

1 **1000 years of population, warfare, and climate change in pre-Columbian societies of**
2 **the Central Andes**

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19 **Abstract:** Different Andean societies underwent processes of expansion and collapse
20 during propitious or adverse climate conditions, resource boost or depletion along with
21 population variations. Previous studies have emphasized that demographic collapses of
22 polities in the Central Andes Area were triggered by warfare and the negative impacts of
23 fluctuating climate (droughts) on crop productivity. Nevertheless, the interactions between
24 climatic variability, demography and warfare have been less thoroughly evaluated. We
25 develop population dynamic models to test feedback relationships between population
26 growth, climate change and warfare in the Central Andes, where considerable regional
27 hydroclimate variations have occurred over a millennium. Through population models, we
28 found out that the rise and demise of social polities in the northern coast of the Central
29 Andes appear to be a consequence of climate change. In contrast, for the highlands of Peru

30 and the Titicaca basin, population models suggest that warfare intensity has a negative
31 effect on population growth rates.

32

331- Introduction

34 Holocene climate variability affected the trajectory of ancient civilizations across the globe
35 within complex processes of mutual influence [1], where human societies play key role in
36 transforming historical landscape, resulting in enhancing richness, soil fertility, equitability
37 biodiversity of nature and landform heterogeneity [2, 3].

38

39 Different complex societies after developing several action to transform their agrarian,
40 agro-pastoral or agro-marine economies landscape, underwent collapse during periods of
41 adverse climate conditions, resource depletion and high population levels [4-6], which
42 could not be overthrow by human technological and social actions. The vulnerability of
43 these economies could increase due to the "threat multiplier" effect of changes in the
44 frequency and duration of extreme climate events in straining social instability in states
45 with weak governance [7-9] and limited technological solutions. However, such causal
46 links between climate change, population growth, critical resources and social conflicts are
47 still debated [10-12]. Causality analyses suggest that past demographic collapses in China
48 and Europe were triggered by social unrest, which was ultimately modulated by the
49 negative impacts of prolonged cooling events on crop productivity and per capita food
50 supply [13, 14]. Conversely, nonlinear dynamical models attest to a much more active role
51 of demography in driving warfare and population collapses via offer-demand dynamics
52 over strategic resources [15-17]. That is, population demises could arise from the
53 endogenous interplay between population size/pressure and social conflict. Nevertheless, to

54 the best of our knowledge, the interference of changes in climate conditions in nonlinear
55 dynamics between demography and social conflict has not been empirically evaluated.

56

57 Here, we develop a quantitative approach to test long-term feedback relationships between
58 population growth, climate change and warfare by implementing population models based
59 on the principles of nonlinear dynamical systems. We focused on the Central Andes area
60 (Fig. 1A), in which several state level polities have risen and collapsed under diversified
61 ecogeographic zones, from the cold semiarid Andean highlands (the southern centers area)
62 to the extreme hyperarid Pacific coast of South America (the northern centers area), where
63 people developed transformative complex productive technological systems. Parallely, the
64 region has experienced considerable variations in regional hydroclimate conditions over the
65 last millennium [18-21]. Thus, much attention has been given to the potential role that
66 changes in water availability and technological management could have played in the rise
67 and fall of Andean state level polities across the rather arid landscape that characterizes the
68 western Andean slope. For example, the demise of the Tiwanaku and Wari empires in AD
69 ~1000 has been linked to an intense regional megadrought that limited crop production
70 over the Andean highlands [19, 22-24]. The collapse of the State Moche societies in
71 approximately AD 900 [25] has been attributed to the loss of arable lands caused by
72 repeated drought or flood cycles and sand dune invasion due to severe of El Niño events
73 that affected their territories in the northern Peruvian coast, which is usually dominated by
74 arid conditions [26-29]. Although most of available evidence indicates that these demises
75 were accompanied by increased warfare intensity [30-34], the interaction of internal
76 conflicts has been poorly considered. Still, McCool et al. [35] have recently explored the
77 relationship between demography, hydroclimate and conflict in groups that dwelled mid-

78 elevation valleys from the southern centers area at 700-1400 AD. Based on statistical
79 causality analyses, these authors found that chronic conflict in the Nasca region was
80 indirectly linked to climate, but directly to increased population size/pressure, which was
81 ultimately set by the positive effect of wetter conditions on the food production in an arid
82 region with limited availability of croplands.

83

84 **Figure 1: Central Andes archeological sites and the analyzed time series.** (A) - Map
85 showing the locations of archaeological sites providing radiocarbon data for each cultural
86 tradition. (B) and (C) - Normalized (solid curves) and unnormalized (dashed curves) SPDs
87 for northern (blue curve) and southern (orange curve) sociocultural areas. Vertical dashed
88 bars indicate declining population growth rates. Note that colors of curves that describe
89 SPDs for each tradition are maintained in panels below. (D) and (E) - Calculated growth
90 rates based on normalized (solid curve) and unnormalized (dashed curve) SPDs. (F) and
91 (G) - Raw (dashed curves) and smoothed (solid curves) time series for warfare intensity in
92 each sociocultural area. (H) - Proxy time series for regional hydroclimate conditions. The
93 green curve shows annually resolved lithic concentrations (see [21]), and the solid dark
94 curve denotes the corresponding smoothed time series.

95

96 We fitted population dynamic models to empirically capture the interplay between long-
97 term population size/pressure, warfare intensity and regional hydroclimate conditions (see
98 Methods). To account for past demographic levels over the last 2000 years, we used as
99 proxy data of Summed Probability Distributions (SPDs) for archeological radiocarbon dates
100 aggregated in a novel chronometric database for the region. Our models were supplemented
101 with time series for internal conflicts based on the dataset for defensive settlements
102 developed by Arkush and Tung [30]. To explore the effect of anomalies in hydroclimate
103 conditions, we considered a high-resolution proxy for long-term changes in the activity of
104 the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which is the main driver for hydroclimate,
105 frequency of extreme weather events, bioproductivity and agricultural production over the
106 western Andean slope at the interannual scale [36-39]. Linguistic, genetic and archeological

107 evidence attests to two relatively independent centers of cultural and sociopolitical
108 development across the Central Andes area that encompasses from the modern Ecuadorian-
109 Peruvian border to the Lake Titicaca basin in Bolivia [40, 41]. The northern center is
110 represented by agro-marine social structures that dwelled on the northern Peruvian coast
111 (hereafter the northern sociocultural area; Fig. 1A). The southern nuclei include agro-
112 pastoral societies from the highlands of southern Peru and the Titicaca Basin (i.e., the
113 southern sociocultural center, Fig. 1). Consistent with such social structures, we evaluated
114 dynamical interplays independently for the northern and southern centers.

115

116 **2- Methods**

117 ***2.1 Paleodemographic data***

118 We generated a database of 382 radiocarbon dates of terrestrial samples (i.e., charcoal,
119 plant remains, and wood) collected from 70 archaeological sites along the Central Andes
120 Culture Area (Fig. 1A). We followed criteria proposed by Bird et al. [42] to assemble
121 archeological ^{14}C dates into a database that provides information on long-term
122 paleodemographic trends in a given area. The northern sociocultural area is represented by
123 125 ^{14}C dates from 13 archeological sites unequivocally assigned to the Moche tradition. In
124 contrast, 257 dates from the Wari and Tiwanaku archaeological sites ($n=57$) serve as the
125 southern sociocultural center. The resulting dataset covers the period of 50 to 1300 AD,
126 concatenating existing repositories and previously published data (e.g., [43-45]). The dataset
127 is available through the GitHub account of the PEOPLE 3000 Working Group of PAGES
128 (<https://github.com/people3k>) and is thus indexed as an update of the P3K14C dataset [42].
129 Sampling intensities are 0.14 and 0.26 dates/100 yr/100 km² for northern coast and south-
130 central highland traditions, respectively. These intensities are within the range reported in

131 other works that examine paleodemographic trends and patterns for different regions of
132 South America (0.13-0.22 dates/100 yr/100 km²; [46].

133

134 To estimate demographic levels over time, we calculated independent SPDs of calibrated
135 radiocarbon dates for each sociocultural area. Theoretical and empirical studies indicate
136 that SPDs represent a good proxy for relative changes in population growth and human
137 energy consumption [47]. Radiocarbon data were processed in the Rcarbon package for R
138 [48]. All data were calibrated using the SHCAL20 calibration curve [49]. We controlled the
139 edge effect by calibrating and summing dates over the time range of 50 to 1500 AD. To
140 offset the contribution of intra-site overrepresentation and calibration biases, we applied a
141 bin size of 50 years and a 100-year rolling mean. Following recommendations made by
142 [48], we generated SPDs based on normalized and unnormalized radiocarbon dates.
143 Logistic null models on normalized and unnormalized SPDs were run to test positive or
144 negative deviations from simulated envelopes via “calsample” and “uncalsample” methods,
145 respectively [48]. Before the implementation of population dynamic models, normalized
146 and unnormalized SPD time series were sectioned into time-step intervals of 25 years. This
147 procedure allowed us to capture only major population trends, avoiding a high-frequency
148 noise source of variability [5].

149

150 ***2.2 Warfare data***

151 Original data of warfare intensity come from the review by [30], which collates
152 archeological evidence identifying threats or harms that past Central Andes populations
153 suffered in times of conflict (Fig. 1D). The review by [30] considers frequencies of violent
154 skeletal trauma and defensive settlements. We selected data for defensive settlement

155 because the chronological and spatial resolution for this proxy is well resolved in our
156 studied areas. In practice, the frequency of defensive settlements represents the actions
157 taken by a given group to face the threat of attacks from other populations. Under the
158 classification of [30], a defensive settlement is understood as a settlement localized in areas
159 that are difficult to access because of its geographic characteristic (e.g., hilltops) that may
160 or may not have constructive fortifications (structural defenses or fenced villages), or other
161 strategic architectural devices (shelters, walls, ditches, checkpoints), complementary to
162 enhance its unassailability or to reduce their vulnerability. The basic data used for the
163 frequency of defensive settlement were obtained by coding numerically whether these were
164 absent (0), present (1), or common (2) during a given period over each area. Hence,
165 frequencies within this raw time series range from 0 to 6. Because warfare data are grouped
166 into broad chrono cultural periods of the Central Andes area (e.g, Formative, Early
167 Horizon, Early Intermediate Period, Middle Horizon, Late Intermediate Period, Late
168 Period), we translated these discrete and large time step data into an annual time index.
169 Then, the resulting time series was smoothed using a cubic smoothing spline function [50]
170 with a spar (smoothing) parameter of 0.90. We then resampled the data at 25-year intervals
171 to match the SPD time series (Fig. 1E).

172

173 ***2.3 Hydroclimate data***

174 Even when there are different hydroclimate reconstructions for local hydroclimate over
175 restricted areas of the western Andean slope, our perspective is based on the premise that
176 proxies for overall drivers best describe large-scale conditions (e.g., “packages of weather”
177 *sensu* [51]). This approach relies on the fact that many available reconstructions for local
178 hydroclimate are temporally discontinuous and/or poorly constrained due to insufficiently

179 resolved paleoclimate records. That is, we assume that reconstructions for past changes in
180 ENSO activity serve as proxies for long-term hydroclimate conditions over the Central
181 Andes area. The selected ENSO proxy is the annually resolved concentration of terrestrial
182 clasts in a marine core (SO147-106KL) retrieved ~80 km off the Peruvian coast (12°S,
183 [21]). We used lithic concentrations instead of photosynthetic pigments or alkenone
184 records, as riverine sedimentary flushing events into the Peruvian shelf reflect variations in
185 regional hydroclimate conditions (Fig. 1E). Specifically, lithic concentrations in this
186 sediment core depend on the intensity/magnitude of continental precipitation. Thus,
187 decreased/increased clast accumulations in the marine core are associated with prevailing
188 La Niña/El Niño conditions over the Tropical Pacific and, in turn, negative/positive rainfall
189 anomalies and a reduced/increased frequency/intensity of flooding events along the
190 northern Peruvian coast [21]. Reduced/increased lithic concentrations, and in turn
191 prevailing La Niña-like/El Niño-like conditions, respectively are associated with increased
192 rainfall over the Andean highlands.

193 Raw data for clast percentages in the SO147-106KL core are presented at an annual
194 timescale (green curve in Fig. 1E), thus capturing high-frequency climate variations.
195 Because we are interested in the long-term signal for mean hydroclimate conditions (i.e.,
196 wet interludes versus droughts), we smoothed the raw time series by fitting a cubic spline
197 function with a spar parameter of 0.65 (dark curve in Fig. 1E). The smoothed time series
198 was resampled at 25-year intervals to match the SPD time series.

199

200 ***2.4 Population dynamic models***

201 We applied a modeling framework that assumes a coupled dynamical system between two
202 endogenous variables and an exogenous variable. The endogenous variables are population

203 dynamics (N_t) and warfare intensity (W_t) [15, 17]. The exogenous variable is represented
204 by long-term climatic variability (C_t). We assume that changes in hydroclimate conditions
205 will affect long-term food production or crop yields, in turn modifying the equilibrium
206 density (k , also called carrying capacity) of a given society. Thus, k is set by the available
207 amount of arable land for farming and herding and concomitant technologies (yield per unit
208 of area). As the population approaches k , all available resources will be used (e.g.,
209 cultivable land, water management). Further increases in population size will immediately
210 result in lower average consumption rates. However, these societies may face long-term
211 changes in climate conditions that modulate resource availability (i.e., the amount of arable
212 land or yield per unit of area). The explanation relies on the combination of Malthusian
213 theory [52] with climatic variability as an exogenous forcing factor. Climatic variability
214 determines agricultural land carrying capacity, which affects the population growth of
215 societies [4, 5]. Lateral perturbations result from exogenous factors (e.g., climate) that act
216 on population equilibrium k and cause nonadditive effects. In the absence of warfare, the
217 dynamic of this system can be defined as a logistic equation with lateral perturbation effects
218 [53]:

$$N_t N_{t-1} \cdot e^{r_N \left[1 - \frac{N_{t-1}}{k + \alpha C_{t-1}} \right]} \quad (1)$$

219 N_t denotes the human population size at time t ; r_N is a positive constant representing the
220 maximum per capita reproductive rate, k is the "carrying capacity" of the system, α is the
221 climatic coefficient and C_{t-1} is the climatic variable or the proxy influencing food
222 production. In fact, the ratio N /resource availability value in Equation 1 is the proxy of
223 "population pressure" defined as the relationship between population size relative to
224 available resources [54-56]. However, the rise in population in complex societies might

225 increase the frequency of warfare and conflicts, creating a mutual feedback structure among
226 population growth and warfare intensity [e.g., 17]. Therefore, the population dynamic
227 model of Equation 1 can be modified to include a term for warfare intensity or frequency:

$$228 \quad N_t = N_{t-1} \cdot e^{r_N \left[1 - \frac{N_{t-1}}{k + \alpha \cdot C_{t-1}} \right] - \beta \cdot W_{t-1}} \quad (2).$$

229 where α is the climatic effect on crops or land productivity, and β is direct mortality caused
230 by warfare. The model can be modified to introduce the effects of both climate change and
231 warfare intensity on land productivity:

$$N_t = N_{t-1} \cdot e^{r_N \left[1 - \frac{N_{t-1}}{k + \alpha \cdot C_{t-1} + \gamma \cdot W_{t-1}} \right]} \quad (3),$$

232 Parameter γ represents the negative effects of warfare intensity on land productivity [17].
233 We estimate that two processes could drive the dynamic of warfare intensity in complex
234 societies. First, large population sizes increase opportunities for encounters between social
235 groups, in turn placing demographic pressures on land use and productivity. Second, an
236 increased probability of armed conflicts between social groups could also arise from
237 reductions in land productivity or area due to the occurrence of adverse climate conditions
238 such as prolonged droughts or more frequent floods. The impact of these extreme
239 hydroclimate events is especially important along the arid western slope of the central
240 Andes, as they are capable of triggering yield losses in several traditional crops [37].
241 Therefore, to account for the dynamics of warfare intensity (W), the starting rate of conflict
242 λ is assumed to be proportional to population density, and by appealing to the mass-action
243 law, there is an exponential rate of conflict decay μ [e.g., 17]. The basic model for warfare
244 intensity dynamics is as follows:

$$245 \quad W_t = W_{t-1} \cdot e^{[\lambda \cdot N_{t-1} - \mu]} \quad (4).$$

246 The impact of climate fluctuations was incorporated into this model by assuming that harsh
247 hydroclimate conditions result in reduced crop productivity and increased warfare intensity.
248 There are two different hypotheses; one proposes a simple additive effect of climate.

$$249 \quad W_t = W_{t-1} \cdot e^{[\lambda \cdot N_{t-1} + \psi \cdot C_{t-1} - \mu]} \quad (5),$$

250 where constant ψ represents the negative/positive effects of climatic change on warfare
251 dynamics. On the other hand, as in Equation 1, we can assume that the ratio
252 population/resource availability is the proxy of “population pressure” defined as the
253 relationship between population size relative to available resources [55]. Hence, the
254 dynamics of warfare might be driven by the ratio of population size/land productivity.

$$255 \quad W_t = W_{t-1} \cdot e^{\left[\lambda \cdot \frac{N_{t-1}}{C_{t-1}} - \mu\right]} \quad (6),$$

256 In sum, we expect the population rate of change ($\log N_t - \log N_{t-1}$) to be negatively affected
257 by warfare, while population size will positively influence the warfare rate of change (\log
258 $W_t - \log W_{t-1}$). Hydroclimate conditions are expected to have an exogenous perturbation
259 effect on this coupled relationship.

260

261 **2.5 Statistical Analyses: *Nonlinear regression analyses and model comparison and*** 262 ***validation***

263 The parameters of Equations 1-6 were estimated through nonlinear least-squares fitting
264 procedures using the nls (nonlinear least squares) library on the R platform. To fit these
265 nonlinear models, we used the population (r_t) and warfare (w_t) rates of change as response
266 variables by log transforming Equations 1-6.

267

268 Because we use smoothed time series for SPDs (population levels), warfare intensity and
269 hydroclimate conditions, a temporal autocorrelation is included, which creates some
270 problems when using standard statistical tools for assessing the goodness of fit of the
271 models. To compare the statistical models, we used different and complementary
272 approaches. First, we selected the models by measuring the Bayesian Akaike information
273 criterion (BIC) [57], and models with the lowest BIC values were selected. Second, we
274 compare and validate the models by simulating the total trajectory predictions initiated with
275 the first observed value of the time series and running the algorithm using each model with
276 their estimated parameters to obtain the time series' remaining simulated values.

277

278 In all simulations, the accuracy of predictions was assessed using coefficient of prediction

279 σ^2 [58]

280
$$\sigma^2 = \mathbf{1} - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (O_i^* - O_i)^2}{\sum_{i=1}^n (\bar{O} - O_i)^2} \quad (7),$$

281 O_i is the observed data from the testing dataset, O_i^* denotes the model predictions, \bar{O} is
282 the mean of the observations, and n is the number of data to be predicted. Coefficient of
283 prediction σ^2 is 1 when the predicted data are equal to the observed data, 0 when the
284 regression model predicts and the data average, and negative if the predictions of the model
285 are worse than the data mean.

286

287 **3- Results**

288 The raw SPDs for normalized and unnormalized radiocarbon dates from both sociocultural
289 areas are practically identical, thus reproducing equivalent overall patterns for past
290 population levels over time (Fig. 1B). The magnitude and amplitude for peaks (population

291 increased) and troughs (population declines) in raw SPD curves vary slightly when
292 normalized and unnormalized ¹⁴C-dates are summed. The same is true for the extent and
293 duration of positive and negative significant deviations from logistic null models (Fig. S1).

294

295 We document striking temporal variation in population dynamics for the period of AD ~
296 50-1300 in both the northern and southern center areas (Fig. 1 B-C). The northern and
297 southern centers experienced demographic levels peaking at AD ~650 and AD ~1000,
298 respectively (Fig. 1 B-C). This implies that these sociocultural areas underwent sustained
299 phases of population growth that lasted between 400 and 500 years (Fig. 1 D-E). Analyses
300 of temporal changes are consistent with this demographic pattern, suggesting rapid
301 increases in regional population levels from AD ~400 to AD 550 (Fig. 1D - E), during the
302 so-called Middle Horizon period (AD ~600-1000). This overall growth phase matches with
303 the rise of Wari, Tiwanaku and Moche state level polities with their characteristic
304 iconographic styles [43-45].

305

306 For the northern centers area, there was a rapid growth transition starting at AD ~300-350
307 and then a demographic collapse occurring at approximately AD 900 (Fig. 1D). The latter
308 coincides closely with the estimated chronology for the end of the material culture that
309 characterized the Moche tradition (26). In the southern centers area, a sudden increase in
310 growth rates took place by AD ~500-600. This phase was followed by strong population
311 decline centered at AD ~1100–1200 (Fig. 1E), which appears related with the timing of the
312 fall of the Tiwanaku and Wari traditions [43-45], and strong climatic deterioration [19, 24,
313 26].

314

315 Corresponding data for northern and southern centers are constrained to AD 50-925 and
316 AD 250-1225, respectively (Figure S2 and S3 B-D). Hence, we can evaluate whether
317 distinct boom-and-bust dynamics that characterized different past Andean societies (e.g.,
318 [6]) were also present in the Central Andes Area. We verify that this procedure captures the
319 core processes of such a dynamic and that these cultural areas indeed endured socio
320 ecological rise and fall from AD ~50-1250 (Figure 1 A-D).

321 At first glance, population dynamics at each of the sociocultural centers area follow long-
322 term variations in warfare intensity and hydroclimate (Fig. 1F-H). Positive population
323 growth rates prevailed over the northern centers (AD 400-600; Fig. 1D) when warfare
324 intensity was relatively low (Fig. 1F), and clast concentrations in the SO147-106KL core
325 were high (>35%, Fig. 1H). The peak in population growth rates (AD 400-500) coincides
326 with a period of lowest conflict intensity and increased coastal rainfall. In contrast,
327 population decline is observed from AD 500 to 600 as warfare intensity steadily increases,
328 as interpreted by the proliferation of cranial trauma among adults [30, 31]. This also
329 occurred during a period in which the Eastern Pacific went into El Niño-like conditions
330 (AD 400-500) but characterized by an incipient decline in rainfall and flood activity (Fig.
331 1H). From AD 600 to 900, population decline occurred (Fig. 1 B and D), warfare intensity
332 continued to increase (Fig. 1F), and the overall trend in lithic concentrations suggests
333 reduced coastal precipitation (Fig. 1H).

334

335 The warfare intensity over the southern sociocultural centers area shows an increasing trend
336 (Fig. 1G). The lowest values occurred in AD 600, concomitant with a period of population
337 increase (Fig. 1E) and a long-term tendency toward a La Niña-like conditions (Fig. 1I),
338 leading to rainfall increase over the Andean highlands. Around approximately AD 900,

339 population began to decline, and conflict intensity increased rapidly. Such coupling
340 between warfare and population dynamics, however, occurs despite the Eastern Pacific
341 remaining locked into La Niña-like wet conditions (Fig. 1I).

342

343 Population dynamic models (Eqs. 1-6) highlight important differences between both
344 northern and southern sociocultural centers areas on the long-term
345 demographic/hydroclimate/conflict interplay. For instance, best-fitted population models
346 either in BIC or R^2 values (Table S1) for the northern sociocultural centers include
347 population sizes and variations in hydroclimate. Total trajectory predictions from a model
348 that includes climate as a lateral perturbation effect are considerably better than predictions
349 from models that consider warfare effects (Figure 2 A-D, Table S1). Moreover, warfare
350 dynamics are mainly determined by the additive combined positive effects of population
351 size and hydroclimate (lower BIC and higher R^2 values) (Table S1). Changes in the
352 intensity of warfare are loosely related to population increase over the northern
353 sociocultural center areas (Table S1).

354

355 **Figure 2: Predicted and observed population dynamic at Northern sociocultural area.**
356 Comparisons between population dynamic model-predicted trajectories (red solid curve)
357 and observed SPD data (normalized SPD: solid line and blue dots; nonnormalized SPD:
358 dotted lines and blue dots) for the northern sociocultural area. Panels (A) and (B) show
359 model predictions that include hydroclimatic variation for normalized and unnormalized
360 data, respectively. (C) and (D) show predictions for models including warfare effects for
361 normalized and unnormalized data. Further details on the model predictions are provided in
362 Table S2.

363

364 In the case of the southern sociocultural centers area, demographic dynamic models fitted
365 to SPD data clearly demonstrate that warfare intensity has a negative effect on population
366 growth rates. Those models that incorporate conflict explain more than three times the
367 variance in population growth rates than models including hydroclimate conditions as
368 predictors (Table S2). In fact, total trajectory predictions indicate that warfare is the best
369 predictor and main driver of population dynamics over these sociocultural centers (Figure 3
370 A-D, Table S2). Likewise, warfare dynamics are mainly determined by the positive effect
371 of population sizes (Table S2). Models that only consider demographic levels (i.e., SPD
372 data) as explanatory variables explain over 80% of the change rate for conflict intensity
373 (Table S2). Nevertheless, models including the effects of population pressure display lower
374 BIC and higher R^2 values, indicating that the ratio of population/water availability is the
375 most important factor behind the warfare dynamic (Table S2). Thus, our results attest to the
376 reciprocal influences of population and warfare in the southern sociocultural centers area
377 where warfare has a negative effect on population growth rates, while population positively
378 affects warfare growth rates.

379

380 **Figure 3: Predicted and observed population dynamic at Southern sociocultural area.**
381 Comparisons between population dynamic model-predicted trajectories (dark dashed curve)
382 and observed SPD data (normalized SPD: solid curves; nonnormalized SPD: dotted orange
383 curves) for the southern sociocultural area. Model predictions for the effect of changes in
384 hydroclimate are shown for normalized and unnormalized data in Panels (A) and (B),
385 respectively. Predictions of models that include warfare effects for normalized and
386 unnormalized data are shown in Panels (C) and (D). Gray shaded areas show 95%
387 confidence intervals for model predictions. Further details on the model predictions are
388 provided in Table S3.

389

390 **4- Discussion**

391 Our results derived from a population dynamic approach suggest that the rise and fall of
392 complex societies in the Central Andes Culture Area over a period of ~1000 years (AD ~
393 50-1300) involved processes affected by population growth, warfare and hydroclimate
394 conditions. Ortloff and Kolata [22] proposed that vulnerability to drought in pre-Columbian
395 societies varied according to the degree of dependence on rainfed agricultural production,
396 which is a function of environmental constraints and the development of specialized
397 irrigation technologies to buffer drought impacts [24-26].

398 Compared to the Middle Horizon northern high-Andes polities (Wari and Tiwanaku
399 centers) that deployed complex farming irrigated raised field systems across semiarid areas,
400 complex societies of the northern sociocultural centers area in the arid Peruvian coast are
401 expected to be more vulnerable, as farming production systems rely heavily on the local
402 precipitation regime, subject to cycles of drought, floods and sand dune erosion [28]. We
403 effectively verified differentiated vulnerabilities to climate risk between the northern and
404 southern Andean sociocultural centers areas. Our results, however, contribute additional
405 elements for understanding such a relationship between climate and societal collapse. First,
406 hydroclimate conditions (drought and flood) were indeed a key factor in driving the growth
407 and demise of the Moche polities, but this dynamic was greatly modulated by population
408 size. Second, although, the long-term variations in water availability acted as an exogenous
409 factor in the rise and collapse of the southern highland centers, it marginally affected the
410 feedback between population growth and conflict.

411

412 Contrasting positions exist on the impact of ENSO-driven positive hydroclimate anomalies
413 that could have affect the trajectory of past societies from the northern coast of Peru,

414 ranging from devastating to beneficial consequences [26, 27, 29, 32, 59, 60]. Demographic
415 dynamic models attest to a positive effect of these events on population dynamics, which is
416 consistent with evidence for adaptive practices used to cope with the interrelated impacts of
417 amplified water availability and flood risk. The Moche deployed distinct cultivation areas
418 along the arid coastal escarpment, where slopes could easily accumulate rainfall runoff and
419 then be managed through small-scale and low-investment irrigation infrastructure that was
420 rapidly restored after major flooding events [26]. This opportunistic production regime was
421 complemented by seizing flooding water from rivers through networks of
422 redundant/intermittent irrigation channels [26] or transient farming in peripheral areas [27,
423 59]. High lithic concentrations in the SO147-106KL core (>35%, Fig. 1E) indicate that the
424 period between AD 350 and 590 was a period favorable for thriving opportunistic and
425 intensified maize production. This implies that positive population growth rates (AD 400-
426 600) were achieved by increased agricultural land carrying capacity insofar as water
427 resources became abundant, but vulnerability to flooding and sand dune deposition was
428 also mitigated.

429

430 Negative rainfall anomalies greatly challenged coastal farming systems of the Central
431 Andes Culture Area [26, 28, 59]. Aside from depleted water availability, the loss in arable
432 land and crop productivity was exacerbated by desertification, flood as a consequence of
433 strong local rainfall link to El Niño events, and localized dune transgression [59].
434 Infrastructure against sand encroachment, redundant irrigation canals, and high mobility
435 were recurrent mitigation strategies used in the Moche period to face drought impacts [26,
436 59]. Data from the SO147-106KL core and independent multiproxy reconstructions [61-64]
437 indicate that the Eastern Pacific entered the La Niña mean state between AD 900 and 1100,

438 which resulted in a multicentennial drought (Fig. 1H). The demographic collapse detected
439 in AD 900 matches closely with the chronology of the most severe drought event in the
440 Peruvian coast of the last 4000 years [21]. The population decline from AD 650 onward
441 (Fig. 1B, D), however, suggests that such demographic decline was felt earlier and
442 regardless of adaptive strategies. Thus, the impact of a long-term depletion in water
443 availability and/or arable land since AD 650 appears to be modulated by population size.
444 This nonadditive effect through the per capita resource share [4, 5, 53, 55] implies that even
445 minor hydroclimate changes are capable of triggering disproportionate demographic
446 responses when population sizes and production systems are near the maximum.

447

448 Increased intensity of warfare and political fragmentation during the so-called Late Moche
449 period (AD 700-900) have been linked to different mechanisms, such as prevailing adverse
450 environmental conditions along the northern Peruvian coast [28, 29, 65]. The models
451 developed here, however, suggest that neither hydroclimate, population pressure nor
452 growth explain the dynamics of conflict incidence in the northern centers (Table S1). In this
453 vein, our results concur with the empirical-theoretical analysis conducted by [66] on the
454 trajectory of warfare in the Moche valley. Billman [66] concluded that the emergence of
455 conflict was little related to the feedback between population pressure and land productivity
456 and was instead caused by expansion toward coastal valleys of polities from the Andean
457 highlands. Data derived from nonmetrical dental traits suggest that the influx of highland
458 peoples into the Jequetepeque Valley occurred during the late Moche period [65, 67]. Such
459 a proxy for genetic distance concurs with cultural data (i.e., changes in ceramic styles or
460 burial patterns) in showing the existence of highland migrants over the valley. Ancient
461 DNA analyses on the bioanthropological record suggest that Moche elite pertained to a

462 particular “lowland” lineage [68], but that highlands and coastal populations maintained
463 certain gene flux at least till the Spaniard colonization [69]. This implies that potential
464 affinities between local and migrants in the Jequetepeque Valley (as well as in other
465 Mochica territories) must be confirmed with further evidence such as ancient DNA. By this
466 means, the role of external and internal tensions in fueling conflicts in the Moche tradition
467 must remain speculative until additional information becomes available.

468 The spatially differentiated pattern in the mutual coupling between population growth and
469 conflict detected here supports the notion that warfare was a localized process across the
470 Central Andes Centers Area, and it was particularly relevant in the southern highland
471 centers (e.g., [30, 66]. Conflict dynamics in this area have been attributed to the
472 disintegration of sociopolitical networks [70], but more recently to increased population
473 pressure on food production [35]. Alternatively, the increase in warfare intensity has been
474 linked to the impact of a multicentennial drought that hit the Andean highlands between
475 AD 900 and AD 1200 [e.g., 30, 31]. Arkush and Tung [30] indicate that weakened political
476 infrastructure likely limited the drought mitigation strategies of high Andean communities
477 (e.g., trade networks), in turn stoking conflicts over cropland, herds, and stores. The
478 concurrent evidence for a prolonged drought [19, 23], infrastructure desecration [70] and
479 sociopolitical dissolution [71] has led to the proposition that the Tiwanaku polities collapse
480 and their further transformation was shaped by environmental crises that weakened the
481 technological food production system (raised fields failure due to rainfall decrease), and the
482 social structure of the state like polities, all of which fueled social instability, warfare, food
483 supply disruption [22, 24]. Our modeling approach, however, suggests that the Tiwanaku-
484 Wari rise and collapse involved an endogenous dynamic between population and warfare as
485 part of coupled oscillations between these two variables. Under this dynamic, demographic

486 growth or decline emerges as mutual feedback between population levels and internal
487 warfare intensity in that the hydroclimate is an exogenous factor acting on the ratio of
488 population to resource availability. This feedback loop is consistent with structural-
489 demographic models proposed to explain growth-collapse cycles occurring in complex
490 societies [15-17]. In this sense, our results partially agree with the causal mechanism
491 evoked by McCool et al. [35] to explain the positive relationship between population
492 growth and hydroclimate, and how this process is translated into the escalated lethal
493 violence observed in the Nasca region after the Wari collapse at ~AD 1000. Even when we
494 attest for a positive effect of population pressure on the conflict dynamic, our results point
495 to reciprocal influences between demographic levels and warfare intensity. That is, conflict
496 negatively affect the population growth rates and demographic levels affects positively
497 warfare.

498

499 The relationships between collapse, conflict and drought have been generally accepted even
500 when there are important discrepancies among paleoclimate reconstructions on the
501 direction and timing of high-Andean hydroclimate anomalies for over a millennium (AD
502 50-1300). Some reconstructions show prolonged aridity from AD 800-1200 [e.g., 19, 23].
503 New paleoclimate reconstructions for the Titicaca Basin [18, 20] are compatible with the
504 direction and chronology of hydroclimate changes inferred from the SO147-106KL core
505 [21]. Reconstructed lake levels provided by [18, 20] attest to an overall wet period from
506 800-1200, which was briefly interrupted by a moderate drought dated between AD 1120
507 and AD 1270.

508

509 In sum, the results of our study, together with recent paleoclimate data, challenge the
510 traditional view of the links between hydroclimate conditions, conflict and population
511 dynamics. For instance, population growth expansion (AD 600-900, Fig. 1B-C) appears to
512 be associated with low warfare intensity and highly variable hydroclimate conditions [18,
513 20]. The demographic collapse (AD 900-1200), however, is not synchronous with the
514 decadal-scale desiccation of the Andean highlands. Indeed, prevailing humid conditions to
515 AD 1120 [18] preclude the role of environmental stress as an explanatory factor involved in
516 the incipient increase in warfare intensity and the transition from the positive to negative
517 population growth phase.

518

519 An important element to highlight is the theoretical models' excellent predictive power in
520 capturing the dynamic relationships between population, warfare, and climate change.
521 Nevertheless, we are aware of the potential biases and sampling errors of archeological
522 data. Our statistical models are based on indirect proxies of human population size, crop
523 productivity, climate change and warfare intensity. Thus, these results are statistical
524 hypotheses, and they are far from a definitive explanation. Despite these caveats, we
525 suggest that the analysis of several chronologically affiliated datasets provides some novel
526 insights into the patterns of warfare in parts of the Andes.

527

528 For decades, scholars and scientists have tried to understand why complex societies get to
529 and collapse, and transform into new sociopolitical and ethnic entities [72, 73]. Our results
530 may seem to support the view that societal changes in the Central Andes Centers are related
531 to mutual feedback between population growth and social complexity [e.g., 74]. Although a
532 postindustrial society has notable technological and informational advantages over ancient

533 societies in responding to hydroclimate, the magnitude of the current population size, the
534 consumption of energy and resources, and feedback from the climate system on a global
535 scale should alert us to take a closer look at the social and conflict dynamics suffered by
536 ancient societies in the face of population pressure and profound changes in climate.

537

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551

552 **8- Author contributions:**

553

554 Conceptualization: ML, EMG, SAE

555 Methodology: ML, EMG, SAE, AG

556 Investigation: ML, EMG, SAE, AG

557 Visualization: ML, EMG, SAE

558 Supervision: ML, EMG, SAE, CMS

559 Writing—original draft: ML, EMG, SAE

560 Writing—review & editing: ML, EMG, SAE, CMS
561

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563

564 **10- References**

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(A)











Figure 2







Figure 3

