

Vaccination and the evolution of seasonal influenza

Frank T. Wen^{*a}, Anup Malani^{b,c}, and Sarah Cobey^{a,d}

^aDepartment of Ecology and Evolution,

^bThe University of Chicago Law School,

^cThe University of Chicago Pritzker School of Medicine,

^dCommittee on Microbiology, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA

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1 Abstract

2 Although vaccines against seasonal influenza are designed to protect against currently circulating
3 strains, they may also affect the emergence of antigenically divergent strains and thereby change
4 the rate of antigenic evolution. Such evolutionary effects could change the benefits that vaccines
5 confer to vaccinated individuals and to the host population (i.e., the private and social benefits of
6 vaccination). To investigate the potential evolutionary impacts of vaccination, we simulated the
7 dynamics of an influenza A/H3N2-like pathogen in a host population receiving annual vaccines.
8 On average, increasing vaccination rates decreased the cumulative amount of antigenic evolution of
9 the viral population and the incidence of disease. Vaccination at a 5% random annual vaccination
10 rate, implying a 48% cumulative vaccine coverage after 20 years, decreased cumulative evolution
11 by 56% and incidence by 76%. These effects were mediated by the breadth of immunity conferred
12 by the vaccine. To understand how the evolutionary effects of vaccination might affect its private
13 and social benefits over multiple seasons, we fit linear panel models to simulated longitudinal
14 infection and vaccination histories. Including the evolutionary effects of vaccination lowered the
15 private benefits by 14% but increased the social benefits by 30% (at a 5% annual vaccination rate)
16 compared to when evolutionary effects were ignored. Thus, in the long term, vaccines' private
17 benefits may be lower and social benefits may be higher than predicted by current measurements
18 of vaccine impact, which do not capture long-term evolutionary effects. These results suggest that
19 conventional seasonal vaccines against influenza, if protective against transmission, could greatly
20 reduce the burden of disease by slowing antigenic evolution. Additionally, these evolutionary effects
21 could compound collective action problems, increasing the importance of social policies to encourage
22 vaccination.

23 1 Introduction

24 As seasonal influenza evolves from year to year, antigenic differences between previously and cur-
25 rently circulating strains contribute to low vaccine efficacy [1–4] and high incidence of influenza

*frankwen@uchicago.edu

26 illness [2, 5]. The influenza A/H3N2 subtype evolves faster than influenza A/H1N1 and B [6], and
27 the vaccine is least effective against A/H3N2 on average compared to other circulating subtypes [7].
28 While vaccines regularly undergo reformulation to accommodate antigenic evolution, it is also the-
29 oretically possible for vaccines to affect antigenic evolution [8]. Traditional estimates of the public
30 health benefits of influenza vaccines tend to focus on the benefits of vaccination in the current
31 season and assume viral evolution is unchanged by the vaccine [9–12]. Accounting for the potential
32 evolutionary impact of vaccines, however, may alter assessments of their long-term value.

33 In theory, seasonal influenza vaccines might be able to slow antigenic evolution [13–15]. Univer-
34 sal vaccines, which confer immunity against all antigenic variants, are predicted to slow antigenic
35 evolution by uniformly decreasing the fitness of all strains [15]. Conventional vaccines against sea-
36 sonal influenza, which protect against some strains more than others and thereby confer narrower
37 immunity, might have similar effects. First, by reducing the prevalence of infection, they reduce
38 viral population size and thus the probability that antigenic escape mutants will arise. Second,
39 although vaccination increases the growth rate of antigenically distant mutants relative to less dis-
40 tant mutants (which can lead to strain replacement in other pathogens [16–26]), it also increases
41 the amount of immunity in the population. This increased immunity reduces the growth rate or
42 invasion fitness of escape mutants, slowing the rate of strain replacement (SI 1.1, Eq. S19, Fig. S1).
43 Finally, smaller viral population sizes increase the rate at which different strains go stochastically
44 extinct, weakening selection for more antigenically diverged strains. However, vaccination might
45 *accelerate* antigenic evolution if the vaccine is ineffective against some strains that compete with
46 vaccine-targeted strains, leading to strain replacement or vaccine escape [27, 28].

47 Vaccination’s potential evolutionary effects may change the private and social benefits of vacci-
48 nation. Vaccination confers a private benefit to vaccinated individuals by directly reducing their risk
49 of infection: the vaccine reduces the within-season rate of clinical laboratory-confirmed influenza
50 infections in healthy adult recipients by 41% (95% CI 36-47%) [29]. Vaccination also confers a
51 social benefit to the host population by reducing the burden of disease, although these effects
52 are infrequently measured. Vaccinating children reduces the risk of influenza infection in unvac-
53 cinated household contacts by 30-40% [30, 31], in the local community by up to 5-82% [32], and
54 in a metropolitan county by up to 59% [33]. The valuation of private and social benefits changes
55 according to how much vaccination decreases the burden of disease. If vaccines slow antigenic
56 evolution and thereby further decrease incidence, then the social benefit increases. However, the
57 private benefit may fall as the lower infection risk reduces vaccines’ marginal protective benefit. As
58 the private benefit falls, additional incentives might be necessary to compensate for less frequent
59 voluntary vaccination [34, 35]. A reduction in antigenic evolution from vaccination could also reduce
60 the need to update vaccines as frequently.

61 Empirical estimates of the benefits of vaccination have so far been unable to measure the poten-
62 tial long-term evolutionary effects of vaccination. Most studies estimating the value of vaccination
63 occur in temperate populations such as North America, Europe, and Oceania, which have high vac-
64 cine coverage but do not consistently contribute to influenza’s long-term evolution [7, 36–39]. By
65 contrast, source populations that contribute more to influenza’s evolution (e.g., China and India)
66 have almost zero vaccination [36–38], and few studies of vaccination occur there [40].

67 We consider here the consequences of an idealized vaccination strategy, where vaccination occurs
68 in populations that shape influenza’s long-term evolution. To assess the potential effects of vaccines
69 on antigenic evolution, we simulated the evolutionary and epidemiological dynamics of an influenza-
70 like pathogen. We evaluated how different rates of vaccination may slow antigenic evolution and in
71 turn decrease the total burden of disease. We then quantified how the evolutionary effects change
72 the relative magnitude of the private and social benefits of vaccination in the short and long term.

73 2 Results

74 2.1 Modeling approach and choice of parameters

75 We adapted a model to simulate the transmission and evolution of an influenza-like pathogen over
76 20 years in a well-mixed population (Methods) [41]. Individuals infected with a strain of the virus
77 can transmit their infection to susceptible individuals upon contact. The risk of infection given
78 contact depends on the antigenic identities (phenotypes) of previous infections and the challenging
79 strain. After recovering from infection, individuals acquire immunity against the infecting strain,
80 whose antigenic phenotype is represented by a point in two-dimensional Euclidean space (Fig. 1A).
81 Geometrically distributed mutations displace strains in this space (Table S1, Fig. 1D). This space
82 is analogous to the main components after multidimensional scaling of pairwise measurements
83 of cross-reactivity in hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays, where one antigenic unit of distance
84 represents a twofold dilution of antiserum [6,42]. Each antigenic unit difference in distance between
85 strains increases susceptibility by 7% (Fig. 1C) [1,41,43].

86 The model reproduces characteristic epidemiological and evolutionary patterns of the A/H3N2
87 subtype in the absence of vaccination (Fig. 1A,B). Unvaccinated populations are best for model
88 validation because they contribute most to the evolution of seasonal influenza in reality [36,38].
89 We chose transmission and mutation parameters (Table S1) such that simulated epidemiological
90 and evolutionary patterns most resembled qualitative patterns observed for H3N2 [44]. H3N2 has
91 remained endemic in the human population since its emergence in 1968 and also has low standing
92 genetic and antigenic diversity. Due to the stochastic nature of the simulations, the viral population
93 goes extinct 18% of the time and becomes too diverse 29% of the time across replicate simulations.
94 A viral population is considered too diverse when the time separating two co-circulating lineages
95 (time to most recent common ancestor, or TMRCA) exceeds 10 years, since recent H3N2 HA
96 lineages have coexisted for no more than 7 years. The remaining 53% of simulations that show
97 qualitatively influenza-like dynamics reproduce epidemiological and evolutionary statistics of H3N2.
98 The viral population has low genealogical diversity with an average TMRCA across replicates of 3.80
99 years ($SD = 0.52$), comparable to empirical estimates of 3.84 years [38]. The path of evolution in
100 antigenic space is mostly constrained to one dimension (Fig. 1A), characteristic of H3N2's antigenic
101 evolution [6,42]. Antigenic evolution occurs at an average rate of 1.09 antigenic units per year (SD
102 $= 0.14$), comparable to an observed rate of 1.01 antigenic units per year [6]. The mean annual
103 incidence is 9.0% ($SD = 1.0\%$). Annual incidence across all types of seasonal influenza ranges from
104 9-15% [45]. To confirm the accuracy of the model's transmission dynamics, we compared model
105 outputs against analytic expectations without evolution (since analytic solutions for a model with
106 evolution are intractable) (Figs. S2, S3, S4, and S5).




Figure 1: Properties of the model. (A) Antigenic phenotypes are represented as points in two-dimensional space (AG1 is antigenic dimension 1 and AG2 is antigenic dimension 2). Over time, new strains appear as old strains can no longer transmit to immune hosts. Viral evolution is mostly linear in antigenic space. The amount of evolution is calculated as the distance between the founding strain and the average phenotype of strains circulating at the end of the simulation. Vaccine strains (triangles) are chosen at the beginning of each year by averaging the antigenic phenotype of all circulating strains. Strains are colored according time. (B) Incidence per 10 days is shown. Cumulative incidence (not shown) is calculated as the sum of cases over the duration of the simulation. Vaccines are distributed beginning 300 days after strain selection for 120 days. Strain selection for the following year occurs during the distribution of the current vaccine (inset). (C) Upon contact, the risk of infection increases linearly with the distance between the infecting strain and the strain in the host’s infection or vaccination history that minimizes the risk of infection (Eq. 3) (D) The sizes of antigenic mutations are chosen from a gamma distribution with mean and standard deviation δ_{mean} and δ_{sd} . The radial directions (not pictured) of mutations are chosen from a random uniform distribution. In this example, vaccines confer half the breadth of immunity as natural immunity ($b = 0.5$).

107 To assess the potential effects of vaccination on antigenic evolution and disease burden, we
 108 introduced vaccination to the host population. At the beginning of each year, a vaccine strain
 109 is selected with the average antigenic phenotype of circulating strains. In the United States, the
 110 seasonal influenza vaccine is typically distributed from September through February. Distribution
 111 usually peaks in October or November, 8-9 months after strain selection [46]. In the model, the
 112 vaccine is distributed 300 days after strain selection and for a period of 120 days. During distribu-
 113 tion, individuals are randomly vaccinated at a constant daily rate (Eq. 2). Since individuals are

114 randomly vaccinated each year, the fraction of vaccinated individuals over time. At a 5% annual
115 vaccination rate, approximately 4.9% of individuals in the population are vaccinated every year
116 (due to sampling with replacement in the model) and 48.4% of the population has been vaccinated
117 at least once by the twentieth year (Fig. S6A). At this rate, vaccination effectively renders 26.0%
118 of individuals immune when vaccination is in equilibrium with antigenic evolution (Fig. S6B). We
119 also tested the effects of the breadth of cross-immunity conferred by vaccination. The vaccine’s
120 breadth b is defined as the ratio of the vaccine-induced immunity to that of infection-induced (or
121 “natural”) immunity (Fig. 1). Vaccines with $b = 1$ have breadth identical to natural immunity,
122 whereas vaccines with $b < 1$ ($b > 1$) have respectively smaller (larger) breadth compared to natural
123 immunity.

124 We initially used two metrics to quantify the effects of vaccination on the evolution and epi-
125 demiology of the virus. First, because antigenic phenotypes evolve roughly linearly in two di-
126 mensions [6, 41, 42], we measured the cumulative amount of antigenic evolution by calculating the
127 antigenic distance between the founding strain’s antigenic phenotype and the average antigenic
128 phenotype of strains circulating at the end of the simulation (Fig. 1). Second, we measured the
129 burden of disease by calculating the cumulative incidence, or the total number of cases over the
130 duration of the simulation divided by the population size (Fig. 1). In calculating the amount of
131 antigenic evolution and incidence, we included simulations where the viral population remained
132 endemic or went extinct. However, we excluded simulations where the viral population became too
133 diverse (TMRCA > 10 years) because our measure of cumulative antigenic evolution is inadequate
134 for branching viral populations.

135 Because vaccination may qualitatively alter evolutionary patterns of H3N2, we used an addi-
136 tional metric to assess evolutionary effects, namely the probability that viral populations would
137 become too diverse (TMRCA > 10 years) under different vaccination regimes. Viral populations
138 that are too diverse have the potential to cause high morbidity because hosts are unlikely to have
139 immunity against many antigenic variants. Influenza subtypes H1N1 and B evolve antigenically
140 slower than H3N2 but have greater genetic diversity at any time [6, 38, 47, 48] Thus, we also examine
141 whether vaccination, by affecting antigenic evolution, could also impact diversification.

142 To estimate the contribution of evolution to vaccination’s epidemiological impact, we compared
143 simulations in which vaccination could affect antigenic evolution to simulations where it could not.
144 We generated the latter by first running simulations without vaccination and recording strain phe-
145 notypes and relative abundances at every time step to use as a reference. Then, in each time step
146 of the simulations with vaccination, we replaced all infections with randomly selected contempo-
147 raneous strains from an unvaccinated reference simulation, matching the reference frequencies. In
148 this way, temporal changes in strain frequencies were unaffected by vaccination.

149 2.2 Vaccination reduces the average amount of antigenic evolution and disease 150 burden




Figure 2: High vaccination rates decrease the average amount of (A) cumulative antigenic evolution and (B) cumulative incidence. The solid white lines show LOESS curves fit to cumulative antigenic evolution and incidence across all simulations. The dotted white lines show fits for simulations where the viral population survived until the end of the simulation. The dashed white lines show fits for simulations where the viral population went extinct. Shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals. Densities reflect 500 total simulations for each vaccination rate with excessively diverse simulations (TMRCA > 10 years) excluded, leaving ~ 300 – 400 simulations.

151 Vaccination reduces the average amount of antigenic evolution (Spearman’s $\rho = -0.75$, $p < 0.001$)
152 and incidence (Spearman’s $\rho = -0.86$, $p < 0.001$, Fig. 2) when the breadth of vaccine-induced
153 immunity is the same as that of infection. Without vaccination, the viral population evolves on
154 average 21.5 (SD = 3.3) antigenic units and causes an average of 1.8 (SD = 0.2) cases per person
155 over the 20-year simulation. By reducing susceptibility in the host population, vaccination decreases
156 the number of cases and the average size of surviving mutations, thus slowing the rate of antigenic
157 evolution. In turn, slower antigenic evolution further reduces the force of infection, often driving
158 the virus extinct. Once extinct, the viral population can no longer evolve or cause new infections.
159 Above a 10% annual vaccination rate, implying a 28% cumulative vaccination rate over 4 years,
160 extinction occurs rapidly, typically within 2.3 years (SD = 0.6, Fig. S7). Eliminating the time
161 interval between strain selection and vaccine distribution reduces the amount of antigenic evolution
162 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, $p < 0.001$) and incidence (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, $p < 0.001$) even more
163 (Fig. S8).

164 Increasing the vaccination rate also decreases the probability that the viral population becomes
165 too diverse (TMRCA > 10 years on average, Fig. S9). Thus, vaccination is unlikely to increase
166 morbidity from diversifying viral populations.

167 We next examined how much these reductions could be attributed solely to the “ecological”
168 effects of vaccination—the reduction in prevalence and increased extinction risk from enhanced herd
169 immunity—versus the combined ecological and evolutionary impacts. Relative to the case where the
170 evolutionary effects of vaccination are blocked, vaccination with evolutionary effects decreases both
171 the rate of antigenic evolution and the burden of disease (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, $p < 0.001$), (Fig.
172 3). Also relative to the same baseline, eradication is achieved at a lower vaccination rate. At an 8.5%
173 annual vaccination rate (~ 20% cumulative vaccine coverage within 5 years), vaccination eradicates

174 the virus 100% of the time (within 3.3 years on average) when vaccines can affect evolution but
175 only does so 68% of the time (within 5.6 years on average) when vaccines cannot affect evolution.




Figure 3: Vaccination further decreases incidence when vaccines can affect antigenic evolution compared to when they cannot. Purple lines represent simulations where vaccination can affect antigenic evolution. Yellow lines represent simulations where vaccination cannot affect antigenic evolution. The solid lines show LOESS fits to cumulative (A) antigenic evolution and (B) incidence across all simulations. The dotted lines show LOESS fits for simulations where the viral population does not go extinct. Shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals. Lines reflect 500 total simulations for each vaccination rate and evolutionary condition with excessively diverse simulations (TMRCA > 10 years) excluded, leaving ~ 300 – 400 simulations.

176 The breadth of vaccine-induced immunity and the delay between vaccine strain selection and
177 distribution change the impact of vaccination. With narrower vaccines, higher vaccination rates
178 are needed to achieve the same average reductions in cumulative antigenic evolution and incidence
179 using broader vaccines (Fig. S10). Regardless of breadth, distributing vaccines immediately after
180 strain selection helps vaccines achieve the same average reductions in evolution and incidence at
181 lower vaccination rates (Fig. S12).

182 2.3 Vaccine-driven excessive evolution is rare

183 We developed a test to determine whether vaccination causes excess evolution. We defined excess
184 evolution as more than 21 antigenic units (the average amount of evolution without vaccination)
185 over the duration of the simulation, or when the TMRCA exceeded 10 years. We counted the
186 number of “excessively evolved” simulations for each vaccination rate and breadth. If vaccination
187 does not affect the rate of evolution, the frequency of excessively evolved simulations should be the
188 same as in vaccine-free case (Fig. S14). In contrast, if vaccination increases the rate of evolution,
189 the frequency of excessively evolved simulations should be greater than without vaccination.

190 Although viral populations that survive are associated with more evolution (Figs. 2, 3, S10), this
191 apparent excess evolution is generally not caused by vaccination. Instead, these viral populations
192 evolved just as much in the absence of vaccination, and only survive vaccination because they
193 evolved unusually quickly. In these cases, more vaccination does not increase the rate of antigenic
194 evolution, but instead drives slowly evolving viral populations extinct while occasionally allowing
195 persistence of quickly evolving populations (Fig. S14). Thus, apparent increases in the amount
196 of antigenic evolution among survivors generally reflect selection among simulations (not among

197 viruses within a simulation) for fast-evolving populations, and these populations would appear at
198 the same rate without vaccination.

199 We found that vaccine-driven excess evolution was only possible at low-intermediate immune
200 breadth ($b = 0.2$ or 0.3) and at low vaccination rates (Fig. S13). Even when we detected statis-
201 tically significant excess evolution, these outcomes were only 10% more common with vaccination
202 relative to without. Based on this analysis, we conclude that vaccine-driven excessive evolution is
203 rare for the influenza-like parameters considered.

204 2.4 Ignoring the evolutionary effects of vaccination overestimates the private 205 benefit and underestimates the social benefit of vaccination




Figure 4: Comparison of the private and social benefits of vaccination when vaccination can or cannot affect antigenic evolution. Risk ratios are calculating using coefficients from a linear panel model fitted to the last 17 years of simulated hosts' infection and vaccination histories. Mean estimates and 95% confidence intervals are shown. Red lines represent simulations where vaccination can affect antigenic evolution (dynamic). Blue lines represent simulations where vaccination cannot affect antigenic evolution (static). The relative risk for a population with a 10% annual vaccination rate could not be calculated because all simulations were driven extinct within the first 3 years.

206 To quantify the private and social benefits of vaccination, we collected panel data consisting of
207 individual hosts' vaccination and infection histories from simulations where vaccination could affect
208 antigenic evolution and simulations where vaccination could not affect antigenic evolution. We then
209 fit linear panel models to these data (Eq. 4). We measured the private benefit of vaccination as
210 vaccine efficacy, or one minus the risk of infection having been vaccinated relative to the risk of
211 infection having not been vaccinated (Eq. 5). To measure the social benefit, we used an analogous
212 risk ratio. The social benefit is one minus the risk of infection in a population vaccinated at a
213 given rate relative to the risk of infection in an unvaccinated population (Eq. 6). The social benefit
214 reflects a reduction in the force of infection due to vaccination.

215 The social benefit of vaccination rises when vaccines can slow antigenic evolution compared to
216 when evolutionary effects are omitted. The average risk of infection over the course of a season
217 without vaccination is $\sim 10\%$ (Table S3). When 5% of the host population is vaccinated annually,
218 the average host is 60.5% less likely to become infected compared to a host in an unvaccinated
219 population (Fig. 4, Table S3). However, when vaccination cannot affect antigenic evolution, the

220 average host is only 27.7% less likely to become infected (Fig. 4, Table S3) at the same vaccination
221 rate relative to a host in an unvaccinated population. The social benefits accounting for evolution
222 at 10% vaccination rate could not be calculated because the virus was always eradicated quickly.

223 Since the evolutionary effects of vaccination further reduce the overall risk of infection in the
224 population, individuals personally benefit less from getting vaccinated when vaccines affect antigenic
225 evolution than when vaccines do not. The reduction in the private benefit due to evolutionary effects
226 is a natural consequence of lower incidence: when the overall risk of infection is low, the marginal
227 benefit of vaccination is lower than when incidence is high (Eq. 5). Individuals receiving the current
228 vaccine are 36.0% less likely to become infected in the same season compared to unvaccinated
229 individuals when vaccines can affect evolution (Fig. 4, Table S3). However, when vaccines cannot
230 affect antigenic evolution, vaccinated individuals are 49.5% less likely to become infected (Fig. 4,
231 Table S3). We observed similar patterns when the breadth of vaccine-induced immunity was half
232 that of natural immunity (Table S4).

233 By slowing antigenic evolution, vaccination prolongs its own effectiveness. When vaccination
234 cannot affect antigenic evolution, the private benefit decreases by 9.0% per passing year compared to
235 only 5.6% per passing year when vaccines can affect evolution (Fig. 4, Table S3). Thus, evolutionary
236 effects cause the private benefits of vaccination to decay slower with time. Consequently, ignoring
237 the evolutionary effects of vaccines also undervalues the long-term private benefits relative to the
238 short-term private benefits.

239 3 Discussion

240 We found that vaccination against seasonal influenza could hypothetically slow antigenic evolution
241 and thereby reduce the disease burden beyond its immediate impact on transmission. Indeed,
242 annual vaccination rates as low as 10%, which imply a 28% cumulative vaccine coverage after 4
243 years, can reliably eradicate the virus in simulation. This is a previously unrecognized potential
244 benefit of widespread vaccination. At a 5% annual vaccination rate (16% cumulative coverage after
245 4 years), evolution increases the social benefits of vaccination by 30.4%, which in turn decreases
246 the private benefits by 13.5% compared to when evolutionary effects are omitted. Thus, while the
247 evolutionary effects of vaccination yield a large social benefit by reducing incidence, they reduce
248 the private benefit to vaccinated individuals.

249 Though our simulations suggest that a 10% annual vaccination rate could eradicate influenza,
250 this prediction may not appear realistic since up to 8% of the global population is vaccinated each
251 year [36]. However, vaccination is almost exclusively concentrated in seasonal populations rather
252 than in the populations that contribute most to influenza's evolution [36–38]. For instance, from
253 the 2008-2009 season to the 2014-2015 season, seasonal vaccine coverage averaged 43.4% in the
254 United States and 13.5% across European countries, but was <1% in China and India [36, 49].
255 Moreover, the same people tend to get vaccinated repeatedly, which lessens the accumulation of
256 vaccine-induced immunity in the population over time. In the United States, up to 68.4% of
257 vaccine recipients get vaccinated every year [50, 51]. Consecutive vaccinations may also reduce
258 vaccine effectiveness by interacting with prior immune responses, although these effects are not
259 well understood [52–55]. Thus, the effective amount of vaccine-induced immunity in a population
260 is potentially lower than vaccine coverage estimates would suggest, implying higher vaccination
261 rates might be necessary for eradication.

262 The seasonal influenza vaccine is unlikely to cause excessive evolution, assuming that the breadth
263 of vaccine-induced immunity is similar to that of natural immunity. In simulations, vaccine-driven
264 accelerated antigenic evolution only occurs when the breadth of vaccine-induced immunity is nar-

265 rower than that of natural infection and then only at low vaccination rates. The relative breadths
266 of vaccine-induced and and natural immunity are unclear. One difference is that although natural
267 infection elicits antibodies that bind both the hemagglutinin and the neuraminidase (NA) anti-
268 gens, inactivated vaccines may induce fewer antibodies to NA [56], suggesting that the breadth of
269 vaccine-induced immunity could be narrower than that of natural immunity. Host immune his-
270 tory also affects the generation of immune responses [57–61], and by extension the breadths of
271 vaccine-induced and natural immunity, in ways that are largely unexplored.

272 Although our simulations show vaccines typically slow evolution (and drive extinction) in a
273 single, closed population (i.e., a global population), other models predict faster evolution or higher
274 incidence under particular assumptions. Vaccination accelerates antigenic evolution when stochas-
275 tic extinctions in small viral populations are ignored [27]. In contrast, stochastic extinctions in
276 our agent based model weaken selection in small viral populations. Vaccines can also accelerate
277 antigenic evolution locally when antigenically diverged strains can immigrate re-seed seasonal epi-
278 demics [28]. Our model simulates a closed global population where immigration is not a source
279 of novel strains and extinct viral populations cannot be re-seeded. Finally, assuming that new
280 strains do not appear by mutation, vaccination targeting a single strain potentially increases inci-
281 dence when two competing strains co-circulate [62]. In our model, strains emerge dynamically by
282 mutation, so the novel strains are less likely to appear when prevalence is low.

283 Improved understanding of the fine-scale evolutionary and immunological dynamics might shift
284 predictions. For instance, the rate of vaccine-driven evolution is sensitive to transmission rates and
285 the distribution of mutation sizes. We chose transmission and mutation parameters such that the
286 simulated epidemiological and evolutionary dynamics match those of H3N2 [41,44]. However, in
287 this model, increasing the mutation rate, skewing the distribution of mutation sizes toward large
288 mutations, or increasing the transmission rate increases the rate of antigenic evolution and the
289 tendency for viral populations to diversify [41,44]. Such changes would also increase the probability
290 that viral populations survive to evolve further or diversify especially under small amounts of
291 vaccination (or vaccines with narrow breadth). Our model assumes that an individual’s immune
292 responses against multiple infections or vaccinations are independent, but immunity from prior
293 infection or vaccination affects subsequent immune responses [63]. Consistent with this hypothesis,
294 there is evidence that vaccination history [52–54] and recipient age (potentially a proxy for infection
295 history) [64] affect vaccine efficacy.

296 Our results suggest that conventional seasonal influenza vaccines, already have the potential to
297 slow antigenic evolution and eradicate seasonal influenza. In theory, universal vaccines that im-
298 munize against all strains necessarily slow antigenic evolution by not discriminating between anti-
299 genic variants [15]. Increasing seasonal vaccine coverage, especially in populations that contribute
300 substantially to influenza’s evolution, would help realize similar evolutionary benefits. However,
301 as vaccination further reduces disease burden, people may require more incentives to get vacci-
302 nated [34,35,65].

303 4 Methods

304 4.1 Model overview

305 We adapted an individual-based model of influenza’s epidemiological and evolutionary dynamics [41]
306 to include vaccination. In each time step of a tau-leaping algorithm, individuals can be born, can die,
307 can become infected after contacting other hosts, can recover from infection, or can be vaccinated.
308 Transmission occurs by mass action, with the force of infection given by

$$\lambda(t) = \beta \frac{I(t)}{N}, \quad (1)$$

309 where I is the number of infected hosts. For computational efficiency, individuals cannot be coin-
310 fected.

311 Antigenic phenotypes are represented as points in 2-dimensional Euclidean space, analogous to
312 antigenic maps produced using pairwise measurements of serum cross-reactivity [6, 42]. One anti-
313 genic unit corresponds to a two-fold antiserum dilution in a hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay.
314 At the beginning of the simulation, a single founding strain is introduced at the endemic equilib-
315 rium in the host population. When hosts recover from infection, they acquire lifelong immunity to
316 the infecting strain. Upon contact with an infected host, the probability that the susceptible host
317 becomes infected is proportional to the distance d_n between the infecting strain and the nearest
318 strain in the susceptible host's infection history, with one unit of antigenic distance conferring a
319 7% absolute increase in risk (Eq. 3) [1, 41, 43].

320 Each infection mutates to a new antigenic phenotype at a rate μ mutations per day. The
321 mutation's radial direction is drawn from a uniform distribution, and the size (distance) is drawn
322 from a gamma distribution with mean δ_{mean} and standard deviation δ_{sd} .

323 Vaccination occurs at rate r , breadth b (relative to natural immunity), and lag θ (relative to the
324 timing of strain selection). The vaccine strain is selected on the first day of each year. By default,
325 the vaccine is distributed for 120 days. During the period of vaccine distribution, individuals are
326 randomly vaccinated at a constant daily rate according to the specified annual vaccination rate.

$$r_{\text{day}} = r_{\text{annual}} \times \frac{1 \text{ year}}{365 \text{ days}} \quad (2)$$

327 By default, the breadth of vaccine-induced and natural immunity are equal. Thus, a host's
328 probability of infection upon contact is given by

$$\text{Risk} = P(\text{infection}|\text{contact}) = \min\left\{1, cd_n, \frac{cd_v}{b}\right\} \quad (3)$$

329 where d_n is the distance between the infecting strain and the nearest strain in the host's infection
330 history, and d_v is the distance between the infecting strain and the nearest strain in the host's
331 vaccination history (if the host is vaccinated) and $c = 0.07$ is a constant for converting antigenic
332 distance to a risk of infection [1, 41, 43].

333 4.2 Simulation of vaccine-independent evolution

334 We created a simulation where vaccination could not affect antigenic evolution, the "static" sim-
335 ulation. We first ran 500 simulations of the model without vaccination. For each simulation, we
336 recorded the circulating strains and their relative abundances at each time step to use as reference
337 viral populations. The evolution of these reference viral populations is unaffected by vaccination
338 since they were obtained from simulations without vaccination.

339 To run the static simulation where vaccination could not affect antigenic evolution, we first
340 randomly selected one of the reference viral populations. In each time step of the static simulation,
341 the composition of the viral population was replaced with that of the reference viral population at
342 the matched time step, scaled for prevalence. In this way, vaccination could still alter the overall
343 viral abundance, but the rate of antigenic evolution was already previously set by the dynamics of
344 the simulation without vaccination. Thus, vaccination was separated from the evolutionary process.

345 4.3 Estimating the private and social benefits of vaccination

346 To generate panel data, we ran simulations at four annual vaccination rates r (0%, 1%, 5%, and
347 10%) and recorded individual hosts' dates of infection and vaccination. We randomly sampled
348 0.005% of individuals from the host population at the end of the simulation for analysis. We fit
349 a linear panel model (equation 4) to the simulated longitudinal vaccination data from multiple
350 simulations j . Observations are at host i level in each time period τ (see Table S2 for hypothetical
351 example). The dependent variable indicator variable $I_{ij\tau} = 1$ if a host is infected in the current
352 season τ , and 0 otherwise. The indicator $V_{ij\tau} = 1$ if a host is vaccinated in the current season.
353 Analogously lags $V_{ij\tau-k}$ measure vaccination in period $\tau - k$. If the annual vaccination rate in
354 the host population is, e.g., 5%, then $r_{5ij} = 1$. The regression is estimated as a linear probability
355 model (with random effects) in order to simplify interpretation of reported coefficients. Standard
356 errors are clustered at the simulation-level to account for correlation in outcomes across hosts in a
357 simulation. The equation estimated is as follows.

$$I_{ij\tau} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 V_{ij\tau} + \beta_2 V_{ij\tau-1} + \dots + \beta_5 V_{ij\tau-4} + \beta_6 r_{1ij} + \beta_7 r_{5ij} + \beta_8 r_{10ij} + \epsilon_i + u_{j\tau} \quad (4)$$

358 The fitted coefficients estimate the change in probability of infection given an individual's
359 vaccination status (direct effects) and the host population's vaccination rate (indirect effects). For
360 example, the coefficient β_1 estimates the absolute change in the probability of becoming infected
361 in the current season for a host who has also been vaccinated in the current season. Likewise,
362 $\beta_2, \beta_3, \beta_4$, and β_5 estimate the respective changes in the risk of becoming infected in the current
363 season given vaccination one, two, three, and four seasons ago. Collectively, β_1, \dots, β_5 represent
364 the direct benefits of vaccination. More formally, $\sum_{k=1}^5 \beta_k$ is the impulse response to vaccination
365 over 5 years and measures the total direct protective benefit of vaccination over time.

366 The coefficients β_6, β_7 , and β_8 estimate the change in an individual's risk of infection in the
367 current season when the population vaccination rate is 1%, 5%, or 10%, respectively. Thus, β_6, β_7 ,
368 and β_8 represent the indirect benefits of vaccination under different vaccination policies.

369 To estimate the private benefit (equivalent to vaccine efficacy), the absolute reduction in risk
370 can be expressed in terms of a relative risk.

$$\text{Private} = \left[1 - \frac{P(I = 1|V = 1)}{P(I = 1|V = 0)} \right] \times 100\% \quad (5)$$

371 To estimate the social benefit (or a social vaccine efficacy) for a specific vaccination rate R , we
372 calculate an analogous relative risk:

$$\text{Social} = \left[1 - \frac{P(I = 1|r = R)}{P(I = 1|r = 0)} \right] \times 100\% \quad (6)$$

373 5 Data and code availability

374 The source code of the model can be found at <https://github.com/cobeylab/antigen-vaccine>.
375 All data and code used to generate the results in this manuscript are available at <https://github.com/cobeylab/vaccine-manuscript>.
376

377 **6 Competing interests**

378 We have no conflicts of interests to declare.

379 **7 Author contributions**

380 AM and SC conceived the study. FW performed the analysis and wrote the first draft of the paper.
381 All of the authors contributed to and approved the final version.

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550 1 Supplementary Information

551 1.1 Vaccination and the invasion fitness of mutants

552 We use invasion analysis to understand how vaccination affects the invasion fitness of antigenically
 553 diverged strains by effectively reducing susceptibility. We develop an expression for the fitness of
 554 an invading mutant strain to explain how the antigenic selection gradient with vaccination.

555 Here, S , I , and R represent the fraction of susceptible, infected, and recovered individuals.
 556 The birth rate ν and the death rate are equal, so the population size is constant. All individuals
 557 are born into the susceptible class. Transmission occurs at rate β , and recovery occurs at rate γ .
 558 We vaccinate some fraction p of newborns. In practice, this approximates vaccination of young
 559 children, who are primarily responsible for influenza transmission. Vaccinated individuals move
 560 into the recovered class.

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = \nu(1 - p) - \beta SI - \nu S \quad (\text{S1})$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI - \gamma I - \nu I \quad (\text{S2})$$

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \gamma I - \nu R + \nu p \quad (\text{S3})$$

561 The endemic equilibrium of S_{eq} , I_{eq} , and R_{eq} is

$$S_{\text{eq}} = \frac{\gamma + \nu}{\beta} \equiv \frac{1}{R_0} \quad (\text{S4})$$

$$I_{\text{eq}} = \frac{\nu(R_0(1 - p) - 1)}{\beta} \quad (\text{S5})$$

$$R_{\text{eq}} = 1 - \frac{1}{R_0} - \frac{\nu(R_0(1 - p) - 1)}{\beta} \quad (\text{S6})$$

562 where R_0 , the basic reproductive number, is the number of secondary infections from a single
 563 infected individual in a totally susceptible population.

564 The disease-free equilibrium (when $p > 1 - \frac{1}{R_0}$) is

$$S_{[I=0]} = 1 - p \quad (\text{S7})$$

$$I_{[I=0]} = 0 \quad (\text{S8})$$

$$R_{[I=0]} = p \quad (\text{S9})$$

565 We introduce a single invading mutant $I' = \frac{1}{N}$. To find the growth rate of the mutant, we
 566 develop an expression for the amount of immunity against the mutant strain. The single mutant
 567 has an antigenic phenotype d antigenic units away from the resident. The conversion factor between
 568 antigenic units and infection risk is notated by c . Thus, the susceptibility to the mutant is given
 569 by $\min\{cd, 1\}$, and immunity to the mutant is $\max\{1 - cd, 0\}$. For convenience, we assume $cd \leq 1$.

570 We can decompose R_{eq} into immunity conferred by recovery natural infection R_n and immunity
 571 conferred by vaccination R_v :

$$R_n = 1 - \frac{1}{R_0} - \frac{\nu(R_0 - 1)}{\beta} \quad (\text{S10})$$

$$R_v = \frac{\nu R_0 p}{\beta} \quad (\text{S11})$$

$$R_{\text{eq}} = R_n + R_v \quad (\text{S12})$$

572 The fraction of the population immune to the invading strain from previous infection is denoted
 573 R' . Assuming that vaccines confer a breadth of immunity relative to natural immunity b ,

$$R' = (1 - cd)R_n + (1 - \frac{cd}{b})R_v \quad (\text{S13})$$

Note that when the mutant and resident are identical ($d = 0$), the immunity to the invading strain is identical to the immunity against $R' = R_{\text{eq}}$. Allowing for coinfection, the fraction susceptible to the invading strain is

$$S' = 1 - R' - \frac{1}{N} \quad (\text{S14})$$

$$= 1 - R' \quad (\text{S15})$$

574 for large N . When the vaccination rate exceeds $1 - \frac{1}{R_0}$, the resident is eradicated and S' and R'
 575 are calculated using the disease-free equilibrium.

576 The invasion fitness s of the mutant relative to the endemic strain is the difference between the
 577 per-capita growth rates. Note that since the resident is in equilibrium, $dI/dt = 0$.

$$s = \frac{1}{I'} \frac{dI'}{dt} - \frac{1}{I} \frac{dI}{dt} = [\beta S' - (\gamma + \nu)] - 0 \quad (\text{S16})$$

$$= \beta S' - (\gamma + \nu) \quad (\text{S17})$$

578 The value of s increases with greater distance between the mutant and resident, but decreases as
 579 more hosts become vaccinated (Fig. S1A). The expected s can be used to determine the effect of
 580 vaccine coverage on the expected invasion fitness of the mutant $\frac{\partial \mathbf{E}(s)}{\partial p}$. $\mathbf{E}(s)$ is a function of the
 581 expected distance of a mutant $\mathbf{E}(d)$. In our model, we assume gamma distributed mutation sizes
 582 with a mean δ_{mean} of 0.3 antigenic units and standard deviation δ_{sd} of 0.6 antigenic units (Fig.
 583 S1C).




Figure S1: (A) High vaccination rates decrease the invasion fitness of mutant strains. For a given vaccination rate, the invasion fitness of a mutant increases with antigenic distance. However, the invasion fitness of a mutant at a given distance decreases as vaccine coverage increases. An example profile of invasion fitnesses is shown for $d = 0.2$ (the red line) in (B). Above the invasion threshold for the resident ($\rho > 1 - 1/R_0$), the mutant must be increasingly more distant to invade. The white curve shows the invasion threshold, where the invasion fitness for the mutant strain is zero. Mutants above the curve can invade, while mutants below the curve cannot. (C) Density of gamma distributed mutations with a $\delta_{\text{mean}} = 0.3$ and $\delta_{\text{sd}} = 0.6$.

We decompose $\frac{\partial \mathbf{E}(s)}{\partial p}$ to understand how vaccines affect susceptibility and resistance to change the invasion fitness of the mutant.

$$\frac{\partial \mathbf{E}(s)}{\partial p} = \left(\frac{\partial \mathbf{E}(s)}{\partial S'} \right) \left(\frac{\partial S'}{\partial R'} \right) \left(\frac{\partial R'}{\partial R_v} \right) \left(\frac{\partial R_v}{\partial p} \right) \quad (\text{S18})$$

$$= (\beta)(-1)\left(1 - \frac{c\mathbf{E}(d)}{b}\right)\left(\frac{\nu R_0}{\beta}\right) \quad (\text{S19})$$

584 Since $1 - \frac{c\mathbf{E}(d)}{b} \geq 0$ (i.e. one cannot be more than 100% immune to infection), vaccination must
 585 decrease the expected invasion fitness of the mutant $\frac{\partial \mathbf{E}(s)}{\partial p} \leq 0$, slowing evolution. This decrease
 586 is attributed to vaccination reducing susceptibility to the mutant by increasing immunity ($\frac{\partial S'}{\partial R'} \leq 0$
 587 and $\frac{\partial R'}{\partial p} > 0$) against any mutant. Larger breadth of vaccine-induced immunity (b) also decreases
 588 the expected invasion fitness.

589

590 1.2 Model validation without antigenic evolution

591 In the main text, we show general agreement between our simulations and observations of in-
 592 fluenza's epidemiology and evolution using our parameterization. We further validate the epidemi-
 593 ological processes of our agent-based model by removing evolution and comparing output against
 594 analytic solutions to a model using deterministic ordinary differential equations. A simple analytic
 595 solution to a model with antigenic evolution is intractable.

596 Classical *SIR* models include vaccination of newborns only. In a newborn-only vaccination
 597 model, the threshold eradication rate $p_t = 1 - 1/R_0 \equiv \frac{\gamma + \nu}{\beta}$. Here, we derive an eradication
 598 threshold vaccination rate for a model where all hosts are vaccinated at the same rate.

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = \nu - \nu S - \beta SI - pS \quad (\text{S20})$$

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = \beta SI - \gamma I - \nu I - pI \quad (\text{S21})$$

$$\frac{dR}{dt} = \gamma I - \nu R - pR \quad (\text{S22})$$

$$\frac{dV}{dt} = p - \nu V - pV \quad (\text{S23})$$

599 At equilibrium:

$$\frac{dI}{dt} = 0 = \beta S^* I^* - \gamma I^* - \nu I^* - pI^* \quad (\text{S24})$$

$$S^* = \frac{\gamma + \nu + p}{\beta} \equiv \frac{1}{R_0} \quad (\text{S25})$$

600 We find agreement between the simulated equilibrium fraction susceptible and the theoretical
601 S^* for a range of influenza-like values of R_0 (1.2-3.0) S2.




Figure S2: Simulated susceptible fraction at the end of 20 years without vaccination. The theoretical equilibrium fraction susceptible is given by $S^* = \frac{1}{R_0}$

602 We derive a general expression for the eradication threshold first by calculating I^* :

$$\frac{dS}{dt} = 0 = \nu - \nu S^* - \beta S^* I^* - pS^* \quad (\text{S26})$$

$$0 = \nu - S^*(\nu + \beta I^* + p) \quad (\text{S27})$$

$$\nu \frac{\beta}{\gamma + \nu + p} = \nu + p + \beta I^* \quad (\text{S28})$$

$$\nu \frac{\beta}{\gamma + \nu + p} - \nu - p = \beta I^* \quad (\text{S29})$$

$$I^* = \frac{\nu}{\beta} (R_v - 1) - \frac{p}{\beta} \quad (\text{S30})$$

603 The condition for the existence of a disease-free equilibrium is $I^* > 0$. We derive an eradication
 604 threshold p_t for which $I^* = 0$:

$$I^* = \frac{\nu}{\beta}(R_v - 1) - \frac{p_t}{\beta} = 0 \quad (\text{S31})$$

$$\frac{\nu}{\beta}(R_v - 1) - \frac{p_t}{\beta} = 0 \quad (\text{S32})$$

$$\nu(R_v - 1) = p_t \quad (\text{S33})$$

$$\frac{\nu\beta}{\nu + \gamma + p} - \nu = p \quad (\text{S34})$$

$$\nu\beta - \nu(\nu + \gamma + p) = p^2 + (\gamma + \nu)p \quad (\text{S35})$$

$$\nu\beta - \nu(\nu + \gamma) = p^2 + (\gamma + 2\nu)p \quad (\text{S36})$$

$$0 = p^2 + (\gamma + 2\nu)p - \nu\beta + \nu(\nu + \gamma) \quad (\text{S37})$$

605 Since $p \geq 0$, we take the nonnegative root.

$$p = \frac{-(\gamma + 2\nu)}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{(\gamma + 2\nu)^2 - 4(\nu(\nu + \gamma) - \nu\beta)}}{2} \quad (\text{S38})$$

$$= \frac{-(\gamma + 2\nu)}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{\gamma^2 + 4\nu\gamma + 4\nu^2 - 4\nu^2 - 4\nu\gamma + 4\nu\beta}}{2} \quad (\text{S39})$$

$$= \frac{-(\gamma + 2\nu)}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{\gamma^2 + 4\nu\beta}}{2} \quad (\text{S40})$$

606 Again, we find agreement between the simulated and theoretical eradication threshold vacci-
 607 nation rates over a range of influenza-like values of R_0 (Figs. S3, S4). Because we initialize the
 608 simulations at the endemic equilibrium *without* vaccination, some damped oscillation is to be ex-
 609 pected, which may cause eradication at slightly lower vaccination rates than expected by theory
 610 (Fig. S5). For instance, at $R_0 = 1.8$, theory predicts eradication at $p = 0.0267 \text{ day}^{-1}$, while
 611 simulation achieves extinction in 20/20 simulations within 20 years at $p = 0.024$ (Fig. S5).




Figure S3: With vaccination, the simulated eradication thresholds agree with analytic predictions. The simulated threshold is the minimum vaccination rate where 40/40 simulations go extinct within 20 years. Error bars show the sampling resolution (Fig. S4). Simulations were initialized at the analytically derived equilibrium S, I, and R with vaccination (equation S40).




Figure S4: Estimation of simulated eradication thresholds without evolution, starting at the equilibrium S , I , and R with vaccination. To generate response curves, we ran 40 replicate simulations for each combination of R_0 and vaccination rate and calculated the fraction of extinct simulations. The simulated eradication threshold is the minimum vaccination rate that causes 40/40 simulations to go extinct within 20 years. When the analytic equilibrium I was nonnegative, we initialized the simulation with a single infection.




Figure S5: Simulated timeseries without evolution, starting at the endemic equilibrium *without* vaccination (i.e., $S_0 = 1/R_0 \equiv \frac{\gamma + \mu + p}{\beta}$, as in the manuscript, but in contrast to Appendix Figures 2 and 3). Because the population starts away from the vaccinated equilibrium, the system experiences damped oscillations, which increase the probability of stochastic extinction. Thus, we observe extinction even when the vaccination rate is slightly below the expected eradication threshold. Vaccination remains pulsed in 9-month periods, as in the model. Frequencies of susceptible (S), infected (I), recovered (R), and vaccinated (V) individuals are shown for 20 replicate simulations. The left y-axis shows the frequencies of S (blue), R (green), and V (purple). The right y-axis shows the number of infections (red). The dashed lines shows the expected equilibrium frequencies for each class.

612 2 Supplementary tables and figures

Table S1: Parameters

Parameter	Value	Reference
Intrinsic reproductive number (R_0)	1.8	[66, 67]
Duration of infection $1/\gamma$	5 days	[68]
Population size N	50 million	(see text)
Birth/death (turnover) rate ν	$1/30 \text{ year}^{-1}$	[69]
Mutation rate μ	10^{-4} day^{-1}	(see text)
Mean mutation step size δ_{mean}	0.6 antigenic units	(see text)
SD mutation step size δ_{sd}	0.3 antigenic units	(see text)
Infection risk conversion c	0.07	[1, 41, 43]
Duration of simulation	20 years	
Annual vaccination rate r	$0.0\text{-}0.2 \text{ year}^{-1}$	
Breadth of vaccine-induced immunity b	100%	
Temporal lag between vaccine strain selection and distribution θ	300 days	

Table S2: Sample panel data

Identifier			Data								Interpretation
τ	i	j	$I_{ij\tau}$	$V_{ij\tau-1}$	$V_{ij\tau-2}$	$V_{ij\tau-3}$	$V_{ij\tau-4}$	r_{1ij}	r_{5ij}	r_{10ij}	
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	The host was infected this season (1) and only vaccinated 2 seasons ago. The population vaccination rate is 5%
1	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	Host not infected this season (1). Host vaccinated this season and 4 seasons ago. Population vaccination rate is 5%
...											
10	1	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	Host infected this season (10). Host vaccinated 4 seasons ago. Population vaccination rate is 10%




Figure S6: (A) Vaccine coverage and (B) effective vaccine-induced immunity over time calculated from simulations. (A) The fraction of individuals who have been vaccinated at least once accumulated over time and saturates at 50%. (B) The effective amount of vaccine-induced immunity in the population is calculated using the mean antigenic distance between circulating strains and the vaccinated hosts' vaccine strains. At any given time, the effective vaccine immunity is $\frac{1}{N} \sum_i^{Np} \min \{0, 1 - cd_{xv_i}\}$, where N is the host population size, p is the fraction of vaccinated, v_i is the vaccine strain received by individual i , x is the average circulating strain, d is the antigenic distance between the strains, and c is a constant that converts between antigenic distance and risk. The horizontal line indicates the theoretical eradication threshold in an antigenically homogenous population $1 - 1/R_0$.




Figure S7: High vaccination rates increase the probability of extinction and shorten the average time to extinction. (A) Points show the fraction of simulations where the viral population went extinct before 20 years. (B) Density of times to extinction. The solid white line shows the average time to extinction across these simulations. Lines reflect 500 total simulations for each vaccination rate with excessively diverse simulations (TMRCA > 10 years) excluded, leaving $\sim 300 - 400$ simulations.




Figure S8: With no temporal lag between vaccine strain selection and distribution, increasing the vaccination rate quickly decreases the average amount of (A) cumulative antigenic evolution (A) and (B) incidence. The solid white line shows a LOESS fit to cumulative antigenic evolution and incidence across all simulations. The dotted white line shows a LOESS fit to cumulative antigenic evolution and incidence for simulations where the viral population did not go extinct. Shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals.




Figure S9: Increasing the vaccination rate increases the probability that the viral population will go extinct (B) and decreases the probability of exhibiting influenza-like dynamics (A) or excessive diversification (TMRCA > 10 years) (C). Lines are colored according to the breadth of the vaccine. Data are collected from 500 replicate simulations per unique combination of vaccination rate and vaccine immune breadth with excessively diverse simulations (TMRCA > 10 years) excluded, leaving ~ 300 – 400 simulations per parameter combination.




Figure S10: Across all simulations (A&B), vaccination decreases the average (A) cumulative antigenic evolution and (B) incidence regardless of breadth. In the subset of simulations where the viral population does not go extinct (C&D), vaccines with narrow breadth are associated with greater average antigenic evolution (C) and incidence (D), but these increases are not necessarily caused by vaccination (see Fig. S13). Lines are colored according to the breadth of vaccine-induced immunity. The grey dashed lines indicate the average amount of antigenic evolution (A,C) or incidence (B,D) without vaccination. Points indicate significant decrease (below the dashed line) or increase (above the dashed line) compared to no vaccination according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test ($p < 0.05$) performed on at least 5 replicate simulations. Complete data are shown in Figures S11 and S14. Data are collected from 500 replicate simulations per unique combination of vaccination rate and vaccine immune breadth with excessively diverse simulations (TMRCA > 10 years) excluded, leaving $\sim 300 - 400$ simulations per parameter combination.




Figure S11: Density plots of complete simulation data corresponding to Figure S10. The solid white lines show a LOESS fit to cumulative antigenic evolution or incidence across all simulations. The dotted white lines show a LOESS fit to cumulative antigenic evolution or incidence for simulations where the viral population did not go extinct. Shaded areas show 95% confidence intervals. Data are collected from 500 replicate simulations per unique combination of vaccination rate and vaccine immune breadth with excessively diverse simulations ($TMRCA > 10$ years) excluded, leaving $\sim 300 - 400$ simulations per parameter combination.




Figure S12: With no temporal lag between vaccine strain selection and distribution, lower vaccination rates are needed to achieve the same reductions in (A) cumulative antigenic evolution and (B) cumulative incidence compared to when vaccines are distributed 300 days after strain selection (Fig. S10). The solid lines show averages across all simulations, while dotted lines show averages over simulations where the viral population did not go extinct. Lines are colored according to the breadth of vaccine-induced immunity. Data are collected from 500 replicate simulations per unique combination of vaccination rate and vaccine immune breadth with excessively diverse simulations (TMRCAs > 10 years) excluded, leaving ~ 300 – 400 simulations per parameter combination.




Figure S13: Vaccination almost always reduces the rate of antigenic evolution. The subplots show the number of simulations (out of 1000 replicates for each unique combination of parameters) that demonstrate excessive evolution for each vaccination rate and breadth b . Here, excessive evolution is defined by either more than 21 antigenic units of cumulative evolution or a TMRCA > 10 years. Black lines show the number of simulations that evolve excessively without vaccination (the null expectation if vaccines do not drive faster evolution). Red bars show significantly more counts of excessive evolution compared to unvaccinated simulations ($p < 0.05$, Pearson's χ^2 test).




Figure S14: The distributions of cumulative antigenic evolution are profiles along each vaccination rate shown in figure S11. Data are collected from 500 replicate simulations per unique combination of vaccination rate and vaccine immune breadth with excessively diverse simulations (TMRCA > 10 years) excluded, leaving ~ 300 – 400 simulations per parameter combination.

Table S3: Private and social benefits of vaccination. In the static model, vaccination cannot affect antigenic evolution. In the dynamic model, vaccination can affect antigenic evolution. Statistics are computed using a linear panel model on longitudinal panel data of simulated hosts' infection and vaccination histories. Robust standard errors shown in brackets are clustered by simulation.

	Probability of infection in the current season (τ)	
	Static ($\times 10^{-2}$)	Dynamic ($\times 10^{-2}$)
Constant	9.91*** [0.35]	9.94*** [0.23]
Vaccinated in current season (τ)	-4.65*** [0.20]	-3.34*** [0.32]
Vaccinated 1 season ago ($\tau-1$)	-3.62*** [0.18]	-2.78*** [0.33]
Vaccinated 2 seasons ago ($\tau-2$)	-2.65*** [0.13]	-2.05*** [0.24]
Vaccinated 3 seasons ago ($\tau-3$)	-1.47*** [0.19]	-1.74*** [0.22]
Vaccinated 3 seasons ago ($\tau-4$)	-1.28*** [0.20]	-1.08*** [0.16]
Vaccination rate = 1%	-0.95** [0.46]	-0.93** [0.47]
Vaccination rate = 5%	-2.75*** [0.50]	-5.75*** [0.65]
Vaccination rate = 10%	-2.42*** [0.35]	
Observations	1,627,500	987,500
Number of hosts	140,000	87,500
Vaccine efficacy (%)	46.95	33.58
Vaccine efficacy (% , social $r = 1\%$)	9.28	9.36
Vaccine efficacy (% , social $r = 5\%$)	27.4	57.8
Vaccine efficacy (% , social $r = 10\%$)	24.1	—

Table S4: Private and social benefits of vaccination for a vaccine that provides half the immune breadth of natural immunity ($b = 0.5$). In the static model, vaccination cannot affect antigenic evolution. In the dynamic model, vaccination can affect antigenic evolution. Statistics are computed using a linear panel model on longitudinal panel data of simulated hosts' infection and vaccination histories. Robust standard errors shown in brackets are clustered by simulation.

	Probability of infection in the current season (τ)	
	Static ($\times 10^{-2}$)	Dynamic ($\times 10^{-2}$)
Constant	9.63*** [0.25]	9.84*** [0.44]
Vaccinated this season (τ)	-3.48*** [0.19]	-3.22*** [0.22]
Vaccinated 1 seasons ago ($\tau-1$)	-2.00*** [0.16]	-1.72*** [0.22]
Vaccinated 2 seasons ago ($\tau-2$)	-0.88*** [0.14]	-0.82*** [0.19]
Vaccinated 3 seasons ago ($\tau-3$)	-0.08 [0.15]	0.26 [0.19]
Vaccinated 4 seasons ago ($\tau-4$)	0.19 [0.19]	0.27 [0.20]
Vaccination rate = 1%	0.68 [0.44]	-0.20 [0.53]
Vaccination rate = 5%	-1.50*** [0.41]	-0.34 [0.50]
Vaccination rate = 10%	-0.91 [0.88]	-4.85*** [1.11]
Observations	1,727,500	927,500
Number of hosts	155,000	82,500
Vaccine efficacy (% , private)	36.10	32.68
Vaccine efficacy (% , social $r = 1\%$)	-9.24	2.03
Vaccine efficacy (% , social $r = 5\%$)	1.34	3.05
Vaccine efficacy (% , social $r = 10\%$)	7.27	49.3