Differential Effects of Propofol and Ketamine on Critical Brain Dynamics

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Abstract

Whether the brain operates at a critical "tipping" point is a long standing scientific question, with evidence from both cellular and systems-scale studies suggesting that the brain does sit in, or near, a critical regime. Neuroimaging studies of humans in altered states of consciousness have prompted the suggestion that maintenance of critical dynamics is necessary for the emergence of consciousness and complex cognition, and that reduced or disorganized consciousness may be associated with deviations from criticality. Unfortunately, many of the cellular-level studies reporting signs of criticality were performed in non-conscious systems (in vitro neuronal cultures) or unconscious animals (e.g. anaesthetized rats). Here we attempted to address this knowledge gap by exploring critical brain dynamics in invasive ECoG recordings from multiple sessions with a single macaque as the animal transitioned from consciousness to unconsciousness under different anaesthetics (ketamine and propofol). We use a previously-validated test of criticality: avalanche dynamics to assess the differences in brain dynamics between normal consciousness and both drug-states. Propofol and ketamine were selected due to their differential effects on consciousness (ketamine, but not propofol, is known to induce an unusual state known as "dissociative anaesthesia"). Our analyses indicate that propofol dramatically restricted the size and duration of avalanches, while ketamine allowed for more awake-like dynamics to persist. In addition, propofol, but not ketamine, triggered a large reduction in the complexity of brain dynamics. All states, however, showed some signs of persistent criticality when testing for exponent relations and universal shape-collapse. Further, maintenance of critical brain dynamics may be important for regulation and control of conscious awareness.

Author summary

Here we explore how different anaesthetic drugs change the nature of brain dynamics, from sub-dural electrophysiological arrays implanted in a macaque brain. Previous research has suggested that loss of consciousness under anaesthesia is associated with a movement away from critical brain dynamics, towards a less flexible regime. When comparing ketamine and propofol, two anaesthetics with largely different effects on consciousness, we find that propofol, but not ketamine, produces a dramatic reduction in the complexity of brain activity and restricts the range of scales where critical

dynamics are plausible. These results suggest that maintenance of critical dynamics may be important for regulation and control of conscious awareness.

1 Introduction

The hypothesis that the brain operates in a critical regime near a "tipping" point between different states (often, but not always, described as low and high entropy, respectively) is growing in popularity, both on neurophysiological evidence and due to appealing properties of critical, or near-critical, systems [1], that are thought to be key elements of optimal nervous system functioning. In both *in vivo* recordings and simulations, critical systems show the widest dynamic range [2–5], which indicates that critical systems can respond to, and amplify, a broad range of signals. For a system embedded in a complex environment, where salient signals may have a variety of intensities, a broad dynamic sensory range is a necessary adaptation. Critical systems also have optimized memory storage capacity from which complex information about states and patterns can be retrieved [6–9]. A related series of findings suggest that, in addition to optimal dynamic range and memory capacities, critical systems have optimized information transmission capabilities [10–12], and that the ability to integrate information is locally maximal near the critical zone as well [13]. Signs of critical dynamics have been found in the brains of a large number of different animals with different levels of CNS complexity, including rat brain cultures [18], leeches [17], turtles [16], zebrafish [15], freely-behaving rodents [19], non-human primates [20], and humans [14], suggesting that the evolutionary advantage conferred by critical neural dynamics is highly conserved between species. The "critical brain" hypothesis has not been universally accepted however [91], and disagreement remains within the field as to when it is acceptable to conclude data was produced by a critical or near-critical system [18].

Despite the considerable work that has been performed on identifying indicators of criticality at the level of neuronal circuits, the relationship between critical dynamics (or lack thereof) at the micro-scale and macro-scale phenomena such as cognition, sensation, and awareness is less clear. In human neuroimaging studies, deviations from criticality have been found to be associated with altered or abnormal states of consciousness. Long-term sleep deprivation reduces signatures of critical dynamics in human MEG activity [14], and the pathophysiology of epilepsy has been modelled as a failure to maintain healthy critical dynamics [21, 22]. Psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, obsessive-compulsive disorder and major depressive disorders have also been discussed as possible deviaitons away from "healthy" critical dynamics. Human neuroimaging studies have suggested that "classical" serotonergic psychedelic drugs (eg. psilocybin, lysergic acid diethylamide, dimethyltryptamine, etc) increase markers of criticality, both in fMRI [23] and MEG [25] studies. These findings have prompted some to hypothesize that normal consciousness emerges when brain activity is tuned near a critical regime, and that alterations in consciousness are reflective of transitions towards, or away from, the critical regime [26, 27].

However, signs of criticality in neural tissue are observed in animals (or cultured tissues) that could not be plausibly considered conscious. This includes dissociated cortical cultures [18], excised turtle brains [16], and animals anesthetized with a number of different anaesthetics [28]. Clearly criticality alone is not sufficient for conscious awareness, although the question of necessity remains open. Cortical recordings from anaesthetized rats found loss of critical dynamics during the period of anaesthesia that re-emerged over the course of waking [29]. A similar study using cellular imaging found that anaesthesia reversibly altered signs of critical dynamics, as well as reducing the complexity of brain activity [30]. Computational models of brain dynamics informed by

the pharmacology of anaesthetic agents have suggested that loss of consciousness induced by anaesthesia may be associated with a loss of critical dynamics [31] at a macro scale as well, although this remains an under-explored area of research.

To assess the relative differences in criticality between states of consciousness, we used publicly available invasive electrocorticography (ECoG) recordings from a *Macaca fuscata* monkey to compare the normal, awake resting-state (the monkey is awake, with eyes open, restrained in a primate chair) to two distinct states of anesthesia induced by two different drugs: propofol and ketamine (recordings were begun only after loss of consciousness had been diagnosed). These recordings are available as part of the NeuroTycho project's open data initiative [32, 33]. While both drugs induce surgical anaesthesia in high doses, and are used in clinical settings, they display markedly different pharmacologies and trigger different subjective experiences at low to moderate doses. Propofol is a commonly-used anaesthetic administered either by inhalation or intravenously. While its exact mechanism of action remains unknown, it is believed that it's primary action is through potentiating inhibitory $GABA_A$ receptors resulting in wide-spread decreases in neuronal activity [34]. Behaviourally, propofol induces sedation, atonia, and at high doses, cardiac arrest, respiratory depression, and hypotension [35]. Ketamine acts as an antagonist of glutamatergic NMDA receptors and, in contrast to propofol, causes mild nervous system stimulation and has little effect on respiration [35, 36]. Furthermore, while propofol induces a state reminiscent of deep coma, at sub-anaesthetic doses, ketamine induces an atypical state known as "dissociative anaesthesia" [37, 38], in which a person appears unresponsive to sensory or physical stimuli, but will often experience dream-like states, including hallucinations, out-of-body experiences, and immersive visions [36]. In this way, ketamine models other altered states of consciousness such as NREM sleep and locked-in syndrome, where phenomenological awareness can persist, despite an external appearance of unresponsive unconsciousness.

We chose electrophysiological recordings for this analysis for several reasons. Many previous studies that have found signs of criticality in anaesthetized animals have been performed while recording at the single-neuron micro-scale, while studies reporting alterations to critical dynamics following changes to consciousness have been performed using macro-scale neuroimaging methods (fMRI, MEG, etc). Intracranial ECoG provides a type of meso-scale signal: with coarse-graining of electrical activity in large numbers of neurons ($\approx 10^5$), but with finer localization than scalp EEG/MEG [39]. Consequently, these data are ideal for the study of criticality as the likely highly local preservation of critical dynamics in neuronal-level studies may interact with alterations to criticality seen neuroimaging studies. Human ECoG studies have found indirect evidence of dynamical criticality [40, 41] - not using avalanche-based analyses such as we used here. Alonso et al (2014) reported changes high-frequency ECoG signal stability during the onset of clinical anaesthesia although signs of metastability persisted through all states.

Here we test two hypotheses concerning the relationship between consciousness and critical dynamics.

1. during the awake state, activity would express several hallmarks of criticality, including a power-law distribution of avalanche sizes and durations, exponent relations [18], as well as signs of data collapse when subsampling channels (known as finite size scaling).

2. propofol would dramatically reduce signs of critical dynamics, but that criticality would persist under the influence of ketamine. We also included a related measure, complexity [42], which has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness and found to be associated with criticality in cortical cultures [13].

Fig 1. Recording array map.
The placement of recording arrays for Chibi. Image taken from the NeuroTycho website,
http://neurotycho.org/spatial-map-ecog-array-task

2   Materials and Methods

2.1   Data Set and Preprocessing

2.1.1   Data Set

We used the NeuroTycho dataset, an open-source set of 128-channel invasive ECoG
recordings in two Macaca fuscata monkeys [32]. For this study, we analysed the
resting-state scans from one monkey (Chibi), as the scans from the other monkey
contained intractable artifacts that could not be eliminated during preprocessing.
Arrays were placed on the left hemisphere only, recording from all major areas including
the medial wall (for a map, see Fig. 1).

In both the propofol and ketamine conditions, the monkey was restrained in a
primate chair . In the propofol condition, the monkey was given a single bolus of
intra-venous propofol (5.2 mg/kg), until loss of consciousness was observed (defined as
unresponsiveness to having their forepaws touched and/or unresponsiveness to having
their nose tickled with a cotton swab). For the ketamine condition, a single bolus of
intramuscular ketamine (5.1 mg/kg) was administered until loss of consciousness was
observed using the above criteria. No maintenance anaesthesia was given following the
initial induction. Following diagnosis of anaesthesia, 10-minute recordings were taken, .
We did not include any recordings from the transition period between wakefullness and
anaesthesia. More detailed discussion of the drug administration protocols can be found
in [33] and the Neurotycho data wiki (
http://wiki.neurotycho.org/Anesthesia_and_Sleep_Task_Details).

2.1.2   Preprocessing

The data were initially examined visually in EEGLAB (v.14.1.2) [43] run in a MATLAB
(v. 2018b) environment for major non-reoccurring artefacts. Some sample five-second
plots of the selected ECoG channels can be seen in Figure 3. After inspection (no data
were removed), we performed Independent Component Analysis (ICA) using the *runica*
function in EEGLAB to extract minor artefacts [39, 43]. We ran the ICA with the full

Fig 2. Best-fit normal distributions between conditions.
Representative examples of the histograms of instantaneous amplitudes across the three
conditions. **Left**: the awake condition. **Middle**: ketamine, and **right**: propofol. Note
that while ketamine allows for a heavy-tail to persist, the propofol condition collapses to
a tight Gaussian distribution.

128 possible components and, across all scans, removed an average of 4 components,   128
corresponding to brief bursts of high-frequency noise. After the ICA and removal of   129
components, the data were filtered in MNE Python (v. 0.19.2) with a low-pass filter at   130
120Hz, high-pass filtered at 1Hz, and notch filtered at 50Hz and all subsequent   131
harmonics up to 250 Hz, to account for electrical line-noise in Japan. All filters were of   132
the FIR Overlap type (the default in MNE Python), [44])and all filters were run twice,   133
forwards and backwards to eliminate phase-shift artefacts. Finally, we normalized the   134
data by removing the mean of each channel and dividing it by its standard deviation.   135
Due to the need for long time-series in this analysis, we operated on the whole 10   136
minute time-series (there was no epoching). MNE Python (v. 0.19.2) was run in Python   137
3.7.4 using the Anaconda (v. 3.7) environment.   138

2.2   Point Process   139

For each condition, we followed the method for point-processing data described by [45]   140
and [14]. Briefly: after filtering, the probability distribution of signal amplitudes in   141
terms of their standard deviation from the mean, was plotted, along with the best-fit   142
Gaussian distribution, and the point at which the actual distribution and the best-fit   143
curve diverged were chosen as the threshold (σ). This ensured that diversions above the   144
threshold are unlikely to be due to noise inherent in the signal. While there were   145
differences in the point of divergence between conditions, we chose a threshold of 4, as   146
the most conservative likely value. We sampled a range of thresholds around 4 (3 to   147
4.25) and found that this did not substantively alter the results, although a too-low   148
threshold (< 3) allowed excessive noise through, while a too-high threshold (> 4.5) did   149
not allow enough events for analysis of avalanches. For visualization of the various   150
distributions, see Figure 2.   151

Once the threshold had been chosen, all instances where the absolute value of a   152
signal was less than the threshold were set to zero: 153

$$\forall t \in |X| : X(t) = 0 \ if \ |X(t)| < \sigma$$

as well (sending all other values to 0). For a more in-depth discussion of this,   154
see [14].   155

The resulting calculation produced a binary raster plot (channel $\times$ samples, for an   156
example see Fig. 4) where every event corresponds to the moment of maximal excursion   157
from the mean. This data structure matches the type used when analysing spiking   158
activity from cultured neurons [10], making it amenable to many of the tools already   159
developed for criticality analysis. We chose not to re-bin the data, instead maintaining   160

Fig 3. Examples of raw EEG timeseries visualized.
Visualization of five seconds of all 128 channels for each condition. Top: awake, middle: ketamine, bottom: propofol. Images taken from EEGLAB (v.14.1.2) [43]. Note that the time-series are un-normalized, with scales ranging from 464-515 microvolts.

Fig 4. Coherence cascades in the awake condition.
An example of a section of the raster plot. Notice the banding effect of coherence
cascades (a few examples are highlighted by blue ovals). This banding effect shows the
cascades of events that include many distinct channels that "fire" in synchrony.

the 1000 Hz sampling rate across all scans due to the relative shortness of the 161
recordings: significant re-binning would reduce the available data to the point that not 162
enough individual avalanches could be identified. 163

2.3 Avalanches and Critical Exponents 164

"Avalanches", defined as transient periods of coordinated activity between elements of a 165
system, are a feature common to many complex, dynamic systems [46]. In the context 166
of the nervous system, avalanches typically refer to synchronized action potentials in a 167
neural network [10]. Coordinated avalanches of activity have also been found in human 168
EEG [45], MEG [14,47], and fMRI [83] data. Avalanches are described by two values: 169
the avalanche size (S, the number of elements that participate in the avalanche) and the 170
avalanche duration (T, the lifetime of the avalanche from start to finish). In critical 171
systems, these two values are expected to follow power laws with exponents τ, and α: 172

$$P(S) \propto S^{-\tau}$$
$$P(T) \propto T^{-\alpha}$$

S and T should be distributed such that, over all avalanches, the average size for a 174
given duration also follows a power law: 175

$$\langle S \rangle (T) \propto T^{1/\sigma \nu z}$$

τ, α and $1/\sigma \nu z$ are collectively known as the critical exponents of the system [18]. 176
We note that in this context, $1/\sigma \nu z$ is treated as a single variable and should not be 177
considered a function of three distinct variables. Furthermore, all three exponents 178
should be related to each other such that: 179

$$\frac{\alpha - 1}{\tau - 1} - \frac{1}{\sigma \nu z} = 0$$

It is generally considered to be insufficient evidence of criticality if only the 180
distributions of avalanche sizes and durations follow power laws: these exponents must 181
be related to each other through an exponent relation as given above [18]. 182
To calculate the scaling exponents τ and α, we used the NCC Toolbox (v. 1.0) [49] 183
to extract avalanches from our binary time series, and perform a maximum likelihood 184
estimate (MLE) of the power-law exponent [49,50]. The NCC Toolbox returns several 185
values associated with each power-law inference: the MLE value of the exponent, the 186

Fig 5. Synthetic and empirical doubly-truncated power law distributions for the data.
Right: an empirical, doubly-truncated power-law distribution taken from this dataset with an x_{min} of 16 and an x_{max} of 196. Within this range, the exponent has been estimated to be 2.7. Left: a synthetic doubly-truncated power-law distribution with the same minimum and maximum values as the empirical distribution as well as the same exponent. Note that the synthetic model has significant curves which begin well before the upper-bound cut-off. When modelling a system that produces data within a fixed range, even power-law distributed values may not follow the canonical straight line when plotted in log-log space [52, 53].

minimum and maximum values of x for which the power law estimate holds , and the p-value. Following the convention of Timme et al., (2016), we set our significance threshold such that we would only accept the power law hypothesis at $p \geq 0.2$ (this is the reverse of how significance estimation is usually performed, for discussion, see [50]. For the estimate of $1/\sigma\nu z$, we plotted $\langle S \rangle(T)$ against T and extracted an estimate of the exponent by linear regression in log-log space. While this is a much cruder method than the MLE power law fit described above, unfortunately the values of $\langle S \rangle(T)$ vs. T do not describe a probability distribution and so the usual methods of inference do not work.

When plotting the distribution of avalanche sizes and avalanche durations, we use complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs) (defined as 1-CDF) instead of probability density functions (PDFs), following [51]. When dealing with power law (or plausibly power law) distributions with defined upper and lower bounds (x_{min}, x_{max}), the CDF and CCDFs may not display the characteristic straight line when plotted in log-log space [52, 53]. Consequently, distributions may look curved while still being plausibly drawn from a doubly-truncated power law. For a visualization of this, see Figure 5.

2.3.1 Avalanche Shape Collapse

In addition to having sizes and durations, avalanches also have *profiles*, which describe the number of channels active at each moment over the course of the avalanche's lifetime. Near the critical regime, the profiles of all avalanches should be self-similar, that is, it should be possible to find some scaling exponent γ such that all avalanches can be rescaled to lie on top of one another [13, 18]. This is referred to as "shape collapse" and is a commonly used indicator of operating near the critical point in dynamical systems.

This scaling parameter γ can be defined as:

$$\gamma = \frac{1}{\sigma\nu z} - 1$$

where $1/\sigma\nu z$ is the same exponent that describes the distribution of average 211
avalanche sizes for a given duration. 212

To calculate shape collapse, we first averaged together all avalanches of a given 213
duration to create "average profiles". From there, we used the NCC Toolbox [49] to find 214
the optimal rescaling value and extract an estimate of $1/\sigma\nu z$. 215

2.4 Data Collapse and Finite Size Scaling 216

A common issue with analysis of critical dynamics in complex systems is one of 217
sub-sampling [54, 55]. When a very large system is sub-sampled, the characteristic 218
power-law behaviour can be lost as large events are fragmented and perceived as 219
separate, smaller events. This is a particularly salient issue in electrophysiological 220
recordings, as the number of channels in an array is orders of magnitude less than the 221
number of functional units in the cortex that could be participating in critical avalanche 222
dynamics. 223

In a system near the critical point, while subsampling destroys the power-law, it 224
should not destroy the scale-free nature of the distributions - that is, when 225
appropriately renormalized, the distributions (despite not following power laws), should 226
display data collapse. This property is known as finite size scaling. The logic here is the 227
same as when performing data collapse on individual avalanches, as above. 228

We tested for distribution shape-collapse following a similar approach to a previously 229
procedure [55]. For each scan, we randomly sub-sampled half, a quarter, and an eighth 230
of the channels, ten times each, and from each, calculated the associated probability 231
distribution of avalanche events and sizes. In addition to plotting them to visualize the 232
differences between the four distributions (the original plus the three subsampled 233
distributions), we calculated the average pair-wise Wasserstein metric [81] to quantify 234
the similarity between all distributions. 235

We then performed the same sub-sampling again, this time rebinning the binary 236
timeseries to reflect the sampling of elements: when taking half the channels, we 237
rebinned by a factor of two, when taking a quarter of the channels, we rebinned by a 238
factor of four, etc. If the system is poised near the critical point, after rebinning, the 239
distributions of avalanche activities should collapse onto one-another. When 240
recalculating the Wasserstein metric, the average pairwise distance should be 241
significantly reduced. 242

2.5 Complexity 243

Here, "complexity" of an N-dimensional system X ($C_N(X)$) can be intuitively 244
understood as "the degree to which the whole is greater than the sum of it's parts" [42]. 245
To calculate the complexity, the entropy of the entire system is compared to the joint 246
entropies of all possible subsets of the system. Each state i of an N-dimensional system 247
can be described as an N-dimensional vector x_i, and the probability of state i (p_i) is the 248
number of occurrences of i divided by the number of samples. The Shannon entropy 249
($H(X)$) of the system is given by: 250

$$H(X) = -\sum_i p(x_i)log_2(p(x_i))$$

We can measure the level of integration (or coordination) of a set of elements of the 251
system by comparing the joint entropies of all the elements in the set to the sum of 252
their individual entropies: 253

$$I(X)_j^k = \left(\sum_{j' \in k} H(X_{j'}^1) \right) - H(X)_j^k$$

Here, k is the number of neurons in a subset, and j is the index of a given subset of k neurons in the set of all sets of k neurons. This has also been called "multinformation" or "total correlation" [56]. For instance, X_j^1 refers to the jth element from the set of N -choose-1 elements alone, while X_j^4 refers to the jth set of 4 elements from the set of N-choose-4 sets of 4 elements.

The complexity is then found by comparing the integration of the entire system (X_1^N) to the average integration $(\langle I(k)_1^j \rangle j)$ over every possible subset, for every possible subset size of k.

$$C_N(X) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=2}^{N} \left[\left(\frac{k-1}{N-1} \right) I(X) - \langle I(X_j^k) \rangle_j \right]$$

This value of $C_N(X)$ is a more intuitively meaningful representation of "complexity" than other commonly used measures, such as Lempel-Ziv Complexity [57], in that it is low for systems that are both perfectly ordered and systems that are perfectly random [13], while peaking in systems that combine elements of both. Calculating the complexity of a system is a non-trivial task, exploding to intractable levels as N gets even modestly large (for context, for a 128-channel system, it would take longer than the expected lifetime of the universe of exhaustively search all partitions). To avoid interminable run-times, the NCC Toolbox [49] includes several corrections for sub-sampling and heuristics for estimating integration in large systems.

As with the avalanche size and duration distributions, we used the same 30-second jitter null-model to explore the effect of randomizing the data. We hypothesized that jittering the data should significantly reduce the nonlinearity and total integrated information.

3 Results

3.1 Channel Activity

We found large differences between the channel rates following the administration of both ketamine and propofol. In the awake condition, the average channel-wise firing rate was 9×10^{-4} spikes per millisecond (s/m), which dropped to 5×10^{-4} (s/m) in the ketamine condition and 8×10^{-5} (s/m) under propofol. We found that, within conditions, there was a high correlation between channel activity rates during different scans. Within the awake condition (across all six possible pairwise comparisons), we found an average correlation of 0.89 ± 0.03. In the ketamine condition (which only allows a single comparison), the correlation was 0.76 and in the propofol condition, the correlation was 0.62). Interestingly, we did not find strong correlations when comparing channel activity rates within the same scan before and after induction of anaesthesia (data not shown). The correlation between channel activity rates before and after ketamine induction was 0.225 and the correlation between channel activity before and after propofol induction was 0.06. These results suggest a much higher degree of dynamical similarity within conditions scanned on different days than between conditions induced during a single scan. For visualization of these results, see Figure 6.

Using the NeuroTycho channel labelling (see Figure 1), we found that, in the awake condition, high levels of activity were seen occipito-temporal and parietal regions of the brain. This pattern was disrupted by both propofol and ketamine. In the ketamine condition, there was a decrease in the range of channel activities, and in both

Fig 6. Changes in channel activity levels between conditions.
A: For each condition, the correlation between channel activity (firing rate $\times$ 100)
between two scans. In all conditions, it is apparent that those channels that are more
activity in one scan are similarly active during different scans within the same condition.
This suggests that brain dynamics are consistent within conditions. **B**: histograms of
the the channel rate $\times$ 100 for all three conditions. It is apparent that propofol
decreases the overall channel firing rate more that ketamine, although both have a lower
firing rate than the awake condition. **C-E**: normalized channel activity rates projected
onto the recording array. It is clear that propofol and ketamine disrupt the activity-rate
structure that exists in the awake condition.

anaesthetic conditions, there was a shift in activity towards the occipital lobe. This   296
significance of this is unclear, as the monkeys were wearing eyeshades throughout the   297
anaesthetic experience and consequently were not receiving visual input.   298

3.2 Avalanche Distributions

x_{min}	D	x_{max}	Exp. Rel.	Avg. Size / Dur	$1/\sigma\nu z$	Complexity	Rebin KS D	No Rebin KS D	Rebin KS S	No Rebin KS S
22	8	30	2.00234055	1.2529880263	1.144	0.0473942748	0.0444209518	0.1290998009	0.0623528147	0.1503449156
07	4	17	1.6383673469	1.2472912656	1.221	0.0316139101	0.0259019459	0.1375173692	0.0508161703	0.1653117455
33	9	41	2.5491913747	1.2654549163	1.262	0.0469241472	0.0395054996	0.1244217247	0.0677982829	0.1588397862
07	3	16	1.8586872587	1.2407987895	1.271	0.0036012452	0.0297453155	0.1134300394	0.0788062334	0.1661862264
79	7	32	1.4607415485	1.3887947163	1.377	0.0470132706	0.0378105651	0.1299924942	0.0556711293	0.1639426327
46	1	8	1.1131639723	1.4430822801	1.508	0.0051650643	0.0252161665	0.0926269857	0.0729665868	0.1340633845
29	8	67	1.5694300518	1.405535723	-1.1	0.0477691165	0.0346876135	0.12823451	0.063741846	0.1690890631
29	8	67	1.5694300518	1.2537008081	1.25	0.029773869	0.0261199899	0.1324190428	0.0550677446	0.1445344283

There are clear differences between the awake, ketamine, and propofol distributions of avalanche sizes and durations (Figure 7). The Wasserstein distances between the conditions reveal that, in all cases, the awake condition was far more similar to the ketamine condition than the propofol condition. The distance between the avalanche size distribution in the awake condition and the ketamine condition was 0.46, while between the awake condition and the propofol condition it was 1.77. The same pattern was apparent between the avalanche duration distributions. The distance between the awake and ketamine conditions was 0.05, while for the awake and propofol conditions it was 0.43 (for the raw values Table 1).

3.3   Scaling Exponents

For every distribution, there was a range between some x_{min} and x_{max} for which the power-law hypothesis held with $p \geq 0.2$. However, in the propofol condition, this range was dramatically restricted. In the awake condition, the average value x_{min} for the avalanche size distribution was 16.25 channels and the average value for x_{max} was 378.5 channels. In the ketamine condition, the average value x_{min} for the avalanche size distribution was 14 channels, and the average value for x_{max} was 347 channels. Finally, in the propofol condition, the average value x_{min} for the avalanche size duration was 2 channels and the average value x_{max} was 48 channels. The same pattern was observed in the distributions of avalanche durations. The average x_{min} of the distribution of avalanche durations in the awake condition is 8 ms, while the average x_{max} is 42.5 ms. In the ketamine condition, the average x_{min} was 6 ms and the average x_{max} is 42 ms. In the propofol condition, the range was much more constricted: the average x_{min} was 2 ms and the average x_{max} was 12 ms. These results indicate that, while all distributions had regions that could be plausibly modelled as following a power-law, in the propofol condition, this region was extremely narrow and typically restricted to very small values (excluding the tail, where the power-law distribution is most relevant). In contrast, ketamine maintained a range comparable to the awake condition, suggesting that, unlike propofol, ketamine anaesthesia does not suppress the propagation of large bursts of coordinated activity.

For each range where the power-law fit held, we calculated the associated exponents, τ and α. The sample size is too small for significance testing, although on average, the awake condition had the largest exponents for avalanche sizes (2.74) and durations (4.23), followed by ketamine, for both sizes (2.58) and durations (3.52) as well. Propofol had the smallest scaling exponents for both avalanche parameters (size: 2.3, durations: 2.93). The average calculated values of $1/\sigma\nu z$ were quite similar between all three (awake: 1.89, ketamine: 1.6, propofol: 1.5).

In all conditions, within the relevant ranges of x_{min} and x_{max}, we found a strong relationship between the average size for a given duration (see Figure 8). The calculated value of $1/\sigma\nu z$ was similar across all conditions (awake: 1.33, ketamine: 1.25, propofol 1.34). Having two separate estimations of $1/\sigma\nu z$ (one from the exponent relation, one from the average size for a given duration) allows us to see how well the scaling exponents relate. Surprisingly, the awake condition had the greatest percentage difference between the two values, at 35.19%, followed by ketamine at 24.76% and finally propofol with 10.83%. We had hypothesized that the awake and/or ketamine conditions would show the highest degree of concurrence between the measures, but instead, the awake condition has the lowest degree of concurrence.

3.4   Avalanche Shape Collapse

The avalanche collapse results are largely consistent with the analysis of average size for a given duration. The estimated values of $1/\sigma\nu z$ calculated from the shape collapse

Fig 7. CCDFs of Avalanche Size and Duration by Condition
Comparison CCDFs for awake (purple) vs. ketamine (grey) and propofol (orange).
Right panels: awake vs. ketamine. **Left** panels: awake vs. propofol. Avalanches sizes
(top four panels) and durations (bottom four panels). Visual inspection shows that the
ketamine condition tracks the awake condition much more closely than the propofol
condition does This indicates that ketamine supports larger, longer-lived avalanches
than propofol.

Fig 8. The average avalanche size for a given duration by condition
The color mapping is the same as in Figure 7: purple corresponds to the awake
condition, grey to ketamine, and orange to propofol. In all cases there is a clear linear
relationship between the average avalanche size for a given duration. Such a relationship
is considered necessary, but not sufficient, to conclude a system is displaying critical
dynamics [18].

between conditions were largely similar: awake: 1.261, ketamine: 1.24, propofol 1.39.   350

Once again, the percentage difference between these values and the exponent relationship was highest in the awake condition (40.2%), followed by the ketamine condition (25.95%), and with the greatest agreement in the propofol condition (6.7%). We also calculated the percentage difference between values of $1/\sigma\nu z$ derived from the shape collapse and the average size/given duration analysis. These showed a much higher degree of concurrence. The awake condition again had the greatest percentage difference (5.19%), followed by propofol (3.48%), and ketamine had the lowest percentage difference (1.2%).

3.5 Finite-Size Scaling and Distribution Collapse

In addition to power-law and exponent-relation based indicators of critical dynamics, we also tested whether the probability distributions of avalanche sizes and durations exhibited data collapse when subsampled (finite size scaling) [55]. We initially sub-sampled the system by randomly selecting subsets of channels (half the channels, a quarter, an eighth, etc) and comparing the distributions of avalanche sizes and durations by computing the average pairwise KS-distance between all four distributions. We then rebinned the binary time series with the inverse of the fraction of the sample selected (eg: when subsampling half the nodes, we rebinned the timeseries by two, when sampling a quarter, rebinned by four, etc).

When compared, all conditions showed visual indicators of finite size scaling collapse (see Figure 9 for an illustration with the distributions of avalanche sizes). To quantify this, we calculated the fold-change between the average pairwise KS-distance before and after re-binning. For the distributions of avalanche sizes, ketamine showed the highest average fold change (-0.66), indicating the greatest collapse. The awake condition came second with a fold-change of -0.61, and the propofol condition showed the weakest shape-collapse, with a fold change of -0.49. For the avalanche duration distributions, the pattern was similar, with ketamine showing the greatest fold change (-8.1), but in this case, propofol was in the middle with a fold change of -0.73, and the awake condition (-0.69) at the end.

This suggests that all the conditions display some measurable collapse when renormalized, and in both avalanche shape and durations, the effect was most dramatic in the ketamine condition, compared to awake and propofol.

3.6 Complexity

There were dramatic differences between the degree to which ketamine and propofol reduced the complexity of brain activity (Figure 10). Both anaesthetics reduced the total $C_N(X)$, however, propofol had a much stronger effect. On average, the fold-change between the awake condition and the ketamine condition was -0.35, compared to the awake vs. propofol condition, which showed an average fold-change of -0.91. This is a strong indicator that, even at surgical doses, ketamine supports significantly more complex brain dynamics than propofol.

4 Discussion

In this manuscript we present several converging lines of evidence that propofol and ketamine produce different effects on markers of critical brain dynamics. Furthermore, ketamine, but not propofol, appears to supports dynamics similar to those observed in normal waking consciousness in ECoG activity recorded from a single macaque in different states of consciousness. Despite inducing states that appear similar to external observers (unresponsiveness to pain or sensory stimuli, decreased voluntary motor

Fig 9. Data collapse under rescaling
Shape collapse for the various subsampled avalanche sizes before (left column) and after
(right column) renormalizing (rebinning) the binary timeseries. The color indicators are
consistent with other figures: purple is awake, grey is ketamine, yellow is propofol. In
all conditions, renormalization resulted in noticeable shape collapse, which can be
quantified by doing pairwise calculations of the Wasserstein distance metric.

output, anaesthesia), propofol produces a near-total extinction of consciousness, while 397
ketamine frequently induces states of "dissociative" anaesthesia, which can include 398
dream-like or out-of-body experiences [37,38]. To test for signs of criticality we explored 399
the dynamics of avalanches (coordinated bursts of high-intensity activity) across the 400

Fig 10. Differences in multi-scale complexity between conditions.
Integration of information across scales for awake (purple) vs. ketamine (grey) and
awake vs. propofol (orange). Complexity was calculated using the NCC Toolbox [49],
using the measure first proposed by Tononi, Sporns & Edelman [42]. While the
ketamine condition (grey) was associated with a noticable decrease in complexity
compared the awake condition (purple), it was a much smaller decrease than what was
observed in the propofol condition, which was an order of magnitude less complex. Note
that the total value of complexity is not the greatest value, but rather, the difference
between the area under the curves for the linear fit and the true non-linear integration.

cortex, testing for scale-free distributions and exponent relations between them. We also   401
examined universality under renormalization and an information-theoretic measure of   402
multi-dimensional complexity to further characterize the effects of these drugs on brain   403
dynamics.   404

    We found that ketamine slightly reduced the rate of events across the cortex when   405
compared the awake condition, while the propofol condition reduced activity rates by an   406
entire order of magnitude. Within conditions, the distributions of activities across   407
channels were consistent between scans, suggesting that these measures are stable across   408
multiple drug experiences, at least within one individual.   409

4.1 Avalanche Distributions   410

We found that, when compared to normal wakefulness, propofol dramatically attenuated   411
signs of power-law distributions in both the distributions of avalanche sizes and   412
durations. Heavy tailed distributions imply that avalanche dynamics are playing out   413
over a range of temporal and spatial scales; consequently, the finding of multiscale   414
dynamics in the awake and ketamine conditions, but not the propofol condition suggests   415
that this kind of multiscale coordination is significant for the maintenance of   416

consciousness. This is consistent with previous work using fMRI, EEG, and ECoG 417
neuroimaging, suggesting that loss of multiscale structure in brain networks occurs in 418
patients with disorders of consciousness [66, 80] and decrease in the fractal dimension of 419
EEG and fMRI BOLD signals [76–79, 98]. 420

The differences in the distributions of avalanche sizes and durations may be 421
indicative of changes to the ability of the brain to coordinate activity in different states. 422
In the awake condition, we observed avalanches that included many distinct channels, as 423
well as being comparatively longer lived, while those long, large avalanches were 424
significantly impaired by propofol, but not by ketamine. The propofol result is 425
consistent with previous work which found that propofol inhibited the ability of the 426
brain to form integrated higher-level networks, while leaving local activity in 427
tact [72, 73]. If avalanches indicate when signals are able to propagate across the cortex, 428
we might expect to see alterations in avalanche activity being associated with 429
fragmentation or disintegration of functional connectivity networks. Previous research 430
using point-processing methods on fMRI time-series has found that rare, high-amplitude 431
events can capture a significant information relevant to critical brain dynamics and 432
states of consciousness [83, 84]. Using techniques from information theory such as mutual 433
information and transfer entropy [85] it would be informative to construct functional 434
connectivity networks from the binarized time-series to directly relate changes in critical 435
dynamics to alterations to network topologies and computational capabilities [86, 87]. 436

The relative differences in the frequency of large avalanches between the three 437
conditions may also be relevant to work with the Global Workspace Theory (GWT). 438
Previous work has proposed that large avalanches represent the "ignition" of 439
information percolating through the neuronal global workspace [74, 82]. In the context 440
of the GWT, this percolation is thought to define the difference between information 441
processing that is "conscious", from processing that is "unconscious" [75], and so 442
ketamine may allow consciousness to persist (in contrast to propofol) by failing to 443
disrupt the ability of information to "ignite" and propagate into the Global Workspace. 444

4.2   Indicators of Critical Dynamics 445

The other indicators of criticality are harder to interpret. All conditions showed similar 446
patterns of critical exponent relations, with the value of $1/\sigma\nu z$ calculated from the 447
avalanche shape collapse showing a high degree of agreement when calculated from the 448
regression of the average avalanche size for a given avalanche duration. In contrast, 449
both values of $1/\sigma\nu z$ showed less consistency when compared to the exponent relation 450
$\alpha - 1/\tau - 1$. Finally, when individual channels were subsampled and rescaled, all 451
conditions showed reasonable signs of collapse, with ketamine showing the most 452
significant signs of operating near the critical point. 453

None of the states showed consistently tighter exponent relations, although we 454
should stress that all exponents were calculated *within the range of x_{min} and x_{max} for* 455
which the power-law hypothesis fit with p-values $\geq$ 0.2. The propofol condition had a 456
dramatically reduced range of x_{min} and x_{max} values compared to awake and ketamine, 457
so whatever inferences about the plausibility of critical dynamics we make from these 458
data is only relevant within these ranges. Consequently, although all three conditions 459
showed reasonably similar behaviour in terms of exponent relations, overall, the awake 460
and ketamine conditions showed this behaviour over 2 orders of magnitude, while 461
propofol showed it over one tenth of that range. Based on these, we propose that the 462
brain is able to support critical dynamics in all three states, but that propofol (but not 463
ketamine) *reduces the scale over which critical dynamics can occur.* Critical dynamics 464
are often described as being 'scale-free', so the notion of restricting critical dynamics to 465
a range of scales may seen contradictory. However perfect scale-freeness of critical 466
systems only occurs in infinite systems. In all finite systems, criticality can emerge in a 467

restricted range. 468

This shrinking of the critical zone may provide an explanation for the original 469
motivating question for this study: why do critical dynamics seem preserved in 470
unconscious systems at the micro-scale [16, 18, 28], but are altered at the 471
macroscale [23, 27, 98]? It may be that at the local level, neural networks are able to 472
maintain critical dynamics, but the ability of these local ensembles to coordinate is 473
impaired [72, 73]. Relevant to this hypothesis is the finding that anaesthetics alter the 474
functioning of pyramidal neurons in Layer IV and V of the cortex [88, 89]. As Layer V 475
pyramidal neurons are thought to serve as "outputs" from one brain region to 476
another [90] and so changes to pyramidal neural functioning may explain how local 477
critical dynamics are able to propagate to macro-scale critical dynamics. Layer V 478
pyramidal neurons expressing 5-HT$_{2A}$ receptors have already been implicated in 479
macro-scale critical dynamics [26] in the context of serotonergic drugs, so a possible 480
involvement in anaesthesia is not totally out of the question. 481

The question about relative ranges is significant for the exponent relationship results, 482
but not necessarily for the universality and sub-sampling results, which are probably the 483
hardest to interpret. All three conditions showed roughly equivalent degrees of shape 484
collapse upon time-series re-binning, suggesting that all three display self-similar 485
dynamics across channels. One possible interpretation is that, despite the alteration in 486
consciousness induced by propofol and ketamine, the brain is able to adaptively 487
maintain at least some qualities of critical dynamics. Previous work has found that the 488
brain appears to adapt to perturbations and return to the critical regime despite 489
alterations to incoming sensory inputs [16, 92]. One possible explanation for the 490
persistence of signs of criticality is that the brains are rapidly adapting to the drug 491
state. If this is the case, it presents an intriguing window of possibility: might it be 492
possible to break "criticality" writ-large down into separate phenomena and explore 493
which ones are necessary (or sufficient) for complex consciousness and cognition, and 494
which may be irrelevant? 495

4.3 Complexity 496

We also found that, using a multi-scale measure of complexity [42], the propofol 497
condition was associated with dramatic decreases in the complexity of brain activity, 498
while ketamine preserved higher levels of complexity. 499

The most dramatic difference is the effect of the anaesthetics on multi-scale 500
complexity. This measure has been suggested to be relevant to the emergence of 501
phenomenological consciousness [62]. Our findings are consistent with tendency of 502
ketamine to preserve consciousness in states of dreamlike "dissociative anaesthesia" in 503
contrast to propofol. It is unsurprising that highly complex behavioural states should be 504
underpinned by complex dynamics, and evidence from studies of 505
anaesthesia [63–65, 67, 69, 99], disorders of consciousness [66, 68], sleep [70], and 506
psychedelic states [24, 65, 71] bears this out. Our results are consistent with, and extend 507
these previous findings using a more principled measure of "complexity" than 508
randomness-based measures. 509

4.4 Limitations 510

One of the most significant limitations of this work is that it rests on the assumption 511
that, when in the ketamine condition, the monkey was experiencing dissociative 512
anaesthesia, as opposed to true anaesthesia (as it presumably experienced under 513
propofol). The dosage used in the original study (5.1mg/kg) were consistent with doses 514
used for pre-surgical anaesthesia in primates [33] and it is unclear at what dose 515
dissociative anaesthesia transitions into "total" anaesthesia (with no dream-like content 516

at all). Presumably even in cases of "true" ketamine anaesthesia, the subject passes ₅₁₇
through hallucinatory states during induction and emergence [36–38]. It is also not ₅₁₈
entirely clear that, even if the dose was appropriate to induce hallucinatory states of ₅₁₉
dissociative anaesthesia in humans, whether macaques experience such a state at all. ₅₂₀
Despite this limitation, the fact that ketamine maintained wakefulness-like dynamics on ₅₂₁
multiple measures implies that it is not inconceivable that whatever processes allow ₅₂₂
consciousness to persist under ketamine in humans are also playing out in the macaque ₅₂₃
brain. ₅₂₄

₅₂₅

    Having only a single viable monkey to analyse is another significant limitation, ₅₂₆
although given the rarity of this dataset, we believe the results are still informative. ₅₂₇
This work should, however, be replicated in a larger cohort of humans or animals ₅₂₈
undergoing similar anaesthesia and recording procedures. Concerns about the low power ₅₂₉
are at least somewhat ameliorated by the fact that, for our monkey, we have $2\times$ scans ₅₃₀
in both the propofol and ketamine conditions, and $4\times$ scans in the awake condition. In ₅₃₁
general, the results were quite consistent within conditions, suggesting that, at least for ₅₃₂
this individual, the effects observed here are reasonably robust. ₅₃₃
    Finally, the analyses described here require binarizing continuous time-series data, ₅₃₄
which throws out a considerable amount of information (although point-processes like ₅₃₅
this have been found retain surprising amounts of information, see [83,84]). For this ₅₃₆
study, the point process was necessary as the indicators of critical dynamics we explored ₅₃₇
here were derived from models of binary branching processes [18]. Future analyses that ₅₃₈
incorporate the full, continuous time series may provide insights missing from this ₅₃₉
current body of work. The method that we used to define an "event" (an ₅₄₀
above-threshold excursion in one channel or a sequence in another channel that is ₅₄₁
significantly correlated with the excursion) partially addresses this concern by including ₅₄₂
temporal similarity as a criteria by which an event could be identified, but further ₅₄₃
improvements are no doubt possible. ₅₄₄

5   Conclusions ₅₄₅

These results show that, despite their shared status as anaesthetics and the similarity of ₅₄₆
the external appearance of effects, propofol and ketamine cause different brain states ₅₄₇
typified by dramatically different neural dynamics. Unlike propofol, ketamine allows for ₅₄₈
large, long-lasting avalanches of coordinated activity to persist in the cortex in a ₅₄₉
manner similar to normal consciousness, as well as maintaining a much higher degree of ₅₅₀
multi-scale complexity. These results may explain why the state induced by ketamine ₅₅₁
can often include complex, phenomenological consciousness to persist in a dissociated, ₅₅₂
dream-like state, while propofol extinguishes awareness completely. Understanding ₅₅₃
which brain dynamics are necessary or sufficient to support consciousness is of interest ₅₅₄
to both for those interested in the theoretical basis of conscious awareness as well as ₅₅₅
addressing clinical concerns related to identifying covert consciousness in patients who ₅₅₆
may not be able to directly communicate. ₅₅₇

Acknowledgements ₅₅₈

TFV is supported by the NSF-NRT grant 1735095, Interdisciplinary Training in ₅₅₉
Complex Networks and Systems. We would like to thank Dr. Yang-Yeol Ahn for advice ₅₆₀
on power-law inference and visualization, Dr. Filippo Radicci for insights and discussion, ₅₆₁
as well as Joshua Faskowitz and Dr. Alice Patania for support, friendship, and advice. ₅₆₂

6 Supporting information

6.1 Glossary

- **Anaesthetic**: A drug that reversibly disrupts normal consciousness, inducing a state of coma-like unconsciousness.

- **Criticality**: Refers to a system on the boundary between two qualitatively distinct phases. A canonical example from physics is boiling water, which is at the critical boundary between liquid and gas.

- **Metastability**: Refers to a dynamical regime where the system orbits a set of competing attractors without any one "winning." Associated with the maintenance of complex, adaptive behaviour.

- **Power Law**: A statistical distribution where $P(X = x) \propto x^{-\alpha}$. Critical systems are expected to produce power law distributions of events, although non-critical systems can produce them as well.

- **Universality**: When a complex system has the same critical exponents even when smaller scale details are varied, it is said to belong to a universality class.

S1 Table   All of the results reported, as a .csv table.

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