Detection and spread of high pathogenicity avian influenza virus H5N1 in the Antarctic Region

Running title: HPAIV in the Antarctic

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Abstract

Until recent events, the Antarctic was the only major geographical region in which high pathogenicity avian influenza virus (HPAIV) had never previously been detected. The current panzootic of H5N1 HPAIV has decimated wild bird populations across Europe, North America, and South America. Here we report on the detection of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic regions of South Georgia and the Falkland Islands, respectively. We initially detected H5N1 HPAIV in samples collected from brown skuas at Bird Island, South Georgia on 8th October 2023. Since this detection, mortalities were observed in brown skuas, kelp gulls, South Georgia shag, Antarctic tern, elephant seals and fur seals at multiple sites across South Georgia. Subsequent testing confirmed H5N1 HPAIV across several sampling locations in multiple avian species and two seal species. Simultaneously, we also confirmed H5N1 HPAIV in southern fulmar and black-browed albatross in the Falkland Islands. Genetic assessment of the virus indicates spread from South America, likely through movement of migratory birds. Critically, genetic assessment of sequences from mammalian species demonstrates no increased risk to human populations. Here we describe the detection, species impact and genetic composition of the virus and propose both introductory routes and potential long-term impact on avian and mammalian species across the Antarctic region. We also speculate on the threat to specific populations following recent reports in the area.

Introduction

Following the emergence and global expansion of A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 (GsGd)-lineage H5 high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAIV) there have been repeat epizootics in wild birds and poultry populations globally. This lineage spread to other Asian countries, evolving into diverse clades classified according to the H5 haemagglutinin (HA) gene phylogeny [1]. In the autumn of 2021, the situation escalated considerably with the detection of a clade 2.3.4.4b HPAIV subtype H5N1 in Europe[2]. Subsequently, two unprecedented epizootic waves with this lineage in 2021/22 and 2022/23 were associated with mass mortality events in wild birds together with unprecedented numbers of incursions into poultry premises[2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. High levels of viral adaptation to wild bird species[7], and increased fitness advantage through continued genetic reassortment[8] likely underpin the broad impact infection has had across many avian species[3]. This wide host range has facilitated the transmission of the lineage across a large geographic area, including from Europe to North America[9, 10], where it has since rapidly expanded its range southward into South America via migratory avian species. Incursion into South American countries, starting in November of 2022, represented the first recorded instances of GsGd-lineage H5 HPAIV in the region[11, 12, 13]. Mass mortality events in the region have been particularly severe and reported across several different bird species in addition to marine mammals[3, 11, 14, 15], highlighting the extensive ecological impact of HPAIV and the ongoing threat it presents to naïve hosts.

The Antarctic region includes the ice shelves, waters, and all the island territories in the Southern Ocean situated inside of the 'Antarctic Convergence' or 'Antarctic Polar Front', a marine belt encircling Antarctica where Antarctic waters meet those of the warmer sub-Antarctic[16]. Several islands are located inside the Antarctic region, including South Georgia, while the Falkland Islands among others are located outside the Antarctic Convergence in the sub-Antarctic zone (Figure 1A). There have been no previous reports of HPAIV inside the Antarctic region[17, 18]. Antarctica and the sub-Antarctic islands possess unique ecosystems which support the population strongholds of several avian and marine mammal species. The relative isolation of these islands from human populations has provided species across the Antarctic with only limited protection from anthropogenic environmental

change[19]. Indeed, wildlife populations in the Antarctic face a broad range of challenges from

introduced species[20], to longline fisheries[21, 22], and rapid climate change[23, 24, 25]. Several native bird

species including wandering albatross (*Diomedea exulans*), macaroni penguins (*Eudyptes*

chrysolophus), grey-headed albatross (*Thalassarche chrysostoma*), and white-chinned petrel

(*Procellaria aequinoctialis*), are listed as either vulnerable or endangered[26]. Iconic long-lived species

with late maturity, such as albatross, exhibit low resilience to rapid increases in population

mortality[27]. High mortality disease outbreaks therefore represent a substantial threat to already

vulnerable seabird populations[28, 29].

77   While geographically isolated, several Antarctic seabird species routinely range between the

South Atlantic and Southern Ocean, visiting the South American coast to either forage or

overwinter[30]. Brown skuas (*Stercorarius antarcticus*), kelp gulls (*Larus dominicanus*), southern giant

petrel (*Macronectes giganteus*), and snowy sheathbills (*Chionis albus*) have previously been

identified as potential vectors of infectious pathogens into this vulnerable ecosystem due to their

migratory traits, scavenging behaviour, and previously identified roles as carriers of low pathogenicity

avian influenza viruses (LPAIV)[31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38]. Evidence of low pathogenicity avian influenza

virus (LPAIV) in the Antarctic region was first identified from serological studies in the 1980s[39, 40, 41].

A range of subtypes have since been reported (H1[41], H3[32], H4[36], H5[42], H6[33], H7[40], H9[32], and H11[34])

including genetic analysis of the influenza virus subtypes H4N7[36], H5N5[34, 39, 40, 41, 42], H6N8[33] and

H11N2[34, 43, 44]. In contrast to the more prevalent H11N2 influenza viruses, H4-H6 subtypes were

found to share high sequence similarity with viruses from South America, indicating more recent

introduction events[33, 34, 36]. Evidence of LPAIV transmission to the continent from the Americas

demonstrates the elevated risk of clade 2.3.4.4b H5 HPAIV being introduced to the Antarctic,

encouraging researchers in 2022 to employ additional biosecurity measures while maintaining

surveillance activities[31, 45]. During the austral summer of 2022/23, sampling and surveillance was

conducted at several sites in the Antarctic region, and as of March 2023, HPAIV had not been

detected[17, 18].

95   Here we describe the observation of morbidity and mortality events across different species

as well as the positive detection of H5N1 HPAIV in a variety of species in South Georgia, inside the

Antarctic region and the sub-Antarctic Falkland Islands. We detail the suspicion, diagnostic

evaluation, and clinical presentations of HPAIV in the region. Genetic analysis is used to characterise

potential introduction routes and the consequences of HPAIV circulation in this region are considered.

Results

Case description and virus detection

Provision for diagnostic investigation of avian influenza is limited in the Antarctic and sub-

Antarctic regions. For some samples in the description below, local RT-PCR testing at the KEMH

Pathology and Food, Water & Environmental Laboratory on the Falkland Islands was used to screen

for the presence of avian influenza virus H5N1 viral RNA (vRNA). This was initially undertaken for a

Southern Fulmar as described below and this detection, alongside the increase clinical disease and

mortalities observed on South Georgia triggered shipment of samples to the World Organisation for

Animal Health (WOAH) and Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) International Reference

Laboratory for avian influenza, swine influenza and Newcastle disease virus at the Animal and Plant

Health Agency (APHA), Weybridge, UK for confirmatory and further diagnostic evaluation. An

overview of both observations and testing is detailed below.

On the 17th September, researchers of the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) on Bird Island,

South Georgia (an island approximately 0.5 km Northwest of the main island of South Georgia)

(Figure 1B) discovered a single southern giant petrel showing behaviours indicative of loss of

coordination, neurological twitching, and lethargy. This individual was observed being predated and

scavenged upon by brown skuas and other southern giant petrels (*Macronectes giganteus*). On 8th

October, brown skuas were observed in the same locality showing lethargy, neck spasms, twitching,

and an inability to fly, and by 10th October, bird mortality was seen on Bird Island, with the highest

number of mortalities occurring at the roosting site of non-breeding birds. Swab samples were

collected from the three brown skua (*Stercorarius antarcticus*) on 8th October 2023 and a further

brown skua on the 11th October which were all later found dead on Bird Island. These initial sampling

events all yielded PCR positivity for HPAIV H5N1. The series of sampling events and species testing

positive from this point onwards are detailed in Table 1 and Supplementary Table S1.

Briefly, both brown skuas and kelp gulls then tested positive at two different locations on

South Georgia (Hound Bay and St. Andrews Bay) on the 30th October with further gulls and skuas

(Moltke Harbour) swabbed a day later (31st October) also testing positive. Further positive samples

were taken on the 3rd (Harpon Bay) and 8th (Penguin River) November from both brown skuas and

kelp gulls. Further escalation in mortality occurred by 17th November 2023, when 57 skuas were

observed to have died at Bird Island although samples could not be retrieved. On the 27th of

November a South Georgia shag tested positive from King Edward Cove alongside an Antarctic tern

sampled dead on the 6th of December.

Alongside avian species, in early December clinical disease consistent with mammalian

infection with HPAIV was observed in colonies of southern elephant seal (*Mirounga leonine*) and

Antarctic fur seal (*Arctocephalus gazella*) at Jason Harbour on South Georgia (Supplementary table

S2). Clinical presentation included difficulty breathing, with coughing and short sharp breath intake.

Individuals also showed accumulation of viscous fluid around the nasal passage. Five southern

elephant seals and 1 Antarctic fur seal from Jason Harbour collected on the 9th December tested

positive for the virus (Supplementary table S2).

Overall, between the initial detection of HPAIV on the 8th of October and 9th December, from

South Georgia a total of 33 avian carcasses and 17 mammalian carcasses were sampled including

representatives of five different avian species and two mammalian species across eight different

locations. Of these, 66% (n=28/33 avian carcasses; n=5/17 mammalian carcasses) tested positive for

HPAIV H5N1.

Concurrent to the events occurring on South Georgia, on 30th October, a southern fulmar

(*Fulmarus glacialoides*) was reported dead on Stanley, Falkland Islands and tested positive for the

virus (Figure 1C). Numerous other swabs were taken from different avian species across the Falkland

Islands (Supplementary Table 1) but only three black-browed albatross (*Thalassarche melanophris*)

tested positive from Saunders Island (n=1) and Steeple Jason (n=2) being collected on the 19th and

the 26th of November, respectively. In total between the 30th October and 10th December samples

were taken and tested from a total of 13 carcasses from nine different bird species with 31% testing

positive for HPAIV H5N1 (Table 1 and Supplementary Table S1).

Virus isolation

Wherever samples tested positive for HPAIV H5N1, attempts to isolate viable virus were undertaken.

From the samples collected from South Georgia, virus isolation was successful from two brown skuas

and a kelp gull taken from Hound Bay on the 30th October, a brown skua and kelp gull collected from

Moltke harbour on the 31st October, a kelp gull from Harpon Bay on the 3rd November and both a

South Georgia shag and an Antarctic tern from King Edward Cove on the 27th November and the 6th

December, respectively.

Virus isolation was also successful from swabs taken from carcasses found dead on the

Falklands Islands, including from samples from two southern fulmar collected on the 30th October and

the 13rd November from the Falklands Islands, and from black-browed albatross from Saunders Island

and Steeple Jason on the 19th November and the 26th November, respectively.

From a mammalian perspective, no viable virus could be recovered from any of the samples

testing positive by the generic AIV, HPAIV H5-specific assay and N1-specific rRT-PCR assays[46, 47, 48]

(Supplementary Table 2).

Genomic and phylogenetic analysis

Whilst successful virus isolation gave material for full virus genomic sequencing and analysis,

wherever possible, samples for which only rRT-PCR detection was possible were also assessed for

full genome generation and sequence analysis. A total of 20 full genomes were generated from avian

samples and a further three full genomes were generated from samples collected from seals. These

included ten full virus genomes from brown skuas (from Bird Island, Hound Bay, Moltke Harbour,

and Penguin River); six full virus genomes from kelp gulls (from Hound Bay, Moltke Harbour,

Harpon Bay, and Penguin River); and both a South Georgia shag and an Antarctic tern (both from

King Edward Cove). A further avian full virus genome was generated from two Southern Fulmars,

both from Stanley Island on the Falklands Islands (Supplementary table S1).

From a mammalian perspective we generated two full virus genomes from southern elephant

seals (both from Jason Harbour); and one full virus genome from an Antarctic fur seal (from Jason

Harbour) were generated (Supplementary table S2).

The sequences generated were then analysed with representative global H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b

full-genome sequences to assess genetic ancestry by inferring maximum-likelihood phylogenetic trees

(Supplementary Figure 1). The sequences from South Georgia and the Falkland Islands clustered with

H5N1 viral sequences obtained from South America between October 2022 and October 2023, in

particular Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, and Chile across all gene segments. All sequences from South

Georgia and the Falkland Islands were genotyped according to the United States of America H5N1

schema, given the spread of these viruses from North to South America in early 2022[11], and found to

be part of the B3.2 genotype[49]. Comparison of the full data set revealed that they shared 99.86-100%

nucleotide identity across all eight influenza gene segments (Supplementary table S3).

To further investigate the introduction of H5N1 HPAIV into South Georgia and the Falkland

Islands, representative H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b HA sequences from North and South America were used

to perform time-resolved phylogenetic analysis (Figure 2A). This analysis provided evidence for

distinct, separate introductions of H5N1 into South Georgia and the Falkland Islands, with both sets of

sequences sharing a common ancestor with sequences from South America dating back to July 2023

(Falkland Islands, range: December 2022 to November 2023) and August 2023 (South Georgia,

range: February November 2023). However, both sets of sequences produced long branch lengths

compared to South American sequences, potentially due to unsampled ancestry. The sequences from

South Georgia formed a single monophyletic group suggestive of a single introduction, whilst those

from the Falkland Islands formed a paraphyletic group, with sequences from Argentina and Brazil. To

investigate the source of these introductions, a Bayesian stochastic search variable selection (BSSVS)

analysis was performed using the country or location from which the sequences originated as a

discrete trait and then the support for these transmissions was quantified using Bayes factors (BFs).

This analysis demonstrated that Argentina was the likely source of H5N1 HPAIV for both South

Georgia (moderate support with a BF of 3-10) and the Falkland Islands (very strong support with a BF

of 30-100) (Figure 2B). The spread of H5N1 HPAIV within South Georgia was then also investigated

using the same approach (Figure 2C). This analysis further supported that the initial introduction into

South Georgia occurred on Bird Island, before onward spread to Penguin River (definitive support

with a BF >100), Hound Bay (strong support with a BF of 10-30) and Moltke Harbour (moderate

support with a BF of 3-10). Interestingly, both Harpon Bay and Jason Harbour did not demonstrate a

statistically relevant connection to Bird Island based on the BSSVS analysis, but also there was no

connection between these sampling locations and any outside of South Georgia either. Nevertheless,

this demonstrates that after introduction into South Georgia, H5N1 HPAIV was then spread onward to

multiple locations across the islands, whereby it infected multiple avian and mammalian species.

Alongside interrogation of phylogenetic ancestry, the sequences derived from all species were

assessed for the presence or absence of adaptive mutations that may indicate adaptation to replication

in mammals. From the mammalian samples, only a single amino acid change of interest (PB2 E627K

in one southern elephant seal sequence from Jason Harbour) was observed. None of the sequences

contained any of the other PB2 mutations of particular interest (i.e., T271A, K526R, Q591K or

D701N) or any other mutations associated with adaptation to replication in mammals. Interestingly, a

kelp gull sequence from Harpon Bay displayed a single amino acid change of interest, PB2 D701N,

but no others. Both southern fulmar sequences obtained from the Falkland Islands contained Q591K

and D701N mutations. There were also no mutations in either mammalian or avian species that would

affect the susceptibility of this virus to antivirals (Supplementary Table S4).

Discussion

Since the emergence and global expansion of Gs/Gd-lineage H5Nx HPAIV in 1996,

Antarctica and Oceania were the only two continents in which it has not been detected. Moreover,

until now, the Antarctic region remained the only major geographical region in which HPAIV had

never been detected. The island of South Georgia lies in the Southern Ocean inside the Antarctic

convergence, a marine belt encircling Antarctica which defines the Antarctic Region. The island is an

area of high biodiversity and high conservation priority with multiple species being defined as

vulnerable to the incursion of infectious diseases[50, 51, 52]. The Falkland Islands constitute a remote

cluster of islands in the South Atlantic Ocean situated approximately 1500 km to the west of South

Georgia. The Falkland Islands are situated outside of the Antarctic convergence, in the sub-Antarctic

region. Both the Falkland Islands archipelago and South Georgia represent key areas that are host to

significant avian biodiversity and the presence of HPAIV on these islands represents a significant risk

to the susceptible bird populations. South Georgia is home to approximately 29 avian species which

breed on the islands and is recognised as an 'Important Bird Area' by Birdlife International[53].

Therefore, any colony or population that comes under threat from an HPAIV outbreak on South

Georgia may have direct impact upon the wider population of seabirds. Despite seabird colonies

showing space partitioning between colonies[54], there is often a high degree of species overlap within

colonies. Often this is due to the movement of nonbreeders or juvenile birds[55]. It is therefore, not

unreasonable to suspect that birds on South Georgia may freely interact, which may aid the spread of

disease, as has been documented previously[37, 56]. Indeed, in the northern hemisphere it has been found

that northern gannets (*Morus bassanus*) increased their interactions due to high levels of colony

prospecting from surviving birds[56].

The interlinkages between avian and mammalian species testing positive for H5N1, in closely

linked ecosystems across the Antarctic region, means that there is potential for the virus to spread

further and there have been reports of the virus being detected on mainland Antarctica[57, 58] as well as

causing low level mortality events in penguins (APHA, unpublished results)[58, 59]. Circumpolar and

trans-Pacific migrants such as grey-headed albatross[60], white-chinned petrel[61], southern giant petrels,

and northern giant petrels (*Macronectes halli*) may facilitate this spread. Indeed, phylogeographic

analysis has suggested a dynamic geneflow between southern Atlantic populations and Macquarie

Island (an island in the southwestern Pacific Ocean, about halfway between New Zealand and

Antarctica)[62], and as such the threat of transmission to New Zealand and Australasia must be

considered.

From a mammalian infection standpoint there have been several reports globally of wild

aquatic mammals, including seals, being infected with H5Nx HPAIV since 2020, where infection has

been attributed to the predation of sick or dead infected birds[11, 15, 63, 64]. Information to date suggests

that HPAIV infection in seals often leads to a neurological presentation with infrequent detection of

viral material being detected through standard swab sampling activities[63]. This may explain the initial

lack of influenza vRNA detection in elephant seal swab samples taken in this study, despite the

consistency of clinical presentation seen in elephant seals with that reported elsewhere. However,

follow up invasive sampling clearly demonstrated that swab samples from elephant seals were

positive for vRNA. Whilst weather conditions prevented a thorough sampling of species from across

the different islands/regions experiencing mortality events in seals, those achieved did include

samples testing positive. Whilst the impact of the virus on avian populations appears to be reducing

(as of March 1st 2024), infection of both fur seals and elephant seals resulting in mortality events

continues to be noted. Importantly, where mortality events continue to occur in cetacean species, the

opportunity for infection of scavenging birds exists which may then continue the cycle of risk through

the potential for disease events in birds and further shedding of virus into new environments.

However, carcass removal, disposal and environmental clean-up is not an option. The Antarctic

region is one of the most remote environments on earth and is the location of enormous breeding

colonies of various avian species that may be susceptible, and succumb, to infection with HPAIV.

Further, the potential for virus survival in this cold environment is increased and it may be that

infectious virus remains for longer periods in carcasses preserved by the local climate. Local ecology

of species could also influence the scale of impact throughout Antarctica. Although all species remain

vulnerable to large scale infection events, it is possible that the density of animals may preclude some

species from succumbing to viral spread[65]. For example, wandering albatross nest at low density

(approximately 0.0022 nests per m^2)[66], which could limit spread between breeding individuals.

However, non-breeding birds congregate in groups to display and dance[67] which may provide

opportunities for disease spread. Similar ecological considerations must be made when considering

burrow nesting species (such as white-chinned petrel, diving petrel [*Pelecanoides spp.*], and prion

species [small petrels in the genera *Pachyptila* and *Halobaena*]), which nest in separated burrow

systems and may limit spread. Penguins are also susceptible to HPAIV, and mortality has been

observed following infection[68]. Penguin species nest in high densities (dependent upon species

ranging between 0.25 - 1.7 nests per m^2)[69, 70], and although limited impact has been seen to date, if

HPAIV does start to impact more significantly on penguin colonies, it could show rapid infection and

spread. However, the current situation does not suggest that significant mortality events will be seen

in penguin species. The report of an outbreak in Gentoo penguin (*Pygoscelis papua*) chicks has not

resulted in dissemination and mortality events in adult birds[59]. Further, reports of Adelie penguin

(*Pygoscelis adeliae*) testing positive for vRNA on swab material in the absence of clinical disease

suggests further that either resistance to infection, or prior exposure to an antigenically related H5

AIV giving some level of protection[58]. Importantly, sampling of penguin populations is ongoing and

although a very small number of king penguin (*Aptenodytes patagonicus*) have tested positive for the

virus (APHA, unpublished data)[59], extensive mortality events have not been seen suggesting that the

impact may not be as severe on these populations as initially feared. Activities within the region are

ongoing to track mortality events and autonomous authorities are on high alert to signal the potential

for incursions across the broader area although as suggested previously the proximity of affected

species, both avian and mammalian, suggests that penguins may be less susceptible to this genotype

of the virus.

Genomic analysis of the avian sequences obtained from South Georgia and the Falkland

Islands suggested separate, distinct introductions of the B3.2 HPAIV genotype into the two locations.

The B3.2 genotype emerged in early 2022 in the midwestern United States of America as a reassortant

formed following coinfection with the original H5N1 that was transmitted from Europe to North

America in late 2021[9] with a North American virus from which the novel genotype emerged,

containing the PB2, PB1, NP and NS gene segments of the North American AIVs[49]. This genotype

has been demonstrated to have been introduced into South America four times between October 2022

and March 2023[11]. Analysis of all available full-genome sequences from South America demonstrated

that 95% (184 of 193) of H5N1 HPAIV sequences corresponded to this genotype. Given the close

geographical proximity of South Georgia and the Falkland Islands to South America, and that wild

bird species are known to migrate between the mainland and these islands, it is not surprising that the

B3.2 was detected as the cause of the disease events. The phylogenetic analyses undertaken demonstrated that the viruses detected in South Georgia and the Falkland Islands shared common ancestors with those detected in mainland South America from mid-2023 and further analyses demonstrated that Argentina was the likely source of HPAIV. However, the long branch lengths observed across all gene segments suggests unsampled evolutionary ancestry. Further to this, analysis of the sequences obtained from the sampling sites on South Georgia suggests that after the initial introduction, there was spread of HPAIV to multiple locations which is consistent with eye-witness accounts from the island.

The observation that all sequences generated from positive samples across these sampling activities conducted on South Georgia cluster closely within a monophyletic group, along with the BSSVS analysis demonstrates a singular introduction and that they do not constitute a divergent lineage. Further, the mammalian sequences cluster amongst the avian sequences demonstrating that they are not forming a separate evolutionary lineage. Contrary to this, the two sequences from the Falkland Islands do not form a monophyletic group and cluster with sequences from Argentina and Brazil. However, assessment of whether this is the result of multiple, separate introductions is limited due to the small number of sequences available at the time of writing. Further sampling activities within the Falkland Islands should be considered to further investigate the introduction of H5N1.

Critically, assessment of sequences derived from mammalian species did not indicate any adaptive mutations or increased risk to human populations. A single sequence from a single Southern elephant Seal sequence from Jason Harbour) contained the PB2 E627K mutation that is associated with adaptation to replication in mammalian species and a Kelp Gull sequence from Harpon Bay displayed PB2 D701N. No other mammalian or avian sequences investigated from South Georgia contained any of the other PB2 mutations of particular interest (i.e., T271A, K526R, Q591K or D701N). This contrasts with reports coming from sequences derived from mortality events in mammals across South America[11, 71, 72, 73]. However, the two southern fulmar sequences obtained from the Falkland Islands contained Q591K and D701N mutations which match the mammal sequences from South America, potentially indicating different sources for introduction into the

Antarctic region. The data generated here indicates that human populations on these islands are not at

any increased risk from infection from these viruses. Further, should this situation change, there were

no mutations that would affect the susceptibility to antivirals observed in the data generated in this

study. Still, continual monitoring of the virus, especially where it appears to be the causative agents of

mortality events in seals (and potentially further avian species where scavenging occurs on dead seals

occurs), is critical to maintain an understanding of whether adaptive events may occur. Clearly, with

continual infection events occurring in mammals globally it is of great importance to understand

where mutations may represent a genuine zoonotic risk as well as understand where adaptations that

have occurred in mammals become tolerated in avian species.

In conclusion, whilst the H5N1 B3.2 HPAIV has been translocated to the fragile ecosystem in

the sub-Antarctic region, the current impact appears to be relatively minimal for avian species with

minimal impact upon penguin populations being reported to date. Further whilst infection and

significant mortality events have been observed in both fur and elephant seals, there remains no

evidence of viral adaptation for enhanced infection of mammals and, consequently no increased risk

to the human populations on the islands is predicted. Whilst this data supports a low impact on

penguin species and little to no risk to humans, the global release of data restricts a fulsome

interpretation here. It is of high interest to understand what impact repeat introduction events may be

having in the region. Currently, there are only a limited number of sequences deposited in public

databases from H5N1 HPAIV detections in South America during summer 2023, which limits

interpretation. This factor, as with countless other studies highlights the importance of real-time

global data sharing as a key tool in understanding the emergence and spread of these viruses. The

current lack of publicly available data precludes a conclusive assessment of potential incursion routes.

Multiple disciplines globally continue to monitor the situation in Antarctica to see whether fears of

ecological disaster in the region will be realised.

Methods

Virological detection

On the Falkland Islands, initial diagnostic assessment of samples was undertaken at the KEMH

Pathology and Food, Water & Environmental Laboratory utilising the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit

(Qiagen) and the Oasig OneStep RT-qPCR kit for H5N1 (Genesig). A preliminary diagnosis was made

of avian influenza H5N1 infection. Following reports of increasing mortalities and the observation of

disease consistent with HPAIV infection in avian and mammalian species in South Georgia,

oropharyngeal (OP) and cloacal (C) swabs collected from birds were submitted to the Animal and Plant

Health Agency (APHA)-Weybridge for laboratory virological investigation. Total nucleic acid was

extracted from all samples[47] for testing by a suite of three AIV real-time reverse transcription

polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) assays consisting of the Matrix (M)-gene assay for generic

influenza A virus detection[46]; an assay for specific detection of HPAIV H5 clade 2.3.4.4b[47] and an N1-

specific rRT-PCR to confirm the neuraminidase type[48]. A positive result was denoted in each case by a

Cq value ≤36.0. The samples were also screened for avian paramyxovirus type 1 (APMV-1) by an rRT–

PCR assay targeting the large polymerase (L) gene[74] where a positive result was denoted by a Cq value

≤37.0. All amplifications were carried out in an AriaMx qPCR System (Agilent, United Kingdom). The

OP swabs, C swabs or brain material were used for virus isolation in 9- to 11-day-old specific pathogen-

free (SPF) embryonated fowls' eggs (EFEs) according to the internationally recognised methods[75].

Whole-Genome Sequencing and Phylogenetic Analysis

Wherever possible, sequence generation was undertaken on original clinical material. However,

material derived following successful virus isolation in eggs was also utilised for sequence generation.

For whole-genome sequence analysis, the extracted vRNA was converted to double-stranded cDNA

and amplified using a one-step RT-PCR using SuperScript III One-Step RT-PCR kit (Thermo Fisher

Scientific). The primers used were as follows: Optil-F1 5'-TTACGCGCCAGCAAAAGCAG-3',

Optil-F2 5'-GTTACGCGCCAGCGAAAGCAGG-3' and Optil-R1 5'-

GTTACGCGCCAGTAGAAACAAG-3' that have been previously described[76, 77]. PCR products were

purified with Agencourt AMPure XP beads (Beckman Coultrer) prior to sequencing library

preparation using the Native Barcoding Kit (Oxford Nanopore Technologies) and sequenced using a

GridION Mk1 (Oxford Nanopore Technologies) according to manufacturer's instructions. Assembly

of the influenza A viral genomes was performed using a custom in-house pipeline as described

previously[8] but adapted for nanopore sequence reads. All influenza sequences generated and used in

this study are available through the GISAID EpiFlu Database (https://www.gisaid.org). All H5N1

HPAIV clade 2.3.4.4b sequences available in the EpiFlu database between 1st September 2020 and

22nd January 2024 were downloaded to create a sequence dataset. As North America and Europe were

over-represented in this dataset, these were sub-sampled to maintain representative sequences using

PARNAS[78]. The remaining dataset was separated by segment and aligned using Mafft v7.520[79], and

manually trimmed to the open-reading frame using Aliview version 1.26[80] The trimmed alignments

were then used to a infer maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree using IQ-Tree version 2.2.3[81] along

with ModelFinder were downloaded to create a sequence dataset. As North America and Europe were

over-represented in this dataset, these were sub-sampled to maintain representative sequences using

PARNAS[78]. The remaining dataset was separated by segment and aligned using Mafft v7.520[79], and

manually trimmed to the open-reading frame using Aliview version 1.26[80] The trimmed alignments

were then used to a infer maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree using IQ-Tree version 2.2.3[81] along

with ModelFinder[8] and 1,000 ultrafast bootstraps[82]. For the time-resolved phylogenetic analysis, all

HA sequences available from South America, and representatives from North America were

combined with the sequences from South Georgia and the Falkland Islands and used to infer

phylogeny using BEAST version 1.10.4[83] with the BEAGLE library[84]. The Shapiro-Rambaut-

Drummond-2006 (SRD06)[85] nucleotide substitution model was implemented with a four-category

gamma distribution model of site-specific rate variation and separate partitions for[83] with the

BEAGLE library[83, 84]. The Shapiro-Rambaut-Drummond-2006 (SRD06)[85] nucleotide substitution

model was implemented with a four-category gamma distribution model of site-specific rate variation

and separate partitions for codon positions 1 plus 2 versus position 3 with the Hasegawa-Kishino-

Yano (HKY) HKY substitution models on each with a strict clock and a coalescent GMRF Bayesian

skyride tree prior. Three independent Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) runs were performed and

combined using the Log Combiner tool in the BEAST package. Each chain consisted of 200,000,000

steps and was sampled every 20,000 steps, and the first 10% of samples were discarded as the burn-in.

Discrete geographical transition events were reconstructed using a symmetric continuous-time

Markov Chain model with an incorporated Bayesian stochastic search variable selection (BSSVS) to determine which transition rates sufficiently summarize connectivity[86]. SpreaD3 was used to determine the rates of transmission using a Bayes factor (BF) test. The BF represents the ratio of two competing statistical models, represented by their marginal likelihood, and, in this case, was used to determine the likelihood of transmission between geographical locations. The support of the BF for transmission was interpreted as described previously[87]). BF and representative transitions related to South Georgia and the Falkland Islands were visualised on maps in R (v4.3.2) using the packages GGPlot2[88], rnaturalearth[89], rnaturalearth data and sf[90]. Nucleotide identity between sequences was determined as described previously[82]. Sequences were genotyped according to the USDA schema, using the GenoFLU tool (https://github.com/USDA-VS/GenoFLU)[49].

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Author contributions

Conceptualisation: ACB, JJ, AB, EMF, ZF; formal analysis: AB, JJ, SMR, KF, ACB, AMPB; investigation: SMR, JLJ, DdS, FB, MB, RH, AMPB, JPD, BM; resources: ACB, JJ, IHB, ZF, EMF;

445 writing—original draft, ACB, JJ, AMPB, SR; writing—review and editing: ACB, JJ, APMB, AB, ZF,

446 EMF, SMR, IHB. All authors have read and agreed to the final version of the manuscript.

Competing interests

448 The authors declare no competing interests.

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Additional information

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Figure Legends

Figure 1. Geographical distribution of H5N1 HPAIV detections from South Georgia and The

Falkland Islands. (A) Map showing the locations of South America, the Falkland Islands, South

Georgia, the Antarctic peninsula, and other major islands in the Antarctic region. The location of the

Antarctic Convergence (Antarctic Polar Front) is indicated by a blue hashed line. **(B)** Map showing

the location, species, and date of influenza positive samples collected from South Georgia. Photo

credits: Brown skua, Viktorialvanets/Shutterstock.com; Kelp gull, Holmes, P./Pixabay.com; Antarctic

tern, Stubblefield Photography/Shutterstock.com; South Georgia shag, Lindie R./Shutterstock.com;

Antarctic fur seal, Carroll, P./Unsplash.com; Southern elephant seal, Osborn, D./Shutterstock.com.

(C) Map showing the location, species, and date of influenza positive samples collected from the

Falkland Islands. Locations with mortalities but no positive samples are also labelled. Photo credits:

Black-browed albatross, jmarti20/Pixaby.com; Southern fulmar, juan68/Shutterstock.com.

Figure 2. H5N1 HPAIV transmission from the South American continent to Falkland Islands

and South Georgia. (A) Maximum clade credibility (MCC) phylogeny of the HA gene by BEAST

analysis. The phylogeny is scaled by collection date of samples. Tip points are coloured by country of

origin. **(B)** Analysis of South American, Falklands Islands and South Georgia H5N1 sequences

suggests transmission from the mainland to the islands. BSSVS analysis is shown to describe potential

transmission routes. Arrows are coloured according to relative strength, inferred using a bayes factor

(BF), by which transmission events are supported **(C)** Analysis of South Georgia H5N1 sequences

suggests transmission between geographically related HPAIV detections. BSSVS analysis is shown to

describe potential transmission routes across the island. Arrows are coloured according to relative

strength, inferred using a bayes factor (BF), by which transmission events are supported.

Supplementary Figure 1. Representative global H5N1 HPAIV sequences collected since 1st

September 2020 were combined with the sequences generated from samples collected from South

Georgia and the Falkland Islands and used to infer maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees. Tips are

coloured according to region of origin, and the sequences from South Georgia and the Falkland Islands

are indicated.

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Figure 1A

Figure 1B

Figure 1C

Black-browed albatross

Southern fulmar

OCT   NOV   DEC
2023

N

20 km

Figure 2A

Figure 2B

Figure 2C

Table 1: Summary of H5 HPAIV testing results from avian and mammalian species from South Georgia and the Falkland Islands.

Location	Common name	Scientific name	H5 HPAIV +ve animals (total tested)	Sequences obtained
South Georgia	Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	15 (15)	9
	Kelp gull	*Larus dominicanus*	11 (11)	6
	Antarctic tern	*Sterna vittata*	1 (1)	1
	South Georgia shag	*Leucocarbo georgianus*	1 (5)	1
	King penguin	*Aptenodytes patagonicus*	0 (1)	0
	Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	5 (13)	2
	Antarctic Fur Seal	*Arctocephalus gazella*	1 (4)	1
Falkland islands	Black browed albatross	*Thalassarche melanophris*	2 (4)	0
	Southern fulmar	*Fulmarus glacialoides*	2 (2)	2
	Austral thrush	*Turdus falcklandii*	0 (1)	0
	Chicken	*Gallus gallus domesticus*	0 (1)	0
	Falkland steamer duck	*Tachyeres brachypterus*	0 (1)	0
	Grey-backed storm petrel	*Garrodia nereis*	0 (1)	0
	Imperial shag	*Leucocarbo atriceps*	0 (1)	0
	Rock shag	*phalacrocorax magellanicus*	0 (1)	0
	Southern rockhopper penguin	*Eudyptes chrysocome*	0 (1)	0

PB2　　　　**PB1**　　　　**PA**　　　　**HA**　　　　Figure S1

South Georgia

Falkland Islands

South Georgia

South Georgia

Falkland Islands

Falkland Islands

South Georgia

Falkland Islands

0.003　　　　0.003　　　　0.003　　　　0.003

Africa　Antarctica　Asia　Europe　North America　South America

NP   NA   MP   NS   Figure S2

South Georgia

Falkland Islands

South Georgia

Falkland Islands

South Georgia

Falkland Islands

Falkland Islands

South Georgia

0.003   0.003   0.003   0.003

■ Africa   ■ Antarctica   ■ Asia   ■ Europe   ■ North America   ■ South America

Supplementary Table 1: Summary of date, location and species of avian samples collected, and testing result for H5N1 HPAIV from South Georgia and the Falklands Islands.

Location	Collection date	Common name	Scientific name	Swab type	RRT-PCR assay			RRT-PCR Interpretation[a]	Virus isolation[b]	Virus strain name	GISAID accession number
					M-gene	H5-HP	N1				
Bird Island, South Georgia	08/10/2023	Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	OP[c]	28.46	27.75	29.82	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	A/brown_skua/Bird_Island/128287/2023	EPI_ISL_18439562
				C[d]	27.1	26.2	28.3	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P[e]	N/A[f]
		Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	OP	28.09	26.25	28.99	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	A/brown_skua/Bird_Island/128288/2023	EPI_ISL_18439563
				C	35.01	33.65	35.69	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
		Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	OP	31.07	30.16	32.36	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	A/brown_skua/Bird_Island/128289/2023	EPI_ISL_18439564
				C	32.63	31.85	33.87	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
	11/11/2023	Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	OP	28.91	27.91	28.37	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	A/Brown_Skua/Bird_Island/141232/2023	EPI_ISL_18742214
				C	-	-	38.04	Negative	Negative	N/P	N/A
Hound Bay, South Georgia	30/10/2023	Kelp gull	*Larus dominicanus*	C	-	-	-	N/P	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	27.27	25.24	27.96	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	A/Kelp_Gull/Hound_Bay/133744/2023	EPI_ISL_18592422
		Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	C	32.36	29.52	32.75	H5N1 HPAIV	Positive	A/Brown_Skua/Hound_Bay/133947/2023	EPI_ISL_18592428
				OP	32.31	29.87	32.09	H5N1 HPAIV	N/P	N/P	N/A
		Kelp gull	*Larus dominicanus*	C	-	-	-	N/P	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	35.89	34.71	35.8	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
		Kelp gull	*Larus dominicanus*	C	-	-	37.81	N/P	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	28.18	26.27	29.22	H5N1 HPAIV	Positive	A/Kelp_Gull/Hound_Bay/133747/2023	EPI_ISL_18592423
		Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	C	28.86	26.87	29.88	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
				OP	29.61	27.84	30.53	H5N1 HPAIV	N/P	N/P	N/A
		Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	C	26.92	24.65	27.28	H5N1 HPAIV	Positive	A/Brown_Skua/Hound_Bay/133949/2023	EPI_ISL_18592429
				OP	27.61	27.39	29.47	H5N1 HPAIV	N/P	N/P	N/A
St Andrew's Bay, South Georgia		Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	C	36.31	35.76	36.67	H5N1 HPAIV	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	29.34	26.5	28.64	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
		Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	C	32.43	30.89	33.86	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
				OP	34.98	31.47	34.54	H5N1 HPAIV	N/P	N/P	N/A
Moltke Harbour, South Georgia	31/10/2023	Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	C	-	-	-	N/P	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	31.43	28.42	31.77	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	A/Brown_Skua/Moltke_Harbour/133752/2023	EPI_ISL_18592424
		Kelp gull	*Larus dominicanus*	C	-	-	-	N/P	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	36.29	33.65	35.55	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
		Kelp gull	*Larus dominicanus*	C	38.84	-	39.19	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	29.21	27.54	29.78	H5N1 HPAIV	Positive	A/Kelp_Gull/Moltke_Harbour/133754/2023	EPI_ISL_18592425
		Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	C	30.65	28.43	31.7	H5N1 HPAIV	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	27.25	25.51	28.42	H5N1 HPAIV	Positive	A/Brown_Skua/Moltke_Harbour/133755/2023	EPI_ISL_18592426
		Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	C	32.66	30.37	33.76	H5N1 HPAIV	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	30.87	29.32	31.65	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
		Kelp gull	*Larus dominicanus*	C	-	-	-	N/P	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	29.97	28.92	31.5	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
Harpon Bay, South Georgia	03/11/2023	Kelp gull	*Larus dominicanus*	C	32.77	31.46	33.9	H5N1 HPAIV	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	30.67	28.51	31.04	H5N1 HPAIV	Positive	A/Kelp_Gull/Harpon_Bay/133943/2023	EPI_ISL_18592427
		Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	C	30.09	29.26	31.53	H5N1 HPAIV	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	27.4	24.62	27.54	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
		Kelp gull	*Larus dominicanus*	C	38.93	-	37.63	N/P	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	31.93	29.55	32.32	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
		Kelp gull	*Larus dominicanus*	C	-	-	-	N/P	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	36.53	33.81	35.96	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
Penguin River, South Georgia	08/11/2023	Kelp gull	*Larus dominicanus*	OP	27.88	26.95	27.32	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	A/Kelp_Gull/Penguin_River/141234/2023	EPI_ISL_18742215
				C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
		Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	OP	27.96	26.77	28.27	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	A/Brown_Skua/Penguin_River/141236/2023	EPI_ISL_18742216
				C	35.95	35.41	35.53	H5N1 HPAIV	N/P	N/P	N/A
		Kelp gull	*Larus dominicanus*	OP	34.41	33.4	34.16	H5N1 HPAIV	N/P	N/P	N/A
				C	30.31	29.69	29.92	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	A/Kelp_Gull/Penguin_River/141239/2023	EPI_ISL_18742217
		Brown skua	*Stercorarius antarcticus*	OP	31.95	31.25	37.48	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	A/Brown_Skua/Penguin_River/141240/2023	EPI_ISL_18742218
				C	36.65	28.5	29.27	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
King Edward Cove, South Georgia	25/11/2023	South Georgia shag	*Leucocarbo georgianus*	OP	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
	27/11/2023	South Georgia shag	*Leucocarbo georgianus*	OP	34.7	27.59	31.3	H5N1 HPAIV	N/P	N/P	N/A
				C	26.66	19.9	23.62	H5N1 HPAIV	Positive	A/South_Georgia_Shag/King_Edward_Cove/141245/2023	EPI_ISL_18742219
	06/12/2023	South Georgia shag	*Leucocarbo georgianus*	OP	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
		South Georgia shag	*Leucocarbo georgianus*	Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
		South Georgia shag	*Leucocarbo georgianus*	C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
		King penguin	*Aptenodytes patagonicus*	OP	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
		Antarctic tern	*Sterna vittata*	OP	25.88	20.58	24.38	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
				Brain	19.81	13.29	17.07	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	A/Antarctic_tern/King_Edward_Point/141271/2023	EPI_ISL_18742220
Stanley, Falkland Islands	30/10/2023	Southern fulmar	*Fulmarus glacialoides*	OP	20.5	18.65	20.71	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	A/Southern_fulmar/Falkland_Island/133789/2023	EPI_ISL_18522961
				C	18.85	17.57	19.62	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
				Brain	21.51	20.49	22.41	H5N1 HPAIV	Positive	N/P	N/A
	06/11/2023	Grey-backed storm petrel	*Garrodia nereis*	OP	39.83	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
		Falkland steamer duck	*Tachyeres brachypterus*	OP	39.37	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
	13/11/2023	Southern fulmar	*Fulmarus glacialoides*	OP	28.81	25.58	26.85	H5N1 HPAIV	Positive	A/Southern_Fulmar/Falkland_Island/138870/2023[g]	EPI_ISL_18918640
				C	32.89	29.45	30.98	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
	24/11/2023	Austral thrush	*Turdus falcklandii*	OP	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
	25/11/2023	Rock shag	*phalacrocorax magellanicus*	OP	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
	27/11/2023	Chicken	*Gallus gallus domesticus*	OP	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
Saunders Island, Falkland Islands	19/11/2023	Black browed albatross	*Thalassarche melanophris*	OP	36.51	33.92	35.84	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
				C	31.61	29.46	30.81	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P[h]	N/A
Steeple Jason, Falkland Islands	26/11/2023	Black browed albatross	*Thalassarche melanophris*	OP	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
		Black browed albatross	*Thalassarche melanophris*	OP	34.75	34.6	32.87	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/P	N/A
				C	30.47	30.94	29.16	H5N1 HPAIV	Negative	N/D	N/A
New Island, Falkland Islands	01/12/2023	Imperial shag	*Leucocarbo atriceps*	OP	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
	04/12/2023	Black browed albatross	*Thalassarche melanophris*	C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
Kidney Island, Falkland Islands	10/12/2023	Southern rockhopper penguin	*Eudyptes chrysocome*	C	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
				OP	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A

a, RRT-PCR interpretation from M-gene, H5-HP and N1; **b**, virus isolation in embryonated fowl eggs;**c**, oropharyngeal (OP); **d**, cloacal (C); **e**, not performed (N/P); **f**, not applicable (N/A); **g**, sequence derived from egg amplified material;**h**, performed but could not be determined (ND); -, No Cq

Supplementary Table 2: Summary of date, location and species of mamalian samples collected and testing result for H5 HPAIV from South Georgia.

Location	Collection date	Age	Common name	Scientific name	Swab type	M-gene	H5-HP	N1	RRT-PCR Interpretation[a]	Virus isolation[b]	Virus strain name	GISAID accession number
						RRT-PCR assay						
Moltke Harbour, South Georgia	31/10/2023	Pup	Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Nasal	37.75	-	39.5	Negative	Negative	N/P[c]	N/A[d]
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
			Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Nasal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
			Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Nasal	38.8	-	-	Negative	Negative	N/P	N/A
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
King Edward Cove, South Georgia	06/12/2023	Pup (newborn)	Antarctic fur seal	*Arctocephalus gazella*	Oral	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Nasal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
Jason Harbour, South Georgia	09/12/2023	Weaner (molting)	Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Oral	37.21	34.44	36.58	**H5N1 HPAIV**	Negative	A/Southern_Elephant_Seal/Jason_Harbour/141027/2023	EPI_ISL_18742221
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Nasal	-	-	39.93	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
			Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Oral	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Nasal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
			Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
			Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Oral	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Nasal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
			Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Oral	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Nasal	-	-	37.97	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
			Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Oral	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Anal	32.32	30.47	32.09	**H5N1 HPAIV**	Negative	N/D[f]	N/A
					Nasal	38.27	-	39.31	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
			Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Oral	37.84	-	38.38	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Anal	35.51	34.25	34.21	**H5N1 HPAIV**	Negative	N/D	N/A
					Nasal	-	-	37.88	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Brain	33.35	32.84	33.2	**H5N1 HPAIV**	Negative	N/D	N/A
			Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Oral	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Nasal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
			Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Oral	-	-	39.86	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Nasal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Brain	32.78	31.02	32.63	**H5N1 HPAIV**	Negative	N/D	N/A
			Southern elephant seal	*Mirounga leonina*	Oral	-	-	39.64	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Anal	37.98	-	36.14	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Nasal	36.05	35.1	36.23	**H5N1 HPAIV**	Negative	N/D	N/A
					Brain	37.04	-	39.35	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Liver	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Lung	32.03	31.41	32.24	**H5N1 HPAIV**	Negative	A/Southern_Elephant_Seal/Jason_Harbour/141078/2023	EPI_ISL_18742213
					Blood	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
		Adult male	Antarctic fur seal	*Arctocephalus gazella*	Oral	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Nasal	36.9	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
			Antarctic fur seal	*Arctocephalus gazella*	Oral	30.66	29.87	31.18	**H5N1 HPAIV**	Negative	A/Antarctic_Fur_Seal/Jason_Harbour/141037/2023	EPI_ISL_18742212
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Nasal	32.41	33.81	35.49	**H5N1 HPAIV**	Negative	N/P	N/A
					Brain	31.61	33.71	32.59	**H5N1 HPAIV**	Negative	N/P	N/A
			Antarctic fur seal	*Arctocephalus gazella*	Oral	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Anal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Nasal	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A
					Brain	-	-	-	Negative	N/P	N/P	N/A

a, RRT-PCR interpretation from M-gene, H5-HP and N1; **b**, virus isolation in embryonated fowl eggs; **c**, not performed (N/P); **d**, not applicable (N/A); **f**, performed but could not be determined (ND); -, No Cq

Table S3: Percentage nucleotide (nt) identity across H5N1 HPAIV sequences generated from South Georgia and The Falkland Islands.

The table is a large pairwise percentage nucleotide identity matrix, organised by gene segment (PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA, MP, NS). Both the rows and columns list the following sequences:

- A/Kelp Gull/Hound Bay/133744/2023
- A/Kelp Gull/Hound Bay/133747/2023
- A/Brown Skua/Moltke Harbour/133752/2023
- A/Kelp Gull/Moltke Harbour/133754/2023
- A/Brown Skua/Moltke Harbour/133755/2023
- A/Kelp Gull/Harpon Bay/133943/2023
- A/Brown Skua/Hound Bay/133947/2023
- A/Brown Skua/Hound Bay/133949/2023
- A/Brown skua/Bird Island/128289/2023
- A/Brown skua/Bird Island/128288/2023
- A/Brown skua/Bird Island/128287/2023
- A/Kelp Gull/Penguin River/141239/2023
- A/Brown Skua/Penguin River/141236/2023
- A/Kelp Gull/Penguin River/141234/2023
- A/Brown Skua/Bird Island/141232/2023
- A/Southern Elephant Seal/Jason Harbour/141078/2023
- A/Antarctic Fur Seal/Jason Harbour/141037/2023
- A/Southern Elephant Seal/Jason Harbour/141027/2023
- A/Southern Fulmar/Falkland Islands/138870/2023
- A/Southern fulmar/Falkland Islands/133789/2023

Table S4: amino acid polymorphisms in PB2 at positions associated with mammalian adaptation (271, 591, 627 and 701) in H5N1 HPAIV sequences derived from mammalian samples collected in South Georgia.

Sequence name	Amino acid mamalian adapation polymorphism in PB2			
	T271A	Q591K	E627K	D701N
A/Southern Elephant Seal/Jason Harbour/141078/2023	T	Q	K	D
A/Antarctic Fur Seal/Jason Harbour/141037/2023	T	Q	E	D
A/Southern Elephant Seal/Jason Harbour/141027/2023	T	Q	E	D