Reciprocal social ties drive stable cooperation within a social network

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KEYWORDS: dynamic network, directed network, manakin, social connectivity, reciprocity, bidirectional, sociality

ABSTRACT

30   Social reciprocity is thought to be the most important driver of cooperation among non-kin, but

its effects on complex social networks in the wild have not been studied. Here, we test whether

32   reciprocation can explain social dynamics in a cooperative bird, the wire-tailed manakin (*Pipra*

filicauda). Over three years of study, we observed that territory holding males engaged in far

34   more reciprocated (bidirectional) partnerships with other territory holders than expected by

chance. Reciprocated partnerships were also stronger (i.e., the partners interacted more

36   frequently) than non-reciprocated partnerships, controlling for spatial proximity. Furthermore,

we show that a male's social contribution to a given partner was predictive of the number of

38   social interactions he received from that same partner. Finally, we show that reciprocation

predicted the long-term stability of a partnership one year later. Together, these results

40   demonstrate that reciprocity can stabilize cooperation within a broader social network.

1. INTRODUCTION

42   Helping behavior among non-kin is found in many taxa, including mammals, birds, fish, and

invertebrates (Backwell et al., 1998; Brucks and von Bayern, 2020; DuVal, 2007; Griffiths and

44   Magurran, 1997; Hart and Hart, 1992; McDonald and Potts, 1994; Moore et al., 2020; Rutte and

Taborsky, 2007). One of the primary mechanisms thought to drive the evolution of cooperative

46   behaviour in non-kin is social reciprocity (Roberts and Sherratt, 1998; Taborsky et al., 2016;

Trivers, 1971). Recently, several pioneering studies have used careful experiments to

48   demonstrate that animals can both detect and respond in kind to help from unrelated social

partners (Brucks and von Bayern, 2020; Carter et al., 2020; Cheney et al., 2010; Rutte and

50   Taborsky, 2007). In nature, however, social relationships often occur in the context of dense and

complex social networks, where individuals are free to choose their social partners, and where

52   social structure changes dynamically through time (Croft et al., 2008; Fehl et al., 2011; Hart and

Hart, 1992; Ilany et al., 2015). In this context, an individual's social investment into one partner

54   (or social tie) often occurs at the cost to other partnerships and to self-maintenance behaviour

(e.g., foraging, reproduction). Consequently, social reciprocity is predicted to drive long-term

56   patterns of group-level social structure and stability (Dakin and Ryder 2020). Despite the well-

known importance of reciprocity in evolutionary and ecological theory (Fehl et al., 2011), the

58   effects of mutual social investment on behaviour in the context of a social network has not been

studied.

60   Here, we test the hypothesis that mutual social investment can explain social dynamics in

a wild population of a cooperative bird, the wire-tailed manakin *Pipra filicauda* (Ryder et al.,

62   2008). This species is part of a large clade of manakins characterized by elaborate male displays

that are considered to be some of the most complex of all passerine birds (Heindl, 2002; Prum,

64   1990; Ryder et al., 2008; Schwartz and Snow, 1978). In the wire-tailed manakin, males form

cooperative partnerships with non-kin and perform complex coordinated displays at specific

66   display perches within lek territories. A typical male will have several social partners that he

displays with repeatedly, within and across breeding seasons (Dakin and Ryder, 2020; Ryder et

68   al., 2008; Ryder et al., 2011). Previous studies have shown that an individual male's social

centrality within the broader social network is a strong predictor of his ability to acquire a

70   territory and achieve long-term siring success (Ryder et al., 2008; Ryder et al., 2009). Male-male

partnerships in this system are also temporally stable across multiple years (Dakin and Ryder,

72   2020; Ryder et al., 2011), as observed in other manakins (Trainer, 2002).

In the wire-tailed manakin, there are two status classes: the dominant males who hold a

74   territory, and the subordinate floater males who do not yet hold a territory (Heindl, 2002; Ryder

et al., 2008; Ryder et al., 2009; Ryder et al., 2011). Although most social interactions occur

76   between a floater and a territory-holder, approximately a third of social interactions involve one

male leaving his territory to interact and display with the owner of another territory (Dakin et al.,

78   2020). Importantly, the visiting male in this type of directed social interaction takes on a crucial

cost: by leaving his own territory, he foregoes potential mating opportunities and beneficial

80   social ties that could have occurred on his own territory (Ryder et al., 2008; Ryder et al., 2009).

On the other hand, the recipient male is expected to gain a fitness benefit, because cooperative

82   partnerships on a male's own territory are known to increase his reproductive fitness (Ryder et

al., 2008; Ryder et al., 2009). Hence, the cooperative ties between two territory holders have an

84   unambiguous directionality. This presents an opportunity to determine how often reciprocity

occurs, and to test whether it has consequences on behaviour in a network context.

86   Accordingly, we categorized social partnerships among territory-holding male manakins

as either mutually reciprocal or one-directional (Fig. 1A). A mutually reciprocal partnership is a

88   bidirectional relationship in which the two territory-holders interacted with each other mutually

on their two respective territories. One-directional partnerships are those in which only one of

90   the territorial males visited the other male's territory to interact socially with him, and the reverse

did not occur. We determined the directionality of manakin partnerships over both weekly and

92   annual timescales. Our analysis here evaluates the following four questions: (1) Do reciprocated

cooperative partnerships occur more often than expected by chance, based on individual

94   spatiotemporal behavior? (2) Are reciprocated partnerships preferred, as defined by having a

higher social interaction frequency, as compared to one-directional partnerships? (3) At an

96   individual level, does the magnitude of one male's social contribution to a given partner predict

the contribution he received from that partner? (4) Are reciprocated partnerships more

98   temporally stable in the long-term than one-directional partnerships? Overall, these analyses

allow us to test whether reciprocity is a mechanism of social preference and temporal stability

100   within social networks in a cooperative system.

102   **2. METHODS**

(a) Field work

104   We studied a population of wire-tailed manakins at the Tiputini Biodiversity Station in Orellana

Province, Ecuador (0º 38' S, 76º 08' W, ~20m elevation). Field work took place over three

106   breeding seasons (December to March) from 2015 to 2018. At the beginning of each field

season, wire-tailed manakins were captured using mist nets and tagged with a unique

108   combination of color bands as well as a coded nanotag (NTQB-2, Lotek Wireless; 0.35 g).

Nanotags transmitted a unique VHF radio signal throughout the field season. To record male

110　social interactions on lek territories, we placed proximity data-loggers (SRX-DL800, Lotek

Wireless) within each territory on a lek for a recording session of ~6 consecutive days (± SD 1

112　day; loggers were active between 6:00 to 16:00 each day). Each lek was monitored for 3–4

recording sessions per field season, distributed approximately evenly throughout the

114　reproductive period from December to March. Territory ownership was determined through

direct observation and confirmed in the proximity data. To determine the distance between

116　territories, GPS latitude and longitude coordinates were recorded at a location near the display

perch within each territory. In total, we monitored between 48–54 territory-holders per year (see

118　Table S1).

120　*(b) Social data*

We used an algorithm described in (Dakin and Ryder, 2018) to identify social interactions

122　between two male manakins within a display territory. The algorithm defined a social interaction

to have occurred when two males pinged a data-logger within a threshold of 45 s and 10 signal

124　strength units, which indicates spatial proximity of two males < 5 m of each other near the

display perch (Dakin and Ryder, 2018; Dakin et al., 2020). This method has been shown to

126　reliably detect social interactions between wire-tailed manakins in ground-truthing studies

(Dakin and Ryder, 2018; Ryder et al., 2012). All data processing and analyses were performed in

128　R 3.6.3 (R Core Team, 2020). We define a directed social interaction among territory holders to

have occurred whenever two territory-holders engaged in a social interaction on one of their

130　respective territories (Pinter-Wollman et al., 2014). A partnership between two territory-holders

was defined as one-directional if all of their social interactions during a given time period

132   occurred on only one of their respective territories, whereas it was reciprocated (or bidirectional)

if the two males interacted on both territories. We computed both directed and undirected edge

134   weights based on the social interaction frequencies. The undirected edge weight was the total

frequency of social interactions for a dyad within a given time period (either weekly or annual);

136   the directed edge weights refer to the edge weight on each recipient male's territory. An

important indicator of directional symmetry for reciprocated partnerships is the minimum edge

138   weight that occurred in both directions. Hence, we defined an additional metric that we refer to

as the "mutual edge weight", defined as the smaller of the two directed edge weights for a given

140   dyad. The Euclidean distance between each pair of territories was estimated from latitude and

longitude coordinates using the sp package 1.4-2 (Pebesma and Roger, 2020) in R.

(c) Raw data stream permutation

144   We compared the occurrence of reciprocated partnerships with the number expected to occur by

chance using a null model of territory visitation (Dakin et al., 2020; Farine, 2017). The null

146   model was based on a permutation of the territory visits performed by each male, as described in

(Dakin et al., 2020). Note that we use "territory visit" here to refer to the detection of an

148   individual male on *any* territory, independent of social context. The null permutation preserved

each male's spatial and temporal distribution of territory visits, including the dates of each visit,

150   and the visit durations, but randomly sampled the visit start times from the distribution of actual

start times observed in the data (Dakin et al., 2020). Hence, the null model preserved each male's

152   spatiotemporal behavior (i.e., the same territories were visited, the same number of times, and for

the same duration), but ensured that the exact timing of visits was independent of the presence of

154   other males. This approach previously demonstrated that manakin social partnerships have much

greater undirected edge weights than expected (Dakin et al., 2020). For the present study, we

156   used 100 permuted null datasets to determine the expected number and directionality of annual-

partnerships among territory-holders, and their edge weights (undirected and mutual; based on

158   frequency of social interactions, as defined above). We then compared these expected values

from the permutation analysis with the actual values observed in the manakin data.

(d) Predictors of whether a partnership was reciprocated

162   We used multilevel models at the dyad level to determine the factors that could predict whether

or not a partnership was reciprocated within a particular recording session. The response variable

164   for this analysis was the partnership type (reciprocated vs. one-directional), modelled in a

binomial analysis in the lme4 package 1.1-23 (Bates et al., 2020) in R. Because this analysis

166   focused on a dyad-level property, the random effect accounted for the dyad identity, based on the

combined identities of the two participating males. To examine the factors that predict

168   reciprocation, we examined two fixed effect predictors of interest: (i) the undirected edge weight

(log-transformed) and (ii) the spatial distance between the two males' territories. We also

170   accounted for fixed effects of field season (three levels, one for each year) and sampling effort,

as defined by the total number of hours that the two territories were recorded. To ensure that this

172   analysis only considered partnerships that could have been reciprocated, we limited it to 377

session-partnerships that had an edge weight ≥ 2 (the minimum required for reciprocation), and

174   where both males' territories were monitored throughout the season.

178 *(e) Magnitude of individual contributions in reciprocated partnerships*

The goal of this individual-level analysis was to describe the factors that predict a given

180 territory-holder's social contribution to his territorial partners within a recording session. Hence,

we use 'strength' here to refer to the social interaction frequency of a particular individual (i.e.,

182 the sum of the edge weights for a node in the social network). This analysis was run using a

multilevel model in the lme4 package in R, with the response variable as the relative amount that

184 a focal male contributed to a specific partner. To calculate this variable (relative amount

contributed), we took the focal male's social interactions contributed to partner x_i, divided by the

186 focal male's total social interactions away from his own territory. Note that "contributed" here

refers to times when the focal male went to the partner's territory and interacted with him there.

188 The main predictor of interest was the relative amount that the focal male received on his

territory from partner x_i (i.e., strength received from x_i expressed relative to the focal male's total

190 social interactions received). Thus, this analysis tested whether the focal male's social

contribution to a particular partner was correlated with the amount received (reciprocal social

192 investment) from that partner. Additional fixed effects accounted for field season (three levels,

one for each year), the spatial distance between territories, and sampling effort. We also included

194 the duration of visits by floater males to the focal male, and the duration of visits by floater

males to partner x_i as two additional fixed effect predictors (both expressed as the natural log of

196 the total number of floater pings). This allowed us to account for the possibility that social

contributions among territory holders may depend on the activity of alternative social partners.

198 The identities of the focal and partner male were included as crossed random effects. We limited

this analysis to reciprocated session-partnerships, represented in a sample size of 326

200 contributions within 163 partnerships among 72 males.

202   *(f) Predictors of long-term cooperative partnership stability*

To evaluate whether reciprocity leads to long-term stability of cooperative partnerships, we

204   analyzed the interaction frequency of a partnership in the following year, after an initial

designation of partnership type. The response variable was the partnership's undirected edge

206   weight in the second year, $t + 1$, analyzed in a Gaussian model in lme4. To meet the assumptions

of the Gaussian model, the response variable was log-transformed. To test whether previous

208   reciprocation could predict long-term dynamics, the model included a fixed effect of partnership

directionality in the initial year t (either reciprocated or one-directional). The other fixed effects

210   in the model included field season, the spatial distance between territories, and the edge weight

of the partnership in the initial year t (log-transformed). Hence, this analysis tested whether edge

212   weight in year $t + 1$ was associated with previous reciprocation in year t, after accounting for the

previous edge weight. Because this analysis focused on a dyad-level property, the random effect

214   accounted for identity of the dyad as describe above. The criteria for inclusion in this analysis

was that the year t edge weight had to be ≥ 2 (i.e., the partnership had to have occurred often

216   enough that it could have been reciprocated in year t), and that both males had to be tagged and

monitored in the subsequent field season; the resulting sample size was 109 annual-partnerships.

3. RESULTS

220   *(a) Occurrence of reciprocated partnerships*

We recorded over 9,500 directed social interactions between two territorial male wire-tailed

222   manakins and identified 122 bidirectional annual-partnerships that were reciprocated at least

once. The number of reciprocated partnerships was 56% more than expected, based on a null

224   model (Fig. 1c). By contrast, we observed fewer one-directional partnerships than expected by

chance (Table S1). The average territory-holder had about 4 ($\pm$ 2.0 SD) territorial partners per

226   year, 2 ($\pm$ 1.4 SD) of which were reciprocated, and 2 ($\pm$ 1.6 SD) of which were one-directional.

The mutual edge weights of reciprocated partnerships were typically 6-to-14-fold greater

228   than expected in the null model, demonstrating that these social partnerships are far more

symmetrical than expected (Fig. 1d). For example, 58 partnerships had an annual mutual edge

230   weight $\geq$ 5, a level of symmetry that was never observed in the null model (Fig. 1d). Moreover,

we found that reciprocated social partners interacted 10-to-20-fold more than expected by chance

232   (based on undirected edge weights; see Table S1). One-directional social partners also interacted

more than expected, but to a much lesser extent, with only a 3-to-7-fold difference as compared

234   to the expected values (see Table S1).

236   *(b) Predictors of whether a partnership was reciprocated*

Reciprocation was more likely to occur within partnerships that interacted frequently, as

238   compared to partners that interacted rarely (Fig. 2). This strong association between

reciprocation and edge weight also holds while accounting for territory proximity, which was

240   another significant predictor of reciprocation. Pairs with closer territories were more often

reciprocal (Table S2).

(c) Magnitude of individual contributions in reciprocated partnerships

244   There were two main factors that predicted a male's social contribution to a given partner. The

first predictor was the relative social contribution received from that partner: males contributed

246   more to partners who had contributed more to them (Fig. 3; Table S3). The second major

predictor was the spatial proximity of their territories: males contributed more to closer

248   neighbors (Table S3). The magnitude of social contribution was not significantly associated with

the frequency of floater male occurrence at either territory in this analysis (Table S3).

(d) Predictors of long-term partnership stability

252   Partnerships that were reciprocated in year *t* maintained far greater edge weight (interaction

frequency) the following year than did one-directional partnerships (Fig. 4). This result held even

254   when accounting for territory proximity and the previous year's edge weight, both of which were

also positive predictors of edge weight in the following year (Table S4).

4. DISCUSSION

258   Reciprocation has been proposed to drive the evolution of cooperation and determine the

structure and dynamics of partner choice within cooperative social networks (Dakin and Ryder,

260   2020; Fehl et al., 2011). We used directed social network analysis to test this hypothesis in a wild

population of cooperative birds, where individuals were free to choose their social partners. We

262   found that the social networks of territory-holding male manakins contained many more

reciprocated (bidirectional) partnerships than expected, and fewer one-directional partnerships

264   than predicted by a null model of individual spatiotemporal behaviour. Moreover, mutual edge

weight, a key measure of social symmetry, was also found to be much higher than expected. Our

266   analysis demonstrates that there are two main predictors of whether or not a social interaction

was reciprocated: the overall frequency of social interactions between the two partners, and the

268   spatial proximity of their territories. Pairs that were located physically closer to each other, and

those with a higher frequency of social interaction, were more likely to have a reciprocated

270   relationship. These findings suggest that reciprocation is either a cause of, or a marker of, social

preference. They also indicate that spatial structure can also influence the costs and benefits of an

272   individual's social choices (Backwell et al., 1998; Bonar et al., 2020; Webber and Vander Wal,

2018).

274   Previous studies of wire-tailed manakins have shown that a male's social connectivity on

his own territory is correlated with reproductive success (Ryder et al., 2008; Ryder et al., 2009).

276   Here, we show that a male manakin's social contribution to another territory-holding partner was

positively correlated with the number of social interactions he received from that partner,

278   independent of spatial proximity. Collectively, these findings suggest that males who form strong

social bonds with other territory holders may receive delayed benefits through reciprocated

280   social interactions that "return the favour". This result adds to the growing literature that animals

can respond in-kind to others' social contributions (Brucks and von Bayern, 2020; Carter et al.,

282   2020; Cheney et al., 2010; Rutte and Taborsky, 2007). Importantly, the present findings

demonstrate that reciprocation can drive social investment in natural systems where individuals

284   allocate their time towards multiple partnerships within a complex network

       How are the long-term dynamics of social ties influenced by reciprocation? We found

286   that reciprocated cooperative partnerships retained greater social interaction frequencies one year

later, even after accounting for positive effects of the initial social interaction frequency and

288   territory spatial proximity. Hence, cooperative relationships that are reciprocal are more likely to

be maintained at a high rate in the future. Although we lack the ability to experimentally

290   manipulate social bonds, this longitudinal analysis is consistent with two non-exclusive

hypotheses, as mentioned above: (1) reciprocation may directly enhance social preference for

292   particular partners, and (2) reciprocation may be a marker of (or consequence of) more general

social compatibility. Under the first hypothesis, reciprocation in the past is a direct cause of

294　future social preference (Roberts and Sherratt, 1998). The fact that reciprocation predicted future

dynamics after accounting for the previous social interaction frequency is suggestive of this first

296　possibility, and is consistent with recent controlled experiments in other species (Carter et al.,

2020). An additional possibility is that reciprocation in year t may be a consequence of more

298　general social compatibility (Busia et al., 2017; Ellis et al., 2019), which may in turn drive the

enhanced stability of particular social bonds. Although we are unable to experimentally

300　disentangle these two possibilities with the present data, future studies may be able to address

this by the comparison of data on the fine-scale temporal dynamics of natural systems with

302　carefully constructed simulation models.

　　　　Our results raise further questions about the behavioral mechanisms underlying

304　reciprocation in the wild. For example, the results of our individual-level analysis suggest that

wire-tailed manakins may recognize and distinguish the quality of cooperative social

306　partnerships with particular individuals (Cheney et al., 2010). This raises the question of whether

individuals within complex social networks can allocate their social contributions strategically

308　(Ellis et al., 2019). Although not a main focus of our study, our results also emphasize the

importance of physical proximity in determining the directionality and dynamics of social

310　network ties (Webber and Vander Wal, 2018). Because a positive correlation exists between

proximity and the probability of an initial interaction occurring within a pair, spatially

312　constrained social systems may have a greater potential for reciprocated interactions.

　　　　Historically, research on the ecology of cooperation among non-kin has focused on

314　distinguishing reciprocal altruism from other mechanisms, such as by-product mutualism

(Nowak, 2006). Recent studies highlight how reciprocation can often be graded and dynamic in

316   time (Carter et al., 2020; Roberts and Sherratt, 1998). We show here that reciprocation occurs

often in a complex social network, that it is either a cause of or a marker of social preference,

318   and that it is associated with long-term social stability of cooperative partnerships (Dakin and

Ryder, 2020; Fehl et al., 2011). More broadly, social network structures are an important

320   framework for understanding the movement ecology and behaviour in the wild. We propose that

reciprocal network ties may often be stronger and more stable, and that the emergent properties

322   of social networks will often depend on the composition and symmetry of these bidirectional

ties.

FIGURE LEGENDS

Figure 1. Social relationships can be one-directional or reciprocated. (A) Male manakins
328 form cooperative partnerships with other males to perform coordinated courtship displays. A
reciprocated partnership occurs when two territory holders interact with each other mutually on
330 their two respective territories. In the network diagrams, the circles represent each male's
territory and the arrows represent directional social interactions that originate from the visitor
332 and point toward the recipient. (B) Example of a directed social network among 10 territory-
holding males. (C) In total, we observed 122 reciprocated annual-partnerships (indicated in red),
334 which is 56% more than expected based on a null permutation. (D) The mutual edge weights of
reciprocated partnerships were also far greater than expected by chance. The boxplots show
336 mutual edge weights with lines connecting the observed value for each partnership with its null
expectation (n = 122 reciprocated annual-partnerships). See also Table S1.

Figure 2. Reciprocated dyads interact more frequently. Reciprocation was more likely to
340 occur among partners that interacted more frequently with each other (greater undirected edge
weight). The positive association between reciprocation and edge weight holds while accounting
342 for the spatial proximity of the two males' territories, field season, recording duration, and the
identities of the two partner males. The number of session-partnerships in each column is
344 provided along the top of the graph (total = 377 session-partnerships with an edge weight >= 2,
involving 80 males). Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for the proportion estimated
346 in each column. Note that while edge weight is binned here for visualization purposes, it was
treated as a continuous variable in the statistical analysis (see Table S2).

**Figure 3. A male's contribution to a given social partner is correlated with the amount he
350 received.** Following the cartoon on the top left, this analysis evaluated whether a focal male's
contribution to partner x was predicted by the relative number of social visits received from
352 partner x. The y-axis shows partial residuals for a male's social contribution while controlling for
other factors in the analysis, including proximity, field season, recording duration, floater male
354 visits, and the identities of the two partner males (see Table S3 for details). Note that this
analysis is limited to reciprocated session-partnerships (n = 326 individual contributions within
356 163 session-partnerships, among 72 males).

358 **Figure 4. Reciprocated dyads maintain greater stability through time**. Social dyads that were
reciprocated in year t had significantly stronger edge weights (interaction frequencies) in year $t +$
360 1 (n = 109 annual-partnerships among 38 males). This positive association holds while
accounting for the undirected edge weight in year t, spatial proximity of the two males'
362 territories, field season, and the identities of the two partner males (see Table S4). Note that this
analysis is limited to dyads that interacted at least twice in year t and that were both tagged and
364 monitored over the following year.

ETHICS STATEMENT

368 All research was approved by the Smithsonian ACUC (protocols #12-23, 14-25, and 17-11) and the Ecuadorean Ministry of Environment (MAE-DNB-CM-2015-0008).

DATA ACCESSIBILITY

372 All data and R scripts are available at: https://figshare.com/s/f225fefb1ec4906e0353
The repository will be made public when the final version of the study is published.

AUTHORS' CONTRIBUTION

376 All authors designed the study. TBR collected the data. RD and PC analyzed the data and wrote the manuscript. All authors edited the manuscript.

COMPETING INTERESTS

380 We have no competing interests.

382 FUNDING
Supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) IOS 1353085, the Smithsonian Migratory
384 Bird Center, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), and Carleton University.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
388 We thank Ben Vernasco, Camilo Alfonso, Brent Horton, Ignacio Moore, Brian Evans, David and Consuelo Romo, Kelly Swing, Diego Mosquera, Gabriela Vinueza, and the Tiputini Biodiversity
390 Station of the Universidad San Francisco de Quito.

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Figure 1

(a)

(b)

(c) # Reciprocated
Null   Observed

40 60 80 100 120 140

(d) 200
100
50

Mutual edge weight
(# interactions)

10
5

Observed   Null

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4