Spatial and Temporal Origin of The Third SARS-Cov-2 Outbreak in Taiwan

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ABSTRACT

Since the first report of SARS-CoV-2 in December 2019, Taiwan has gone through three local

outbreaks. Unlike the first two outbreaks, the spatial and temporal origin of the third outbreak

(April 20 to November 5, 2021) is still unclear. We assembled and analyzed a data set of more

than 6,000 SARS-CoV-2 genomes, including 300 from Taiwan and 5812 related sequences

downloaded from GISAID as of 2021/12/08. We found that the third outbreak in Taiwan was

caused by a single virus lineage belonging to Alpha (B.1.1.7) strain. This lineage, T-III (the

third outbreak in Taiwan), carries four distinct genetic fingerprints, including spike M1237I

(S-M1237I) and three silent changes. The T-III is closest to the sequences derived from Turkey

on February 8, 2021. The estimated age of the most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) of T-

III is March 23, 2021 (95% highest posterior density [HPD] February 24 - April 13, 2021),

almost one month before the first three confirmed cases on April 20, 2021. The effective

population size of the T-III showed approximately 20-fold increase after the onset of the

outbreak and reached a plateau in early June 2021. Our results reconcile several unresolved

observations, including the occurrence of two infection clusters at the same time without

traceable connection and several airline pilots who were PCR negative but serum IgM-/IgG+

for SARS-CoV-2 in late April. Therefore, in contrast to the general notion that the third SARS-

CoV-2 outbreak in Taiwan was sparked by two imported cases from USA on April 20, 2021,

which, in turn, was caused by the partial relaxation of entry quarantine measures in early April

2021, our comprehensive analyses demonstrated that the outbreak was most likely originated

from Europe in February 2021.

Keywords: Spike protein, M1237I, alpha/B.1.1.7, time to the most recent common ancestor

(TMRCA), haplotype network

Importance

In order to clarify the spatial and temporal origin of the third SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in Taiwan, we sequenced and reconstructed a phylogeny of SARS-CoV-2 genomes. Our comprehensive analyses demonstrated that the outbreak was caused by a unique lineage (T-III), descended from the alpha variant of concern (B.1.1.7), which most likely originated from Europe, perhaps Turkey, in February 2021. In addition, the T-III could have circulated in Taiwan in mid-March 2021. The virus was unnoticed while spreading within the community. Our results demonstrate that phylogenetic approaches can be used to trace the outbreak derived from local spread by infected travelers and even a small number of imported cases can undermine the strict control measures in Taiwan.

Introduction

Since the first report of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by *Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus* 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in the December of 2019 in Wuhan, the virus has rapidly sparked an ongoing pandemic. SARS-CoV-2 is the third coronavirus causing severe respiratory illness in humans after SARS-CoV and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) (1-3).

After experiencing a series of SARS outbreaks in 2003 which caused 668 probable cases and 181 deaths (4), Taiwan has been exceedingly cautious of emerging disease and has strengthened its pandemic control measures. For example, the Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) was established after the SARS epidemic in 2003, and was activated on 20 January 2020, before the first case of COVID-19 was identified in Taiwan. The control strategy implemented by the CECC was based on three essential components: border control, case identification and contact tracing, and containment.

As of February 2022, Taiwan has ended three local COVID-19 outbreaks, while the fourth is ongoing (Fig. 1). The first local outbreak was between January 28 and April 11, 2020 and involved 55 confirmed cases. Most of these local cases had a contact history or exposure to SARS-CoV-2 infected patients (5). The second local outbreak started on January 12 and ended on February 9, 2021. It was sparked by an intra-hospital infection and involved 21 cases. The third outbreak consists of two infection clusters and lasted for at least five months with more than 14,000 cases. The first cluster began with two airline flight crews (case 1078 and 1079) showing symptoms on April 17 and 18, respectively, after returning from the USA on April 16, 2021 (Table S1). They were diagnosed as COVID-19 positive on April 20, 2021 (6). On the same day, one pilot of the same airline tested positive for COVID-19 in Australia while on duty (7). This cluster was subsequently linked to staff working in a hotel in Northern Taiwan close to Taoyuan Airport where airline pilots and flight crews stayed during their quarantine (8). The second cluster involved several local incidences in New Taipei City and Yilan County that later spread to many other counties. This cluster was first recognized on May 11, 2021, but a later survey found that the first case (case 1424) in this cluster showed symptoms as early as April 23, 2021 (9). Unlike the first two outbreaks, the spatial and temporal origin of this outbreak is still debating.

While it has been suggested that the third SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in Taiwan was sparked by
two imported cases from USA on April 20, 2021 (10), which, in turn, was caused by the partial
relaxation of entry quarantine measures in early April 2021 (11, 12), several unresolved
observations remain to be answered. First, according to CECC, the dates of symptom onset in
two infection clusters are very close (April 16 for the first cluster and April 23 for the second)
(9). However, the relationships between the two clusters remain elusive. Second, several airline
pilots and their family members were PCR negative but with serum IgM-/IgG+ in late April
and early May 2021 (13, 14), suggesting they have probably been infected by SARS-CoV-2
earlier than April 20, 2021.
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Understanding the origin of the outbreak is important not only for epidemiological study but
also for the design of future control measures. In order to clarify the origin(s) and
interrelationship between the clusters, we sequenced and reconstructed a phylogeny of SARS-
CoV-2 genomes. We find that the third outbreak is caused by a single virus lineage (T-III),
descended from the alpha variant of concern (B.1.1.7), which carries four distinctive mutations,
including spike M1237I (S-M1237I) and three silent changes, from its most closely related
sequences in Europe.
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Methods

Sample preparation

Thirty-three specimens from SARS-CoV-2 positive patients were obtained (Table S1). One
sample from Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, Australia was sequenced directly from extract using
Nanopore (15). The rest 32 specimens from National Taiwan University Hospital (NTUH)
were maintained in viral transport medium. Virus in the specimens was propagated in VeroE6
cells in Dulbecco's modified Eagle's medium (DMEM) supplemented with 2 μg/mL
tosylsulfonyl phenylalanyl chloromethyl ketone (TPCK)-trypsin (Sigma-Aldrich, St. Louis, MI,
USA). Culture supernatant was harvested when cytopathic effects (CPE) were observed in
more than 70% of cells, and the culture supernatant was harvested for viral genomic sequencing.
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Reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)

139 SARS-CoV-2 cDNA was generated from 100 ng of RNA in a RT-PCR reaction buffer
140 containing 4 μL of 5X PrimeScript IV 1st strand cDNA Synthesis Mix (Takara Bio, Kusatsu,
141 Shiga, Japan), 2 μL of 50 μM random hexamer primer, and variable amount of DEPC water to

142   fill up to 20 µL of total reaction volume. Pre-heat at 30℃ for 10 minutes, followed by 20

143   minutes of 42℃, and then 15 minutes of 70℃.

Amplification of complete SARS-CoV-2 genomes with multiplex PCR

The "Midnight" amplicon protocol was used to generate 1200 bp amplicons. Briefly, PCR was

used with 2·5 µL of cDNA product from RT-PCR in 22·5 µL buffer, containing 12·5 µL of Q5

Hot Start High-Fidelity 2X Master Mix (New England BioLabs, M0494S), 1·1 µL of 10 µM

SARS-Cov2-Midnight-1200 primer (either Pool 1 or Pool 2)(16) (Integrated DNA

Technologies, Coralville, IA USA), and 8·9 µL of nuclease-free water (Thermo Scientific,

Waltham, MA, USA). Amplifications were performed with 30 seconds of 98℃ for initial

denaturation, followed by 25 cycles of 98℃ for 15 seconds and 65℃ for 5 minutes in a Veriti

96-Well Thermal Cycler machine (Applied Biosystems, Waltham, MA, USA). Each sample

was separately amplified using both Pool 1 and Pool 2 primers. 20 µL PCR products were then

purified with DNA Clean & Concentrator-5 (Zymo Research, Irvine, CA, USA). Amplicons

were eluted with 25 µL of nuclease-free water (Thermo Scientific). DNA quality checks were

done using a Nanodrop (Thermo Scientific) and 1·5% agarose gel electrophoresis.

Library preparation for Nanopore MinION sequencing

For each sample, 1 µL (0·5 µL from each pool of a same sample), approximately 50 ng, of

purified PCR amplicons were used for library preparation. The KAPA HyperPrep Kit (Roche,

Basel, Switzerland) was used in a 15 µL reaction for end repair and A-tailing. The reactions

contained 1 µL of amplicon, 1·75 µL of End-repair & A-tailing Buffer, 0·75 µL of End-repair

& A-tailing Enzyme, and 11·5 µL of nuclease-free water (Thermo Scientific). Reactions were

done in 30 minutes at 20 ℃ and 30 minutes at 65 ℃. Each sample was then barcoded via

ligation in a 27·5 µL reaction at 20℃ for 15 minutes, with 2·5 µL of DNA Ligase, 7·5 µL of

Ligation Buffer, 2·5 µL of Native Barcode (Oxford Nanopore Technologies, Oxford, UK), and

15 µL of A-tailed amplicon. After that, barcoded amplicons were purified with 33 µL (1.2X)

of KAPA Pure Beads (Roche) by following the official protocol and eluted with 11 µL of

nuclease-free water (Thermo Scientific, R0582). We then pooled 2·7 µL of each barcoded

amplicon. The 110 µL of reaction for adapter ligation contained 65 µL of pooled barcoded

amplicons, 5 µL of Adapter Mix II (Oxford Nanopore Technologies, EXP-NBD104), 30 µL of

Ligation Buffer and 10 µL of DNA Ligase. After incubating in 20 ℃ for 15 minutes, libraries

were purified with 110 µL (1X) of KAPA Pure Beads (Roche, 07983271001) and Short

Fragment Buffer (Oxford Nanopore Technologies, SQK-LSK109) according to the official

protocol and then eluted with 14 μL of Elution Buffer (Oxford Nanopore Technologies, SQK-
LSK109).
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Nanopore MinION sequencing

We sequenced 220 ng of purified library with an Oxford Nanopore Technoogies MinION
R.9.4.1 flowcell (FLO-MIN106) with the software MinKNOW Core version 19.12.5. Super-
accurate basecalling was done using Guppy version 5.0.11 with default settings in GPU mode.
The Nanopore reads of each sample were mapped to the reference genome Wuhan-hu-1
(EPI_ISL_402125) by *BWA-mem* [preprint] (17) to generate an alignment file.
BCFtools (18) was applied to call variant (-i 'QUAL > 20') and generate consensus sequence.
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Data collection

A total of 267 complete and high coverage SARS-CoV-2 genomes from Taiwan with complete
collection date were downloaded from the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data
(GISAID, https://www.gisaid.org/)(19) on December 8, 2021. To find the SARS-CoV-2
genomes most closely related to the third outbreak in Taiwan, we used the Audacity Instant
search tool in GISAID to search the database and used EPI_ISL_2455264 (case 1079) as the
query. After excluding 42 sequences from Taiwan, 5,812 foreign sequences with fewer than or
equal to 10 SNP differences were downloaded. All the sequences used in this study can be
found in https://github.com/ala98412/T-III.
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M1237I frequency in different genetic backgrounds

We used tools within GISAID to provide a quick search of the database. We chose different
SARS-CoV-2 strains in the drop-down menu "Variant" to get the count of sequences in each
major variant strain (e.g., Alpha, Delta …), and further selected "Spike_M1237I" in the drop-
down menu "Substitutions" to receive the count of sequences with the M1237I mutation in
each genetic background. We calculated the frequency of M1237I in different genetic
backgrounds via the count of sequences with the M1237I mutation divided by the total number
of sequences representing each major variant.
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Sequence analysis and phylogenetic reconstruction

All sequences were aligned against the reference genome Wuhan-hu-1 (EPI_ISL_402125) by
using MAFFT v7 (20). Nucleotide diversity, including number of segregating sites,

Watterson's estimator of θ (21), and nucleotide diversity (π)(22), was estimated using MEGA-

X (23). Phylogenetic trees were also constructed by using the neighbor-joining method (24)

based on Kimura's two-parameter model in MEGA-X. The Nexus file for the haplotype

network analysis was generated using DnaSP 6.0 (25) and input into PopART v1.7 (26) to

construct the haplotype network using TCS software (27).

The times to the most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) of T-III lineage were estimated using

an established Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach implemented in

BEAST version 2.5 (28). The sampling dates were incorporated into TMRCA estimation.

These analyses were performed using the Hasegawa-Kishino-Yano (HKY) model of nucleotide

substitution assuming an uncorrelated lognormal relaxed molecular clock (29). We linked

substitution rates for the first and second codon positions and allowed independent rates for the

third codon position. We performed two independent runs with 1×10^7 MCMC steps and

combined the results. Log files were checked using Tracer (http://beast.bgio.ed.ac.uk/Tracer).

Effective sample sizes were >300 for all parameters.

225 Results

A total of 33 SARS-CoV-2 genomes were sequenced, including 32 from NTUH, Taiwan, and

one from Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, Australia (Table S1). We also downloaded 267

genomes from GISAID as of 2021/12/08, to construct the phylogeny as shown in Fig. 2. Since

the cases from the first outbreak had a contact history or exposures to different SARS-CoV-2

infected patients, they do not form a single cluster in the phylogeny. The sequences derived

from the second local outbreak are presented in emerald green (Fig. 2). The third local outbreak

consisted of the alpha strain (B.1.1.7), divided into two main clusters, shown in Fig. 2b. All

sequences in the basal lineage of Fig. 2b were from imported cases, whereas all sequences in

the more advanced lineage were local to Taiwan. Hereafter, we name this particular lineage as

T-III, which stands for the third outbreak in Taiwan, and note that the T-III belongs to Pangolin

lineage B.1.1.7.

Spatial and temporal origin of the third local outbreak in Taiwan

In order to search for the spatial origin of T-III, the sequence recovered from the earliest case

in the third outbreak (case 1079: EPI_ISL_2455264, Table S1) was used to search against the

GISAID database. There were 5,812 sequences with ≤ 10 nucleotide differences from

EPI_ISL_2455264 as of November 21, 2021. Phylogenetic reconstruction including all 5,812

sequences and T-III demonstrate that the latter is a distinctive lineage (Fig. S1). The vast

majority of sequences closely related to T-III were from Europe, including Turkey (Fig. S1b).

Haplotype network analyses of the T-III lineage reveals 48 haplotypes. The network shows that

T-III differs from the outgroups in four mutation steps (Fig. 3), including two synonymous

mutations, C5812T and C15895T, in Orf1ab, one nonsynonymous mutation G25273C

(M1237I) in Spike, and one T27869C mutation in a non-coding region (Table S2). The closest

outgroup haplotype consists of four sequences, including two sequences from Turkey that were

collected on February 8, 2021 (EPI_ISL_1097034, 1097035). The rest were collected after the

onset of the third outbreak in Taiwan (Table S3). Further database mining confirmed that of

1,140,328 alpha strain genomes examined as of 12/11/2021, only the lineage T-III possessed

the four above mentioned mutations, which form a distinctive genetic fingerprint. Within T-III,

the network forms a star-like shape centered on a core haplotype comprising 26 sequences.

Most of the remaining haplotypes are directly connected to this major haplotype. Of the three

cases identified on the first day of the third outbreak (April 20, 2020), the case from Australia

belongs to the major haplotype, with the rest (1078 and 1079) one mutation away.

The estimated substitution rate of T-III is 9.8×10^{-4} substitution per site per year (95% highest

posterior density [HPD] $5.6 \times 10^{-4} – 1.4 \times 10^{-3}$) which is close to 8.4×10^{-4} /site/year of SARS-

CoV-2 (30), and 7.5×10^{-4} /site/year of strain B.1.1 (31). The date of the most recent common

ancestor (TMRCA) of T-III is in late March (3/23/2021; 95% HPD February 24 - April 13,

2021) (Fig. 4), almost one month before the first three confirmed cases on April 20, 2021. We

noticed that the mutation rate of T-III during this epidemic was almost constant (Fig. S2).

Effective population size of the T-III lineage increased approximately 20-fold after the onset

of the outbreak and reached a plateau in early June. The estimated demographic expansion of

T-III is consistent with epidemiological data (Fig. 1). We noticed that demography in Fig. 4

does not capture the population decline after July 2021 as shown in Fig. 1. This finding is

because most sequences used in this analysis were collected before June 2021 (Table S1), with

only four sequences obtained after July 2, 2021. As we are interested in the outbreak origin,

this sampling strategy should not affect our conclusions.

Rapid population expansion can also be revealed by contrasting patterns of genetic variation

estimated using different approaches. The Watterson's estimator of θ (6.95×10^{-4}) is

approximately seven times higher than the nucleotide diversity (π) ($1\cdot05$ x 10^{-4}), leading to

significantly negative Tajima's D (-2·82, p < 0·001) (Table S4). Because θ is strongly

influenced by rare mutations, which are common during recent population expansion or after

positive selection (32), it is a better estimator of genetic diversity for T-III.

Discussion

Our results provide solid evidence that the third local outbreak in Taiwan was caused by a

single lineage, T-III. This does not in itself mean that two clusters of infections (see

Introduction) have a single common origin. For example, among 293,742 sequences analyzed

during the first year of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, the most abundant haplotype was sampled

3,466 times from across 53 countries (Table S5). It is possible that the haplotype exhibited

some transmission advantage, making it widespread. Under this scenario, two clusters of

infection may be caused by the same lineage imported from different sources. However, as the

T-III lineage bearing a combination of four unique mutations is exclusive to Taiwan, it seems

highly unlikely that this lineage was imported from different sources.

Our estimation that T-III originated from Europe with TMRCA on March 23, 2021 (95% HPD

February 24, 2021 – April 13, 2021) reconciles several unresolved observations. First, the first

two cases (case 1078 and 1079) of the outbreak shared identical sequences, indicating that they

were from the same source. Nevertheless, the cycle threshold (Ct) values at the time of

diagnosis (April 20, 2021) were 29 and 17 for case 1078 and 1079, respectively, suggesting

that they were infected at different times (6). Second, several airline pilots and their family

members were PCR negative but with serum IgM-/IgG+ in late April and early May 2021 (13,

14). It has been shown that IgM levels increase during the first week after a SARS-CoV-2

infection, peak after two weeks, and then recede to near-background levels in most patients.

IgG is detectable one week after disease onset and is maintained at a high level for a long period

(33). Consequently, IgM negative but IgG positive individuals have probably been infected by

SARS-CoV-2 earlier than April 20, 2021. Third, according to CECC, the dates of symptom

onset in two seemingly unrelated infection clusters are very close (April 16 for the first cluster

and April 23 for the second) (9). As our phylogenetic analysis reveals that all sequences in the

third outbreak have a single origin, the occurrence of two infection clusters at similar time

without traceable connection demonstrates that the virus may have been cryptically circulating

in the community undetected. Consequently, the origin of the third outbreak was most likely
prior to April 20, 2021.

As most sequences closely related to T-III were from Europe, our results disagree with the
notion that the outbreak was imported by cases 1078 and 1079 from the USA (10). Among four
sequences closest to T-III, only two from Turkey were collected before April 20, 2021 (on
February 8, 2021). The rest appeared after April 20 and cannot be associated with the third
outbreak. Consequently, the lineage leading to the third outbreak was most likely introduced
from Europe, perhaps Turkey, by infected travelers in February 2021 (Fig. 3).

There are several possible routes by which SARS-CoV-2 can be introduced by incoming
travelers. First, some carriers may have the virus undetected during quarantine. Although the
mean incubation period ranges from five to seven days, it can be longer than 14 days (34, 35).
Indeed, there has been much debate about whether changing from the mandatory five day home
quarantine plus nine day autonomous health management (or the so-called "5+9" strategy) to
three day home quarantine plus 11 day autonomous health management ("3+11") for flight
crews on April 15, 2021 (36) was the cause of the third outbreak (11, 12). Since the outbreak
likely originated in mid-March, as our analyses demonstrate, the possibility that changing
strategies from "5+9" to "3+11" directly caused the outbreak can be ruled out.

Second, there may have transmission from people associated with quarantine hotels to the
community. For example, from December 2021 to March 2022 alone, 15 infection clusters
occurred in quarantine hotels (37). Since one of the two infection clusters in the third outbreak
directly link to a hotel where many flight crews stayed during their quarantine (see
Introduction), it is most likely that the outbreak was introduced from this hotel during late
February to early April 2021. The virus was then undetected while spreading within the
community until late April 2021.

Our results demonstrate that even a small number of imported cases can undermine the strict
control measures in Taiwan (38). We also show that phylogenetic approaches can be used to
trace the outbreak derived from local spread by infected travelers (39). Although Taiwan has
been very cautious of emerging disease and has strengthened its control measures, the SARS-
CoV-2 genomes have not been sampled in proportion to the actual size of infection and made
publicly available in a timely fashion. This situation severely hinders efforts to trace the

underlying transmission patterns of spread. Consequently, policies that include real-time

public-sharing and transparency for infectious disease surveillance and control are critically

and urgently needed. Blackouts in information sharing and transparency can cause information

disparity and suspicion, which in turn hamper pandemic control efforts (40).

Declaration of Interests

348 The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

Availability of Data and Materials

351 The National Taiwan University Hospital, Taiwan and the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital,

352 Australia sequences have uploaded to Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data

353 (GISAID, https://www.gisaid.org/). The remaining genome sequences were downloaded from

354 GISAID as well. All the sequences used in this study can be downloaded from

355 https://github.com/ala98412/T-III.

Authors' Contributions

358 JHT and HFL analyzed the data. SYC and SHY guided the analyses. JHT, YKL, PJC, HYW,

359 CSPF drafted and revised the manuscript. YKL, Ya-Yun Lin, You-Yu Lin, and SYC prepared

360 samples. TYW, CSPF, SJH, and You-Yu Lin sequenced samples. PJC, SMC, and HYW

361 designed the study, obtained funding, and wrote the manuscript.

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Figure legends

Figure 1 Number of local COVID-19 cases in Taiwan. Data were downloaded from COVID-19 DASHBOARD (https://covid-19.nchc.org.tw/) on February 22, 2022.

Figure 2 Phylogeny of (A) all SARS-CoV-2 and (B) Alpha strain only genomes from Taiwan. In (B) the black branches are imported, and colored branches are local cases.

Figure 3 Haplotype network of SARS-CoV-2 genomes from the third local outbreak. The haplotype network was constructed by the median joining algorithm. Circle areas are proportional to the number of sequences. Mutational steps between haplotypes are symbolized by dashes. Haplotypes in yellow and pink are from Airline flight crews, who were the first three cases during the third outbreak. Cases 1078 and 1079 (in yellow) were diagnosed as COVID-19 positive on April 20 (CECC 2021b). On the same day, one pilot of the same airline tested positive for COVID-19 in Australia (in pink) while on duty (CECC 2021f).

Figure 4 The epidemic growth curve of SARS-CoV-2 genomes from the third local outbreak. The three lines are the median (blue line) and 95% HPD intervals (dashed lines) of the Bayesian skyline plot (m = 5). Vertical solid line indicates the estimated time to the most recent common ancestor with 95% HPD intervals in dashed lines.

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