

Same-sex sexual behavior and selection for indiscriminate mating

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1 **The widespread presence of same-sex sexual behavior (SSB) has long been thought**
2 **to pose an evolutionary conundrum¹⁻³, as participants in SSB suffer the cost of failing to**
3 **reproduce after expending the time and energy to find a mate. The potential for SSB to**
4 **occur as part of an optimal strategy has received almost no attention, although**
5 **indiscriminate sexual behavior may be the ancestral mode of sexual reproduction⁴. Here,**
6 **we build a simple model of sexual reproduction and create a theoretical framework for the**
7 **evolution of indiscriminate sexual behavior. We provide strong support for the hypothesis**
8 **that SSB is likely maintained by selection for indiscriminate sexual behavior, by showing**
9 **that indiscriminate mating is the optimal strategy under a wide range of conditions.**
10 **Further, our model suggests that the conditions that most strongly favor indiscriminate**
11 **mating were likely present at the origin of sexual behavior. These findings have**
12 **implications not only for the evolutionary origins of SSB, but also for the evolution of**
13 **discriminate sexual behavior across the animal kingdom.**

14 Empirical observations of same-sex sexual behavior (SSB; i.e., any attempted sexual
15 activity between two or more members of the same sex) in animals are widespread, with
16 evidence of SSB in mammals⁵⁻⁹, birds¹⁰⁻¹⁴, arthropods¹⁵⁻¹⁹, mollusks²⁰⁻²², echinoderms²³⁻²⁵, and
17 other animals²⁶⁻³⁰. Since SSB is traditionally thought to be deleterious, as same-sex matings
18 require energy expenditure but cannot produce offspring, there has been much interest in
19 understanding its origin and maintenance¹⁻⁵. Despite this, there exists no strong theoretical
20 foundation for understanding SSB (but see ^{31,32}), resulting in a wide range of untested verbal
21 arguments in the literature¹⁻⁵.

22 Recently, Monk et al.⁴ challenged the longstanding perspective of SSB as a derived trait,
23 arguing that rather than trying to understand its presence, a more salient question would be to

24 understand its absence. They hypothesize that indiscriminate sexual behavior (i.e., mating
25 without determining the sex of one's partner) is the ancestral condition, realizing that
26 discriminate sexual behavior (i.e., directing sexual behavior at members of the opposite sex)
27 must evolve through mechanisms controlling sexual signaling and mate choosiness. Of course,
28 the existence of indiscriminate mating as the ancestral condition does not explain its current
29 prevalence³³. While in some cases (e.g., broadcast spawning and wind pollination) indiscriminate
30 mating predominates as a result of little potential benefit to (or opportunity for) sexual
31 discrimination, it is oftentimes unclear why indiscriminate mating persists.

32 Building on the perspective of Monk et al.⁴, we argue that selection may actually favor
33 indiscriminate sexual behavior (or prevent the evolution of sexual discrimination) under a wide
34 range of conditions observed in nature. We create a theoretical framework for understanding the
35 conditions that favor indiscriminate sexual behavior and provide a test of whether SSB is likely
36 to result from selection for indiscriminate sexual behavior. We start with a simple optimization
37 model of sexual reproduction, then support this approach with a population genetic model that
38 explicitly tracks evolutionary dynamics. We find that indiscriminate mating is the optimal
39 strategy for many parameter combinations and produce testable predictions about the conditions
40 that favor SSB resulting from indiscriminate mating.

41 **Optimization Model**

42 We present the optimization model in full in the Supplementary Methods and provide a
43 basic summary of its features here. Our approach explores one of many³⁴ potential hypotheses
44 for SSB (that it results from indiscriminate mating) without considering the evolution of same-
45 sex preferences that have evolved in some vertebrates and may result from complex social or
46 genetic interactions (see Table 2 in Bailey and Zuk¹). As a result, and because our model does

47 not make assumptions consistent with sexual behavior in humans, this study should not be
48 considered in relation to human sexuality. We assume that a population consists of two sexes
49 (the searching sex and the targeted sex), where a proportion σ is of the targeted sex. We make no
50 assumptions about the identity of the sexes and use the terms searching and targeted liberally.
51 For example, if our model were applied to an insect in which males seek females to display to,
52 males would be the searching sex and the females would be the targeted sex.

53 We assume that reproduction occurs in discrete bouts (corresponding to generations)
54 where each member of the searching sex has only one opportunity to mate per bout (an
55 assumption that biases against indiscriminate mating since SSB cannot be corrected for within
56 one reproductive bout). We assume that an individual of the searching sex finds another
57 individual of either sex with which to attempt to mate with probability f . The evolutionarily
58 labile parameter of our model a controls whether the searching sex attempts to mate
59 discriminately. In particular, a is the proportion of bouts in which a member of the searching sex
60 attempts to sexually discriminate. Of course, members of the searching sex can only mate
61 discriminately if they identify some signal (or cue) that an individual is of the opposite sex. We
62 define s as the proportion of bouts in which a member of the targeted sex provides a signal of
63 their sexual identity. Then, as shown in the Supplementary Methods, given that a member of the
64 searching sex finds a mate, it will be of the opposite (targeted) sex with probability $\sigma + (1 - \sigma)as$.
65 Thus, if members of the targeted sex always signal ($s = 1$) and members of the searching sex
66 always attempt to discriminate ($a = 1$), a member of the searching sex is guaranteed to find a
67 member of the targeted sex. Furthermore, without any signal from the targeted sex ($s = 0$) or any
68 attempt to discriminate from the searching sex ($a = 0$), the probability of finding a mate of the

69 opposite sex is simply the proportion of the population of that sex σ . We discuss the
70 interpretation of a and s further in the Supplementary Methods.

71 Even upon finding a mate of the opposite sex the searching sex may be rejected by their
72 potential mate (with probability r), in which case they do not reproduce in the reproductive bout.
73 We assume that matings suffer a fecundity cost p associated with the sexual signal. Individuals
74 from the searching sex die between reproductive bouts with probability d in the absence of
75 sexual discrimination. They also carry an additional survival cost c when they attempt sexual
76 discrimination (a search cost), such that a member of the searching sex will survive to the next
77 reproductive bout with probability $1 - (d + ac)$.

78 **Analysis and Results**

79 The model above results in a wide range of parameter space in which indiscriminate
80 mating is an optimal strategy. Specifically, one can derive from this model the expected lifetime
81 reproductive success of a member of the searching sex, R_0 . Differentiating R_0 with respect to a
82 gives the fitness gradient dR_0/da (see Supplementary Methods). At a given amount of sexual
83 discrimination a , the sign of the fitness gradient gives the expected direction of evolution. Values
84 of a for which the fitness gradient is 0 are potential evolutionary optima. In analyzing the
85 optimal amount of sexual discrimination, one can determine under what conditions, if any,
86 individuals should attempt to mate indiscriminately. If the optimal strategy is indiscriminate
87 mating, then SSB is expected to be frequent.

88 Of particular interest is whether indiscriminate mating ($a = 0$) is ever an optimal strategy.
89 We show in the Supplementary Methods that the fitness gradient at $a = 0$ will be negative (and
90 thus sexual discrimination should never evolve) whenever

91
$$c > (1 - \sigma)(1 - d)ds/\sigma. \tag{1}$$

92 Given a 1:1 sex ratio ($\sigma = 0.5$), equation (1) simplifies to $c > (1 - d)ds$. Equation (1) shows that
93 even under restrictive conditions in which the targeted sex always provides a sexual signal ($s =$
94 1), the optimal strategy may be to never attempt sexual discrimination. Without sexual signaling
95 ($s = 0$), if there is any cost to attempting to sexually discriminate, sexual discrimination is not
96 expected to evolve. Although this is obvious given the formulation of the model, it formalizes
97 the important point that the origin of sex and the origin of providing signals of one's sex are not
98 the same. Logically, such cues likely evolved after the origin of sexual reproduction⁴, so our
99 model suggests selection for sexual discrimination was unlikely to follow immediately upon the
100 origin of sex, strengthening the hypothesis that indiscriminate sexual behavior is likely
101 ancestral⁴.

102 Similarly, the conditions for maximum attempted discrimination $a = 1$ to be the best
103 strategy are derived in the Supplementary Methods and shown in Table 1. If neither condition is
104 met, then an intermediate level of sexual discrimination will evolve (an outcome that occurs in a
105 small but non-trivial portion of the parameter space).

106 A high cost to sexual discrimination c and poor signaling by the targeted sex s promotes
107 indiscriminate mating as the optimal strategy (equation (1) and Fig. 1). Sexual discrimination is
108 most likely to evolve when the sex ratio is biased in favor of the searching sex (equation (1)).
109 When the majority of the population is of the targeted sex ($1 > \sigma \gg 0.5$), individuals are more
110 likely to find a member of the opposite sex with which to mate by chance, so attempted sexual
111 discrimination is a worse strategy than when the targeted sex is rare.

112 Interestingly, an intermediate death rate d favors the evolution of sexual discrimination
113 (Fig. 1). When death is rare (small d), members of the searching sex are expected to have many
114 reproductive opportunities in their lifetime. Under these conditions, the best strategy is to live as
115 long as possible by not attempting to sexually discriminate. The cost of SSB in this case is low
116 because one failed mating due to SSB will likely be made up for by chance later in life. On the
117 other hand, when d is high, members of the searching sex are unlikely to ever mate. In this case,
118 they cannot afford to pay any additional cost and their optimal strategy is to mate
119 indiscriminately and rely on luck. Of course, indiscriminate mating will result in SSB being
120 common (Fig. 1, bottom row).

121 Although they do not affect the optimal level of discrimination, increasing the cost of
122 sexual signals p and the probability of mate rejection r and decreasing the probability of finding
123 any individual f cause the selection gradient to approach 0 (i.e., weaker selection; Movie S1 and
124 Table 2 show the effect of each parameter). If indiscriminate mating is ancestral, these conditions
125 are more conducive to the transient maintenance of indiscriminate sexual behavior by reducing
126 the efficacy of selection and making the stochastic loss of discriminate mating more likely. Thus,
127 discriminate mating is less likely to evolve in sparse populations (low f) or when the targeted sex
128 is choosy or the searching sex competitive (high r).

129 We test the generality of our results by modifying our assumptions to allow same-sex
130 matings to carry an additional cost (Supplementary Appendix S1), to include mortality from
131 different sources acting multiplicatively (Supplementary Appendix S2), to assume the cost to
132 sexual discrimination is due to fecundity as opposed to survival (Supplementary Appendix S3),
133 and to assume a semelparous life history (Supplementary Appendix S4). We show the conditions
134 for no or complete sexual discrimination to evolve given these assumptions in Table 1. We

135 consider the existence of additional costs to SSB as an extension since while such costs have
136 been found³⁵ (and are often suggested³), other studies fail to support that such costs exist^{36,37}.
137 Our primary results are robust to all of these changes, with each version of the model predicting
138 an appreciable region of parameter space for which indiscriminate mating is the optimal strategy.
139 Of course, assuming that SSB carries explicit costs (in addition to the opportunity costs implicit
140 in the above analysis) results in more restrictive conditions for sexual discrimination to evolve,
141 although small costs to SSB have only small impacts on the model outcomes. The only
142 qualitative differences between the model versions occur at high death rates d when mortality is
143 multiplicative, high signaling costs p when discrimination cost is to fecundity, or low death rates
144 d when the searching sex is semelparous. Qualitative outcomes of the models are compared in
145 Table 3.

146 **Dynamical Model**

147 Although our optimization model is analytically tractable and clarifies costs and benefits,
148 lifetime reproductive success is not necessarily maximized by selection³⁸. As such, we also build
149 a single-locus population genetic model with haploid genetics and overlapping generations that
150 makes similar assumptions to the approach above. Importantly, the population genetic model
151 extends the optimization approach by incorporating frequency dependence and allowing the sex
152 ratio to change naturally from feedbacks with mortality due to discrimination costs. Since p , r ,
153 and f play no role in this framework, they are ignored. We still assume a background mortality of
154 d afflicts both sexes and a survival cost of attempted discrimination of ac is suffered only by the
155 searching sex. The probability of finding a mate of the opposite sex is still $\sigma + (1 - \sigma)as$, but now
156 the sex ratio σ emerges from the model. We use successive invasions to determine the

157 evolutionarily stable values of attempted sexual discrimination a . Although not analytically
158 tractable, this model makes no assumptions *a priori* about the quantity that selection maximizes.

159 The results from this population genetic model align strikingly well with the optimization
160 approach, with the range of conditions under which indiscriminate mating is uninvadible being
161 practically identical between approaches (Fig. S1). A stable polymorphism identified by mutual
162 invasibility only occurs in about 2% of 10,000 randomly generated parameter combinations and
163 is especially common at low or high death rates d and strong sexual signals s . This model shows
164 that not attempting to discern the sex of potential mates can be a convergent stable evolutionary
165 optimum.

166 **Implications**

167 SSB is often considered a result of mistaken identity³⁹⁻⁴¹, as is suggested to account for
168 about 80% of reported cases in arthropods³. Our model provides an evolutionary perspective on
169 this mistaken identity hypothesis, suggesting that poor sex identification could actually occur as
170 an optimal strategy. This evokes hypotheses that SSB may result from a mating strategy of
171 attempting copulation with any encountered conspecific due to low probability of encounter²¹ or
172 low costs to SSB^{22,30}. The costs of missing an opportunity to mate and of attempting SSB have
173 been discussed⁴²⁻⁴⁴ in the context of the acceptance cost threshold hypothesis⁴⁵—a general theory
174 suggesting that erroneous associations (e.g. between mates or cooperative partners) become more
175 likely with poor discrimination ability and low costs to mistaken associations. We provide a
176 formal application of this hypothesis to SSB and show which conditions favor indiscriminate
177 mating.

178 It was argued by Parker⁴⁶ that six evolutionary transitions (the “sexual cascade”) drove
179 unicellular asexual organisms to become behaviorally-complex, sexual organisms. One such
180 transition is the evolution of the movement of males toward females before sperm release during
181 external fertilization (an example of sexual discrimination referred to as “female targeting”⁴⁶).
182 To our knowledge, Parker’s model⁴⁶ is the only study addressing whether sexual discrimination
183 evolves. Direct comparison between Parker’s model and our model is difficult, but we seem to
184 find more restrictive conditions for the evolution of sexual discrimination, which can be
185 attributed to 1) imperfect signaling (our s) of the targeted sex (as is likely at the origin of sexual
186 reproduction⁴) and 2) a search cost^{47,48} (our c) for attempting to sexually discriminate (instead of
187 a tradeoff with gonad expenditure⁴⁶). These models are complementary; our model applies to
188 cases not considered by Parker⁴⁶ such as SSB in species with internal fertilization (e.g. insects³)
189 or species with limits on their ability to find and identify mates (e.g. those with search costs, poor
190 signals of sexual identity, and deep-sea species^{21,23,24}).

191 It is interesting to consider how the predictions of the model relate to the conditions
192 expected at the origin of sexual behavior. Echinoderms are likely good proxies for such
193 animals^{4,46}, supported by their position as an outgroup to chordates (where most complexity in
194 sexual behaviors arise). Consistent with the model’s predictions for species that mate
195 indiscriminately, long-lived adults are common in echinoderms^{49,50}. Additionally, it is reasonable
196 to expect that cues to determine sex in echinoderms are relatively limited both because visual
197 cues cannot be relied upon and there exists little evidence in this taxon for chemical cues for sex-
198 specific recognition from a distance^{51,52}. Indeed, multiple studies suggest some echinoderm
199 species form mating pairs without consideration for sex^{23,24,53}. This suggests that if

200 indiscriminate sexual behavior is the ancestral condition⁴, sexual discrimination was unlikely to
201 have evolved readily.

202 This model relates to previous work on mate choice in which there can be a direct cost of
203 mating with one category of individuals versus another⁵⁴, in finding that costs can prevent
204 mating preferences from evolving. In fact, all cases where there are direct viability or fecundity
205 benefits to choosing one type of mate are also somewhat analogous. However, the costs of
206 indiscriminate mating in the current model are much higher than in many other cases with direct
207 benefits, as SSB results in a mating which cannot produce any offspring at all. The mechanisms
208 operating here are most similar to the evolution of preferences for conspecifics, where mating
209 with a heterospecific produces no viable hybrids. In both cases, costs of discrimination will trade
210 off against the peril of producing no offspring. In the current context, the unexpected
211 consequence is that SSB often results.

212 By showing that there are a broad range of conditions for which indiscriminate mating
213 can be an optimal strategy, we extend recent work⁴ suggesting the evolutionary origins of
214 discriminate sexual behavior as a new and fruitful area of research. Our model provides an
215 important proof-of-concept regarding whether indiscriminate mating can be an optimal
216 evolutionary strategy and what conditions facilitate its evolution. One important result from this
217 modeling exercise is that sexual discrimination can be favored by either low, intermediate, or
218 high mortality rates depending on other features of the system (Table 3). As such, mortality rates
219 alone are unlikely to predict whether indiscriminate mating is an optimal strategy. Costs to
220 discrimination c and strengths of sexual signals s are more likely candidates for the drivers of
221 indiscriminate mating, but their values in natural populations are unknown. Attempts to measure
222 these (or related) parameters are important gaps to fill in determining whether SSB results from

223 selection for indiscriminate mating in nature. Specifically, our model leads to the predictions that
224 species that mate indiscriminately have high costs to discrimination, search costs to survival
225 rather than fecundity (since this results in more stringent conditions for sexual discrimination,
226 Supplementary Appendix S3), and subtle differences between the sexes. In this way, our model
227 suggests which features of organisms are likely to predispose them to indiscriminate mating,
228 providing a guide future work to determine how widespread selection favoring indiscriminate
229 mating is in nature

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362 **Author Contributions**

363 BAL conceived of the project and the optimization models. BAL and MRS designed the
364 population genetic models. BAL led the writing on the manuscript with input from MRS.

365 **Data Availability**

366 All analyses can be reproduced by the files in the supplementary information.

367 **Competing Interests**

368 The authors declare no competing interests.

369 **Table 1.** Conditions for no discrimination or complete discrimination to be the optimal
 370 evolutionary strategy given an equal sex ratio for each of the models we consider.

Discrimination cost to:	Presented in	Indiscriminate mating best strategy	Complete sexual discrimination best strategy
Survival (additive)	Main text	$c > (1 - d)ds$	$c < \frac{-(1 + 2ds) + \sqrt{1 + 4ds(1 + s)}}{2s}$
Survival (multiplicative)	Appendix S2	$c > ds$	$c < \frac{-(1 + 2ds) + \sqrt{1 + 4ds(1 + s)}}{2s(1 - d)}$
Fecundity	Appendix S3	$c > s(1 - ps)$	$c < \frac{s(1 - ps)}{1 + 2s}$
Survival (additive) with semelparous life history	Appendix S4	$c > (1 - d)s$	$c < \frac{s(1 - d)}{1 + 2s}$
Survival (additive) with extra cost to SSB	Appendix S1	$c > s[d((1 - \delta) - d) + (1 - \delta/4)\delta]$	$c < -(1 + 2ds + s\delta(1 - s))/2s + \sqrt{1 + 4ds(1 + s) + 2s\delta(1 + s)}/2s$

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373 **Table 2.** Summary of parameters, their meaning, and their role in the evolution of sexual
374 discrimination from the first model presented with discrimination as an additive cost to survival.

Parameter	Meaning	Range	Effect
<i>a</i>	Attempt to mate discriminately	$0 \leq a \leq 1$	N/A
<i>c</i>	Cost of mating discriminately	$0 \leq c \leq (1-d)$	Decreasing <i>c</i> favors sexual discrimination
<i>s</i>	Signal (by targeted sex) of their sexual identity	$0 \leq s \leq 1$	Increasing <i>s</i> favors sexual discrimination
σ	Proportion of population of the targeted sex	$0 < \sigma < 1$	Decreasing σ favors sexual discrimination
<i>p</i>	Cost of presenting sexual identity (by targeted sex)	$0 \leq p < 1$	Increasing <i>p</i> decreases the selection gradient but has little effect on the ESS
<i>d</i>	Baseline mortality probability between each reproductive bout	$0 < d < 1$	Intermediate values of <i>d</i> favor sexual discrimination
<i>f</i>	Probability of finding any individual with which to attempt mating	$0 < f \leq 1$	Increasing <i>f</i> increases the selection gradient but has little effect on the ESS
<i>r</i>	Probability mate of correct sex rejects focal individual	$0 \leq r < 1$	Increasing <i>r</i> decreases the selection gradient but has little effect on the ESS


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377 **Table 3.** Summary of how key parameters qualitatively influence optimal sexual discrimination
 378 in each model variant considered. The four distinct variants are shown as columns and are
 379 presented in the location indicated by italics. The information in the table should be read as in the
 380 following example. For the top left cell in the main body of the table: in the model variant where
 381 there are additive survival costs to discrimination, high sexual discrimination evolves with a low
 382 discrimination cost c .

Parameter	In the model variant with...			
	Survival cost (additive) <i>Main text</i>	Survival cost (multiplicative) <i>Appendix S2</i>	Fecundity cost <i>Appendix S3</i>	Semelparous life history <i>Appendix S4</i>
	High sexual discrimination evolves with...			
Discrimination cost c	Low	Low	Low	Low
Sexual signal s	High	High	High	High
Proportion targeted σ	Low	Low	Low	Low
Signaling cost p	No effect	No effect	Low	No effect
Mortality d	Intermediate	High	No effect	Low

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385 **Fig. 1.** Top row: Optimal discrimination strategies a predicted by the optimization model with
386 cost to discrimination c on the x-axis, strength of sexual signal s on the y-axis, and death rate d
387 increasing across columns from left to right. Higher levels of attempted discrimination
388 correspond to lighter shading (white: $a = 1$; black $a = 0$). A wide range of parameter values
389 predict that indiscriminate mating (black) is the best strategy. Indiscriminate mating is favored
390 by increasing the cost of discrimination c and decreasing the strength of the sexual signal s .
391 Bottom row: proportion of matings expected to be SSB at the evolutionary optimum. Darker
392 values indicate more same-sex matings (black: half of matings are with individuals of the same
393 sex at the optimum; white: no matings are with individuals of the same sex if behaving
394 optimally). Other parameters: proportion of the population of the targeted sex $\sigma = 0.5$,
395 probability of finding any individual with which to attempt to mate $f = 1$, probability of being
396 rejected by a potential mate $r = 0$, cost of sexual signal $p = 0$.

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