

# Runaway evolution from male-male competition

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## AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

AJM, JWM, and JBW conceived the idea, developed the model, and wrote the paper.

## KEYWORDS

aggression, honest signals, indirect genetic effects, male-male competition, quantitative genetics, runaway evolution, sexual selection, social evolution, weapons

## 1 **Abstract**

2 Wondrously elaborate weapons and displays that appear to be counter to ecological optima  
3 are widespread features of male contests for mates across the animal kingdom. To understand  
4 how such diverse traits evolve, here we develop a quantitative genetic model of sexual  
5 selection for a male signaling trait that mediates aggression in male-male contests and show  
6 that an honest indicator of aggression can generate selection on itself by altering the social  
7 environment. This can cause selection to accelerate as the trait is elaborated, leading to  
8 runaway evolution. Thus, an evolving source of selection provided by the social environment  
9 is the fundamental unifying feature of runaway sexual selection driven by either male-male  
10 competition or female mate choice. However, a key difference is that runaway driven by  
11 male-male competition requires signal honesty. Our model identifies simple conditions that  
12 provide clear, testable predictions for empirical studies using standard quantitative genetic  
13 methods.

## 14 INTRODUCTION

15 Darwin (1859, 1871) chronicled the amazing diversity of traits associated with success in  
16 mating, proposing the theory of sexual selection to explain the diverse exaggerated,  
17 spectacular, and bizarre structures and behaviors found in males of many species. Darwin  
18 suggested that such traits evolve either because they enhance success in contests between  
19 males for access to females or because they are preferred by females when choosing mates.  
20 As Darwin (1871) wrote, “It is certain that amongst almost all animals there is a struggle  
21 between the males for the possession of the female. This fact is so notorious that it would be  
22 superfluous to give examples.” In contrast, the ability of females to influence evolution  
23 through choice of partners was almost immediately questioned and continued to be  
24 controversial for decades after Darwin (Wallace 1889; Huxley 1938). However, theoretical  
25 models of evolution via female choice (Lande 1981; Kirkpatrick 1982; Mead & Arnold 2004)  
26 and empirical research documenting female preference in nature (Andersson 1982, 1994;  
27 Rosenthal 2017) eventually led to mate choice becoming the dominant paradigm in studies of  
28 sexual selection. The development of formal mathematical models showing that male traits  
29 and female preferences coevolve in self-reinforcing fashion, an idea first proposed by Fisher  
30 (1915, 1930), was particularly crucial to the acceptance of mate choice as an important  
31 evolutionary mechanism. The key component of the Fisher process is that female preference  
32 and a preferred male trait become genetically correlated as a result of assortative mating that  
33 generates linkage disequilibrium between the preference and male trait. This can cause  
34 sexually selected male traits to evolve at ever-increasing speed, a pattern that has been  
35 referred to as an evolutionary “runaway” (Fisher 1930; Lande 1981; Bailey & Moore 2012).

36 Despite the current bias towards studies focused on mate choice, Darwin was not  
37 wrong about male-male competition. Members of entire taxa are characterized by highly  
38 modified sexually dimorphic structures that function only in male contests (e.g., Dermaptera,  
39 Briceño & Eberhard 1995). Weapons can evolve to be massive and create real functional  
40 constraints for the males that bear them, and such bizarrely elaborate and diverse structures  
41 associated with duels are indeed found across the animal kingdom (Emlen 2008, 2014;  
42 McCullough *et al.* 2016; O'Brien *et al.* 2018). In fact, male-male competition remains a more  
43 common source of selection shaping male traits that influence mating success, and traits  
44 expressed in male-male interactions can be as elaborate as those that are the target of female  
45 preferences (Darwin 1871; Huxley 1938; Andersson 1994; Moore & Moore 2006; Emlen  
46 2008, 2014; McCullough *et al.* 2016; O'Brien *et al.* 2018). However, we still lack robust

47 genetic models that generate testable predictions for the evolution of sexually selected traits  
48 via male-male competition. Notably, the potential for male-male competition to result in a  
49 runaway process that drives extreme trait elaboration remains unresolved.

50 Many elaborate male traits used in male-male contests, such as showy plumage  
51 (Hagelin 2002), color (Seehausen & Schluter 2004), pheromones (Moore *et al.* 1997b), and  
52 structures such as antlers (Wilkinson & Dodson 1997), horns (Emlen *et al.* 2005), forceps  
53 (Briceño & Eberhard 1995), and claws (Sneddon *et al.* 1997) function as signals that may  
54 provide information about some underlying qualities of the individuals, such as the  
55 willingness or ability to fight (Parker 1974; Maynard Smith & Harper 1988; Maynard Smith  
56 & Harper 2003; Emlen 2008, 2014). For example, there is often a positive association  
57 between signals or weapons and other traits such as body size (McCullough *et al.* 2016;  
58 O'Brien *et al.* 2018), making the signal or weapon an honest indicator of potential threat to an  
59 opponent. As such, males are expected to adaptively modulate their behavior in response to  
60 these signaling traits, escalating contests they are more likely to win and withdrawing from  
61 ones they are more likely to lose. Because the effect of signaling traits inherently depends on  
62 social context, such traits serve as both targets and sources of selection, potentially leading to  
63 self-reinforcing and accelerating selection as occurs in the runaway process driven by female  
64 preference (Lande 1981; Bailey & Kölliker 2019). However, despite insights from game  
65 theory models (Parker 1974; Maynard Smith & Brown 1986; Maynard Smith & Harper 1988;  
66 Maynard Smith & Harper 2003; Rutte *et al.* 2006), how this fundamental feature of extreme  
67 elaboration – an evolving source of selection – may arise within male-male contests is  
68 unclear.

69 Here, we utilize a framework that explicitly incorporates socially contingent trait  
70 expression and fitness (Moore *et al.* 1997a; Wolf *et al.* 1999; McGlothlin *et al.* 2010) to  
71 model trait evolution arising from male-male competition. We show that when honest signals  
72 are used to modulate the behavior of competitors, male-male competition leads to  
73 evolutionary elaboration of male traits. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for  
74 trait elaboration to become a runaway process and outline predictions that can be empirically  
75 tested to evaluate this scenario in natural systems. We show that sexual selection by male-  
76 male competition can have features that are analogous to those of runaway sexual selection by  
77 female choice; just as in female mate choice, the social environment in male-male contests  
78 may generate a self-reinforcing source of selection on the traits that mediate the interaction,  
79 potentially leading to self-sustaining and escalating selection.

## 80 **MODEL**

81 To capture the influence of the social environment in a model of male-male competition, we  
82 assume that individuals adjust their behavior in response to the signaling trait values of their  
83 social partners, an assumption that is supported empirically and theoretically (Parker 1974;  
84 West-Eberhard 1979; Maynard Smith 1982; West-Eberhard 1983, 1984; Moore *et al.* 1997a;  
85 West-Eberhard 2003; O'Brien *et al.* 2018; Tinghitella *et al.* 2018; Rico-Guevara & Hurme  
86 2019; Wiens & Tuschhoff 2020). Because the social context (i.e., the social environment) is  
87 constructed from traits of conspecifics, this flexible response to social context provides the  
88 opportunity for indirect genetic effects (Moore *et al.* 1997a), which allow the social  
89 environment itself to evolve (Moore *et al.* 2002; Wolf 2003; Bijma & Wade 2008;  
90 McGlothlin *et al.* 2010). Evolutionary changes in the social environment can lead to  
91 concerted evolution because the social environment can be a source of selection on the traits  
92 that themselves compose the social environment (West-Eberhard 1979; Wolf *et al.* 1999;  
93 Bailey & Kölliker 2019; Araya-Ajoy *et al.* 2020; McGlothlin *et al.* 2022). Such “social  
94 selection” (West-Eberhard 1979, 1983, 1984; Wolf *et al.* 1999; Bijma & Wade 2008;  
95 McGlothlin *et al.* 2010) is expected to arise whenever traits act as both agents and targets of  
96 selection.

97 Our model assumptions are based on common conditions observed in male-male  
98 contests (Emlen 2008, 2014; Eberhard *et al.* 2018). Although we model the outcome of  
99 pairwise duels between males drawn at random from the population, our model is easily  
100 generalized to include multiple interactions between males (Supporting Appendix). First, we  
101 assume that males possess a trait (designated by the subscript  $S$ ) that is used as a signal  
102 conveying potential threat in social contests. There are many diverse examples include traits  
103 such as plumage patches, exaggerated weapons, or vocal or chemical signals. Elaboration of  
104 the signal may consist of an increase in size or complexity, although for heuristic simplicity,  
105 we discuss the evolution of increased signal size. Second, we assume that males vary in the  
106 underlying quality trait that reflects their fighting ability or some other aspect of their  
107 phenotype that determines the potential interaction cost they represent to their opponent in a  
108 contest. We describe this trait as body size (designated by the subscript  $B$ ) for simplicity (see  
109 the discussion of male quality in Eberhard *et al.* 2018). Finally, we assume males respond to  
110 the assessment of the signal by modulating their behavioral response of aggression toward

111 their opponent (designated by the subscript  $A$ ) within the contest because the signal provides  
112 information on the likelihood that they would win an escalated contest (see below).

113 We assume that both signal size ( $z_S$ ) and body size ( $z_B$ ) are normally distributed  
114 metric traits influenced by many loci of small effect. Expression of these traits can be  
115 partitioned into heritable additive genetic effects (denoted  $a_S$  and  $a_B$ ) and general non-  
116 heritable (environmental and nonadditive genetic) effects (denoted  $e_S$  and  $e_B$ ). We assume  
117 that neither signal nor body size changes as a result of the social interaction. An individual's  
118 total phenotypic value for each trait is then described by a simple sum of the heritable and  
119 non-heritable components:

$$120 \quad z_i = a_i + e_i, \quad (1)$$

121 where  $a_i$  is normally distributed with mean  $\bar{a}_i$  and variance  $G_{ii}$  and  $e_i$  is normally distributed  
122 with mean 0 and variance  $E_{ii}$ . We make the standard quantitative genetic assumption that  
123 heritable and non-heritable components are uncorrelated.

124 We model male-male competition where the larger males will defeat smaller males in  
125 a fight. We therefore further assume that the phenotypic value for aggressive behavior ( $z_A$ )  
126 associated with a given genotype depends on social context, influenced by their rival's signal  
127 size relative to their own, as suggested by West-Eberhard (1979, 1983, 1984). This effect is  
128 captured in our model as a term in which aggression scales with the magnitude of the size  
129 difference between opponents, which is supported by optimality models and empirical studies  
130 (Huxley 1938; Parker 1974; Riechert 1984; Sneddon *et al.* 1997; Maynard Smith & Harper  
131 2003; Emlen 2008, 2014). The phenotypic value of aggression can thus be written:

$$132 \quad z_A = a_A + e_A + \delta_{AS}(z_S - z'_S), \quad (2)$$

133 where  $a_A$  and  $e_A$  represent standard additive genetic and uncorrelated non-heritable  
134 components, respectively. Here and elsewhere, terms with primes indicate a value assigned to  
135 the focal individual's opponent so  $z_S$  is the phenotypic value of the signal of the focal  
136 individual and  $z'_S$  of their opponent. The coefficient  $\delta_{AS}$  measures the influence of the  
137 difference in signal size on the expression of aggressive behavior. Thus,  $\delta_{AS}$  is analogous to  
138 the  $\psi$  term in standard interacting phenotype models (Moore *et al.* 1997a), but differs because  
139 it depends upon the value of an interactant's phenotype relative to the focal individual.  
140 Because signal size is heritable, the phenotype value of aggression for the focal individual  
141 includes modifications arising from both direct genetic effects of their own genotype ( $\delta_{AS}a_S$ )

142 and indirect genetic effects ( $-\delta_{AS}a'_S$ ), which is defined as the effect of a social interactant's  
143 genotype on the focal individual's phenotype (Moore *et al.* 1997a). We describe the  
144 relationship between this model and the standard model of indirect genetic effects in the  
145 Supporting Appendix.

146 The underlying genetic value of aggression is assumed to be genetically uncorrelated  
147 to both that of signal size and body size (i.e., there is no direct pleiotropic relationship  
148 between the traits such that genetic covariances  $G_{SA} = G_{BA} = 0$ ). This is a conservative  
149 assumption as a positive correlation would result in even faster evolution. However, the signal  
150 may be genetically correlated to body size, providing signal honesty, which is quantified by  
151 the covariance between signal size and body size ( $G_{SB}$ ). Because the level of aggression  
152 displayed is conditional on the social context, a correlation within the population is generated  
153 if males with larger signals and/or larger body size are more aggressive on average (and vice  
154 versa). Hence, aggression can be correlated to the signal and body size traits despite the  
155 absence of a direct pleiotropic link (or linkage disequilibrium) because the flexible behavioral  
156 response creates a relationship between these traits through the social interaction.

## 157 **Selection imposed by male-male competition**

158 In social interactions, associations between traits and fitness may cause selection via two  
159 pathways: nonsocial selection (quantified by the gradient  $\beta_N$ ), which arises from effects of a  
160 focal individual's traits on its own fitness, and social selection (quantified by the gradient  $\beta_S$ ),  
161 which arises from the effects of an opponent's traits on the fitness of a focal individual (Wolf  
162 *et al.* 1999). From Wolf *et al.* (1999), when both nonsocial and social selection are present,  
163 individual relative fitness can be written:

$$164 \quad w = w_0 + \mathbf{z}^T \boldsymbol{\beta}_N + \mathbf{z}'^T \boldsymbol{\beta}_S + \varepsilon, \quad (3)$$

165 where  $w_0$  is an intercept,  $\mathbf{z}$  and  $\mathbf{z}'$  are column vectors of focal and opponent traits,  $\boldsymbol{\beta}_N$  and  $\boldsymbol{\beta}_S$   
166 are vectors of nonsocial and social selection gradients,  $\varepsilon$  is an uncorrelated error term, and the  
167 superscript T denotes transposition. Expressing relative fitness using Eq. 3 has two distinct  
168 advantages. First, selection gradients can be estimated in natural populations using multiple  
169 regression (Lande & Arnold 1983; Wolf *et al.* 1999; Formica *et al.* 2011; Fisher & Pruitt  
170 2019), allowing our model to generate testable predictions. Second, selection gradients can be



171 combined with genetic parameters to predict short-term evolutionary response to selection  
172 (Lande & Arnold 1983; Bijma & Wade 2008; McGlothlin *et al.* 2010).

173 To understand how these selection gradients arise from male-male contests with  
174 signaling, we can use evolutionary game theory (see Supporting Appendix) to write a  
175 mechanistic expression for relative fitness:

$$176 \quad w = w_0 + b_A(z_A - z'_A) - c_A z_A z'_A - c_B z'_A z'_B - c_S(\bar{z}_S - \theta_S)z_S + \varepsilon, \quad (4)$$

177 where terms including  $b$  represent fitness benefits and terms including  $c$  represent fitness  
178 costs. In Eq. 4, the benefit term and the first cost term derive from the hawk-dove model of  
179 evolutionary game theory (Appendix; Maynard Smith & Price 1973; Maynard Smith 1982;  
180 McGlothlin *et al.* 2022). The coefficient  $b_A$  is the fitness benefit of winning a contest, which  
181 we assume derives from greater access to females. In a contest, access to females is  
182 determined by a focal individual's aggression relative to its opponent. Multiplying  $b_A$  by  
183  $(z_A - z'_A)$  reflects the fact that the probability of winning a contest increases as a male can  
184 become increasingly more aggressive than its opponent. This benefit, however, does not come  
185 without a cost. The term  $c_A z_A z'_A$  is the fitness cost of aggression associated with escalation of  
186 encounters. Logically, an individual pays a cost for acting aggressive that depends on the  
187 level of aggression shown by its opponent. In the hawk-dove model, this corresponds to the  
188 cost associated with a hawk player facing a hawk opponent, which increases in likelihood as  
189 both players act increasingly aggressive. A second fitness cost ( $c_B z'_A z'_B$ ) reflects the fact that  
190 the fitness impact of aggression by an opponent ( $z'_A$ ) depends on the size of the opponent ( $z'_B$ ).  
191 This cost, which we call the threat of the opponent, derives from the fact that larger males  
192 impose a greater risk of harm than do smaller males. Finally, we assume that a third cost  
193 ( $c_S(\bar{z}_S - \theta_S)z_S$ ) arises from natural selection favoring some optimal trait value ( $\theta_S$ ), which  
194 therefore will oppose signal elaboration. Following a Gaussian model of selection (Lande  
195 1976, 1979), selection against elaborate signals becomes stronger as the population mean of  
196 the signal ( $\bar{z}_S$ ) becomes further away from its naturally selected optimum ( $\theta_S$ ). Although we  
197 do not do so here, this term could be replaced with a multivariate Gaussian term (Lande 1979)  
198 to add naturally selected optima for aggression and body size.

199 Taking partial derivatives of with respect to focal and opponent traits (evaluated at the  
200 population mean) allows us to translate the fitness model in Eq. 4 into nonsocial and social  
201 selection gradients (McGlothlin *et al.* 2022; Supporting Appendix). The nonsocial gradients  
202 are:



203  $\beta_{N_S} = -c_S(\bar{z}_S - \theta_S)$  (5a)

204  $\beta_{N_B} = 0$  (5b)

205  $\beta_{N_A} = b_A - c_A\bar{z}_A$  (5c)

206 and social selection gradients:

207  $\beta_{S_S} = 0$  (6a)

208  $\beta_{S_B} = -c_B\bar{z}_A$  (6b)

209  $\beta_{S_A} = -b_A - c_A\bar{z}_A - c_B\bar{z}_B$ . (6c)

210 Thus, males with large signals are selected against via nonsocial selection but interacting with  
211 such males does not directly impose social selection (Eq. 5a). Body size is not under direct  
212 nonsocial selection but imposes a fitness cost via social selection that increases with the  
213 population mean of aggression (Eq. 5b). Nonsocial selection favors aggression until the  
214 benefits of aggression are outweighed by the costs, while social selection imposed by  
215 opponent's aggression is always negative, representing a net fitness cost (Eq. 5c). This  
216 gradient becomes increasingly negative as the population mean aggression and body size  
217 increase. These selection gradients suggest that signal size itself experiences no direct sexual  
218 selection. If signal size increases, it must do so as an indirect response to selection on a  
219 correlated trait.

## 220 **Evolutionary response to selection**

221 Selection within a generation is translated into an evolutionary response across generations  
222 through the association between the phenotype, upon which selection acts, and the genotype,  
223 which contributes to the inheritance of the traits across generations. In quantitative genetics,  
224 this genotype-phenotype relationship is most often summarized by the additive genetic  
225 variance, which is used to predict evolutionary response to selection across generations  
226 (Lande & Arnold 1983; Arnold 1994). However, for traits expressed in social interactions, we  
227 must also consider social pathways to fitness, which arise from indirect genetic effects and  
228 social selection, when calculating response to selection (Moore *et al.* 1997a; Bijma & Wade  
229 2008; McGlothlin *et al.* 2010). Because the model of phenotypic modification described in  
230 Eq. 2 deviates from the standard model of indirect genetic effects, we develop a general  
231 equation for response to selection in the Supporting Appendix (Eq. A10). Using this equation,  
232 the response to selection for the three traits in our model can in general be written:

$$233 \quad \Delta \bar{z}_S = \frac{1}{2} G_{SS} (\beta_{N_S} + \delta_{AS} (\beta_{N_A} - \beta_{S_A})) + \frac{1}{2} G_{SB} \beta_{N_B} \quad (7a)$$

$$234 \quad \Delta \bar{z}_B = \frac{1}{2} G_{BB} \beta_{N_B} + \frac{1}{2} G_{SB} (\beta_{N_S} + \delta_{AS} (\beta_{N_A} - \beta_{S_A})) \quad (7b)$$

$$235 \quad \Delta \bar{z}_A = \frac{1}{2} G_{AA} \beta_{N_A}. \quad (7c)$$

236 The multiplier  $\frac{1}{2}$  in Eq. 7 arises because selection is acting only on males. Eq. 7a shows that  
 237 modification of aggressive behavior in response to the signaling trait ( $\delta_{AS}$ ) causes both  
 238 nonsocial and social selection gradients for aggression to contribute to signal evolution. This  
 239 behavioral modification also contributes to evolution of body size when the signal is honest,  
 240 which is captured by the covariance between signal size and body size ( $G_{SB}$ ; Eq. 7b). This is  
 241 easily shown by setting the modification of aggression based on the signaling trait ( $\delta_{AS}$ ) to 0,  
 242 which recovers standard quantitative genetic expressions for evolution. In contrast, behavioral  
 243 modification never contributes to evolution of aggression (Eq. 7c).

244 By substituting Eqs. 5-6 into Eq. 7, we can predict evolutionary change using our  
 245 mechanistic fitness model (Eq. 4):

$$246 \quad \Delta \bar{z}_S = \frac{1}{2} G_{SS} (\delta_{AS} (2b_A + c_B \bar{z}_B) - c_S (\bar{z}_S - \theta_S)) \quad (8a)$$

$$247 \quad \Delta \bar{z}_B = \frac{1}{2} G_{SB} (\delta_{AS} (2b_A + c_B \bar{z}_B) - c_S (\bar{z}_S - \theta_S)) \quad (8b)$$

$$248 \quad \Delta \bar{z}_A = \frac{1}{2} G_{AA} (b_A - c_A \bar{z}_A). \quad (8c)$$

249 Eq. 8a shows that when fitness is defined as in Eq. 4, evolution of the signaling trait beyond  
 250 its naturally selected optimum depends crucially on modification of aggression. If males do  
 251 not change their aggression to the signal (i.e., if  $\delta_{AS} = 0$ ), the population mean of the  
 252 signaling trait cannot increase. From Eq. 8b, the evolution of body size depends on both  $\delta_{AS}$   
 253 and the presence of signal honesty (i.e.,  $G_{SB} > 0$ ). Eqs. 8a-b also show that evolution of the  
 254 signaling trait and of male body size is potentially open-ended because the evolutionary  
 255 response to selection for each trait becomes stronger as the population mean body size  
 256 increases. In contrast, from Eq. 8c, the evolution of aggression is self-limiting because  
 257 selection depends on the balance of the benefits and costs of aggression, the latter of which  
 258 become more intense as mean aggression intensifies. This observation suggests that both  
 259 signal size and body size may experience runaway evolution if the benefits of aggression and  
 260 the threat of the opponent are strong enough to outweigh natural selection against elaborate  
 261 signals, whereas aggression should always tend to quickly evolve to an equilibrium value.

262 To solve for equilibrium and to explore the conditions for such a runaway, we set Eqs.  
 263 8a-c equal to zero and solve for the equilibrium mean of each trait ( $\hat{z}_i$ ):

$$264 \quad \hat{z}_S = \theta_S + \delta_{AS} 2b_A + \delta_{AS} \frac{c_B}{c_S} \hat{z}_B \quad (9a)$$

$$265 \quad \hat{z}_B = \frac{c_S}{\delta_{AS} c_B} (\hat{z}_S - \theta_S) - \frac{2b_A}{c_B} \quad (9b)$$

$$266 \quad \hat{z}_A = \frac{b_A}{c_A}. \quad (9c)$$

267 As predicted, aggression will always reach a stable equilibrium whenever there is a cost of  
 268 aggression (Eq. 9c, Fig. 1). Eqs. 9a-b predicts a line of equilibria for signal size and body size,  
 269 because their evolutionary change is completely intertwined with the relationship  $\Delta \bar{z}_B =$   
 270  $\frac{G_{SB}}{G_{SS}} \Delta \bar{z}_S$  (Fig. 1). The slope of the line of equilibria predicting mean signal size from mean  
 271 body size, and hence the evolutionary allometry of signal size, is  $\delta_{AS} \frac{c_B}{c_S}$ . This relationship  
 272 indicates that when comparing population means through time or across space, positive  
 273 allometry (i.e., a slope greater than unity) is predicted when the strength of behavioral  
 274 modification multiplied by the threat of the opponent ( $\delta_{AS} c_B$ ) is greater than the strength of  
 275 natural selection on signal size ( $c_S$ ). In general, when male behavior is more strongly  
 276 dependent on the signal of their opponent (i.e., when  $\delta_{AS}$  is larger), more elaborate signals are  
 277 expected at equilibrium (Fig. 2).

278 Whether an evolving population will reach a predicted equilibrium (no runaway) or  
 279 overshoot it (runaway) also depends on the rate of evolution of body size versus natural  
 280 selection on signal size. Specifically, from Eq. 8a, for runaway evolution of signal size, body  
 281 size must evolve fast enough so that  $\delta_{AS}(2b_A + c_B \bar{z}_B) > c_S(\bar{z}_S - \theta_S)$ . Because  $b_A$  and  $\theta_S$  are  
 282 constants, this occurs when  $\delta_{AS} c_B \Delta \bar{z}_B > c_S \Delta \bar{z}_S$ , or equivalently:

$$283 \quad \frac{G_{SB}}{G_{SS}} \delta_{AS} c_B > c_S. \quad (10)$$

284 This result is also achievable by solving for the condition generating a negative eigenvalue of  
 285 the Jacobian of  $\Delta \bar{z}$ , which indicates an unstable equilibrium (Lande 1981; Bailey & Kölliker  
 286 2019).

287 The first term in Eq. 10 is the regression of body size on signal size, which is typically  
 288 large for weapons and signals (McCullough *et al.* 2016; Eberhard *et al.* 2018). As a regression  
 289 coefficient, this term measures the degree to which body size can be predicted from signal  
 290 size, which captures the logic of why the term measures signal honesty. In addition, Eq.10

291 indicates that runaway evolution of a signal is most likely to occur when three conditions  
292 exist: the signal is honest ( $G_{SB}$  is large and positive), it modifies aggressive behavior of social  
293 partners ( $\delta_{AS} > 0$ ), and aggression imposes a fitness cost that increases when opponents are  
294 larger ( $c_B$ ). Fig. 1 illustrates a scenario in which the predicted outcome (equilibrium or  
295 runaway) depends upon the value of the genetic covariance  $G_{SB}$ .

## 296 **DISCUSSION**

297 Our model provides explicit conditions for sexual selection arising from male-male  
298 competition to result in elaborate signals and runaway evolution. We model the origin of costs  
299 and benefits associated with male traits mediating male-male interactions using  
300 considerations from evolutionary game theory, which allows us to derive expressions for  
301 natural and social selection gradients that reflect the mechanistic properties of male contests  
302 (Eqs. 5-6). We incorporate these expressions for selection into a model of trait genetics based  
303 on the interacting phenotypes framework, which accounts for the influence of indirect genetic  
304 effects arising from interactions with an opponent (Eq. 2). Elaboration of a signal occurs  
305 whenever males adjust their level of aggression based on the signal of an opponent; i.e.,  
306  $\delta_{AS} > 0$  (Eq. 8a). This elaboration becomes runaway evolution when the signal is honest and  
307 when the cost imposed by aggression in an opponent increases with their body size (Eqs. 9a,  
308 10; Figs. 1-2). In contrast, aggression always reaches an equilibrium, both because the fitness  
309 benefit of aggression is relative to that of the opponent and because of the fitness costs of  
310 escalated contests (Eq. 9c). Limits to runaway evolution of the signaling trait depend on the  
311 strength of natural selection opposing signal elaboration, which may arise through costs of  
312 producing or bearing the signal.

313 Our model does not specify the nature of the costs and benefits associated with  
314 aggression, the signaling trait, and body size (condition). These are important variables, likely  
315 ecologically contingent, and empirical work that quantifies these costs and benefits will  
316 provide context for the generality of our model. However, one of the strengths of this  
317 quantitative genetic modeling approach is that it provides predictions that are testable in  
318 natural populations. Specifically, we expect the evolution of elaborate signaling traits that  
319 resolve duels between males to evolve when three conditions are present. First, signals should  
320 be reliable predictors of body size or some other proxy of fighting ability. Indeed, such signal  
321 honesty, which is often characterized as positive allometry (McCullough *et al.* 2016; O'Brien  
322 *et al.* 2018) or a positive genetic correlation between size and signal (Clark & Moore 1995;

323 McGlothlin *et al.* 2005; Laidre & Johnstone 2013), is a common feature of traits involved in  
324 male-male competition. Second, males must modify their behavior in response to their  
325 opponent's signal. We assume that males increase their aggression when encountering an  
326 opponent with a smaller signal than their own and reduce their aggression when encountering  
327 an opponent with a larger signal. Such adjustment is common in species that resolve contests  
328 via limited fights or displays (Darwin 1871; West-Eberhard 1979, 1983; Emlen 2008, 2014).  
329 In our model, this phenomenon alters the relationship between genotype and phenotype,  
330 causing a net force of social selection to contribute to signal evolution (Eqs. 7a, 8a). Finally,  
331 we expect social selection to be imposed via the aggression of opponents. This selection  
332 becomes stronger as male body size or fighting ability evolves due to the threat of escalation  
333 of fights with large opponents. Mean level of aggression need not change if the threat  
334 escalates. Our model makes specific predictions for the signs of these gradients when  
335 selection on signal size, body size, and aggression can all be measured (Eqs. 5-6). Most  
336 crucially, our model predicts negative social selection gradients for both body size and  
337 aggression, which reflect the costs of escalated contests. In populations that are experiencing  
338 an evolutionary runaway, these gradients should become stronger as body size and signal size  
339 coevolve. Although few studies have measured social selection gradients, the limited  
340 evidence that exists supports the existence of negative social selection gradients imposed by  
341 competitors (Formica *et al.* 2011; Fisher & Pruitt 2019).

## 342 **Parallels to Lande's model of female choice**

343 The results of our model are conceptually analogous to Lande's (1981) model of runaway  
344 sexual selection via female choice, suggesting some key parallels between the processes. Both  
345 our model and Lande's, which was the first formal model of Fisher's runaway process, result  
346 in lines of equilibria that may be stable or unstable depending on the genetic parameters. For  
347 the scenario of relative mate preference in Lande's model, the line of equilibria for a male  
348 trait ( $\hat{z}$ ) and a female preference ( $\hat{y}$ ) can be written:

$$349 \quad \hat{z} = \theta + \frac{b_{SS}}{c_{NS}} \hat{y} \quad (11)$$

350 where  $\theta$  is the naturally selected optimum,  $b_{SS}$  is the strength of sexual selection, and  $c_{NS}$  is  
351 the strength of natural selection. Eq. 11 directly parallels Eq. 9a from our model and  
352 emphasizes that in male-male competition, the force of sexual selection is provided not by  
353 direct female choice but by male body size (or some other measure of willingness or ability to

354 engage in aggression). In male-male competition, the threat of the opponent ( $c_B$ ) leads to  
355 social selection, which is indirectly translated into evolutionary change in male signals via the  
356 parameter  $\delta_{AS}$ , measuring the dependence of aggression on relative signal size of two  
357 competing males.

358 Similarly, the condition for runaway evolution of male traits and female preference  
359 driven by mate choice in Lande's model can be written:

$$360 \quad \frac{G_{mf}}{G_{mm}} b_{SS} > c_{NS} \quad (12)$$

361 where  $G_{mf}$  represents the genetic covariance between male trait and female preference and  
362  $G_{mm}$  represents genetic variance of the male trait. The condition in Eq. 12 directly parallels  
363 the condition in Eq. 10, emphasizing again that in male-male competition,  $\delta_{AS}c_B$  provides the  
364 force of social selection that indirectly leads to an evolutionary increase in male signal size.  
365 Both types of runaway evolution are driven by genetic covariance. In mate choice, runaway is  
366 driven by the covariance between the sexes that arises from choosy females mating with  
367 attractive males, but in male-male competition, this effect arises directly from signal honesty,  
368 i.e., the genetic covariance between a signaling trait and the threat (willingness or ability to  
369 fight) it signals. Moreover, if the mean level of aggression does not change, as when the  
370 aggression plateau is reached (Figs. 1-2), increasing costs during male-male competition are  
371 associated only with the increasingly elaborated signal. This may occur when limited fights  
372 settle contests (Maynard Smith & Harper 1988; Maynard Smith & Harper 2003). These are  
373 common conditions (Parker 1974; West-Eberhard 1983, 1984; Maynard Smith & Harper  
374 1988; Andersson 1994), suggesting that runaway from male-male competition may occur  
375 frequently (McCullough *et al.* 2016; Rico-Guevara & Hurme 2019). Finally, the genetic  
376 covariance in Lande's model arises from linkage disequilibrium that accumulates via  
377 nonrandom mating whereas ours reflects pleiotropy between body size and signal size. Thus,  
378 the genetic covariance driving runaway from male-male competition is likely to be much  
379 larger both because recombination efficiently erodes linkage disequilibrium and positive  
380 allometry (e.g., signals and body size) is common and reflects pleiotropy. Indeed, in models  
381 of mate choice where there is a pleiotropic relationship between direct benefits or good genes,  
382 runaway is difficult. In our model, however, the pleiotropic nature of the honest signal leads to  
383 runaway.

384 There are many other models of mate choice in the literature, and a full comparison to  
385 them all is beyond the scope of this paper. Our goal here is simply to highlight potentially

386 common features of runaway evolution, the most important is that runaway sexual selection  
387 by both male-male competition and female mate choice appears to be an evolving source of  
388 selection provided by the social environment. A more expansive comparison may well  
389 stimulate modifications or additions to the model we present here. In addition, there would be  
390 much to gain by combining studies of female mate choice and male-male competition to  
391 simultaneously test models of sexual selection (Hunt *et al.* 2009). This may be especially  
392 enlightening when traits serve as both ornaments and armaments (Berglund *et al.* 1996) or  
393 when mate choice opposes male-male competition (Moore & Moore 1999).

## 394 **Conclusion**

395 Ritualized displays and elaborated signals associated with the potential for aggression are  
396 readily observed in nature and their importance often obvious and spectacular (Darwin 1871;  
397 Parker 1974; Maynard Smith & Harper 1988; Maynard Smith & Harper 2003; Emlen 2008,  
398 2014). Yet the details of how these might evolve have been unclear. Previous game theory  
399 models have shown that overt aggression can be ameliorated by conventional signals (Parker  
400 1974; Maynard Smith 1982; Maynard Smith & Harper 1988; Maynard Smith & Harper 2003;  
401 Rutte *et al.* 2006), and verbal models have proposed that signaling traits associated with  
402 male-male competition evolve exaggerated expression because social selection is intense  
403 (West-Eberhard 1979, 1983, 1984). Male-male competition may well result in intense  
404 selection (Maynard Smith & Brown 1986), as mating can be highly skewed toward one or a  
405 few males in a population (Darwin 1871; Andersson 1994; Shuster & Wade 2003), but this  
406 alone is insufficient to result in exaggerated traits. Our model shows that feedback between  
407 the behavioral and morphological traits mediating male-male competition create runaway  
408 evolution.

409 Sexual selection arising from male-male competition is prevalent and so the  
410 consequences of such selection important for understanding the generation of biological  
411 diversity. We hope our model stimulates empiricists in much the same way that the model of  
412 mate choice stimulated research on mating preferences. Ultimately, our understanding of the  
413 consequences of sexual selection arising from male-male competition will come from  
414 empirical research. Our hope is that this model helps direct and focus some of that research.



## 415 SUPPORTING APPENDIX

### 416 Fitness model for male-male interactions

417 To model the fitness consequences of an interaction between two males, we use a  
418 modification of the classic hawk-dove game, which involves competition over a resource  
419 (Maynard Smith & Price 1973, Maynard Smith 1982). In a traditional hawk-dove game, there  
420 are two strategies. Hawks tend to start fights, while doves tend to flee. When two hawks meet,  
421 a fight determines the outcome of the contest, with one hawk winning and receiving a  
422 resource of value  $v$ , while the other hawk pays a cost  $c$ , which may be related to injury or  
423 other costs of aggression. The average payoff for a hawk in a hawk-hawk encounter is thus  
424  $\frac{v-c}{2}$ . When two doves meet, they either divide the resource evenly or decide the contest  
425 without aggression and its associated costs, leading to an average payoff for each dove of  $\frac{v}{2}$ .  
426 When a hawk meets a dove, the hawk wins the contest, receiving a fitness payoff of  $v$ , while  
427 the dove receives a payoff of 0, reflecting the fact that the dove neither wins the resource nor  
428 pays a cost for being aggressive. If  $z = 1$  represents playing hawk and  $z = 0$  represents  
429 playing dove, this fitness model can be written in terms of the phenotypes of two interactants  
430 expressing traits  $z$  and  $z'$ :

$$431 \quad W = W_0 + \frac{v}{2}(1 + z - z') - \frac{c}{2}zz' + \varepsilon \quad (\text{A1})$$

432 Following McGlothlin et al. (2022), we generalize this equation to a continuous scale,  
433 allowing  $z_A$ , representing aggression, to take on any non-negative value. This means that  
434 individuals that are more aggressive (i.e., that employ a more hawkish strategy) will tend to  
435 win interactions and that the fitness cost of being aggressive will increase as both individuals  
436 become more aggressive (i.e., more hawkish). The fitness model in Eq. 4 differs from Eq. A1  
437 by being expressed in terms of relative fitness ( $w$ ) rather than absolute fitness ( $W$ ). Thus, the  
438 translations between the parameters in the general hawk-dove fitness model and the fitness  
439 effects of aggression in Eq. (4) are

$$440 \quad w_0 = W_0 + \frac{v}{2} \quad (\text{A2a})$$

$$441 \quad b_A = \frac{v}{2} \quad (\text{A2b})$$

$$442 \quad c_A = \frac{c}{2} \quad (\text{A2c})$$

443 In words,  $b_A$  represents access to resources (here, mates) achieved by winning a contest, while  
444  $c_A$  represents the costs paid by the loser of a contest when both individuals are aggressive. We  
445 also include two additional unique costs. We assume that the cost of an encounter is  
446 proportional to the body size (or fighting ability) of an opponent, resulting in a cost  
447 proportional to  $c_B$ . Importantly, this cost is paid regardless of an individual's own behavior.  
448 Second, bearing a signal larger than the naturally selected optimum imposes a cost  
449 proportional to  $c_S$ , which is presumably paid outside the context of male-male encounters.  
450 Nonsocial and social selection gradients may be calculated from fitness functions such as Eq.  
451 A1 and Eq. 4 by taking the partial derivatives of relative fitness with respect to focal and  
452 social phenotypes, respectively (McGlothlin *et al.* 2022). These derivatives are then evaluated  
453 at the population mean. For linear fitness functions, selection gradients will be constant, but  
454 quadratic and higher-order functions may lead to selection gradients that change with the  
455 population mean.

456

457

## 458 **General equation for response to selection**

459 Here, we develop a general model for evolution when trait expression depends upon the  
460 difference between a focal individual's own traits and traits of another individual encountered  
461 in the context of a social interaction. This model is directly applied to male-male contests in  
462 the main text and may be useful for considering many other types of social interactions. First,  
463 consider a vector of traits ( $\mathbf{z}$ ) whose expression can be decomposed into three components: a  
464 vector of additive genetic effects ( $\mathbf{a}$ ), a vector of environmental effects ( $\mathbf{e}$ ), and a social  
465 response term that depends on the difference between the traits of the focal individual and  
466 those of a social interactant ( $\mathbf{z}'$ ):

$$467 \quad \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{e} + \boldsymbol{\delta}(\mathbf{z} - \mathbf{z}'). \quad (\text{A3})$$

468 The matrix  $\boldsymbol{\delta}$  consists of components  $\delta_{ij}$  that translate the effect of differences in trait  $j$  into  
469 expression of trait  $i$ . Similarly, the phenotype of the social partner can be written as

$$470 \quad \mathbf{z}' = \mathbf{a}' + \mathbf{e}' + \boldsymbol{\delta}(\mathbf{z}' - \mathbf{z}). \quad (\text{A4})$$

471 As we show below, because the term  $\boldsymbol{\delta}(\mathbf{z} - \mathbf{z}')$  in Eqs. A3-A4 contains phenotypes of both  
472 individuals, it consists of a combination of direct and indirect genetic effects.

473 To calculate a response to selection for traits expressed as in Eq. A3, we first solve for  
 474 the multivariate phenotypic mean. Assuming that environmental effects have a mean of zero,  
 475 the trait mean is

$$476 \quad \bar{\mathbf{z}} = \bar{\mathbf{a}} + \boldsymbol{\delta}(\bar{\mathbf{z}} - \bar{\mathbf{z}}) = \bar{\mathbf{a}}, \quad (\text{A5})$$

477 which means that the population trait mean will depend only on the mean additive genetic  
 478 value. The vector of total breeding values ( $\mathbf{A}$ ), which represents the genetic contribution to the  
 479 population mean and is used to calculate evolutionary responses to selection, is equivalent to  
 480 the vector of additive genetic effects ( $\mathbf{a}$ ). Next, to derive an explicit definition of the  
 481 phenotype, we first use substitution to write

$$482 \quad \boldsymbol{\delta}(\mathbf{z} - \mathbf{z}') = (\mathbf{I} - 2\boldsymbol{\delta})^{-1}\boldsymbol{\delta}(\mathbf{a} + \mathbf{e} - \mathbf{a}' - \mathbf{e}') \quad (\text{A6})$$

483 where  $\mathbf{I}$  is the identity matrix. After some algebra, Eq. A6 allows us to write explicit  
 484 definitions of the two phenotypes as

$$485 \quad \mathbf{z} = (\mathbf{I} - 2\boldsymbol{\delta})^{-1}((\mathbf{I} - \boldsymbol{\delta})(\mathbf{a} + \mathbf{e}) - \boldsymbol{\delta}(\mathbf{a}' + \mathbf{e}')) \quad (\text{A7})$$

486 and

$$487 \quad \mathbf{z}' = (\mathbf{I} - 2\boldsymbol{\delta})^{-1}((\mathbf{I} - \boldsymbol{\delta})(\mathbf{a}' + \mathbf{e}') - \boldsymbol{\delta}(\mathbf{a} + \mathbf{e})). \quad (\text{A8})$$

488 Response to selection can then be calculated following (McGlothlin *et al.* 2010) as

$$489 \quad \Delta\bar{\mathbf{z}} = \text{Cov}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{z}^T)\boldsymbol{\beta}_N + \text{Cov}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{z}'^T)\boldsymbol{\beta}_S. \quad (\text{A9})$$

490 Substituting Eqs. A7-A8 into Eq. A9 and simplifying yields

$$491 \quad \Delta\bar{\mathbf{z}} = \mathbf{G}(\mathbf{I} - (1 + r)\boldsymbol{\delta}^T)(\mathbf{I} - 2\boldsymbol{\delta}^T)^{-1}\boldsymbol{\beta}_N + \mathbf{G}(r\mathbf{I} - (1 + r)\boldsymbol{\delta}^T)(\mathbf{I} - 2\boldsymbol{\delta}^T)^{-1}\boldsymbol{\beta}_S, \quad (\text{A10})$$

492 where  $\mathbf{G}$  is the additive genetic (co)variance matrix and  $r$  is relatedness. Eq. A10 can be used  
 493 to generate the specific model in the text by setting parameters as

$$494 \quad \mathbf{G} = \begin{bmatrix} G_{SS} & G_{SB} & 0 \\ G_{SB} & G_{BB} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & G_{AA} \end{bmatrix}, \quad \boldsymbol{\delta} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \delta_{AS} & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad \boldsymbol{\beta}_N = \begin{bmatrix} \beta_{NS} \\ \beta_{NB} \\ \beta_{NA} \end{bmatrix}, \quad \boldsymbol{\beta}_S = \begin{bmatrix} \beta_{SS} \\ \beta_{SB} \\ \beta_{SA} \end{bmatrix}, \quad r = 0 \quad (\text{A11})$$

495 and multiplying the result by  $\frac{1}{2}$  to indicate selection acting only on males.

## 496 Relationship to indirect genetic effects models

497 The model described above differs from previous models of indirect genetic effects in that  
 498 phenotypes may be adjusted in relation to both the phenotypes of a social partner and other  
 499 phenotypes of the focal individual. The standard model of phenotypic expression used in trait-  
 500 based genetic effects models (Moore *et al.* 1997a) is:

$$501 \quad \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{e} + \Psi \mathbf{z}'. \quad (\text{A12})$$

502 The relationship between the two models can be seen by adding an additional term to the  
 503 standard model:

$$504 \quad \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{e} + \xi \mathbf{z} + \Psi \mathbf{z}'. \quad (\text{A13})$$

505 The term  $\xi \mathbf{z}$ , which is similar to developmental interaction effects (Wolf *et al.* 2001),  
 506 contains a conditional modification of the direct genetic effect in response to other phenotypic  
 507 traits of the same individual, while the term  $\Psi \mathbf{z}'$  contains indirect genetic effects (Moore *et*  
 508 *al.* 1997a). When  $\xi = \mathbf{0}$ , Eq. 13 is equivalent to Eq. A12, and when  $\xi = -\Psi = \delta$ , Eq. A13 is  
 509 equivalent to Eq. A3.

510 Incorporating conditional direct genetic effects is a way to mechanistically represent  
 511 genetic covariances in a quantitative genetic model (Wolf *et al.* 2001). Combining such  
 512 effects with indirect genetic effects allows exploration of a wide variety of models of  
 513 phenotypic adjustment, including behavioral modification, in evolutionary quantitative  
 514 genetic models. For full generality, we give the equation for multivariate response to selection  
 515 derived from Eq. A13. First, the vector of total breeding values derived from the trait mean is

$$516 \quad \mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{I} - \xi - \Psi)^{-1} \mathbf{a}. \quad (\text{A14})$$

517 By substituting Eqs. A13-A14 into Eq. A9,

$$518 \quad \Delta \bar{\mathbf{z}} = (\mathbf{I} - \xi - \Psi)^{-1} \mathbf{G} (\mathbf{I} + r (\mathbf{I} - \xi^T)^{-1} \Psi^T) (\mathbf{I} - \xi^T - \Psi^T (\mathbf{I} - \xi^T)^{-1} \Psi^T)^{-1} \beta_N + \\ 519 \quad (\mathbf{I} - \xi - \Psi)^{-1} \mathbf{G} (r \mathbf{I} + (\mathbf{I} - \xi^T)^{-1} \Psi^T) (\mathbf{I} - \xi^T - \Psi^T (\mathbf{I} - \xi^T)^{-1} \Psi^T)^{-1} \beta_S. \quad (\text{A15})$$

520 This equation is unwieldy in its multivariate form, but one can follow the approach we take  
 521 here for male-male competition and use Eq. A15 to generate much simpler models of the  
 522 evolution of systems of responsive traits given assumptions about fitness and trait expression.

523 **Extension to multiple opponents**

524 Our results can be extended to incorporate interactions with multiple opponents. Suppose that  
525 a male encounters opponents sequentially. The phenotype of a focal individual averaged over  
526 all encounters:

$$527 \bar{\mathbf{z}} = (\mathbf{I} - 2\boldsymbol{\delta})^{-1}((\mathbf{I} - \boldsymbol{\delta})(\mathbf{a} + \mathbf{e}) - \boldsymbol{\delta}(\bar{\mathbf{a}}' + \bar{\mathbf{e}}')), \quad (\text{A16})$$

528 and the average of his social partners:

$$529 \bar{\mathbf{z}}' = (\mathbf{I} - 2\boldsymbol{\delta})^{-1}((\mathbf{I} - \boldsymbol{\delta})(\bar{\mathbf{a}}' + \bar{\mathbf{e}}') - \boldsymbol{\delta}(\mathbf{a} + \mathbf{e})), \quad (\text{A17})$$

530 where an overbar is now taken to indicate an average over an individual male's encounters. If  
531 we assume that the fitness effects of individual encounters accrue additively, then Eq. A10  
532 may still be used to predict the evolution of the population mean, with  $\boldsymbol{\beta}_N$  and  $\boldsymbol{\beta}_S$  now  
533 representing vectors of partial regression slopes of fitness on focal individual mean and social  
534 group mean phenotypes, respectively. Specific fitness models may be substituted into Eq.  
535 A10 in the same way as for models of single pairwise interactions.

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
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
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**FIGURE 1** Evolution of a male signal, body size, and aggression in response to male-male competition. Panels A and B show evolutionary trajectories for each trait over 200 generations, and panels C and D show predicted lines of equilibria (heavy line) and their stability (gray arrows). In all panels, all three traits have the same genetic variance ( $G = 1$ ), benefit ( $b_A = 0.2$ ) and cost of aggression ( $c_A = 0.05$ ), fitness cost deriving from the threat of a male's opponent ( $c_B = 0.2$ ), cost of signal size ( $c_S = 0.05$ ; with naturally selected optimum  $\theta_S = 0$ ), and a responsiveness of aggression to body size ( $\delta_{AS} = 0.4$ ). The line of equilibria is calculated from Eq. 9a using these values. In panels A and C, signal size is weakly correlated with body size ( $G_{SB} = 0.4$ ), while in panels B and D, the two traits are more strongly correlated ( $G_{SB} = 0.8$ ). When the genetic correlation between signal size and body size is weak, all three traits reach equilibria (A), with equilibrium aggression predicted solely by costs and benefits. Signal size and body size reach a point on the predicted line of equilibrium (C) that differs depending on their starting values. When the genetic correlation is strong, aggression still reaches an equilibrium, but signal size and body size run away together (B), overshooting the predicted line of equilibria (D). As in Fisherian selection from female mate choice (Lande 1981), male-male competition can drive traits to runaway elaboration or extinction when the line of equilibria is unstable (D).



**FIGURE 2** Stronger dependence of male aggressive behavior leads to more elaborate traits at equilibrium. Panel A illustrates a relatively weak influence of opponent signal on male aggression ( $\delta_{AS} = 0.4$ ), while panel B illustrates a stronger influence ( $\delta_{AS} = 0.8$ ). In each panel, we use starting values for traits relevant to the highly sexually dimorphic earwig *Labidura riparia*, which uses its forceps as a signaling trait and is shown to the right of each panel (drawing modified from Lucas 1920). Other parameters are the same as Fig. 1A. When the influence of opponent signal is weak (A), both body size and signal show a moderate evolutionary increase. When the influence is stronger (B), both body size and signal increase more, but the final signal size is much larger relative to body size. The highly elaborate elongate forceps in panel B may be found in other earwig species like *Forcipula gariazzi*.