

1 **Double drives and private alleles for localised population genetic control**

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11 Double drives for localised population genetic control

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## 29 **Abstract**

30           Synthetic gene drive constructs could, in principle, provide the basis for highly efficient  
31 interventions to control disease vectors and other pest species. This efficiency derives in part  
32 from leveraging natural processes of dispersal and gene flow to spread the construct and its  
33 impacts from one population to another. However, sometimes (for example, with invasive  
34 species) only specific populations are in need of control, and impacts on non-target  
35 populations would be undesirable. Many gene drive designs use nucleases that recognise and  
36 cleave specific genomic sequences, and one way to restrict their spread would be to exploit  
37 sequence differences between target and non-target populations. In this paper we propose  
38 and model a series of low threshold double drive designs for population suppression, each  
39 consisting of two constructs, one imposing a reproductive load on the population and the other  
40 inserted into a differentiated locus and controlling the drive of the first. Simple deterministic,  
41 discrete-generation computer simulations are used to assess the alternative designs. We find  
42 that the simplest double drive designs are significantly more robust to pre-existing cleavage  
43 resistance at the differentiated locus than single drive designs, and that more complex designs  
44 incorporating sex ratio distortion can be more efficient still, even allowing for successful control  
45 when the differentiated locus is neutral and there is up to 50% pre-existing resistance in the  
46 target population. Similar designs can also be used for population replacement, with similar  
47 benefits. A population genomic analysis of PAM sites in island and mainland populations of  
48 the malaria mosquito *Anopheles gambiae* indicates that the differentiation needed for our  
49 methods to work can exist in nature. Double drives should be considered when efficient but  
50 localised population genetic control is needed and there is some genetic differentiation  
51 between target and non-target populations.

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## 54 **Author summary**

55           Some disease vectors, invasive species, and other pests cannot be satisfactorily  
56 controlled with existing interventions, and new methods are required. Synthetic gene drive  
57 systems that are able to spread through populations because they are inherited at a greater-  
58 than-Mendelian rate have the potential to form the basis for new, highly efficient pest control  
59 measures. The most efficient such strategies use natural gene flow to spread a construct  
60 throughout a species' range, but if control is only desired in a particular location then these  
61 approaches may not be appropriate. As some of the most promising gene drive designs use  
62 nucleases to target specific DNA sequences, it ought to be possible to exploit sequence  
63 differences between target and non-target populations to restrict the spread and impact of a  
64 gene drive. In this paper we propose using two-construct "double drive" designs that exploit  
65 pre-existing sequence differences between target and non-target populations. Our  
66 approaches maintain the efficiencies associated with only small release rates being needed  
67 and can work if the differentiated locus is selectively neutral and if the differentiation is far from  
68 complete, and therefore expand the range of options to be considered in developing genetic  
69 approaches to control pest species.

## 70 **Introduction**

71           Gene drive is a natural phenomenon in which some genes are able to increase in  
72 frequency and spread through populations by contriving to be inherited at a greater-than-  
73 Mendelian rate [1, 2]. Strong drive can cause genes to increase rapidly in frequency even if  
74 they also harm the organisms carrying them, and there is currently much effort trying to  
75 develop synthetic gene drive constructs (or gene drives) to control disease-transmitting  
76 mosquitoes and other pest populations that have thus far been difficult or impossible to  
77 manage satisfactorily [3-6]. If a species is harmful and subject to control measures wherever  
78 it exists, then, in principle (i.e., in the computer), highly efficient gene drive strategies can be  
79 devised that exploit natural processes of dispersal and gene flow such that relatively small  
80 inoculative releases in a few locations can lead to substantial and widespread impacts over

81 subsequent generations [7-9]. However, some species are pests only in a part of their range  
82 (e.g., invasive species), and other approaches are needed.

83 Two broad approaches have been proposed for restricting the impact of genetic control  
84 interventions to a target population. First, one can use a strategy requiring relatively large  
85 releases, which can be restricted to the target population, with any introductions into the non-  
86 target population (by dispersal, or by accidental or unauthorised releases) being too small to  
87 have a significant impact. Potentially suitable genetic constructs include those that do not drive  
88 (e.g., dominant lethals, autosomal X-shredders, or Y-linked editors; [10-12]), or those that do,  
89 but only if they are above some threshold frequency (e.g., many approaches based on the  
90 logic of toxins and antidotes; [13-15]). Some of these approaches are more efficient than  
91 others [10, 16, 17], but, by necessity, all of them require a non-trivial production and release  
92 effort.

93 Alternatively, one could exploit sequence differences between target and non-target  
94 populations, in which case it may be possible to retain the small release rates and overall  
95 efficiency of low threshold gene drive approaches [18, 19]. Sudweeks et al. [19] present useful  
96 modelling of this approach, considering the case where there is a locally fixed allele of an  
97 essential gene in the target population, while non-target populations carry a resistant allele at  
98 some frequency. A nuclease-based gene drive that uses the homing reaction (i.e., sequence-  
99 specific cleavage followed by homologous repair [3, 20]) to disrupt the locally fixed allele could  
100 be released into and eliminate the target population, but have little impact, or only a transient  
101 impact, on non-target populations. However, as emphasised by the authors, if the target  
102 population has even a small frequency of the resistant allele, then that allele could be rapidly  
103 selected for and the intervention fail.


104 In this paper we explore alternative two locus “double drive” low threshold strategies  
105 to restrict population control based on pre-existing sequence differences between target and  
106 non-target populations. All our designs are based on a division of labour between the two  
107 constructs, with one imposing a reproductive load by disrupting a gene needed for survival or  
108 reproduction, and therefore responsible for the desired impact (population suppression), and

109 the other responsible for the population restriction. These designs are substantially less  
110 susceptible to pre-existing resistance in the target population at the differentiated locus than  
111 single drive designs, and can even work if the differentiated locus is selectively neutral. Double  
112 drives may also be useful for population replacement. Finally, analyses of published genome  
113 sequences from island and mainland populations of the malaria mosquito *Anopheles gambiae*  
114 indicates that the sort of population differentiation we model can exist in nature.

## 115 **Results**

### 116 **Simple double drives for population suppression**

117 The simplest double drive designs we consider consist of one construct (call it  $\alpha$ )  
118 inserted into and disrupting a haplo-sufficient female-essential gene, such that homozygous  
119 females die without reproducing while heterozygous females and all males are unaffected,  
120 and a second construct ( $\beta$ ) inserted into a sequence that is significantly more common in the  
121 target than the non-target population(s). Both constructs are able to drive by the homing  
122 reaction but  $\alpha$  can home only in the presence of  $\beta$ , while  $\beta$  may either home autonomously or  
123 rely on the presence of  $\alpha$ . With CRISPR-based designs,  $\alpha$  would encode its cognate gRNA,  $\beta$   
124 would encode the Cas9, and either construct could encode the gRNA for the second locus  
125 (Fig 1, Designs 1 and 2). We assume the  $\alpha$  construct has been designed such that functional  
126 resistance is not possible, though non-functional resistant alleles can arise by end-joining  
127 repair [21]. For the  $\beta$  construct we initially suppose its insertion site (i.e., the differentiated  
128 locus) is selectively neutral and unlinked with the  $\alpha$  insertion site, and that differentiation is  
129 nearly complete, with the target sequence present at a frequency of 99% in the target  
130 population and absent in the non-target population (i.e., it is a virtually fixed private allele).




131

132 **Fig 1. Alternative double drive designs for population suppression.** Constructs  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$   
 133 can drive autonomously (a) or non-autonomously (n); one or the other may encode an X-  
 134 shredder; and the A target locus can be a gene that is haplo-sufficient (HS) or haplo-  
 135 insufficient (HI) for female viability or fertility. fsHS - female-specific haplo-sufficient locus; fsHI  
 136 - female-specific haplo-insufficient locus; diff - differentiated sequence; X-shr - X-shredder  
 137 targeting an X-linked repeat.  
 138

139 Under these conditions, a small (0.1%) release of males carrying Design 1 constructs  
 140 into the target population leads to both constructs rapidly increasing in frequency and, as a  
 141 result, the population size crashes to a minimum size of  $3.58e-6$  (relative to the pre-release  
 142 equilibrium) in 25 generations (Fig 2A). Depending on the initial population size and the biology  
 143 of the species (e.g., whether there are Allee effects [22]), this decline could be enough to  
 144 eliminate the population. However, in our simple deterministic model population elimination is  
 145 not possible. Instead, the population recovers due to the evolution of resistance at the  
 146 differentiated locus, leading to loss of the  $\beta$  construct, which then leads to loss of  $\alpha$ , allowing  
 147 the wild-type allele and population fertility to recover. By contrast, the same releases into the

148 non-target population have minimal effect:  $\beta$  cannot increase in frequency, both construct  
 149 frequencies remain low, and population size is little affected (Fig 2B).




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151 **Fig 2. Performance of double drives for population suppression.** (A, B) Timecourse for  
 152 Design 1 in target and non-target populations, assuming 1% and 100% pre-existing resistance  
 153 at the B locus, respectively. In the target population the  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  constructs increase in  
 154 frequency together (blue and red solid lines), causing the number of females to decline. If the  
 155 population is not eliminated, then eventually the resistant  $b$  allele replaces  $\beta$ , followed by the  
 156 wild-type  $A$  allele replacing  $\alpha$ , allowing the population to recover. In the non-target population  
 157 both constructs remain rare and the reduction in female numbers remains small. (C, D)  
 158 Timecourse for Design 3 assuming 20% and 100% pre-existing resistance in the target and  
 159 non-target populations. (E, F) Timecourse for Design 5 assuming 50% and 100% pre-existing  
 160 resistance in the target and non-target populations.  
 161

162 Because the spread of construct  $\alpha$  in the target population depends on  $\beta$ , and therefore  
 163 will be affected by the association between them, it might be expected that close linkage  
 164 between the two constructs may increase construct spread and the extent of population  
 165 suppression. Furthermore, because the population may eventually recover due to the  
 166 evolution of resistance at the differentiated locus, additional improvements might be expected  
 167 by using an essential gene as the differentiated locus and designing  $\beta$  to have minimal fitness  
 168 effects (e.g., by containing a recoded version of the target gene [23-25], or being inserted in  
 169 an artificial intron [26]). With such a design end-joining repair will tend to produce non-

170 functional resistance alleles, and resistance will be slower to evolve, relying instead on pre-  
171 existing resistant alleles. Both these expectations about linkage and using an essential  
172 differentiated gene are met individually, and, in combination, can reduce the minimum  
173 population size achieved by many orders of magnitude (Fig 3; see also S1 Fig for the separate  
174 effect of each modification). If it is not possible to have close linkage, then the maximum level  
175 of suppression can also be increased by releasing the two constructs in different males rather  
176 than in the same males, though at the cost of the impact being delayed, and separate releases  
177 perform worse than combined releases when linkage is tight (S2 Fig).

178 Design 2, which has the same components as Design 1, but arranged differently such  
179 that homing of the  $\beta$  construct only occurs in the presence of  $\alpha$ , has dynamics qualitatively  
180 similar to Design 1, but quantitatively different (S3 Fig). Interestingly, if the two constructs are  
181 unlinked then the extent of suppression is less than with Design 1, but if they are closely linked  
182 then the suppression can be greater (Fig 3 and S1 Fig). All these possible alternatives give  
183 significantly greater suppression than a single drive imposing a reproductive load by targeting  
184 a female-essential gene (Fig 3).



185

186 **Fig 3. Timecourse for the relative number of females over time for Designs 1 and 2.** Solid  
187 lines are for  $\beta$  in a neutral locus unlinked to the  $\alpha$  construct, and dashed lines for  $\beta$  as a neutral  
188 insertion in a haplo-insufficient essential gene closely linked ( $r=0.01$ ) to the  $\alpha$  construct. In all




189 cases there is 1% pre-existing resistance at the B locus. Also shown for comparison are results  
190 for a single construct drive targeting a haplo-sufficient female-specific viability gene (S).  
191

## 192 **Coping with higher frequencies of pre-existing resistance**

193         Though these simple double drive designs work well with pre-existing target site  
194 resistance at the differentiated locus of 1%, performance declines rapidly after that. For  
195 example, if there is 10% pre-existing resistance, then even the best of these designs (Design  
196 2 with close linkage and the differentiated locus being haplo-insufficient) only suppresses the  
197 target population to a minimum of  $2.38e-4$ . In some situations the target population may not  
198 have a private allele with frequency over 90% and alternative approaches would need to be  
199 considered. One possibility is to increase the load imposed on the population by the  $\alpha$   
200 construct by adding to it an X-shredder locus that destroys the X-chromosome during  
201 spermatogenesis such that it produces a male-biased sex ratio as well as killing heterozygous  
202 females (Fig 1, Designs 3 and 4). Since population productivity in many species depends on  
203 the number of females, population size may thereby be further reduced. A single drive based  
204 on these components has previously been constructed in *Anopheles gambiae* by Simoni et al.  
205 [27]. Our modelling indicates that adding an X-shredder to a double drive gives a quantitative  
206 improvement in the dynamics, and even pre-existing resistance frequencies of 20% are  
207 compatible with good control, while still having minimal effect on non-target populations (Fig  
208 2C and D).

209         Even more robust control can be obtained by adding the X-shredder to the  $\beta$  locus and  
210 having the  $\alpha$  locus drive autonomously in males and cause dominant sterility or lethality in  
211 females (e.g., target a female-specific haplo-insufficient locus; Fig 1, Design 5). The dynamics  
212 in this case are somewhat different from the others: the X-shredder does not function to  
213 directly increase the load, but instead it allows the  $\alpha$  construct to spread in the population,  
214 because it will end up more often in males (where it homes), and less often in females (where  
215 it is a dead end). The male bias also protects the  $\beta$  construct from the female lethality produced  
216 by the  $\alpha$  construct, and so selection against  $\beta$  is much weaker than in the previous designs,

217 and resistance evolves more slowly (compare the rate of spread of the resistant b allele in Fig  
 218 2E to that in Fig 2A and C). As a result the design is able to perform well even with pre-existing  
 219 resistance of up to 50%, but still not spread in the non-target population (Fig 2E and F).  
 220 Moreover, if the population is not eliminated, it can nevertheless be suppressed for many  
 221 generations. For example, with 50% pre-existing resistance the minimum population size  
 222 reached is  $2.15e-3$ , and the population remains below 5% of its pre-intervention size for 63  
 223 generations; with close linkage ( $r=0.01$ ), then the corresponding values are  $8.79e-7$  and 147  
 224 generations. A comparison of the maximum extent of suppression as a function of the pre-  
 225 existing resistance frequency for the different designs is shown in Fig 4 (see also S4 Fig). With  
 226 all the modifications considered (linkage, use of an essential differentiated gene, or separate  
 227 releases) effects on the non-target population remain small (S5 Fig).



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
229 **Fig 4. Minimum population size for each of the 5 designs as a function of the pre-**  
 230 **existing frequency of resistance.** Solid lines are for the baseline case ( $r=0.5$ ,  $\beta$  in a neutral  
 231 locus), while dashed lines are for the improved case ( $r=0.01$ ,  $\beta$  as a neutral insertion in a  
 232 haplo-insufficient essential gene).  
 233

## 234 Evolutionary stability and impact of fitness costs

235 We now explore the consequences of relaxing two assumptions that have been implicit  
 236 thus far in our modeling. First, we have assumed that our various constructs remain intact  
 237 after release. In fact, mutations that destroy the function of one component or another will be  
 238 expected to arise as the constructs spread through a population, particularly as homing may  
 239 be associated with a higher mutation rate than normal DNA replication [28]. For components

240 that contribute directly to their construct's spread, one would expect that loss-of-function  
241 mutations would remain rare in the population and have little effect, whereas for other  
242 components (e.g., the X-shredder), such mutations may be actively selected for. To  
243 investigate we allowed homing-associated loss-of-function mutations to occur in each  
244 component of each construct. Mutation rates of  $10e-3$  have a small but significant impact on  
245 the performance of the three designs with an X-shredder, due to the accumulation of mutant  
246 constructs missing that component, while mutation rates of  $10e-4$  have negligible impact for  
247 all designs (Fig 5A, S6 Fig and S7 Fig).

248         Second, we have assumed thus far that the genetic constructs have little unintended  
249 impact on survival or reproduction. Experiments with *An. gambiae* have revealed at least two  
250 unintended fitness costs can occur, a reduced fitness of homing heterozygous females due to  
251 somatic expression of the nuclease [21, 27], and reduced fitness of males expressing an X-  
252 shredder, possibly due to paternal deposition of the nuclease and/or reduced sperm  
253 production [29]. The first of these costs is not relevant to Design 5 (because heterozygous  
254 females die anyway), and the second is not relevant to Designs 1 and 2 (because they do not  
255 use an X-shredder), but in other contexts, as expected, these costs reduce performance,  
256 requiring a lower frequency of pre-existing resistance in order to achieve a particular level of  
257 suppression (Fig 5B and C).




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259 **Fig 5. The impact of evolutionary stability and added fitness costs on the performance**  
 260 **of each of the 5 designs for population suppression. (A)** The effect of loss-of-function  
 261 mutations on the minimum population size reached. Solid lines are for the baseline case of no  
 262 mutations, and dashed lines are with each component of each construct having a mutation  
 263 rate of  $10e-3$  per homing event. Note that the effect is only visible for designs with an X-  
 264 shredder, and if the mutation rate was  $10e-4$ , the results for all designs would be virtually  
 265 indistinguishable from the solid lines. **(B, C)** Contour plots showing combinations of fitness  
 266 costs and pre-existing frequency of resistance giving a minimum population size of  $10e-4$  for  
 267 different double drive designs. For **(B)** the costs are reductions in female fitness due to somatic  
 268 expression of the nuclease targeting the A locus, and for **(C)** the costs are reductions in male  
 269 fitness due to the X-shredder. Vertical lines indicate the cost is irrelevant, either because  
 270 heterozygous females in any case have fitness 0 (Design 5 in **(B)**), or because the designs do  
 271 not include an X-shredder (Designs 1 and 2 in **(C)**).  
 272

## 273 Population replacement

274 Gene drive can be used not only for population suppression but also to introduce a  
 275 new desirable ‘cargo’ gene into a target population for population replacement or modification  
 276 – for example, a gene reducing a mosquito’s ability to transmit a pathogen [30, 31]. In double  
 277 drive designs for population replacement the  $\alpha$  construct would carry the cargo and homing

278 by  $\alpha$  would require  $\beta$ , while that by  $\beta$  could be either autonomous or depend on  $\alpha$  (Fig 6A).  
 279 Both  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  could be inserted into neutral sites, or into essential genes in such a way as to  
 280 minimise fitness effects. We have modeled these approaches assuming, for purposes of  
 281 illustration, the cargo imposes a dominant 20% fitness cost on females, and find that, again,  
 282 such double drives can spread rapidly through target populations even when there is  
 283 significant pre-existing resistance, and would not spread in non-target populations fixed for  
 284 the resistant allele (Fig 6B and C). Unless there is virtually no pre-existing resistance at the  
 285 differentiated locus, double drives can keep the frequency of the cargo gene above 95% much  
 286 longer than a single drive construct targeting a differentiated locus, either neutral or essential  
 287 (Fig 6D). If  $\alpha$  is inserted in an essential gene, protection can be even longer.




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289 **Fig 6. Double drives for population replacement.** (A) Alternative double drive designs. (B)  
 290 Timecourse of allele frequencies for Design 2r in a target population assuming 50% pre-  
 291 existing resistance. The dynamics for Design 1r are qualitatively similar. (C) Allele frequencies  
 292 for Designs 1r and 2r in a non-target population with 90% pre-existing resistance, assuming  
 293 insertion of both  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  into neutral loci (solid lines); or  $\alpha$  as a neutral insertion into a haplo-  
 294 insufficient essential gene (dashed lines). (D) Duration of at least 95% of adult females  
 295 carrying the cargo-bearing  $\alpha$  construct as a function of the pre-existing frequency of resistance

296 at the B locus for double drives 1r and 2r, where solid and dashed lines are as in **(C)**. Also  
297 shown for comparison are results for a single drive (S) carrying the cargo at a neutral A locus  
298 (solid line) or a haplo-insufficient essential gene (dashed lines). Note that results for insertion  
299 of  $\beta$  into a haplo-insufficient essential gene would be virtually indistinguishable from the solid  
300 lines **(C, D)**. All plots assume 20% fitness cost of the cargo on females and a homing-  
301 associated loss-of-function mutation rate of  $10e^{-3}$ .  
302

### 303 **PAM site analysis in *An. gambiae***

304 To explore whether the type of population differentiation assumed in our modelling can  
305 exist in nature, we analysed published genome sequence data on *An. gambiae* mosquitoes  
306 from the Ag1000G project [32]. The Ag1000G dataset includes sequences from 16 mainland  
307 African populations and from populations on Mayotte and Bioko, two islands 500km off the  
308 east and 30km off the west coast of Africa, respectively. Note that in presenting this analysis  
309 we are not advocating the use of double drives on these islands, and merely wish to investigate  
310 whether the requisite differentiation can be found on island populations. For our analysis we  
311 focussed on potential PAM sequences (NGG or CCN), on the logic that a construct would be  
312 unlikely to mutate to recognise a new PAM, whereas this could occur for a protospacer. The  
313 entire dataset includes 57 million polymorphic sites, which we screened for PAM sites present  
314 in the island population and at a frequency  $<10\%$ ,  $<5\%$ , or absent from all other populations.  
315 In Mayotte, for PAM sequences that were completely private to the island (i.e., not found in  
316 any other population), only 1 of them had no pre-existing resistance (i.e., was found in all 48  
317 sequences from the island), whereas 25 had pre-existing resistance less than 20%, and 353  
318 had pre-existing resistance less than 50%. PAM sequences with small but nonzero  
319 frequencies on the mainland were even more abundant (Fig 7). Bioko island is not as  
320 differentiated as Mayotte from the mainland populations, and the sample size is smaller (18  
321 sequences), but still there are some potential candidate sites.



323

324 **Fig 7. Frequency of PAM sites in island populations of *An. gambiae*.** Numbers of PAM  
 325 sites (NGG or CCN) with varying frequencies of resistance in samples of *An. gambiae* from  
 326 two oceanic islands (blue map labels): **(A)** Bioko island (n = 18 sequences, from 9 individuals),  
 327 and **(B)** Mayotte island (n = 48 sequences, from 24 individuals), where the PAM site frequency  
 328 in each non-target population (black map labels) is <10%, <5% or 0% (i.e., target site  
 329 resistance is >90%, >95% or 100%). GG or CC dinucleotides which varied by at least one  
 330 base were considered to be resistant.

## 331 Discussion

332 Given that some of the most promising gene drive approaches for population control  
 333 use (CRISPR-based) sequence-specific nucleases, an obvious way to limit their spread and  
 334 impact is to exploit sequence differences between target and non-target populations. In this  
 335 paper we have proposed using a double drive design, here defined as one that uses two  
 336 constructs, inserted at different locations in the genome, both of which can increase in  
 337 frequency, and which interact such that the transmission of at least one of them depends on

338 the other. Previously published examples that fit this definition include those for 2-locus under-  
339 dominance [14, 15, 33, 34], and Medusa [35], tethered [36], integral [26], and  
340 transcomplementing [37] gene drives. As with single-construct gene drives, these various  
341 proposed designs differ in purpose (suppression vs. modification), release rate needed to  
342 initiate spread (low vs high threshold), and the molecular basis for the superMendelian  
343 inheritance (homing, toxin-antidote interactions, or a combination of the two). The requirement  
344 that both constructs can increase in frequency over time excludes split drives [25, 38-40] and  
345 killer-rescue systems [41, 42], in which only one of the two components increases in  
346 frequency. In our proposed designs there is a division of labour between the two constructs,  
347 with one responsible for the desired impact (suppression or replacement) and the other for the  
348 population restriction, such that together they act as a double drive in the target population  
349 and as a split drive in non-target populations. Note that if there are multiple populations of the  
350 same species requiring control, each with a different private allele, the same  $\alpha$  construct could  
351 be used in each case, with only a change in the insertion site of the  $\beta$  construct and the  
352 corresponding gRNA. This flexibility may be particularly useful when the  $\alpha$  construct requires  
353 significant optimisation [26].

354 We have considered a range of double drive designs of increasing resilience, as  
355 judged by their ability to cope with an increasing frequency of pre-existing resistance at the  
356 differentiated locus. The simplest designs do not have any component beyond those needed  
357 for any CRISPR-based construct, and so should be widely applicable [37]. More powerful  
358 constructs can be made by adding an X-shredding sex ratio distorter to the load-inducing  
359 construct; these have been most effectively demonstrated in *An. gambiae* mosquitoes [11,  
360 43], but may also work more broadly [44]. In other species there are other ways to distort the  
361 sex ratio [45-47], and it would be interesting to model whether these alternatives would be  
362 expected to have the same impact as an X-shredder in the context of a double drive. An even  
363 simpler way to increase the load would be to add extra gRNAs to the  $\alpha$  construct that mutate  
364 other female fertility genes [48, 49]. The most powerful design we considered targets a female-



365 specific haplo-insufficient gene, or otherwise causes dominant female sterility or lethality.  
366 Such genes are not common, but there are some possible candidates [50-52], and our  
367 modelling motivates the search for others. Finally, performance (in terms of being able to cope  
368 with ever higher frequencies of pre-existing resistance) could presumably also be improved  
369 by using a third construct, to construct a triple drive, though modelling would be required to  
370 explore the implications of the many different configurations this extension would allow.

371         The proposed strategy requires that there be a differentiated locus between target and  
372 non-target populations. It need not be an essential gene, and could even be selectively neutral.  
373 Our focus has been on using so-called private alleles – sequences that are present (but not  
374 necessarily fixed) in the target population, and absent (or of negligible frequency) in non-target  
375 populations. Our analysis of PAM sites in *An. gambiae* indicates that appropriately  
376 differentiated sites may exist in island populations of this species, though our analysis must  
377 be considered preliminary: the dataset does not include mainland sites in closest proximity to  
378 the island populations, where differentiation may be lower, and we have not considered  
379 potential polymorphism in the protospacer sequence (which, if present, may require the use  
380 of multiple gRNAs). We have focussed on nucleotide variation at PAM sites on the assumption  
381 that a construct is unlikely to mutate to recognise a new PAM; structural variation in the  
382 protospacer region may also be an appropriate basis for geographically restricting double drive  
383 spread. We have also not attempted to determine whether the observed differentiation is due  
384 solely to mutation and drift, or if selection may be involved as well.

385         Note that the single drives modelled by Sudweeks et al. [19] require the opposite type  
386 of differentiation: sequences that are fixed in the target population, even if not private (i.e.,  
387 even if found at appreciable frequencies in the non-target population). In this latter scenario  
388 the challenge is not so much to have an impact on the target population as to not have an  
389 impact on the non-target population. What constitutes “acceptable non-impact” may differ  
390 widely from one use case to another and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis: in some  
391 circumstances spread of the construct and a transient decline in population size followed by  
392 recovery may be acceptable, whereas in others any significant spread of the construct may

393 be unacceptable, regardless of impact on population size. Designs with non-autonomous  
394 homing of the  $\beta$  construct (Designs 2, 4, and 5) should be less likely to increase in frequency  
395 in the non-target population, and may therefore be preferable. We have focused in this paper  
396 on differentiated loci on autosomes, but note that for Design 5 the X-shredder is required for  
397 the spread of the  $\alpha$  construct and, in principle, one could achieve population-restricted spread  
398 if the shredder targeted a population-specific sequence on the X chromosome (rather than  
399 inserting it into a population-specific autosomal sequence). In many species the X  
400 chromosome shows greater population differentiation than autosomes [53], so this alternative  
401 may be useful. Finally, if there are no private alleles in the target population, it may be  
402 worthwhile considering a two-step approach of first introducing a private allele into a  
403 population and then using that allele to control the population [18]. The ability of double drives  
404 to exploit private alleles that are selectively neutral and that have a frequency of only 50%  
405 (suppression) or 20% (modification) potentially makes this approach more feasible than would  
406 otherwise be the case.

407 In this paper we have used a simple high-level modelling framework in which the  
408 generations are discrete, the population is well mixed, and dynamics are deterministic. This  
409 framework is appropriate for strategic models aiming to identify candidate approaches that are  
410 worthy of further investigation. For any specific use case the appropriate tactical models would  
411 need to be developed that incorporate more biological detail, including spatial and stochastic  
412 effects. Such extensions will be particularly important when the goal is to eliminate the target  
413 population, which is not possible in our deterministic models. Instead, we have reported the  
414 minimum relative population size achieved, which is expected to be related to the size of a  
415 population that could be eliminated, but determining the precise connection will require  
416 bespoke modelling tailored to a specific situation. Further extensions would be needed to allow  
417 for on-going movement between target and non-target populations – if there is on-going  
418 immigration into the target population, and this cannot be stopped, then it may not be possible  
419 to eliminate the target population with a single release of a double drive. Nevertheless, such

420 a release may be sufficient to suppress the population to such an extent that it can be  
421 controlled by other means, including recurrent releases of the same constructs. If one is able  
422 to achieve an initial release rate of 1% into a target population, and that suppresses the  
423 population by a factor of 1000, then the same releases going forwards will constitute a 10-fold  
424 inundation, and self-limiting genetic approaches may be sufficient.

## 425 **Methods**

426 The basic modelling structure follows that of Burt & Deredec [10]. In brief, populations  
427 have discrete generations, mating is random, there are two life stages (juveniles and adults),  
428 and juvenile survival is density dependent according to the Beverton-Holt model, which has  
429 two parameters, but since we report results in terms of relative population sizes, only one  
430 matters, the intrinsic rate of increase ( $R_m$ ). We assume this is equal to 6 [49]. Genetic  
431 parameter values (rates of DNA cleavage, rates of alternative repair pathways, and the sex  
432 ratio produced by X-shredding) are as estimated from *An. gambiae* [11, 21, 54]. Constructs  
433 may be inserted into a haplo-sufficient or haplo-insufficient female-essential gene (in which  
434 case gene function is disrupted), a selectively neutral sequence (in which case the insertion  
435 is also selectively neutral), or a haplo-sufficient or haplo-insufficient gene required for male  
436 and female viability (in which case the insertion is again selectively neutral, because it contains  
437 a re-coded version of the target gene [23-25], or is inserted in an artificial intron [26]). For  
438 constructs inserted into an essential gene we assume end-joining repair produces non-  
439 functional cleavage-resistant alleles [21, 55], while for constructs inserted into selectively  
440 neutral sites the products of end-joining repair are also neutral. In all models we assume  
441 individuals with an intact CRISPR system suffer a 1% fitness cost for every different gRNA  
442 they carry as a cost of off-target cleavage, and for population replacement we assume the  
443 cargo gene imposes a 20% fitness cost on females. Both these costs are assumed to be  
444 dominant. For simplicity, we assume all fitness costs affect survival after density dependent  
445 juvenile mortality and before censusing (e.g., as if pupae die). All results are for populations  
446 censused at the adult stage. Releases are of heterozygous adult males at 0.1% of the pre-

447 release number of males, and if the two constructs are linked then they are assumed to be in  
448 cis; for constructs released in separate males we assume release rates of 0.05% of each. A  
449 list of parameters and their baseline values is given in S1 Table and S2 Table. For the PAM  
450 site analysis we screened the Ag1000G phase II SNP data for PAM sites (GG or CC  
451 dinucleotides) showing variation between samples at one or both nucleotides. PAM site  
452 frequencies were calculated per sampling location and filtered for those present in the island  
453 population and at <10%, 5%, or absent from all other populations, excluding those containing  
454 >5% missing data in at least one sampled population. Further details are given in the S1  
455 Appendix.

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637

## 638 **Supporting Information**

### 639 **S1 Text. Supplemental methods.**

#### 640 ***Genetics and fitness effects of disrupting host genes***

641 Our baseline model has 2 autosomal loci each with 3 alleles. At the first locus A is the  
642 wildtype allele;  $\alpha$  is the transgenic construct inserted into and disrupting the wild type allele;  
643 and a is a cleavage-resistant allele produced by end-joining repair. For population suppression  
644 we assume that the A locus is needed for female survival past the pupal stage, that the  
645 resistant allele is non-functional, and that functional resistance is not possible [1]. When A is  
646 a haplo-sufficient gene, we assume no reduction in survival probability when carrying only one  
647 functional copy of the gene. At the second locus there are initially 2 segregating alleles of  
648 equal fitness, B and b, with B being more common in the target population than in the non-  
649 target population (and vice versa for b). The third allele,  $\beta$ , is the transgenic construct which  
650 can home into B but not into b. Where the differentiated B locus is neutral, we assume all end-  
651 joining repair events produce cleavage-resistant alleles (b). In the case where the  
652 differentiated B locus is an essential gene, we extend the model to have a 4th allele at this  
653 locus,  $b_j$ , which is a non-functional, cleavage resistant, version of B that can be formed by  
654 end-joining repair and assume all end-joining leads to non-functional alleles. We also assume  
655 that the  $\beta$  construct has been engineered to have minimal effects on fitness (e.g., by having a  
656 recoded version of the B allele, or being inserted into an artificial intron). For comparison we  
657 also model a single drive consisting of a single construct homing into a female viability gene,  
658 and allow for both functional resistance genes that may pre-exist in the population and non-  
659 functional resistance alleles created by end-joining (4 allele model; Fig 3 in main text).

660 For population replacement where  $\alpha$  carries a desirable cargo gene and  $\beta$  is in the  
661 differentiated locus, we consider three cases, where (i) both A and B loci are selectively  
662 neutral; (ii) the A locus is selectively neutral, and B is a haplo-insufficient essential gene; or  
663 (iii) the A locus is a haplo-insufficient essential gene, and the B locus is selectively neutral. In  
664 those cases where the A or B locus is an essential gene, the  $\alpha$  or  $\beta$  construct is assumed to

665 have been designed to have minimal effects on fitness (as above), end-joining produces non-  
666 functional alleles which are dominant lethal, and any pre-existing resistant allele (at B) is  
667 selectively neutral. In each case there are 3 alleles at each locus, except when B is an  
668 essential gene, when there are 4. For comparison we also consider a single drive consisting  
669 of a construct that homes into a neutral site (3 allele model) or into a haplo-insufficient  
670 essential gene (4 allele model; Fig 6 in main text).

671 Where the fitness of either A/A or B/B homozygotes is standardised to 1, the fitness of  
672 individuals homozygous for the construct  $\alpha/\alpha$  or  $\beta/\beta$  is  $1 - s_I$ ; homozygous for the cleavage  
673 resistant allele  $a/a$  or  $b/b$  is  $1 - s_R$ ; heterozygous for the construct  $A/\alpha$  or  $B/\beta$  is  $1 - h_I s_I$ ;  
674 heterozygous for the cleavage resistant allele  $A/a$  or  $B/b$  is  $1 - h_R s_R$  or heterozygous carrying  
675 both the construct and cleavage-resistant allele  $\alpha/a$  or  $\beta/b$  is  $1 - s_{IR}$ , where  $s_I$ ,  $s_R$  and  $s_{IR}$  are  
676 selection coefficients and  $h_I$  and  $h_R$  are dominance coefficients, each of which differ  
677 depending on the locus (A and B) and between sexes (see S2 Table for more details of locus-  
678 specific fitness costs for each scenario modelled).

### 679 **Construct activity and fitness effects**

680 Each construct consists of one or more transcription units (Cas9, gRNA, X-shredder,  
681 Cargo), and the activity associated with each is assumed to be dominant. For individuals  
682 carrying at least one Cas9, one gRNA and the site targeted by the gRNA (A or B), cleavage  
683 of the target site occurs with probability  $c$ , after which end-joining repair occurs with probability  
684  $j$  converting the target site to a resistant allele ( $a$  or  $b$ ), and homing occurs with probability  $1 -$   
685  $j$  converting the target site to the construct ( $\alpha$  or  $\beta$ ). For males carrying at least one X-shredder,  
686 sperm is produced carrying Y or X chromosomes at a ratio of  $m:1 - m$ . In all models, we  
687 assume a fitness cost due to off-target cleavage ( $sH$ ) of 1%, where fitness is reduced by a  
688 factor  $1 - sH$  if there is at least one Cas9 and one gRNA present, or by a factor  $(1 - sH)^2$  if  
689 there is at least one Cas9 and two different gRNAs present. To model costs due to somatic  
690 expression of the nuclease, individuals carrying at least one Cas9, one gRNA and the site  
691 targeted by the gRNA, have fitness reduced by a factor  $1 - sS$ . Similarly, to model costs

692 associated with X-shredding, males carrying at least one X-shredder have fitness reduced by  
693 a factor  $1 - sX$ . With the exception of Fig 5B and C in the main text, we assume both  $sS$  and  
694  $sX$  to be zero. For population replacement we assume the cargo has a fitness cost ( $sC$ ) of 20%  
695 in females, with no effect on males. In all cases the fitness costs associated with each unit's  
696 activity are assumed to be dominant, and for simplicity, are assumed to affect survival of  
697 individuals after density dependence and before censusing (e.g., at the pupal stage).

698 The overall fitness of an individual is therefore the product of the relative fitness due to  
699 host gene disruption at locus A, host gene disruption at locus B and construct activity.

### 700 ***Analyses of evolutionary stability***

701 We extend both the 3-allele and 4-allele models to allow for loss-of-function mutations  
702 of each transcription unit (Cas9, gRNA, X-shredder, cargo). After release of fully functional  
703 constructs, we assume that each unit mutates with probability  $\mu$ ; mutation can only occur  
704 during homing; it is possible for more than one unit to mutate during a single homing event;  
705 and mutation back to a functional unit does not occur. Constructs carrying non-functional units  
706 are expected to carry the fitness costs associated with disrupting the function of the host gene,  
707 however, no longer carry costs due to the transcription unit activity (e.g., off-target cleavage).  
708 Although at the sequence level constructs carrying only non-functional units are expected to  
709 differ from cleavage-resistant alleles produced through end-joining repair, both are assumed  
710 to be resistant to cleavage and carry the same fitness costs, therefore we model them as a  
711 single allele.

### 712 ***Population biology***

713 We model a population with discrete, non-overlapping generations. In each generation,  
714 we assume the population mates randomly, that females produce  $f$  fertilised eggs and that  
715 males are not limiting in their production. Juvenile survival is density-dependent, such that the  
716 probability of surviving is  $\theta_j \frac{\gamma}{\gamma + N_j}$ , where  $\theta_j$  is the density-independent probability the juvenile  
717 survives to adulthood,  $\gamma$  determines the strength of density dependent mortality and  $N_j$  is the  
718 total number of juveniles in the population during the generation. The intrinsic rate of increase

719 ( $R_m$ ) of wild-type population is  $\frac{f\theta_j}{2}$ . After density-dependent juvenile mortality, additional  
 720 genotype-dependent mortality occurs before juveniles mature into adults, taking into account  
 721 fitness costs associated with the constructs and cleavage-resistant alleles. Adult males and  
 722 females then produce gametes, during which recombination occurs between the A and B loci  
 723 with probability  $r$ , and, depending on the genotype, cleavage followed by homing or mutation  
 724 may occur in males or females, and shredding of the X-chromosome may occur in males.

725 **Population censusing**

726 Relative population densities and allele frequencies are of populations censused at the  
 727 adult stage and the correlation between the constructs  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  is:

728 
$$\frac{(p_{\alpha\beta} - p_{\alpha} * p_{\beta})}{\sqrt{p_{\alpha}(1 - p_{\alpha})p_{\beta}(1 - p_{\beta})}} \quad (1)$$

729 where,  $p_{\alpha\beta}$  is the frequency of  $\alpha\beta$  chromosomes in the population and  $p_{\alpha}$  and  $p_{\beta}$  are the  
 730 frequency of  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  alleles in the population respectively, each calculated from populations  
 731 censused at the adult stage.

732 **PAM site analysis in *An. gambiae***

733 To identify PAM sites (NGG or CCN) in *An. gambiae* with the type of differentiiion  
 734 required for our approach, SNP variants from the Phase II Ag1000G dataset were first  
 735 screened for the presence of at least one G or C allele. Positions upstream and downstream  
 736 of the variant were then screened to calculate frequencies of GG and CC dinucleotides, using  
 737 the AgamP4 reference genome for invariant neighbouring sites, or the Ag1000G SNP data for  
 738 neighbouring variants. Since phased data was only available for biallelic variants,  
 739 dinucleotides containing two variants, of which at least one was multiallelic, were not screened  
 740 (24% of G or C variants). For each differentiated PAM site, frequencies were calculated for  
 741 the 16 sampled populations (Cameroon *An. gambiae* n=594, Uganda *An. gambiae* n=224,  
 742 Burkina Faso *An. gambiae* n=184, Guinea-Bissau uncertain sp. n=182, Angola *An. coluzzii*  
 743 n=156, Burkina Faso *An. coluzzii* n=150, Cote d'Ivoire *An. coluzzii* n=142, Gabon *An. gambiae*  
 744 n=138, The Gambia uncertain sp. n=130, Ghana *An. coluzzii* n=110, Kenya uncertain sp.



745 n=96, Guinea *An. gambiae* n=80, Mayotte *An. gambiae* n=48, Ghana *An. gambiae* n=24,  
746 Bioko *An. gambiae* n=18 and Guinea *An. colluzzi* n=8, where n is the number of sequences  
747 and n/2 is the number of individuals sampled). PAM sites containing >5% missing data at any  
748 sampling location were removed (0.5% PAMs), leaving a total of 13,462,450 polymorphic PAM  
749 sites. The per-site PAM frequencies were used to identify PAM sites present in the island  
750 population of interest, and at frequencies <10%, <5% or absent in all other populations,  
751 excluding the *An. coluzzii* population from Guinea due to low sample size (n=8, from 4  
752 individuals). Analysis of the Ag1000G data made heavy use of the python package scikit-allel  
753 (<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3238280>).

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756 Cas9 gene drive targeting doublesex causes complete population suppression in caged  
757 *Anopheles gambiae* mosquitoes. *Nat Biotechnol.* 2018;36(11):1062-6. Epub 2018/09/25. doi:  
758 10.1038/nbt.4245. PubMed PMID: 30247490.

759 **S1 Table. Model parameters and baseline values.**

760

Parameter	Description	Baseline value
$R_m$	Intrinsic rate of population increase	6
$r$	Recombination between loci	0.5
$d$	Proportion of offspring carrying transgene	0.976 [1]
$u$	Proportion of non-homed chromosomes which are mutant	0.392 [2]
$e$	Probability of homing	$2d - 1 = 0.953$
$c$	Probability of cleavage	$e + (1 - e)u = 0.971$
$j$	Probability of end joining given cleavage	$\frac{(1 - e)u}{e + (1 - e)u} = 0.019$
$m$	Proportion of Y-bearing sperm produced by X-shredder males	0.95 [3]
$s_H$	Cost of off-target cleavage in individuals expressing Cas9 and gRNA (targeting either allele A or B) (dominant)	0.01
$s_S$	Female cost of somatic cleavage of wildtype allele by Cas9 and gRNA (targeting either allele A or B) (dominant)	0
$s_X$	Male cost of X-shredding (dominant)	0
$s_C$	Female cost of cargo expression	0.2
$p$	Probability of a functional mutant being produced through end joining	0
$\mu$	Probability of each component becoming non-functional during homing	0

761

762 **References**

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764 Cas9 gene drive targeting doublesex causes complete population suppression in caged  
765 Anopheles gambiae mosquitoes. Nat Biotechnol. 2018;36(11):1062-6. Epub 2018/09/25. doi:  
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774


775 **S2 Table. Host gene disruption fitness costs.**  
776

Parameter	Description	A-suppression*		A-replacement or B <sup>†</sup>		
		Haplo-sufficient	Haplo-insufficient	Neutral	Haplo-sufficient	Haplo-insufficient
$s_I$	Fitness cost for target site disruption by insertion of construct	1	1	0	0	0
$h_I$	Dominance coefficient for target site disruption by insertion of construct	0	1	0	0	0
$s_R$	Fitness cost for target site disruption by resistant allele	1	1	0	1	1
$h_R$	Dominance coefficient for target site disruption by resistant allele	0	1	0	0	1
$s_{IR}$	Fitness cost for heterozygotes (construct/resistant)	1	1	0	0	1

777  $s_I$ ,  $s_R$  and  $s_{IR}$  are selection coefficients associated with host gene disruption and  $h_I$  and  $h_R$  are  
778 dominance coefficients. At locus A in suppression double drives, fitness costs for disruption of  
779 function at the target site can occur either by insertion of the construct (I) or by end-joining that  
780 produces non-functional cleavage resistance (R), resulting in recessive or dominant female-  
781 specific lethality for haplo-sufficient or -insufficient genes respectively. At locus A in  
782 replacement double drives, or at the differentiated locus B in either suppression or  
783 replacement drives, fitness costs for disruption of the target site by construct insertion are  
784 assumed to be zero (e.g., by having the construct contain a recoded version of the target  
785 gene). Where the target site is a haplo-sufficient or -insufficient essential gene, non-functional  
786 cleavage-resistant mutants are expected to cause recessive or dominant lethality respectively,  
787 affecting in both males and females.


788 \* Fitness costs are female-specific.

789 † Fitness costs apply to both males and females.




790

791 **S1 Fig. Timecourse for the relative number of females over time for Designs 1 and 2.**  
 792 Solid lines are for where  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are unlinked and dashed lines for where they are linked  
 793 ( $r=0.01$ ). Shown are the cases where  $\beta$  is inserted as a neutral insertion into **(A)** a neutral  
 794 locus, **(B)** an essential haplo-sufficient gene or **(C)** an essential haplo-insufficient gene. Shown  
 795 for comparison is a time course for a single drive targeting a haplo-sufficient female-specific  
 796 viability gene (S).




797

798 **S2 Fig. Effect of releasing constructs in the same or different males.** Comparison of  
 799 dynamics for Design 1 when the constructs are unlinked and are released in the same (A)  
 800 or in different (B) males. If the constructs are released in separate males the initial correlation  
 801 between  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  (black dotted line) is negative, allowing  $\beta$  (solid red line) to increase to a  
 802 higher frequency than if released in the same males as  $\alpha$  where it experiences higher fitness  
 803 costs. Consequently  $\alpha$  (solid blue line) is retained at high frequency in the population for longer  
 804 resulting in a greater reduction in relative number of females, though there is a longer delay  
 805 between release and impact. (C-G) Timecourse for the relative number of females over time  
 806 for Designs 1-5 where constructs are unlinked and released in the same males (solid lines),  
 807 linked and released in the same males (dotted lined), unlinked and released in different males  
 808 (dashed lines) or linked and released in different males (dot-dashed). Pre-existing resistance  
 809 is assumed to be 1% (C, D), 20% (E, F) and 50% (G). For Designs 2, 4 and 5 (D, F, G)  
 810 separate releases only delay the impact because  $\beta$  cannot increase in frequency  
 811 autonomously, whereas for Designs 1 and 3 separate releases can give a larger (though still  
 812 delayed) impact when constructs are unlinked, but not when they are closely linked. Shown  
 813 for comparison is a time course for a single drive targeting a female-specific viability gene with  
 814 the same level of pre-existing resistance (1%, 20%, or 50%; black solid lines).



815

816 **S3 Fig. Example time courses for double drives for population suppression.** Design 1  
 817 (A, B) and 2 (B, C) assuming 1% and 100% pre-existing resistance in target and non-target  
 818 populations. Design 3 (E, F) and 4 (G, H) assuming 20% and 100% pre-existing resistance  
 819 in target and non-target populations. Design 5 (I, J) assuming 50% and 100% pre-existing  
 820 resistance in target and non-target populations respectively. Plots for Designs 1, 3, and 5 are  
 821 the same as in the main text, and presented here to facilitate comparisons.




822

823 **S4 Fig. The impact of alternative designs and their variants on population suppression**  
 824 **as a function of the pre-existing frequency of resistance.** Solid lines are for baseline  
 825 conditions ( $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are released in the same males,  $\beta$  is in a neutral locus, and loci are  
 826 unlinked), and are the same in each panel. Dashed lines are for variants where **(A)**  $\beta$  is  
 827 inserted as a neutral insertion into an essential haplo-insufficient gene, **(B)**  $\beta$  is inserted as a  
 828 neutral insertion into an essential haplo-sufficient gene, **(C)** loci are linked ( $r=0.01$ ), and **(D)**  $\alpha$   
 829 and  $\beta$  are released in separate males, holding all other properties at baseline.  
 830




831




832

833 **S5 Fig. Timecourse of allele frequencies and population suppression (1-relative number**  
 834 **of females) for Designs 1-5 in non-target populations where the resistant allele is**  
 835 **present at 100%. (A-E)  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are unlinked (solid lines) or linked (dashed lines). (F-J)  $\beta$  is**  
 836 **inserted as a neutral insertion into a neutral site (solid lines), haplo-sufficient essential gene**  
 837 **(dashed lines) or haplo-insufficient essential gene. (K-O)  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are released in the same**  
 838 **males (solid lines) or different males (dashed lines).**



839

840 **S6 Fig. Timecourses for Designs 3, 4 and 5 assuming pre-existing frequency of**  
 841 **resistance of 1%, where homing-associated loss-of-function mutations occur for each**  
 842 **component of each construct with probability 10e-3.** For each design, the intact constructs  
 843 ( $\alpha$ , blue solid lines and  $\beta$ , red solid lines) increase in frequency together, causing the relative  
 844 number of females (black dashed lines) to decline. For designs 3 and 4, loss-of-function  
 845 mutations at the X-shredder ( $\alpha$ -XS, blue dashed-dotted lines) are selected for, replacing  $\alpha$  (**A**,  
 846 **C**). Since  $\alpha$ -XS is identical to  $\alpha$  in designs 1 and 2, the construct continues to reduce the  
 847 relative number of females. If the population is not eliminated,  $\beta$  is eventually replaced by the  
 848 resistant b allele and  $\alpha$ -XS is replaced by the wild-type A allele, allowing the population to  
 849 recover. For design 5, loss-of-function mutations at the X-shredder ( $\beta$ -XS, red dashed-dotted  
 850 lines) are also selected for, but increases in frequency more slowly than the  $\alpha$ -XS allele in  
 851 Designs 3 and 4, and the intact  $\beta$  construct persists longer. For all designs, loss-of-function  
 852 mutations at each of the other components (Cas-9, gRNA<sub>A</sub> and gRNA<sub>B</sub>) remain at low  
 853 frequency, having negligible impact on the efficacy of the designs (**B**, **D**, **F**).



854

855 **S7 Fig. Loss-of-function mutation rates of  $10e-4$  have minimal impact on the extent of**  
 856 **population suppression.** Solid lines are for baseline conditions where constructs remain  
 857 intact after release, while dashed lines are for homing-associated loss-of-function mutations  
 858 occurring at each component of each construct with probability  $10e-4$ .