

1 **Transmission of one predicts another: Apathogenic proxies for transmission dynamics**
2 **of a fatal virus**

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28

29 **Abstract**

30 Identifying drivers of transmission prior to an epidemic—especially of an emerging pathogen—is
31 a formidable challenge for proactive disease management efforts. We tested a novel approach
32 in the Florida panther, hypothesizing that apathogenic feline immunodeficiency virus (FIV)
33 transmission could predict transmission dynamics for pathogenic feline leukemia virus (FeLV).
34 We derived a transmission network using FIV whole genome sequences, and used exponential
35 random graph models to determine drivers structuring this network. We used these drivers to
36 predict FeLV transmission pathways among panthers and compared predicted outbreak
37 dynamics against empirical FeLV outbreak data. FIV transmission was primarily driven by
38 panther age class and distances between panther home range centroids. Prospective FIV-
39 based modeling predicted FeLV dynamics at least as well as simpler, often retrospective
40 approaches, with evidence that FIV-based predictions captured the spatial structuring of the
41 observed FeLV outbreak. Our finding that an apathogenic agent can predict transmission of an
42 analogously transmitted pathogen is an innovative approach that warrants testing in other host-
43 pathogen systems to determine generalizability. Use of such apathogenic agents holds promise
44 for improving predictions of pathogen transmission in novel host populations, and could thereby
45 provide new strategies for proactive pathogen management in human and animal systems.

46

47 **Keywords**

48 transmission tree; exponential random graph model; network modeling; disease model; Florida
49 panther; transmission heterogeneity

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52

53 **Introduction**

54 Infectious disease outbreaks can have profound impacts on conservation, food security,
55 and global health and economics. Mathematical models have proven a vital tool for
56 understanding transmission dynamics of pathogens [1], but struggle to predict the dynamics of
57 novel or emerging agents [2]. This is at least partially due to the challenges associated with
58 characterizing contacts relevant to transmission processes. Common modeling approaches that
59 assume all hosts interact and transmit infections to the same degree ignore key drivers of
60 transmission. Such drivers can include specific transmission-relevant behaviors including
61 grooming or fighting in animals [3], concurrent sexual partnerships in humans [4], or homophily
62 [5], and result in flawed epidemic predictions [6,7]. Further, identifying drivers of transmission
63 and consequent control strategies for any given pathogen is typically done reactively or
64 retrospectively in an effort to stop or prevent further outbreaks or spatial spread (e.g. [8,9]).
65 These constraints limit the ability to perform prospective disease management planning tailored
66 to a given target population, increasing the risk of potentially catastrophic pathogen outbreaks,
67 as observed in humans [10], domestic animals [11], and species of conservation concern (e.g.,
68 [12–14]).

69 A handful of studies have evaluated whether common infectious agents present in the
70 healthy animal microbiome or virome can indicate contacts between individuals that may
71 translate to interactions promoting pathogen transmission [15–22]. Such an approach
72 circumvents some of the uncertainties associated with more traditional approaches to contact
73 detection [6]. In these cases, genetic evidence from the transmissible agent itself is used to
74 define between-individual interactions for which contact was sufficient for transmission to occur.
75 Results of such studies show mixed success [15–18]. For example, members of the same
76 household [19,20] or animals with close social interactions [21,22] have been found to share
77 microbiota, but disentangling social mechanisms of this sharing is complicated by shared diets,
78 environments, and behaviors [23].

79 These studies have, however, revealed ideal characteristics of non-disease inducing
80 infectious agents (hereafter, *apathogenic agents*) for use as markers of transmission-relevant
81 interactions. Such apathogenic agents should have rapid mutation rates to facilitate discernment
82 of transmission relationships between individuals over time [24,25]. Furthermore, these agents
83 should be relatively common and well-sampled in a target population, have a well-characterized
84 mode of transmission that is similar to the pathogen of interest, and feature high strain alpha-
85 diversity (local diversity) and high strain turnover [25,26]. RNA viruses align well with these
86 characteristics [27] such that apathogenic RNA viruses could act as “proxies” of specific modes
87 of transmission (i.e., direct transmission) and indicate which drivers underlie transmission
88 processes. Such drivers, including but not limited to host demographics, relatedness, specific
89 behaviors, or space use, would subsequently allow prediction of transmission dynamics of
90 pathogenic agents with the same mode of transmission [25].

91 Here, we test the feasibility of this approach using a naturally occurring host-pathogen
92 system to test if an apathogenic RNA virus can act as a proxy for direct transmission processes
93 and subsequently predict transmission of a pathogenic RNA virus. Florida panthers (*Puma*
94 *concolor coryi*) are an endangered subspecies of puma found only in southern Florida. We have
95 documented that this population is infected by several feline retroviruses relevant to our study
96 questions [28,29]. Feline immunodeficiency virus (FIV_{pco}; hereafter, FIV) occurs in
97 approximately 50% of the population and does not appear to cause significant clinical disease
98 [28]. FIV is transmitted by close contact (i.e., fighting and biting), generally has a rapid mutation
99 rate (intra-individual evolution rate of 0.00129 substitutions/site/year; [30]), and, as a chronic
100 retroviral infection, can be persistently detected after the time of infection. Panthers are infected
101 with feline leukemia virus (FeLV), also a retrovirus, which caused a well documented, high
102 mortality outbreak among panthers in 2002-2004 [29]. FeLV infrequently spills over into
103 panthers following exposure to infected domestic cats [31]. Once spillover occurs, FeLV is
104 transmitted between panthers by close contact and results in one of three infection states:

105 progressive, regressive, or abortive infection [29]. Progressive cases are infectious and result in
106 mortality; regressive infections are unlikely to be infectious—though this is unclear in panthers—
107 and recover [29,32,33]. Abortive cases clear infection and are not themselves infectious [32].

108 The objectives of this study were therefore: (1) to determine which drivers shape FIV
109 transmission in Florida panthers, and (2) test if these drivers can predict transmission dynamics
110 of analogously transmitted FeLV in panthers. Success of this approach in our model system
111 would pave the way for testing similar apathogenic agents in other host-pathogen systems,
112 thereby improving our understanding of drivers of individual-level heterogeneity in transmission,
113 and consequently our ability to predict transmission dynamics of novel agents in human and
114 animal populations.

115

116 **Methods**

117 *Dataset assembly*


118 We assembled an extensive dataset covering almost 40 years of Florida panther
119 research and including panther sex and age class. A subset of the population is monitored using
120 very high frequency (VHF) telemetry collars, with relocations determined via aircraft typically
121 three times per week. Previous panther research has generated a microsatellite dataset for
122 monitored panthers [34], and a dataset of 60 full FIV genomes (proviral DNA sequenced within
123 a tiled amplicon framework in [35]). In addition, to augment observations from the 2002-04 FeLV
124 outbreak [29], we leveraged an FeLV database which documents FeLV status (positive and
125 negative) for 31 panthers from 2002-04 as determined by qPCR.

126

127 *FIV transmission inference*

128 To determine drivers of FIV transmission, we first generated a “who transmitted to
129 whom” transmission network using 60 panther FIV genomes collected from 1988 to 2011
130 (average of minimum annual panther counts across this period was 62.3 panthers; [36]). We

131 used the program PhyloScanner [37] (see Figure 1 for workflow across all analyses), which
132 assumes both within- and between-host evolution when inferring transmission relationships
133 between sampled and even unsampled hosts [37]. PhyloScanner operates in a two step
134 process, first inferring within- and between-host phylogenies in windows along the FIV genome.
135 Then, using the within-host viral diversity gleaned from deep sequencing, PhyloScanner
136 functionally performs ancestral state reconstruction to infer transmission relationships between
137 hosts, outputting transmission trees or networks. For PhyloScanner's step one, we used 150bp
138 windows, allowing 25bp overlap between windows. To test sensitivity to this choice, we
139 separately ran a full PhyloScanner analysis with 150bp windows, but without overlap between
140 windows (supplementary methods). The tiled amplicon PCR approach used to generate our FIV
141 genomic data biases for detection of one known variant, such that we did not expect detectable
142 superinfections. In the second step of PhyloScanner, we therefore held the parameter which
143 penalizes within-host diversity (k) equal to 0. We used a patristic distance threshold of 0.05 and
144 allowed missing and more complex transmission relationships. Because we had uneven read
145 depth across FIV genomes, we downsampled to a maximum of 200 reads per host. The output
146 of the full PhyloScanner analysis was a single transmission network (hereafter, *main FIV*
147 *network*), but see supplementary methods for details regarding analysis of the sensitivity of our
148 results to variations in and summary across multiple transmission networks.
149



150

151 **Figure 1:** Conceptual workflow across all analysis steps. Processes are shown on the left in
152 blue; specific outcomes are shown on the right in green; the final analysis outcome is in yellow
153 at the bottom right. Solid lines show direct flows or outcomes. Dashed lines show processes
154 acting on or in concert with prior outcomes: for example, exponential random graph modeling
155 (ERGM) was performed using the FIV transmission network, and the combination of the two
156 produced the ERGM coefficients outcome.

157

158 *Statistical analysis of FIV transmission networks*

159 Phyloscanner transmission tree output suggests direction of transmission, but in our
160 case, these results were often uncertain (see Results). To avoid putting undue emphasis on an
161 uncertain direction of transmission, we simplified the transmission tree output to undirected,
162 unweighted (binary) networks and performed statistical analysis of these networks using
163 exponential random graph models (ERGMs; [38]). ERGMs model the edges in networks, with
164 explanatory variables representing the potential structural drivers of the observed network [38].
165 By including network structural variables, ERGMs account for the inherent non-independence of
166 network data. As such, we modeled “transmission relationships” (i.e., being connected in the
167 transmission network) as a function of network structural variables and transmission variables
168 we a priori expected to influence direct transmission processes in panthers. We considered
169 several structural variables: an intercept-like edges term [38]; geometrically weighted edgewise
170 shared partner distribution (*gwesp*; representation of network triangles); alternating k-stars
171 (*altkstar*; representation of star structures); and 2-paths (2 step paths from *i* to *k* via *j*; [39]). In
172 addition, we considered a suite of transmission variables (see supplementary methods for
173 additional variable details): panther sex; age class (subadult or adult); pairwise genetic
174 relatedness (panther microsatellite data from [34]); position of panther home range centroid
175 (95% minimum convex polygon) or capture location (hereafter, *centroid*) relative to the major I-
176 75 freeway (locations could be north or south of this east-west freeway); distance from centroid
177 to nearest urban area (in km; USA Urban Areas layer, ArcGIS; [40]); pairwise geographic
178 distance between centroids (log-transformed; Figure S1); and pairwise home range overlap
179 (utilization distribution overlap indices of 95% bivariate normal home range kernels; [41,42]).

180 Because ERGMs are prone to degeneracy with increasing complexity [38], we first
181 performed forward selection for network structural variables, followed by forward selection of
182 dyad-independent variables, while controlling for network structure. Model selection was based
183 on AIC and goodness of fit, and MCMC diagnostics were assessed for the final model
184 (supplementary methods). ERGMs were fit with the *ergm* package [43] in R (v3.6.3; [44]).

185

186 *Panther population simulations*

187 We next simulated FeLV transmission through a network representing panthers during
188 the 2002-04 FeLV outbreak where network edges represented likely transmission pathways
189 based on ERGM-identified predictors of FIV transmission (*FIV-based model*). Hereafter, a *full-*
190 *simulation* includes both simulation of the panther population with its likely transmission
191 pathways and simulation of FeLV transmission within that population. Below, we describe the
192 process for a single simulation, but these procedures were repeated for each full simulation.

193 We first based the simulated population size on the range of empirical estimates from
194 2002-2004 (Table S1; [36]). Additional characteristics of the simulated population included those
195 identified as significant variables in the ERGM analysis: age category and pairwise geographic
196 distances between panther home range centroids (see Results). We randomly assigned age
197 categories to the simulated population based on the proportion of adults versus subadults. Age
198 proportions were based on age distributions in the western United States [45], which
199 qualitatively align with the historically elevated mean age of the Florida panther population [46].
200 Pairwise geographic distances for the simulated population were generated by randomly
201 assigning simulated home range centroids based on the distribution of observed centroids on
202 the landscape (supplementary methods).


203 We then used ERGM coefficients to generate network edges among the simulated
204 panther population using the *ergm* package in R [43]. The FIV transmission network spanned 15
205 years of observations and represents a subset of the actual contact network, as it includes only
206 those interactions that resulted in successful transmission. We therefore had a high degree of
207 uncertainty regarding the appropriate network density for our simulations. To manage this
208 uncertainty, we constrained density (ratio of existing edges to all possible edges) in our network
209 simulations across a range of parameter space (*net_dens*, Table S1).

210

211 *Simulation of FeLV transmission on FIV-based networks*

212 The next step in each full simulation was to model FeLV transmission through the
 213 network generated from FIV predictors of transmission. FeLV transmission was based on a
 214 stochastic chain binomial process on the simulated network, following a modified SIR
 215 compartmental model (Figure 2). Simulations were initiated with one randomly selected
 216 infectious individual and proceeded in weekly time steps. Transmission simulations lasted until
 217 no infectious individuals remained or until 2.5 years, whichever came first.

218



219

220 **Figure 2:** Diagram of flows of individuals between compartments in transmission model. Virus
 221 icons indicate infectious states, with the regressive infection icon darkened to represent reduced
 222 or uncertain infectiousness of this class. Note: a vaccination process was also included in the
 223 transmission model, but is not shown for simplicity. With vaccination, susceptibles could be
 224 vaccinated, and vaccinated individuals subsequently infected as with susceptibles, but with an
 225 additional probability of $(1-\nu)$. See Table S1 for definitions of parameters.

226

227 Transmission was dependent on the following (Figure 2; see Table S1 for parameter
228 definitions): (1) existence of an edge between two individuals, (2) the dyad in question involving
229 a susceptible and infectious individual, and (3) a random binomial draw based on the probability
230 of transmission given contact (β). In addition, *Puma concolor* generally have low expected
231 weekly contact rates [47]; we therefore included a weekly contact probability, represented as a
232 random binomial draw for contact in a given week (ω).

233 Upon successful transmission, infectious individuals were randomly assigned to one of
234 three outcomes of FeLV infection [29]. *Progressive* infections (probability P) are infectious (β),
235 develop clinical disease, and die due to infection (μ). *Regressive* infections (also probability P)
236 recover from infection ($K*\mu$, where K is a constant) and, having entered a state of viral latency,
237 are not considered at risk of FeLV reinfection [29,48]. Using model assumptions derived from
238 known patterns of FeLV infection in domestic cats, regressive individuals are not infectious [29],
239 but given ongoing uncertainty, we included some transmission from regressives ($C*\beta$, where C
240 is a constant). *Abortive* infections (probability $1-2P$) are never infectious, clearing infection and
241 joining the recovered class. While the duration of immunity in abortive cases has not been
242 studied in panthers, because abortive cases clear infection through a strong immune response
243 and develop anti-FeLV antibodies, reinfection with FeLV is considered extremely unlikely [48].

244 A vaccination process was included in simulations as panthers were vaccinated against
245 FeLV during the historical FeLV outbreak starting in 2003. Vaccination occurred at a rate, τ , and
246 applied to the whole population, as wildlife managers are unlikely to know if a panther is
247 susceptible at the time of capture or darting. However, only susceptible individuals transitioned
248 to the vaccinated class (i.e. vaccination failed in non-susceptibles). Because panthers were
249 vaccinated in the empirical outbreak with a domestic cat vaccine with unknown efficacy in
250 panthers, we allowed vaccinated individuals to become infected in transmission simulations by
251 including a binomial probability for vaccine failure (1 -vaccine efficacy, v_e , Table S1).

252 The panther population size remained roughly static through the course of the FeLV
253 outbreak [36]. We therefore elected not to include background mortality, but did include
254 infection-induced mortality. To maintain a consistent population size, we therefore included a
255 birth/recruitment process. Because FIV-based simulated networks drew edges based on
256 population characteristics, we treated births as a “respawning” process, in which territories
257 vacated due to mortality were reoccupied by a new susceptible at rate, ν . This approach allowed
258 us to maintain the ERGM-based network structure and is biologically reasonable, as vacated
259 panther territories are unlikely to remain unoccupied for long.

260

261 *Comparison of simulation predictions to observed FeLV outbreak*

262 To evaluate the performance of our FIV-based model, we also predicted FeLV
263 transmission dynamics using three alternative models: random networks, home range overlap-
264 based networks, and a well-mixed model. The random networks model used Erdős-Rényi
265 random networks, matching network densities from the FIV-based model (Table S1), but
266 otherwise allowing edges to occur between any pairs of individuals. Overlap-based networks
267 were generated using the degree distributions of panther home range overlap networks from
268 2002-2004 and simulated annealing with the R package *statnet* ([49]; supplementary methods).
269 For both random and overlap-based networks, FeLV transmission was simulated as in the FIV-
270 based simulations. The well-mixed model was a stochastic, continuous time compartmental
271 model (Gillespie algorithm), with rate functions aligning with the chain binomial FeLV
272 transmission probabilities (see supplementary methods).

273 We performed transmission simulations for all *model types* (FIV-based, overlap-based,
274 random, and well-mixed) across a range of reasonable parameter space (Table S1), using a
275 Latin hypercube design (LHS) to generate 150 parameter sets that efficiently sampled
276 parameter space [50,51]. For each parameter set and model type, we performed 50 simulations
277 (30,000 total). In each simulation, we recorded the number of mortalities and the duration of

278 outbreaks, which were each summarized (medians) across each parameter set. For each model
279 type, we determined if each parameter set's predicted median mortalities, duration of outbreaks,
280 and abortive cases were within a reasonable range based on the observed FeLV outbreak (5-20
281 mortalities, 78-117 week duration, at least 5 abortive infections; [29]). If so, a parameter set was
282 deemed "feasible" for that model type. Ranges were used to account for uncertainty in
283 observations and population size in this cryptic species (supplementary methods). To test for
284 differences in the frequency of feasible FeLV predictions between model types, we fit a binomial
285 generalized linear mixed model (GLMM), assuming a logistic regression with "feasible" (vs
286 "unfeasible") as the outcome, model type as a predictor variable, and a random intercept for
287 parameter set.

288 We tested for spatial clustering of cases in the observed FeLV outbreak by leveraging
289 our database of qPCR-based FeLV status. We performed a local spatial clustering analysis of
290 FeLV cases and controls using SaTScan (50% maximum, circular window; [52]). A SaTScan
291 analysis seeks to identify clusters of cases in which the observed cases within a particular
292 cluster exceed random expectation; this analysis reports the observed/expected ratio and radius
293 of any significant clusters. In addition, we performed a global cluster analysis with Cuzick and
294 Edward's test (global cluster detection with case-control data) in the R package *smacpod* (1, 3,
295 5, 7, 9, and 11 nearest neighbors; 999 iterations; [53–55]). To determine if simulated FeLV
296 cases likewise demonstrated spatial clustering, we repeated SaTScan local cluster analysis and
297 Cuzick and Edward's tests (at 3, 5, and 7 nearest neighbors) with feasible FIV-based simulation
298 results. To determine if detected clustering in FIV-based simulations was simply based on our
299 respawning protocol, we also performed both spatial analyses with feasible overlap-based
300 simulation results as a "negative control." Because the overlap-based model was not spatially
301 explicit, we assigned the same geographic locations to nodes in the overlap-based networks
302 from the corresponding FIV-based networks.

303 To determine if certain transmission parameters were important for feasible outcomes,
304 we performed post hoc random forest variable importance analyses for each of the four model
305 types with “feasible” as the binary response variable (using the R package randomForest
306 [56,57]; see supplementary results).


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308 **Results**

309 *FIV transmission network analysis*

310 In the main FIV network, PhyloScanner inferred 42 potential transmission relationships
311 (edges) between 19 individuals (nodes; network density = 0.25), after removing 9 edges that
312 were between individuals known not to be alive at the same time (Figure 3). Panther FIV
313 genomes missing from the transmission network were those for whom transmission
314 relationships could not be inferred by PhyloScanner (see Discussion). ERGM results for the
315 main FIV network identified triangle (*gwesp*) and star structures (*altkstar*) as key structural
316 variables, and age category and log transformed pairwise geographic distance as key
317 transmission variables (Tables 1, S2). Though *altkstar* was not statistically significant, inclusion
318 of this variable contributed to improved AIC and goodness of fit outcomes. Adults were more
319 likely to be involved in transmission events (but see discussion of sample size limitations) and
320 inferred transmission events were more likely between individuals which were geographically
321 closer to each other. The fitted model showed reasonable goodness of fit (Figures S2-3).

322



323
 324 **Figure 3:** *Phyloscanner-derived main FIV transmission network. Node shape indicates panther*
 325 *age class (square = subadult; circle = adult). Node color indicates panther sex (blue = male;*
 326 *red = female). Edge weight represents Phyloscanner tree support for each edge (thicker edge =*
 327 *increased support); for visualization purposes, edges are displayed as the inverse of the*
 328 *absolute value of the log of these support values. While pictured as a directed and weighted*
 329 *network, statistical analyses used binary, undirected networks.*

330
 331 **Table 1: Main FIV transmission network exponential random graph model results**

Variable	Estimate	SE	p-value
Edges (intercept)	-2.56	1.33	0.055
gwesp	0.98	0.26	<0.001
altkstar	-0.70	0.96	0.47
Age (Adult)	0.93	0.44	0.03
Log pairwise distance	-0.45	0.21	0.03

332 *Note: “gwesp” is geometrically weighted edgewise shared partner distribution (a representation*
333 *of triangle structures) and “altkstar” is alternating k-stars (a representation of star structures).*
334 *Age classes were subadult and adult, with subadults the reference level; pairwise distances*
335 *were between home range centroids and log-transformed. Only those variables from the final*
336 *model are shown. Estimates shown are untransformed; SE represents standard error; p-values*
337 *less than 0.05 were considered statistically significant.*

338

339 *FeLV simulations*

340 About 9% of parameter sets across all model types were classified as feasible (Figures
341 S6-S7). The FIV-based model had the highest odds of feasibility, though this difference did not
342 achieve statistical significance (Table 2). SaTScan analysis of observed FeLV status found
343 weak evidence of local spatial clustering (two clusters detected, but not statistically significant
344 with $p=0.165$ and 0.997 , respectively; Figure S5). Cuzick and Edward’s tests found evidence of
345 global clustering at 3, 5, and 7 nearest neighbor levels (test statistic T_k where k is number of
346 nearest neighbors considered: $T_3 = 20$, $p = 0.049$; $T_5 = 32$, $p = 0.028$; $T_7 = 43$, $p = 0.023$).
347 Feasible parameter sets from both the FIV-based and overlap-based models produced some
348 evidence of local and global spatial clustering of simulated FeLV cases (Figures 4, S8).
349 However, the FIV-based model better captured the size and strength of predicted local clusters
350 (SaTScan radius and observed/expected cases, respectively; Figure 4) and was moderately
351 better at capturing global spatial patterns (Figure S8).

352 The post-hoc random forest analyses typically showed poor balanced accuracy and area
353 under the curve (AUC) results. However, the parameter shaping transmission from regressively
354 infected individuals (C), consistently showed support for weak to moderate transmission from
355 regressives (i.e., $C = 0.1$ or 0.5 ; Figure S11).


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357 **Table 2: Fixed effects results from model-type performance GLMM***

Variable	Estimate	SE	p-value
Intercept	0.055	0.40	<0.001
FIV-based network model	1.55	0.42	0.30
Random network model	1.32	0.43	0.52
Overlap-based network model	1.21	0.44	0.66

358 **Note: estimates provided are exponentiated; the well-mixed model was the reference group*
359 *and none of the model-type results achieved statistical significance.*

360



361

362 **Figure 4:** SaTScan cluster analysis for feasible FIV-based and overlap-based network
363 simulations show stronger agreement for the FIV-based model, compared to the overlap-based
364 model, between empirical observations (red horizontal lines) and model predictions for (A) FeLV
365 cluster size and (B) Observed/Expected FeLV cases associated with the top detected cluster.
366 Shown are feasible simulation results in which at least one cluster was detected with p-values
367 less than or equal to 0.1; further, only the results from the top cluster are shown.

368

369 **Discussion**

370 In this study we develop a new approach whereby we leverage knowledge of
371 transmission dynamics of a common apathogenic agent to prospectively predict dynamics of an
372 uncommon and virulent pathogen. Our approach was distinctly different from simpler models we
373 tested, as the apathogenic (FIV)-based approach focused on underlying drivers or mechanisms
374 of transmission and could be used to prospectively identify predictors of transmission and
375 develop disease control plans prior to an outbreak of a virulent pathogen (FeLV). We found that
376 FIV transmission in panthers is primarily driven by distance between home range centroids and
377 age class, and that our prospective FIV-based approach predicted FeLV transmission dynamics
378 at least as well as simpler or more reactive approaches. While we do not propose that this
379 apathogenic agent approach could accurately predict exactly when, where, and to whom
380 transmission might occur, our results support the role of apathogenic agents as novel tools for
381 prospectively determining sources of individual-level heterogeneity in transmission and
382 consequently improving proactive disease management.

383

384 *An FIV-based model captures FeLV transmission dynamics*

385 We found that our network model based on drivers of FIV transmission produced FeLV
386 outbreak predictions consistent with the observed FeLV outbreak. The FIV-based approach
387 performed at least as well as simpler models, per our GLMM analysis, with evidence that FIV
388 better predicted the observed spatial dynamics for FeLV transmission. A key difference between
389 the FIV-based approach and other spatially explicit methods is that FIV allowed us to determine
390 the importance of spatial dynamics prospectively and then translate to predictions of FeLV
391 transmission, rather than relying on retrospective FeLV spatial analyses. Furthermore, while
392 more complex potential drivers of transmission (e.g., host relatedness or assortative mixing by
393 age or sex) were not found to be important for FIV transmission, these may yet be key for
394 structuring transmission in other systems. Simpler model types like random networks or

395 metapopulation models may struggle to make transmission predictions that incorporate these
396 drivers of transmission-relevant contact. The predictive power we observed here using an
397 apathogenic virus could thus open new opportunities to determine behavioral and ecological
398 drivers of individual-level heterogeneity in the context of pathogen transmission, and even
399 shape proactive epidemic management strategies for pathogens such as FeLV.

400 Our network statistical analysis (ERGMs) determined that pairwise geographic distances
401 and age category structure FIV transmission in the Florida panther. These findings are well
402 supported by panther and FIV biology, providing confidence in the functioning of our
403 apathogenic agent workflow. For example, panthers are wide-ranging animals but maintain
404 home ranges, and this appears to translate to increased transmission between individuals that
405 are close geographically. This finding is supported by the tendency for FIV phylogenies to show
406 distinct broad [58] and fine scale [59] geographic clustering in *Puma concolor*. Further,
407 specifically among Florida panthers, spatial autocorrelation of FIV exposure status was
408 previously found to approach statistical significance [60]. The wide-ranging nature of puma
409 appears to limit geographic clustering of many infectious agents [60], with FIV a notable
410 exception to this pattern. In addition, because FIV is a persistent infection, we would expect
411 cumulative risk of transmission to increase over an individual's lifetime and adults would
412 consequently be involved in more transmission events. The low number of subadult individuals
413 in our dataset, however, means that this finding must be interpreted with some caution.

414 With these ERGM results in mind, key components of the success of our apathogenic
415 agent approach are likely that (1) FIV is a largely species-specific virus with transmission
416 pathways closely matching intraspecific transmission of FeLV, and (2) both FIV and FeLV,
417 perhaps unusually for infectious agents of puma, display spatial clustering of infection. Here,
418 FIV fundamentally acted as a proxy for close, direct contact in panthers, and could consequently
419 determine drivers of such contacts. If, for example, FIV also exhibited strong vertical or
420 environmental transmission, we would no longer expect the predictive success for FeLV we

421 observed here. This consideration highlights the importance of careful apathogenic agent
422 selection when attempting to predict pathogen transmission, a workflow which must now be
423 tested in additional host-pathogen systems. For example, the mixed results when using
424 commensal agents to identify close social relationships in other systems [15–18,21,22]
425 highlights that some host-apathogenic agent combinations will work better than others for
426 determining drivers of transmission. Within our study, Phyloscanner struggled to elucidate
427 transmission relationships between many of our FIV genomes, likely due to unusually low
428 genetic diversity among our FIV isolates, or our use of proviral DNA (which has lower diversity
429 than circulating RNA) [35]. While the drivers of transmission we identified are biologically
430 reasonable, we may have lacked the power to identify more complex relationships (e.g.,
431 homophily) due to the low number of individuals in our transmission network.

432 Elaborating on agent selection suggestions outlined in the introduction, we propose that
433 apathogenic agent selection should carefully consider agent genetic diversity within a target
434 population—not just expected diversity based on typical mutation rates, as in our case—and
435 favor those agents with high diversity to facilitate transmission inference. We also propose that
436 apathogenic agents should represent the timescales of transmission for the pathogen of
437 interest. For example, FeLV produces long, slow epidemics, such that FIV transmission
438 relationships may be most representative across the longer timescales we evaluated here. In
439 contrast, short, acute pathogen epidemics would likely best be represented by apathogenic
440 agent transmission over shorter timescales. Our results highlight that, perhaps most importantly,
441 an apathogenic agent should have a well characterized mode of transmission that closely
442 matches transmission of the pathogen of interest, as this was likely key to our success with FIV
443 and FeLV. Future research should determine how divergent an apathogenic agent may be from
444 a pathogen of interest while still predicting transmission dynamics.

445 While few parameter sets in our simulations were classified as feasible, this appears to
446 be predominantly the result of the wide range of parameter space explored through our LHS

447 sampling design. This limitation was fundamentally due to uncertainties in FeLV transmission
448 parameters, and is representative of the uncertainties experienced in predicting transmission of
449 emerging or understudied pathogens. Infectiousness of regressives, the number of introductions
450 of FeLV to the panther population, and the duration of FeLV infection in panthers were all
451 important sources of uncertainty in our models. All three of these dynamics can have significant
452 impacts on the duration of a simulated epidemic, allowing an epidemic to continue to “stutter”
453 along at low levels [61], much as was observed in the empirical FeLV outbreak. Our *post hoc*
454 random forest analysis provided some evidence of weak transmission from regressive
455 individuals, but this finding would need to be validated with additional research, as it is in stark
456 contrast to FeLV dynamics in domestic cats. Reducing uncertainties in these three key
457 dynamics would significantly narrow the range of our predictions, and even assist in ongoing
458 management efforts for FeLV in endangered panthers. The effect of transmission parameter
459 uncertainties underscores the importance of linking laboratory and model-based research to
460 generate more accurate transmission forecasts [62].

461

462 *Limitations and future directions*

463 The suite of tools for inferring transmission networks from infectious agent genomes is
464 rapidly expanding [24]. In this study, we used the program Phyloscanner as it maximized the
465 information from our deep sequencing viral data. However, our FIV sequences were generated
466 within a tiled amplicon framework [35,63], which biases intrahost diversity and limits viral
467 haplotypes [64]. Phyloscanner was originally designed to analyze RNA from virions and not
468 proviral DNA, as we have done here. We have attempted to mitigate the effects of these
469 limitations by analyzing several different Phyloscanner outputs to confirm consistency in our
470 results, and by using only binary networks to avoid putting undue emphasis on transmission
471 network edge probabilities, as these are likely uncertain. Further, our primary conclusions from
472 the transmission networks—that age and pairwise distance are important for transmission—are

473 biologically plausible and supported by other literature, as discussed above. Nevertheless,
474 future work should evaluate additional or alternative transmission network inference platforms.

475 In addition, ERGMs assume the presence of the “full network” and it is as yet unclear
476 how missing data may affect transmission inferences [38]. ERGMs are also prone to
477 degeneracy with increased complexity and do not easily capture uncertainty in transmission
478 events, as most weighted network ERGM (or generalized ERGM) approaches have been
479 tailored for count data (e.g., [65]). ERGMs may therefore not be the ideal solution for identifying
480 drivers of transmission networks in all systems. Alternatives may include advancing dyad-based
481 modeling strategies [66], which may more easily manage weighted networks and instances of
482 missing data.

483 Our FIV-based approach required extensive field sampling, and many disciplines from
484 viral genomics through simulation modeling. However, with increasing availability of virome data
485 and even field-based sequencing technology, our approach may become more accessible with
486 time. Further, the predictive benefits seen here, while needing further testing and validation,
487 could become a key strategy for proactive pathogen management in species of conservation
488 concern, populations of high economic value (e.g. production animals), populations with
489 infrequent pathogen outbreaks that make targeted surveillance more difficult, or populations at
490 high risk of spillover, all of which may most benefit from rapid, efficient epidemic responses.

491

492 *Conclusions*

493 Here, we integrated genomic and network approaches to identify drivers of FIV
494 transmission in the Florida panther. This apathogenic agent acted as a marker of close, direct
495 contact transmission, and was subsequently successful in predicting the observed transmission
496 dynamics of the related pathogen, FeLV. Further testing of apathogenic agents as markers of
497 transmission and their ability to predict transmission of related pathogens is needed, but holds
498 promise for revolutionizing proactive epidemic management across host-pathogen systems.

499

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509

510 **Data Availability**

511 Data and R code for replication of simulations and analyses is available on GitHub

512 (https://github.com/mjones029/FIV_FeLV_Transmission) and upon acceptance will be archived

513 at Zenodo.

514

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