

1 The cost of heat waves and droughts for global crop production

2
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4

5 6 **Abstract** 7

8 Heat waves and droughts are a key risk to global crop production and quantifying the
9 extent of this risk is essential for insurance assessment and disaster risk reduction. Here
10 we estimate the cumulative production losses of six major commodity groups under both
11 extreme heat and drought events, across 131 countries, over the time period of 1961-
12 2014. Our results show substantial variation in national disaster risks that have hitherto
13 gone unrecognised in regional and global average estimates. The most severe losses are
14 represented by cereal losses in Angola (4.1%), Botswana (5.7%), USA (4.4%) and
15 Australia (4.4%), oilcrop losses in Paraguay (5.5%), pulse losses in Angola (4.7%) and
16 Nigeria (4.8%), and root and tuber losses in Thailand (3.2%). In monetary terms we
17 estimate the global production loss over this period to be \$237 billion US Dollars (2004-
18 2006 baseline). The nations that incurred the largest financial hits were the USA (\$116
19 billion), the former Soviet Union (\$37 billion), India (\$28 billion), China (\$10.7 billion)
20 and Australia (\$8.5 billion USD). Our analysis closes an important gap in our
21 understanding of the impacts of extreme weather events on global crop production and
22 provides the basis for country relevant disaster risk reduction.
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39 **Main text**

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41 There is now credible evidence that human driven climate change is leading to an
42 increase in the severity and frequency of extreme weather events¹. However, the
43 agricultural risk associated with these extreme events is not only a function of their
44 frequency: it also depends on whether they occur in key production locations, and how
45 vulnerable production systems are to their onset^{2,3}. Despite calls from within and outside
46 the scientific community to determine agricultural risk under extreme weather
47 disasters^{2,4,5}, and the identification of heat waves and droughts as key components of this
48 risk³, we still know surprisingly little about the impact of disaster events on crop
49 production at the global level. There are at least three agenda setting knowledge gaps
50 that need to be filled. First, previous work on the impact of these events has averaged
51 impacts at a regional level³. We need to estimate risk on the country level to align
52 scientific efforts with international disaster risk response profiling initiatives (e.g.
53 INFORM⁶). Second, average per-impact loss estimates³, are important for determining
54 stocking requirements for isolated events, but do not give the full picture of risk, which is
55 intrinsically dependent on disaster return times². Third, whilst cereals have been the
56 predominant focus of global analyses of climate impacts^{3,7-9}, differences in production
57 geographies¹⁰ as well as renewed focus on nutrition^{11,12} suggest a need to assess climate
58 disaster risk profiles across different commodity groups.

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60 Here we attempt to fill these three knowledge gaps by estimating the cumulative impact
61 of nationally reported extreme heat and drought disasters occurring in 131 countries on
62 the productivity of six major commodity groups (cereals, oilcrops, pulses, roots and
63 tubers, vegetables and fruits), over the period of 1961-2014. Following previous work³,
64 we utilize disaster occurrence data from the EM-DAT CRED International Disasters
65 Database¹³, and crop production and value time series data from the United Nations Food
66 and Agricultural Organisation¹⁴. We estimate national production deviations during heat
67 and drought disaster years for each country and commodity compared to a counterfactual
68 without disasters. We then use historical simulations to identify the null distribution of
69 production deviations in each country in non-disaster years. This methodology provides
70 new insights into the countries that show out of the ordinary crop production deviations
71 in years in which extreme weather disasters were reported. In addition to calculating the
72 impacts associated with heat and drought disasters, we also identify the global cost of
73 these losses in monetary terms and the profile of monetary losses across all nations for
74 which notable production deviations occurred.

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76 Globally, we estimate that 1.4% of cereal production, 0.5% of oilcrops, 0.6% of pulses,
77 0.2% of fruits, and 0.09% of vegetable were lost due to heat and drought disasters over
78 1961-2014. Our improved estimate of global cereal production loss is almost half the
79 previous estimate of the impact of heat and drought events³ which pooled counterfactuals
80 across countries globally. This is the first time to our knowledge that the global crop
81 production losses to heat and drought events for non-cereal commodity groups has been
82 calculated.

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
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85 Our results show substantial variation in national responses to heat and drought (Figure
86 1). The largest drag from heat and drought for cereals were observed in Botswana (5.7%),
87 followed closely by the USA (4.4%), Australia (4.4%), and Angola (4.1%). There are a
88 few things to note about these losses. First, these national losses deviate markedly from
89 the global loss estimate. Second, there are some countries where the production losses
90 under heat and drought events are close to the null distribution for these types of disasters
91 (e.g. Botswana), and others where associated losses fall far outside the natural variation
92 in production (e.g. Angola and USA; Figure 1A). This illustrates that the perception of
93 heat and drought disaster risk is likely to greatly depend on the other factors that drive
94 inter-annual production variation within each country. Third, our analyses show equal
95 levels of long-term risk in percentage terms in both developed and less developed
96 countries. Thus on a percentage basis, disaster risks might not be greater in
97 technologically advanced farming systems as had previously been suggested^{3,15}.


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99 Our analysis also shows substantial variation in the influence of heat and drought across
100 different commodity types. The largest non-cereal losses occurred in Paraguay for oilcrop
101 production (5.5%), Angola and Nigeria for pulse production (4.7% and 4.8%
102 respectively), and Thailand for roots and tubers (3.2%). This commodity comparison
103 provides two additional insights. First, there are differences between commodity
104 responses within countries during heat and drought events. For example, over the study
105 period the USA saw significant losses in cereal (see above) and oilcrops (1.1%), but
106 significant gains in pulse production (1.6%). The presence of positive deviations, or lack
107 of significant impacts in certain commodities where others fail, is suggestive that
108 commodity diversity might offer some alleviation of risk to extreme events due to
109 portfolio effects – a benefit of biodiversity well recognized in the ecological literature
110 (see Ref 16). Secondly, some commodities seem more susceptible than others – the least
111 severe losses occur in vegetables, fruits, and roots and tubers, and the most severe in
112 cereals, oilcrops and pulses. These differences suggest that an assessment of sustainable
113 diets^{11,12} might also benefit from identifying the ‘climate riskiness of the plate’ in
114 addition to other environmental and social considerations.

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116 In monetary terms we estimate the net effect of heat and drought events across all
117 commodities and countries over the study period to be ~\$237 billion USD (2004-2006
118 baseline). These losses were not evenly distributed across countries – the largest financial
119 losses were incurred by USA (\$116 billion), Soviet Union (\$37 billion), India (\$28
120 billion), China (\$11 billion) and Australia (\$8.5 billion) (Figure 2) (Although our
121 estimates for China are more conservative than for other countries, see Supplementary
122 Information). Losses were also not evenly distributed across commodity types, with the
123 vast majority being due to cereals (\$190 billion), and the remaining allocated to pulses
124 (\$3.4 billion), oilcrops (\$19 billion), roots and tubers (\$9.3 billion), fruits (\$12 billion)
125 and vegetables (\$2.1 billion). These monetary impacts show substantial bias for losses
126 toward countries holding the world’s major breadbaskets, and towards crops that make up
127 most of human calorific intake. These figures highlight the potential economic
128 opportunity from reducing vulnerability and exposure to extreme heat and drought events
129 in arable agriculture.

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 132 **Fig 1.** Effect of heat and drought disasters on global crop production. All the cases where
 133 a significant production loss or gain was estimated are shown. The y-axis indicates the
 134 percent of production within a country that was lost or gained during heat and drought
 135 events over 1961-2014. Gray points and whiskers show the median and range of the null
 136 distribution for losses or gains in years when heat and drought events did not occur.
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141 **Fig 2.** Estimated economic cost of heat and drought disasters on global crop production
 142 during 1961-2014. Losses and gains in production from figure 1 were converted into
 143 dollar values and summed for each country. A y-axis value of $-1e+09$ is equal to a loss of
 144 1 billion USD (2004-2006 baseline). Note the logarithmic scale on the y-axis.

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148 We have four key messages from this analysis. First, we find large variation in the effects
149 of heat and drought disasters on crop production at the national level, which has to date
150 gone unrecognized in global analyses. Second, we find evidence for significant drag on
151 crop production in countries in Africa and Asia that on a percent basis equal those in the
152 USA or Europe. This contradicts previous analysis that estimated regional averages and
153 suggests that both developed countries and less developed countries can be equally
154 susceptible on the national level to droughts and heat waves. Third, we observed
155 differences between commodities in the historical impacts of heat and drought events.
156 These differences between nations and commodities suggest that our risk profiles to
157 extreme events will depend on what we choose to consume and in which country we
158 choose to grow it. How future consumption trends influence the climate risk comprises an
159 important avenue of future research. Finally, we found that the financial losses from
160 extreme heat and drought events are not trivial and are not evenly allocated across
161 countries. We show significant economic opportunity from avoiding similar losses to heat
162 and drought events in future – particularly for large agricultural producers such as the
163 USA.

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165 In sum, our analysis provides the first global picture of cumulative losses associated with
166 drought and heat events across different commodity types at the country level, and the
167 first monetary evaluation of these losses. We hope that this work will help better integrate
168 scientific assessments of risk into international disaster risk response profiling initiatives,
169 will aid proactive action to prevent losses in the future, and garner support for designing
170 more resilient global cropping systems.

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238 **Materials and Methods**

239 A full set of reproducible R¹⁷ script and data are supplied as Supplementary Information
240 to enable others to undertake the entirety of the analysis presented in this paper. Here we
241 provide a brief description of the analysis.

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243 **Data sets**

244 Three open source data sets were used in the analysis presented here. We obtained
245 records of extreme weather disasters from the EM-DAT CRED International Disaster
246 Database (<http://emdat.be/>), and crop production and gross production value data from
247 the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization's FAOSTAT database
248 (<http://www.fao.org/faostat/en>). We processed the data to maintain continuity in
249 geographic boundaries over time (e.g., aggregating data from 1992 onward to the Former
250 Soviet Union). We matched the production data to the countries and year of recording
251 present in the disaster database.

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253 **Disaster impacts**

254 To identify the impact of heat and drought events on production for each of the six
255 commodities for each country, we constructed a counterfactual production in disaster
256 years and compared it to the observed production in those years. To do this we created
257 two complementary 3D arrays, $x_{i=1:131, j=1:53, k=l=1:18}$ and $y_{i=1:131, j=1:53, k=l=1:18}$
258 containing the national level production data for disaster and non-disaster years
259 respectively, where i are countries, j are years (1961-2014), k are the commodities
260 (cereals, oilcrops, pulses, roots and tubers, vegetables and fruits), and l are disasters (heat,
261 drought, heat & drought). Counterfactual production in disaster years was estimated by
262 linearly interpolating between y_j 's to create a new array $\bar{y}_{i,j,k,l}$. The loss or gain during
263 heat and drought events for each country and commodity, $L_{i,k}$, was then estimated by
264 summing the differences between the observed production and the counterfactual for all
265 disaster types, $L_{i,k} = \sum_{j,l} (\bar{y}_{i,j,k,l} - x_{i,j,k,l})$. The cumulative impact during heat and
266 drought events for each country for each commodity, $I_{i,k}$ was then estimated as $I_{i,k} = L_{i,k}$
267 $/(P_{i,k} + L_{i,k})$, where $P_{i,k}$ is the sum of observed production for a given country and
268 commodity over the study period, $P_{i,k} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j,l} (y_{i,j,k,l} + x_{i,j,k,l})$, where n is the length of
269 l . Thus, $I_{i,k}$, identifies the percent loss or gain in crop production for a given country and
270 commodity, over the study period, against a counterfactual in which the disaster did not
271 occur.

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275 Null distributions

276 To identify if the production deviations in $I_{i,k}$ were no different from what would be
277 expected in years in which heat or drought disasters did not occur, we calculated the null
278 distributions for each element of $I_{i,k}$, by running a 1000 simulated histories. We first set
279 production values in real disasters years to null values. Then, for each of the 1000
280 simulations, we randomly generated three fake disaster occurrences to occur in each
281 country (the median number of heat and drought disasters occurring over the 1961-2014
282 across countries was 4, and the range was 1-25). We used these fake disasters to create
283 two more complementary 3D arrays, $x_{F_{i=1:131,j=1:53,k=1:6}}$ and $y_{F_{i=1:131,j=1:53,k=1:6}}$,
284 containing the national level production data for fake disaster and non-disaster years
285 respectively. Counterfactual production for fake disaster years was estimated by linearly
286 interpolating between y_{F_j} 's to create a new array $\overline{y}_{F_{i,j,k}}$. The loss or gain during fake
287 disasters for each country and commodity, $LF_{i,k}$, was then estimated by summing the
288 differences between the observed production and the counterfactual,
289 $LF_{i,k} = \sum_j (\overline{y}_{F_{i,j,k}} - x_{F_{i,j,k}})$. The cumulative impact of fake disasters for each country
290 for each commodity, $IF_{i,k}$ was then estimated as $IF_{i,k} = LF_{i,k} / (P_{i,k} + LF_{i,k})$. $I_{i,k}$ elements
291 falling outside the bounds of the distribution of $IF_{i,k}$ highlight the countries and
292 commodities that show cumulative deviations in production during heat and drought
293 years that are more extreme than deviations in years in which heat and drought events did
294 not occur.

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296 Monetary impacts

297 To estimate the total value of crop production for each commodity and country in our
298 analysis, $V_{i,k}$, we retrieved the annual Gross Production Value (constant 2004-2006
299 terms) for each of commodity and country, and summed these for the years 1961-2014.
300 To estimate the cost of heat and drought events for each country and commodity, $C_{i,k}$ we
301 then multiplied the values of production, by the percent loss or gain in crop production
302 for a given country and commodity against the counterfactual $C_{i,k} = I_{i,k} \cdot V_{i,k}$. Thus, $C_{i,k}$
303 indicates the dollar value of production that might have been obtained if heat and drought
304 events did not occur for a given country and commodity, under the assumption of linear
305 pricing with respect to supply. We summed over all commodities, k , to estimate the net
306 impact of heat and drought events on a country basis.

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