle \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)}$. Then, in the example from the previous paragraph ($l_1 \ll 1$, $l_2 \gg 1$), the right
588 hand side of Eq. (16) would be $\approx 1/(l_2 + 1)$, and so $\Delta_r n_1/m_1 \approx 1/(l_2 + 1)$ in Eq. (14).
589 Similarly, $\sum_j \langle x_j \rangle_a \approx l_2$ in Eq. (17), and so $\Delta_a n_2/m_2 \approx 1/l_2$. Thus, the rare type would be
590 predicted to decline in frequency even though it has identical traits.

591 This pathological behavior occurs because the expected total density of propagules in the
592 respective groups of territories are different: $\langle X \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_1=1, X_1 \geq 1)} \approx l_2 + 1 > \langle X \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_2 \geq 2)} \approx l_2$.
593 As a result, the rare type's behavior is approximated as though it experiences more intense
594 lottery competition than the common type, which cannot be the case since the two types are
595 identical. The effective means must thus be taken in a way that ensures that the expected
596 total propagule density is the same in Eq. (16) and Eq. (17).

597 We achieve this as follows. For nonfocal types $j \neq i$, we separately evaluate the X -
 598 dependence of the conditional dispersal probabilities to ensure that X has the same distri-
 599 bution for both $\langle \rangle_r$ and $\langle \rangle_a$. Specifically, we assume that X follows a Poisson distribution
 600 with rate parameter L , conditional on $X \geq 2$; this distribution will be denoted $P(X|X \geq 2)$.
 601 However, for the focal type i , we use the exact conditional dispersal distributions p to cal-
 602 culate the effective mean,

$$\langle x_i \rangle_r = 1, \quad \langle x_i \rangle_a = \langle x_i \rangle_{p(x_i|x_i \geq 2)}. \quad (18)$$

603 As we will see, these effective means are straightforward to calculate analytically, and ensure
 604 that the expected total propagule density $\langle x_i \rangle + \sum_{j \neq i} \langle x_j \rangle$ is the same in Eq. (16) and Eq. (17).

Starting with Eq. (16), we only need to evaluate $\langle x_j \rangle_r$ since $\langle x_i \rangle_r = 1$. To evaluate the
 X -dependence separately, we first hold X fixed to obtain

$$\sum_{x_j} p(x_j|x_i = 1, X)x_j = \frac{l_j}{L - l_i}(X - 1) \quad j \neq i. \quad (19)$$

The right hand side is obtained by observing that the sum on the left is the expected number
 of propagules with type j that will be found in a territory which received $X - 1$ nonfocal
 propagules in total. We then take the expectation with respect to $P(X|X \geq 2)$ to give

$$\begin{aligned} \langle x_j \rangle_r &= \frac{l_j}{L - l_i} \sum_{X=2}^{\infty} P(X|X \geq 2)(X - 1) \\ &= \frac{l_j}{L - l_i} \frac{L - 1 + e^{-L}}{1 - (1 + L)e^{-L}}, \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

605 where the last line follows from $P(X|X \geq 2) = \frac{1}{1 - (1 + L)e^{-L}}P(X)$ and $\sum_{X=2}^{\infty} P(X)(X - 1) =$

606 $\sum_{X=1}^{\infty} P(X)(X-1) = L-1 + e^{-L}$. Substituting Eqs. (16) and (20) into Eq. (14), we obtain

$$\Delta_r n_i \approx m_i R_i \frac{c_i}{c}, \quad (21)$$

607 where R_i is defined in Eq. (7).

Turning now to Eq. (17), from Eq. (18) the mean focal abundance is

$$\begin{aligned} \langle x_i \rangle_a &= \sum_{x_i} p(x_i | x_i \geq 2) x_i \\ &= \frac{1}{1 - (1 + l_i)e^{-l_i}} \sum_{x_i \geq 2} p(x_i) x_i \\ &= l_i \frac{1 - e^{-l_i}}{1 - (1 + l_i)e^{-l_i}}. \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

For nonfocal types $j \neq i$, we have analogously to Eq. (19),

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{\mathbf{x}_i} p(\mathbf{x}_i | x_i \geq 2, X) x_j &= \sum_{\mathbf{x}_i} p(\mathbf{x}_i | X_i = X - x_i) x_j \\ &= \frac{l_j (X - x_i)}{L - l_i}. \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

Again taking the expectation with respect to $P(X | X \geq 2)$ yields

$$\begin{aligned} \langle x_j \rangle_a &= \frac{l_j}{L - l_i} \left[\sum_{X=2}^{\infty} P(X | X \geq 2) X - \langle x_i \rangle_a \right] \\ &= \frac{l_j}{L - l_i} \left(L \frac{1 - e^{-L}}{1 - (1 + L)e^{-L}} - l_i \frac{1 - e^{-l_i}}{1 - (1 + l_i)e^{-l_i}} \right). \end{aligned} \quad (24)$$

608 Combining these results with Eqs. (15) and (17), we obtain

$$\Delta_a n_i = m_i A_i \frac{c_i}{c}, \quad (25)$$

609 where A_i is defined in Eq. (7).

610 It is easily verified from Eqs. (20), (22) and (24) that the total expected propagule
 611 density is the same in in Eq. (16) and Eq. (17) i.e. $\langle x_i \rangle_r + \sum_{j \neq i} \langle x_j \rangle_r = \langle x_i \rangle_a + \sum_{j \neq i} \langle x_j \rangle_a =$
 612 $\langle X \rangle_{P(X|X \geq 2)}$. As a result, Eq. (6) satisfies the consistency requirement (see Fig. 9).

613 Approximation limits

614 Having derived the approximation Eq. (6), we now evaluate its domain of validity. Eq. (6)
 615 relies on ignoring the fluctuations in x_i and x_j , such that we can replace them with
 616 constant effective mean values. To justify this, we show that the standard deviations
 617 $\sigma_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)}(\sum_{j \neq i} c_j x_j)$ and $\sigma_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)}(\sum_j c_j x_j)$ are small compared to the corresponding
 618 means $\langle \sum_{j \neq i} c_j x_j \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)}$ and $\langle \sum_j c_j x_j \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)}$ in Eqs. (16) and (17). This result means
 619 that using the exact distributions $p(\mathbf{x}|x_i = 1, X_i \geq 1)$ and $p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)$ for the effective means
 620 would produce an accurate approximation of the components in (12) (though, as we have
 621 seen, not a consistent one). It is then clear that the effective means derived in the previous
 622 section will also give an accurate approximation since their magnitudes are similar to the
 623 exact means; this is obvious from the fact that the expected total number of propagules is
 624 of order $\max\{L, 2\}$ in both cases.

We first consider the means and standard deviations in Eq. (16). We have
 $\langle x_j \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)} = l_j/C$, where $C = 1 - e^{-(L-l_i)}$, and the corresponding variances and
 covariances are given by

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)}^2(x_j) &= \langle x_j^2 \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)} - \langle x_j \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)}^2 \\ &= \frac{l_j^2 + l_j}{C} - \frac{l_j^2}{C^2} \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{1}{C}\right) \frac{l_j^2}{C} + \frac{l_j}{C}, \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}
 \sigma_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)}(x_j, x_k) &= \langle x_j x_k \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)} - \langle x_j \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)} \langle x_k \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)} \\
 &= \frac{1}{C} \langle x_j x_k \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)} - \frac{l_j l_k}{C^2} \\
 &= \left(1 - \frac{1}{C}\right) \frac{l_j l_k}{C} \quad j \neq k.
 \end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

625 Note that $1 - 1/C$ is negative because $C < 1$. Decomposing the variance in $\sum_{j \neq i} c_j x_j$,

$$\sigma^2\left(\sum_{j \neq i} c_j x_j\right) = \sum_{j \neq i} \left[c_j^2 \sigma^2(x_j) + 2 \sum_{k > j, k \neq i} c_j c_k \sigma(x_j, x_k) \right], \tag{28}$$

626 we obtain

$$\frac{\sigma_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)}\left(\sum_{j \neq i} c_j x_j\right)}{\langle \sum_{j \neq i} c_j x_j \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)}} = C^{1/2} \frac{\left(\sum_{j \neq i} c_j^2 l_j + \left(1 - \frac{1}{C}\right) \left(\sum_{j \neq i} c_j l_j\right)^2\right)^{1/2}}{\sum_{j \neq i} c_j l_j}. \tag{29}$$

627 Eq. (29) shows that, when the c_j have similar magnitudes (their ratios are of order one),

628 Eq. (16) is an excellent approximation. The right hand side of Eq. (29) is then approximately

629 equal to $C^{1/2} \left(\frac{1}{L-l_i} + 1 - \frac{1}{C}\right)^{1/2}$, which is small for both low and high nonfocal densities. The

630 worst case scenario occurs when $L - l_i$ is of order one, and it can be directly verified that

631 Eq. (16) is then still a good approximation (see Fig. 9).

632 Turning to Eq. (17), all covariances between nonfocal types are now zero, so that

633 $\sigma_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)}^2\left(\sum c_j x_j\right) = \sum c_j^2 \sigma_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)}^2(x_j)$. For nonfocal types ($j \neq i$) $\sigma_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)}^2(x_j) = l_j$, whereas

634 for the focal type we have

$$\sigma_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)}^2(x_i) = \frac{l_i}{D} \left(l_i + 1 - e^{-l_i} - \frac{l_i}{D} (1 - e^{-l_i})^2 \right), \tag{30}$$

635 where $D = 1 - (1 + l_i)e^{-l_i}$, and

$$\frac{\sigma_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)}(\sum c_j x_j)}{\langle \sum c_j x_j \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)}} = \frac{\left(\sum_{j \neq i} c_j^2 l_j + c_i^2 \sigma_p^2(x_i)\right)^{1/2}}{\sum_{j \neq i} c_j l_j + c_i l_i (1 - e^{-l_i})/D}. \quad (31)$$

636 Similarly to Eq. (29), the right hand side of Eq. (31) is small for both low and high nonfocal
 637 densities provided that the c_j have similar magnitudes. Again, the worst case scenario occurs
 638 when l_i and $L - l_i$ are of order 1, but Eq. (17) is still a good approximation in this case
 639 (Fig. 9).

640 In both Eqs. (29) and (31), the standard deviation in $\sum_{j \neq i} c_j x_j$ can be large relative to
 641 its mean if some of the c_j are much larger than the others. Specifically, in the presence of
 642 a rare, strong competitor ($c_j l_j \gg c_{j'} l_{j'}$ for all other nonfocal types j' , and $l_j \ll 1$), then the
 643 right hand side of Eqs. (29) and (31) can be large and we cannot make the replacement
 644 Eq. (16). Fig. 9 shows the breakdown of the effective mean approximation when there are
 645 large differences in c .

646 Appendix B: Total density under Lotka-Volterra com- 647 petition

648 Here we show that under the Lotka-Volterra model of competition, total density N does not
 649 in general remain constant over a selective sweep in a crowded population even if the types
 650 have the same equilibrium density (for a related discussion on the density- and frequency-
 651 dependence of selection in the Lotka-Volterra model, see (Smouse, 1976; Mallet, 2012)).

We assume equal effects of crowding within types $\alpha_{11} = \alpha_{22} = \alpha_{\text{intra}}$ and $N = 1/\alpha_{\text{intra}}$ and check whether it is then possible for $\frac{dN}{dt}$ to be zero in the sweep ($n_1, n_2 \neq 0$). Substituting




Figure 9: Comparison of our effective mean approximation Eq. (6) with simulations, and also with the naive $\langle \rangle_r = \langle \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i=1, X_i \geq 1)}$ and $\langle \rangle_a = \langle \rangle_{p(\mathbf{x}|x_i \geq 2)}$ approximation, as a function of the relative c difference between two types. Eq. (6) breaks down in the presence of large c differences. The inset shows the pathology of the naive approximation — growth rates for rare and common types are not equal in the neutral case $c_1 = c_2$. Simulation procedure is the same as in Fig. 3, with $U = 10^5$.

these conditions into Eq. (10), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{dn_1}{dt} &= r_1(\alpha_{11} - \alpha_{12})n_1n_2 \\ \frac{dn_2}{dt} &= r_2(\alpha_{22} - \alpha_{21})n_1n_2\end{aligned}\tag{32}$$

652 Adding these together, $\frac{dN}{dt}$ can only be zero if

$$r_1(\alpha_{\text{intra}} - \alpha_{12}) + r_2(\alpha_{\text{intra}} - \alpha_{21}) = 0.\tag{33}$$

653 To get some intuition for Eq. (33), suppose that a mutant arises with improved competitive
654 ability but identical intrinsic growth rate and equilibrium density ($r_1 = r_2$ and $\alpha_{11} = \alpha_{22}$).
655 This could represent a mutation to an interference competition trait, for example (Gill,
656 1974). Then, according the above condition, for N to remain constant over the sweep, the
657 mutant must find the wildtype more tolerable than itself by exactly the same amount that
658 the wildtype finds the mutant less tolerable than itself.

659 Even if we persuaded ourselves that this balance of inter-type interactions is plausible
660 in some circumstances, when multiple types are present the requirement for constant N
661 becomes

$$\sum_{ij} r_i(\alpha_{\text{intra}} - \alpha_{ij})p_i p_j = 0,\tag{34}$$

662 which depends on frequency and thus cannot be satisfied in general for constant inter-type
663 coefficients α_{ij} . Therefore, Lotka-Volterra selection will generally involve non-constant N .

664 **Appendix C: Density-dependence of b -selection**

665 In section “Density-regulating traits under strong selection” we argued that the density-
666 dependent factor $f(\bar{b}, N) = \frac{1 - e^{-\bar{b}N/T}}{N}(T - N)$ is unchanged at the beginning and end points

667 of an equilibrium to equilibrium sweep of a type with higher b . Here we estimate the
 668 magnitude of the deviation in $f(\bar{b}, N)$ during the sweep.

For simplicity, we introduce the notation $D = N/T$ and assume that D is small. We can thus make the approximation $1 - e^{-\bar{b}D} \approx \bar{b}D$ and $f(\bar{b}, N) \approx \bar{b}(1 - D)$. We expect this to be a conservative approximation based on the worst case scenario, because N is most sensitive to an increase in b in this low-density linear regime. We first calculate the value of $f(\bar{b}, N)$ at the halfway point in a sweep, where the halfway point is estimated with simple linear averages for b and N . The sweep is driven by a b variant with $b_2 = b_1(1 + \epsilon)$, and we denote the initial and final densities by D_1 and D_2 respectively, where we have $f_{\text{initial}} = b_1(1 - D_1) = d_1 - 1 = f_{\text{final}} = b_2(1 - D_2)$. We obtain

$$\begin{aligned} f_{\text{half}} &= f\left(\frac{b_1 + b_2}{2}, \frac{N_1 + N_2}{2}\right) = \frac{b_1 + b_2}{2} \left(1 - \frac{D_1 + D_2}{2}\right) \\ &= \frac{1}{4}(b_1 + b_2)(2 - D_1 - D_2) \\ &= \frac{1}{4}(2(d_1 - 1) + b_1(1 - D_2) + b_2(1 - D_1)). \end{aligned} \quad (35)$$

Dividing by $d_1 - 1$, the proportional deviation in $f(N)$ at the midpoint of the sweep is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{f_{\text{half}}}{d_1 - 1} &= \frac{1}{4} \left(2 + \frac{b_1}{b_2} + \frac{b_2}{b_1}\right) \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \left(2 + \frac{1}{1 + \epsilon} + 1 + \epsilon\right) \\ &= 1 + \frac{1}{4}(\epsilon^2 - \epsilon^3 + \dots), \end{aligned} \quad (36)$$

669 where we have used the Taylor expansion $\frac{1}{1+\epsilon} = 1 - \epsilon + \epsilon^2 - \epsilon^3 + \dots$

670 By contrast, for a δ sweep in Eq. (11), the density-dependent term N increases by a
 671 factor of $\frac{1}{1-\epsilon} = 1 + \epsilon + \epsilon^2 + \dots$. Thus, the deviations in $f(N)$ are an order of magnitude
 672 smaller than those shown in Fig. (6).