# Neural dynamics between anterior insular cortex and right supramarginal gyrus dissociate genuine affect sharing from automatic responses to pretended pain

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## Abstract

Empathy for pain engages both shared affective responses and self-other distinction. In this study, we addressed the highly debated question of whether neural responses previously linked to affect sharing could result from the perception of salient affective displays. Moreover, we investigated how affect sharing and self-other distinction interact to determine our response to a pain that is either perceived as genuine or pretended (while in fact both were acted for reasons of experimental control). We found stronger activations in regions associated with affect sharing (anterior insula, aIns, and anterior mid-cingulate cortex, aMCC) as well as with affective self-other distinction (right supramarginal gyrus, rSMG), in participants watching video clips of genuine vs. pretended facial expressions of pain. Using dynamic causal modeling (DCM), we then assessed the neural dynamics between the right aIns and rSMG in these two conditions. This revealed a reduced inhibitory effect on the aIns to rSMG connection for genuine compared to pretended pain. For genuine pain only, brain-to-behavior regression analyses highlighted a linkage between this inhibitory effect on the one hand, and pain ratings as well as empathic traits on the other. These findings imply that if the pain of others is genuine and thus calls for an appropriate empathic response, neural responses in the aIns indeed seem related to affect sharing and self-other distinction is engaged to avoid empathic over-arousal. In contrast, if others merely pretend to be in pain, the perceptual salience of their painful

25 expression results in neural responses that are down-regulated to avoid inappropriate affect sharing

26 and social support.

27

## Introduction

As social beings, our own affective states are influenced by other people's feelings and affective states. The facial expression of pain by others acts as a distinctive cue to signal their pain to others, and thus results in sizeable affective responses in the observer. Certifying such responses as evidence for empathy, however, requires successful self-other distinction, the ability to distinguish the affective response experienced by ourselves from the affect experienced by the other person.

Studies using a wide variety of methods convergently have shown that observing others in pain engages neural responses aligning with those coding for the affective component of self-experienced pain, with the anterior insula (aIns) and the anterior mid-cingulate cortex (aMCC) being two key areas in which such an alignment has been detected (Lamm et al., 2011; Rütgen et al., 2015; Jauniaux et al., 2019; Xiong et al., 2019; Zhou et al., 2020; Fallon et al., 2020, for meta-analyses). However, there is consistent debate on whether activity observed in these areas should indeed be related to the sharing of pain affect, or whether it may not rather result from automatic responses to salient perceptual cues - with pain vividly expressed on the face being one particularly prominent example (Zaki et al., 2016, for review). It was thus one major aim of our study to address this question. In this respect, contextual factors, individuals' appraisals, and attentional processes would all impact their exact response to the affective states of others (Gu & Han, 2007; Hein & Singer, 2008, for review; Lamm et al., 2010; Forbes & Hamilton, 2020; Zhao et al., 2021). Recently, Coll et al. (2017) have thus proposed a framework that attempts to capture these influences on affect sharing and empathic responses. This model posits that individuals who see identical negative facial expressions of others may have different empathic responses due to distinct contextual information, and that this may depend on identification of the underlying affective state displayed by the other. In the current functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we therefore created a situation where we varied the genuineness of the pain affect felt by participants while keeping the perceptual saliency (i.e., the quality and strength of pain expressions) identical. To this end, participants were

shown video clips of other persons who supposedly displayed genuine pain on their face vs. merely pretended to be in pain. Note that for reasons of experimental control, all painful expressions on the videos had been acted. This enabled us to interpret possible differences between conditions to the observers' appraisal of the situation rather than to putative visual and expressive differences. This way, we sought to identify the extent to which responses in affective nodes (such as the aIns and the aMCC) genuinely track the pain of others, rather than resulting predominantly from the salient facial expressions associated with the pain.

Another major aim of our study was to assess how self-other distinction allowed individuals to distinguish between the sharing of actual pain vs. regulating an inappropriate and potentially misleading "sharing" of what in reality is only a pretended affective state. We focused on the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG), which has been suggested to act as a major hub selectively engaged in *affective* self-other distinction (Silani et al., 2013; Steinbeis et al., 2015; Hoffmann et al., 2016; Bukowski et al., 2020). Though previous studies have indicated that rSMG is functionally connected with areas associated with affect processing (Mars et al., 2011; Bukowski et al., 2020), we lack more nuanced insights into how exactly rSMG interacts with these areas, and thus how it supports accurate empathic responses. Hence, we used dynamic causal modeling (DCM) to investigate the hypothesized distinct interactions between affective responses and self-other distinction for the genuine and pretended pain situations, focusing on the aIns, aMCC, and their interaction with rSMG. Furthermore, we investigated the relationship between neural activity and behavioral responses as well as empathic traits. In line with the literature reviewed above, we expected that, on the behavioral level, genuine pain would result in – alongside the obvious other-oriented higher pain ratings – higher self-oriented unpleasantness ratings. On the neural level, we predicted aIns and aMCC to show a stronger response to the genuine expressions of pain, but that these areas would also respond to the pretended pain, but to a lower extent. Differences in rSMG engagement and distinct patterns of this area's effective connectivity with aIns and aMCC were expected to relate to

self-other distinction, and thus to explain the different empathic responses to genuine vs. pretended pain.

## Results

### Behavioral results

Three repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed with the factors *genuineness* (genuine vs. pretended and *pain* (pain vs. no pain), for each of the three behavioral ratings. For ratings of painful *expressions* in others (Figure 1C, left), there was a main effect of the factor genuineness: participants showed higher ratings for the genuine vs. pretended conditions, $F_{genuineness}(1, 42) = 8.816$, $p = 0.005$, $\eta^2 = 0.173$. There was also a main effect of pain: participants showed higher ratings for the pain vs. no pain conditions, $F_{pain}(1,42) = 1718.645$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.976$. The interaction term was significant as well, $F_{interaction}(1, 42) = 7.443$, $p = 0.009$, $\eta^2 = 0.151$, and this was related to higher ratings of painful expressions in others for the genuine pain compared to the pretended pain condition. For ratings of painful feelings in others (Figure 1C, middle), there was a main effect of genuineness: participants showed higher ratings for the genuine vs. pretended conditions, $F_{genuineness}(1, 42) = 770.140$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.948$. There was also a main effect of pain, as participants showed higher ratings for the pain vs. no pain conditions, $F_{pain}(1,42) = 1544.762$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.974$. The interaction for painful feelings ratings was significant as well, $F_{interaction}(1, 42) = 752.618$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.947$, and this was related to higher ratings of painful feelings in others for the genuine pain compared to the pretended pain condition. For ratings of unpleasantness in self (Figure 1C, right), there was a main effect of genuineness: participants showed higher ratings for the genuine vs. pretended conditions, $F_{genuineness}(1, 42) = 74.989$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.641$. There was also a main effect of pain: participants showed higher ratings for the pain vs. no pain conditions, $F_{pain}(1,42) = 254.709$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.858$. The interaction for unpleasantness ratings was significant as well, $F_{interaction}(1, 42) = 73.620$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.637$, and this was related to higher ratings of unpleasantness in self for the genuine pain compared to the pretended pain condition. In sum, the behavioral data

103 indicated higher ratings and large effect sizes of painful feelings in others and unpleasantness in self
104 for the genuine compared to the pretended pain condition. Ratings of pain expressions also differed
105 in terms of genuineness, at comparably low effect size, though they were expected to not show a
106 difference by way of our experimental design and the pilot study.

107 We also found a significant correlation between behavioral ratings of painful feelings in others and
108 unpleasantness in self in the genuine pain condition, $r = 0.691$, $p < 0.001$; while in the pretended
109 pain condition, the correlation was not significant, $r = 0.249$, $p = 0.107$ (Figure 1D). A bootstrapping
110 comparison showed a significant difference between the two correlation coefficients, $p = 0.002$, 95%
111 Confidence Interval (CI) = [0.230, 1.060].

112 [Insert Figure 1 here]

113 **fMRI results: mass-univariate analyses**

114 Three contrasts were computed: 1) genuine: pain – no pain, 2) pretended: pain – no pain, and 3)
115 genuine (pain – no pain) – pretended (pain – no pain). Across all three contrasts, we found
116 activations as hypothesized in bilateral aIns, aMCC, and rSMG (Figure 2A and Table 1).

117 To identify whether or which brain activity was specifically related to the behavioral ratings
118 described above, we performed a multiple regression analysis where we explored the relationship of
119 activation in the contrast genuine pain – pretended pain with the three behavioral ratings. We found
120 significant clusters in bilateral aIns, visual cortex, and cerebellum (Figure 2B); notably, when
121 statistically accounting for ratings of painful expressions in others and painful feelings in others, all
122 three clusters were exclusively explained by the ratings of self-unpleasantness.

123 [Insert Figure 2 here]

124 [Insert Table 1 here]

125 **DCM results**

We performed DCM analysis to specifically examine the modulatory effect of genuineness on the effective connectivity between the right aIns and rSMG. More specifically, we sought to assess whether the experimental manipulation of genuine pain vs. pretended pain tuned the bidirectional neural dynamics from aIns to rSMG and *vice versa*, in terms of both directionality (sign of the DCM parameter) and intensity (magnitude of the DCM parameter). If the experimental manipulation modulated the effective connectivity, we would observe a strong posterior probability ($p_p > 0.95$) of the modulatory effect. Our original analysis plan was to include aMCC in the DCM analyses, but based on the fact that aMCC did not show as strong evidence (in terms of the multiple regression analysis) as the aIns of being involved in our task, we decided to use a more parsimonious DCM model without the aMCC.

We found strong evidence of inhibitory effects on the aIns to rSMG connection both in the genuine pain condition and in the pretended pain condition (Figure 3A, 3B and 3C). Comparing the strength of these modulatory effects on the aIns to rSMG connection revealed a reduced inhibitory effect for genuine pain as opposed to pretended pain, $t_{41} = 2.671$, $p = 0.011$ (Mean $_{\text{genuine pain}} = -0.821$, 95% CI = [-0.878, -0.712]; Mean $_{\text{pretended pain}} = -0.934$, 95% CI = [-1.076, -0.822]; Figure 3C). There was no evidence of a modulatory effect on the rSMG to aIns connection.

**Individual associations between modulatory effects, behavioral ratings and questionnaires**

To examine how the modulatory effects from the DCM were related to the behavioral ratings, we computed two stepwise linear regression models for each condition. The regression model was significant for the genuine pain condition ($F_{\text{model }(1,41)} = 4.639$, $p = 0.037$, $R^2 = 0.104$), when painful feelings in others were added to the model and the other two ratings were excluded ($B = 0.079$, *beta* = 0.322, $p = 0.037$). However, the model was not significant for the pretended pain condition (Figure 3D). The variance inflation factors (*VIF*s) for three ratings in both models were calculated to diagnose collinearity, showing no severe collinearity problem (all *VIFs* < 5; the smallest *VIF* =1.132 and the largest *VIF* = 4.387).

In addition, we tested two stepwise linear regression models to investigate whether subscales of all three questionnaires could explain modulatory effects for genuine pain and pretended pain. In the genuine pain condition, we found that the modulatory effect was significantly explained by scores of two subscales, i.e., affective ability and affective reactivity of the ECQ: $F_{model}(1,39) = 6.829$, $p = 0.003$, $R^2 = 0.270$; $B_{affective\ ability} = 0.052$, *beta* = 0.497, $p = 0.002$; $B_{affective\ reactivity} = -0.040$, *beta* = -0.421, $p = 0.008$. No significant predictor was found with the other questionnaires (i.e., IRI and TAS). In the pretended pain condition, none of the three questionnaires significantly predicted variations of the modulatory effect. No severe collinearity problem was detected for either regression model (all *VIFs* < 2; the smallest *VIF* =1.011 and the largest *VIF* = 1.600).

[Insert Figure 3 here]

## Discussion

In this study, we developed and used a novel experimental paradigm in which participants watched video clips of persons who supposedly either genuinely experienced or merely pretended to be in strong pain. Combining mass-univariate analysis with effective connectivity (DCM) analyses, our study provides evidence on the distinct neural dynamics between regions suggestive of affect processing (i.e., aIns and aMCC) and self-other distinction (i.e., rSMG) for genuinely sharing vs. responding to pretended, non-genuine pain. With this, we aimed to clarify two main questions: First, whether neural responses in areas such as the aIns and aMCC to the pain of others are indeed related to a veridical sharing of affect, as opposed to simply tracking automatic responses to salient affective displays. And second, how processes related to self-other distinction, implemented in the rSMG, enable appropriate empathic responses to genuine vs. merely pretended affective states.

The mass-univariate analyses suggest that the increased activity in aIns for genuine pain as opposed to pretended pain properly reflects affect sharing. As aforementioned, the network of affective sharing and certain domain-general processes (e.g., salience detection and automatic emotion processing) overlap in aIns and aMCC (Zaki et al., 2016, for review). This indicates that indeed, part

of the activation in these areas could be related to perceptual salience, which is why it has been widely debated as a potential confound of empathy and affect sharing models (Zaki et al., 2016; Lamm et al., 2019, for review). However, when comparing genuine pain versus pretended pain, activity in these areas was not only found to be stronger in response to genuine pain, but the increased activation in aIns was also selectively correlated with ratings of self-oriented unpleasantness (i.e., after statistically accounting for painful expressions and painful feelings in others). That only aIns and not also aMCC shows such correlation may be explained by previous studies, according to which aIns is more specifically associated with affective representations, while the role of aMCC rather seems to evaluate and regulate emotions that arise due to empathy (Fan et al., 2011; Lamm et al., 2011; Jauniaux et al., 2019). Taken together, the activation and brain-behavior findings provide evidence that responses in aIns (and to a lesser extent also the aMCC) are not simply automatic responses triggered by perceptually salient events. Rather, they seem to track the actual affective states of the other person, and thus the shared neural representation of that response (see Zhou et al., 2020, for similar recent conclusions based on multi-voxel pattern analyses). Our findings are also in line with the proposed model of Coll et al. (2017), which suggests that affect sharing is the consequence of emotion identification. More specifically, while part of the activation in the aIns and aMCC is indeed related to an (presumably earlier) automatic response, the added engagement of these areas once they have identified the pain as genuine shows that only in this condition, they then also engage in proper affect sharing. Ideally, one should be able to discern these processes in time, but neither the temporal resolution of our fMRI measurements nor the paradigm in which we always announced the conditions beforehand would have been sensitive enough to do so. Thus, future studies including complementary methods such as EEG and MEG, and tailored experimental designs are needed to pinpoint the exact sequence of processes engaged in automatic affective responses vs. proper affect sharing.

Beyond higher activation in affective nodes supporting (pain) empathy, increased activation was also found in rSMG. This area was shown to be engaged in action observation and imitating emotions

(Bach et al., 2010; Pokorny et al., 2015; Gola et al., 2017; Hawco et al., 2017), and a specific role in affective rather than cognitive self-other distinction has been identified for rSMG (Silani et al., 2013; Steinbeis et al., 2015; Bukowski et al., 2020). Based on such findings, it has been proposed that the rSMG allows for a rapid switching between or the integration of self- and other-related representations, as two processes that may underpin the functional basis of successful self-other distinction (Lamm et al., 2016, for review). Concerning the current findings, we thus propose that the higher rSMG engagement in the genuine pain condition reflects an increasing demand for self-other distinction imposed by the stronger shared negative affect experienced in this condition. Theoretical models of empathy and related socio-affective responses suggest that such regulation is especially important to avoid so-called empathic over-arousal, which would shift the focus away from empathy and the other's needs, towards taking care of one's own personal distress (Batson et al., 1987; Decety & Lamm, 2011, for review).

Beyond these differences in the magnitude of rSMG activation, the DCM analysis demonstrated less inhibition on the aIns-to-rSMG connection for genuine pain compared to pretended pain. Various theoretical accounts suggest that areas such as the aIns and rSMG may play a key role in comparing self-related information with the sensory evidence (Decety & Lamm, 2007; Seth, 2013, for review). According to recent theories on predictive processing (Clark, 2013, for review) and active inference (Friston, 2010, for review), the brain can be regarded as a "prediction machine", in which the top-down signals pass over predictions and the bottom-up signals convey prediction errors across different levels of cortical hierarchies (Chen et al., 2009; Friston, 2010, for review; Bastos et al., 2015). It is suggested that these top-down predictions are mediated by inhibitory neural connections (Zhang et al., 2008; Bastos et al., 2015; Miska et al., 2018). Our findings align with such views, by suggesting that the inhibitory connection from aIns to rSMG can be explained as the predictive mismatch between the top-down predictions of self-related information (e.g., personal affect) and sensory inputs (e.g., pain facial expressions). This suppression of neural activity leads to an *explaining away* of incoming bottom-up prediction error. This is reflected by the absence of any

condition-dependent modulatory effects on the rSMG to aIns connection, suggesting that the influence of the task conditions is sufficiently modeled by the predictions from aIns to rSMG. Therefore, the stronger inhibition for pretended pain, compared to genuine pain, could indicate a higher demand to overcome the mismatch between the visual inputs and the agent's prior beliefs and contextual information about the situation (i.e., "this person looks like in pain, but I know he/she does not actually feel it"). The reduced inhibition in the genuine pain condition could moreover be a mechanism that explains the higher rSMG activation in this condition.

We also found the strength of the inhibitory effect in the genuine pain condition to correlate with ratings of painful feelings in others, but not with the ratings of pain expression in others or unpleasantness in self. For the pretended pain condition none of the ratings showed a correlation. The latter could in principle be due to a lack of variation in the ratings (which by way of the design were mostly close to zero or one). We deem it more plausible, though, that the correlation findings provide further evidence that the modulation of aIns to rSMG is implicated in encoding others' emotional states when participants engaged in genuine affect sharing. It is also interesting to note that the found correlation relates to cognitive evaluations of the other's pain rather than to own affect, as tracked by the unpleasantness in self-ratings. This would to some extent be in line with DCM findings by Kanske et al. (2016). These authors found that the inhibition of the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) by the aIns was linked to interactions between Theory of Mind (ToM) and empathic distress, i.e., the interaction of "cognitive" vs. "affective" processes engaged in understanding others' cognitive and affective states. Note that the right TPJ is an overarching area involved in self-other distinction of which rSMG is considered a part or at least closely connected to (Decety & Lamm, 2007, for review).

The correlations between the DCM inhibitory effect and empathic traits assessed via questionnaires provide further refinements for the relevance of rSMG in implementing self-other distinction to allow for an appropriate empathic response. When participants shared genuine affect, the inhibitory

253 effect on the aIns to rSMG connection was positively correlated with affective ability and negatively
254 correlated with affective reactivity. Affective ability reflects the capacity to subjectively share
255 emotions with others, while affective reactivity plays a role in the susceptibility to vicarious distress
256 and thus to more automatic responses to another's emotion (Batchelder et al., 2017). Again, as for
257 the correlations with the three rating scales, we did not find correlations of empathic traits for the
258 pretended pain condition. Taken together, the DCM results and their qualification by the correlation
259 findings suggest that in the genuine pain condition, which requires an accurate sharing of pain, rSMG
260 interacts with aIns to achieve "affective-to-affective" self-other distinction – i.e., disambiguating
261 affective signals originating in the self from those attributable to the other person. The aIns to rSMG
262 connection in the pretended pain condition may reflect a related, yet slightly distinct mechanism.
263 Here, it seems that "cognitive-to-affective" self-other distinction is at play, which helps resolve
264 conflicting information between the top-down contextual information (i.e., that the demonstrator is
265 not actually in pain) from what seems an unavoidable affective response to the highly salient
266 perceptual cue of the facial expression of pain. Given our behavioral and trait data did not allow us
267 to distinguish more precisely between these different types of self-other distinction, this however
268 remains an interpretation and a hypothesis that will require further investigation.

269 One potential limitation of the study could be the slightly higher ratings of other-oriented pain
270 expressions for genuine pain, which were hypothesized to have no difference, as compared to
271 pretended pain. As we found the enhanced aIns activation in the genuine pain condition mainly
272 tracked personal unpleasantness rather than perceptually domain-general processes, and because
273 the effect size of the pain expression difference was much smaller than for the affect ratings, we
274 consider this difference did not fundamentally influence the interpretation of our findings.

275 In conclusion, the current study advances our understanding of two main aspects of empathy. First,
276 we provide evidence that empathy-related responses in the aIns can indeed be linked to affective
277 sharing, rather than attributing them to responses triggered only by perceptual saliency. Second, we

show how aIns and rSMG are orchestrated to track what another person really feels, thus enabling us to appropriately respond to their actual needs. Beyond these basic research insights, our study provides novel avenues for clinical application, and the investigation of contextual and interpersonal factors in the accurate diagnosis of pain and its expression.

## Materials and Methods

### Participants

Forty-eight participants took part in the study. Five of them were excluded because of excessive head motion (> 15% scans with the frame-wise displacement over 0.5 mm in one session). Data of the remaining 43 participants (21 females; age: Mean = 26.72 years, S.D. = 4.47) were entered into analyses. This sample size was determined on a priori power analysis in Gpower 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007). We assumed a medium effect size of *Cohen's d* = 0.5. After calculation, the minimum sample size statistically required for this study was 34 ($\alpha = 0.05$, two-tailed, $1-\beta = 0.80$). Participants were pre-screened by an MRI safety-check questionnaire, assuring normal or corrected to normal vision and no presence or history of neurologic, psychiatric, or major medical disorders. All participants were being right-handed (self-reported) and provided written consent including post-disclosure of any potential deception. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Medical University of Vienna and was conducted in line with the latest version of the Declaration of Helsinki (2013).

### Manipulation of facial expressions

As part of our study we developed a novel experimental design and corresponding stimuli, which consisted of video clips showing different demonstrators ostensibly in four different situations: 1) Genuine pain: the demonstrator's right cheek was penetrated by a hypodermic needle attached to a syringe, and the demonstrator's facial expression changed from neutral to a strongly painful facial expression. 2) Genuine no pain: the demonstrator maintained a neutral facial expression when a Q-tip fixed on the backend of the same syringe touched their right cheek. 3) Pretended pain: the

demonstrator's right cheek was approached by the same syringe and the hypodermic needle, with the latter covered by a protective cap; upon touch by the cap, the demonstrator's facial expression changed from neutral to a strongly painful facial expression. 4) Pretended no pain: the demonstrator maintained a neutral facial expression when a Q-tip fixed on the backend of the same syringe touched their right cheek.

To create these stimuli, we recruited 20 demonstrators (10 females), with experience in acting, and filmed them in front of a dark blue background. An experimenter who stood on the right side of the demonstrators, but of whom only the right hand holding the syringe could be seen, administered the injections and touches. Unbeknownst to the participants, all painful expressions were acted, as the needle was a telescopic needle (i.e., a needle that seemed to enter the cheek upon contact, but in reality, was invisibly retracting into the syringe). The reason for using a protective cap in the pretended pain condition was to match the perceptual situation that an aversive object was approaching a body part in both pain conditions. In all situations, the demonstrator was instructed to look naturally towards the camera 1.5 m in front of them. As soon as the needle or the cap touched the demonstrator's cheek, the demonstrator made a painful facial expression, as naturally and vividly as possible. In the neutral control conditions, demonstrators maintained a neutral facial expression when a Q-tip fixed at the backend of the syringe touched their cheek. Again, a syringe with a needle attached to the other end was used to perceptually control for the presence of an aversive object in all four conditions. Note that in another set of conditions, demonstrators showed disgusted or neutral expressions. Data from these conditions will be reported elsewhere. All demonstrators signed an agreement that their video clips and static images could be used for scientific purposes.

**Stimulus validation and pilot study**

To validate the stimuli, we performed an online validation study with N = 110 participants, who were asked to rate a total of 120 video clips of 2 s duration of the two conditions (60 of each condition)

showing painful expressions (i.e., the genuine and the pretended pain conditions). The main aim of the validation study was to identify a set of demonstrators that expressed pain with comparable intensity and quality, and whose pain expressions in the genuine and pretended conditions were comparable. After each video clip, participants rated three questions on a visual analog scale with 9 tick-marks and the two end-points marked as “almost not at all” to “unbearable”: 1) How much pain did the person *express* on his/her face? 2) How much pain did the person *actually* feel? 3) How *unpleasant* did you feel to watch the person in this situation? The order of these three questions was pseudo-randomized. Moreover, eight catch trials randomly interspersed across the validation study to test whether participants maintained attention to the stimuli. Here, participants were asked to correctly select the demonstrator they had seen in the last video, between two static images of the correct and a distractor demonstrator displayed side by side, both showing neutral facial expressions.

The validation study was implemented within the online survey platform SoSci Survey (https://www.soscisurvey.de), with a study participation invite published on Amazon Mechanical Turk (https://www.mturk.com/), a globally commercial platform allowing for online testing. Survey data of 62 out of 110 participants (34 females; age: Mean = 28.71 years, S.D. =10.11) were entered into analysis (inclusion criteria: false rate for the test questions < 2/8, survey duration > 20 min and < 150 min, and the maximum number of continuous identical ratings < 5). Based on this validation step, we had to exclude videos of 6 demonstrators (3 females) for which participants showed a significant difference in painful expressions in others between the genuine pain and the pretended pain conditions. As a result of this validation, videos of 14 demonstrators (7 females), which showed no difference in the pain *expression* rating between genuine and pretended conditions, and which overall showed comparable mean ratings in all three ratings, were selected for the subsequent pilot study.

In the pilot study, 47 participants (24 females; age: Mean = 26.28 years, S.D. = 8.80) were recruited for a behavioral experiment in the behavioral laboratory. The aim was to verify the experimental effects and the feasibility of the experimental procedures that we intended to use in the main fMRI experiment, as well as to identify video stimuli that may not yield the predicted responses. Thus, all four conditions described above were presented to the participants. Participants were explicitly instructed that they would watch other persons' genuine painful expressions in some blocks, while in other blocks, they would see other persons acting out painful expressions (recall that in reality, all demonstrators had been actors, and the information about this type of necessary deception was conveyed to participants at the debriefing stage). They would see all demonstrators' neutral expressions as well. Participants were instructed to rate the three questions mentioned above. Upon screening for video clips that showed aberrant responses, we excluded videos of two demonstrators (1 female), for whom the pain *expression* rating difference between the pretended vs. genuine expressions was large. 48 videos of 12 demonstrators entered the following analyses. Three separate repeated-measures ANOVAs were respectively performed for the three rating questions. For the main effect of *genuineness* (genuine vs. pretended), it was not significant and low in effect size for painful expressions in others ($F_{\text{genuineness}}(1, 46) = 2.939$, $p = 0.093$, $\eta^2 = 0.060$), but was significant with high effect size for the painful feelings in others ($F_{\text{genuineness}}(1, 46) = 280.112$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.859$) as well as the unpleasantness in self ($F_{\text{genuineness}}(1, 46) = 43.143$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.484$). The main effects of *pain* (pain vs. no pain) for all three questions were found significant with high effect size (the smallest effect size was for the rating of unpleasantness in self, $F_{\text{pain}}(1, 46) = 82.199$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.641$). Our pilot study thus a) provided assuring evidence that the novel experimental paradigm worked as expected, and b) made it possible to select video clips that we could match for the two conditions (i.e., genuine pain and pretended pain). More specifically, as expected and required for the main study, participants rated the painfulness of the demonstrators to be substantially higher when it was genuine as compared to those that were pretended, and this also resulted in much higher unpleasantness experienced in the self. It is worth noting that, the two

conditions did not differ with respect to the ratings of the painful facial expressions, implying that putative differences in ratings as well as the subsequent brain imaging data could only be attributed to the contextual appraisal of the demonstrators' actual painful states, rather than the differences in facial pain perception. Based on this pilot study, we thus decided on video clips of 12 demonstrators (6 females) in the main fMRI experiment.

**Experimental design and procedure of the fMRI study**

The experiment was implemented using Cogent 2000 (version 1.33; http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent_2000.php). MRI scanning took place at the University of Vienna MRI Center. Once participants arrived at the scanner site, an experimenter instructed them that they would watch videos from the four conditions outlined above. Participants were explicitly instructed to recreate the feelings of the demonstrators shown in the videos as vividly and intensely as possible. Based on the validation and pilot study, the painful *expressions* for the genuine and pretended conditions were matched. We also counterbalanced the demonstrators appearing in the genuine and pretended conditions across participants, thus controlling for differences in behavioral and brain response that could be explained by differences between the stimulus sets. Note that, all video clips were validated and piloted multiple times to ensure the experimental effect (details can be found in the section above).

The participant performed the fMRI experiment in two runs (Figure 1A and 1B). Each run was composed of two blocks showing genuine pain and two blocks showing pretended pain. In each block, the participant watched nine video clips containing both painful and neutral videos. To remind participants' the condition of the upcoming block, a label of 4 s duration appeared at the beginning of each block, showing either "genuine" or "pretended" (in German). Each trial started with a fixation cross (+) presented for 4 – 7 s (in steps of 1.5 s, Mean = 5.5 s). After that, the video (duration = 2 s) was played. A short jitter was inserted after the video for 0.5 – 1.0 s (in steps of 0.05 s, Mean = 0.75 s). After the jitter, the following three questions were displayed (in German) one after the other

in a pseudo-randomized order: 1) How much pain did the person *express* on his/her face? 2) How much pain did the person *actually feel*? 3) How *unpleasant did you feel* to watch the person in this situation? Beneath each question, a visual analog scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 8 (unbearable) with 9 tick-marks was positioned. The participant moved the marker along the scale by pressing the left or right keys on the button box, and they pressed the middle key to confirm their answer. The marker initially was always located at the midpoint ("4") of the scale. When the confirmed key was pressed, the marker turned from black to red. All ratings lasted for 4 s even when the participant pressed the confirmed key before the end of this period. Between the two runs, the participant had a short break (1-2 min).

Before entering the scanner, participants conducted practice trials on the computer to get familiarized with the button box and the experimental interface. After that, participants were moved into the scanner and performed the task. Following the functional imaging runs, a 6.5 min structural scanning was employed. When participants finished the scanning session, they were scheduled for a date to complete three questionnaires in the lab: the Empathy Components Questionnaire (ECQ) (Batchelder, 2015; Batchelder et al., 2017), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1980), and the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS) (Bagby et al., 1994). For the ECQ, there are 27 items in total to be categorized into five subscales: cognitive ability, cognitive drive, affective ability, affective drive, and affective reactivity, using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 4 ("strongly agree") (Batchelder, 2015; Batchelder et al., 2017). For the IRI, there are 28 items divided into four subscales: perspective taking, fantasy, empathic concern, and personal distress, using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 ("does not describe me well") to 4 ("describes me very well") (Davis, 1980). For the TAS, there are 20 items and three subscales - difficulty describing feelings, difficulty identifying feelings, and externally oriented thinking, using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 5 ("strongly agree") (Bagby et al., 1994). The average interval between the scanning session and the lab survey was one week. The participant was debriefed after completing the whole study.

**Behavioral data analysis**

We applied repeated-measures ANOVAs to investigate the main effects and the interaction of the two factors genuine vs. pretended and pain vs. no pain, using SPSS (version 26.0; IBM). Furthermore, we conducted Pearson correlations to examine whether ratings of painful feelings in others were correlated with unpleasantness in self for the genuine pain and the pretended pain. The correlation coefficients were further compared using a bootstrap approach with the R package bootcorci (https://github.com/GRousselet/bootcorci).

**fMRI data acquisition**

fMRI data were collected using a Siemens Magnetom Skyra MRI scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) with a 32-channel head coil. Functional whole-brain scans were collected using a multiband-accelerated T2*-weighted echoplanar imaging (EPI) sequence (multiband acceleration factor = 4, interleaved ascending acquisition in multi-slice mode, 52 slices co-planar to the connecting line between anterior and posterior commissure, TR = 1200 ms, TE = 34 ms, acquisition matrix = 96 × 96 voxels, FOV = 210 × 210 $mm^2$, flip angle = 66°, inter-slice gap = 0.4 mm, voxel size = 2.2 × 2.2 × 2 $mm^3$). Two functional imaging runs, each lasting around 16 min (~800 images per run), were performed. Structural images were acquired with a magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo (MPRAGE) sequence (TE/TR = 2.43/2300 ms, flip angle = 8°, ascending acquisition, single-shot multi-slice mode, FOV= 240 × 240 $mm^2$, voxel size = 0.8×0.8×0.8 $mm^3$, 208 sagittal slices, slice thickness = 0.8 mm).

**fMRI data processing and mass-univariate functional segregation analyses**

Imaging data were preprocessed with a combination of Nipype (Gorgolewski et al., 2011) and MATLAB (version R2018b 9.5.0; MathWorks) with Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM12; https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm12/). Raw data were imported into BIDS format (http://bids.neuroimaging.io/). Functional data were subsequently preprocessed using slice timing

452 correction to the middle slice (Sladky et al., 2011), realignment to the first image of each session, co-
453 registration to the T1 image, segmentation between grey matter, white matter and cerebrospinal
454 fluid (CSF), normalization to MNI template space using Diffeomorphic Anatomical Registration
455 Through Exponentiated Lie Algebra (DARTEL) toolbox (Ashburner, 2007), and smoothing with a 6
456 mm full width at half-maximum (FWHM) three-dimensional Gaussian kernel.

457 To improve data quality, we performed data scrubbing of the functional scans for those whose
458 frame-wise displacements (FD) were over 0.5 mm (Power et al., 2012; Power et al., 2014). In other
459 words, we identified individual outlier scans and flagged the volume indices as nuisance regressors
460 in the general linear model (GLM) for the first-level analysis.

461 In order to perform mass-univariate functional segregation analyses, a first-level GLM design matrix
462 was created and composed of two identically modeled runs for each participant. Seven regressors of
463 interest were entered in each model: stimulation phase of the four conditions (i.e., genuine pain,
464 genuine no pain, pretended pain, pretended no pain; 2000 ms), rating phase of the three questions
465 (i.e., painful expressions in others, painful feelings in others, and unpleasantness in self; 12000 ms).
466 Six head motion parameters and the scrubbing regressors (FD > 0.5 mm; if applicable) were
467 additionally entered as nuisance regressors. Individual contrasts of the four conditions and the three
468 ratings (all across the two runs) against implicit baseline were respectively created.

469 On the second level, a flexible factorial design was employed to perform the group-level analysis.
470 The design included three factors: a between-subject factor (i.e., subject) that was specified
471 independent and with equal variance, a within-subject factor (i.e., genuine or pretended) that was
472 specified dependent and with equal variance, and a second within-subject factor (i.e., pain or no
473 pain) that was specified dependent and with equal variance (Gläscher & Gitelman, 2008). Three
474 contrasts were computed: (1) main effect of genuine: pain – no pain, (2) main effect of pretended:
475 pain – no pain, and (3) interaction: genuine (pain – no pain) – pretended (pain – no pain). We
476 applied an initial threshold of $p < 0.001$ (uncorrected) at the voxel level and a family-wise error

(FWE) correction ($p < 0.05$) at the cluster level. The cluster extent threshold was determined by the SPM extension "cp_cluster_Pthresh.m" (https://goo.gl/kjVydz).

**Brain-behavior relationships**

A multiple regression model was built on the group level to investigate the relationship between specific brain activations and behavioral ratings. In this model, the contrast genuine pain – pretended pain was set as the dependent variable, and three behavioral ratings were specified as independent variables. All covariates were mean-centered. The model aimed to test which brain activations of the contrast could be explained by an independent variable after accounting for the other two. Note that, we performed the regression model with the contrast genuine pain – pretended pain instead of the more exhaustive contrast genuine (pain - no pain) - pretended (pain – no pain), and this was because the genuine and the pretended pain conditions were the main focus of our work. Moreover, the pain contrast showed more robust (in terms of statistical effect size) and widespread activations across the brain, making it more likely to pick up possible brain-behavior relationships. The same threshold as above was applied in this analysis.

We aimed to assess these brain-behavior relationships for the following regions of interest (ROI): 1) aIns and aMCC, i.e., two regions associated with affective processes and specifically with empathy for pain, 2) rSMG, an area implicated in affective self-other distinction. The ROI masks were defined as the conjunction of the averaging contrast between genuine and pretended: pain – no pain (threshold: voxel-wise FWE correction, $p < 0.05$) and the anatomical masks created by the Wake Forest University (WFU) Pick Atlas SPM toolbox (http://fmri.wfubmc.edu) with the automated anatomical atlas (AAL). The ROI masks were created with Marsbar ROI Toolbox implemented in SPM12 (Brett et al., 2002). Note that we specifically selected the ROIs this way, such that they were orthogonal (i.e., independent) to the subsequent analyses of interest. As exploratory analyses found significant correlations mainly in aIns, rather than in aMCC, we will focus in the results section on

two ROIs: the right aIns and the rSMG. Focusing on the right aIns instead of the left one was because the right aIns is on the ipsilateral hemisphere as rSMG.

**Analyses using dynamic causal modeling (DCM)**

To investigate the functional network involved in affective processes and self-other distinction and how it was modulated by our experimental manipulations (i.e., genuine pain and pretended pain), we used DCM to estimate the effective connectivity between the ROIs based on the tasked-related brain responses (Stephan & Friston, 2010, for review). The DCM analyses were conducted with DCM12.5 implemented in SPM12 (v. 7771). Firstly, we extracted individual time series separately for each ROI. To ensure the selected voxels engaged in a task-relevant activity but not random signal fluctuations, we determined the voxels both on a group-level threshold and an individual-level threshold (Holmes et al., 2020). An initial threshold was set as $p < 0.05$, uncorrected. The significant voxels in the main effect of genuine pain and pretended pain were further selected by an individual threshold. For each participant, an individual peak coordinate within the ROI mask was searched and an individual mask was consequently defined using a sphere of the 6 mm radius around the peak. As a result, the individual time series for each ROI was extracted from the significant voxels of the individual mask and summarized by the first eigenvariate. One participant was excluded as no voxels survived significance testing. Secondly, we specified three regressors of interest: genuine pain, pretended pain, and the video input condition (the combination of genuine pain and pretended pain). That we did not specify no-pain conditions was because 1) the pain conditions were our main focus, and 2) adding no-interest conditions would inevitably increase the model complexity. Then, a fully connected DCM model for each participant was created. Three parameters were specified: 1) bidirectional connections between regions and self-connections (matrix A), 2) modulatory effects (i.e., genuine pain and pretended pain) on the between-region connections (matrix B), and 3) driving inputs (i.e., the video input condition) into the model on both regions (matrix C) (Zeidman et al., 2019a). To remain parsimonious, we did not set modulatory effects on the self-connections in Matrix

A. Then the full DCM model was individually estimated. Finally, group-level DCM inference was performed using parametric empirical Bayes (Zeidman et al., 2019b). We conducted an automatic search over the entire model space (max. n =256) using Bayesian model reduction (BMR) and random-effects Bayesian model averaging (BMA), resulting in a final group model that takes accuracy, complexity, and uncertainty into account (Zeidman et al., 2019b). The threshold of the Bayesian posterior probability was set to $p_p > 0.95$ (i.e., *strong evidence*) but we reported all parameters above $p_p > 0.75$ (i.e., *positive evidence*) for full transparency of the DCM results. Finally, a paired sample *t*-test was performed to compare modulatory effects between the genuine pain and the pretended pain conditions.

To probe whether task-related modulatory effects were associated with behavioral measurements, we performed stepwise linear regression analyses of modulatory parameters with, 1) the three behavioral ratings, and 2) the empathy-related questionnaires (i.e., IRI, ECQ, and TAS). We set up two regression models for the genuine pain condition and the pretended pain condition, respectively, in which the DCM parameters of modulatory effects were determined as dependent variables and the ratings of painful expressions in others, painful feelings in others, and unpleasantness in self as independent variables. Accordingly, we performed additional two regression models for both conditions in which DCM modulatory effects were set as dependent variables and scores of each subscale of all questionnaires were set as independent variables, respectively. As two participants did not complete all three questionnaires, we excluded their data from the regression analyses. The statistical significance of the regression analysis was set to $p < 0.05$. The multicollinearity for independent variables was diagnosed using the variance inflation factor (VIF) that measures the correlation among independent variables, in the R package car (https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/car/index.html). Here we used a rather conservative threshold of $VIF < 5$ as a sign of no severe multicollinearity (Menard, 2002; James et al., 2013).

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557 **Conflicts of interest**

558 The authors declare no competing financial interests.

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


727 **Figure 1. fMRI experimental design and behavioral results.** (A) Overview of the experimental design
728 with the four conditions genuine vs. pretended, pain vs. no pain. Examples show static images, while
729 in the experiment participants were shown video clips. (B) Overview of experimental timeline. At the
730 outset of each block, a reminder of "genuine" or "pretended" was shown (both terms are shown
731 here for illustrative purposes, in the experiment either genuine or pretended was displayed). After a
732 fixation cross, a video in the corresponding condition appeared on the screen. Followed by a short
733 jitter, three questions about the video were separately presented and had to be rated on a visual
734 analogue scale. These would then be followed by the next video clip and questions (not shown). (C)
735 Violin plots of the three types of ratings for all conditions. Participants generally demonstrated
736 higher ratings for painful expressions in others, painful feelings in others, and unpleasantness in self
737 in the genuine pain condition than in the pretended pain condition. Ratings of all three questions
738 were higher in the painful situation than in the neutral situation, regardless of whether in the
739 genuine or pretended condition. The thick black lines illustrate mean values, and the white boxes
740 indicate a 95% CI. The dots are individual data, and the "violin" outlines illustrate their estimated

741 density at different points of the scale. (D) Correlations of painful feelings in others and
742 unpleasantness in self for the genuine pain and the pretended pain (the relevant questions were
743 highlighted with a green rectangular). Results revealed a significant Pearson correlation between the
744 two questions in the genuine pain condition, but no correlation in the pretended pain condition. The
745 lines represent the fitted regression lines, bands indicate a 95% CI.

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


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748 **Figure 2. Neuroimaging results: Mass-univariate analyses.** (A) Activation maps of genuine: pain – no
749 pain (top), pretended: pain - no pain (middle), and genuine (pain – no pain) – pretended (pain – no
750 pain) (bottom). As expected, we found brain activations in the bilateral aIns, aMCC, and rSMG in all
751 three contrasts (except for the bottom contrast, where the right aIns is only close to the significance
752 threshold). (B) The multiple regression analysis demonstrated significant clusters in the left (peak: [-
753 42, 15, -2]) and right anterior insular cortex (peak: [45, 5, 8]) for the ratings of unpleasantness in self.
754 All activations are thresholded with cluster-level FWE correction, $p < 0.05$ ($p < 0.001$ uncorrected
755 initial selection threshold).

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


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761 **Figure 3. DCM results and brain-behavior analyses.** (A) ROIs included in the DCM: aIns (blue; peak:
762 [33, 29, 2]) and rSMG (green; peak: [41, -39, 42]). (B) Posterior probability of modulatory effects for
763 the genuine pain and the pretended pain. (C) The group-average DCM model. Green arrows indicate
764 neural excitation, and orange arrows indicate neural inhibition. Importantly, we found strong
765 evidence of inhibitory effects on the connection of aIns to rSMG for both the genuine pain condition
766 and the pretended pain condition. Values without the bracket quantify the strength of connections
767 and values in the bracket indicate the posterior probability of connections. All DCM parameters of
768 the optimal model showed greater than a 95% posterior probability (i.e., strong evidence) except for
769 the intrinsic connection of aIns to rSMG ($p_p$ = 0.80). Paired sample t-test showed less inhibitory
770 effects of the aIns-to-rSMG connection for the genuine pain than the pretended pain. This result is

771 highlighted with a grey rectangular. Data are mean ± 95% CI. (D) The stepwise linear regression

772 model revealed a positive correlation between the inhibitory effect and painful feelings in others

773 (after accounting for the other two ratings) for genuine pain but no correlation for pretended pain.

774

775 **Table 1.** Results of mass-univariate functional segregation analyses in the MNI space. Region names
776 were labeled with the AAL atlas, threshold $p < 0.05$ cluster-wise FWE correction (initial selection
777 threshold $p < 0.001$, uncorrected). BA = Brodmann area, L = left hemisphere, R = right hemisphere.

778

| Region label | BA | Cluster size | *x* | *y* | *z* | *t*-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Genuine: pain - no pain** | | | | | | |
| Lingual_R | 18 | 183732 | 11 | -84 | -3 | 13.38 |
| Temporal_Pole_Sup_R | 38 | | 30 | 33 | -33 | 13.31 |
| Supp_Motor_Area_R | 8 | | 5 | 15 | 51 | 12.96 |
| Supp_Motor_Area_R | 8 | | 3 | 17 | 50 | 12.92 |
| Supp_Motor_Area_L | 8 | | -5 | 17 | 48 | 12.56 |
| Insula_L | 45 | | -32 | 26 | 6 | 12.32 |
| Insula_R | 45 | | 33 | 29 | 3 | 12.09 |
| Frontal_Inf_Oper_R | 44 | | 51 | 14 | 15 | 12.01 |
| Frontal_Inf_Oper_R | 44 | | 50 | 12 | 18 | 11.79 |
| Precentral_L | 6 | | -42 | 3 | 39 | 11.72 |
| Fusiform_R | 20 | 463 | 36 | -5 | -41 | 5.58 |
| **Pretended: pain - no pain** | | | | | | |
| Supp_Motor_Area_R | 8 | 59665 | 5 | 20 | 48 | 11.80 |
| Supp_Motor_Area_L | 8 | | -6 | 18 | 50 | 11.14 |
| Frontal_Inf_Oper_L | 44 | | -50 | 15 | 15 | 10.39 |
| Insula_R | 45 | | 33 | 29 | 0 | 9.81 |
| Insula_L | 45 | | -29 | 30 | 0 | 9.60 |
| Frontal_Inf_Tri_R | 44 | | 47 | 15 | 26 | 9.21 |
| Precuneus_L | 7 | 35136 | -9 | -71 | 41 | 10.27 |
| Parietal_Inf_L | 39 | | -32 | -51 | 41 | 9.39 |
| Precuneus_R | 7 | | 9 | -69 | 38 | 8.44 |
| Temporal_Mid_L | 21 | | -53 | -47 | 5 | 7.67 |
| Occipital_Mid_L | 19 | | -44 | -78 | 2 | 7.47 |
| Parietal_Inf_R | 39 | | 39 | -50 | 41 | 7.25 |
| Temporal_Mid_R | 22 | 12970 | 51 | -20 | -6 | 7.70 |
| Lingual_R | 17 | | 12 | -86 | -2 | 7.40 |
| Fusiform_R | 37 | | 47 | -33 | -27 | 5.32 |
| Occipital_Mid_R | 18 | | 33 | -86 | 3 | 5.23 |
| Cingulum_Mid_R | 23 | 1666 | -3 | -14 | 27 | 6.35 |
| Cingulum_Mid_L | 23 | | -3 | -24 | 32 | 5.57 |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Temporal_Pole_Sup_R | 47 | 589 | 32 | 35 | -33 | 7.18 |
| Frontal_Sup_Orb_R | 11 | | 17 | 41 | -24 | 3.36 |
| **Genuine (pain – no pain) – pretended (pain – no pain)** | 19 | 18 | 24 | -81 | 39 | 5.27 |
| SupraMarginal_L | 40 | 1877 | -66 | -21 | 32 | 4.94 |
| Postcentral_L | 1 | | -50 | -21 | 26 | 3.75 |
| SupraMarginal_R | 40 | 1833 | 63 | -20 | 42 | 5.09 |
| Rolandic_Oper_R | 40 | | 59 | -15 | 14 | 4.47 |
| Insula_L | 13 | 1299 | -38 | -3 | -2 | 5.01 |
| Rolandic_Oper_L | 4 | | -45 | -6 | 8 | 4.8 |
| Cingulum_Ant_L | 32 | 1138 | 0 | 41 | 17 | 4.54 |
| Cingulum_Mid_R | 32 | | 2 | 24 | 32 | 4.45 |
| Cingulum_Mid_L | 24 | | 0 | 2 | 35 | 4.43 |
| Cingulum_Ant_R | 8 | | 2 | 32 | 27 | 4.42 |
| Lingual_R | 18 | 1003 | 9 | -84 | -3 | 5.72 |
| Calcarine_R | 17 | | 18 | -78 | 8 | 3.61 |
| Insula_R | 13 | 225 | 39 | 8 | -3 | 3.91 |
| Rolandic_Oper_R | 13 | | 41 | 0 | 11 | 3.77 |

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