

1 **Virulence Differences of Monkeypox Virus Clades 1, 2a and 2b.1 in a Small**
2 **Animal Model**

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11 mouse

12

13 **ABSTRACT**

14 Human monkeypox, a disease with similarities to smallpox, is endemic in Africa where it has
15 persisted as a zoonosis with limited human-to-human spread. Unexpectedly, the disease
16 expanded globally in 2022 driven by human-to-human transmission outside of Africa. It is not
17 yet known whether the latter is due solely to behavioral and environmental factors or whether the
18 monkeypox virus is adapting to a new host. Genome sequencing has revealed differences
19 between the current outbreak strains, classified as clade 2b, and the prior clade 2a and clade 1
20 viruses but whether these differences contribute to virulence or transmission has not been
21 determined. We demonstrate that the wild-derived inbred CAST/EiJ mouse provides an
22 exceptional animal model for investigating clade differences in monkeypox virus virulence and
23 show that the order is clade 1 > clade 2a > clade 2b.1. The greatly reduced replication of the
24 clade 2b.1 major outbreak strain in mice and absence of lethality at 100-times the lethal dose of a
25 closely related clade 2a virus, despite similar multiplication in cell culture, suggest that clade 2b
26 is evolving diminished virulence or adapting to other species.

27

28

29 **SIGNIFICANCE**

30 Three clades of monkeypox virus are recognized: clade 1 is present in the Congo Basin, causes
31 10% human mortality and is transmitted by rodents with little human-to-human spread; clade 2a
32 exists in West Africa, has a low mortality and is also a zoonosis; clade 2b is currently spreading
33 globally by human transmission. The genetic basis for differences in virulence and transmission
34 have not been determined. A major roadblock is the need for a small animal model that can be
35 studied under the stringent safety conditions required. Here we demonstrate that the three clades
36 exhibit highly significant differences in CAST/EiJ mice in the order clade 1 > clade 2a > clade
37 2b, similar to the severity of clinical disease.

38

39 INTRODUCTION

40 Although first isolated from captive Asian monkeys, monkeypox virus (MPXV) infects rodents
41 and is incidentally transmitted to humans and non-human primates in Africa (1). Human
42 monkeypox, a disease resembling smallpox, was recognized upon the eradication of the latter
43 and the cessation of vaccination (2). Historically, monkeypox has been a zoonosis with little
44 human-to-human transmission and until 2022 was largely limited to regions of Africa. The
45 genome sequence of the Congo Basin (now referred to as clade 1) MPXV (3) placed it in the
46 orthopoxvirus genus of the chordopoxvirus subfamily along with variola virus, the causative
47 agent of smallpox as well as vaccinia virus used as the smallpox vaccine. A second clade of
48 MPXV (now referred to as clade 2a) with a 95% nucleotide sequence identity to the original was
49 subsequently recognized (4). Clade 1 is associated with a mortality of up to 10% whereas clade
50 2a from West Africa has a mortality of less than 1%. The current outbreak strain of MPXV, has
51 been designated clade 2b because of its sequence similarity to clade 2a (5) and like the latter has
52 a low mortality in immunocompetent individuals. Whereas clades 1 and 2a are zoonoses, clade
53 2b has exhibited extensive human-to-human spread. Although aerosol transmission of MPXV
54 has been demonstrated in the laboratory (6), direct contact with animals and close human
55 interactions appear more important (7).

56 The number of human monkeypox cases has been increasing in Africa, likely due to
57 waning population immunity from the discontinued smallpox vaccine as well as changing
58 environmental and social factors (8). Human monkeypox due to Clade 2a has occurred in other
59 parts of world through importation of African rodents into the U.S. in 2003 and by travelers from
60 Africa but without evident human-to-human transmission (9). However, the unprecedented

61 increase in clade 2b cases in 2022 is due to human transmission outside of Africa. At the time of
62 writing, more than 80,000 cases in over 100 different locations were diagnosed.

63 Genetic differences contributing to the greater morbidity of clade 1 MPXV compared to
64 clade 2a and the increased human transmission of clade 2b are unknown. Knowledge of such
65 differences could provide an early warning of the potential virulence of new or hybrid strains,
66 help identify therapeutic targets, and contribute to basic knowledge of virus-host interactions.

67 Although the genomes of clade 1 and 2 viruses are highly conserved, there are numerous
68 sequence differences that could account for the greater virulence of the former (4, 10), whereas
69 clades 2a and 2b viruses have fewer differences (5, 11). Animal models are crucial for
70 investigating virus pathogenesis, and in the case of MPXV such studies need to be carried out
71 under stringent BSL-3 containment conditions. Moreover, clade 1 viruses are classified as Select
72 Agents in the US limiting the number of laboratories working on MPXV. Parker and Buller (12)
73 and Alakunle et al. (13) have provided extensive descriptions of natural and experimental
74 infections with MPXV, although the primary reservoir species is unknown. The experimental
75 animals include Asian primates, African rodents, and a variety of North American rodents
76 including prairie dogs and squirrels. The African dormouse (*Graphiurus kelleni*) is of particular
77 interest since these small squirrel-like rodents can be bred in captivity and were among the
78 African rodents that tested positive for MPXV in a shipment that introduced the virus into the US
79 in 2003. Cotton rats (*Sigmodon sp.*) are another species susceptible to MPXV that can be raised
80 in captivity. Nevertheless, African dormice and cotton rats are not inbred, and the absence of
81 immunological reagents is a disadvantage for the study of virulence. Other small animals that
82 can be reared in captivity such as guinea pigs, hamsters, rats, and most mouse strains do not
83 develop severe disease upon inoculation with MPXV.

84 A mouse model for MPXV would have numerous advantages. To identify a susceptible
85 mouse, we screened a panel of 38 inbred strains by intranasal (IN) inoculation of a Clade 1
86 MPXV and discovered the exceptional vulnerability of the CAST/EiJ mouse and confirmed the
87 resistance of common inbred mouse strains (14). Subsequent studies showed that the CAST
88 mouse is also highly susceptible to other orthopoxviruses including vaccinia, cowpox and
89 Akhmeta viruses (15, 16). IN inoculation of CAST mice with variola virus, the causative agent
90 of smallpox, resulted in only mild disease with some virus shedding and limited skin lesions (17)
91 in accordance with the specificity of variola virus for humans.

92 CAST mice were derived from founder specimens trapped in a grain storage facility in
93 Thailand (JAX[®] NOTES, Issue 456, Winter 1994) and because they are genetically distinct from
94 common inbred laboratory mice were included in the Collaborative Cross panel (18). CAST
95 mice are immunologically competent; they make good antibody and T-cell responses upon
96 vaccination that provide complete protection from MPXV (14). Low basal levels of natural killer
97 cells likely contribute to their susceptibility to MPXV and other orthopoxviruses, as
98 administration of interferon gamma, IL-15 or natural killer cells expanded *in vitro* each provide
99 resistance (15, 19-21). Here, we develop the CAST mouse as a model to compare MPXV clades
100 and show that the order of virulence is clade 1 > 2a > 2b.1.

101 RESULTS

102 **Clade 1 MPXV and clade 2a MPXV lethally infect African dormice.** Schultz and co-workers
103 (22) reported that African dormice are highly susceptible to MPXV by the intranasal (IN) route
104 with a median 50% lethal dose (LD₅₀) of 12 PFU for the clade 1 MPXV-ZAI-1979-005, and they
105 cited a similar though undisclosed value for MPXV Copenhagen-58, a 2a clade. We confirmed

106 and extended these studies using clonal isolates of MPXV-ZAI-1979-005, abbreviated here as Z-
107 1979, and clade 2a MPXV-USA-2003-044 (abbreviated USA-2003). No difference in replication
108 of the two viruses was found during multi-step growth in African green monkey BS-C-1 cells
109 (Fig. 1A). Upon IN infection of African dormice with Z-1979, some deaths occurred with 5 and
110 50 PFU and all died with 500 and 5,000 PFU (Fig. 1B). IN infection with USA-2003 followed a
111 similar pattern with 100% deaths with 5,000 PFU (Fig. 1C). LD₅₀ values of 12 and 5 PFU were
112 calculated for Z-1979 and USA-2003, respectively. Large numbers of non-inbred African
113 dormice would be required to establish biological significance of the relatively small difference
114 in LD₅₀ and therefore were not considered suitable for investigating clade differences.

115

116 **Clade 1 MPXV is up to 1,000 times more virulent than clade 2a MPXV in CAST mice.**

117 CAST mice infected IN with 10³ PFU of Z-1979 lost more than 20% of their weight and one
118 died (Fig. 2A). At 10⁴ and 10⁵ PFU all mice infected with Z-1979 died or were euthanized
119 because of 30% weight loss. Following IN infection with USA-2003, comparable weight loss
120 occurred at slightly higher doses and most mice died at 10⁴ PFU and all at 10⁵ PFU. From these
121 data, LD₅₀ of 2,370 and 4,200 were obtained for Z-1979 and USA-2003, respectively. In
122 addition, there was greater recovery of virus from the nasal turbinates, lungs, brain, and
123 abdominal organs on days 5 and 7 after IN infection of Z-1979 compared to USA-2003 (Fig.
124 2B).

125 Since the upper respiratory tract is not thought to be an important route of MPXV
126 infection and extensive spread of virus to abdominal organs occurred by day 5 after IN infection,
127 we investigated a systemic route of infection. Remarkably, most CAST mice infected with Z-
128 1979 died with 1 and 10 PFU and all with 100 and 1,000 PFU administered intraperitoneally

129 (IP), despite little weight loss (Fig. 3A). In contrast, USA-2003 caused no deaths at 100 PFU and
130 only 50% succumbed to 1,000 PFU. The LD₅₀ values were <1 for Z-1979 and 1,000 for USA-
131 2003. Furthermore, the titers of the Z-1979 were significantly higher in all organs analyzed at
132 day 6 after infection compared to USA-2003 (Fig. 3B). Note that mortality is greater by IP
133 infection, but weight loss is more pronounced by IN infection, possibly because the latter route
134 reduces eating and drinking.

135

136 **MPXV clade 2b is more attenuated than clade 2a.** The above experiments were carried out
137 with MPXV isolated decades before the global 2022 outbreak due to MPXV clade 2b. We
138 received a low passage MPXV isolated in 2022 from an individual in Massachusetts that is
139 designated MPXV-USA-2022-MA001 (abbreviated MA-2022) and is a prototype for the major
140 outbreak variant called b.1. Replication of the USA-2003 and MA-2022 at low (0.05 PFU/cell)
141 and high (3 PFU/cell) multiplicities in African green monkey BS-C-1 cells was not significantly
142 different, although there was a trend for greater release of USA-2003 into the medium compared
143 to MA-2022 (Fig. 4A, B). Upon IN infection of CAST mice USA-2003 caused severe disease
144 with weight loss and deaths at doses of 10⁴ and 10⁵ PFU (Fig. 4C), similar to that obtained for
145 USA-2003 in the prior experiment shown in Fig. 2. In contrast, neither weight loss nor disease
146 occurred with MA-2022. Furthermore, following IP infection USA-2003 caused weight loss and
147 100% lethality at 10³ and 10⁴ PFU, whereas neither weight loss nor lethality occurred at doses up
148 to 10⁵ PFU of MA-2022 (Fig. 4D).

149 Next, we determined virus titers and genome copies in the organs of mice infected with
150 10⁴ PFU of USA-2003 and MA-2022. At 7 days after IN infection, the titers of USA-2003 were
151 >10⁶ PFU and >10⁵ PFU in the lungs and nasal turbinates, respectively, and about 10⁴ PFU in the

152 liver and spleen (Fig. 5A). In contrast, only 1 of 3 mice infected with MA-2022 had detectable
153 virus in the lungs, none had detectable virus in liver or spleen and the mean titer in the nasal
154 turbinates was 3 logs lower than that of USA-2003. Those results were consistent with an
155 analysis of genomic DNA in the same samples by digital droplet (dd) PCR (Fig. 5B). We also
156 determined virus titers and genomic DNA following IP infection with USA-2003 and MA-2022.
157 The titers of USA-2003 were more than 100-fold higher than that of MA-2022 (Fig. 5C) and
158 again this was corroborated by analysis of genomic DNA by ddPCR. Thus, the lower virulence
159 of MA-2022 in CAST mice correlated with lower virus replication.

160

161

162 **DISCUSSION**

163 There are numerous reports suggesting that observed genome sequence variations might account
164 for differences in virulence and transmission of MPXV clades. However, few such predictions
165 have been tested experimentally. Reasons for this include the need for a suitable animal model
166 and the stringent biosafety conditions that must be met, particularly for clade 1 MPXV. Using
167 objective criteria, we showed that clade 1, clade 2a and clade 2b.1 MPXVs exhibit large
168 differences in morbidity and virus replication in CAST mice. By the IP route of infection,
169 MPXV clades 1 and 2a had LD₅₀ values of 1 PFU and 10³ PFU, respectively, whereas all mice
170 survived even 10⁵ PFU of the clade 2b.1 virus. The difference in virulence between clades 1 and
171 2a was less by the IN route but here too mice survived 10⁵ PFU of the clade 2b.1 virus. For both
172 routes, replication in the lungs and abdominal organs also followed the order of clade 1 > 2a >
173 2b.1. Although we have not yet compared clades using other routes for infection of CAST mice,
174 we previously reported that skin scarification of the clade 1 virus causes local lesions but no

175 other signs of disease (14), whereas footpad inoculation caused swelling of the lower leg and one
176 of four mice died on day 14 with virus in the lungs, liver and spleen (14). Similar studies with
177 clade 2a and 2b viruses are planned. The increase in human transmission of clade 2b and the
178 striking reduction in virulence for CAST mice raise the possibility that MPXV is adapting to
179 humans with a concomitant loss of fitness for certain other species.

180 Determination of which genes are responsible for the virulence differences of MPXV
181 clades remains to be determined. MPXV like other members of the orthopoxvirus genus encode
182 about 100 accessory genes that are largely dispensable for replication *in vitro* but affect host
183 range and virulence. Interestingly, recent gene loss has been a major factor in the evolution of
184 orthopoxviruses that can account for differences in their host range (23). For example, cowpox
185 virus with the most accessory genes has a wide host range, whereas variola virus with the fewest
186 is specific for humans. Of interest, human transmitted variola virus (17) and MPXV clade 2b.1
187 cause only mild disease in CAST mice. We have started to investigate the genetic determinants
188 responsible for virulence differences of clade 1 and 2a viruses and plan to extend this to clade 2b.
189 It has been suggested that orthopoxvirus immune modulators might reduce an overreaction of the
190 host immune response and loss of such genes might increase virulence (24). Thus, both gain and
191 loss of gene function should be considered in assessing virulence.

192

193 **METHODS**

194 **Ethics statement.** All procedures with infectious MPXV were performed in registered Select
195 Agent BSL-3 and ABSL-3 laboratories by trained and smallpox vaccinated investigators using
196 protocols approved by the NIH Institutional Biosafety Committee and judged not to have the
197 potential for dual use research of concern (DURC). Experiments and procedures using mice

198 were approved by the NIAID Animal Care and Use Committee according to standards set forth
199 in the NIH guidelines, Animal Welfare Act and U.S. Federal law. Euthanasia was carried out
200 using carbon dioxide inhalation in accordance with the American Veterinary Medical
201 Association guidelines (2013 Report of the AVMA panel on euthanasia).

202

203 **Cells.** African green monkey BS-C-1 cells (ATCC CCL-26) were maintained at 37°C and 5%
204 CO₂ in modified Eagle minimal essential medium (Quality Biological, Inc.) supplemented with
205 8% fetal bovine serum, 2 mM L-glutamine, 10 U penicillin/ml, and 10 µg streptomycin/ml.

206

207 **Viruses.** Low passage stocks of MPXV-ZAI-1979-005, MPXV-USA-2003-044 and MPXV-
208 USA-2022-MA1 were obtained from the CDC and procedures for isolation of clones of the 1979
209 and 2003 viruses have been reported (14). The MPXV Z-1979 clone expressing Luc (previously
210 called MPXV-z06) has been described (25) and the same procedure was used to insert Luc into a
211 clone of MPXV USA-2003. The primers used for construction of chimeric viruses are in the
212 Extended Data Note.

213

214 **Analysis of virus replication.** BS-C-1 cells in 12-well plates were infected with MPXV. After 1
215 h, monolayers were washed three times and overlaid with fresh medium. At various times, cells
216 from triplicate wells were harvested and stored at -80°C. Cells were lysed by three rounds of
217 freeze-thawing and samples were sonicated, and virus yields determined by plaque assay on BS-
218 C-1 cells (26). For determination of extracellular virus, the medium was collected before
219 harvesting cells, centrifuged and the supernatant analyzed.

220

221 **Mice.** Female CAST/EiJ mice were obtained from Jackson Laboratories (Bar Harbor, ME) and
222 were maintained in small, ventilated microisolator cages. IN and IP inoculations were performed
223 as described previously (14). Titers of each virus inoculum were confirmed by plaque assay.

224

225 **Titration of virus from organs.** Organs were removed aseptically from animals, placed in 2 ml
226 of balanced salt solution supplemented with 0.1% bovine serum albumin, and stored at -80°C
227 until used. Homogenization and titration were performed as described previously (14).

228

229 **Quantitation of viral DNA.** Viral DNA from infected organs was determined by ddPCR as
230 previously described (27). Briefly, DNA was isolated from homogenized MPXV-infected tissues
231 using the DNeasy Blood and Tissue Kit (Qiagen). Several 10-fold dilutions of each purified
232 DNA were prepared in nuclease-free H₂O and added to a reaction mixture containing ddPCR
233 EvaGreen Supermix (Biorad). Forward (5'-GAATACATTCACATTGACCAATCAGAA-3') and
234 reverse (5'GGTTCGTCAAAGACATAAACTCATT-3') primers were specific for the
235 conserved VACV WR E11L open reading frame (27). Reaction oil droplets were synthesized
236 using an Automated Droplet Generator (Biorad) prior to PCR thermocycling. Droplets were
237 subsequently acquired using a QX200 Droplet Reader (Biorad) and the number of genome
238 copies were determined using QuantaLife software (Biorad).

239

240 **Statistics.** Significance was calculated by Mann-Whitney using Prism.

241

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246
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315

316

317

318 **FIGURE LEGENDS**

319 **Fig. 1. MPXV Z-1979 and USA-2003: *in vitro* replication and African dormouse infection.**

320 **(A)** BS-C-1 cells were infected in triplicate with 0.05 PFU/cell of MPXV Z-1979 or USA-2003.

321 At intervals virus yields were determined by plaque assay on BS-C-1 cells. Bars indicate

322 standard deviation. **(B)** Each group (n=3-5) of African dormice were mock infected or infected

323 IN with 0.05 to 5,000 PFU of Z-1979 and survival plotted. **(C)** Same as panel B except animals

324 were inoculated with 0.5 to 5000 PFU of USA-2003.

325 **Fig. 2. Virulence of MPXV Z-1979 and USA-2003 upon IN infection of CAST mice. (A)**

326 CAST mice (groups of n=4-5) were mock infected or infected IN with 10^2 to 10^5 PFU of MPXV

327 Z-1979 or USA-2003 and examined and weighed daily. The percent of starting weights and

328 survival are indicated. Bars indicate standard deviation. **(B)** CAST mice (n=4-5) were infected

329 IN with 10^2 PFU of MPXV Z-1979 or USA-2003. On days 5 (d5) and 7 (d7), organs were

330 removed, homogenized and the total PFU determined by plaque assay. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$).

331 **Fig. 3. Virulence of MPXV Z-1979 and USA-2003 upon IP infection of CAST mice. (A)**

332 CAST mice (groups of n=4-5) were mock infected or infected IP with 1 to 10^3 PFU of MPXV Z-

333 1979 or USA-2003 and examined and weighed daily. The percent of starting weight and survival

334 are indicated. Bars indicate standard deviation. **(B)** CAST mice (n=3-6) were infected IP with

335 10^2 PFU of MPXV Z-1979 or USA-2003. On day 6, organs were removed, homogenized and


336 total PFU determined by plaque assay. * $p < 0.05$.

337 **Fig. 4. *In vitro* replication and virulence of USA-2003 and MA-2022. (A)** One-step
338 replication. BS-C-1 cells were infected in triplicate with 3 PFU/cell of USA-2003 or MA-2022
339 and harvested at the indicated times. Infectious virus in cell lysates was determined by plaque
340 assay on BS-C-1 cells. Bars represent standard deviations. **(B)** Multi-step replication. BS-C-1
341 cells were infected in triplicate with 0.05 PFU of USA-2003 or MA-2022. At the indicated times,
342 the medium was removed, centrifuged and supernatant collected. The pelleted cells were
343 combined with the cells that adhered to the dish and lysed. Infectious virus in the lysates and
344 supernatant were determined by plaque assay on BS-C-1 cells. Bars indicate standard deviations.
345 **(C)** IN infection of CAST mice. CAST mice were inoculated with 10^2 PFU (n=3), 10^3 PFU
346 (n=4) 10^4 PFU (n=6-7) and 10^5 PFU (n=2) of USA-2003 and MA-2022. Daily weights and
347 survival are plotted. **(D)** IP infection of CAST mice. CAST mice were inoculated with 10^2 PFU
348 (n=3), 10^3 PFU (n=4-7) and 10^4 PFU (n=6) of USA-2003 and MA-2022. Daily weights and
349 survival are plotted.

350 **Fig. 5. Infectious virus and genome copies of USA-2003 and MA-2022 in organs of CAST**
351 **mice. (A, B)** CAST mice (groups of n=3) were infected IN as in Fig. 5C and infectious virus and
352 MPXV genome copies determined. **(C, D)** CAST mice (groups of n=3) were infected IP as in
353 Fig. 5D and infectious virus and MPXV genome copies determined.


Fig. 1

A



B

Z-1979



C

USA-2003




Fig.2





Fig.3

