Conformist social learning leads to self-organised prevention against adverse bias in risky decision making

Wataru Toyokawa[1*] **and Wolfgang Gaissmaier**[1,2]

***For correspondence:** wataru.toyokawa@uni-konstanz.de (WT)

[1]Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz; [2]Centre for the Advanced Study of Collective Behaviour, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany

Abstract

Given the ubiquity of potentially adverse behavioural bias owing to myopic trial-and-error learning, it seems paradoxical that improvements in decision-making performance through conformist social learning, a process widely considered to be bias amplification, still prevail in animal collective behaviour. Here we show, through model analyses and large-scale interactive behavioural experiments with 467 human subjects, that conformist influence can indeed promote favourable risk taking in repeated risky decision making, even though many individuals are systematically biased towards adverse risk aversion. Although strong positive feedback conferred by copying the majority's behaviour could result in unfavourable informational cascades, our dynamic model of collective behaviour identified a key role for increasing exploration by negative feedback arising when a weak minority influence undermines the inherent behavioural bias. This 'collective behavioural rescue', emerging through coordination of positive and negative feedback, highlights a benefit of collective learning in a broader range of environmental conditions than previously assumed and resolves the ostensible paradox of adaptive collective flexibility under conformist influences.

Introduction

Although the potential cost of strong conformist social influences in decision making has been well recognised (***Boyd and Richerson, 1985***; ***Kandler and Laland, 2013***; ***Kendal et al., 2005***; ***King and Cowlishaw, 2007***; ***Raafat et al., 2009***; ***Giraldeau et al., 2002***; ***Toyokawa et al., 2019***), collective learning through a tendency to engage in copying others' behaviour has been considered widely adaptive in a range of environmental conditions (***Rendell et al., 2010***; ***Kameda and Nakanishi, 2002***; ***Toyokawa et al., 2014***, ***2019***; ***Miu et al., 2018***). One rationale behind this optimistic view might come from the assumption that individuals tend to prefer a behavioural option that provides larger net benefits in utility over those providing lower outcomes. Therefore, even though uncertainty makes individual decision making fallible, statistical filtering through informational pooling may be able to reduce uncertainty by cancelling out such noise. As a consequence, the group

as a whole can boost its probability of choosing the benefit-maximising behaviour.

However, as numerous examples in behavioural science have documented, humans and many other non-human animals may not always choose or prefer a benefit-maximising behaviour over other behavioural alternatives. Instead, trial-and-error learning and adaptive exploration can constrain animals to be risk averse, which may prevent individuals from exploiting a high-risk high-return behavioural option (***Hertwig and Erev, 2009***; ***Yechiam et al., 2006***; ***Weber, 2006***; ***March, 1996***). Although risk sensitivity can be adaptive in many ecological circumstances (***Real and Caraco, 1986***; ***McNamara and Houston, 1992***; ***Yoshimura and Clark, 1991***), such a risk-taking bias constrained by the fundamental nature of learning may function independently from the adaptive risk perception (***Frey et al., 2017***), potentially preventing adaptive risk taking. Therefore, the ostensible prerequisite of collective intelligence, that is, that individuals have a higher chance of exhibiting a more profitable behaviour than choosing a less profitable alternative, may not always hold in reality. What is worse, individual tendencies to copy others may nourish the spread of those risk-related behavioural biases (***Chung et al., 2015***; ***Dussutour et al., 2005***; ***Suzuki et al., 2016***; ***Shupp and Williams, 2008***; ***Jouini et al., 2013***; ***Moussaïd et al., 2015***).

Given that biases are ubiquitous and learning animals rarely escape from them, it may seem that collective intelligence through conformist social influences does not operate in many trial-and-error learning situations where individuals tend to obtain a systematic bias. However, the collective improvement of decision accuracy has been widely observed in the real world in a wide range of taxa (***Sasaki and Biro, 2017***; ***Seeley et al., 1991***; ***Alem et al., 2016***; ***Sumpter, 2006***; ***Camazine et al., 2001***), including the very animals known to exhibit the learnt risk-taking biases that may incur large opportunity costs in particular circumstances, such as bumblebees (***Real, 1981***; ***Real et al., 1982***), honeybees (***Drezner-Levy and Shafir, 2007***), and pigeons (***Ludvig et al., 2014***). How, if at all, can group-living animals improve collective decision accuracy while suppressing the potentially deleterious constraint of decision-making through trial-and-error learning?

Here we provide a mathematical model and experimental results of a collective learning task. We assumed that decision makers could repeatedly choose between a safe alternative that would provide certain payoffs and a risky alternative that would provide uncertain payoffs, while being able to observe other players' choices (***McElreath et al., 2005***, ***2008***; ***Toyokawa et al., 2014***, ***2017***, ***2019***; ***Deffner et al., 2020***). To maximise one's own long-term individual profit in such an experience-based risky decision-making task, it is crucial to strike the right balance between exploiting the option that has seemed better so far and exploring the other options to seek informational gain. Because of the nature of adaptive information sampling under such exploration–exploitation trade-offs, lone decision makers often end up being risk averse, trying to reduce the chance of further failures once the individual has experienced an unfavourable outcome from the risky alternative (***March, 1996***; ***Denrell, 2007***; ***Hertwig and Erev, 2009***), a phenomenon known as the *hot stove effect*. Within the framework of this task, risk aversion is suboptimal in the long run if the risky option provides higher payoffs on average (***Denrell and March, 2001***).

The hot stove effect can be mitigated if individuals can learn not only from payoffs of the chosen option but also from the forgone outcomes of the unchosen alternative (***Denrell, 2007***; ***Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2006***). Therefore, if payoff information about other

individuals is made publicly observable among the group, it would not be surprising that learning from the public information rescues individuals from suboptimal risk aversion, because the public information could act as the forgone payoffs. However, such complete public information may not be readily available, and only behavioural cues, such as frequency of choices indicating how many other individuals chose each behavioural alternative, may be accessible in many ecological circumstances. Therefore, if collective intelligence in risky decision making can commonly emerge even under the potential danger of the adverse hot stove effect, it should be a simple, behavioural-cue-based mechanism that alters the course of learning and mitigates the potentially unfavourable bias.

Using an agent-based computational model simulation and analyses of a differential equation model representing approximated dynamics of collective behaviour, we show theoretically that such a *collective behavioural rescue* could indeed emerge through self-organisation because modest conformist social influences can promote exploration. The theoretical predictions are further supported by online behavioural experiments with 467 human subjects. We argue that collective reinforcement learning can alter, rather than amplify, the unfavourable behavioural bias, suggesting a previously overlooked benefit of conformity.

Results

The collective behavioural rescue effect

We observed a mitigation of suboptimal risk aversion in the simplest two-armed bandit task for which a formal analysis was available (***Denrell, 2007***). Consider a decision maker facing a repeated choice between a safe (i.e., certain) alternative s and a risky (i.e., uncertain) alternative r over T trials (Fig. 1a). We followed Denrell's (2007) setup, with a safe option generating a constant payoff (which was 1 in Fig. 1), coupled with a risky option whose payoff π_r followed a Gaussian distribution with mean $= \mu$ and s.d. $= s$ (Fig. 1). In the main analysis, we focused on the case where the risky alternative had $\mu = 1.5$ and $s = 1$, that is, where choosing the risky alternative was the optimal strategy for a decision maker in the long run.

In such a risk-heterogeneous multi-armed bandit setting, reinforcement learners are prone to exhibiting suboptimal risk aversion (***March, 1996***; ***Denrell, 2007***; ***Hertwig and Erev, 2009***), even though they could have achieved high performance in a risk-homogeneous task where all options have an equivalent payoff variance (***Sutton and Barto, 2018***). ***Denrell*** (***2007***) mathematically derived a condition under which suboptimal risk aversion arises, depicted by the dashed curve in Fig. 1b. The suboptimal risk aversion becomes prominent when value updating in learning is myopic (i.e., when the learning rate α is large) and/or action selection is exploitative (i.e., when the inverse temperature of the softmax action selection β is large). Under such circumstances, the hot stove effect occurs: Experiences of low-value payoffs from the risky option tend to discourage decision makers from further choosing the risky option, trapping them in the safe alternative. In sum, whenever the interaction between the two learning parameters $\alpha(\beta + 1)$ exceeds a threshold value, which was 2 in the current example, decision makers are expected to become averse to the risky option (Fig. 2).

As shown in Fig. 1c, a simple frequency-based social influence, even with a conformist influence ($\theta > 1$), widened the region of parameter combinations where decision makers



Figure 1. Mitigation of the hot stove effect by collective decision making in a two-armed risky bandit task. (a) A schematic diagram of the task. A safe option provides a constant reward $\pi_s = 1$ whereas a risky option provides a reward randomly drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean $\mu = 1.5$ and s.d. $= 1$. (b, c): The emergence of risk-taking bias due to the hot stove effect depending on a combination of the reinforcement learning parameters; (b): under no social influence (i.e., the copying weight $\sigma = 0$), and (c): under social influences with different values of the conformity exponents θ and copying weights σ. The dashed curve is the asymptotic equilibrium at which asocial learners are expected to end up choosing the two alternatives with equal likelihood (i.e., $P_r^\star = 0.5$), which is given analytically by $\beta = (2 - \alpha)/\alpha$. The coloured background is a result of the agent-based simulation with total trials $T = 150$ and group size $N = 10$, showing the average proportion of choosing the risky option in the second half of the learning trials $P_{r,t>75} > 0.5$ under a given combination of the parameters. (d): The differences between the mean proportion of risk aversion of asocial learners and that of social learners, highlighting regions in which performance is improved (orange) or undermined (purple) by social learning.



Figure 2. The effect of social learning on average decision performance. The *x* axis is a product of two reinforcement learning parameters $\alpha(\beta+1)$, namely, the susceptibility to the hot stove effect. The *y* axis is the mean probability of choosing the optimal risky alternative in the last 75 trials in a two-armed bandit task whose setup was the same as in Fig. 1. The black solid curve is the analytical prediction of the asymptotic performance of individual reinforcement learning with infinite time horizon $T \to +\infty$. The analytical curve shows a choice shift emerging at $\alpha(\beta+1) = 2$; that is, individual learners ultimately prefer the safe to the risky option when $\alpha(\beta+1) > 2$ holds in the current setup of the task. The dotted curves are mean results of agent-based simulations of social learners with two different mean values of the copying weight $\sigma \in \{0.25, 0.5\}$ (green and yellow, respectively) and asocial learners with $\sigma = 0$ (purple). The difference between the agent-based simulation with $\sigma = 0$ and the analytical result was due to the finite number of decision trials in the simulation, and hence, the longer the horizon, the closer they become (Supplementary Fig. S**??**). Each panel shows a different combination of the inverse temperature β and the conformity exponent θ.

could escape from the suboptimal risk aversion (the red area). The increment of the area of adaptive risk seeking was greater with $\theta = 1$ than $\theta = 4$. When $\theta = 1$, a large copying weight σ can eliminate almost all the area of risk aversion (Fig. 1c; see also Supplementary Fig. S1 for a greater range of parameter combinations). Note that increasing the copying weight $\sigma \to 1$ eventually approximates a random choice (Supplementary Fig. S1). Interestingly, such a switch to risk seeking did not emerge when risk aversion was actually optimal (Supplementary Fig. S5), suggesting that social influence does not mindlessly increase risk seeking; instead, it may work only when to do so is adaptive.

Fig. 2 highlights the extent to which risk aversion was relaxed through social influences. Individuals with positive $\sigma > 0$ could maintain a high proportion of risk seeking even in the region of high susceptibility to the hot stove effect $\alpha(\beta + 1) > 2$. Although social learners eventually fell into a risk-averse regime with increasing $\alpha(\beta + 1)$, risk aversion was largely mitigated compared to the performance of individual learners who had $\sigma = 0$. Interestingly, the probability of choosing the optimal risky option was maximised at an intermediate value of $\alpha(\beta + 1)$ when the conformity exponent was large $\theta = 4$ and the copying weight was high $\sigma = 0.5$.

In the region of less susceptibility to the hot stove effect ($\alpha(\beta + 1) < 2$), social influence could enhance individual optimal risk seeking up to the theoretical benchmark expected in individual reinforcement learning with an infinite time horizon. A socially induced increase in risk seeking in the region $\alpha(\beta + 1) < 2$ was more evident with larger β, and hence with smaller α to satisfy $\alpha(\beta + 1) < 2$. The smaller the learning rate α, the longer it would take to achieve the asymptotic equilibrium state, due to slow value updating. Asocial learners, as well as social learners with high σ (= 0.5) coupled with high θ (= 4), were still far from the analytical benchmark, whereas social learners with weak social influence $\sigma = 0.25$ were nearly able to converge on the benchmark performance, suggesting that social learning might affect the speed of learning. Indeed, a longer time horizon $T = 1075$ reduced the advantage of weak social learners in this $\alpha(\beta + 1) < 2$ region because slow learners could now achieve the benchmark accuracy (Supplementary Figs. S2 and S3).

Approaching the benchmark with an elongated time horizon, and the concomitant reduction in the advantage of social learners, was also found in the high susceptibility region $\alpha(\beta + 1) \gg 2$ especially for those who had a high conformity exponent $\theta = 4$ (Supplementary Fig. S2). Notably, however, facilitation of optimal risk seeking became further evident in the other intermediate region $2 < \alpha(\beta + 1) < 4$. This suggests that merely speeding up or slowing down learning could not satisfactorily account for the qualitative choice shift emerging through social influences.

We obtained similar results across different settings of the multi-armed bandit task, such as a skewed payoff distribution in which large payoffs were less likely to be realised and small payoffs were common, because of an asymmetric probability different from Gaussian noise (***March, 1996***; ***Denrell, 2007***) (Supporting Fig. S6). Further, the conclusion still held under different assumptions of social influences on reinforcement learning, assuming that the conformist influence acts on the learning process (the value-shaping model (***Najar et al., 2020***)) rather than on the action-selection process (the decision-biasing model) assumed above (see Supplementary Methods). Although groups of agents with the value-shaping algorithm seemed more prone to herding, the results were not qualitatively changed and collective behavioural rescue emerged when β was sufficiently small (Supporting Fig. S4).



Figure 3. The effect of individual heterogeneity on the proportion of choosing the risky option in the two-armed bandit task. (a) The effect of heterogeneity of α, (b) β, (c) σ, and (d) θ. Individual values of a focal behavioural parameter were varied across individuals in a group of five. Other non-focal parameters were identical across individuals within a group. The basic parameter values assigned to non-focal parameters were $\alpha = 0.5$, $\beta = 7$, $\sigma = 0.3$, and $\theta = 2$, and groups' mean values of the various focal parameters were matched to these basic values. We simulated 3 different heterogeneous compositions: The majority (3 of 5 individuals) potentially suffered the hot stove effect $\alpha_i(\beta_i + 1) > 2$ (a, b) or had the highest diversity in social learning parameters (c, d; purple); the majority were able to overcome the hot stove effect $\alpha_i(\beta_i + 1) < 2$ (a, b) or had moderate heterogeneity in the social learning parameters (c, d; blue); and all individuals had $\alpha_i(\beta_i + 1) > 2$ but smaller heterogeneity (green). The yellow diamond shows the homogeneous groups' performance. Lines are drawn through average results across the same compositional groups. Each round dot represents a group member's mean performance. The diamonds are the average performance of each group. For comparison, asocial learners' performance, with which the performance of social learners can be evaluated, is shown in grey. For heterogeneous α and β, the analytical solution of asocial learning performance is shown as a solid-line curve. We ran 20,000 replications for each group composition.

The effect of individual heterogeneity

We have thus far assumed few parameter variations across individuals in a group to focus on the qualitative differences between social and asocial learners' behaviour. However, individual differences in development, state, or experience or variations in behaviour caused by personality traits might either facilitate or undermine collective decision performance. Especially if a group is composed of both types of individuals, those who are less susceptible to the hot stove effect $\alpha(\beta+1) < 2$ as well as those who are more susceptible $\alpha(\beta+1) > 2$, it remains unclear who benefits from the rescue effect: Is it only those individuals with $\alpha(\beta+1) > 2$ who enjoy the benefit, or can collective intelligence benefit a group as a whole?

Fig. 3a shows the effect of heterogeneity in the learning rate α. Heterogeneous groups (shown in green, blue, or purple) performed better on average than a homogeneous group (represented by the yellow diamond). The heterogeneous groups owed this overall improvement to the large rescue effect operating for highly susceptible individuals who had $\alpha(\beta+1) \gg 2$. On the other hand, the performance of less susceptible individuals [$\alpha(\beta+1) < 2$] was slightly undermined compared to the asocial benchmark performance. Notably, however, how large the detrimental effect was for the low-susceptibility individuals depended on the group's composition: The undermining effect was largely mitigated when low-susceptibility individuals [$\alpha(\beta+1) < 2$] made up a majority of a group (3 of 5; the blue line), whereas they performed worse than the asocial benchmark when the majority were those with high susceptibility (purple).

A similar pattern was found for the inverse temperature β, although the impact of its heterogeneity was much smaller than that in α, and there was little difference between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups (Fig. 3b). Interestingly, no detrimental effect for less susceptible individuals was found in association with the β variations.

On the other hand, individual variations in the copying weight σ had an overall detrimental effect on collective performance, although individuals in the highest diversity group could still perform better than the asocial benchmark (Fig. 3c). Individuals who had an intermediate level of copying weight achieved relatively higher performance within the group than those who had either higher or lower weight. This was because individuals with lower σ could benefit less from social information, while those with higher σ relied so heavily on social frequency information that behaviour was barely informed by individual learning. As a result, the average performance decreased with increasing diversity in σ.

Such a substantial effect of individual differences was not observed in the conformity exponent θ (Fig. 3d), where individual performance was almost stable regardless of whether the individual was heavily conformist ($\theta_i = 8$) or even anti-conformist ($\theta_i = -1$). The existence of a few conformists in a group could not itself trigger positive feedback among the group unless other individuals also relied on social information in a conformist-biased way, because the flexible behaviour of non-conformists could keep the group's distribution nearly flat (i.e., $N_s \approx N_r$). Therefore, the existence of individuals with small θ in a heterogeneous group could prevent the strong positive feedback from being immediately elicited, compensating for the potential detrimental effect of maladaptive herding by strong conformists.

In sum, the relaxation of, and possibly the complete rescue from, a suboptimal bias in repeated risky decision making emerged in a range of conditions in collective learning.

It was not likely a mere speeding up or slowing down of learning process (Supplementary Fig. S2 and S3), nor just an averaging process mixing performances of both risk seekers and risk-averse individuals (Fig. 3). It depended neither on specific characteristics of social learning models (Supplementary Fig. S4) nor on the profile of noise (Supplementary Fig. S6). Instead, our simulation suggests that self-organisation may play a key role in this emergent phenomenon. To seek a general mechanism underlying the observed collective behavioural rescue, we developed a reduced, approximated differential equation model that could provide qualitative insights into the collective decision-making dynamics.

The simplified collective dynamic model

To obtain a qualitative understanding of the synergy of positive and negative feedback that seems responsible for the pattern of adaptive behavioural shift observed in our individual-based simulation, we made a reduced model that approximates temporal changes of behaviour of an 'average' individual, where the computational details of reinforcement learning were purposely ignored. Specifically, we considered a differential equation model that focuses only on increases and decreases in the expected number of individuals who chose the risky option and the safe option (Fig. 4a). Such a dynamic modelling approach has been commonly used in population ecology and collective animal behaviour research and has proven highly useful in disentangling the factors underlying complex systems (e.g., ***Beckers et al., 1990***; ***Goss et al., 1989***; ***Seeley et al., 1991***; ***Sumpter and Pratt, 2003***; ***Camazine et al., 2001***).



Figure 4. The collective behavioural dynamics model. (a) A schematic diagram of the dynamics. Solid arrows represent a change in population density between connected states at a time step. The thicker the arrow, the larger the per-capita rate of behavioural change. (b, c) The equilibrium bias towards risk seeking (i.e., $N_r^\star - N_s^\star$) as a function of the degree of risk premium e as well as of the per-capita probability of moving to the less preferred behavioural option p_l. (b) The explicit form of the curve is given by $-n(p_h - p_l)\left\{(1-e)p_h - ep_l\right\}/(p_h + p_l)\left\{(1-e)p_h + ep_l\right\}$. (c, d) The equilibrium bias in risk seeking ($N_R^* - N_S^* > 0$; red) or risk aversion ($N_R^* - N_S^* < 0$; blue) depending on the combinations of p_l and e for (c) the asocial baseline dynamics and (d) the collective behavioural dynamics with social influences. The dashed curve is the analytically derived neutral equilibrium of the asocial system that results in $N_R^* = N_S^*$, given by $e = p_h/(p_h + p_l)$. The numerical results were obtained with $N^-_{S,t=0} = N^+_{S,t=0} = 5$, $N_{R,t=0} = 10$, and $p_h = 0.7$.

To confirm that this approximated model can successfully replicate the fundamental

property of the hot stove effect, we first describe the asocial behavioural model without social influence (see Methods). The baseline, asocial dynamic system has a locally stable non-trivial equilibrium that gives $N_S^\star \geq 0$ and $N_R^\star \geq 0$, where $N^\star$ means the equilibrium density at which the system stops changing ($dN_S^\star/dt = dN_R^\star/dt = 0$). At equilibrium, the ratio between the number of individuals choosing the safe option S and the number choosing the risky option R is given by $N_S^\star : N_R^\star = e(p_l/p_h)+(1-e)(p_h/p_l) : 1$, indicating that risk aversion (defined as the case where more people choose the safe option; $N_S^\star > N_R^\star$) emerges when the inequality $e < P_S^-/(P_S^- + P_R^-)$ holds.

Fig. 4b visually shows that the population is indeed attracted to the safe option S, which results in $N_S^\star > N_R^\star$, in a wide range of the parameter region even when there is a positive 'risk premium' defined as $e > 1/2$. Although individuals choosing the risky option R are more likely to become enchanted with the risky option (i.e., to become R^+ state) than to get disappointed (i.e., to become R^- state), emergence of the risk-seeking equilibrium, defined as $N_S^\star < N_R^\star$, could become harder with decreasing exploration rate p_l, consistent with the known property of asymmetric adaptive sampling that causes the hot stove effect (***Denrell, 2007***). Risk seeking never emerges when $e \leq 1/2$, which is also consistent with the results of reinforcement learning.

This reduced dynamic model provides an illustrative understanding of how the asymmetry of adaptive sampling causes the hot stove effect. Consider the case of high inequality between exploitation (p_h) and exploration (p_l), namely, $p_h \gg p_l$. Under such a condition, the behavioural state S^- becomes a 'dead end' from which individuals can seldom escape once entered. However, if the inequality $p_h \geq p_l$ is not so large that a substantial fraction of the population now comes back to R^- from S^-, the increasing number of R^+ people (N_R^+) could eventually exceed the number of people 'spilling out' to S^-. Such an illustrative analysis shows that the hot stove effect can be overcome if the number of people who get stuck in the dead end S^- can somehow be reduced. And this is possible if one can increase the 'come-back' to R^-. In other words, if any mechanisms can increase P_R^- in relation to P_S^-, the hot stove effect should be overcome.

Through numerical analyses of the dynamic model with social influence (see Methods), we confirmed that social influence could indeed increase the flow-back rate P_R^-, which raised the possibility of risk-seeking equilibrium $N_R^\star > N_S^\star$ (Fig. 4d; see Supplementary Fig. S7 for a wider parameter region). For an approximation of the bifurcation analysis, we recorded the equilibrium density of the risky state $N_R^\star$ starting from various initial distributions of both $N_{R,t=0}$ and $N_{S,t=0}$. Fig. 5 shows the conditions under which the system ends up in risk-seeking equilibrium. When the conformity exponent θ was not too large ($\theta < 10$), risk seeking can be a unique equilibrium irrespective of the initial distribution, attracting the population even from an extremely biased initial distribution such as $N_{R,t=0} = 0$ (Fig. 5).

Under the conformist bias $\theta \geq 2$, a bifurcation with two locally stable equilibria emerged. Strong positive feedback dominates the system when both σ and θ are large. Therefore, the system could end up in either of the equilibria depending solely on the initial density distribution. This is consistent with a well-known result of collective foraging by pheromone trail ants, which react to social information is a conformity-like manner (***Beckers et al., 1990***; ***Camazine et al., 2001***).

Notably, however, even with a large conformist bias, such as $\theta = 2$, there is a region with a moderate value of σ where risk seeking remained a unique equilibrium when the

premium of the risky option e was high ($e \geq 0.7$). In this regime, the benefit of collective behavioural rescue could dominate without any cost of maladaptive herding.

It is worth noting that in the case of $\theta = 0$, where individuals made merely a random choice at a rate σ, risk aversion was also relaxed (Fig. 5), and the adaptive risky shift even emerged around $0.25 < \sigma < 1$. However, this ostensible behavioural rescue was due solely to the pure effect of additional random exploration that reduces $P_S^-/(P_S^- + P_R^-)$, mitigating stickiness to the dead end. When $\sigma \approx 1$, therefore, the risky shift disappeared because the population chose between S and R almost randomly.

However, the collective risky shift observed in the conditions of $\theta > 0$ cannot be explained solely by the mere addition of exploration. A weak conformist bias (i.e., a linear response to the social frequency; $\theta = 1$) monotonically increases the equilibrium density $N_R^\star$ with increasing social influence σ, which goes beyond the level of risky shift observed with the addition of random choice (Fig. 5). Therefore, although the collective rescue might indeed owe its part of the mitigation of the hot stove effect to increasing exploration, which reduces the ratio $P_S^-/(P_S^- + P_R^-)$, the further enhancement of risk seeking cannot be fully explained by it alone.

The key is the interaction between negative and positive feedback. As we discussed above, risk aversion is reduced if the ratio $P_S^-/(P_S^- + P_R^-)$ decreases, either by increasing P_R^- or reducing P_S^-. The per capita probability of choosing the safe option with belief $-$, that is, $P_S^- = (1-\sigma)p_h + \sigma N_S^\theta/(N_R^\theta + N_S^\theta)$, becomes smaller than the baseline exploitation probability p_h, when $N_S^\theta/(N_R^\theta + N_S^\theta) < p_h$ holds. Even though the majority of the population might still choose the safe alternative and hence $N_S > N_R$ holds, the inequality $N_S^\theta/(N_R^\theta + N_S^\theta) < p_h$ can nevertheless hold with a sufficiently small value of θ. Crucially, the reduction of P_S^- leads to a further reduction of P_S^- itself through decreasing N_S^-, thereby further decreasing the social influence supporting the safe option $N_S^\theta/(N_R^\theta + N_S^\theta)$. Such a process creates negative feedback that weakens the concomitant risk aversion. Naturally, this negative feedback could be maximised with $\theta = 0$.

Once the negative feedback has weakened the underlying risk aversion, the majority of the population may eventually choose the risky option, an effect evident in the case of $\theta = 0$ (Fig. 5). What uniquely operates in cases of $\theta > 0$ is that because N_S is a minority by now, positive feedback starts. Thanks to the conformist bias, the inequality $N_R > N_S$ is further *amplified*. In this phase, the larger θ, the stronger the concomitant relationship $N_S^\theta/(N_R^\theta + N_S^\theta) \ll p_h$. Such positive feedback could never operate with $\theta \leq 0$.

In conclusion, it is the synergy of negative and positive feedback that explains the full range of adaptive risky shift. Neither positive nor negative feedback alone could account for both accuracy and flexibility emerging through collective learning and decision making. The results are qualitatively unchanged across a range of different combinations of e, p_l, and p_h (Supporting Figs. S7 and S8). It is worth noting that when $e < 0.5$, the system tends to exhibit risk aversion (Supplementary Fig. S8), consistent with the result of the agent-based simulation for the case where the mean payoff of the risky option was smaller than that of the safe option (Supplementary Fig. S5). Therefore, the system does not mindlessly prefer risk seeking, but it becomes risk prone only when to do so is favourable in the long run.



Figure 5. The approximate bifurcation analysis. The relationships between the social influence weight σ and the equilibrium number of individuals in the risky behavioural state $N_R^\star$ across different conformity exponents $\theta \in \{0, 1, 2, 10\}$ and different values of risk premium $e \in \{0.55, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75\}$, are shown as black dots. The background colours indicate regions where the system approaches either risk aversion ($N_R^\star < N_S^\star$; blue) or risk seeking ($N_R^\star > N_S^\star$; red). The horizontal dashed line is $N_R = N_S = 10$. Two locally stable equilibria emerge when $\theta = 2$ and $\theta = 10$, which suggests that the system has a bifurcation when σ is sufficiently large. The other parameters are set to $p_h = 0.7$, $p_l = 0.2$, and $N = 20$.

An experimental demonstration

A series of online behavioural experiments confirmed that collective learning could indeed mitigate suboptimal risk aversion. One hundred sixty adult human subjects performed the individual task without social interactions, while 307 subjects performed the task collectively with group sizes ranging from 3 to 8 (Supplementary Fig. S10). We used three different settings for the multi-armed bandit task (see Methods).



Figure 6. The effect of social learning on decision performance in the online behavioural experiments. (a) A two-armed bandit task ($N = 168$). (b) A 1-risky-3-safe (four-armed) bandit task ($N = 148$). (c) A 2-risky-2-safe (four-armed) bandit task ($N = 151$). The *x* axis is $\alpha_i(\beta_i + 1)$, namely, the susceptibility to the hot stove effect. The *y* axis is the mean proportion of choosing the optimal risky alternative averaged over the second half of the trials. The black triangles represent subjects in the individual learning condition, and the coloured dots are those in the group condition with group sizes ranging from 3 to 8. For subjects in the group condition, the fit value of copying weight σ_i is shown in the colour gradient. The solid lines are predictions from the model with the calibrated global parameters for the individual condition (black) and for the group condition (orange). The dashed violet curves are hypothetical predictions of the calibrated model supplied with a larger copying weight than that for real human subjects, that is, $\overline{\sigma}_i = 0.4$, showing a larger rescue effect potentially emerging with heavier social influence.

Fig. 6 shows that subjects who had a larger estimated value of $\alpha_i(\beta_i+1)$ were less likely to choose the optimal risky alternative, whereas those who had a smaller value of $\alpha_i(\beta_i+1)$ had a higher chance of escaping from suboptimal risk aversion in both two-armed and four-armed tasks, consistent with the theory of the hot stove effect (Fig. 2). This suggests that our model successfully captured subjects' behavioural patterns. We confirmed a high performance of parameter recovery in our model fitting procedure (Supplementary Fig. S9).

The behaviour in the group condition supports our theoretical predictions. The proportion of choosing the optimal risky option increased with social influence (σ_i) particularly for individuals who had a high susceptibility to the hot stove effect. On the other hand, social influence had little benefit for those who had a low susceptibility to the hot stove effect (e.g., $\alpha_i(\beta_i + 1) \leq 0.5$), which also supported our theory.

However, a complete switch of the majority's behaviour from the suboptimal options to the optimal risky option (i.e., $P_r > 0.5$ for the two-armed task and $P_r > 0.25$ for the four-armed task) was not widely observed (Supplementary Fig. S10). This was because of the low reliance on social learning (i.e., the mean σ_i = 0.19 and the median = 0.12), coupled

with the low susceptibility $\alpha_i(\beta_i + 1)$ in individual learners (i.e., the mean $\alpha_i(\beta_i + 1)$ = 0.8 and median = 0.3 for the individual condition, whereas the mean = 1.1 and median = 0.5 for the group condition). Although the mitigation of risk aversion still emerged for those with higher $\alpha_i(\beta_i + 1)$ (Fig. 6), the weak reliance on social learning hindered the strong collective rescue effect because strong positive feedback was not robustly formed.

The estimated global mean of the conformity exponent μ_θ was larger than 1 for all three tasks (Table 1), suggesting that human groups might still have possessed the potential to set up the positive-feedback loops required for a strong rescue effect. In keeping with this, if we extrapolated the larger value of the copying weight (i.e., $\bar{\sigma}_i = 0.4$) into the best fitting social learning model with the other parameters calibrated, a strong collective rescue became prominent (Fig. 6, the violet dashed lines).

Table 1. Means and 95% Bayesian credible intervals (shown in square brackets) of the global parameters. All parameters satisfied the Gelman–Rubin criterion $\hat{R} < 1.01$. All estimates are based on over 500 effective samples from the posterior.

Task	1-risky-1-safe	1-risky-3-safe	2-risky-2-safe
Group condition	*n* = 123	*n* = 97	*n* = 87
$\mu_{\text{logit}\alpha}$	-2.2 [-2.8, -1.5]	-1.8 [-2.3, -1.4]	-1.7 [-2.1, -1.3]
(Mean α)	0.10 [0.06, 0.18]	0.14 [0.09, 0.20]	0.15 [0.11, 0.21]
$\mu_{\log\beta}$	1.4 [1.1, 1.6]	1.5 [1.3, 1.8]	1.3 [1.0, 1.5]
(Mean β)	4.1 [3.0, 5.0]	4.5 [3.7, 6.0]	3.7 [2.7, 4.5]
$\mu_{\text{logit}\sigma}$	-2.4 [-3.1, -1.8]	-2.1 [-2.6, -1.6]	-2.1 [-2.5, -1.7]
(Mean σ)	0.08 [0.04, 0.14]	0.11 [0.07, 0.17]	0.11 [0.08, 0.15]
μ_θ	1.4 [0.58, 2.3]	1.6 [0.9, 2.4]	1.8 [1.0, 2.9]
Individual condition	*n* = 45	*n* = 51	*n* = 64
$\mu_{\text{logit}\alpha}$	-2.1 [-3.1, -0.87]	-2.1 [-2.6, -1.6]	-1.3 [-2.1, -0.50]
(Mean α)	0.11 [0.04, 0.30]	0.11 [0.07, 0.17]	0.21 [0.11, 0.38]
$\mu_{\log\beta}$	0.42 [-0.43, 1.1]	0.91 [0.63, 1.2]	0.76 [0.42, 1.1]
(Mean β)	1.5 [0.65, 3.0]	2.5 [1.9, 3.3]	2.1 [1.5, 3.0]

Discussion

We have demonstrated that frequency-based copying, one of the most common forms of social learning strategy, can rescue decision makers from committing to adverse risk aversion in a risky trial-and-error learning task, even though a majority of individuals are potentially biased towards suboptimal risk aversion. Although an extremely strong reliance on conformist influence can raise the possibility of getting stuck on a suboptimal option, the mitigation of risk aversion, and the concomitant collective behavioural rescue, could emerge in a wide range of situations under modest use of conformist social learning.

Our simplified differential equation model has identified a key mechanism of the collective behavioural rescue: the synergy of positive and negative feedback. Despite conformity, the probability of choosing the suboptimal option can decrease from what is expected by individual learning alone. Indeed, an inherent individual preference for the safe alternative [i.e., the softmax $e^{\beta Q_s}/(e^{\beta Q_s} + e^{\beta Q_r})$] is always mitigated by the conformist

influence $N_s^\theta/(N_s^\theta + N_r^\theta)$ as long as the former is larger than the latter. Once individual risk aversion is reduced, there will exist fewer individuals choosing the suboptimal safe option, which further weakens the majority support for the safe option. This negative feedback facilitates individuals revisiting the risky alternative. Such an attraction to the risky option allows more individuals, including those who are currently sceptical about the value of the risky option, to experience a large bonanza from the risky option, which results in 'gluing' them to the risky alternative for a while. Once a majority of individuals get glued to the risky alternative, positive feedback from conformity kicks in, and optimal risk seeking is further strengthened.

Temporally flexible collective behaviour emerging under positive frequency-based copying has been repeatedly suggested in previous empirical studies (***Toyokawa et al., 2019***; ***Aplin et al., 2017***; ***Beckers et al., 1990***; ***Seeley et al., 1991***; ***Camazine et al., 2001***; ***Kandler and Laland, 2013***). Our model can provide a general explanation of these results too. For example, ***Aplin et al.*** (***2017***) demonstrated that populations of great tits (*Parus major*) could switch their behavioural tradition after an environmental change even though individual birds were likely to have a strong conformist tendency. A similar phenomenon was also reported in humans (***Toyokawa et al., 2019***). Although these studies did not focus on risky decision making, and hence individuals were not inherently biased, experimentally induced environmental change was able to create such a situation where a majority of individuals exhibited a suboptimal behaviour. Many individuals in the population were choosing the outdated suboptimal behavioural option soon after the environmental change. However, as we have shown, a collective learning system could rescue their performance even though the individual distribution was strongly biased towards the suboptimal direction at the outset. The great tit and human groups were able to switch their tradition because of, rather than despite, the conformist social influence, thanks to the synergy of negative and positive feedback processes.

Through online behavioural experiments using a risky multi-armed bandit task, we have confirmed our theoretical prediction that simple frequency-based copying could mitigate unfavourable risk aversion that many individual learners, especially those who had higher learning rates and/or lower exploration rates, would have exhibited as a result of the hot stove effect. Yet, a majority, albeit a smaller one, still showed risk aversion. The weak reliance on social learning, which affected only about 15% of decisions, was unable to facilitate strong positive feedback. The little use of social information might have been due to the stationarity of the task. In a stable environment, learners could eventually gather enough information as trials proceeded, which might have made them less curious about information gathering including social learning (***Rendell et al., 2010***). Future research will look at the conditions that elicit heavier reliance on social learning in humans, such as volatility in the environment, time pressure, or an increasing number of behavioural options (***Muthukrishna et al., 2015***), coupled with larger group sizes (***Toyokawa et al., 2019***).

The low learning rate α, which was at most 0.2 for many individuals, should also have hindered the potential benefits of collective rescue in our current experiment, because the benefit of mitigating the hot stove effect would be minimal or hardly realised under such a small susceptibility to the hot stove effect. Although we believe that the simplest stationary environment in our current analyses and experiments was a necessary first step in building our understanding of the collective behavioural rescue effect, we would

suggest that future studies use a temporally unstable ('restless') bandit task to elicit both a higher learning rate and a heavier reliance on social learning, so as to investigate the possibilities of a stronger effect. Indeed, previous studies with changing environments have reported a learning rate as high as $\alpha > 0.5$ (***Toyokawa et al., 2017***, ***2019***; ***Deffner et al., 2020***), under which individual learners should have suffered the hot stove trap.

Information about others' payoffs might also be available in addition to inadvertent social frequency cues in some cooperative contexts, especially with the aid of benevolent pedagogical instructions from others. Although communicative acts may transfer information about unexplored options and forgone payoffs, which potentially mitigates the hot stove effect (***Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2006***), it may further amplify the suboptimal decision bias if instructors, despite their cooperative motivation, selectively filter out some pieces of information they think are redundant (***Moussaïd et al., 2015***). In contrast, previous studies suggested that competitions or conflicts of interest among individuals can lead to better collective intelligence than fully cooperative situations (***Conradt et al., 2013***) and can promote adaptive risk taking (***Arbilly et al., 2011***). Further research will identify conditions under which cooperative communication can improve decision making and drive adaptive cumulative cultural evolution (***Csibra and Gergely, 2011***; ***Morgan et al., 2015***), when suboptimal individual behavioural biases prevail.

The generality of our dynamic model should apply to various collective decision-making systems, not only to human groups. Because it is a fundamental property of adaptive reinforcement learning, risk aversion due to the hot stove effect should be widespread in animals (***Real, 1981***; ***Weber et al., 2004***; ***Hertwig and Erev, 2009***). Therefore, its solution, the collective behavioural rescue, should also operate broadly in collective animal decision making because frequency-based copying is one of the common social learning strategies (***Hoppitt and Laland, 2013***; ***Grüter and Leadbeater, 2014***). Future research should determine to what extent the collective behavioural rescue actually impacts animal decision making in wider contexts, and whether it influences the evolution of social learning, information sharing, and the formation of group living.

We have identified a previously overlooked mechanism underlying the adaptive advantages of frequency-based social learning. Our results suggest that an informational benefit of group living could exist well beyond simple informational pooling where individuals can enjoy the wisdom of crowds effect (***Ward and Zahavi, 1973***). Furthermore, the flexibility emerging through the interaction of negative and positive feedback suggests that conformity could evolve in a wider range of environments than previously assumed (***Aoki and Feldman, 2014***; ***Nakahashi et al., 2012***), including temporally variable environments (***Aplin et al., 2017***). Social learning can drive self-organisation, regulating the mitigation and amplification of behavioural biases and canalising the course of repeated decision making under risk and uncertainty.

Methods

The baseline learning model and hot stove effect

We considered a decision maker facing a repeated choice between a safe (i.e., certain) alternative s that generated a constant payoff π_s and a risky (i.e., uncertain) alternative r that generated a random payoff π_r, following a Gaussian distribution $\mathcal{N}(\mu, \text{s.d.})$ (i.e., a two-armed risky bandit task; Fig. 1a).

We assumed that a decision maker updates their value of choosing the alternative i ($\in \{s, r\}$) at time t following the Rescorla–Wagner learning rule: $Q_{i,t+1} \leftarrow (1-\alpha)Q_{i,t} + \alpha\pi_{i,t}$, where α ($0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$) is a *learning rate*, manipulating the step size of the belief updating, and $\pi_{i,t}$ is a realised payoff from the chosen alternative i at time t (***Sutton and Barto, 2018***). The larger the α, the more weight is given to recent experiences, making reinforcement learning more myopic. The Q value for the unchosen alternative is unchanged. Before the first choice, individuals had no previous preference for either option (i.e., $Q_{r,1} = Q_{s,1} = 0$). Then Q values were translated into choice probabilities through a softmax (or multinomial-logistic) function such that $P_{i,t} = \exp(\beta Q_{i,t})/(\exp(\beta Q_{s,t}) + \exp(\beta Q_{r,t}))$, where β, an *inverse temperature*, is a parameter regulating how sensitive the choice probability is to the value of the estimate Q (i.e., controlling the proneness to explore). As $\beta \to 0$, the softmax probability approximates to a random choice (i.e., highly explorative). Conversely, if $\beta \to +\infty$, it asymptotes to a deterministic choice in favour of the option with the highest Q value (i.e., highly exploitative).

In this simplest setup of the two-armed bandit, ***Denrell*** (***2007***) formally derived a condition under which a decision maker exhibits risk aversion. When the number of decision trials is infinite ($t \to \infty$), risk aversion emerges under $\beta > (2-\alpha)/\alpha$, which corresponds to the area above the dashed curve in Fig. 1. See Supplementary Methods for the details of the analytical results.

Collective learning and social influences

Using the simplest setup of the two-armed bandit (***March, 1996***; ***Denrell, 2007***), we considered a collective learning situation in which a group of 10 individuals complete the task simultaneously and individuals can obtain social information. For social information, we assumed a simple frequency-based social cue specifying distributions of individual choices (***McElreath et al., 2005***, ***2008***; ***Toyokawa et al., 2017***, ***2019***; ***Deffner et al., 2020***). We assumed that individuals could not observe others' earnings, ensuring that individuals could not learn from approximate forgone payoffs that would have easily rescued people from the hot stove effect (***Denrell, 2007***; ***Yechiam and Busemeyer, 2006***).

A payoff realised was independent of others' decisions and it was drawn solely from the payoff probability distribution specific to each alternative, meaning that there was no direct social competition over the monetary reward. We assumed that individuals knew this was the case, and hence we ignored the possibility of competitive motivations in decision making.

Following the previous modelling of social learning in such multi-agent multi-armed bandit situations (e.g., ***Aplin et al., 2017***; ***Barrett et al., 2017***; ***McElreath et al., 2005***, ***2008***; ***Toyokawa et al., 2017***, ***2019***; ***Deffner et al., 2020***), we assumed that social influences on reinforcement learning would be expressed as a weighted average between the softmax probability based on the Q values and the conformist social influence as follows:

$$P_{i,t} = (1-\sigma)\frac{\exp(\beta Q_{i,t})}{\exp(\beta Q_{r,t}) + \exp(\beta Q_{s,t})} + \sigma\frac{(N_{i,t-1}+0.1)^{\theta}}{(N_{s,t-1}+0.1)^{\theta} + (N_{r,t-1}+0.1)^{\theta}} \tag{1}$$

where σ was a weight given to the social influence (*copying weight*) and θ was the strength of conformist influence (*conformity exponent*), which determines the influence of social frequency of choosing the alternative i at time $t-1$, that is, $N_{i,t-1}$. The larger the conformity exponent θ, the higher the influence that was given to an alternative that was chosen

Table 2. Summary of the learning model parameters

Symbol	Meaning	Range of the value
α	Learning rate	$[0, 1]$
β	Inverse temperature	$[0, +\infty]$
$\alpha(1+\beta)$	Susceptibility to the hot stove effect	
σ	Copying weight	$[0, 1]$
θ	Conformity exponent	$[-\infty, +\infty]$

by more individuals, with non-linear conformist social influence arising when $\theta > 1$. Note that there was no actual social influence when $\theta = 0$ because in this case the 'social influence' favours a uniformly random choice, irrespective of the social frequency distribution N_s and N_r. We added a small number, 0.1, to $N_{i,t-1}$ so that an option chosen by no one (i.e., $N_{i,t-1} = 0$) could provide the highest social influence when $\theta < 0$ (negative frequency bias). Although this additional 0.1 slightly reduces the conformity influence when $\theta > 0$, we confirmed that the results were qualitatively unchanged. Note also that in the first trial $t = 1$, we assumed that the choice was determined solely by the asocial softmax function because there was no social information available yet. The descriptions of the parameters are shown in Table 2.

The approximated dynamic model of collective behaviour

We assume a group of N individuals who exhibit two different behavioural states: choosing a safe alternative S, exhibited by N_S individuals; and choosing a risky alternative R, exhibited by N_R individuals ($N = N_S + N_R$). We also assume that there are two different 'inner belief' states, labelled '−' and '+'. Individuals who possess the negative belief prefer the safe alternative S to R, while those who possess the positive belief prefer R to S. A per capita probability of choice shift from one behavioural alternative to the other is denoted by P. For example, P_S^- means the individual probability of changing the choice to the safe alternative from the risky alternative under the negative belief. Because there exist N_S^- individuals who chose S with belief −, the total number of individuals who 'move on' to S from R at one time step is denoted by $P_S^- N_S^-$. We assume that the probability of shifting to the more preferable option is larger than that of shifting to the less preferable option, that is, $P_S^- > P_R^-$ and $P_R^+ > P_S^+$ (Fig. 4a).

We assume that the belief state can change by choosing the risky alternative. We define that the per capita probability of becoming + state, that is, having a higher preference for the risky alternative, is e ($0 \leq e \leq 1$), and hence $N_R^+ = eN_R$. The rest of the individuals who choose the risky alternative become belief state −, that is, $N_R^- = (1-e)N_R$.

We define e so that it can be seen as a risk premium of the gambles. For example, imagine a two-armed bandit task equipped with one risky arm with Gaussian noises and the other a sure arm. The larger the mean expected reward of the risky option (i.e., the higher the risk premium), the more people who choose the risky arm are expected to obtain a larger reward than what the safe alternative would provide. By assuming $e > 1/2$, therefore, it approximates a situation where risk seeking is optimal.

Here we focus only on the population dynamics: If more people choose S, N_S increases. On the other hand, if more people choose R, N_R increases. As a consequence,

Table 3. Summary of the differential equation model parameters

Symbol	Meaning	Range of the value
N_R^+	Density of individuals choosing R and preferring R	$N_R^+ = eN_R$
N_R^-	Density of individuals choosing R and preferring S	$N_R^- = (1-e)N_R$
N_S^+	Density of individuals choosing S and preferring R	
N_S^-	Density of individuals choosing S and preferring S	
p_l	Per capita rate of moving to the unfavourable option	$0 \le p_l \le p_h \le 1$
p_h	Per capita rate of moving to the favourable option	$0 \le p_l \le p_h \le 1$
e	Per capita rate of becoming risk prone	$[0, 1]$
σ	Social influence weight	$[0, 1]$
θ	Conformity exponent	$[-\infty, +\infty]$

the system may eventually reach an equilibrium state where both N_S and N_R no longer change. If we find that the equilibrium state satisfies $N_R^\star > N_S^\star$, we define that the population exhibits risk seeking, escaping from the hot stove effect. For the sake of simplicity, we assumed $p_l = P_R^- = P_S^+$ and $p_h = P_R^+ = P_S^-$, where $0 \le p_l \le p_h \le 1$, for the asocial baseline model.

Considering $N_R^+ = eN_R$ and $N_R^- = (1-e)N_R$, the dynamics are written as the following differential equations:

$$\begin{cases} \frac{dN_R}{dt} = p_l N_S^- - p_h(1-e)N_R + p_h N_S^+ - p_l e N_R \\ \frac{dN_S^-}{dt} = -p_l N_S^- + p_h(1-e)N_R, \\ \frac{dN_S^+}{dt} = -p_h N_S^+ + p_l e N_R. \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

Overall, our model crystallises the asymmetry emerging from adaptive sampling, which is considered as a fundamental mechanism of the hot stove effect (***Denrell, 2007***; ***March, 1996***): Once decision makers underestimate the expected value of the risky alternative, they start avoiding it and do not have another chance to correct the error. In other words, although there would potentially be more individuals who obtain a preference for R by choosing the risky alternative (i.e., $e > 0.5$), this asymmetry raised by the adaptive balance between exploration–exploitation may constantly increase the number of people who possess a preference for S due to underestimation of the value of the risky alternative. If our model is able to capture this asymmetric dynamics properly, the relationship between e (i.e., the potential goodness of the risky option) and p_l/p_h (i.e., the exploration–exploitation) should account for the hot stove effect, as suggested by previous learning model analysis (***Denrell, 2007***). The equilibrium analysis was conducted in Mathematica (code is available online).

Collective dynamics with social influences

For social influences, we assumed that the behavioural transition rates, P_S and P_R, would depend on the number of individuals N_S and N_R as follows:

$$
\begin{cases}
P_S^- = (1-\sigma)p_h + \sigma \frac{N_S^\theta}{N_R^\theta + N_S^\theta}, \\
P_R^- = (1-\sigma)p_l + \sigma \frac{N_R^\theta}{N_R^\theta + N_S^\theta}, \\
P_S^+ = (1-\sigma)p_l + \sigma \frac{N_S^\theta}{N_R^\theta + N_S^\theta}, \\
P_R^+ = (1-\sigma)p_h + \sigma \frac{N_R^\theta}{N_R^\theta + N_S^\theta},
\end{cases}
\tag{3}
$$

where σ is the weight of social influence and θ is the strength of the conformist bias, corresponding to the agent-based learning model (Table 2). Other assumptions were the same as in the baseline dynamics model. The baseline dynamics model was a special case of this social influence model with $\sigma = 0$. Because the system was not analytically tractable, we obtained the numeric solution across different initial distribution of $N_{S,t=0}$ and $N_{R,t=0}$ for various combinations of the parameters.

The online experiments

The experimental procedure was approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of Konstanz ('Collective learning and decision-making study'). Four hundred ninety-two English-speaking subjects [234 self-identified as women, 211 as men, 1 as other, and the rest of 46 unspecified; mean (minimum, maximum) age = 34.8 (18, 74) years] participated in the task through the online experimental recruiting platform Prolific Academic. We excluded subjects who disconnected from the online task before completing at least the first 35 rounds from our computational model-fitting analysis, resulting in 467 subjects (the detailed distribution of subjects for each condition is shown in Table 1). A parameter recovery test had suggested that the sample size was sufficient to reliably estimate individual parameters using a hierarchical Bayesian fitting method (see below; Supplementary Fig. S9).

Design of the experimental manipulations

The group size was manipulated by randomly assigning different capacities of a 'waiting lobby' where subjects had to wait until other subjects arrived. When the lobby capacity was 1, which happened at probability 0.1, the individual condition started upon the first subject's arrival. Otherwise, the group condition started when there were more than three people at 3 minutes since the lobby opened (see Online Supplementary Methods). If there were only two or fewer people in the lobby at this stage, the subjects each were assigned to the individual condition (i.e., all groups were larger than or equal to three subjects). The distribution of group size is shown in Supplementary Fig. S10.

We used three different tasks: a 1-risky-1-safe task, a 1-risky-3-safe task, and a 2-risky-2-safe task. All tasks had 70 decision-making trials. The task proceeded on a trial basis; that is, trials of all individuals in a group were synchronised. Subjects in the group condition could see social frequency information, namely, how many people chose each alternative in the preceding trial. No social information was available in the first trial. One of the three different tasks was randomly assigned for each different session, and subjects were allowed to participate in one session only.

We employed a skewed payoff probability distribution rather than a normal distribution for the risky alternative, and we conducted not only a two-armed task but also four-

armed bandit tasks, because our pilot study had suggested that subjects tended to have a small susceptibility to the effect ($\alpha_i(\beta_i + 1) \ll 2$), and hence we needed more difficult settings than the conventional Gaussian noise binary-choice task to elicit risk aversion from individual decision makers.

The details of the three task setups are as follows:

The 1-risky-1-safe task. The optimal risky option produced either 50 or 550 points at probability 0.7 and 0.3, respectively (the expected payoff was 200). The safe option produced 150 points (with a small amount of Gaussian noise with s.d. = 5).

The 1-risky-3-safe task. The optimal risky option produced either 50 or 425 points at probability 0.6 and 0.4, respectively (the expected payoff was 200). The three safe options each produced 150, 125, and 100 points, respectively, with a small Gaussian noise with s.d. = 5.

The 2-risky-2-safe task. The optimal risky option produced either 50 or 425 points at probability 0.6 and 0.4, respectively (the expected payoff was 200). The two safe options each produced 150 and 125 points, respectively, with a small Gaussian noise with s.d. = 5. The suboptimal risky option, whose expected value was 125, produced either 50 or 238 points at probability 0.6 and 0.4, respectively.

We have confirmed through agent-based model simulations that the collective behavioural rescue could emerge in a task equipped with binary noise of the risky option (Supplementary Fig. S6). With the four-armed tasks we aimed to demonstrate that the rescue effect is not limited to binary-choice situations. Other procedures of the collective learning task were the same as those used in our agent-based simulation. The experimental materials including illustrated instructions can be found in Supplementary Video SV1 (individual condition) and SV2 (group condition).

The hierarchical Bayesian model fitting

To fit the learning model, we used a hierarchical Bayesian method, estimating the global means (μ_α, μ_β, μ_σ, and μ_θ) and global variances (v_α, v_β, v_σ, and v_θ) for each of the three experimental conditions and for the individual and group conditions separately. For the individual condition, we assumed $\sigma = 0$ for all subjects and hence no social learning parameters were estimated. Full details of the model-fitting procedure and prior assumptions are shown in the Supplementary Methods. The R and Stan code used in the model fitting are available from an online repository.

Parameter recovery and post hoc simulation. To assess the adequacy of the hierarchical Bayesian model-fitting method, we tested how well the hierarchical Bayesian method (HBM) could recover 'true' parameter values that were used to simulate synthetic data. We simulated artificial agents' behaviour assuming that they behave according to the social learning model with each parameter setting. We generated 'true' parameter values for each simulated agent based on both experimentally fit global parameters (Table 1; parameter recovery test 1). In addition, we ran another recovery test using arbitrary global parameters that deviated from the experimentally fit values (parameter recovery test 2), to confirm that our fitting procedure was not just 'attracted' to the fit value. We then simulated synthetic behavioural data and recovered their parameter values using the HBM described above. Both parameter recovery tests showed that all the recovered individual parameters were positively correlated with the true values, whose correlation coefficients were all larger than 0.5. We also confirmed that 30 of 32 global parameters

in total were recovered within the 95% Bayesian credible intervals, and that even those two non-recovered parameters (μ_β for the 2-risky-2-safe task in parameter recovery test 1 and μ_α for the 1-risky-3-safe task in parameter recovery test 2) did not deviate so much from the true value (Supplementary Fig. S9).

We also ran a series of individual-based model simulations using the calibrated global parameter values for each condition. First, we randomly sampled a set of agents whose individual parameter values were drawn from the fit global parameters. Second, we let this synthetic group of agents perform the task for 70 rounds. We repeated these steps 100,000 times for each task setting and for each individual and group condition.

Data availability

Both experimental and simulation data are available in an online repository: https://github.com/WataruToyokawa/ToyokawaGaissmaier2021

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Author contributions

W.T. planned the study, built and analysed the mathematical model, made the experimental material, and ran the online experiment. W.T. and W.G. analysed the data, discussed and refined the experimental design, and wrote the manuscript.

Materials & Correspondence

Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to W.T.