

Two-dimensional reward evaluation in mice

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Abstract

When choosing among multi-attribute options, integrating the full information may be computationally costly and time-consuming. So-called noncompensatory decision rules only rely on partial information, for example when a difference on a single attribute overrides all others. Such rules may be ecologically more advantageous, despite deviations from economical optimality. Here we present a study that investigates to what extent animals rely on integration versus noncompensatory rules when choosing where to forage. Groups of mice were trained to obtain water from dispensers varying along two reward dimensions: probability and volume. The choices of the mice over the course of the experiment suggested an initial reliance on integrative rules, later displaced by a sequential rule, in which volume was evaluated before probability. Our results also demonstrate that while the evaluation of probability differences may depend on the reward volumes, the evaluation of volume differences is seemingly unaffected by the reward probabilities.

Introduction

Animals confronted with options that differ on a single attribute generally make economically rational choices consistent with gain maximization (Monteiro, Vasconcelos, and Kacelnik 2013; Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017). In multiattribute choice (Pitz and Sachs 1984; Jansen, Duijvenvoorde, and Huizenga 2012; Hunt, Dolan, and Behrens 2014) however, where reward attributes must be weighed against each other (price *vs.* quality, risk *vs.* payoff, etc.), consistent deviations from economical rationality have been described in humans (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Rieskamp, Busemeyer, and Mellers 2006; Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer 2008), non-human animals (Shafir, Waite, and Smith 2002; Bateson, Healy, and Hurly 2003; Schuck-Paim, Pompilio, and Kacelnik 2004; Scarpi 2011; Nachev and Winter 2012; Nachev et al. 2017; Constantinople, Piet, and Brody 2019). Some deviations from gain maximization can be accounted for by considering the ecological circumstances of an animal, which may confer fitness benefits to seemingly irrational choices (Kacelnik 2006; Houston, McNamara, and Steer 2007; Trimmer 2013; McNamara, Trimmer, and Houston 2014).

An animal foraging in its natural environment mostly encounters food items that differ on multiple attributes, but only some of those attributes affect the long-term gains. We refer to those attributes as reward dimensions. In multidimensional choice the decision task is considerably simplified if differences that are (nearly) equal are not evaluated but ignored (Tversky 1969; Pitz and Sachs 1984; Shafir 1994; Shafir and Yehonatan 2014). For example, an animal might only consider the one reward dimension (e.g. prey size) that most strongly affects the long-term gains. Such decision processes in which one reward dimension overrides the others have been described as noncompensatory (Pitz and Sachs 1984; Reid et al. 2015) and can potentially increase speed and decrease computation costs at the expense of accuracy. Attributes can be considered sequentially, for example ranked by salience, until a sufficient difference is detected on one attribute so that a decision can be reached (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig 2006; Jansen, Duijvenvoorde, and Huizenga 2012). In compensatory decision-making (Pitz and Sachs 1984; Reid et al. 2015) on the other hand, choice is affected by multiple attributes that are integrated into a common decision currency (utility) (Levy and Glimcher 2012). A fully

43 integrative approach that makes use of all the available information (also referred to as absolute reward
44 evaluation Tversky (1969); Shafir (1994); Shafir and Yehonatan (2014)) is equivalent to gain maximization.
45 For example, if options differ along the reward dimensions of amount and probability of obtaining this amount,
46 maximizing the gain is ensured by selecting the option with the highest expected value, which is the product
47 of the amount and probability. Even in two-dimensional reward evaluation, a range of strategies are possible,
48 from sequential and other noncompensatory rules, up to full integration.

49 When studying animal decision-making, preferences are measured over many choices, especially when options
50 differ in reward probability. Although a rational subject should exclusively select the most profitable option,
51 animals can persist in choosing less profitable options even after long training, usually at some low frequency.
52 The partial preference observed in choice experiments can be explained by profitability matching (Kacelnik
53 1984), which states that animals proportionally allocate their effort depending on the relative pay-off of the
54 options.

55 Scalar Utility Theory (SUT; Kacelnik and Brito e Abreu (1998); Marsh and Kacelnik (2002)) is a framework
56 that proposes a proximate mechanism that accounts for partial preferences in the context of reward amount
57 and reward variability (Rosenström, Wiesner, and Houston 2016). Based on findings in psychophysics, SUT
58 postulates that cognitive representations of stimuli exhibit a scalar property, i.e. they have error distributions
59 that are normal with a mean equal to the magnitude of the stimulus and a standard deviation that is
60 proportional to the mean. In other words, SUT states that the memory traces of perceived or expected
61 outcomes of choices are subject to Weber's Law (Akre and Johnsen 2014) and that rewards are evaluated
62 proportionally rather than linearly (Marsh and Kacelnik 2002; Rosenström, Wiesner, and Houston 2016).
63 Therefore, according to SUT choice is modelled by sampling from the internal representations and selecting
64 the most favorable sample. This allows for making quantitative predictions about the strength of preferences
65 from the contrasts between options.

66 In previous experiments we have demonstrated that proportional processing can be used to predict the choice
67 behavior of animals when options vary along a single dimension (Nachev, Stich, and Winter 2013; Rivalan,
68 Winter, and Nachev 2017). In the present study we extend the application of proportional processing and
69 SUT to two-dimensional choice tasks with the aim to test whether (contradictory) information from two
70 reward dimensions generates choices more consistent with integrative or noncompensatory decision rules.

71 Results

72 We performed a series of four experiments (in chronological order) using mice in automated group cages
73 (Haupt, Eccard, and Winter 2010; Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017). Cages had four computer-controlled
74 liquid dispensers that delivered drinking water as a reward. During each of the 18h-long drinking sessions
75 each mouse had access to all dispensers, but received rewards at only two of them. The two rewarding
76 dispensers differed on one or both reward dimensions, probability and volume (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev
77 2017). An overview of the differences between choice options in the different experimental conditions is given
78 in Table 1. All experiments were conducted with three different cohorts of eight mice each. Cohort 2 was
79 housed in a different automated group cage than cohorts 1 and 3 (See Methods for differences between cages).

80 Experiment 1: Mice consistently preferred the more profitable option, even with 81 a trade-off between reward probability and reward volume

82 In the baseline conditions rewards only differed on one dimension (the relevant dimension), but not on the
83 other dimension (the background dimension). For example, in the BVP1 (baseline for volume at probability 1)
84 condition, both options had the same probability of 0.2, but one option had a volume of 4 μ L and the other, a
85 volume of 20 μ L (Table 1). Based on previous experiments (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017), we expected
86 a baseline difference between 4 μ L and 20 μ L volumes to result in a similar discrimination performance
87 (relative preference for the superior option) compared to a baseline difference between probabilities 0.2 and
88 0.5. In the C (congruent) condition one option was superior to the other on both dimensions. Finally, in the
89 I (incongruent) condition each of the options was superior to the other on one of the reward dimensions, so
90 that the option that had the higher volume had the lower probability and vice versa. Since the differences on
91 both dimensions were chosen to be of comparable salience (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017), we expected

Table 1: Overview of the experimental conditions in all four experiments.

experiment ^a	condition ^b	option A			option B			EV_A/EV_B
		volume ^c	probability	EV ^d	volume ^c	probability	EV ^d	relative value
1	BPV1	4	0.2	0.8	4	0.5	2.0	0.40
1	BPV2	20	0.2	4.0	20	0.5	10.0	0.40
1	BVP1 ^e	4	0.2	0.8	20	0.2	4.0	0.20
1	BVP2	4	0.5	2.0	20	0.5	10.0	0.20
1	C	4	0.2	0.8	20	0.5	10.0	0.08
1	I	4	0.5	2.0	20	0.2	4.0	0.50
2	BPV1	4	0.2	0.8	4	1.0	4.0	0.20
2	BPV2	20	0.2	4.0	20	1.0	20.0	0.20
2	BVP2	4	1.0	4.0	20	1.0	20.0	0.20
2	C	4	0.2	0.8	20	1.0	20.0	0.04
2	I	4	1.0	4.0	20	0.2	4.0	1.00
3	PV1	4	0.2	0.8	4	0.5	2.0	0.40
3	PV2	10	0.2	2.0	10	0.5	5.0	0.40
3	PV3	15	0.2	3.0	15	0.5	7.5	0.40
3	PV4	20	0.2	4.0	20	0.5	10.0	0.40
3	VP1	4	0.2	0.8	10	0.2	2.0	0.40
3	VP2	4	0.5	2.0	10	0.5	5.0	0.40
3	VP3	4	0.7	2.8	10	0.7	7.0	0.40
3	VP4	4	0.8	3.2	10	0.8	8.0	0.40

^a conditions in experiment 1 and 4 were identical; only conditions for experiment 1 are shown here for brevity;

^b condition sequences were randomized for each mouse;

^c volumes (in microliters) shown are for cohorts 1 and 3. In cohort 2 the volumes were 4.7 instead of 4, 9.4 instead of 10, 14.0 instead of 15, and 20.3 instead of 20 microliters;

^d EV: expected value;

^e condition BVP1 in experiment 1 was not repeated in experiment 2, but instead the results from experiment 1 were reused in further analyses

92 the mean discrimination performance in the incongruent condition to be at chance level (0.5), despite the
93 difference in expected value (Table 1).

94 In experiment 1 and in all subsequent experiments, each mouse had its individual pseudo-random sequence of
95 conditions. However, each condition was experienced by each mouse in two consecutive drinking sessions
96 (first exposure and reversal), with a spatial reversal of the two reward conditions between the two sessions. In
97 order to investigate how the two reward dimensions contributed towards choice, we looked at the contrasts
98 between the baselines (when only one dimension was relevant) to the conditions when the two dimensions
99 were congruent or incongruent to each other. We used equivalence tests (Lakens 2017) with an *a priori*
100 smallest effect size of interest (sesoi) of 0.1, chosen based on variance observed in a previous study (see Fig.4
101 in Rivalan, Winter, Nachev 2017). When using equivalence tests, if the 90% confidence interval (CI) of 105
102 the result estimate falls within the equivalence bounds (+sesoi, -sesoi) the effect is statistically smaller than
103 any effect deemed worthwhile (Methods). If the 90% CI is not fully bounded by the sesoi, but the 95% CI
104 includes the effect size of zero, the results are deemed inconclusive. Therefore, we only considered absolute
105 differences of at least 0.1 percentage points to be of biological relevance. Smaller differences, regardless of
106 their statistical significance using other tests, were considered to be trivial.




Figure 1: **Overview of discrimination performance for all mice in all experiments.** Experiments 1 through 4 are shown in different panels (1-4). Each colored dot is the mean discrimination performance of an individual mouse over two presentations of the same condition (first exposure and reversal). The experimental conditions are described in detail in Table 1. The discrimination performance gives the relative visitation rate of the more profitable option, or, in the incongruent condition, the option with the higher volume. Dotted line gives the chance level of 0.5. Data are shown in different colors for three different cohorts of eight mice each (total $n = 24$). Data from the same individuals are connected with lines. Cohort 2 (green) was tested in a different cage set-up than cohorts 1 and 3 (see Methods for details).




Figure 2: **Discrimination performance in experiment 1.** (A) Difference between discrimination performance in the baseline conditions and in the congruent and incongruent conditions. Colored dots show the individual differences in discrimination performance for the given conditions of each individual mouse (total $n = 24$), with different cohorts ($n = 8$) shown in different colors. Positive differences indicate an increase in performance and negative differences - a decrease in performance, compared to the baseline. Large blue circles give the means and the blue vertical lines the 90% confidence intervals from non-parametric bootstraps. The smallest effect size of interest (sesoi) is represented by the dashed lines. Green whiskers give the 95% CI from non-parametric bootstraps. When the blue confidence intervals lie completely within the sesoi interval there is statistical support for equivalence (Lakens 2017). When the green confidence intervals do not cross the zero line, and the blue confidence intervals are not bounded by the sesoi, there is statistical support for difference. Discrimination performance in the baseline conditions was calculated from the mean values from the two different baseline conditions for each reward dimension (volume and probability), i.e. BP was the mean of BPV1 and BPV2, and BV was the mean of BVP1 and BVP2 (Table 1, Fig. 1). The discrimination performance in the incongruent condition was calculated as the relative preference for the higher probability dispenser when contrasted with the probability baseline (I - BP) and for the higher volume dispenser when contrasted with the volume baseline (I - BV). (B) Discrimination performance in the incongruent condition. Dashed lines give the sesoi around chance level performance. Remaining notation is the same as in (A). In this experiment the option with the higher volume was also the more profitable option.

107 An overview of all experimental results is seen in Fig. 1. Compared to the baselines, mice showed an increase
 108 in discrimination performance in the congruent condition and a decrease in performance in the incongruent
 109 condition (Fig. 2A). Contrary to our expectations based on previous work, the trade-off between volume
 110 and probability chosen for this experiment did not abolish preference in the incongruent condition, with a
 111 discrimination performance significantly higher than the chance level of 0.5 (0.57, 95% CI = [0.5, 0.63], Fig.
 112 2B). Thus, in the incongruent condition mice preferred the more profitable option and the subjective contrast
 113 in probability was not stronger than the subjective contrast in volume.

114 **Experiment 2: Some evidence for equal weighing of reward probability and re-**
115 **ward volume**

116 In previous experiments (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017), we had shown that the relative stimulus
117 intensity (i), i.e. the absolute difference between two options divided by their mean (difference/mean ratio),
118 was a good predictor of discrimination performance for both volume and probability differences. Another
119 finding from these experiments was that, at least initially, mice responded less strongly to differences in
120 volume than to differences in probability, despite equivalence in expected values (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev
121 2017). We aimed to correct for this effect in experiment 1 by selecting options with a higher relative intensity
122 for volume (4 μL vs. 20 μL , $i = 1.33$) than for probability (0.2 vs. 0.5, $i = 0.857$). However, the results
123 from experiment 1 were not consistent with a subjective equality between the chosen volume and probability
124 differences. In order to test whether we had over-corrected for decreased sensitivity to volume in experiment 1,
125 we replaced the 0.5 probability with a probability of 1 in each experimental condition of experiment 2 (Table
126 1). With the two choice options having the same relative intensities ($i = 1.33$) for both reward dimensions and
127 the same expected values, we hypothesized that the discrimination performance in the incongruent condition
128 would be at chance level if both dimensions were equally weighed and equally perceived. On the other hand,
129 if mice were less sensitive for volume than for probability differences as in our previous experiments, then the
130 discrimination performance in the incongruent condition should be skewed towards probability (< 0.5).




Figure 3: **Discrimination performance in experiment 2.** Same notation as in Fig. 2. (A) Difference between discrimination performance in the baseline conditions and in the congruent and incongruent conditions. Discrimination performances in the baseline conditions was calculated from the mean values from the two different baseline conditions for each reward dimension (volume and probability), i.e. BP was the mean of BPV1 and BPV2, and BV was the mean of BVP1 and BVP2, where the values for condition BVP1 were taken from experiment 1 (Table 1). The discrimination performance in the incongruent condition was calculated as the relative preference for the higher probability dispenser when contrasted with the probability baseline (I - BP) and for the higher volume dispenser when contrasted with the volume baseline (I - BV). (B) Discrimination performance in the incongruent condition. In this experiment both options were equally profitable and had the same expected value.

131 In contrast to experiment 1, in experiment 2 mice showed an increase in discrimination performance in the
 132 congruent condition only when compared to the volume baseline, but not when compared to the probability
 133 baseline (Fig. 3A). As in experiment 1, the discrimination performance in the incongruent condition was lower
 134 than in either of the two baselines (Fig. 3A). Although the discrimination performance in the incongruent
 135 condition was again different from 0.5 (0.41, 95% CI = [0.35, 0.47]), it was lower than chance, thus skewed
 136 towards probability (Fig. 3B). However, when the data from cohort 2 were excluded, the discrimination
 137 performance became equivalent to 0.5 (0.48, 95% CI = [0.42, 0.54]). We return to the differences between
 138 cohorts in the discussion.

139 Experiment 3: Probability discrimination decreased with an increase in reward 140 volume, but volume discrimination was not affected by changes in reward prob- 141 ability

142 In the previous experiments we used two different baseline conditions for each dimension (BPV1, BPV2, BVP1,
 143 and BVP2, Table 1), in order to exhaust all combinations of reward stimuli and balance the experimental

144 design. However, we also wanted to test whether the level of the background dimension despite being the
145 same across choice options nevertheless affected the discrimination performance on the relevant dimension.
146 If mice use a noncompensatory decision rule, we can predict that regardless of the level of the background
147 dimension, the discrimination performance on the relevant dimension should remain constant. Alternatively,
148 with absolute reward evaluation the subjective difference between the options is said to decrease as the
149 background (irrelevant) dimension increases and therefore the discrimination performance is also expected
150 to decrease (Shafir and Yehonatan 2014). This prediction is derived from the concave shape of the utility
151 function, which is generally assumed to increase at a decreasing rate with the increase in any reward dimension
152 (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kenrick et al. 2009; but see also Kacelnik and Brito e Abreu 1998). The same
153 prediction can be made if we assume that motivation decreases with satiety, i.e. the strength of preference
154 decreases under rich environmental conditions (Schuck-Paim, Pompilio, and Kacelnik 2004), for example
155 at high reward volume or probability. In order to test whether the two reward dimensions (volume and
156 probability) interact with each other even when one of them is irrelevant (as background dimension that is
157 the same across choice options), we performed experiment 3.

158 The conditions in experiment 3 were chosen to be similar to the baseline conditions in the previous experiments,
159 by having one background and one relevant dimension (Table 1). The relevant dimension always differed
160 between the two options. For the probability dimension, we selected the same values of 0.2 and 0.5 ($i = 0.86$),
161 as in the previous experiments. For the volume dimension we selected the values of 4 μL and 10 μL (4.8 μL
162 and 9.6 μL in cohort 2, Table 1), because the combination of a higher volume with a probability of 0.8 was
163 expected to result in an insufficient number of visits for analysis. Cohort 2 had different reward volumes
164 due to differences in the pumping process between the two cages used (Methods), which also resulted in
165 a lower relative intensity for volume (0.67 instead of 0.86; we will return to this point in the discussion).
166 There were four different levels for each background dimension (volume and probability, Table 1). Each
167 mouse had its own pseudo-random sequence of the eight possible conditions. In order to test whether the
168 background dimension affected discrimination performance we fitted linear regression models for each mouse
169 and each dimension, with discrimination performance as the dependent variable and background level as the
170 independent variable. The background level was the proportion of the actual value to the maximum of the
171 four values tested, e.g. the background levels for volumes 4, 10, 15, 20 were 0.2, 0.5, 0.75, 1, respectively. We
172 defined *a priori* a smallest effect size of interest (sesoi), as 0.125, which is the slope that would result from a
173 difference of 0.1 in discrimination performance between the smallest and the largest background levels (PV1
174 and PV4, 0.2 and 1, respectively). A slope estimate (whether positive or negative) within the sesoi interval
175 was considered equivalent to zero and demonstrating a lack of an effect of background dimension.




Figure 4: **Slope estimates for the effect of the background dimension on the discrimination performance in the relevant dimension.** The two choice options always differed along the relevant dimension (either probability or volume, given on the abscissa) at a fixed relative intensity. The discrimination performance for each mouse was measured at four different levels of the background dimension, which was set at the same values on both choice options during a single drinking session, but differed from condition to condition (Table 1). Each dot is the individual slope estimate over the four different background dimensions, color-coded for cohort number. The smallest effect size of interest (sesoi, dashed lines) was determined to be the slope (0.125) that would have resulted in a difference in discrimination performance of 0.1, from the lowest to the highest level of the background dimension. Large blue circles give the means and the blue vertical lines the 90%-confidence intervals from non-parametric bootstraps. Green whiskers give the 95% CI from non-parametric bootstraps.

176 The results of experiment 3 show that the discrimination performance for probability decreased with increasing
177 volumes, although the effect size was small (PV1-PV4, Fig. 1, Fig. 4). In contrast, the discrimination
178 performance for volume was independent from probability as the background dimension, since the slope
179 was smaller than the sesoi (VP1-VP4, Fig. 1, Fig. 4). These results partially support the hypothesis that
180 decision-makers may ignore a reward dimension along which options do not vary.

181 **Experiment 4: Mice improved their volume discrimination over time**

182 For laboratory mice that have unrestricted access to a water bottle, the volume of a water reward is not
183 usually a stimulus that predicts reward profitability. In previous experiments (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev
184 2017), mice had shown an improved discrimination performance for volume over time. This suggests that
185 with experience mice become more attuned to the relevant reward dimension. In order to test whether the

186 discrimination performance for one or both dimensions improved over time, we performed experiment 4,
187 which had the same conditions as experiment 1 (Table 1), but with a new pseudo-random order. The same
188 mice participated in all experiments (1 to 4), with about seven weeks between experiment 1 and experiment
189 4. As in the previous experiments, we also used equivalence tests on the contrasts between the baselines and
190 the congruent and incongruent conditions.




Figure 5: **Difference in discrimination performance between identical conditions in experiment 1 and experiment 4.** Same notation as in in Fig. 2. The sequence of conditions was pseudo-random in each experiment and different for each individual. Positive differences indicate an increase in discrimination performance with time. Mice were seven weeks old at the beginning of experiment 1 and 13-14 weeks old at the beginning of experiment 4. The discrimination performance in the incongruent condition was calculated as the relative preference for the higher volume dispenser.

191 In the comparison between experiment 1 and experiment 4, mice showed an improved discrimination
192 performance in both volume baselines, as well as in the incongruent and BPV1 conditions (Fig. 5). There
193 was no change in the C condition. When we applied a familywise error control procedure, only the BPV1
194 result changed from an increase to inconclusive. Thus, consistent with our prior findings, mice improved
195 their volume discrimination over time. The discrimination performance in the congruent condition was better
196 than in the probability baseline, but the same as in the volume baseline (Fig. 6A). The discrimination in the
197 incongruent condition was lower than in any of the two baselines, but the difference to the volume baseline
198 was smaller (Fig. 6A). Finally, compared to experiment 1 the influence of the volume dimension on choice
199 was even more pronounced (Fig. 6B).




Figure 6: **Discrimination performance in experiment 4, with identical conditions to experiment 1.** Same notation as in Fig. 2. **(A)** Difference between discrimination performance in the baseline conditions and in the congruent and incongruent conditions. The discrimination performance in the incongruent condition was calculated as the relative preference for the higher probability dispenser when comparing to the probability baseline and for the higher volume dispenser when comparing to the volume baseline. **(B)** Discrimination performance in the incongruent condition. In experiments 1 and 4 the option with the higher volume was also the more profitable option. Compare to Fig. 2.

200 **Decision models of two-dimensional choice suggest that mice initially relied on**
 201 **both reward volume and reward probability, but then developed a bias for reward**
 202 **volume**

203 We based our decision models on the Scalar Utility Theory (SUT, Kacelnik and Brito e Abreu (1998);
 204 Rosenström, Wiesner, and Houston (2016)), which models memory traces for reward amounts (or volumes) as
 205 normal distributions rather than point estimates. The scalar property is implemented by setting the standard
 206 deviations of these distributions to be proportional to their means. Choice between two options with different
 207 volumes can be simulated by taking a single sample from each memory trace distribution and selecting the
 208 option with the larger sample.

209 As previously explained, the discrimination performance for reward probabilities can be reasonably predicted
 210 by the relative intensity of the two options (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017). This suggests that the
 211 memory traces of reward probabilities also exhibit the scalar property, so that discrimination of small
 212 probabilities (e.g. 0.2 vs. 0.5, $i = 0.86$) is easier than discrimination of large probabilities (e.g. 0.5 vs. 0.8, i
 213 $= 0.46$). Consequently, discrimination (of either volumes or probabilities) when options vary along a single
 214 dimension can be predicted by SUT.

215 In order to extend the basic model for multidimensional choice situations, we implemented six variations that
 216 differed in the use of information from the volume and probability dimensions (Table 2), including integrative

217 and noncompensatory models. The information from the different reward dimensions was used to obtain for
 218 each choice option a *remembered value* (utility), which exhibited the scalar property. Choice was simulated
 219 by single sampling from the *remembered value* distributions with means equal to the *remembered values* and
 220 standard deviations proportional to the *remembered values*. The *remembered value* in the scalar expected value
 221 and two-scalar models relied on the full integration of both the volume and the probability dimensions, but
 222 differed in the implementation of the scalar property, which either affected only the volume dimension (scalar
 223 expected value) or both dimensions (two-scalar; Table 2). In the randomly noncompensatory model, the
 224 *remembered value* for each choice was determined by only one of the reward dimensions, selected at random.
 225 In the winner-takes-all model, choice was exclusively driven by the more salient of the two dimensions. In the
 226 last two models the saliences of the reward dimensions were considered sequentially, either probability first,
 227 or volume first, and a decision was reached if the salience surpassed a given threshold, estimated in previous
 228 discrimination experiments (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017).
 229 If we assume that mice do not change strategies over time, the best model should predict their choices in all
 230 experiments. We thus used the probability baselines (BPV1 and BPV2) in experiments 1 and 4 to estimate
 231 the free parameters of the models and then used simulations to predict choices in all remaining experiments.
 232 For each model we generated 100 choices by 100 virtual mice for each experimental condition in each of
 233 the four experiments. We then quantified the out-of-sample model fits to the empirical data by calculating
 234 root-mean-square-errors (RMSE) and ranked the models by their RMSE scores.

Table 2: Decision-making models.

abbreviation	model	remembered value	criterion	γ
sev	scalar expected value	$\pi\mathcal{N}(v, \gamma v)$	-	1.05
2scal	two-scalar	$\mathcal{N}(\pi, \gamma\pi) \times \mathcal{N}(v, \gamma v)$	-	0.65
rnonc	randomly noncompensatory	$\mathcal{N}(r, \gamma r)$	$\theta_v = 0.5$	0.05
wta	winner-takes-all	$\mathcal{N}(r, \gamma r)$	$\theta = 1$	0.7
pfirst	probability first	$\mathcal{N}(r, \gamma r)$	if $s(\pi) > 0.8$ then $r = \pi$, if $s(v) > 0.8$ then $r = v$, otherwise $\theta = 0.5$	0.95
vfirst	volume first	$\mathcal{N}(r, \gamma r)$	if $s(v) > 0.8$ then $r = v$, if $s(\pi) > 0.8$ then $r = \pi$, otherwise $\theta = 0.5$	0.5

235 Note: π - probability estimate; v - volume estimate; γ - coefficient of variation; r - either v or π depending
 236 on the *criterion*; θ_v - probability of selecting the volume dimension; θ - probability of selecting the dimension
 237 with the higher salience; $s(r)$ - salience of dimension r , calculated as $\frac{\max(r) - \min(r)}{\bar{r}}$, where \bar{r} is the arithmetic
 238 mean of r over all options.

239 There was no single model that could best explain the choice of the mice in all four experiments, but the
 240 scalar expected value, two-scalar, and winner-takes-all models were in the top-three performing models most
 241 frequently (Tables 2, 3, see also Appendix 1 Figures A5, A6, A7, and A8). However, due to the unexpected
 242 differences in performance between cohort 2 and the other cohorts (e.g. Appendix 1 Figure A8), we also
 243 ranked the models separately for the different mouse groups, depending on which cage they performed the
 244 experiments in (cohorts 1 and 3 in cage 1 and cohort 2 in cage 2). Indeed, two different patterns emerged
 245 for the different cages. For the two cohorts in cage 1, scalar expected value and two-scalar were the best
 246 supported models, followed by the winner-takes-all and volume first models (Table 4. Notably, the volume
 247 first model was the best performing model in the later experiments 3 and 4, but the worst model in the

Table 3: Best performing models ranked by root-mean-square-errors (RMSE).

rank	experiment			
	1	2	3	4
1	sev	sev	vfirst	2scal
2	2scal	2scal	sev	wta
3	wta	wta	2scal	sev
4	rnonc	pfirst	wta	vfirst
5	pfirst	rnonc	pfirst	rnonc
6	vfirst	vfirst	rnonc	pfirst

earlier experiments 1 and 2. In contrast, the probability first model was the best supported model for cohort 2, followed by the randomly noncompensatory, scalar expected value, and two-scalar models (Table 5).

Table 4: Best performing models ranked by root-mean-square-errors (RMSE) for cohorts 1 and 3.

rank	experiment			
	1	2	3	4
1	sev	2scal	vfirst	vfirst
2	2scal	sev	sev	2scal
3	wta	wta	2scal	wta
4	rnonc	rnonc	wta	sev
5	pfirst	pfirst	rnonc	rnonc
6	vfirst	vfirst	pfirst	pfirst

Table 5: Best performing models ranked by root-mean-square-errors (RMSE) for cohort 2.

rank	experiment			
	1	2	3	4
1	pfirst	pfirst	pfirst	pfirst
2	rnonc	rnonc	wta	rnonc
3	sev	sev	2scal	wta
4	wta	2scal	sev	2scal
5	2scal	wta	rnonc	sev
6	vfirst	vfirst	vfirst	vfirst

Discussion

The foraging choices of the mice in this study provide evidence both for and against full integration of reward volume and probability. In the first two experiments, mice differed in discrimination performance in the conditions in which both reward dimensions were relevant (congruent and incongruent conditions) compared to the baselines, in which only one of the two dimensions was relevant (Figs. 2, 3). Consequently, the best supported models for these two experiments (cohort 2 excluded, see discussion about differences between cohorts below) were the models that made use of the full information from both reward dimensions (sev, 2scal), or from the dimension that was subjectively more salient (wta, Table. 4). Although these models were good predictors of choices in experiments 3 and 4 as well, the best-performing model was the one that considered the probability dimension only if differences on the volume dimension were insufficient to reach a decision (Table 4). Thus, it appears that mice initially used information from all reward dimensions without

261 bias and with experience started to rely more on one reward dimension and disregarded the other when
262 both dimensions differed between choice options. Interestingly, in human development the use of integrative
263 decision rules has also been shown to decrease with age (Jansen, Duijvenvoorde, and Huizenga 2012).
264 In similar and more complex choice situations when options vary on several dimensions, an animal has no
265 immediate method of distinguishing the relevant from the background dimensions. Instead it must rely on its
266 experience over many visits before it can obtain information about the long-term profitability associated with
267 the different reward dimensions. Under such circumstances a decision rule that considers all or the most
268 salient reward dimensions initially and prioritizes dimensions based on gathered experience can be profitable
269 without being too computationally demanding. Indeed, with the particular experimental design in this study,
270 a mouse using a “volume first” priority heuristic would have preferentially visited the more profitable option
271 (whenever there was one) in every single experimental condition, including the incongruent conditions.

272 **Scalar property considerations**

273 An alternative explanation of our main results is that the mice used the “volume first” heuristic from the
274 beginning of the experiment, but only became better at discriminating volumes (their coefficient of variation
275 γ decreased) in the last two experiments. This interpretation is supported by the comparison between
276 experiments 1 and 4 (Fig. 5), as well as from previous experiments (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017), in
277 which mice improved their volume discrimination over time. However, it is not possible with these data to
278 distinguish whether the effect was caused by training or age. Perhaps an increase in mouth capacity (Vora,
279 Camci, and Cox 2016) or, potentially, in the number of acid-sensing taste receptors (Zocchi, Wennemuth,
280 and Oka 2017) due to growth and aging could allow adult mice to better discriminate water volumes. We
281 assumed that mice consumed all water without spilling, but perhaps less experienced mice spill some water.
282 Comparing the discrimination performance of older naive and younger trained mice would help clarify this
283 confound.

284 The increase in discrimination performance for volume between experiments 1 and 4 (Fig. 5) suggests that
285 the scalar property only approximately holds, and that the γ for volume is not truly constant over a long
286 period of time. This can be seen as evidence against the scalar expected value model, which assumes that the
287 same coefficient of variation affects performance along each reward dimension. Instead, the improving volume
288 discrimination supports a version of the two-scalar model, in which there are two different scalars ($\gamma_\pi \neq \gamma_v$).
289 Alternatively, there might be only one scalar, associated with dynamic relative weights of the two dimensions
290 (which can be implemented as a changing θ_v in the randomly noncompensatory model, Fig. A2). Yet another
291 model extension that can account for the improving volume discrimination would be to introduce an explicit
292 sampling (exploration-exploitation balance) method (Sih and Del Giudice 2012; Nachev and Winter 2019).
293 In natural conditions reward dimensions rarely remain stable over time and foragers can benefit from making
294 sampling choices to gather information about the current state of the environment. Thus, not all choices
295 need to be based on expected values and individuals may differ in their sampling rates (Sih and Del Giudice
296 2012; Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017; Nachev and Winter 2019). With such an implementation it is not
297 the scalar but the frequency of sampling visits that changes over time, causing differences in discrimination
298 performance. The biggest challenge is that when it comes to volumes and probabilities, no direct method of
299 interrogating an animal’s estimate and coefficient of variation exist, so that researchers have to infer these
300 values from choice behavior, which is also affected by motivation and sampling frequency. In contrast, when
301 it comes to time intervals, the peak procedure gives us a more direct measurement of the time estimation of
302 animal subjects (Kacelnik and Brito e Abreu 1998).

303 **Interaction between dimensions and noncompensatory decision-making**

304 Although mice were roughly equally good at discriminating volume rewards at each different probability, the
305 discrimination of probabilities decreased at higher volumes (Fig. 4; the estimated effect size was a decrease of
306 0.12 between a volume background at 4 μL and at 20 μL). This suggests that the two dimensions interact
307 with each other. Absolute reward evaluation (Shafir 1994; Shafir and Yehonatan 2014) and state-dependent
308 evaluation (Schuck-Paim, Pompilio, and Kacelnik 2004) are both consistent with this decrease in discrimination
309 performance, but not with the lack of effect in the conditions in which the probability was the background
310 dimension. With comparable expected values (Table 1) between the two series of conditions, these hypotheses

311 make the same predictions regardless of which dimension is relevant and which is background. An alternative
312 explanation is that arriving at a good estimate of probability requires a large number of visits and when
313 the rewards are richer (of higher volume), mice satiate earlier and make a smaller total number of visits,
314 resulting in poor estimates of the probabilities and poorer discrimination performance. Consistent with this
315 explanation, mice made on average (\pm SD) 474 ± 199 nose pokes at the relevant dispensers at $4 \mu L$, but only
316 306 ± 64 nose pokes at $20 \mu L$ (Fig. A9, PV1 and PV4, respectively).

317 As mentioned earlier, researchers have proposed that with absolute reward evaluation the difference/mean ratio
318 in an experimental series like our experiment 3 should decrease with the increase of the background dimension,
319 leading to a decrease in the proportional preference for the high-profitability alternative (i.e. discrimination
320 performance) (Shafir and Yehonatan 2014). However, this is only the case if the difference is calculated from
321 the relevant dimension and divided by the mean utility. We suggest that both the difference and the mean
322 should be calculated from the same entity, either utility or one of the reward dimensions. When, as in our
323 sev and 2scal models 1, we calculate utility by multiplying the estimates for each dimension together, the
324 difference/mean ratio of the utility does not change with the change in the background dimension between
325 treatments. In fact, none of our models in experiment 3 exhibited an effect of the background dimension
326 on the discrimination performance, with all slopes equivalent to zero (Fig. A10). Thus, our results also
327 show that absolute reward evaluation does not necessarily predict an effect of background dimension on
328 discrimination performance.

329 **Difference between cohorts**




Figure 7: **Visit durations during rewarded and unrewarded nose pokes for the three cohorts in all experiments.** Columns give the status of the nose poke (rewarded or unrewarded) and rows, the experiment number (1-4). Data from the three cohorts are represented by differently color-filled density curves from the observed individual nose poke durations. Note the logarithmic scale on the abscissa.

330 Our results revealed some striking differences in behavior between cohort 2 and cohorts 1 and 3 (most
 331 obvious in Fig. 6). The most likely explanation for this is an effect of the specific experimental apparatus.
 332 As explained in Methods, the precision of the reward volumes was lower in cage 2, which housed cohort
 333 2. However, it is unlikely that such a small magnitude of the difference ($0.33 \pm 0.03 \mu Lstep^{-1}$ in cage 1
 334 vs. $1.56 \pm 0.24 \mu Lstep^{-1}$ in cage 2) could influence volume discrimination to the observed extent. Future
 335 experiments can address this issue by specifically manipulating the reliability of the volume dimension using
 336 the higher-precision pump. Instead, we suspect that the difference between cohorts might have been caused
 337 by the acoustic noise and vibrations produced by the stepping motors of the pumps. The pump in cage 1
 338 was much louder, whereas the one in cage 2 was barely audible (to a human experimenter). This could have
 339 made it harder for mice in cage 2 to discern whether a reward was forthcoming, which could have influenced
 340 their choices (Ojeda, Murphy, and Kacelnik 2018). As a result, mice in cage 2 waited longer before leaving
 341 the dispenser during unrewarded nose pokes (Fig. 7). This potentially costly delay might have increased
 342 the relative importance of the probability dimension (decreased θ_v), resulting in the observed discrimination
 343 performance in cohort 2. Furthermore, the same line of reasoning can also explain the improving volume
 344 discrimination: from the first to the fourth experiment there was a shift towards shorter unrewarded nose
 345 poke durations in the loud cage (cohorts 1 and 3, Fig. 7), suggesting that mice had learned over time to
 346 abort the unrewarded visits. This could have decreased the relative importance of the probability dimension

347 (increased θ_v), resulting in better volume discrimination. In an unrelated experiment we tested two cohorts of
348 mice in both cages simultaneously and then translocated them to the other cage. The results demonstrated
349 that differences in discrimination performance were primarily influenced by cage and not by cohort (Nachev,
350 in prep.). Thus, the sound cue associated with reward delivery may be an important confounding factor
351 in probability discrimination in mice, as it provides a signal for the reward outcome (Ojeda, Murphy, and
352 Kacelnik 2018).

353 Conclusion

354 In summary, our results show that mice could integrate reward volume and reward probability, which allowed
355 them to select the more profitable option when the two reward dimensions varied independently. The resulting
356 partial preference was consistent with Scalar Utility Theory. However, we also found that, with time mice
357 improved their performance in volume (but not in probability) discrimination tasks and their choices became
358 more consistent with a noncompensatory decision rule, in which volume is evaluated before probability.
359 Finally, we found that mice could discriminate the same pair of probabilities better when reward volumes
360 were smaller, but changes in the reward probability did not affect their volume discrimination performance.

361 Animals, Methods, and Materials

362 Animals

363 The experiments were conducted with C57BL/6NCrI female mice (Charles River, Sulzfeld, Germany, total n
364 = 30). Mice were five weeks old on arrival. The mice from each cohort were housed together, before and
365 during the experiments. They were marked with unique Radiofrequency Identification tags (RFID: 12×2.1
366 mm, 125 kHz, Sokymat, Rastede, Germany) under the skin in the scruff of the neck and also earmarked at
367 age six weeks. At age seven weeks mice were transferred to the automated group home cage for the main
368 experiment. Pellet chow (V1535, maintenance food, ssniff, Soest, Germany) was always accessible from a
369 trough in the cage lid. Water was available from the operant modules of the automated group cage, depending
370 on individual reward schedules. Light conditions in the experiments were 12:12 LD and climatic conditions
371 were 23 ± 2 °C and 50–70% humidity.

372 Ethics statement

373 The experimental procedures were aimed at maximizing animal welfare. During experiments, mice remained
374 undisturbed in their home cage. Data collection was automated, with animals voluntarily visiting water
375 dispensers to drink. The water intake and health of the mice was monitored daily. Due to the observational
376 nature of the study, animals were free from damage, pain, and suffering. The animals were not sacrificed at
377 the end of the study, which was performed under the supervision and with the approval of the animal welfare
378 officer (*Tierschutzbeauftragter*) heading the animal welfare committee at Humboldt University. Experiments
379 followed national regulations in accordance with the European Communities Council Directive 10/63/EU.

380 Cage and dispenser system

381 We used automated cages ($612 \times 435 \times 216$ mm, P2000, Tecniplast, Buggugiate, Italy) with woodchip
382 bedding (AB 6, AsBe-wood, Gransee, Germany), and enriched with two grey PVC tubes and paper towels as
383 nesting material. The cage was outfitted with four computer-controlled liquid dispensers. The experimental
384 set-up is described in detail in Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev (2017). Briefly, mice were detected at the
385 dispensers via infrared beam-break sensors and RFID-sensors. Water delivery at each dispenser could be
386 controlled, so that it could be restricted or dispensed at different amounts on an individual basis. Mice were
387 therefore rewarded with droplets of water from the dispenser spout that they could remove by licking. We
388 changed cage bedding and weighed all animals on a weekly basis, always during the light phase and at least
389 an hour before the start of the testing session. Data were recorded and stored automatically on a laptop
390 computer running a custom-written software in C#, based on the .NET framework. Time-stamped nose
391 poke events and amounts of water delivered were recorded for each dispenser, with the corresponding mouse

392 identity.

393 A second automated group cage (cage 2) was made for the purposes of this study, nearly identical to the one
394 described above (cage 1). The crucial modification was that the stepping-motor syringe pump was replaced
395 with a model that used disposable plastic 25-mL syringes instead of gas-tight Hamilton glass syringes (Series
396 1025). Thus, the pumping systems in the two cages differed in the smallest reward that could be delivered
397 and in the precision of reward delivery (mean \pm SD: $0.33 \pm 0.03 \mu Lstep^{-1}$ in cage 1 vs. $1.56 \pm 0.24 \mu Lstep^{-1}$
398 in cage 2). The precision of each pump was estimated by manually triggering reward visits at different preset
399 pump steps (17 and 42 in cage 1, 3 and 12 in cage 2) and collecting the expelled liquid in a graduated glass
400 pipette placed horizontally next to the cage. Each dispenser was measured at least 20 times for each pump
401 step value.

402 **Experimental schedule**

403 The general experimental procedure was the same as in Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev (2017). The water
404 dispensers were only active during a 18h-long drinking session each day, which began with the onset of
405 the dark phase and ended six hours after the end of the dark phase. The reward properties (volume and
406 probability) were dependent on the experimental condition. Rewards were drawn from fixed pseudo-random
407 repeating sequences. These sequences were: 11101111101101111110 for 80%, 11011101110101101110 for 70%,
408 10110101101001001010 for 50%, 10010100100001001000 for 30%, and 10001000010001000000 for 20%, where
409 1 is a rewarded nose poke and 0 is an unrewarded nose poke.

410 Although individual mice shared the same dispensers inside the same cage, they were not necessarily in the
411 same experimental phase or experimental condition. The three cohorts (1-3 in chronological order) were
412 tested consecutively, with cohort 2 housed in cage 2 and the other cohorts housed in cage 1. If after any
413 drinking session during any experimental phase a mouse drank less than 1000 μL of water, we placed two
414 water bottles in the automated cage, gently awakened all mice and allowed them to drink freely until they
415 voluntarily stopped.

416 **Exploratory phase**

417 At the beginning of this phase there were ten mice in each cohort, except for cohort 2, in which one mouse was
418 excluded due to the loss of the RFID tag after implantation (the mouse was in good health condition). The
419 mice were transferred to the automated cages 1-2 hours before the first drinking session of the exploratory
420 phase. The purpose of this phase was to let mice accustom to the cage and learn to use the dispensers to
421 obtain water. Therefore, each nose poke at any dispenser was rewarded with a constant volume of 20 μL .
422 The criterion for advancing to the following training phase was consuming more than 1000 μL in a single
423 drinking session. Mice that did not reach the criterion remained in the exploratory phase until they either
424 advanced to the following phase or were excluded from the experiment ($n = 1$ mouse in cohort 2).

425 **Training phase**

426 In this phase the reward volume was reduced to 10 μL and the reward probability was reduced to 0.3 at all
427 dispensers. These reward values ensured that mice remained motivated to make several hundred visits per
428 drinking session. The training phase was repeated for two to three days until at least eight mice fulfilled
429 the criterion of consuming more than 1000 L of water in one drinking session. The purpose of the training
430 phase was to introduce mice to the reward dimensions (volume and probability) that would be used in the
431 following discrimination experiments. In cohorts 1 and 2, mice were excluded from the experiment if they did
432 not reach the criterion in two days, or, alternatively, if more than eight mice had reached the criterion, mice
433 were excluded at random to ensure a balanced number of mice per dispenser. These mice were returned to
434 regular housing and available for reuse in other experiments.

435 **Autoshaping phase**

436 We introduced an autoshaping phase for the mice in cohort 3, because after two days only six of them
437 had advanced to the training phase. The unusually low number of visits made by mice that did not pass
438 the exploratory phase suggested that the noise produced by the pumping systems might scare naive, shy

439 mice away from the dispensers. In order to ensure that all mice were successfully trained, we designed the
440 autoshaping phase so that rewards at all four dispensers were delivered at regular intervals (7 μL every
441 minute), regardless of the behavior of the mice. After two days, all mice had made at least 200 nose pokes
442 and the cohort was then moved to the previous phase before autoshaping, either exploratory or training. Two
443 days later all mice successfully completed the training phase and two mice were randomly selected out of the
444 experiment, bringing the number of mice to eight. We therefore updated our training procedure to always
445 begin with the autoshaping phase, followed by the exploratory phase and the training phase.

446 **General procedure in the main experiments**

447 After eight mice had successfully passed the training phase, they proceeded with experiment 1 from the
448 main experiments (1-4). In all of the main experiments mice had a choice between four dispensers, where
449 two were not rewarding and the other two gave rewards with volumes and probabilities that depended on
450 the experimental condition (Table 1). In most conditions one of the rewarding dispensers (high-profitability
451 dispenser) was more profitable than the other (low-profitability dispenser). The sequence of conditions was
452 randomized for each individual, so that any given mouse was usually experiencing a different experimental
453 condition than all other mice. On any given day two of the dispensers were rewarding for four mice and the
454 other two were rewarding for the other four mice. Within each group of four, each pair of mice shared the
455 same high and low-profitability dispensers, which were spatially inverted between pairs of mice. This pairing
456 was done to increase the throughput of the experiments, while controlling for potential social learning effects
457 and distributing mice evenly over the dispensers to minimize crowding effects.

458 As a control for positional biases, each condition was followed by a reversal on the next day, so that the high
459 and low-profitability dispensers were spatially inverted for all mice, whereas the two non-rewarding dispensers
460 remained unchanged. Reversal was followed by the next experimental condition, with random distribution of
461 the dispensers among the pairs of mice following the constraints described above. Over the 50 total days in
462 the main experiment (twice the number of conditions shown in Table 1, because of reversals, plus experiment
463 4), each mouse experienced each dispenser as a high-profitability dispenser between 11 and 14 times. In
464 the event of an electrical or mechanical malfunction, data from the failed condition and its reversal were
465 discarded and the failed condition was repeated at the end of the experiment. Such a failure occurred once in
466 cohort 1, four times in cohort 2 and did not occur in cohort 3. After experiments 1 and 2, mice were given
467 another training phase (rewards with 10 μL and 0.3 probability) for a single day, before they proceeded with
468 the next experiment. After experiment 3 mice were given water *ad libitum* from a standard water bottle for
469 four days, followed by one day in the training phase, before proceeding with experiment 4. At the end of
470 experiment 4 mice were returned to the animal facility.

471 **Data analysis**

472 On average (mean \pm SD), mice made 477 ± 163 nose pokes per drinking session (Fig. A9), with an average
473 proportion of ± 0.1 nose pokes at the rewarding dispensers. In order to focus on post-acquisition performance
474 (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017), we excluded the first 150 nose pokes at the rewarding dispensers. We
475 then calculated the *discrimination performance* for each mouse and each condition of each experiment. Since
476 each condition was repeated twice (first exposure and reversal), we calculated the discrimination performance
477 as the total number of nose pokes at the high-profitability dispenser divided by the sum of the total number
478 of nose pokes at the high- and at the low-profitability dispensers. Nose pokes at the non-rewarding dispensers
479 were ignored. In the I condition of experiment 2 in which the profitability was equal (relative value = 1,
480 Table 1), the dispenser with the higher reward volume was treated as the “high-profitability” dispenser.
481 When comparing discrimination performances, we used the two one-sided procedure (TOST) for equivalence
482 testing (Lauzon and Caffo 2009; Lakens 2017). First, we picked a smallest effect size of interest (sesoi) *a*
483 *priori* as the difference in discrimination performance of 0.1 units in either direction. (The sesoi can be
484 graphically represented as the [-0.1, 0.1] interval around the difference of zero, or as [-0.6, 0.6] around the
485 chance performance of 0.5.) Then, we estimated the mean differences and their confidence intervals (CIs)
486 from 1000 non-parametric bootstraps using the `smean.cl.boot` function in the package `Hmisc` (Harrell and
487 Dupont 2019). For a single equivalence test the 90% CI is usually constructed, i.e. $1 - 2\alpha$ with $\alpha = 0.05$,
488 because both the upper and the lower confidence bounds are tested against the sesoi (Lauzon and Caffo

2009; Lakens 2017). Thus, equivalence was statistically supported if the 90% CI was completely bounded by the sesoi interval around the effect size of zero (the null hypothesis). A difference was considered to be statistically supported if the 95% CI did not contain zero and the 90% CI was not completely bounded by the sesoi interval. If the 95% CI contained zero, but the 90% CI was not completely bounded by the sesoi, then results were inconclusive. Researchers have shown that in order to correct for multiple comparisons in equivalence tests, it suffices to only apply a familywise correction of the α for the problematic cases where the type I error is most likely (Davidson and Cribbie 2019), i.e. when equivalence is supported, but the mean difference is close to the sesoi bound. The families of tests, for which multiple comparisons occur in our study, are the four contrasts in each of experiments 1, 2, and 4 (three families), the tests on the two slopes in experiment 3, and the six before-after contrasts between experiment 1 and 4. For each of these five families the α was divided by $k^2/4$, where k was the number of problematic cases in each family (Caffo, Lauzon, and Röhmel 2013). However, the number of problematic cases did not exceed two in any of the test families, which resulted in the corrected α equal to the original value of 0.05. Furthermore, even with k equal to four, two, and six (the total number of tests in each test family), only a single result changed from non-equivalent to inconclusive. We therefore report the uncorrected 90% and 95% CIs. Data analysis and simulations were done using R (Team 2019). All data and code is available in the Zenodo repository: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3726829>.

506 Simulations

507 Environment

508 Each of the experimental conditions was recreated in the simulations as a binary choice task between the high-profitability and the low-profitability options. We did not simulate the two non-rewarding options. Upon a visit by a virtual mouse, a choice option would deliver a reward with its corresponding volume and probability (Table 1). The virtual environment was not spatially and temporally explicit. Thus, no reversal conditions were simulated and the test of each experimental condition consisted in a sequence of 100 choices. All experimental conditions in all four experiments were tested.

514 Virtual mice

515 For simplicity and in order to simulate post-acquisition discrimination performance, we assumed that each mouse had a precise estimate of each of the two reward dimensions for both choice options. The virtual mice thus began each experimental condition in a learned state and (further) learning was not simulated. From its memory traces a virtual mouse generated one *remembered value* distribution for each choice option, according to one of six different rules (models, Table 2). Action selection was then implemented by taking a single sample from each distribution and selecting the option with the larger sample.

521 Remembered value models

522 All six models implemented the *scalar property* from the Scalar Utility Theory (SUT, Kacelnik and Brito e Abreu (1998); Rosenström, Wiesner, and Houston (2016)), because the remembered value was modelled as a normal distribution with a standard deviation proportional to its mean. However, the models differed in the way information from the two reward dimensions was used (either through integration of the full information or by one dimension overriding the other).

527 These models were:

- 528 1. *Scalar expected value model*. There is a single memory trace for each option and it consists in the simple product of the estimate for the volume and the estimate for the probability (expected value). The scalar property is implemented as $\pi\mathcal{N}(v, \gamma v)$, where π is the probability estimate. $\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma)$ is a normal distribution with mean μ and standard deviation σ , v is the volume estimate, and γ is a free parameter, the coefficient of variation. This model thus utilizes information from all dimensions for every decision.
- 533 2. *Two-scalar model*. There are traces for each dimension for every option, where each trace exhibits the scalar property independently and the value is obtained by simple multiplication of the traces for each dimension: $\mathcal{N}(\pi, \gamma\pi) \times \mathcal{N}(v, \gamma v)$. This model also utilizes information from all dimensions for every

536 decision. Although it allows each dimension to have its own scalar factor, e.g. $\gamma_\pi \neq \gamma_v$, for the sake of
537 simplicity we assume that they are both equal.

538 The memory traces in the remaining models are identical to the traces in the two-scalar model, but these
539 models usually consider only a single dimension.

540 3. *randomly noncompensatory model*. Each decision is based on a single dimension, selected with probability
541 $\theta_v = 0.5$.

542 4. *Winner-takes-all model*. Each decision is based only on the dimension with the highest salience. The
543 salience for a vector of estimates from memory traces (mean values) along one dimension, e.g. volume
544 $v = (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_n)$, is calculated as $\frac{\max(v) - \min(v)}{v}$, where n is the number of options. In the case of
545 $n = 2$, the salience is equivalent to the previously described relative intensity measure. For dimensions
546 of equal salience the model reverts to random choice.

547 The last two models are examples of a lexicographic rule, in which the dimensions are checked in a specific
548 order. If the salience of a dimension is higher than a given threshold, then a decision is made based only on
549 this dimension. Otherwise the next-order dimension is checked. If all dimensions have saliences below the
550 threshold, the model reverts to random choice. The value of the threshold was set at 0.8, the psychometric
551 function threshold for probability (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017), but we also performed sensitivity
552 analyses on the threshold values (Fig. @??fig:senspfirst), Fig. @??fig:sensvfirst)).

553 5. *Probability first model*. Probability is checked first, then volume.

554 6. *Volume first model*. Volume is checked first, then probability.

555 Model fits

556 All models described above share the same free parameter, the scalar factor γ . In order to obtain baseline
557 estimates for γ for each of the models (Table @ref(tab:conds_tab)), we focused on the probability baseline
558 discrimination performances of all mice in experiments 1 and 4 (conditions BPV1 and BPV2). We performed
559 a grid search sensitivity analysis by varying γ with steps of 0.05 in the range of (0.05, 2). We generated 100
560 decisions by 100 mice for each cell in this grid and then used locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (loess) to
561 fit a model for each condition. The free parameter values that resulted in the smallest RMSEs compared to
562 the observed baseline data were selected for the comparison of the six models (Table 2). We also performed a
563 sensitivity analysis for different values of the free parameters θ_v in the randomly noncompensatory model
564 and of the thresholds for volume and probability in the volume first and probability first models, in the
565 range of (0, 1), with a step of 0.05. The resulting free parameter estimates (across animals) were then used
566 in out-of-sample tests of the six models. For each of the experimental conditions in the four experiments
567 (Table @ref(tab:conds_tab)) and for each of the six models we simulated 100 choices by 100 (identically
568 parametrized) mice. Over the 100 choices we calculated the discrimination performance for each mouse
569 and then used the median of the individual discrimination performances as the model prediction. We then
570 quantified the model fits to the empirical data by calculating root-mean-square-errors (RMSE), excluding the
571 BPV1 and BPV2 conditions in experiments 1 and 4. Finally, we ranked the models by their RMSE scores.

572 Appendix




Figure A1: **Sensitivity tests for the models that only had γ as a free parameter.** Dots give the discrimination performances calculated from 1000 choices for each value of γ tested [0.05 , 2] and for each of the baseline conditions “BPV1” (purple) and “BPV2” (yellow). Lines give the corresponding fits based on locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (loess). The dashed line gives the empirical mean discrimination performance from the baseline conditions “BPV1” and “BPV2” and the green arrows point to the value of gamma that resulted in the smallest root-mean-square-errors (RMSEs). These values were then used in the main simulations (Table 2). The different panels give the results for the scalar expected value (A), two-scalar (B), and winner-takes-all (C) models.




Figure A2: **Sensitivity tests for the randomly noncompensatory model.** Same notation as in Fig. A1. The different panels give the different values of the probability with which the volume dimension was chosen (θ_v). For a non-biased randomly noncompensatory model we set $\theta_v = 0.5$.




Figure A3: **Sensitivity tests for the probability first model.** Same notation as in Fig. A1. The different panels give the different values of the salience threshold that needed to be reached for one option to be preferred over the other. We set the value of the threshold for both the volume and probability dimensions to 0.8, based on the psychometric function threshold for probability (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017).




Figure A4: **Sensitivity tests for the volume first model.** Same notation as in Fig. A1. The different panels give the different values of the salience threshold that needed to be reached for one option to be preferred over the other. We set the value of the threshold for both the volume and probability dimensions to 0.8, based on the psychometric function threshold for probability (Rivalan, Winter, and Nachev 2017).




Figure A5: Comparison of discrimination performance in all six simulation models and in the three mouse cohorts in Experiment 1. Columns give the condition names (Table 1) and rows, the model number (Table 2). Empirical data from the three cohorts are represented by differently color-filled density curves from the observed discrimination performances. Simulation data are represented by an empty thick-lined density curve. The dashed line gives the median of the empirical data and the dotted line - the median of the simulated data. The discrimination performance gives the relative visitation rate of the more profitable option, or, in the incongruent condition, the option with the higher volume.




Figure A6: Comparison of discrimination performance in all six simulation models and in the three mouse cohorts in Experiment 2. Same notation as in Fig. A5.




Figure A7: Comparison of discrimination performance in all six simulation models and in the three mouse cohorts in Experiment 3. Same notation as in Fig. A5.




Figure A8: Comparison of discrimination performance in all six simulation models and in the three mouse cohorts in Experiment 4. Same notation as in Fig. A5.




Figure A9: **Total number of nose pokes for each experimental condition in the three cohorts in all experiments.** Rows show different experiments (1-4). Each symbol represents the total number of nose pokes for a single mouse over one of the two experimental days of the given condition.




Figure A10: **Slope estimates for the effect of the background dimension on the discrimination performance in the relevant dimension for different decision models.** The two choice options always differed along the relevant dimension (either probability or volume) at a fixed relative intensity. The discrimination performance for 100 virtual mice making 100 decisions each was measured at four different levels of the background dimension. Symbols and whiskers give means and 98% confidence intervals estimated from bootstraps. The smallest effect size of interest (dashed lines) was determined to be the slope that would have resulted in a difference in discrimination performance of 0.1, from the lowest to the highest level of the background dimension. Compare to Fig. 4.

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577 Authorship and contribution

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579 Writing—review and editing, Visualization, Supervision, Project Administration.
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582 Competing interests

583 The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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