

1 Title

2 Rewiring cattle movements to limit infection spread.

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10 Abstract

11 The cattle tracing databases set up over the past decades in Europe have become major resources for
12 representing demographic processes of livestock and assessing potential risk of infections spreading by
13 trade. The herds registered in these databases are parts of a network of commercial movements, which
14 can be altered to lower the risk of disease transmission. In this study, we developed an algorithm aimed at
15 reducing the number of infected animals and herds, by rewiring specific movements responsible for trade
16 flows from high- to low-prevalence herds. The algorithm was coupled with a generic computational model
17 describing infection spread within and between herds, based on data extracted from the French cattle
18 movement tracing database (BDNI). This model was used to simulate a wide array of infections, with
19 either a recent outbreak (epidemic) or an outbreak that occurred five years earlier (endemic), on which the
20 performances of the rewiring algorithm were explored. Results highlighted the effectiveness of rewiring
21 in containing infections to a limited number of herds for all scenarios, but especially if the outbreak was
22 recent and if the estimation of disease prevalence was frequent. Further analysis revealed that the key
23 parameters of the algorithm affecting infection outcome varied with the infection parameters. Allowing
24 any animal movement from high to low-prevalence herds reduced the effectiveness of the algorithm in
25 epidemic settings, while frequent and fine-grained prevalence assessments improved the impact of the
26 algorithm in endemic settings. Overall, our approach, which focuses on a few commercial movements,
27 has led to substantial improvements in the control of a targeted disease, although changes in the network

28 structure should be monitored for potential vulnerabilities to other diseases. Due to its generality, the
29 developed rewiring algorithm could be applied to any network of controlled individual movements liable
30 to spread disease.

31 **Keywords**

32 Control strategy; Epidemiology; Data-based; Network; Stochastic model

33 **Abbreviation**

34 BDNI: *Base de données nationale d'identification animale*

35 **Introduction**

36 Following bovine spongiform encephalopathy and classical swine fever epidemics in the 1990s, the Euro-
37 pean Union initiated the mandatory identification and registration of cattle in Europe (EU, 2000). This
38 decision led to the creation of national identification databases, such as the cattle tracing system in the
39 United Kingdom (Kao et al., 2006, Vernon, 2011), the French national bovine identification database
40 (BDNI) (Rautureau et al., 2011, Dutta et al., 2014), the Italian national bovine database (Natale et al.,
41 2009, Bajardi et al., 2011) and the database of the Swedish board of agriculture (Nöremark et al., 2009,
42 2011). These animal tracing systems have enabled the monitoring of infectious livestock diseases and
43 the development of strategies to prevent their spread (Gilbert et al., 2005, Moslonka-Lefebvre et al.,
44 2016, Beaunée et al., 2017), since animal trade is a major transmission pathway between herds. Indeed,
45 commercial exchanges are not only recorded comprehensively, but also controlled by farmers, unlike an-
46 imal mobility in the wild. These databases, whose reliability has increased over time since their creation
47 (Green and Kao, 2007), are therefore powerful tools for simulating infectious diseases in cattle (Ezanno
48 et al., 2020) and assessing the impact of livestock movements on epidemics (Ezanno et al., 2021).

49 The information provided by these commercial animal movements can be used as a basis for repre-
50 senting comprehensively the demographic processes and trades between cattle farms located in a given
51 region, using a metapopulation framework (Liu et al., 2007, Courcoul and Ezanno, 2010). To this end,
52 disease transmission between individuals within a defined set of herds can be modelled, by combining an
53 epidemiological model with existing data on births, deaths and movements. This type of models accounts
54 at least for two ways of spreading the infection: by contact within a herd, or by actually moving animals
55 between herds. This is for instance the case for paratuberculosis, a cattle disease mainly spread by trade
56 (Beaunée et al., 2015, Biemans et al., 2021). Manipulating the structure of cattle movement is expected
57 to have a direct impact on the latter and an indirect impact on the former.

58 The structure of these trade movements can be understood through the prism of graph theory: herds
59 are the vertices of a commercial exchange network, whose edges are the movements of livestock (Dubé
60 et al., 2009). Thus, each herd can be characterized using graph metrics, e.g. its in- and out-degree, i.e.
61 the number of herds it has respectively bought animals from and sold animals to. Network-based control
62 strategies then aim to modify the structure of the network to reduce infection risks. Removing vertices
63 (Rautureau et al., 2011, Büttner et al., 2013) or edges (Yang et al., 2013, Green et al., 2009) through
64 trade ban or slaughtering is often considered to slow down epidemics. In a context of cattle exchange
65 however, preventing farmers from buying or selling livestock entails high economic costs. Therefore, this
66 strategy cannot be used routinely, and is likely better suited to the management of regulated diseases,
67 the consequences of which are also very costly.

68 Edge rewiring is a less radical approach able to balance the trade-off between health risks and economic
69 costs. This method corresponds to the modification of one or both vertices that an edge connects (Gross
70 et al., 2006, Piankoranee and Limkumnerd, 2020, Britton et al., 2016, Ball and Britton, 2020). Although
71 most of the theoretical literature on the subject rather considers rewiring in the context of human contact
72 networks, it has also been used to study epidemic spread in cattle movement networks (Gates and
73 Woolhouse, 2015, Mohr et al., 2018, Ezanno et al., 2021). For instance, Gates and Woolhouse (2015)
74 present a rewiring method that creates an entirely new movement network disconnecting large buyers
75 from large sellers, while retaining the total number of animals bought or sold by each herd. This method
76 requires information at the network level, the criteria used being the distributions of in- and out-degrees
77 of all vertices. Global-level information is also generally required for most rewiring methods in contact
78 networks, although Piankoranee and Limkumnerd (2020) proposed a method based on local information.
79 In their study, rewiring is decided at the vertex level, according to its status and those of its direct
80 neighbours. Controlling cattle movements depending on the sanitary status of their origin has been
81 proposed in previous studies, e.g. by Hidano et al. (2016). Their study presents different scenarios
82 regarding farmers' practices, especially their tendency to avoid buying cattle from regions with a higher
83 incidence of bovine tuberculosis. The approach presented here is similar, albeit at a finer grain: preventing
84 farmers from buying cattle from herds with a higher prevalence of the target disease.

85 This study presents a new rewiring method to reduce the spread of infections in a cattle movement
86 network. To do this, we developed a rewiring algorithm in conjunction with a simulation model. The
87 simulation model coupled demography based on a dataset from the French cattle tracing system (BDNI)
88 with a SIRS epidemiological model. The use of such a generalist epidemiological model made it possible
89 to simulate a wide range of epidemiological settings, only by varying its parameters. The algorithm
90 worked by preventing movements from high- to low-prevalence herds, while maintaining the number of
91 animals bought and sold by each farm. It was based on an edge-level criterion: the estimated difference
92 in prevalence between the herd of origin and the herd of destination of the movement considered. The

93 following presents the cattle movement network concerned by this study, as well as the model and the
94 algorithm. Then, we consider various outputs of runs of the model with or without rewiring, concerning
95 the the functioning of the algorithm itself, its impact on the propagation of the infection, and its impact
96 on the structure of the network of commercial movements.

97 **Data and methods**

98 *Cattle movement network*

99 The dataset used for this study corresponded to an extraction from the French national bovine identifi-
100 cation database (BDNI). It concerned all cattle herds in Brittany (a French region) that sold or bought
101 at least one animal during the year 2014. This set of 21,548 herds is referred to as the ‘metapopulation’
102 thereafter. The database also included commercial exchanges as well as demographic events, all of which
103 were referred to as ‘movements’ hereafter. Three types of commercial exchanges were considered: (i)
104 ‘internal movements’ had an origin and a destination among the herds in the dataset, (ii) ‘imports’ had
105 only a destination in the dataset and (iii) ‘exports’ had only an origin in the dataset. They represented
106 respectively 64%, 16% and 20% of the commercial exchanges involving at least one herd of the dataset.
107 Each commercial exchange of animals was assumed to take place directly from one herd to another, ne-
108 glecting intermediaries. This means that markets and sorting centres were not considered for this study.
109 They differ from herds in that they tend to concentrate a large number of animals, but for a limited
110 period of time (less than a day for markets, a few days for sorting centres). Two types of demographic
111 events were considered: (iv) births had only a destination, corresponding to the herd where the animal
112 was born, and (v) deaths had only an origin, corresponding to the herd where the animal died.

113 The dataset was represented as a network with herds and internal movements corresponding to the
114 vertices and edges, respectively. This network was (i) dynamic, i.e. movements were characterized by
115 the date at which they occurred, (ii) weighted, i.e. a single edge represented the set of all movements
116 from herd A to herd B , with a weight corresponding to the number of movements, and (iii) directed,
117 i.e. movements from herd A to herd B were accounted for separately from movements from herd B to
118 herd A . The network therefore included 21,548 vertices and 100,088 edges. The total number of internal
119 movements over 2014 was 206,640, thus the average edge weight was 2.06.

120 *Epidemiological model: within and between-herd dynamics and infection settings*

121 The model developed aimed to simulate pathogen transmission within herds, and infection spread between
122 herds through cattle movements. A full description of the model is available in Supplementary material 1.
123 The model is stochastic in discrete time – each time-step corresponding to a day of 2014 – and in discrete
124 space – by integrating the network of herds and movements described above. Commercial exchanges and

125 demography were data-based: movement m was characterized by its origin O_m , its destination D_m , its
126 date according to the dataset T_m^* and the date at which it was simulated T_m . By default, movements were
127 simulated according to the dataset, i.e. $T_m = T_m^*$. Within-herd dynamics were based on a SIRS model
128 with three parameters: the infection rate β , the recovery rate γ – therefore the average infection duration
129 was $1/\gamma$ – and the rate of return to susceptibility δ . At each time-step t , herd h was characterized
130 by its number of susceptible, infected and recovered individuals, noted respectively $S_h(t)$, $I_h(t)$ and
131 $R_h(t)$. The total herd size $N_h(t)$ was defined as the sum of these three values and infection prevalence as
132 $P_h(t) = I_h(t)/N_h(t)$.

133 Each simulated infection began with an initial outbreak in a metapopulation without infection, i.e.
134 with only susceptible individuals. At $t = t_I$, the date of the outbreak, 10% of all herds in the metapopu-
135 lation were infected, by replacing 1 susceptible individual with 1 infected individual in each of the herds.
136 The probability of a herd being part of this 10% was proportional to the number of imports in the herd
137 according to the 2014 dataset. The rationale was that herds receiving the most individuals from herds
138 outside of the metapopulation were the most likely to introduce a new infection.

139 Two types of infections were considered for the study: epidemic and endemic. An infection was
140 defined as 'epidemic' if it started at the outbreak, i.e. if $t_0 = t_I$. The initial state of the infection was
141 then as described above. An infection was defined as 'endemic' if its start date was five years after the
142 outbreak, i.e. $t_0 = t_I + 1825$ days. The initial state of infection was then the result of a five-year infection,
143 simulated using the same epidemiological model and an extraction from the BDNI over Brittany between
144 01/01/2009 and 31/12/2013. Endemic simulations for which the infection went extinct before t_0 were
145 discarded, so that only initial states that were not disease-free were considered.

146 *Developed rewiring algorithm*

147 The algorithm developed aimed at preventing movements of cattle from high-prevalence herds to low-
148 prevalence herds. Its functioning was based on prevalence classes, numbered from 1 to c . Class i corre-
149 sponded to prevalences between b_i and b_{i+1} , with the lowest boundary $b_1 = 0$ and the highest boundary
150 $b_{c+1} = 1$. Each herd was assigned a 'real' and an 'observed' prevalence status, corresponding to one of
151 these classes. The real prevalence status $V_h^r(t)$ of herd h at time t was equal to the prevalence class i if
152 $P_h(t) \in [b_i; b_{i+1}[$, with $V_h^r(t) = c$ if $P_h(t) = 1$. The observed prevalence status was updated periodically,
153 every q time-step. If the real status of herd h was observed at time t_{obs} , then its observed status $V_h^o(t)$
154 remained the same for q time-steps, i.e. $V_h^o(t) = V_h^r(t_{obs})$ for any $t_{obs} \in [t; t + q[$. No additional errors on
155 the status were assumed, so that $V_h^r(t)$ always corresponded to the correct prevalence class.

156 *Sequential rewiring*

157 The algorithm was executed at each time-step, before the simulation of the epidemiological model. Sup-
158 plementary material 2 describes its functioning for a single time-step in pseudo-code. First, the algorithm
159 defined all possible quadruplets of prevalence classes $\{c_{OR}, c_{DR}, c_{ON}, c_{DN}\}$, so that $1 < c_{ON} \leq c_{DR} <$
160 $c_{OR} \leq c_{DN} < c$. The quadruplets were arranged primarily in ascending order of c_{DR} , secondarily in
161 descending order of c_{OR} , thirdly in ascending order of c_{ON} and fourthly in descending order of c_{DN} . The
162 algorithm followed this order, which ensured that no potential rewiring was missed. For each quadruplet,
163 the algorithm selected two lists of internal movements set to occur at time t , based on the status of their
164 origin and destination. A movement mR was in the first set if $V_{O_{mR}}^o(t) = c_{OR}$ and $V_{D_{mR}}^o(t) = c_{DR}$. This
165 movement was considered ‘at risk’ because, as $c_{OR} > c_{DR}$, the observed prevalence status of their origin
166 was greater than that of their destination. A movement mN was in the second set if $V_{O_{mN}}^o(t) = c_{ON}$
167 and $V_{D_{mN}}^o(t) = c_{DN}$. This movement was considered ‘normal’, i.e. not at risk, since $c_{ON} < c_{DN}$. For
168 k the size of the shortest of the two movement sets, the algorithm permuted the origins of the first k
169 movements of each set, so that $V_{O_{mR}}^o(t) = c_{ON}$ and $V_{O_{mN}}^o(t) = c_{OR}$. Since $c_{OR} \leq c_{DN}$ and $c_{ON} \leq c_{DR}$,
170 neither movement was at risk after the permutation.

171 Once permutations were performed for each quadruplet, the management of remaining movements at
172 risk, i.e. whose origin had a greater observed prevalence status than their destination, depended on two
173 parameters: the maximal delay Δ_{MAX} and the prohibition of movements at risk. Remaining movement
174 m was postponed, i.e. T_m was increased by 1, if $T_m - T_m^* < \Delta_{MAX}$. Otherwise, it was tagged as
175 ‘problematic’. If movements at risk were not completely prohibited, problematic movement m would not
176 be modified further. If they were, m would be replaced by an import with D_m as its destination and
177 by an export with O_m as its origin. Overall, four algorithm parameters had to be defined *a priori*: the
178 number of classes c , the update period q , the maximal delay Δ_{MAX} and whether the movements at risk
179 were prohibited.

180 *Simulations*

181 Simulations were performed on the dataset between 01/01/2014 (defined as $t = 0$) and 01/01/2015
182 ($t = 365$). Different epidemiological settings were explored by manipulating the SIRS model parameters
183 (β , γ and δ) and infection type (epidemic or endemic). Two clustering analyses were performed on
184 the preliminary simulations to define six epidemiological settings (Supplementary material 3): weak,
185 moderate and strong epidemic settings and weak, moderate and strong endemic settings (Fig. S2).

186 The effectiveness of the algorithm was tested by running simulations with $3 \times 3 \times 3 \times 2$ combinations
187 of the algorithm parameters, respectively (i) the number of prevalence classes c (2, 3 or 4 classes), (ii) the
188 update period q (1, 28 or 91 days), the maximum delay Δ_{MAX} (1, 3 or 7 days) and (iv) the prohibition of
189 movements at risk (yes or no). Each combination, as well as a control without rewiring, were simulated

Outcomes related to	Notation	Description
Algorithm	$n_{rew}(t)$	Number of movements rewired at time t
	$n_{del}(t)$	Number of delayed movements at time t
	$n_{prob}(t)$	Number of problematic movements at time t
	$n_{risk}(t)$	Number of movements at risk at time t
	$n_{err}(t)$	Number of movements undetected as at risk at time t
Infection	n_{inf}	Number of herd infections
	n_{ext}	Number of herds in which the infection goes extinct
	a_{dur}	Average duration of infection
	$c_{inc}(t)$	Cumulated incidence at time t
	$n_{herd}(t)$	Number of infected herds at time t
	$n_{ind}(t)$	Number of infected individuals in the metapopulation at time t
	$a_{prev}(t)$	Average prevalence in the infected herds at time t
Network	n_{SCC}	Number of strongly connected components
	max_{SCC}	Size of the largest strongly connected component
	ind_h	In-degree of herd h
	$outd_h$	Out-degree of herd h

Table 1: List of the outcomes computed from the simulations. The infection-related outcomes were computed for each simulation separately. The algorithm and network-related ones were computed for each simulation with the algorithm.

190 100 times for each of the six epidemiological settings.

191 Preliminary simulations were also carried out for each epidemiological setting between 01/01/2009
192 ($t = -1825$) and 31/12/2013 ($t = -1$), with an initial outbreak at $t_I = -1825$. On the one hand,
193 the number of susceptible, infected and recovered individuals of each herd at $t = -1$ were used as the
194 starting numbers for the endemic simulations (starting at $t = 0$). On the other hand, the boundaries
195 of the prevalence classes b_i used by the algorithm were set as quantiles of the distribution of prevalence
196 values. If fewer than $1/c$ herds had a null prevalence, b_i was the $((i - 1)/c)^{th}$ quantile of the distribution.
197 If it was greater than $1/c$, $b_1 = b_2 = 0$ and b_i was the $((i - 2)/(c - 1))^{th}$ quantile of the distribution.

198 *Outcomes and analyses of numerical explorations*

199 The simulations outcomes are listed in Table 1. They were related either (i) to the functioning of the
200 algorithm, (ii) to the infection or (iii) to the network of internal movements modified by the algorithm.

201 The algorithm-related outcomes $n_{rew}(t)$, $n_{del}(t)$ and $n_{prob}(t)$ were computed each time-step after
202 rewiring, while $n_{risk}(t)$ and $n_{err}(t)$ were computed before. These latter outcomes were computed by
203 using the real prevalence status of the herds, rather than the observed ones. A movement m was included
204 in $n_{risk}(t)$ if $V_{O_m}^r(t) > V_{D_m}^r(t)$, and also included in $n_{err}(t)$ if $V_{O_m}^o(t) \leq V_{D_m}^o(t)$ at the same time. The
205 proportion of undetected movements at risk was computed on a weekly basis, to account for intra-week
206 variability in the number of livestock movements. Over week w , this proportion $p_{err}(w)$ was :

$$p_{err}(w) = \frac{\sum_{t=7(w-1)+1}^{7w} n_{err}(t)}{\sum_{t=7(w-1)+1}^{7w} n_{risk}(t)}.$$

207 The Spearman's correlation coefficient ρ between $p_{err}(w)$ and the number of weeks since last update

208 (from 1 to 4 weeks if $q = 28$ days, from 1 to 13 weeks if $q = 91$ days) was also computed to assess the
209 relationship between errors in herd prevalence status and time. The Spearman's coefficient was preferred
210 because it did not assume any particular distribution of the involved variables.

211 The impact of the algorithm on the infection dynamic was estimated through $c_{inc}(t)$, i.e. the cu-
212 mulated number of herds newly infected over the simulation. The variations in $n_{herd}(t)$ and $n_{ind}(t)$
213 over time are also presented in Supplementary material 4. Besides, the overall impact of the algorithm
214 on the infection was assessed using a global multivariate sensitivity analysis, following Lamboni et al.
215 (2011) and using the *multisensi* package of the *R* software (Bidot et al., 2018). This method allows to
216 perform a sensitivity analysis on a multivariate output. For this analysis, twelve variables were derived
217 from the infection-related outcomes. The three outcomes computed once per simulation n_{inf} , n_{ext} and
218 a_{dur} were used as such. In addition, the maximum, minimum and final values over the whole period
219 simulated (respectively noted $max(u(t))$, $min(u(t))$ and $u(365)$ for outcome $u(t)$) of $n_{herd}(t)$, $n_{ind}(t)$ and
220 $a_{prev}(t)$ were also computed. The analysis included a principal component analysis (PCA) on the scaled
221 variables, which were used as the multivariate output for the analysis. The analysis allowed to compute
222 two generalised sensitivity indices (GSI) for each algorithm parameter, which were weighted means of
223 the sensitivity indices over all the dimensions of the PCA: the total index (tGSI) including interactions
224 with other parameters, and the first-order index (mGSI), not including them. The first principal compo-
225 nent of the PCA was also used to assess the distribution of the simulations depending on the algorithm
226 parameters.

227 The network-related outcomes were based on an static view of the network aggregating all the internal
228 movements performed during the simulation, from $t = 0$ to $t = 365$. Therefore, they took into account the
229 rewiring performed by the algorithm, and the potential removal of problematic movements if movements
230 at risks were completely prohibited. The outcomes recorded for the modified networks were compared to
231 the same metrics for the original network defined by the 2014 dataset. The strongly connected components
232 – from which n_{SCC} and max_{SCC} were computed – corresponded to groups of vertices linked to each other
233 by a directed path. The percentiles of the distributions of ind_h and $outd_h$ of all herds in the static network
234 were used to assess the in-degree and out-degree distributions, respectively.

235 Results

236 *Outcomes related to the algorithm*

237 The number of movements rewired varied greatly depending on the date of the outbreak. It was negligible
238 in the epidemic settings, with 80% of simulations with a total of rewired movements between 192 (fewer
239 than 0.1% of all movements) and 2250 (1.1%). However, it was larger in the endemic settings, with
240 80% of simulations with between 17,344 (8.4% of all movements) and 33,640 (16.3%) movements rewired.

241 Besides, increasing the value of Δ_{MAX} logically increased the number of delayed movements (which was
 242 0 by definition for $\Delta_{MAX} = 0$) and decreased the number of problematic movements. In the endemic
 243 settings, the problematic movements represented a small proportion of the movements detected as high
 244 risk (median: 5.4%, 9th decile: 17.4%). In the epidemic settings however, they represented a larger part
 245 (median: 14.3%, 9th decile: 59.7%), although their absolute numbers remained low (median: 129, 9th
 246 decile: 651). Because of the overwhelming number of initially non-infected herds in these simulations, the
 247 movements at risk were likely more difficult to rewire, and thus more likely to be tagged as problematic
 248 by the algorithm.

249 Increasing the herd status update period q was not associated with a decrease in the number of
 250 rewiring events (Fig. 1A, 1B). The value of q was even rather positively correlated with the number
 251 of rewiring events in epidemic settings. This suggests that the algorithm performed more erroneous
 252 rewiring as q increased. This was confirmed by the distributions of Spearman's correlation coefficient
 253 between $p_{err}(w)$ and the number of weeks since last update ρ with $q = 91$ days (Fig. 1D), in endemic
 254 settings (80% of values of ρ between -0.01 and 0.50) and in epidemic settings (80% of values of ρ between
 255 0.39 and 0.75). This was also somewhat the case with $q = 28$ days (1C), although the correlation were
 256 weaker, in endemic (80% of values of values between -0.09 and 0.79) as well as in epidemic settings (80%
 257 of values of values between -0.05 and 0.34).

258 The average proportions of undetected movements at risk $p_{err}(w)$ all tended to increase with the




Figure 1: Impact of the update period q on the undetected movements at risk, in epidemic (magenta) or endemic settings (green), weak (light), moderate (medium) or strong (dark). First column: total number of rewiring events as a function of the update frequency q , averaged over all simulations for a same algorithm parameter combination, in epidemic (A) and endemic settings (B). Second column: distribution of Spearman's correlation coefficients (ρ), with $q = 28$ days (C) and $q = 91$ days (D). Third column: average proportion of undetected movements at risk $p_{err}(w)$ as a function of the number of weeks since the last update, with $q = 28$ days (E) and $q = 91$ days (F).

259 number of weeks since the last update w (Fig. 1E, 1F). This increase was systematically greater for the
 260 largest value of q , up to $p_{err}(w) = 0.3$. However, they also appeared to have reached a plateau after
 261 10 weeks. This suggests that a further increase in the update period q would not strongly increase the
 262 proportion of undetected movements at risk. As for Spearman's correlation coefficient ρ , the increase was
 263 greater in endemic settings than in epidemic settings.

264 *Outcomes related to the infection*

265 Comparison of the results with and without rewiring showed the overall effectiveness of the algorithm
 266 in containing the infection (Fig. 2). Regardless of the epidemiological setting and the combination of
 267 parameters considered, $c_{inc}(t)$ remained systematically lower after rewiring. The algorithm was partic-
 268 ularly effective in weak and moderate epidemic settings, where very few herds were infected during the
 269 year. In other epidemiological settings, the impact of the algorithm varied more strongly depending on
 270 the scenario considered. Results for $n_{herd}(t)$ and $n_{ind}(t)$ are presented in Supplementary material 4.
 271 The algorithm prevented the increase in the number of infected herds in the epidemic setting and even
 272 decreased their number in an endemic setting (Fig. S3). However, it had little impact on the number of
 273 infected individuals (Fig. S4).

274 The sensitivity analysis showed differences in the relative importance of the algorithm parameters on
 275 the reduction of the infection (Fig. 3). Three different patterns of sensitivity to the algorithm parameters
 276 were observed. Firstly, simulations in weak and moderate epidemic settings exhibited an overwhelming




Figure 2: Cumulated incidence $c_{inc}(t)$, in number of herd infections, as a function of time (t , in days), for simulations with (colour) or without rewiring (black), in epidemic (1st row, magenta) or endemic settings (2nd row, green), weak (1st column, light), moderate (2nd column, medium) and strong (3rd column, dark). Each combination of algorithm parameters is represented by its mean over the repetitions (solid line) and an interval of 80% of simulations (envelope).




Figure 3: Generalised sensitivity indices (GSI) of the maximum delay Δ_{MAX} (purple) the number of prevalence classes c (cyan), the update period q (yellow) and the prohibition of movements at risk (blue), in epidemic (1st row) or endemic settings (2nd row), weak (1st column), moderate (2nd column) and strong (3rd column). The total indices (tGSI) are in solid colour and the first-order indices (mGSI) are hatched.

277 sensitivity to the prohibition of movements at risk. Secondly, those in strong epidemic or endemic
 278 exhibited a strong sensitivity to the number of prevalence classes c . Finally, those in weak and moderate
 279 endemic settings exhibited a more balanced sensitivity to all parameters, with a substantial difference
 280 between total and first-order indices for the maximum delay Δ_{MAX} , the number of classes and the
 281 prohibition of movements at risk. These differences suggest an interaction between the three algorithm
 282 parameters. Besides, simulations for every epidemiological setting were somewhat sensitive to the update
 283 period q .

284 The PCA performed as a first step of the sensitivity analysis was used to explore further the way
 285 algorithm parameters impacted the infection-related outputs. Supplementary material 5 shows that the
 286 first principal component of the PCA was globally positively correlated with outputs describing the extent
 287 of the infection. The distributions of simulations along this first principal component therefore provided
 288 information about the way algorithm parameter values affected the extent of the infection. Supplementary
 289 material 6 presents these distributions for every epidemiological setting and every algorithm parameter,
 290 while Fig. 4 displays some of the most relevant distributions. Fig. 4A shows that, in the weak epidemic
 291 setting, simulations in which movements at risk were prohibited almost always scored lower on the first
 292 principal component than those in which they were not. The distribution was similar in the moderate
 293 epidemic setting (Fig. S6), which had similar sensitivity indices (Fig. 3). Interestingly, distributions
 294 of simulations in strong epidemic or endemic settings showed that those with $c = 2$ scored higher on
 295 their respective first component, while those with $c = 3$ and $c = 4$ were not different (Fig. 4B, 4F). A




Figure 4: Distribution of the simulations on the first component of the PCA performed as a first step of the sensitivity analysis, in the weak epidemic setting (A), the strong epidemic setting (B, C), the weak endemic setting (D, E) and the strong endemic setting (F). The outputs are divided by maximum delay (purple, D), management of problematic movements (blue, A), number of prevalence classes (cyan, B and F) and herd status update period (yellow, C and E).

296 similar pattern was observed with the maximum delay in the weak endemic setting: only simulations
 297 with $\Delta_{MAX} = 0$ scored higher on the first principal component (Fig. 4D). In the strong epidemic setting,
 298 the two high-scoring peaks in the distribution according to c (Fig. 4B) corresponded to the simulations
 299 with $q = 28$ and $q = 91$ (Fig. 4C), highlighting an interplay between the number of classes c and the
 300 update period q . No interplay between Δ_{MAX} and q was visible in the weak endemic setting, although
 301 Fig. 4E showed that the score of simulations on the first principal component was positively correlated
 302 with q . Distributions in the moderate endemic setting were similar to those in the weak endemic setting
 303 (Fig. S6).

304 *Outcomes related to the movement network*

305 In endemic settings, rewiring movements increased the in- and out-degrees of the herds, i.e. the number
 306 of different herds they were connected to (see Supplementary material 7). The increase was small but
 307 systematic, for every algorithm parameter value (Fig. S7). In addition, the algorithm also affected the
 308 strongly connected components of the network in endemic settings. On the one hand, the algorithm
 309 reduced their number, all the more that the infection was strong (Fig. 5). On the other hand, the size of
 310 the largest strongly connected component was increased in most, but not all simulations (64%, 67% and




Figure 5: Distributions of the differences in number of strongly connected components (A, n_{SCC}) and in size of the largest strongly connected component B, max_{SCC}) between rewired networks and the original one from the dataset, for epidemic (magenta) and endemic (green) settings, weak(light), moderate (medium) and strong (dark).

311 80% of simulations in low, moderate and high endemic settings, respectively). It should be noted that
312 the lesser impact of the algorithm on the network in epidemic settings can be explained by a number of
313 rewiring events 25 times smaller on average than in endemic settings.

314 Discussion

315 This study aimed at developing an algorithm preventing movements at risk in order to reduce the extent of
316 infections. Our results show that the rewiring algorithm we developed provided an improvement regardless
317 of the disease parameters (infection rate β , recovery rate γ or rate of return to susceptibility δ), although
318 differences were observed in its effectiveness between epidemiological settings. Indeed, infections in weak
319 or moderate epidemic settings were almost completely prevented for each combination of parameters of
320 the algorithm. In the other epidemiological settings, the impact of the algorithm was still significant,
321 although weaker for some parameter combinations. However, the decrease in the number of infected herds
322 was not necessarily coupled with a decrease in the number of infected individuals. This result highlights
323 the tendency of the algorithm to concentrate infected individuals in the already infected herds. The
324 algorithm therefore performed a trade-off that was beneficial to the metapopulation as a whole – with
325 fewer infected herds – but detrimental to the smaller number of already infected herds, in such a situation
326 where movement rewiring is not combined with complementary on-farm measures to reduce within-herd
327 infection prevalence.

328 Sensitivity analysis on the infection-related outcomes revealed that all four parameters of the algorithm
329 were important, but not for all epidemiological settings. Infections that were neither highly virulent
330 nor already well established remained fully under control as long as movements at risk were completely
331 prohibited, even if they could not be rewired. How these movements were managed seemed less important
332 in other cases, in which infections could not be fully contained. The most virulent infections were strongly

333 influenced by the number of prevalence classes defined, which had to be greater than two for the algorithm
334 to be effective. Because of the way boundaries between prevalence classes were computed, increasing the
335 number of classes tended to limit the lowest prevalence class to (completely or almost) disease-free herds.
336 Defining only two prevalence classes likely mixed those herds with somewhat infected ones, thus preventing
337 the algorithm from effectively protecting infection-free herds and thereby limiting the spread
338 of the infection. Other endemic infections rather depended on an interaction between the parameters,
339 but they were especially impacted by the frequency at which the prevalence status of herds were updated,
340 as were simulations with a strong epidemic setting.

341 The update period had a significant impact on the behaviour of the algorithm, making it more error-
342 prone for high values of q . Indeed, the proportion of undetected movements at risk increased with the
343 time since the last update, at least up to ten weeks. This result, together with the impact of q on
344 infection-related outcomes, indicates that any increase in the update frequency of the status of herds
345 should improve the effectiveness of the algorithm. This was not the case for other algorithm parameters.
346 For instance, the sensitivity analysis showed that when Δ_{MAX} played a role, reporting movements over
347 only a few days – a rather minor constraint – was sufficient to improve the effectiveness of the algorithm.
348 Similarly, considering only three prevalence classes reduced the extent of infections in strong epidemic
349 or endemic settings. Conversely, increasing the frequency to daily updates was necessary for maximum
350 algorithm effectiveness, but would likely entail significant costs. Bulk milk-based sampling systems could
351 be used for some diseases in cattle (e.g. Garoussi et al., 2008, Humphry et al., 2012, with bovine viral
352 diarrhoea), but daily prevalence estimation might be outright impossible for others.

353 Concentrating the prevalence estimation efforts on a few selected herds is a potential way to reduce the
354 sampling costs associated with the algorithm while maintaining its effectiveness. Although the network
355 metrics were not used to drive the algorithm itself, they could be useful for this selection. Indeed, it is
356 expected that the central herds in the network, i.e. those through which a large proportion of animal
357 movements pass, will play a more important role in the spread of infection (Rautureau et al., 2011, Natale
358 et al., 2011). This rationale is notably the one used for rewiring in the study of Gates and Woolhouse
359 (2015). Recently, Hoscheit et al. (2021) reviewed different centrality measures in the BDNI, while taking
360 into account the dynamic nature of the movement network. Among them, the TempoRank index would
361 for example be a good candidate for selecting a subset of herds to be specifically monitored and to which
362 to apply the rewiring algorithm. By targeting specific movements from or to specific herds, the impact
363 on the network structure would be minimal, while potentially keeping a substantial impact on disease
364 spread risks.

365 It should be noted that the impact of the algorithm on the structure of the commercial network
366 was already limited, as it targeted a few movements only: less than 20% of the movements for endemic
367 infections and less than 2% of them for epidemic infections. Nevertheless, it seems that this rewiring

368 method tended to increase the overall connectedness of the herds during endemic infections. Indeed, the
369 increases in degrees and size of the largest strong component indicate that the algorithm connected herds
370 that were originally not so. These metrics are generally correlated with higher expected epidemic risks
371 (Kiss et al., 2006, Dubé et al., 2009). This is however not the case in this context, as these changes
372 result from a trade-off made by the algorithm to prevent the single simulated disease. However, such
373 a rewiring in a real-world context would also have to take into account the potentially increased risks
374 of other diseases, whose spread could be facilitated. The algorithm could be extended to assess several
375 diseases at once, but the additional constraints would probably reduce its effectiveness.

376 For this study, the network-related outcomes concerned only internal movements, i.e. between herds
377 located in Brittany. However, the simulations also took into account interactions with herds located
378 outside Brittany. More precisely, 20% of all movements whose destination was in the metapopulation had
379 an origin outside the metapopulation, and 25% of all movements whose origin was in the metapopulation
380 had a destination outside of it. On the one hand, this confirms that the movements at risk that could not
381 be rewired could probably be replaced by an import and an export if necessary, since those movements
382 are already rather common. On the other hand, all imports were presumed to never be movements
383 at risk, i.e. that the prevalence status of their origin was never higher than that of their destination.
384 This assumption is not trivial, as it assumes that imports did not create greater infection risks than
385 internal movements. In a real-life context, the additional risk because of imports would also have to be
386 taken into account and possibly managed in another way. More generally, the proportion of movements
387 with an origin outside of the metapopulation is expected to decrease when the number of herds in the
388 metapopulation increase. Extending the use of such an algorithm to a national scale, rather than a single
389 region, could therefore mitigate this problem.

390 The present study builds upon the results from Ezanno et al. (2021), and confirms the effectiveness
391 of a rewiring method based on targeted movements beyond the specific case of bovine paratuberculosis.
392 Indeed, the algorithm presented by Ezanno et al. (2021) was developed specifically to address the control
393 of bovine paratuberculosis, notably characterized by an endemic status in France and a low detection
394 rate. To do so, they used a specific age-structured epidemiological model (Camanes et al., 2018) and
395 an algorithm calibrated to target the disease. This was also the case for instance of Mohr et al. (2018),
396 which specifically targeted foot-and-mouth disease. Conversely, the present study aimed at assessing more
397 comprehensively the effectiveness of the algorithm. Therefore, it was tested for different epidemiological
398 settings – both endemic and epidemic – using a non-specific epidemiological model, and for broad range
399 of parameter values. Ezanno et al. (2021) highlight the low effectiveness of rewiring for low evolving
400 diseases, but our study shows its relevance in other types of infections.

401 Although the study here show the effectiveness of rewiring on historical data from the BDNI, the
402 algorithm could also be used prospectively as part of decision-making tools. Indeed, the rewiring method

403 could work without any simulation of infection, if herd statuses were provided otherwise. Given these
404 statuses and the potential movements to occur, the algorithm would also suggest necessary changes to
405 prevent movements at risk. In this context, the implementation of these changes would also depend on
406 the actual decision of the informed farmers. Unless rewiring is enforced, it is expected that constraints
407 other than sanitary ones would affect movements, which would impact the effectiveness of the algorithm.
408 Coupling it with a decision-making model could provide additional insight on this impact. In order to
409 make it easier to use as part of such decision-making tools, the algorithm has been specifically designed
410 to be able to include additional, different constraints. Additional criteria, e.g. concerning the breed or
411 sex of the animals, could be added easily by providing the algorithm with movements for individuals in
412 each category separately. Depending on their number, however, such criteria would reduce the rewiring
413 possibilities of the algorithm, which could reduce its efficiency.

414 This study demonstrates the effectiveness of a rewiring method targeting specific movements to reduce
415 infection risks. Our approach thus differs radically from that presented by Gates and Woolhouse (2015),
416 as it also aims at generating minimal changes in the structure of the movement network. Although the
417 algorithm was tested on a cattle movement network, it is applicable to a much wider range of networks
418 in animal and plant populations, e.g. among seed exchange networks, which face similar infection risks
419 (Jeger et al., 2007, Pautasso et al., 2010). While the need for controlled movements makes this method
420 more relevant to agricultural systems, the spatial and temporal scales considered can also be adapted
421 depending on the context. Indeed, the daily time-step and the region level were used here as they
422 correspond to the BDNI data structure, but are not necessary for the algorithm to work. The usefulness
423 of our rewiring method could therefore extend beyond cattle concerns, even though the effectiveness of
424 the algorithm in other contexts remains to be tested.

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428 **Declarations of interest**

429 None.

430 **Data statement**

431 The code for the algorithm, as well as additional scripts for formatting the data or running preliminary
432 simulations and dummy test data, are freely available at <https://sourcesup.renater.fr/projects/pub-rewir->

433 algo/. The dataset used in the study is an extraction from the French national bovine identification
434 database (BDNI), which is confidential, and therefore cannot be provided publicly.

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