

1 **Full title:** Causal role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in modulating the balance between  
2 Pavlovian and instrumental systems in the punishment domain

3 **Short title:** tDCS on dlPFC modulates Pavlovian bias in the punishment domain bias  
4

5 **Authors:**

6 Hyeonjin Kim<sup>1\*</sup>, Jihyun K. Hur<sup>2</sup>, Mina Kwon<sup>1</sup>, Soyeon Kim<sup>1</sup>, Yoonseo Zoh<sup>2</sup>, Woo-Young  
7 Ahn<sup>1,3</sup>  
8

9 <sup>1</sup> Department of Psychology, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea 08826

10 <sup>2</sup> Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511

11 <sup>3</sup> Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea 08826  
12

13 **Corresponding author:**

14 Woo-Young Ahn, Ph.D.

15

16 Department of Psychology

17 Seoul National University

18 Seoul, Korea 08826

19 Tel: +82-2-880-2538, Fax: +82-2-877-6428. E-mail: [wahn55@snu.ac.kr](mailto:wahn55@snu.ac.kr)  
20

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24

## 25 **Abstract**

26 Previous literature suggests that a balance between Pavlovian and instrumental decision-  
27 making systems is critical for optimal decision-making. Pavlovian bias (i.e., approach toward  
28 reward-predictive stimuli and avoid punishment-predictive stimuli) often contrasts with the  
29 instrumental response. Although recent neuroimaging studies have identified brain regions that  
30 may be related to Pavlovian bias, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), it is  
31 unclear whether a causal relationship exists. Therefore, we investigated whether upregulation  
32 of the dlPFC using transcranial current direct stimulation (tDCS) would reduce Pavlovian bias.  
33 In this double-blind study, participants were assigned to the anodal or the sham group; they  
34 received stimulation over the right dlPFC for 3 successive days. On the last day, participants  
35 performed a reinforcement learning task known as the orthogonalized go/no-go task; this was  
36 used to assess each participant's degree of Pavlovian bias in reward and punishment domains.  
37 We used computational modeling and hierarchical Bayesian analysis to estimate model  
38 parameters reflecting latent cognitive processes, including Pavlovian bias, go bias, and choice  
39 randomness. Several computational models were compared; the model with separate Pavlovian  
40 bias parameters for reward and punishment domains demonstrated the best model fit. When  
41 using a behavioral index of Pavlovian bias, the anodal group showed significantly lower  
42 Pavlovian bias in the punishment domain, but not in the reward domain, compared with the  
43 sham group. In addition, computational modeling showed that Pavlovian bias parameter in the  
44 punishment domain was lower in the anodal group than in the sham group, which is consistent  
45 with the behavioral findings. The anodal group also showed a lower go bias and choice  
46 randomness, compared with the sham group. These findings suggest that anodal tDCS may  
47 lead to behavioral suppression or change in Pavlovian bias in the punishment domain, which  
48 will help to improve comprehension of the causal neural mechanism.

49

## 50 **Author summary**

51 A decision-making bias guided by the Pavlovian system (i.e., approach reward and avoid  
52 punishment) is often useful and predominant across species but it is also related to several  
53 psychiatric conditions. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) is known to be related to  
54 such “Pavlovian bias” but it is unclear whether a causal relationship exists between them. Here,  
55 we evaluated whether decision-making biases including Pavlovian bias could be modulated by  
56 exogenous brain stimulation, transcranial current direct stimulation, over the right dlPFC for 3  
57 successive days. A combination of behavioral analysis and computational modeling revealed  
58 that the anodal group had lower Pavlovian bias in the punishment domain compared with the  
59 sham group. In addition, the anodal group showed lower go bias and choice randomness than  
60 the sham group, which can also hamper instrumental learning. These findings suggest a causal  
61 role for the dlPFC in modulating the balance between the Pavlovian and instrumental decision-  
62 making systems.

63

## 64 **Introduction**

65 Decision-making is governed by multiple systems, including the fundamental  
66 Pavlovian and instrumental systems. The Pavlovian system involves a pre-preprogrammed  
67 behavioral tendency known as Pavlovian bias (i.e., approaching reward-predictive stimuli and  
68 avoiding punishment-predictive stimuli) [1]. In contrast, the instrumental system involves  
69 learning the optimal response to each stimulus by evaluating its outcomes without prior  
70 preparation. Although the Pavlovian bias has several benefits, it may hamper goal-directed  
71 behavior. For example, animals (e.g., pigeons) with strong Pavlovian bias fail to learn to  
72 withhold pecking in response to stimuli predictive of food, even when they can receive food  
73 only by withholding pecking [2,3]. Humans are also affected by Pavlovian bias in various

74 decision-making situations, such as dieting [4,5] or substance abuse [6]. Thus, there is a need  
75 to investigate methods to effectively overcome such bias.

76 The neural mechanisms that underlie Pavlovian bias are not fully understood, but some  
77 previous research has suggested that the prefrontal cortex plays a pivotal role in overcoming  
78 Pavlovian bias [7–9]. A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study of participants  
79 who successfully employed the instrumental system during conflict with the Pavlovian system  
80 found that such individuals showed hyperactivation of the bilateral inferior frontal gyri while  
81 anticipating inhibition [9]. In addition, an electroencephalography study showed that the  
82 activation of the anterior cingulate cortex, as measured by the midfrontal theta power of the  
83 electroencephalogram signal, was associated with overcoming Pavlovian bias [7]. However,  
84 these studies failed to provide conclusive evidence for a causal neural mechanism, and the brain  
85 regions that control Pavlovian bias remained unknown.

86 We speculated that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) might be a key region  
87 involved in controlling Pavlovian bias. The dlPFC has been implicated in higher-level  
88 cognitive control and goal-directed actions [4,5,10–17]. For example, dieters showed  
89 hyperactivation of the dlPFC when they successfully selected healthy food over tasty food [4].  
90 In addition, the dlPFC was important in individuals who valued stimuli in a context-dependent  
91 manner and performed goal-directed behavior to maximize reward [10]. Although a previous  
92 fMRI studying the neural correlates of Pavlovian bias did not identify the dlPFC as a candidate  
93 region [9], the negative results are related to the imaging strategy used in the study, rather than  
94 the lack of a relationship. The imaging was focused on subcortical structures; the dlPFC regions  
95 were not assessed.

96 In the present study, we evaluated the presence of a causal relationship between the  
97 dlPFC and Pavlovian bias using non-invasive brain stimulation (i.e., transcranial direct current  
98 stimulation [tDCS]). Using tDCS was based on several previous studies of modulating

99 decision-making biases. For example, the competition between the model-based and the model-  
100 free systems [18], as well as affective bias of instrumental action [19], were modulated by tDCS  
101 targeting the prefrontal cortex. .

102 Overall, we investigated whether anodal tDCS on dlPFC would suppress the Pavlovian  
103 bias (sham-controlled); we sought to identify the causal neural mechanism underlying such  
104 bias. We applied anodal tDCS over the right dlPFC [20–22] for 3 consecutive days [23–25] On  
105 the third day, we administered a reinforcement learning task known as the orthogonalized  
106 go/no-go task, which measured the degree of Pavlovian bias [9]. The task had four conditions;  
107 two were Pavlovian-congruent, where go was the action required to win the reward and no-go  
108 was the action required to avoid punishment; the two remaining conditions were Pavlovian-  
109 incongruent, where go was the action required to avoid punishment and no-go was the action  
110 required to win the reward. Participants were required to learn the correct action for each  
111 condition to maximize the reward and minimize punishment. We compared the degree of  
112 Pavlovian bias across tDCS groups using the difference in behavioral accuracy between  
113 Pavlovian-congruent and Pavlovian-incongruent conditions. We also used a model parameter  
114 (i.e., Pavlovian bias parameter) estimated by computational modeling and hierarchical  
115 Bayesian analysis (HBA) as another index of Pavlovian bias. Under the punishment domain,  
116 we found significantly lower Pavlovian bias in the anodal tDCS group than in the sham group.

117

## 118 **Results**

### 119 **Anodal and sham group characteristics**

120 We analyzed data from 31 participants, including the basic demographic information  
121 (age and sex), psychiatric symptoms, and psychological characteristics (**Table 1**). There were  
122 no significant group-level differences in terms of demographic, psychiatric, and psychological

123 variables between the sham and the anodal groups. We also measured the perceived side effects  
 124 of tDCS; we found no differences between groups in terms of itching, skin irritation, skin pain,  
 125 fatigue, mood disturbance, and visual distortion ( $p > 0.05$  for all; see **S1 Table** in  
 126 supplementary material). However, the intensity of perceived tingling was significantly higher  
 127 in the anodal group than in the sham group ( $p < 0.05$ ). In addition, the degrees of headache and  
 128 difficulty in concentration were significantly higher in the sham group than in the anodal group  
 129 ( $p < 0.05$  for both). The differences in perceived side effects did not affect the behavioral  
 130 Pavlovian bias. However, there were significant differences in perceived duration and  
 131 continuity of stimulation between the sham and anodal groups (**S2 Table** in supplementary  
 132 material).

133

134 **Table 1. Descriptive statistics.**

	Sham (N = 14)	Anode (N = 17)	p value
<b>Age</b>	25.071 (3.731)	23.529 (3.484)	0.245
<b>Sex; male</b>	5 (35.7%)	8 (47.1%)	0.524
<b>SCID<sup>a</sup></b>			
avoidant	2.357 (2.098)	2.294 (1.724)	0.927
dependent	1.286 (1.773)	1.412 (1.228)	0.817
obsessive-compulsive	2.714 (1.816)	3.353 (1.656)	0.315
passive-aggressive	1.000 (1.109)	1.353 (1.967)	0.555
depressive	1.714 (1.858)	2.059 (1.919)	0.618
paranoid	1.500 (1.871)	1.706 (1.929)	0.767
schizotypal	0.857 (1.027)	0.765 (1.480)	0.845
schizoid	0.929 (1.207)	1.412 (1.502)	0.339
histrionic	1.929 (1.269)	2.176 (1.590)	0.640
narcissistic	3.429 (2.503)	3.353 (2.783)	0.938
borderline	1.429 (1.742)	2.941 (3.750)	0.176
antisocial	0.857 (1.406)	0.412 (0.870)	0.289
<b>Y-BOCS<sup>b</sup></b>			
obsessive	1.357 (2.530)	1.824 (3.206)	0.662
compulsive	4.143 (4.258)	3.688 (3.860)	0.761
<b>BDI<sup>c</sup></b>			
	3.714 (2.920)	9.176 (12.259)	0.115
<b>STAI-X<sup>d</sup></b>			

state	38.000 (9.397)	40.941 (9.523)	0.396
trait	37.071 (6.956)	40.176 (10.212)	0.342
<b>BIS11<sup>e</sup></b>			
cognitive	16.429 (3.322)	16.412 (3.692)	0.990
motor	20.357 (3.934)	19.882 (5.171)	0.780
non-planning	24.571 (5.721)	24.176 (5.637)	0.848

135 Mean (standard deviation) for continuous variables and count (%) for categorical variables.

136 <sup>a</sup>SCID: Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-5

137 <sup>b</sup>Y-BOCS: Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale

138 <sup>c</sup>BDI: Beck's Depression Inventory

139 <sup>d</sup>STAI-X: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory

140 <sup>e</sup>BIS 11: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale Version 11

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
## 142 **Behavioral results**

143 We used the difference in behavioral accuracy under Pavlovian-congruent and  
144 Pavlovian-incongruent conditions to compare the degree of Pavlovian bias across tDCS groups  
145 (see **Methods** for more information). In the punishment domain, the anodal group did not show  
146 any significant difference in behavior under the two punishment conditions (Fig 1A;  $p > 0.05$ ).

147 In contrast, the sham group exhibited significantly lower accuracy under the Pavlovian-  
148 incongruent punishment condition (e.g., go-to-avoid) than under the Pavlovian-congruent  
149 condition (e.g., no-go-to-avoid) (Fig 1B;  $p < 0.05$ ). Neither group exhibited a significant  
150 difference in accuracy under the two reward conditions (e.g., go-to-win and no-go-to-win).

151 Consistent with these findings, the behavioral Pavlovian bias index in the punishment domain  
152 was significantly lower in the anodal group than in the sham group ( $p < 0.05$ ).

153



154

155 **Fig 1.** Pavlovian bias in the punishment domain decreased in the anodal session (accuracy).

156 In the sham group, we found a significant difference in behavioral accuracy between the  
157 punishment conditions, which indicated the presence of Pavlovian bias, particularly in the  
158 punishment domain. This difference was not observed in the anodal group. The behavioral  
159 index of Pavlovian bias in the punishment domain also showed significantly lower bias in the  
160 anodal group than in the sham group.

161 \* $p < 0.05$

162

## 163 Computational modeling

164 We tested three computational models to explain the data (see **Methods** for more  
165 information). Model 1 was a reinforcement learning model suggested by Guitart-Masip et al.  
166 (2012), which included five parameters ( $\xi$ : irreducible noise;  $\varepsilon$ : learning rate;  $\rho$ : outcome  
167 sensitivity;  $b$ : go bias;  $\pi$ : Pavlovian bias). Model 2 was a model with six parameters, including  
168 separate feedback sensitivity parameters for reward and punishment cues ( $\rho_{rew}$  and  $\rho_{pun}$ ),  
169 compared to Model 1. Model 3 further separated Pavlovian bias parameters for reward and  
170 punishment cues ( $\pi_{rew}$  and  $\pi_{pun}$ ) compared with Model 2. We compared the models using the  
171 leave-one-out information criterion (LOOIC) values, which were calculated using leave-one-  
172 out cross-validation [26] (**Table 2**). Data from the sham and anodal groups were fitted



173 separately. Model 3, which had separate Pavlovian bias parameters for reward and punishment  
 174 domains the best fit. Models 2 and 1 were the second and third best-fitting models, respectively.  
 175 Thus, we used estimated parameter values from Model 3 for the subsequent analyses.

176 **Table 2. Model comparison (LOOIC).**

	Parameters	sham	anode
Model 1	$\xi, \varepsilon, b, \pi, \rho$	1852.5	2168.7
Model 2	$\xi, \varepsilon, b, \pi, \rho_{rew}, \rho_{pun}$	1813.6	2129.7
Model 3	$\xi, \varepsilon, b, \pi_{rew}, \pi_{pun}, \rho_{rew}, \rho_{pun}$	<b>1769.7</b>	<b>2093.0</b>

177 Lower LOOIC values indicated better model performance.

178

## 179 **Model parameters**

180 We calculated the posterior distributions of all group-level parameters from Model 3;  
 181 we compared the results between the anodal and sham groups (**Table 3, Fig 2**). The anodal  
 182 group displayed credibly lower irreducible noise ( $\xi$ ), compared with the sham group. Go bias  
 183 (b) was also credibly lower in the anodal group than in the sham group. Finally, the anodal  
 184 group had credibly lower Pavlovian bias in the punishment domain ( $\pi_{pun}$ ), compared with the  
 185 sham group; this is consistent with the behavioral analysis findings that behavioral Pavlovian  
 186 bias in the punishment domain was significantly lower in the anodal group than in the sham  
 187 group. Increased involvement of the frontal-striatal network after anodal stimulation might  
 188 suppress the biases (e.g. Pavlovian bias in the punishment domain, go bias, and choice  
 189 randomness), thereby interrupting goal-directed behavior of the instrumental system.

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
191 **Table 3. Posterior mean (95% HDI highest density interval) of group mean parameters in**  
 192 **anodal and sham groups**

	Anode	Sham	Difference
$\xi$ irreducible noise	0.027 [0.009, 0.060]	0.092 [0.056, 0.141]	-0.064 [-0.117, -0.017]

$\epsilon$ learning rate	0.430 [0.316, 0.554]	0.321 [0.224, 0.442]	0.107 [-0.052, 0.264]
$b$ Go-bias	-0.173 [-0.689, 0.334]	1.27 [0.437, 2.46]	-1.45 [-2.72, -0.461]
$\pi_{rew}$ Pavlovian bias (reward)	0.045 [-0.223, 0.322]	-0.141 [-0.428, 0.351]	0.183 [-0.364, 0.587]
$\pi_{pun}$ Pavlovian bias (punishment)	-0.063 [-0.212, 0.091]	0.411 [-0.033, 0.855]	-0.473 [-0.939, -0.006]
$\rho_{rew}$ reward sensitivity	12.4 [7.72, 21.8]	12.3 [7.63, 21.4]	0.146 [-9.91, 10.7]
$\rho_{pun}$ punishment sensitivity	6.24 [4.69, 8.31]	8.83 [5.92, 14.0]	-2.58 [-8.02, 1.02]

193

194



195

196 **Fig 2.** Pavlovian bias parameter in the punishment domain and other parameters decreased in  
 197 the anodal session (modeling parameter).

198 We found lower parameter values in irreducible noise, go bias, and Pavlovian bias in the  
 199 punishment domain in the anodal session, compared with the sham session. The decrease in  
 200 Pavlovian bias in the punishment domain is consistent with the behavioral analysis.

201 \* 95% highest density interval of the posterior difference did not include zero.

202

203           However, there were no credible differences between groups in terms of other  
204 parameters, such as learning rate ( $\epsilon$ ), Pavlovian bias in reward domain ( $\pi_{rew}$ ), reward  
205 sensitivity ( $\rho_{rew}$ ), and punishment sensitivity ( $\rho_{pun}$ ).

206

## 207 **Discussion**

208           Our results suggest a causal role of the dlPFC in modulating Pavlovian bias in the  
209 punishment domain. Moreover, we found that other decision-making tendencies (i.e., go bias  
210 and irreducible noise) were also modulated.

211           We found that anodal stimulation of the dlPFC reduced Pavlovian bias, which might be  
212 related to goal-directed control in the frontal-striatal circuit. The frontal-striatal circuit connects  
213 the prefrontal cortex and striatum (including following key areas: ventral striatum [nucleus  
214 accumbens], dorsal striatum [caudate and putamen], ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dlPFC,  
215 and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex [dACC]) [17,27]. The dlPFC neurons that project to the  
216 striatum may modulate the action-outcome contingency that is encoded and updated in the  
217 striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Therefore, anodal stimulation over the right dlPFC  
218 may facilitate high-level cognitive control [4,5,12–17] and enhance goal-directed behavior by  
219 suppressing Pavlovian bias. Another possible mechanism is that anodal stimulation of the  
220 dlPFC increases dopamine release in the striatum [28,29]; when the dlPFC is stimulated,  
221 information about instrumental control is transmitted to the striatum, which responds by  
222 increasing dopamine release and overcoming the Pavlovian bias. Furthermore, the tDCS might  
223 lead to increased connectivity between the dlPFC and dACC. The dACC, along with the dlPFC,  
224 plays a critical role in updating action values and modulating the integration of subjective value  
225 and action-outcome contingency. Previous studies showed that Pavlovian bias was suppressed  
226 by frontal midline theta power, an electroencephalography correlate of dACC [7,8]. Therefore,

227 it is plausible that the tDCS over the dlPFC facilitated the dACC activation, which would  
228 reduce Pavlovian bias.

229         However, the current study only found suppression of Pavlovian bias in the punishment  
230 domain, not the reward domain. Thus, the present findings contribute to knowledge about  
231 aversion-related decision-making in the Pavlovian system [30–32]. The underlying neural  
232 mechanisms of appetitive-related decision-making have been widely investigated, but the  
233 mechanisms that underlie aversive-related decision-making have received less attention [33].  
234 A recent study found that aversive stimuli were associated with active escape response or  
235 passive avoidance response [31]. The authors suggested that serotonin might be involved in  
236 passive inhibitory responses [34–36], while dopamine might be involved in active escape  
237 responses; this is similar to the active approach response toward appetitive stimuli [30,37].  
238 Therefore, the current results concerning suppression of Pavlovian bias in the aversive domain,  
239 obtained by connecting behavioral activation and avoidance, might reflect a similar neural  
240 process for active escape response. These results are consistent with previous evidence that  
241 increased dopamine release after anodal tDCS of the dlPFC might suppress Pavlovian bias  
242 [32,38]. Future tDCS studies should separate avoidance and escape trials to further explore the  
243 mechanism that underlies suppression of Pavlovian bias in the punishment domain.

244         We also observed decreases in go bias and choice randomness in the anodal group.  
245 Because go bias and choice randomness interrupt the goal of maximizing benefit, a similar  
246 mechanism for interrupting goal-directed behavior may exist, as previously discussed.  
247 Increased involvement of the frontal-striatal network (dlPFC, striatum, and dACC) after  
248 electrical stimulation of the dlPFC might lead to the suppression of go bias and choice  
249 randomness. We presume that the instrumental system may gain preference under conflicting  
250 conditions between the instrumental and Pavlovian systems.

251 Our result showed that decision-making biases were modulated by external intervention,  
252 which may have clinical relevance, particularly for substance misuse and other addictive  
253 behaviors. For example, increased Pavlovian bias has been linked to substance use and  
254 gambling disorders [39,40], while increased go bias, which may reflect impaired response  
255 inhibition, has also been associated with various addictive disorders [41,42]. Choice  
256 randomness (e.g. decision-making noise or inverse temperature) was greater in patients with  
257 cocaine abuse and gambling disorders than in healthy individuals [43,44]. Thus, the current  
258 findings may aid in the development of treatments that can reduce the decision-making biases  
259 implicated in the various psychiatric conditions. Because the current study only included  
260 healthy participants, future studies should include individuals with psychiatric disorders.

261 A potential limitation of the current study is that the second session data were affected  
262 by the task practice effect. Therefore, overall accuracy of task performance was significantly  
263 higher in the second session than in the first session. To control for the practice effect, we only  
264 analyzed data from the first session and performed between-subject analyses (see Experimental  
265 protocol). Future studies should attempt to eliminate the practice effect from the experimental  
266 protocol.

267 In conclusion, our results suggest a causal relationship between non-invasive dlPFC  
268 stimulation and corresponding decision-making behavior. We found the reduced Pavlovian  
269 bias in the punishment domain, go bias, and choice randomness after dlPFC facilitation using  
270 anodal stimulation. However, further clarification using neuroimaging techniques is needed to  
271 identify the neural mechanism that underlies the effects of tDCS; efforts are also needed to  
272 determine how biases are modulated by neural changes in the dlPFC and connected brain  
273 networks. In addition, because decision-making biases have been implicated in addictive  
274 disorders, our results have practical implications for the treatment of individuals with such  
275 disorders. Furthermore, only Pavlovian bias in the punishment, but not the reward domain, was

276 modulated; thus, there is a need for further studies concerning aversive-related decision-  
277 making to explain why behavior related to avoiding an aversive state was only modulated by  
278 tDCS.

279

## 280 **Materials and Methods**

### 281 **Participants**

282 We recruited 39 participants from Seoul National University in Seoul, Korea, using  
283 online and offline advertisements. The experimental protocol was approved by the Seoul  
284 National University Research Ethics Committee and all participants provided informed consent  
285 before participation. Participants were excluded if they were unwilling to participate in the  
286 study, or were not fluent in Korean; they were also excluded if they reported impaired color  
287 discrimination, psychiatric medication use, neurological or psychiatric illness, or any health  
288 conditions that would make them unsuitable for the experiments. In addition, participants were  
289 excluded if they had low-quality data such as sleep during the experiment or results that  
290 indicated an inability to understand the task. Finally, we eliminated participants with a go-to-  
291 win accuracy of  $< 0.1$  because learning failure in the easiest go-to-win condition indicated a  
292 lack of understanding or concentration. In total, data from 17 and 14 participants in the anodal  
293 and sham sessions, respectively, were analyzed (see below for more information).

294

### 295 **Experimental protocol**

296 First, we collected data regarding the participants' basic demographic information (age  
297 and sex) and psychological characteristics. We administered the Structured Clinical Interview  
298 for DSM-5 to detect mental illnesses (**Table 1**). In addition, we evaluated the psychological  
299 characteristics of obsession-compulsion (Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale),

300 depression (Beck's Depression Inventory), anxiety (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory), and  
301 impulsivity (Barratt Impulsiveness Scale version 11) (**Table 1**). The participants visited the  
302 laboratory for 3 consecutive days and repeated the visits to counterbalance the tDCS polarity  
303 (six total sessions). For the first 2 days, participants received tDCS for 20 min; on the third day,  
304 participants performed an orthogonalized go/no-go task after they had received tDCS  
305 stimulation for 20 min. The daily visiting time was matched on a within-participant basis to  
306 remove the confounding effect of circadian rhythm [38,45]. Participants were randomly  
307 assigned to receive anodal or sham stimulation on the first or second 3 days of visits. The first  
308 and second sets of visits were separated by a mean of 24 days. We found significantly better  
309 performance in the second task (see **S1 Fig** in the supplementary material for more information),  
310 suggesting a practice effect. Therefore, we analyzed behavior data only from the first task to  
311 avoid any potential confounding effects.

312

### 313 **tDCS stimulation**


314 During each session, tDCS was applied for 20 min using circular sponge electrodes  
315 (size = 25 cm<sup>2</sup>) and the Starstim system (Neuroelectronics, Barcelona, Spain). The target  
316 electrode was positioned on the right dlPFC (i.e., F4 according to the 10-10 International 10-  
317 20 electroencephalogram electrode system); the return electrode was positioned on the left  
318 cheek (**Fig 3**). The stimulation protocol was based on previous studies that used tDCS targeting  
319 dlPFC [20]. The left cheek was selected as the return position to avoid confounding cortical  
320 activation [46–49]. The stimulation included 30 s of ramp-up and ramp-down at the beginning  
321 and end of the stimulation, respectively. During the anodal session, anodal stimulation to F4  
322 was performed for 19 min between ramp-up and ramp-down stimulations; however, in the  
323 sham session, participants were not stimulated between the ramp-up and ramp-down  
324 stimulations. During the stimulation, participants were instructed to sit with their gaze fixed on



325 a crosshair on the computer monitor. The double-blind mode in the Starstim software was used  
326 to ensure that all experimenters and participants remained unaware of the order of polarity. The  
327 software blinds the type of current stimulation using a 4-digit password lock set by a third-  
328 party administrator.

329 We employed some strategies to reduce the potential limitations of tDCS in the current  
330 stimulation protocol. First, the electrode placement and size can affect the spatial distribution  
331 of stimulation [50]. Therefore, we placed a return electrode in an extracephalic area (i.e., left  
332 chick) to minimize the stimulation of other cortical areas and the shunting effect caused by a  
333 short inter-electrode distance [51]. In addition, the effects of tDCS can be confounded by  
334 biological and lifestyle factors [51]. We mitigated such factors by stimulating participants over  
335 3 consecutive days before the task to produce cumulative and larger effects. The participants  
336 visited the laboratory at the same time (variation of < 3 h) to reduce the effects of circadian  
337 rhythm. Finally, to reduce confounding factors related to the experimental design, we used a  
338 sham-controlled double-blind protocol.

339



340

341 **Fig 3.** Montage of tDCS


342 A sponge was placed over the right dlPFC (F4) to stimulate the brain using weak electric  
343 current (2 mA) for 20 min. Another sponge was placed on the left cheek. This figure was  
344 adapted from the protocol summary panel in Starstim software NIC (copyright notice ©  
345 Neuroelectrics SLU).

346

## 347 **Experimental task**

348 We used the orthogonalized go/no-go task reported by Guitart-Masip et al. (2013) (**Fig**  
349 **4**). At the beginning of each trial, a 1000-ms cue (fractal image) was presented to indicate one  
350 of four conditions; go-to-win reward, go-to-avoid punishment, no-go-to-win reward, and no-  
351 go-to-avoid punishment. After a variable interval of 250–2000 ms, a target circle appeared for  
352 a maximum of 1500 ms, after which the participants responded with go or no-go within 1000  
353 ms. After 1000 ms, participants received feedback according to their response and cue  
354 condition. The feedback included virtual monetary gain as a reward, a yellow bar as a neutral  
355 outcome, and an electric shock as punishment. The optimal response led to a beneficial  
356 outcome for each condition, with a probability of 0.7. Therefore, participants learned the  
357 optimal response to each cue from trial and error. The task included 180 trials, with 45 trials  
358 for each condition.

359



360

361 **Fig 4.** Orthogonalized go/no-go task.

362 Four types of stimuli were presented. Two stimuli were Pavlovian-congruent: go action to win  
 363 reward and no-go action to avoid punishment. The remaining two stimuli were Pavlovian-  
 364 incongruent: go action to avoid punishment and no-go action to win reward. Participants were  
 365 instructed to maximize reward and minimize punishment by learning the correct action for each  
 366 stimulus. Participants were asked to select an action when a target was presented. The reward  
 367 was a picture of money, 1000 won (approximately US\$ 1), whereas the punishment was an  
 368 electric shock to the wrist.

369 RT: response time, ITI: intertrial interval

370

371 Although money is secondary feedback and shock is primary feedback, we decided to  
 372 use monetary gain as the reward and electric shock as the punishment based on previous studies  
 373 [52–55]. The electric shock was applied to each participant’s left wrist. The intensity of the  
 374 electric shock (2–12.4mA) was adjusted to cause a “moderately unpleasant” sensation (5 points

375 on an 11-point Likert scale [i.e., 0 = not at all unpleasant, 10 = very un- pleasant]). (see  
376 **supplementary material** for more information).

377

## 378 **Behavioral data analysis**

379 Behavioral data were analyzed using R [56]. Response accuracy was calculated as the  
380 proportion of correct choices. The difference in accuracy between Pavlovian-congruent and  
381 Pavlovian-incongruent conditions was evaluated using Student's t-test. The behavioral  
382 Pavlovian bias index was evaluated as the difference between the accuracy of Pavlovian-  
383 congruent and Pavlovian-incongruent conditions; it was calculated individually for each  
384 domain. For example, Pavlovian bias index in the punishment domain was calculated by  
385 subtracting the accuracy of the go-to-avoid condition from the accuracy of the no-go-to-avoid  
386 condition.

387

388  $Pavlovian\ bias = (go\_to\_win + no\_go\_to\_avoid) - (no\_go\_to\_win + go\_to\_avoid)$

389  $Pavlovian\ bias\ (reward) = (go\_to\_win) - (no\_go\_to\_win)$

390  $Pavlovian\ bias\ (punishment) = (no\_go\_to\_avoid) - (go\_to\_avoid)$

391

## 392 **Computational modeling**

393 We tested three models. A previous study suggested that Model 1 had the best fit and  
394 consisted of five parameters (Model RW + noise + bias + Pav; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012).  
395 Model 1 calculates the probability of performing (or withholding it) an action in response to  
396 the stimulus in each trial, based on action weights. If a participant successfully learned the  
397 action-reward contingency, the probability of performing a correct action was higher. It is  
398 calculated as follows:

399

$$400 \quad p(a_1 | s) = \left\{ \frac{\exp(w(a_1, s))}{\exp(W_t(a_1, s)) + \exp(W_t(a_2, s))} \right\} (1 - \xi) + \frac{\xi}{2} \dots (1)$$

401

402           In particular, the go action probability was larger if the W value for go ( $a_1$ ) was greater  
403 using squashed softmax and for no-go ( $a_2$ ), vice versa. Here, t is the trial number ( $1 \leq t \leq 180$ )  
404 and s is the stimulus ( $s \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ ). The four stimuli indicate four conditions, respectively:  
405 go-to-win reward, go-to-avoid punishment, no-go-to-win reward, and no-go-to-avoid  
406 punishment. In addition, a is the action ( $a \in \{0, 1\}$ ), where 1 is go and 0 is no-go.  $\xi$  is the  
407 irreducible noise ( $0 \leq \xi \leq 1$ ), where a value closer to 1 indicates random choice less considering  
408 the W value.  $W(a, s)$  is the action weight, which is defined as follows:

409

$$410 \quad W_t(a, s) = \begin{cases} Q_t(a, s) + b + \pi V_t(s) & \text{if } a = \text{go} \\ Q_t(a, s) & \text{if else} \end{cases} \dots (2)$$

411

412           Q(a, s) and V(s) are updated by each trial according to the equations below:

413

$$414 \quad Q_t(a_t, s_t) = Q_{t-1}(a_t, s_t) + \varepsilon(\rho r_t - Q_{t-1}(a_t, s_t)) \dots (3)$$

$$415 \quad V_t(s_t) = V_{t-1}(s_t) + \varepsilon(\rho r_t - V_{t-1}(s_t)) \dots (4)$$

416

417           In equation (3), r is the feedback ( $r \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ ), where 1 is the reward, 0 is neutral, and  
418  $-1$  is punishment.  $\varepsilon$  is the learning rate ( $0 \leq \varepsilon \leq 1$ ); If  $\varepsilon$  is closer to 1, it is more likely to reflect  
419 the previous feedbacks to update Q values. Furthermore,  $\rho$  is outcome sensitivity ( $0 \leq \rho$ ). A  
420 larger  $\rho$  indicates the participant subjectively exaggerates the outcome value. Using this process,  
421 the Q value converges to the high-probability outcome for each stimulus when the correct  
422 action for the stimulus is accumulated.

423           In equation (4), the  $V$  value is updated in a manner similar to the  $Q$  value, but it  
424 converges to the high-probability feedback for each stimulus, regardless of the performed  
425 actions. In equation (2), for the updated  $Q$  values when the action was go, the go bias parameter  
426  $b$  and  $V$  value multiplied by the Pavlovian bias parameter  $\pi$  ( $0 \leq \pi$ ) were added to the  $Q$  values;  
427 they consisted of the  $W$  values. A large go bias was correlated with large  $W(\text{go}, s)$ . When the  
428  $V$  value converged to reward, and the action was go, the large Pavlovian bias parameter was  
429 correlated with generally large  $W(\text{go}, \text{reward})$  and generally small  $W(\text{no-go}, \text{reward})$ . When  
430 the  $V$  value converged to punishment and the action was go, the large Pavlovian bias parameter  
431 was correlated with generally small  $W(\text{go}, \text{punishment})$  and generally large  $W(\text{no-go},$   
432  $\text{punishment})$ . This suggests that a large Pavlovian bias parameter was correlated with greater  
433 predisposition to Pavlovian-congruent choices.

434           Model 2 shares almost all equations and updating rules with Model 1, although it has  
435 distinct feedback sensitivity parameters for reward and punishment cues:  $\rho_{rew}$ , and  $\rho_{pun}$ ,  
436 respectively. Therefore, Model 2 contains six parameters. Model 3 shares almost all equations  
437 and updating rules with Model 1, although it has different Pavlovian bias parameters for reward  
438 and punishment cues:  $\pi_{rew}$  and  $\pi_{pun}$ , respectively. Model 3 contains seven parameters and was  
439 used to test the distinct effect found in behavioral data, where Pavlovian bias was only  
440 significant in the punishment domain.

441

## 442 **Model parameter estimation using HBA**

443           The model parameters were estimated using HBA [57–59]. HBA has some advantages over  
444 the traditional maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method. First, HBA provides estimated  
445 parameters as posterior distributions, rather than the point estimates provided by MLE. The  
446 distributions provide additional information, particularly regarding the uncertainty of  
447 estimated values. Second, the hierarchical structure of HBA allows stable and reliable

448 estimation of individual parameters. Individual-level MLE estimates are often noisy and  
449 unreliable; group-level MLE estimates do not include information concerning individual  
450 differences. In HBA, each individual estimate informs the group estimate (hyperparameter),  
451 and the individual commonalities reflected in the hyperparameter inform individual  
452 estimates. Therefore, individual estimates are more stable and reliable, even when data are  
453 insufficient. Previous studies have found that parameters estimated by HBA are more  
454 accurate than parameters estimated by MLE [60].

455         We separately fitted the models for anodal and sham groups to make stable and  
456 reliable individual estimates that reflected similarities within each group. HBA was  
457 conducted by hBayesDM (v. 1.1.1) [61] and R Stan (v. 2.21.0) [62]. Stan is a probabilistic  
458 program used for Bayesian modeling; it provides inferences based on Markov chain Monte  
459 Carlo (MCMC) algorithms, such as the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo, for sampling from high-  
460 dimensional parameter spaces. Weakly informative priors were used to reduce their influence  
461 on the posterior distributions [61]. In addition, non-centered parameterization (Matt trick)  
462 was used to optimize the sampling process [63]. We used four independent chains and a  
463 sample size of 4000, including 2000 burn-in samples per chain. The use of four independent  
464 chains ensured that the estimated parameters were stable, despite variations in the starting  
465 points [64]. We also confirmed the accuracy of parameter estimation by inspecting well-  
466 mixed trace plots and the Rhat values ( $Rhat < 1.1$ ).

467

## 468 **Model comparison**

469         We used LOOIC to compare the models [26]. The LOOIC value for each model was  
470 calculated by estimating the out-of-sample prediction accuracy of the fitted models. This  
471 method uses the log-likelihood from posterior simulations of the estimated parameters. We

472 used R package loo to identify the model with the lowest LOOIC value, which had the best fit  
473 [26].

474

## 475 **Group comparison of model parameters**

476 For each group-level parameter, we subtracted the posterior distribution of the sham  
477 group from the posterior distribution of the anodal group for analysis of group-level differences.  
478 Group differences were considered credible when the 95% highest density intervals of posterior  
479 difference distributions did not include the value 0 [65].

480

## 481 **Code accessibility**

482 The codes are publicly available in the GitHub repository (behavioral data and R codes for  
483 behavioral and modeling analyses will be made available in a Github repository upon  
484 publication).

485

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493

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