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9 **Functional and evolutionary constraints of *wtf* killer meiotic drivers**
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Abstract

Killer meiotic drivers are selfish DNA loci that sabotage the gametes that do not inherit them from a driver+/driver- heterozygote. These drivers often employ toxic proteins that target essential cellular functions to cause the destruction of driver- gametes. Identifying the mechanisms of drivers can expand our understanding of infertility and reveal novel insights about the cellular functions targeted by drivers. In this work, we explore the molecular mechanisms underlying the *wtf* family of killer meiotic drivers found in fission yeasts. Each *wtf* killer acts using a toxic Wtf^{poison} protein that can be neutralized by a corresponding Wtf^{antidote} protein. The *wtf* genes are rapidly evolving and extremely diverse. Here we found that self-assembly of Wtf^{poison} proteins is broadly conserved and associated with toxicity across the gene family, despite minimal amino acid conservation. In addition, we found the toxicity of Wtf^{poison} assemblies can be modulated by protein tags designed to increase or decrease the extent of the Wtf^{poison} assembly, implicating assembly size in toxicity. We also identified a conserved, critical role for the specific co-assembly of the Wtf^{poison} and Wtf^{antidote} proteins in promoting effective neutralization of Wtf^{poison} toxicity. Finally, we engineered *wtf* alleles that encode toxic Wtf^{poison} proteins that are not effectively neutralized by their corresponding Wtf^{antidote} proteins. The possibility of such self-destructive alleles reveals functional constraints on *wtf* evolution and suggests similar alleles could be cryptic contributors to infertility in fission yeast populations. As rapidly evolving killer meiotic drivers are widespread in eukaryotes, analogous self-killing drive alleles could contribute to sporadic infertility in many lineages.

Introduction

Genomes often contain selfish DNA sequences that persist by promoting their own propagation into the next generation without providing an overall fitness benefit to the organism [1,2]. Killer meiotic drivers are one such class of selfish sequences that act by preferentially destroying gametes that do not inherit the driver from a heterozygote [3]. This gamete destruction leads to biased, or sometimes, complete transmission of the driver+ genotype from driver+/driver-

heterozygotes. Killer meiotic drive systems generally decrease the fitness of the organism

carrying the driver, both through their killing activities and through indirect mechanisms [4].

Distinct killer meiotic drive systems have repeatedly evolved in eukaryotes and drivers found in

distinct species are generally not homologous [3,5–12]. Despite this, killer meiotic drivers fall

into a limited number of mechanistic classes with shared themes [3,13,14]. Additionally,

unrelated killer meiotic drivers have recurrently exploited conserved facets of cell physiology.

This has enabled study of the killing and/or rescue activities of drive proteins outside of their

endogenous species [5,11,15,16]. Overall, drivers represent unique tools that can be used to

discover novel, unexpected insights into the exploited biological processes.

The *wtf* genes are a family of extremely diverse, rapidly evolving killer meiotic drivers found in

multiple copies in most *Schizosaccharomyces* (fission yeast) species [17–22]. The *wtf* driver

genes each produce a Wtf[poison] and a Wtf[antidote] protein using distinct transcripts with overlapping

coding sequences (Fig 1A) [15,17,23]. The amino acid sequences of the two proteins are largely

identical, except the Wtf[antidote] proteins have an additional N-terminal domain of about 45 amino

acids not found in the Wtf[poison] (Fig 1A). All four developing spores (products of meiosis) are

exposed to the Wtf[poison], but spores that inherit a compatible Wtf[antidote] can neutralize the poison

and survive [22].

Little is known about the mechanism of toxicity of the Wtf[poison] proteins. The general mechanism

used by Wtf[antidote] proteins is better understood. The antidote-specific N-terminal domain is the

most conserved region and includes targeting motifs (PY motifs) that are recognized by

Rsp5/NEDD4 ubiquitin ligases which route the protein through the trans Golgi network to

endosomes and, ultimately, to the vacuole (fungal lysosome; Fig 1B-C) [15,24]. When both

proteins are present, the Wtf[antidote] co-assembles with the Wtf[poison], and the Wtf[antidote] thereby

traffics the Wtf[poison] to the vacuole [15,24]. This mechanism is similar to a non-homologous drive

system recently described in rice, where an antidote protein rescues the driver+ gametes from a

toxic poison protein by co-trafficking the poison to the autophagosome [5].

In general, the poison protein encoded by one *wtf* gene is not compatible with (i.e., neutralized

by) the antidotes of widely diverged *wtf* genes [17,19,25]. However, Wtf[poison] proteins can be

neutralized by Wtf[antidote] proteins encoded at different loci if the sequences are identical or highly

similar (outside of the antidote-specific N-terminal domain; Fig 1A) [17,22,24,26]. Although the

examples are limited, similarity at the C-termini of the Wtf poison and antidote proteins may be

particularly important for compatibility [15,25,26]. For example, the *wtf18-2* allele encodes an

antidote protein that neutralizes the poison produced by the *wtf13* driver. The Wtf18-2[antidote] and

Wtf13[antidote] proteins are highly similar overall (82% amino acid identity) and identical at their C-

termini. Interestingly, the antidote encoded by the reference allele of *wtf18* is not identical to

Wtf13[poison] at the C-terminus and does not neutralize it. In addition, changing two amino acids in

the C-terminus of Wtf18-2[antidote] (D366NN mutation) to make it more like the reference

Wtf18[antidote] abolishes the protein's ability to neutralize Wtf13[poison] (Bravo Núñez et al., 2018).

Still, the rules governing poison and antidote compatibility are largely unknown.

While it is clear that a functional *wtf* driver kills about half the spores produced by *wtf+*/*wtf-*

heterozygotes, the full impacts of *wtf* gene evolution on the fitness of populations is not clear.

Because the *wtf* genes encode the poison and antidote proteins on overlapping coding

sequences (Fig 1A), novel poisons can emerge simultaneously with their corresponding

antidotes via mutation. This has been observed with a limited number of engineered *wtf* alleles,

and one can observe evidence of this divergence in the diversity of extant *wtf* alleles in natural

populations [15,19–21,26]. The natural alleles, however, represent a selected population. Novel

alleles that generate functional drivers are predicted to be favored by the self-selection enabled

by drive, whereas alleles that generate a toxic poison without a compatible antidote would be

expected to be self-killing and removed by natural selection.

Major questions remain about the mechanism(s) of Wtf[poison] toxicity and about the rules of

Wtf[poison] and Wtf[antidote] compatibility. Our working model is that the toxicity of Wtf[poison] proteins is

tied to their self-assembly [15]. This assembly, however, has only been conclusively

demonstrated for the Wtf4 proteins, encoded by the *wtf4* gene from the isolate of *S. pombe*

known as *kambucha*. For Wtf[antidote] function, a working model is that a similar homotypic

assembly with the Wtf[poison] is required to establish a physical connection between the proteins

so that the poison is shuttled to the vacuole along with a ubiquitinated antidote [15,24]. The

ubiquitination and trafficking of the Wtf antidotes to the vacuole has been demonstrated to be

conserved between widely diverged Wtf[antidote] proteins [19,24]. However, it is not clear if antidote

co-assembly with a poison has a functional role in poison neutralization, or if it merely provides

a physical link between the proteins to facilitate co-trafficking. It is also unclear if changes in the

coding sequence shared by the poison and antidote proteins of a given *wtf* can generate an

incompatible set of proteins, or if poisons will always be neutralized by sequence-matched
antidotes.
101
To test these models and to better understand the amino acid sequences that support the Wtf
protein functions, we analyzed a panel of natural and engineered Wtf proteins. We found that
both well conserved and poorly conserved amino acid sequences can contribute to protein self-
assembly and function. Our analyses revealed broad conservation of Wtf[poison] self-assembly and
suggest that assembly size can affect Wtf[poison] toxicity, analogous to several other self-
assembling toxic proteins [27–29]. In addition, we found that the specific co-assembly of the
Wtf[antidote] is required for efficient Wtf[poison] neutralization via trafficking to the vacuole. Finally, our
analyses identified multiple *wtf* alleles that generate poison proteins that are not neutralized by
their corresponding antidotes. Such alleles would be self-destructive if they arose in nature. This
work refines our understanding of Wtf protein functions with important evolutionary implications.
More broadly, our observations offer insight into how functional conservation can be maintained
despite extreme amino acid sequence divergence and extends our understanding of the limits of
protein assembly trafficking mechanisms.
115
116 **Results**
117
118 **Broad conservation of Wtf[poison] protein self-assembly.**
119
To test the models of Wtf protein functions and to understand how these functions could be
supported by extremely diverse protein sequences (e.g., <20% amino acid identity), we
generated a large panel of *wtf* variants that represent over 100 million years of divergence [19].
Twelve variants are wild-type or mutant alleles of *wtf* genes found in *S. octosporus*, *S.*
osmophilus or *S. cryophilus* (S1 Fig A-D). One of these genes, *S. octosporus wtf25*, has been
previously characterized and found to encode a functional meiotic driver in its endogenous
species ([19]; S1 Table). Four additional genes (*S. cryophilus wtf1*, *S. osmophilus wtf19* and
wtf41, and *S. octosporus wtf61*) have been shown to encode functional Wtf[poison] and Wtf[antidote]
proteins in an ectopic *Saccharomyces cerevisiae* assay system ([19]; S1 Table). Finally, we
assay a panel of new mutant alleles of the previously characterized *wtf4* gene from the *S.*
kambucha isolate of *S. pombe* [15,22,23] (n=21; Fig 1 D).
131

Our model, based on Wtf4[poison], is that Wtf[poison] toxicity is linked to the ability of a Wtf[poison] to self-

assemble [15]. To test this idea, we wanted to assay if Wtf[poison] proteins that have greatly

diverged from Wtf4 also self-assemble. To do this, we used the Distributed Amphifluoric FRET

(DAmFRET) [15,30] approach, in which proteins are tagged with the photoconvertible mEos3.1

fluorophore (referred to as mEos hereafter) and expressed in *S. cerevisiae*. A uniform fraction of

the green mEos population is photoconverted to its red form, and protein-protein interactions

are then detected as FRET (Fluorescence Resonance Energy Transfer) between the green and

red fluorophores within single cells. Monomeric mEos exhibits negligeble FRET and is used as

a negative control (Fig 2A, B) [15,30]. The *S. cerevisiae* system used to study Wtf proteins is

well established and reflects phenotypes observed in the endogenous fission yeast species

[15,19,24]. We first tagged four toxic (*S. cryophilus* Wtf1[poison], *S. osmophilus* Wtf41[poison], and *S.*

octosporus Wtf25[poison] and Wtf61[poison]) and one non-toxic (*S. osmophilus* Wtf19[poison]) Wtf[poison]

protein at the C-terminus with mEos. The tagged proteins retained their toxic/non-toxic

phenotypes when expressed in *S. cerevisiae* using a galactose-inducible expression system

(Fig 2C). The assayed proteins all share less than 20% amino acid identity with Wtf4[poison], which

we use as a positive control (S1 Fig B). We found that all five newly tested Wtf[poison]-mEos

proteins, including the nontoxic Wtf19[poison]-mEos, exhibited self-assembly (Fig 2B). It is

important to note, however, that the data reported for Wtf25[poison]-mEos are limited and we could

not reliably assay that protein via DAmFRET due to the high toxicity of the protein.

We also assayed DAmFRET in mutant alleles of *wtf4[poison]-mEos* (S2 Fig, S3 Fig). The two toxic

mutant proteins tested in this subset, Wtf4-14[poison]-mEos (S2 Fig A, D-F) and Wtf4-18[poison]-mEos

(S3 Fig A-E) exhibited self-assembly. Of these two proteins, Wtf4-18-mEos is more like wild-

type Wtf4[poison]-mEos, in both toxicity and degree of assembly (S2 Fig D-F; S3 Fig B-E). Most

non-toxic Wtf4 mutants (Wtf4-8[poison]-mEos, Wtf4-12[poison]-mEos, Wtf4-13[poison]-mEos, Wtf4-15[poison]-

mEos and Wtf4-16[poison]-mEos) exhibited reduced assembly compared to the wild-type (S2 Fig

A-E, S3 Fig A-D). However, the non-toxic Wtf4-17[poison]-mEos showed similar assembly to the

wild-type (S3 Fig A-D). We could not reliably assay the assembly of Wtf4-9[poison]-mEos, Wtf4-

10[poison]-mEos and Wtf4-11[poison]-mEos due to low fluorescence signal (S2 Fig A-B, S6 Fig B).

These results show that Wtf[poison] self-assembly is broadly conserved (over 100 million years)

and can be supported by a wide range of amino acid sequences (e.g., proteins sharing <20%

amino acid identity, S1 Fig B). Given the broad conservation of self-assembly, that all the toxic

alleles exhibited assembly, and that mutant alleles with reduced toxicity also exhibited reduced

assembly, our results are consistent with an association between self-assembly and toxicity.

However, our results demonstrate that assembly alone is insufficient for Wtf[poison] toxicity, as we

found several Wtf[poison] proteins that assemble but are not toxic.

Intracellular localization of mutant Wtf[poison] proteins is an imperfect predictor of toxicity.

We previously imaged the toxic *S. octosporus* Wtf25[poison]-mCherry in *S. cerevisiae* cells and

found that the localization was similar to the more extensively characterized toxic Wtf4[poison] [19].

Specifically, the poisons show small puncta broadly distributed in the cytoplasm, with some

localization to what appears to be the endoplasmic reticulum (ER; [15,19]). All functionally

confirmed Wtf driver proteins have four to eight predicted transmembrane domains (S5 Table)

and hence, this localization pattern may reflect the poison being trafficked from the ER through

the secretory pathway, through the Golgi and trans-Golgi network [24].

The shared localization pattern of toxic Wtf[poison] proteins suggested there may be a link between

the intracellular distribution and toxicity of Wtf[poison] proteins. To test this hypothesis, we imaged

the wild-type Wtf[poison]-mEos proteins described above in *S. cerevisiae* cells. The localization of

the *S. octosporus* Wtf25[poison]-mEos was similar to the previously described Wtf25[poison]-mCherry

described above (Fig 2D). The additional toxic Wtf[poison] proteins from *S. octosporus*, *S.*

osmophilus and *S. cryophilus*, also exhibited dispersed puncta, like the toxic Wtf4[poison]-mEos

control cells (Fig 2D). The nontoxic *S. osmophilus* Wtf19[poison]-mEos, however, showed a strong

signal enrichment in what appears to be the ER (Fig 2D).

We also assayed the localization of the mutant Wtf4[poison] proteins mentioned above (S2 Fig F,

S3 Fig E). The most toxic mutant protein, Wtf4-18[poison]-mEos, localized in distributed puncta like

wild-type (S3 Fig A-C, E). The slightly less toxic Wtf4-14[poison]-mEos protein also formed

distributed puncta, but also exhibited more ER-like localization than wild-type (S2 Fig A, D, F).

Most of the non-toxic mutant Wtf4[poison] proteins (Wtf4-8[poison]-mEos, Wtf4-9[poison]-mEos, Wtf4-

11[poison]-mEos, Wtf4-12[poison]-mEos, Wtf4-13[poison]-mEos, Wtf4-16[poison]-mEos) were less dispersed

and exhibited a largely ER-like localization in *S. cerevisiae* cells, similar to the non-toxic *S.*

osmophilus Wtf19[poison]-mEos (S2 Fig A-D, F, Fig 2C-D). One additional non-toxic mutant, Wtf4-

10[poison]-mEos, localized to the vacuole, reminiscent of Wtf[antidote] protein localization (S2 Fig B, D,

F). The non-toxic Wtf4-15[poison]-mEos had a unique localization pattern that combined a diffuse

distributed signal with some larger protein assemblies (S3 Fig A-C, E). Finally, the non-toxic

Wtf4-17^{poison}-mEos localization was indistinguishable from wild-type Wtf4^{poison}-mEos (S3 Fig A-

C, E).

Together our results show that Wtf^{poison} self-assembly (assayed by DAmFRET) combined with

cellular localization patterns are good, but imperfect predictors of toxicity. All the toxic proteins

show both self-assembly in the DAmFRET assay and Wtf4^{poison}-like distributed protein

localization in *S. cerevisiae* cells. Except for Wtf4-17^{poison}, the nontoxic proteins show reduced or

lack of assembly (assayed by DAmFRET) and altered Wtf^{poison} protein localization (assayed by

microscopy) in cells.

Altering assembly properties of Wtf^{poison} proteins affects toxicity.

To further explore a potential functional connection between the assembly of Wtf^{poison} proteins

and their toxicity, we sought to alter the assembly properties of Wtf4^{poison} using tags. We first

aimed to increase the overall size of the Wtf4^{poison} assemblies. To do this, we employed a

recently described construct that contains the human ferritin heavy chain protein (FTH1) fused

to a nanobody that recognizes mEos (mEosNB) (Kimbrough et al. forthcoming). The FTH1

domain self assembles to form a 24-mer core and can form supramolecular clusters when fused

to self-assembling proteins [31,32]. In our assay, we expressed Wtf4^{poison}-mEos from a

galactose inducible promoter and the mEosNB-FTH1 from a doxycycline repressible promoter

(Fig 3A, B). As expected, we found that Wtf4^{poison}-mEos formed fewer and larger puncta inside

cells in the presence of mEosNB-FTH1 (i.e., -Dox panels, Fig 3C). Expression of the mEosNB-

FTH1 alone had no effect on yeast growth (Fig 3D, panel (i)). While expression of the Wtf4^{poison}-

mEos alone was toxic, co-expression of the mEosNB-FTH1 and Wtf4^{poison}-mEos markedly

suppressed the toxicity of the Wtf4^{poison}-mEos (Fig 3D, compare panel (ii) to panel (iii)). We also

observed the same phenotypes with four additional toxic Wtf^{poison}-mEos proteins in the presence

of the mEosNB-FTH1, indicating the effect was not specific to Wtf4^{poison} (Fig 3C-D).

We next attempted to increase the solubility Wtf4^{poison} assemblies using a modified N-terminal

domain (NT*) tag derived from spidroins, a principal component of spider silk [33]. The NT* tag

can decrease protein aggregation, which is the role of the native domain in spiders [34–38]. We

added NT* to the N-terminus of the *wtf4^{poison}-mEos* allele to generate *wtf4-20^{poison}-mEos* (Fig

4A). We found that this protein had a novel combination of assembly and localization not

represented in any of our other alleles. Specifically, the Wtf4-20^{poison}-mEos protein showed less

self-assembly than Wtf4^{poison}-mEos (Fig 4C), but the NT* tag did not visibly alter the localization

of the protein within cells (Fig 4E). In addition, the Wtf4-20^{poison}-mEos protein showed increased

toxicity in cells (Fig 4B). To test if the effects of the NT* tag were specific to Wtf4^{poison} or more

general, we also tagged *S. octosporus* Wtf25^{poison} with NT* to generate Wtf25-4^{poison}-mEos (S4

Fig A). As with Wtf4-20^{poison}-mEos, we observed unaltered localization and increased toxicity of

the Wtf25-4^{poison}-mEos protein, relative to wild-type Wtf25^{poison}-mEos (S4 Fig B, D). We could

not, however, quantify Wtf25-4^{poison}-mEos assembly by DAmFRET as the protein was too toxic

to cells (S6 Fig E).

We also assayed the how another solubility tag, the *E. coli* Maltose Binding Protein (MBP),

affected Wtf^{poison} toxicity [39–41]. The MBP-tagged Wtf4^{poison} (Wtf4-21^{poison}-mEos) had the same

phenotype as the NT*-tagged allele: decreased assembly, increased toxicity, unaltered

localization, relative to the wild-type protein (S5 Fig). The phenotype of the MBP-tagged

Wtf25^{poison} (Wtf25-5^{poison}-mEos) however, did not mirror that of the NT*-tagged allele. Instead,

we found that the Wtf25-5^{poison}-mEos allele showed reduced toxicity and an altered, stronger

endoplasmic reticulum-like localization, as compared to the wild-type protein (S5 Fig A-C). The

Wtf25-5^{poison}-mEos protein did exhibit self-assembly, but we could unfortunately not compare it

the wild-type protein as we failed to obtain sufficient viable cells to assay via DAmFRET (S5 Fig

D, S6 Fig F).

The bulk of our experiments are consistent with a model where the assembly properties and the

distribution of Wtf^{poison} proteins within cells affects toxicity, with distributed, punctate assemblies

exhibiting more toxicity. The non-toxic Wtf4-17^{poison} protein that forms distributed assemblies,

however, undermines this simple model or at least indicates that there are additional

unidentified features that are essential for toxicity.

An additional possibility that we considered was that the expression levels of the Wtf^{poison}

proteins likely contributes to the phenotypes we observed, despite expressing all alleles from a

common vector backbone using a common promoter. To assay expression levels, we quantified

fluorescence of the mEos tags shared by all alleles. We did not use western blots as that

approach is challenging to apply to Wtf^{poison} proteins as they are toxic and highly hydrophobic

[15,23]. Instead, we looked at the acceptor (red form of mEos) fluorescence in live cells

analyzed in the DAmFRET experiments (S6 Fig; Data from Fig 2B, S2 Fig E, S3 Fig D, Fig 4C,).

As expected, based on other studies [42–45], we observed significant fluorescent protein signal

heterogeneity within cells expressing the monomer mEos control and each Wtf[poison] protein

tested (S6 Fig). We did not, however, find increased fluorescent signal in cells expressing the

most toxic proteins (as determined by growth assays). On the contrary, we tended to observe

less signal in the cells expressing the most toxic proteins (e.g., Wtf4[poison] and Wtf4-20[poison]).

These data support a model in which cells expressing the higher levels of toxic proteins are

more likely to be removed by death and are not quantified. As mentioned above, however, we

also observed low signal in the cells expressing the non-toxic Wtf4-11[poison], Wtf4-9[poison], and

Wtf4-10[poison] alleles (S6 Fig). The low levels of Wtf4-10[poison] could be due to its degradation in

the vacuole (S2 Fig F). For the other two alleles, it is formally possible the low levels of these

proteins in cells could contribute to their lack of toxicity.

Limited modularity of the Wtf[antidote]-specific domain.

We next wanted to test what protein features affect Wtf4[antidote] function (Fig 1A-B). To do this, we

first tested if the N-terminal antidote-specific domain encoded by exon 1 could act independently

of the rest of the protein (S7 Fig A). We hypothesized that the amino acids encoded by exons 2-

6 would be required for protein self-assembly as they comprise the poison protein, which self-

assembles [15]. As expected, we found that a protein consisting of the exon 1-encoded residues

linked to a mEos tag (Wtf4-exon1-mEos) could not self-assemble (S7 Fig B). The Wtf4-exon1-

mEos protein was also not trafficked to the vacuole, despite this protein harboring two PY motifs

that promote ubiquitin-mediated trafficking of wild-type Wtf[antidote] proteins [24] (S7 Fig F). Finally,

the Wtf4-exon1-mEos protein could not rescue Wtf4[poison] toxicity, which parallels recent results

using distinct Wtf proteins ((S7 Fig C) [24]). These results demonstrate that the antidote-specific

domain encoded by exon 1 is insufficient for function.

In addition to self-assembly, the full length Wtf4[antidote] also co-assembles with the Wtf4[poison]

([15,22], S7 Fig G). The co-assembled Wtf4[poison] and Wtf4[antidote] proteins are co-trafficked to the

vacuole and the toxicity of Wtf4[poison] is neutralized [15,24]. We previously demonstrated that a

mismatch in the copy number of coding sequence repeats found in exon 6 could disrupt Wtf[poison]

and Wtf[antidote] interaction and compatibility [15,26]. We were curious if extensive shared

sequence identity between Wtf4[poison] and Wtf4[antidote] proteins was important for co-assembly, or if

identity between the two proteins at the C-terminus was sufficient. To test this idea, we

generated a Wtf4 allele (*wtf4-6*) that moved the antidote-specific domain to the center of the

protein, where it would interrupt the extensive shared amino acid identity with Wtf4[poison] (S7 Fig

A). We also generated a control allele (*wtf4-7*) in which the antidote-specific domain was moved

to the C-terminus of the protein where it should not interrupt the shared amino acid identity with

Wtf4[poison] but would control for the modularity of the exon 1 encoded domain (S7 Fig A). We

found that mEos tagged versions of both Wtf4-6 and Wtf4-7 proteins were both non-toxic and

trafficked to the vacuole (S7 Fig D, G). The Wtf4-7-mEos, with the antidote specific domain at

the C-terminus, could also co-assemble with Wtf4[poison]-mCherry and promote the poison's

trafficking to the vacuole and neutralization (S7 Fig D, G).

The Wtf4-6-mEos protein with the antidote specific domain in the center, however, could not co-

assemble with or neutralize wild-type Wtf4[poison]-mCherry (S7 Fig D, G). This suggested that

shared amino acid identity at the C-terminus is insufficient for Wtf4[poison] and Wtf4[antidote] co-

assembly and function. However, this result could also mean that the Wtf4-6 protein is

incapable of acting as an antidote. To try and distinguish these possibilities, we attempted to

make a 'poison' protein (Wtf4-19) compatible with the Wtf4-6 protein by mutating the PY motifs

required for ubiquitination and vacuole trafficking (PY mutated to PA; S7 Fig A)[24]. Analogous

changes in bona fide antidote proteins turn them into toxic poison-like proteins [24]. As

expected, the Wtf4-19-mCherry protein was toxic, but unexpectedly, it localized to the vacuole

(S7 Fig E, H). In addition, the toxicity of Wtf4-19-mCherry was not neutralized by the Wtf4-6-

mEos allele, despite sharing end-to-end amino acid identity, outside of the PY motifs, and

despite both proteins being trafficked to the vacuole (S7 Fig E, H). This persistent toxicity was

unexpected but suggests that shared amino acid identity can be insufficient for Wtf[poison] and

Wtf[antidote] compatibility.

Protein co-assembly is important for Wtf[antidote] function beyond linkage to the Wtf[poison].

We next wanted to know if co-assembly serves merely to link poison and antidote proteins to

allow for co-trafficking, or if co-assembly serves a more nuanced role. To test this, we artificially

tethered Wtf[poison] proteins with diverged Wtf[antidote] proteins with which they cannot co-assemble

using a combination of GFP and GFP-binding (GBP) tags (Fig 5A, B; S8 Fig A, B).

We first tested if tethering Wtf4[poison] to *S. octosporus* Wtf61[antidote] could neutralize the toxic

Wtf4[poison]. We generated Wtf4[poison]-GBP-mCherry and Wtf61[antidote]-GFP proteins and found the

tags did not disrupt protein function. Specifically, the Wtf4[poison]-GBP-mCherry protein was toxic,

and could be rescued by Wtf4[antidote] proteins, including Wtf4[antidote]-GFP. Similarly, the

Wtf61[antidote]-GFP protein was able to rescue Wtf61[poison]-mCherry (Fig 5C). However, Wtf61[antidote]-

GFP was not able to efficiently rescue Wtf4[poison]-GBP-mCherry (Fig 5C, in bold). We found that

the Wtf61[antidote]-GFP and Wtf4[poison]-GBP-mCherry proteins largely co-localized, but were not

effectively transported into the vacuole (Fig 5D). We saw the same results when we analyzed a

widely diverged, independent pair of Wtf proteins (*S. octosporus* Wtf25[poison] and *S. cryophilus*

Wtf1[antidote]), suggesting that specific antidote-poison co-assembly generally promotes proper

antidote function (S8 Fig).

Given that the Wtf61[antidote]-GFP and Wtf4[poison]-GBP-mCherry were often adjacent to vacuoles

and not totally distributed in cells, as occurs when trafficking of Wtf proteins is disrupted [15], we

suspected that the vacuolar targeting was still occurring, but blocked at a late step in the

process (e.g., vacuole entry). Consistent with this notion, the assemblies often co-localized with

the Rnq-1mCardinal protein, which is a prion protein that marks the insoluble protein deposit

(IPOD) [46–48] (Fig 5E). This result was surprising to us because with a different expression

system (β-estradiol induction) a considerable amount of the Wtf4[poison]/Wtf4[antidote] co-assemblies

accumulate at the IPOD are not toxic to cells [15]. It is unclear why GFP/GBP mediated

assemblies, but not Wtf/Wtf mediated co-assemblies, would be toxic at the IPOD, and we

speculate about this in the discussion.

Beyond the GFP/GBP tethering experiments, we made additional observations suggesting that

a specific nature of co-assembly with Wtf[poison] is required for Wtf[antidote] function when

characterizing the *wtf4-20* allele (with the NT* domain that increases solubility) introduced

earlier. The Wtf4-20[poison]-mEos is toxic, as mentioned above, but we found that it could not be

effectively rescued by wild-type Wtf4[antidote]-mCherry (Fig 4D). This drastic reduction in rescue is

striking given that the interaction (i.e., colocalization) of Wtf4-20[poison]-mEos with Wtf4[antidote]-

mCherry appears only mildly disrupted relative to that observed between wild-type Wtf4 proteins

(Figure 4E, F). The Wtf4-20[poison]-mEos and Wtf4[antidote]-mCherry proteins are not efficiently

trafficked to the vacuole (Fig 4E). This effect was not, however, universal. We did not observe

strong disruption of poison/antidote compatibility caused by the NT* tag on *S. octosporus*

Wtf25[poison] (Wtf25-4[poison] allele, S4 Fig). If anything, the tag caused a mild decrease in rescue by

the Wtf25[antidote] (S4 Fig C). This suggests that the factors affecting poison/antidote compatibility

can be complex or context dependent.

C-terminal domains support Wtf[antidote] rescue.

Because Wtf proteins are encoded on largely overlapping coding sequence, a change in the shared coding sequence can simultaneously create a novel Wtf[poison] protein and a matching novel Wtf[antidote] protein. Our engineered mutant alleles offered the opportunity to explore if matching proteins are always compatible (i.e., if a novel toxic Wtf[poison] protein is always neutralized by its corresponding Wtf[antidote] protein).

We described above how the Wtf4-6 protein could not neutralize the toxicity of the largely identical Wtf4-19 protein, but it is unlikely an allele like this (with exon 1 moved after exon 3) would arise spontaneously (S7 Fig). We therefore explored poison and antidote compatibility more broadly within the alleles we generated. In many cases, the Wtf[antidote] proteins were able to rescue their matching Wtf[poison] alleles (S1 Table). One class of mutants, however, created toxic Wtf[poison] proteins that were not rescued by the matching Wtf[antidote]. In *wtf4*, these mutants changed a region of exon 6 that encodes a 7 amino acid repeat found in variable numbers (0-84 base pairs of repeat sequence) within *S. pombe wtf* genes (Figure 6A, B) [20]. The repeat region in *wtf4* encodes one complete repeat plus three additional amino acids of the repeat (Figure 6C). We found that mutating this region in *wtf4* by either scrambling the amino acid order (*wtf4-4* allele) or by replacing the ten amino acids with alanine (*wtf4-5* allele) generated toxic Wtf[poison] proteins that were not neutralized by their matching Wtf[antidote] proteins (Figure 6D). The Wtf4-4[antidote] and Wtf4-5[antidote] proteins were both trafficked to the vacuole when expressed alone but did not effectively co-traffic their corresponding Wtf[poison] proteins (Figure 6E). The Wtf4-4 poison, and antidote proteins showed decreased co-localization, relative to wild-type proteins, suggesting the proteins failed to co-assemble (Figure 6E-F). Alternatively, the Wtf4-5 proteins colocalized (Fig 6F), but remained more distributed within cells relative to wild-type (Figure 6E). The incompatibility of the Wtf4-5 proteins further supports that a particular form of association is required between Wtf[antidote] and Wtf[poison] proteins to ensure the poison is trafficked to the vacuole and neutralized.

We also assayed the effects of deleting the repeat region of *wtf4* exon 6 alone (*wtf4-2* allele), or in combination with deleting another repetitive region found in exon 3 (*wtf4-3* allele; S9 Fig A) [20]. We found that the Wtf4-2[poison]-mEos protein is toxic but is only partially rescued by Wtf4-2[antidote]-mCherry, relative to the rescue observed between wild-type Wtf4 poison and antidote proteins (S9 Fig D). We found that the two Wtf4-2 proteins exhibit decreased colocalization, relative to wild-type proteins, suggesting the limited rescue is due to disrupted poison-antidote

interaction (S9 Fig E-F). Interestingly, we found that the defect in poison-antidote compatibility

conferred by the deletion of the exon 6 repeats in the *wtf4-2* allele is partially suppressed by

also deleting the repetitive region found in exon 3. Specifically, the proteins encoded by the

wtf4-3 allele, with both regions deleted, have near wild-type phenotypes (S9 Fig A-F). We

observed no defects associated with an allele (*wtf4-1*) lacking only the repetitive region in exon

3 (S9 Fig A-B, D-E).

Finally, we also tested if the novel mutations we made in this study in the exon 3 or C-terminal

repeats affected compatibility with wild-type Wtf proteins. In all cases tested, the repeat mutant

Wtf^{poison} proteins were not neutralized by their wild-type Wtf^{antidote} counterparts and vice versa

(S10 Fig A-H). For example, Wtf4-1^{poison} is not neutralized by Wtf4^{antidote} and Wtf4^{poison} is not

neutralized by Wtf4-1^{antidote} (S10 Fig B).

The repeats in exon 6, but not in exon 3, are broadly conserved in the *wtf* gene family [19]. We

also mutated the homologous region in *S. octosporus wtf25* and found analogous phenotypes

as those described above in *wtf4* (S11 Fig). Like *wtf4*, *S. octosporus wtf25* also encodes 10

amino acids in this C-terminal region (S11 Fig A-C). We generated the *S. octosporus wtf25-2*

allele by swapping the endogenous codons for those of *wtf4*. We found that this allele encoded

an incompatible Wtf25-2^{poison} and Wtf25-2^{antidote} pair (S11 Fig D). Surprisingly, the individual

Wtf25-2 proteins were compatible with Wtf25 proteins (e.g., Wtf25-2^{poison}-mCherry was rescued

by Wtf25^{antidote}-mEos). We also deleted the repeat region of *S. octosporus wtf25* (to generate the

wtf25-1 allele) and again found phenotypes similar to those observed in the analogous *wtf4*

mutant (*wtf4-2*) (S12 Fig A-D). Specifically, the Wtf25-1^{antidote}-mCherry showed reduced rescue

of the Wtf25-1^{poison}-mEos toxicity, relative to the wild-type Wtf25 protein pair (S12 Fig C).

Altogether, our results further support a critical role for the repeats in Wtf^{poison} and Wtf^{antidote}

compatibility and reveal that mutants in this domain can encode Wtf^{poison} proteins not neutralized

by the matching Wtf^{antidote} proteins.

C-terminal truncations reveal idiosyncrasy of Wtf protein functional domains.

An additional set of mutants we characterized followed up on an observation by Hu et al in one

of the inaugural papers describing *wtf* drivers [17]. In that work, Hu et al described 10 amino

acid C-terminal truncations of two *wtf* genes known as *cw9* and *cw27*. These mutant alleles both

exhibited disrupted Wtf^{poison}, but not Wtf^{antidote} activity. These proteins share 62% amino acid

identity in the C-terminal exon 6 with each other and, at most, 70% with Wtf4. We tested if a

similar 10 amino acid truncation of *wtf4* would specifically disrupt Wtf4^{poison} activity. This

mutation gave us the exceptional *wtf4-17* allele described above that encodes a non-toxic Wtf4-

17^{poison}, that surprisingly exhibits wild-type self-assembly and wild-type protein localization in

cells (S3 Fig A-E). The disrupted Wtf4-17^{poison} toxicity is consistent with the phenotypes of the

cw9 and *cw27* truncations, but unlike those alleles, Wtf4-17^{antidote}-mCherry was not able to

rescue the toxicity of a wild-type Wtf4^{poison}-mEos (S13 Fig A-B). Though we could not detect

Wtf4-17^{antidote}-mCherry signal in cells, we infer it is expressed as it confers a phenotype,

described below.

We also generated a larger truncation allele that deleted all 29 amino acids found in exon 6 of

wtf4. This *wtf4-15* allele, also mentioned above, encodes a non-toxic Wtf4-15^{poison}-mEos, which

has slightly reduced self-assembly, and shows diffused localization, with some larger

assemblies (S3 Fig A-E). The Wtf4-15^{antidote}-mCherry is also unable to neutralize Wtf4^{poison}-mEos

(S13 Fig B). Imaging of the proteins shows a lack of colocalization between Wtf4-15^{antidote}-

mCherry and Wtf4^{poison}-mEos, suggesting that failed co-assembly underlies the failed

compatibility (S13 Fig C).

Given that the 10 and 29 amino acid C-terminal truncation mutants both make non-toxic

Wtf4^{poison} proteins and Wtf4^{antidote} proteins that do not rescue wild-type Wtf4^{poison}, we were

surprised to find that a 20 amino acid C-terminal truncation generated a more functional *wtf*

allele, *wtf4-18*, which was mentioned above (S3 Fig A-E). The 20 amino acid truncation extends

into the exon 6 repeats, deleting the last two amino acids of the repeat (S3 Fig B). The Wtf4-

18^{poison} is slightly less toxic than wild-type Wtf4^{poison} (S3 Figure C) but can be neutralized by the

wild-type Wtf4^{antidote} and, to a lesser extent by the Wtf4-18^{antidote} (S13 Fig B). The Wtf-18^{antidote}

can also partially rescue the toxicity of wild-type Wtf4^{poison} (S13 Fig B). Finally, we were also

surprised to find that the Wtf4-18^{poison} could be partially rescued by the antidotes encoded by the

other truncation mutants Wtf4-17^{antidote} and Wtf4-15^{antidote}, despite those antidotes being

ineffective against wild-type Wtf4^{poison} (S13 Fig B). This reveals that the truncated Wtf4-15 and

Wtf4-17 antidotes are at least partially functional.

Finally, to expand our analyses beyond *wtf4*, we also made 10 amino acid C-terminal

truncations of *S. cryophilus wtf1, S. osmophilus wtf41, S. octosporus wtf61* and *wtf25*. We found

these truncations all retained toxicity and were rescuable by the corresponding wildtype

antidotes (S3 Fig F-G; S14 Fig A-D). In the case of *S. osmophilus wtf41*, the rescue of Wtf41-

1^{poison}-mEos by Wtf41^{antidote}-mEos was better than that of the wild-type Wtf41^{poison}-mEos (S14 Fig

C). This uncovers another idiosyncratic pair, where the wild-type antidote rescued the mutant

poison better than the wild-type poison. Overall, our C-terminal truncations reveal that the C-

terminus sequences affect the protein function in a context dependent, sometimes idiosyncratic,

manner.

Discussion

Protein assembly plays conserved roles in Wtf protein function.

The mutant analyses provided in this work expands and supports a working model in which 1)

Wtf^{poison} toxicity is tied to the homotypic assembly of the proteins [15], 2) Wtf^{antidote} proteins are

ubiquitinated and trafficked to the vacuole [15,24] and, 3) Wtf^{antidote} proteins co-assemble with

their matching Wtf^{poison} proteins and co-traffic them to the vacuole [15,26]. Recent work has

established that ubiquitin-mediated Wtf^{antidote} trafficking and co-trafficking with their

corresponding Wtf^{poison} proteins are conserved within the extremely diverse gene family [24]. It

was unclear, however, if homotypic protein assembly is a conserved feature of Wtf^{poison} or

Wtf^{antidote} protein function.

The results of this study support the model that homotypic protein assembly plays critical roles

in the function of Wtf^{poison} proteins. First, we observed that the ability to self-assemble was

conserved amongst functional (i.e., toxic) wild-type Wtf^{poison} proteins from four

Schizosaccharomyces species (Fig 2). Given that the functional proteins share as little as 20%

amino acid identity, these observations likely reflect conserved functional importance of self-

assembly. Our mutant analyses of Wtf4^{poison} proteins provided additional support for this model

in that all toxic mutant proteins self-assembled (S2 Fig, S3 Fig). Furthermore, we found that the

Wtf^{poison} toxicity could be modulated by altering the assembly properties of the protein with tags

(Fig 3, Fig 4, S4 Fig, S5 Fig). Together, our data suggest that Wtf^{poison} toxicity is tied to protein

assembly with distributed, small assemblies showing greater toxicity than localized, larger

assemblies (Fig 2-4, S2-5 Fig). The recent work of Zheng et al. (2023) suggests the distributed

assemblies represent localization to the trans-Golgi network.

Still, it is important to note that the Wtf4-17[poison] allele was non-toxic, despite assembling into

small, distributed assemblies indistinguishable from those generated by the wild-type protein

(S3 Fig). This exceptional protein highlights that even if self-assembly is critical for Wtf[poison]

toxicity, it is not the only factor required. In addition, this allele offers an opportunity for future

work to explore features that distinguish toxic from nontoxic protein assemblies.

Our results also support an expanded, more nuanced role for homotypic protein assembly and

trafficking in Wtf[antidote] function. First, we found that the antidote-specific domain that contains

the PY motifs is insufficient to promote vacuole trafficking, suggesting some other features of

Wtf proteins are also required (S7 Fig). We posit protein self-assembly could contribute to this

function. For Wtf[antidote] neutralization of a Wtf[poison], we initially assumed that co-assembly of

Wtf[antidote] with Wtf[poison] proteins served only to physically link the proteins, thus enabling the

Wtf[antdiote] to traffic the Wtf[poison] to the vacuole [24]. We found, however, that physical linkage

between a Wtf[poison] and Wtf[antidote] can be insufficient to ensure their co-trafficking to the vacuole

and neutralization of the Wtf[poison]'s toxicity. We observed this insufficiency in experiments linking

non-matching Wtf[poison] and Wtf[antidote] proteins using physical tags (Fig 5, S8 Fig). In addition, we

found that the *wtf4-5* and *wtf4-20* alleles encode protein pairs in which poison-antidote

interaction appeared largely intact, but trafficking into the vacuole and poison neutralization was

disrupted (Fig 4, Fig 6). These experiments suggest that efficient co-trafficking of Wtf[poison]/

Wtf[antidote] protein assemblies requires a particular conformation or strong affinity between the

interacting proteins not replicated in the ineffective Wtf[poison]/Wtf[antidote] combinations mentioned

above.

Moreover, our experiments surprisingly revealed that trafficking toxic Wtf assemblies to the

proper destination may not always be sufficient to ensure their neutralization. In previous work

using a different induction system than that employed here, we found that much of the trafficked

Wtf4[poison]/Wtf4[antidote] assemblies accumulated at the insoluble protein deposit (IPOD), in addition

to the vacuole [15] and the cells were viable. Similar, but generally smaller, assemblies can be

seen accumulating outside of the vacuole (likely the IPOD) in many of the viable cells we image

expressing Wtf[antidote] proteins or compatible Wtf[poison]/Wtf[antidote] assemblies using the GAL

induction system employed in this study (e.g., Fig 6E panels expressing Wtf4[antidote] and

Wtf4[antidote]/Wtf4[poison]). Similarly, Zheng et al found that vacuole localization was not essential for

Wtf[poison] neutralization as they observed that trafficking to the endosome can be sufficient [24].

Here, however, we observed that Wtf4[poison]-GBP/Wtf61[antidote]-GFP assemblies (and likely the

Wtf25[poison]-GBP/Wtf1[antidote]-GFP assemblies) were trafficked to the IPOD, but were still toxic (Fig

5 and S8 Fig). Finally, we found that the *wtf4-19* allele encoded a protein that was toxic, despite

its localization to the vacuole (S7 Fig). These results suggest that factors beyond localization,

perhaps assembly conformation, can also affect the toxicity of Wtf proteins.

Commonalities between Wtf proteins and other self-assembling proteins.

The Wtf proteins share broad parallels with other nonhomologous proteins that form

assemblies. For example, a sequence-independent common oligomeric property may underly

the toxicity of unrelated amyloid proteins [49]. While Wtf[poison] proteins are related to each other,

their sequences are extremely diverged. We propose a common feature of their assembled

forms is likely responsible for their shared toxicity. Another feature Wtf proteins share with

several unrelated proteins is the capacity to form functional assemblies. Multiple amyloidogenic

proteins form functional amyloids that perform diverse biological functions, including long term

memory in flies [50], epigenetic inheritance in yeast [51] and biofilm formation in bacteria [52–

54]. Some functionally aggregating amyloids have also shown to be toxic at intermediate stages

of assembly, suggesting that protein toxicity could pose a risk in certain instances [55]. The co-

expression of Wtf[antidote] with the toxic Wtf[poison] results in a change in its localization and the

assembly properties of the Wtf[poison]-Wtf[antidote] complex. This suggests that protein-protein

interaction within a pair of corresponding Wtf proteins is similar to functional aggregation. While

the outcome of functional Wtf protein assembly is different (i.e., successful drive), the delicate

interplay between toxic and non-toxic protein assemblies is similar to functionally aggregating

amyloids.

The use of E3 ubiquitin ligases to direct protein trafficking is an additional theme Wtf proteins

share with other self-assembling proteins acting in diverse cell signaling processes, including

immune response [56,57], prion disease [58] and other neurodegenerative disorders [59–65]. In

multiple cases, ubiquitination of a key protein results in its aggregation, differential trafficking to

specific intracellular locations or degradation, suggesting that this is a common mechanism for

enabling downstream signaling processes. Additionally, a lack of ubiquitination by the ligase

often results in toxic aggregates [58,61,64] or reduced functionality of the key protein [56,57],

which are very reminiscent of the Wtf[poison] + Wtf[antidote] assemblies discussed above.

Rapidly evolving coding sequence repeats can affect Wtf[poison]-Wtf[antidote] compatibility.

Most *S. pombe wtf* genes contain varying copy numbers of a sequence repeat in exon 3 [20].

The potential role of the exon 3 repeats was unclear, but all functionally validated *S. pombe wtf*

drivers contain the exon 3 repeats (S5 Table). One *wtf* gene (*wtf23* from the CBS5557 strain)

that lacks the exon 3 repeats has been tested in *S. pombe* and failed to cause drive in two strain

backgrounds, although it was not determined if the encoded proteins were non-functional or if

the driver was effectively suppressed [20,25]. Previous work also found that a mismatch of

repeat numbers in exon 3 between a Wtf13[poison] (five repeats) and Wtf18-2[antidote] (four repeats)

could still produce a compatible poison + antidote pair. In this work, we found that deleting the

exon 3 repeats in *wtf4* (*wtf4-1* allele) produced a functional, compatible Wtf[poison] and Wtf[antidote]

pair. The Wtf4-1[poison], however, was not neutralized by the wild-type Wtf4[antidote], which has two

repeats (S10 Fig B). This indicates that the exon 3 repeats can affect Wtf[poison] and Wtf[antidote]

compatibility.

Many *S. pombe wtf* genes also contain a sequence repeat in exon 6 [20]. Repeats homologous

to those found in *S. pombe* exon 6 can also be found in the C-termini of many genes in *S.*

octosporus and *S. osmophilus* [19]. All functionally validated drivers contain repeats in *S.*

octosporus, but one functional *S. pombe* driver (*wtf35* from FY29033) lacks the repeats (S5

Table) [19,25]. Previous work demonstrated that a mismatch in the number of exon 6 repeats

could affect Wtf[poison] and Wtf[antidote] compatibility in *S. pombe* Wtf proteins [15,26]. This current

work extends previous work by showing with additional alleles of *wtf4* and novel alleles of *S.*

octosporus wtf25 that copy number mismatches in this region disrupt Wtf[poison] and Wtf[antidote]

compatibility.

Overall, our results support the model that the rapid copy number evolution of the repeats found

in *wtf* genes contributes to rapid innovation of novel Wtf[poison] and Wtf[antidote] pairs [19,20]. These

highly evolvable sequences have likely contributed to the long-term evolutionary success of *wtf*

drivers, as generating novel alleles allows frequent generation of novel drivers likely to be

heterozygous (and thus drive) in crosses. Frequent driver turnover may also complicate the

evolution of drive suppressors that are not other *wtf* genes. Still, this work reveals that these

hypermutable regions come with a burden as they contain the potential to generate self-killing

alleles, which are discussed below.

Wtf fitness landscape likely includes self-killing alleles.

Our analyses of mutations in the repeats found in exon 6 of *S. pombe* genes revealed a novel

self-killing phenotype in which a *wtf* allele can encode a toxic Wtf[poison] that is not effectively

neutralized by its corresponding Wtf[antidote]. Such an allele is expected to lead to a dominant loss

of fertility, analogous to mutations where the antidote protein expression or function is disrupted

[17,22,24]. This phenotype was strongest in mutants that changed the sequence of the repeats

(i.e. *wtf4-4*, *wtf4-5* and *wtf25-2*). These mutations are rather dramatic and have a low probability

of arising spontaneously in nature.

A weaker version of the self-killing phenotype was, however, also observed in mutations that

deleted the repeats. Interestingly, the deleterious effects of removing the exon 6 repeats in *wtf4*

(*wtf4-2* allele) could be suppressed by also deleting the exon 3 repeats (*wtf4-3* allele) (S9 Fig

D). This suppression, in addition to the one functional driver known to lack the exon 6 repeats,

shows that changes in other regions of the protein can compensate for the missing repeats.

Still, the existence of *wtf* genes without the repeats, and extensive gene conversion within the

family, suggests that novel deleterious repeat deletion mutations are likely to arise recurrently in

natural populations [19–21].

We may have also fortuitously sampled one largely self-killing allele from a natural population

that did not have disrupted repeats, suggesting there are multiple paths to generating such

alleles. The *wtf41* gene from *S. octosporus* encodes a toxic Wtf41[poison] that is not efficiently

neutralized by the corresponding Wtf41[antidote] protein (S14 Fig, [19]). All together, we propose

self-killing *wtf* alleles could contribute to recurrent, spontaneous sub-fertility or infertility. We

propose this spontaneous sub-fertility could be a persistent burden on the population fitness of

all *Schizosaccharomyces* species carrying *wtf* drivers.

Rapid evolution and the risk of self-killing alleles.

Beyond *wtf* genes, there are many known killer meiotic drivers [3,5,6,8,9,11]. There are also

likely many more yet to be discovered, given their accelerated pace of discovery in recent years.

Although the genes causing drive in different systems are not homologous, they often share

mechanistic and evolutionary themes [13,14,66]. Those themes include production of

poisons/killer elements and rapid evolution. The *wtf* genes have illustrated that high evolvability,

via nonallelic gene conversion and mutable coding sequence repeats, can facilitate the

evolutionary success of meiotic drivers [19,21,67]. This work has illustrated that rapid evolution

of killer elements also presents the risk of generating self-killing alleles. There is no reason to

suppose such risks would be specific to the *wtf* killers. Instead, we posit that such self-killing

alleles may be a widespread source of recurrent, spontaneous infertility in eukaryotes.

Materials and Methods

Cloning

We confirmed all the vectors described in this study by Sanger sequencing or by Nanopore

sequencing via Plasmidsaurus. Find the specifics for the yeast strains used in this study are

listed in S2 Table, plasmids are in S3 Table and the oligos are in S4 Table.

S. cerevisiae **vectors:**

Generation of a Gal-inducible GFP vector to tag alleles: We amplified GFP-ADH1 terminator

from a previously published plasmid, pSZB464 [15] with oligos 3744+3743. We digested this

product with SacI and SpeI and cloned it into pDK20 [68] to generate pSZB1528. We then

isolated the Gal promoter-GFP-ADH1T after digestion with SacI and KpnI, and cloned it into a

SacI-KpnI digested pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1540.

Generation of a Gal-inducible mCherry vector to tag alleles: We amplified mCherry-ADH1

terminator from pFA6a-mCherry-kanMX6 [70] with oligos 3745+3743. We digested this product

with SacI and SpeI and cloned it into pDK20 [68] to generate pSZB1526. We then isolated the

Gal promoter-mCherry-ADH1T after digestion with SacI and KpnI, and cloned it into a SacI-KpnI

digested pRS314 [69] to generate pSZB1537.

Generation of a Gal-inducible mEos3.1 vector to tag alleles: We digested V08 [30] with SacI and

KpnI to release the fragment with Gal promoter- 4x(EAAAR) linker-mEos3.1. We then cloned

this into SacI-KpnI digested pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1460.

Generation of a monomer mEos3.1 in an ARS/CEN plasmid: We cut out Gal-monomer

mEos3.1-cyc1T from RHX0935 [30] with SacI and KpnI, and cloned into SacI, KpnI cut pRS316

[69] to generate pSZB1514.

Generation of Gal-inducible wtf alleles:

S. kambucha wtf4 exon 1: The gene consisting of 136 base pairs that makes up exon 1 of *S.*

kambucha wtf4 was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate pSZB1552.

S. kambucha wtf4-1: We deleted 66 base pairs (bases 313-378 of poison coding sequence) that

make up the exon 3 coding sequence repeats in *S. kambucha wtf4poison* and cloned it into

pSZB1460 to generate pSZB1565. We repeated the same deletion in *S. kambucha wtf4antidote*

(bases 439-504 of antidote coding sequence) and this construct was synthesized and cloned it

into pSZB1537 by IDT to generate pSZB1736.

S. kambucha wtf4-2: We deleted 30 base pairs (bases 802-831 of poison coding sequence) that

make up the exon 6 repeats in *S. kambucha wtf4* and this construct was synthesized and

cloned it into pSZB1460 to generate pSZB1566 by IDT. To construct the mutant antidote, we

deleted bases 928-957 of the antidote coding sequence and this construct was synthesized and

cloned it into pSZB1537 by IDT generate pSZB1737.

S. kambucha wtf4-3: We deleted 66 base pairs (bases 313-378 of poison coding sequence) and

30 base pairs (bases 802-831 of poison coding sequence) to delete both the exon 3 and 6

coding sequence repeats in *S. kambucha wtf4.* This construct was then synthesized and cloned

into pSZB1460 to generate pSZB1670. To construct the mutant antidote, we deleted 66 base

pairs (bases 439-504 of antidote coding sequence) and 33 base pairs (bases 928-957 of

antidote coding sequence) and this construct was synthesized and cloned it into pSZB1537 by

IDT generate pSZB1738.

S. kambucha wtf4-4: We randomly scrambled the 10 amino acids that make up the exon 6

coding sequence repeats in *S. kambucha wtf4poison*, and then reordered the codons to match the

amino acids. We then replaced the wild-type 30 base pairs with the scrambled 30 base pairs

(TTTGGGAGAGCGAGAGGGATAGGTAATATA) and this construct was synthesized and

cloned into pSZB1460 to generate pSZB1742. To construct the mutant antidote, we replaced

the exon 6 coding sequence repeats with the same scrambled 30 base pairs, and this construct

was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1537 by IDT to generate pSZB1740.

S. kambucha wtf4-5: We replaced the 30 base pairs that make up the exon 6 coding sequence

repeats with alanine codons (GCAGCGGCTGCCGCTGCAGCTGCCGCAGCG) in *S. kambucha*

wtf4poison and this construct was synthesized and was cloned into pSZB1460 to generate

pSZB1743. To construct the mutant antidote, we replaced the exon 6 coding sequence repeats

with the same alanine codons, and this construct was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1537

by IDT to generate pSZB1741.

S. kambucha wtf4-6: We inserted exon 1 in between exons 3 and 4 of *S. kambucha wtf4poison*

and this construct was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate pSZB1616.

To maintain the in-frame codons, we inserted exon 1 at 541 base pairs of the poison coding

sequence, which is one base pair before exon 3 ends.

S. kambucha wtf4-19: We mutated the two PY motifs within exon 1 in *S. kambucha wtf4-6* to PA

(637-670 base pairs mutated from TAC to GCC; 670-673 base pairs mutated from TAC to GCC)

and this construct was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate pSZB1922.

S. kambucha wtf4-7: We inserted exon 1 before the stop codon of *S. kambucha wtf4poison* coding

sequence and this construct was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate

pSZB1555.

S. kambucha wtf4-8: We used TMHMM2.0 [71,72] to predict transmembrane topology (see S6

Table for a detailed description). With these predictions as guidance, we deleted the first

predicted transmembrane domain (bases 121-186 of poison coding sequence) from in *S.*

kambucha wtf4poison and this construct was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to

generate pSZB1561.

S. kambucha wtf4-9: We deleted the second predicted transmembrane domain (bases 232-291

of poison coding sequence) of *S. kambucha wtf4poison* coding sequence and this construct was

synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate pSZB1562.

S. kambucha wtf4-10: We deleted the sixth predicted transmembrane domain (bases 580-648

of poison coding sequence) of *S. kambucha wtf4poison* coding sequence and this construct was

synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate pSZB1563.

S. kambucha wtf4-11: We deleted exon 2 (bases 11-283) of *S. kambucha wtf4^{poison}* coding

sequence and this construct was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate

pSZB1556.

S. kambucha wtf4-12: We deleted exon 3 (bases 284-541) of *S. kambucha wtf4^{poison}* coding

sequence and this construct was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate

pSZB1557.

S. kambucha wtf4-13: We deleted exon 4 (bases 542-733) of *S. kambucha wtf4^{poison}* coding

sequence and this construct was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate

pSZB1558.

S. kambucha wtf4-14: We deleted exon 5 (bases 734-796) of *S. kambucha wtf4^{poison}* coding

sequence and this construct was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate

pSZB1559.

S. kambucha wtf4-15: We deleted exon 6 (bases 797-885) of *S. kambucha wtf4^{poison}* coding

sequence and this construct was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate

pSZB1560. To construct the mutant antidote, we deleted exon 6 and this construct was

synthesized and cloned into pSZB1537 by IDT to generate pSZB1899.

S. kambucha wtf4-16: From previous analysis of *S. pombe wtf* genes, a conserved region within

exon 3 was identified [20]. This conserved region within exon 3 was 29 base pairs long (bases

284-312) in *S. kambucha wtf4^{poison}* coding sequence. To maintain in-frame codons, we included

one base pair upstream the conserved region, and made a 30 base pairs deletion (bases 283-

312) in *S. kambucha wtf4^{poison}* coding sequence and this construct was synthesized and cloned

into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate pSZB1617.

S. kambucha wtf4-17^{poison}-mEos: We amplified a 10 amino acid truncated poison from pSZB464

[15] with oligos 3183+3186 and cloned this into V08 [30] via Golden Gate assembly (New

England Biolabs) to generate pSZB1402. We digested this with SacI and KpnI and cloned the

insert into SacI, KpnI digested pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1505.

S. kambucha wtf4-17^antidote-mCherry: We amplified 10 amino acid truncated antidote from

pSZB708 [15] with oligos 1402+3138, and mCherry-cyc1T from pSZB708 [15] with oligos

3139+2170. We then stitched these pieces with oligos 1402+2170. We cut this fragment with

XhoI, BamHI and cloned this into XhoI, BamHI cut pDK20 [68] to generate pSZB1416. We cut

this plasmid with KpnI and XhoI and cloned the insert into KpnI, XhoI cut pRS314 [69] to

generate pSZB1550.

S. kambucha wtf4-18^poison-mEos: We amplified 20 amino acid truncated poison from pSZB464

[15] with oligos 3183+3282 and cloned this into V08 [30][30] via Golden Gate assembly (New

England Biolabs) to generate pSZB1444. We digested this with SacI and KpnI and cloned the

insert into SacI, KpnI digested pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1507.

S. kambucha wtf4-18^antidote-mCherry: We amplified 20 amino acid truncated antidote from

pSZB708 [15] with oligos 1402+3829. We digested this fragment with XhoI and BamHI and

cloned the insert into XhoI, BamHI cut pSZB1537 to generate pSZB1567.

S. kambucha wtf4^poison-mCherry: We amplified *S. kambucha wtf4^poison-mCherry-cyc1T* from

pSZB708 [15] with oligos 2625+964. This product was cut with BamHI and XhoI and cloned into

BamHI, XhoI cut pDK20 [68] to generate pSZB1374. We cut this plasmid with KpnI and XhoI

and cloned the insert into KpnI, XhoI cut pRS314 [69] to generate pSZB1381.

S. kambucha wtf4^poison-mEos: We digested RHX1389 [15] with KpnI, SacI and ligated the insert

with KpnI, SacI cut pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1455. This plasmid had the start site of the

poison mutated to TAG, which was then corrected to ATG by GenScript to generate pSZB1476.

S. kambucha wtf4^poison-GBP-mCherry: We added the GFP-binding protein sequence from

Addgene plasmid #89068 [73] at the end of *S. kambucha wtf4^poison* and this construct was

synthesized and cloned into pSZB1537 by IDT to generate pSZB1748.

S. kambucha wtf4-20^poison-mEos: We added the mutated N-terminal domain (D40K, K65D) from

the flagelliform spidroin 1A variant 1 from *Trichonephila clavipes*, NT* [33,34], followed by a

TEV cleavage site (ENLYFQS) [74] at the N-terminus of *S. kambucha wtf4^poison* coding

sequence, which was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate pSZB1900.

S. kambucha wtf4-21^poison^-mEos: We added the *S. cerevisiae* codon-optimized *E. coli* Maltose

Binding Protein (MBP) coding sequence [75,76] followed by a 4X(GGGS)-GG linker to the N-

terminus of *S. kambucha wtf4^poison^* coding sequence, which was synthesized and cloned into

pSZB1460 by IDT to generate pSZB1949.

S. kambucha wtf4^antidote^-GFP: We ordered *S. kambucha wtf4^antidote^* which was synthesized and

cloned into pSZB1540 by IDT to generate pSZB1874.

S. kambucha wtf4^antidote^-mCherry: We amplified *S. kambucha wtf4^antidote^-mCherry-cyc1T* from

pSZB1005 [15] with oligos 1402+2170. This product was digested with BamHI and XhoI and

cloned into BamHI, XhoI cut pDK20 [68] to generate pSZB1699. This plasmid was digested with

KpnI, XhoI and ligated with KpnI, XhoI cut pRS314 [69] to generate pSZB1774.

S. kambucha wtf4^antidote^-mEos: We digested pSZB1120 (7) with KpnI, SacI and ligated the insert

into KpnI, SacI cut pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1453. This plasmid had the start site of the

antidote mutated to TAG, which was then corrected to ATG by GenScript to generate

pSZB1477.

S. octosporus wtf25^poison^-mEos: We amplified *S. octosporus wtf25^poison^* from pSZB1353 [19] with

oligos 3841+3840 and cloned this into V08 [30] via Golden Gate assembly (New England

Biolabs) to generate pSZB1548. We digested this with SacI and KpnI and cloned the insert into

SacI, KpnI digested pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1585.

S. octosporus wtf25^poison^-mCherry: We ordered *S. octosporus wtf25^poison^* coding sequence was

synthesized and cloned into pSZB1537 by IDT to generate pSZB1807.

S. octosporus wtf25^poison^-GBP-mCherry: We added the GFP-binding protein sequence from

Addgene plasmid #89068 [73] at the end of *S. octosporus wtf25^poison^* coding sequence and this

construct was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1537 by IDT to generate pSZB1868.

S. octosporus wtf25^antidote^-mCherry: We ordered *S. octosporus wtf25^antidote^* coding sequence was

synthesized and cloned into pSZB1537 by IDT to generate pSZB1746.

S. octosporus wtf25^{antidote}*-mEos:* We ordered *S. octosporus wtf25*^{antidote} coding sequence was

synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate pSZB1806.

S. octosporus wtf25^{antidote}*-mEos in pRS314*: We amplified *S. octosporus wtf25*^{antidote} from

pSZB1347 [19] with oligos 3839+3840. This insert was cloned into V08 [30] via Golden Gate

cloning (New England Biolabs) to generate pSZB1593. We digested this with KpnI, SacI and

cloned the insert into pRS314 [69] to generate pSZB1598.

S. octosporus wtf25^{antidote}*-GFP:* We ordered *S. octosporus wtf25*^{antidote} coding sequence was

synthesized and cloned into pSZB1540 by IDT to generate pSZB1869.

S. octosporus wtf25-1: We deleted 30 base pairs (bases 505-534) that make up the exon 4

repeats in *S. octosporus wtf25*^{poison} and was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to

generate pSZB1687. To construct the mutant antidote, we deleted bases 640-669 of the

antidote coding sequence and this construct was synthesized and cloned it into pSZB1540 by

IDT generate pSZB1739.

S. octosporus wtf25-2: To swap the coding sequence repeats between *S. kambucha wtf4* exon

6 and *S. octosporus wtf25* exon 4, we replaced the 30 base pairs from *wtf25*

(ATAGGAAACGGTGCACGGCATAGGAAAT) with 30 base pairs from *wtf4*

(ATAGGGAATATAGGGAGAGCGTTTAGAGGT) in *S. octosporus wtf25*. The mutant poison

was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1537 by IDT to generate pSZB1732. The mutant antidote

was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate pSZB1731.

S. octosporus wtf25-3^{poison}*-mEos:* We amplified a 10 amino acid C-terminal truncated *wtf25*^{poison}

from pSZB1353 [19] with oligos 4173+4174 and cloned this into V08 [30] via Golden Gate

assembly (New England Biolabs) to generate pSZB1675. We then cut out the tagged poison

with SacI and KpnI, and ligated it with cut pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1694.

S. octosporus wtf25-4^{poison}*:* We added the mutated N-terminal domain (D40K, K65D) from the

flagelliform spidroin 1A variant 1 from *Trichonephila clavipes*, NT* [33,34], followed by a TEV

cleavage site (ENLYFQS) [74] at the N-terminus of *S. octosporus wtf25*^{poison} coding sequence,

which was synthesized and cloned into pSZB1460 by IDT to generate pSZB1927.

S. octosporus wtf25-5poison-mEos: We added the *S. cerevisiae* codon-optimized *E. coli* Maltose

Binding Protein (MBP) coding sequence [75,76] followed by a 4X(GGGS)-GG linker to the N-

terminus of *S. octosporus wtf25poison* coding sequence, which was synthesized and cloned into

pSZB1460 by IDT to generate pSZB1950.

S. octosporus wtf61poison-mEos: We amplified *S. osmophilus wtf61poison* from pSZB1040 [19] with

oligos 3837+3838 and cloned this into V08 [30] via Golden Gate assembly (New England

Biolabs) to generate pSZB1569. We digested this with SacI and KpnI and cloned the insert into

SacI, KpnI digested pRS314 [69] to generate pSZB1583.

S. octosporus wtf61poison-mCherry: We amplified *S. osmophilus wtf61poison* from pSZB1040 [19]

with oligos 4193+4194. We digested this product with XhoI, BamHI and cloned this into XhoI,

BamHI cut pSZB1537 to generate pSZB1706.

S. octosporus wtf61antidote-GFP: We amplified *S. osmophilus wtf61antidote* from pSZB1095 [19] with

oligos 4192+4194. We digested this product with XhoI, BamHI and cloned this into with XhoI,

BamHI cut pSZB1540 to generate pSZB1708.

S. octosporus wtf61antidote-mEos: We amplified *S. osmophilus wtf61antidote* from pSZB1095 [19]

with oligos 3836+3837 and cloned into V08 [30] via Golden Gate assembly (New England

Biolabs) to generate pSZB1645. We then digested pSZB1645 with KpnI and SacI and ligated it

with KpnI, BamHI cut pRS314 to generate pSZB1647.

S. cryophilus wtf1poison-mEos: We amplified *S. cryophilus wtf1poison* from pSZB1122 [19] with

oligos 3844+3843 and cloned this into V08 [30] via Golden Gate assembly (New England

Biolabs) to generate pSZB1544. We digested this with SacI and KpnI and cloned the insert into

SacI, KpnI digested pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1575.

S. cryophilus wtf1poison-mCherry: We ordered *S. cryophilus wtf1poison* which was synthesized and

cloned into pSZB1537 by IDT to generate pSZB1870.

S. cryophilus wtf1antidote-mEos: We amplified *S. cryophilus wtf1antidote* from pSZB1192 [19] with

oligos 3843+3842 and cloned this into V08 [30] via Golden Gate assembly (New England

Biolabs) to generate pSZB1605. We digested this with SacI and KpnI and cloned the insert into

SacI, KpnI digested pRS314 [69] to generate pSZB1612.

S. cryophilus wtf1antidote-GFP: We ordered *S. cryophilus wtf1antidote* which was synthesized and

cloned into pSZB1540 by IDT to generate pSZB1871.

S. cryophilus wtf1-1poison: We amplified a 10 amino acid C-terminal truncated *wtf1poison* from

pSZB1122 [19] and oligos 4177+4178 and cloned this into V08 [30] via Golden Gate assembly

(New England Biolabs) to generate pSZB1673. We then cut out the tagged poison with SacI,

KpnI and cloned into cut pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1692.

S. osmophilus wtf41poison-mEos: We cloned *S. osmophilus wtf41poison* from pSZB1327 [19] with

oligos 3361+3362 and cloned this into V08 [30] via Golden Gate assembly (New England

Biolabs) to generate pSZB1533. We then cut out the tagged poison with SacI, KpnI and cloned

into cut pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1581.

S. osmophilus wtf41-1poison-mEos: We cloned C-terminus 10 amino acid truncated *S.*

osmophilus wtf41poison from pSZB1325 [19] with oligos 4175+4176 and cloned this into V08 [30]

via Golden Gate assembly (New England Biolabs) to generate pSZB1676. We then cut out the

tagged poison with SacI, KpnI and cloned into cut pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1696.

S. osmophilus wtf41antidote-mEos: We amplified *S. osmophilus wtf41antidote* from pSZB1325 [19]

with oligos 3832+3362 and cloned this into V08 [30] via Golden Gate assembly (New England

Biolabs) to generate pSZB1599. We then cut out the tagged poison with SacI, KpnI and cloned

into cut pRS314 [69] to generate pSZB1607.

S. osmophilus wtf19poison-mEos: We amplified *S. osmophilus wtf19poison* from pSZB1324 [19] with

oligos 3835+3834 and cloned this into V08 [30] via Golden Gate assembly (New England

Biolabs) to generate pSZB1546. We then cut out the tagged poison with SacI, KpnI and cloned

into cut pRS316 [69] to generate pSZB1579.

Strain construction

S. cerevisiae strains with Galactose and β-estradiol inducible systems:

We used the previously published strain, SZY1637 [15] and an independently constructed

isolate of SZY1637, SZY1639 or SZY5807, to construct the strains in this study by transforming

in the appropriate vectors. These strains have the lexA-ER-haB42 transcription factor integrated

at *HIS3* [77]. In general, we used a protocol, modified from [78], to transform the vectors into

these strains. Briefly, we incubated a mixture of 266μL of PLATE solution, 50μL of boiled

salmon sperm DNA, 30μL of water, 1-4μL of vector DNA and a match-head sized amount of

yeast at 30°C overnight and plated on selective media on the following day to select for

transformants. We used Synthetic Complete (SC) media (Yeast Nitrogen Base from VWR

#291940 and SC Supplement mix from SunSci) with the appropriate dropouts of the selective

components to maintain vectors in the strains as in [15]. In some cases, transformants did not

express the construct when induced. To ensure proper testing of genotypes, we screened

multiple transformants via cytometry or microscopy to ensure that strains express the

fluorescently tagged construct(s).

Construction of S. cerevisiae strain with mEosNB-FTH1:

We mated RHY3171 (Kimbrough et al, forthcoming) to BY4741 [79] to obtain progeny that did

not have the *pGal-WHI5::hphMX* construct, which resulted in the generation of SZY6594. This

strain had the *hoΔ::natMX::tTa{Off}tet07^mEosNB-(G4s)3-FTH1* construct, and did not undergo

cell cycle arrest when induced with Galactose.

Spot assays

For spot assays, we first grew the strains for each experiment in the appropriate SC dropout

media overnight at 30°C. The next day, we measured the OD600 of each strain, and normalized

the OD of all the strains to an OD of ~1. We then serially diluted these normalized cultures 10-

fold (up to the dilution of 10^{-5}) in water and plated 5μL of each dilution on both SC dropout

media and SC Galactose dropout media. We imaged the plates post 72h of growth at 30°C,

except in the case of Fig 4B and S4 Fig B C, where plates were grown for an additional day at

30°C to clearly visualize differences in poison toxicity.

For the spot assays presented in Fig 3D, we first grew the strains in 5mL SC-URA (uracil) media

overnight at 30°C. The next day, we pelleted overnight cultures and resuspended in 1mL of

sterile water. We then used 100μL of this as the first in the dilution series. This was diluted 5-

fold, up to eleven dilutions in order to observe the toxicity/suppression clearly. We plated 5μL of

each dilution on SC-URA media, SC Galactose-URA media and SC Galactose-URA media with

40mg/L Doxycycline (Calbiochem #324385). We imaged the plates post 72h of growth at 30°C.

For the spot assays presented in S5 Fig B, we first grew the strains in 5mL SC-TRP-URA media

overnight at 30°C. The next day, we pelleted overnight cultures and resuspended in 1mL of

sterile water. We then used 100μL of this as the first in the dilution series. This was diluted 5-

fold, up to 11 dilutions in order to observe the toxicity/suppression clearly. We plated 5μL of

each dilution on SC-TRP-URA media and SC Galactose-TRP-URA media. We imaged the

plates post 72h of growth at 30°C.

Microscopy

The appropriate strains for each experiment were first grown in 5mL of the appropriate SC

dropout media overnight at 30°C. The next day, we inoculated 3mL of SC Raffinose dropout

media with 1mL of the saturated overnight cultures and let them grow overnight at 30°C. On the

following day, we pelleted the cultures and resuspended the cells in 3mL SC Galactose dropout

media and incubated at 30°C. Cells were induced for 4-6 hours on SC Galactose dropout

media, and then imaged on a Zeiss LSM 980 confocal microscope which consisted of an Axio

Observer Z1 base, through a 40x C-Apochromat (NA = 1.2) water immersion objective. The

GFP and mCherry tagged proteins were excited at 488 and 561 nm, respectively. Emission was

collected in channel mode onto a GaAsP detector in photon counting mode through a 491-544

nm bandpass for GFP and a 570-632 nm bandpass for mCherry. Transmitted light was also

collected. Image fields of view were zoomed optically to a ~26 μm square with 512 pixels in

each dimension.

1005

For imaging cells expressing *S. octosporus* Wtf61[antidote]-GFP, *S. kambucha* Wtf4[poison]-GBP-mCh

and Rnq1-mCardinal, we first grew cells in SC-Trp-Ura-Leu media. The next day, we inoculated

3mL of SC Raffinose-Trp-Ura-Leu media with 1mL of the saturated overnight cultures and let

them grow overnight at 30°C. The following day, we pelleted the cultures and resuspended the

cells in 3mL SC Galactose-Trp-Ura-Leu + 500nM β-estradiol (VWR, # #AAAL03801-03) media

and incubated at 30°C. Cells were induced for 4 hours and then imaged as described above,

except that we also excited mCardinal tagged proteins at 640nm and collected the emission on

channel mode onto a 650-700 nm bandpass detector of the Zeiss LSM 980 confocal microscope.

1014

1015   **Spectral unmixing for mEosNB-FTH1 strains**

1016

For imaging the mEosNB-FTH1 strains, we first grew the strains in 5mL SC-URA+40mg/L

Doxycycline. The next day, we inoculated 3mL of both SC Raffinose-URA and SC Raffinose-

URA+40mg/L Doxycycline media with 1mL of the saturated overnight cultures and let them

grow overnight at 30°C. The following day, we pelleted the cultures and resuspended the cells

in 3mL of both SC Galactose-URA and SC Galactose-URA+40mg/L Doxycycline and incubated

at 30°C. The rest of the methodology was as described in the section above.

1023

The background fluorescence for strains constructed with SZY6594 had high autofluorescence

in the GFP channel. To distinguish autofluorescence from true mEos signal, we spectrally

unmixed the images. First, we captured spectral images with the lambda mode on the dectector

of the Zeiss LSM 980 confocal microscope (same settings as above), exciting the cells at 488

nm and collecting emission over the entire visual spectrum, We then made reference spectra for

mEos and autofluorescence from control cells, and then spectrally unmixed images using an in-

house written plugin on ImageJ (https://research.stowers.org/imagejplugins/). The data

presented in Figure 3C has transmitted light images collected on the channel mode with GFP

excitation, and the spectrally unmixed images collected on lambda mode.

1033

1034   **Image analysis to quantify colocalization of mEos and mCherry signals in tagged**

1035   **constructs**

1036

Cell regions of interest (ROIs) were found based on the transmitted light only using Cellpose

(https://www.cellpose.org/) in Python using the "cyto" model and a diameter of 200. Pixels from

these ROIs were then background subtracted using an average background signal from an ROI

placed away from any cell. The Scipy Pearson Correlation for each cell ROI was then calculated

for all pixels in each cell. Dead cells and aberrant ROIs were hand filtered out using Fiji

(https://fiji.sc/). Find the raw data for these analyses in S1 Data.

1043

DAmFRET

We performed the analysis similar to the methods in [15], with a few exceptions. We grew the strains in the same method described for microscopy, however, we induced the cells for 5-6 hours. We then photoconverted the cells post induction for 5 minutes, using the OmniCure S2000 Elite UV lamp for photoconversion. The total power over 5 minutes of exposure amounts to 12.048 J/cm^2. The sample collection and data analysis were similar to methods described in [15] with a few exceptions. We included an empty vector strain in each experiment to effectively exclude auto fluorescent cell populations. All the cells for each experiment were induced at the same time, for the same amount of time, and were grown in the same 96-well plate. Three technical replicates were included for each sample.

There was only one fluorescent population that was independent of expression level for each construct analyzed. In order to clearly visualize AmFRET values across the cells expressing different constructs, we analyzed cells above a certain Acceptor fluorescence intensity threshold set for each experiment. For each set of experimental data, the median of the poison AmFRET values was calculated. The difference of this median value from 1 was then added to all the datasets within an experiment. For visualizing the results of the DAmFRET experiments, plots of AmFRET values were generated using GraphPad Prism 10 (Version 10.2.3 (347)).

Statistical analysis for the DAmFRET experiments involved pooling the technical replicates and performing pairwise t-tests comparing these values to either the wild-type Wtf4^{poison}-mEos dataset, or the monomer dataset. For each DAmFRET experiment, we then did a multiple sampling correction (Bonferroni correction) by dividing the p value cutoff (0.05) by the number of tests performed. Find the raw data and statistical analysis for each DAmFRET experiment in S2 Data.

We used GraphPad Prism 10 (Version 10.2.3 (347)) to visualize acceptor fluorescence intensity values of live cells expressing the relevant Wtf^{poison} constructs. Three technical replicates of each isolate were plotted, with the median included. Find the raw data for this analysis in S2 Data.

Figure legends

Figure 1. Features of *wtf4* and mutant alleles.

A. A cartoon of *S. kambucha wtf4* coding sequence (CDS). Wtf4[antidote] coding sequence is

shown in magenta, which includes exons 1-6. The Wtf4[poison] coding sequence is shown in cyan,

which includes 21 base pairs from intron 1 (in grey), and exons 2-6. **B.** Features of Wtf4[antidote]

and Wtf4[poison] proteins. Row 1 shows predicted secondary structure domains and functional

motifs, including PY motifs (in mustard) and predicted transmembrane domains (in red). Row 2

shows the coding sequence repeats in exon 3 and exon 6. Row 3 highlights a well-conserved

region 9 amino acids long. Row 4 is the normalized hydrophobicity of the Wtf4 proteins from

ProtScale, with the Kyle and Doolittle Hydropathy scale [80]. The higher the number on the

scale, the higher the hydrophobicity of the amino acid. See S5 and S6 Tables for detailed

descriptions. **C.** Percentage amino acid identity of Wtf[antidotes] from 33 *wtf* driver genes from four

isolates of *S. pombe* [20]. The antidote sequences were aligned using Geneious Prime

(2023.0.4) and the percentage amino acid identity is depicted as a heatmap, with yellow being

100% identity. *S. kambucha wtf4* CDS is shown below for comparison, with the exons labeled

corresponding to the consensus. Labeled areas within exons 3 and 6, where identity is low,

represent the expansion and contraction of the coding sequence repeats of different *wtf* genes.

D. Cartoon of *wtf4* mutants constructed in this study. Each mutant category was constructed

based on a specific feature mentioned above. The categories are depicted with a wild type *wtf4*

allele at the top. Each mutant allele is represented by *wtf-'x,'* where 'x' is the mutant allele

number. See S1 Table for a comprehensive overview of the alleles and their phenotypes.

1098

Figure 2. Extremely diverged toxic Wtf[poison] proteins exhibit similar self-assembly and

intracellular localization.

A. Cartoon illustrating the Distributed Amphifluoric FRET (DAmFRET) assay (modified from

[30]). AmFRET values for individual cells were calculated by dividing the acceptor fluorescence

by the FRET fluorescence, both measured via cytometry. **B.** Combined AmFRET values for

three technical replicates of the specified Wtf[poison]-mEos proteins and monomer-mEos (negative

control). X^P represents the WtfX poison proteins tested here. The median is indicated with a

solid line and the bars represent the interquartile range. For easier comparison, the values were

normalized so that Wtf4[poison] had a median of 1 in each experiment. Statistical significance: ns

$p>0.01$, *$p<0.01$; t-tests with Bonferroni correction. See S2 Data for p-values. **C.** A spot assay of

cells serially diluted and plated on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-Ura plates. Each strain carries

an empty [*TRP1*] plasmid, and either an empty [*URA3*] plasmid (EV) or the indicated *wtf[poison]*-

mEos allele under the control of a galactose-inducible promoter. The plates were grown at 30°C

for 3 days. **D.** Representative images of the same strains depicted in C were induced in

galactose media for 4 hours at 30°C to express the indicated mEos-tagged proteins. The images

are not at the same brightness and contrast settings to clearly show localization of tagged

proteins. TL is transmitted light, and the scale bar is 4 µm.

1116

Figure 3. Increasing poison assembly with tags suppresses Wtf^{poison} toxicity.

A. A cartoon of the constructs used in this experiment (C-D). The mEosNB-FTH1 construct was

integrated into the genome and is under the control of a doxycycline-repressible promoter.

mEosNB is a nanobody that binds mEos. The *wtf^{poison}* alleles are carried on a [*URA3*] plasmid

and are under the control of a galactose-inducible promoter. **B.** Cartoon of the constructs

expressed on each medium used: SC-Ura, SC Galactose-Ura + 40 mg/L doxycycline, and SC

Galactose-Ura. FTH1 is a 24-mer, but is depicted as an 8-mer core. **C.** Representative images

of cells induced with galactose media (with or without 40mg/L Doxycycline) for 4 hours at 30°C

to express the indicated Wtf^{poison}mEos proteins. The cells induced without Doxycycline (-Dox)

also express mEosNB-FTH1. This strain background exhibits high autofluorescence, so we

spectrally unmixed the signal to remove autofluorescence (See Methods). The images are not

at the same brightness and contrast settings to clearly show localization of tagged proteins. TL

is transmitted light, and the scale bar is 4 µm. **D.** A spot assay of cells carrying the constructs

illustrated in A-C serially diluted on SC-Ura, SC Galactose-Ura + 40mg/L Doxycycline and SC

Galactose-Ura plates and grown at 30°C for 3 days. Each strain carries either an empty [*URA3*]

plasmid (EV) or the indicated *wtf^{poison}-mEos* allele. These media induce the expression of

mEosNB-FTH1 (i), the indicated Wtf^{poison}-mEos protein (ii), or both (iii), respectively. The

horizontal break in the image of each plate is due to rearrangements of the images to facilitate

easy comparison. All strains within a panel were grown on the same plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-

Ura or SC Gal-Trp-Ura or SC Gal-Trp-Ura + 40mg/L Doxycycline plate).

1137

Figure 4. Reducing Wtf4^{poison} assembly with NT* tag increases toxicity and affects its

rescue by Wtf4^{antidote}.

A. Cartoon of alleles used in this experiment (B-F). The NT* tag has a general anti-aggregation

property [33]. **B.** A spot assay of cells serially diluted and plated on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-

Trp-Ura plates and grown at 30°C for 4 days. Each strain carries both a [*URA3*] and a [*TRP1*]

plasmid. The plasmids are either empty (EV) or carry the indicated *wtf4* alleles under the control

of galactose-inducible promoters. The horizontal break in the image for each plate is due to a

rearrangement of the image to facilitate easy comparison. All strains were grown on the same

plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-Ura or SC Gal-Trp-Ura plate). **C.** AmFRET values for three technical

replicates of the specified Wtf4^{poison}-mEos alleles and monomer-mEos (negative control). The

median is indicated with a solid line and the bars represent the interquartile range. For easier

comparison, the values were normalized so that Wtf4^{poison} had a median of 1 in each

experiment. Since Wtf4-20^{poison}-mEos cells were very low in number, we pooled two biological

replicates (n=6 technical replicates). Statistical significance: ns p>0.025, *p<0.025, t-tests with

Bonferroni correction. Find the p-values in S2 Data. **D.** A spot assay of cells serially diluted and

plated on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-Ura plates and grown at 30°C for 3 days. Each strain

carries both a [*URA3*] and a [*TRP1*] plasmid. The plasmids are either empty (EV) or carry the

indicated *wtf4* alleles under the control of galactose-inducible promoters. The horizontal break in

the image for each plate is due to a rearrangement of the image to facilitate easy comparison.

All strains were grown on the same plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-Ura or SC Gal-Trp-Ura plate). **E.**

Representative images of the same strains depicted in D were induced with galactose media for

4 hours at 30°C to express the indicated Wtf4^{poison}-mEos proteins and/or Wtf4^{antidote}-mCherry.

The images are not at the same brightness and contrast settings to clearly show localization of

tagged proteins. 4^{P} indicates Wtf4^{poison}, 4^{A} indicates Wtf4^{antidote}, TL is transmitted light, and the

scale bar is 4 μm. **F**. Pearson's Correlation between mCherry and mEos signal in cells from E

expressing the specified proteins. N>100, *** p<0.001, t-test.

1164

Figure 5. Effective neutralization of Wtf4^{poison} requires more than a physical connection to

a Wtf^{antidote}.

A. Cartoon of constructs used in this experiment. *S. kambucha wtf4^{poison}* was tagged at the C-

terminus with either mCherry or GBP-mCherry (GBP: GFP-binding protein). *S. kambucha*

wtf4^{antidote} was tagged with mEos or GFP. *S. octosporus wtf61^{antidote}* was tagged with GFP. *S.*

octosporus wtf61^{poison} was tagged with mCherry. **B.** Experimental set up and summary of the

results shown in C and D. In a matching Wtf protein pair (top), poison-antidote interaction and

rescue of poison toxicity is observed. In the mismatched pair (bottom), interaction between GFP

and GBP results in a forced interaction between the poison and the antidote (shown in D). This

interaction is insufficient to rescue the mismatched poison (shown in C). **C.** Spot assay of cells

serially diluted and plated on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-Ura plates and grown at 30°C for 3

days. Each strain carries both a [*URA3*] and a [*TRP1*] plasmid. The plasmids are either empty

(EV) or carry the indicated *wtf* alleles under the control of galactose-inducible promoters. The

horizontal break in the image of each plate is due to rearrangements of the images to facilitate

easy comparison. All strains within a panel were grown on the same plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-

Ura or SC Gal-Trp-Ura plate). **D.** Representative images of the same strains shown in C were

induced in galactose for 4 hours at 30°C to express the indicated Wtf proteins. **E.**

Representative images of cells induced with galactose and 500 nM β-estradiol for 4 hours at

30°C to produce the indicated proteins. Rnq1-mCardinal marks the insoluble protein deposit

(IPOD) that is associated with the vacuole [46–48]. In D-E, the images are not at the same

brightness and contrast settings to clearly show localization of tagged proteins. 4^P indicates

Wtf4^{poison}, 4^A indicates Wtf4^{antidote}, 61^P indicates Wtf61^{poison}, 61^A indicates Wtf61^{antidote}, TL is

transmitted light, and the scale bar is 4 μm.

1188

Figure 6. Modification of *wtf4* exon 6 CDS repeats can disrupt antidote rescue.

A. Cartoon of two coding sequence repeat mutants of *S. kambucha wtf4*. **B**. Logo representing

the amino acids encoded by the repeats found in exon 6 of *S. pombe wtf* genes from [20]. **C.**

The amino acids encoded by the exon 6 repeats in *S. kambucha wtf4* and the *wtf4-4* and *wtf4-5*

mutant alleles. **D.** Spot assay of cells serially diluted and plated on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-

Ura plates and grown at 30°C for 3 days. Each strain carries both a [*URA3*] and a [*TRP1*]

plasmid. The plasmids are either empty (EV) or carry the indicated *wtf4* alleles under the control

of galactose-inducible promoters. The horizontal breaks in the image of each plate are due to

rearrangements of the images to facilitate easy comparison. All strains within a panel were

grown on the same plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-Ura or SC Gal-Trp-Ura plate). **E.** Representative

images the same strains depicted in D were induced in galactose for 4 hours at 30°C to express

the indicated Wtf proteins. The images are not at the same brightness and contrast settings to

clearly show localization of tagged proteins. The arrows in the TL panels highlight vacuoles. 4^P

indicates Wtf4^{poison}, 4^A indicates Wtf4^{antidote}, TL indicates transmitted light, and the scale bar is 4

μm. **F**. Pearson's Correlation between mEos and mCherry signal in cells expressing the

specified constructs from E. N>100, n.s. p>0.05, ***p<0.001, t-test.

1205

1206   **Supplemental Information**

1207

S1 Figure. Wtf proteins share limited amino acid identity but have common features

A. A cartoon of *S. octosporus wtf25* coding sequence (CDS). Wtf25^{antidote} coding sequence is

shown in purple, which includes exons 1-5. The Wtf4^{poison} coding sequence is shown in navy,

which begins at the 27th base pair of exon 2 and extends through exon 5. Row 4 depicts the

predicted transmembrane domains (in red) and PY motif (in mustard). Row 5 depicts the CDS

repeats found in exon 4 (in cobalt). Row 6 depicts the normalized hydrophobicity of Wtf25

proteins from ProtScale, with the Kyle and Doolittle Hydropathy scale [80]. The higher the

number on the scale, the higher the hydrophobicity of the amino acid. See S5 and S6 Tables for

more detailed descriptions. **B.** Pairwise amino acid identity of the 6 Wtf[antidote] proteins shown.

The amino acid sequences were aligned using Geneious Prime (2023.0.4), and the percentage

amino acid identity is depicted as a heatmap, with yellow being 100% identity. **C.** Depiction of

CDS repeats and lengths of 6 *wtf[antidote]* CDSs. The CDS repeats found in exon 6 of *S. kambucha*

wtf4 are homologous to those found in exon 4 of the other *wtf* genes [19]. The scale bar

represents 108 base pairs (bp). **D-E.** *S. octosporus wtf25* (**D**), *S. cryophilus wtf1*, and *S.*

osmophilus wtf41 (**E**) mutants constructed in this study. The categories have their respective

wild type allele shown on top. Each mutant allele is represented by *wtf-'x',* where 'x' is the

mutant allele number. See S1 Table for a comprehensive overview of the alleles and their

phenotypes.

1226

S2 Figure. Deletion mutants affect Wtf4[poison] toxicity, self-assembly and localization.

Cartoon of *S. kambucha wtf4* exon deletion mutants (**A**), predicted transmembrane domain

(TMD) deletion mutants (**B**) and a mutant that deletes a 9 amino acid conserved region encoded

in exon 3 (**C**). **D.** A spot assay of cells serially diluted and plated on SC-Ura and SC Gal-Ura

plates and grown at 30°C for 3 days. Each strain carries an empty [*LEU2*] plasmid, and either an

empty [*URA3*] plasmid (EV) or the indicated *wtf4[poison]-mEos* alleles under the control of a

galactose-inducible promoter. The horizontal break in the image for each plate is due to

rearrangement of the image to facilitate easy comparison. All strains were grown on the same

plates (i.e., one SC-Leu-Ura or SC Gal-Leu-Ura plate). **E.** AmFRET values for three technical

replicates of the specified Wtf4[poison]-mEos proteins and monomer-mEos (negative control). The

median is indicated with a solid line and the bars represent the interquartile range. For easier

comparison, the values were normalized so that Wtf4[poison] had a median of 1 in each

experiment. Statistical significance: ns p>0.008, *p<0.008, **p<0.0008, t-tests between the

means of each replicate, with Bonferroni correction. **F.** Representative images of the same

strains depicted in D were induced in galactose media for 4 hours at 30°C to express the

indicated mEos-tagged proteins. The images are not at the same brightness and contrast

settings to clearly show localization of tagged proteins. 4[P] indicates Wtf4[poison], TL is transmitted

light, and the scale bar is 4 μm.

1245

S3 Figure. C-terminal truncations have inconsistent effects on Wtf[poison] protein toxicity.

A. Cartoon of C-terminal truncation mutants of *S. kambucha wtf4*. **B.** Cartoon illustrating the

amino acids lost with the C-terminal truncation alleles of *wtf4*. The amino acids comprising the

exon 6 coding sequence repeats are highlighted in pink. **C.** A spot assay of cells serially diluted

and plated on SC-TRP-URA and SC Gal-TRP-URA plates and grown at 30˚C for 3 days. Each

strain carries both an empty [*TRP1*] plasmid (EV) and a [*URA3*] plasmid that is either empty or

carries the indicated *wtf4^{poison}-mEos* allele under the control of a galactose inducible promoter.

D. AmFRET values for three technical replicates of the specified Wtf4^{poison}-mEos alleles and

monomer-mEos (negative control). The median is indicated with a solid line and the bars

represent the interquartile range. For easier comparison, the values were normalized so that

Wtf4^{poison} had a median of 1 in each experiment. Statistical significance: ns p>0.0125,

*p<0.0125, t-test with Bonferroni correction. Find p-values in S2 Data. **E.** Representative images

of the same strains depicted in C were induced with galactose media for 4 hours at 30˚C to

express the indicated mEos-tagged proteins. The images are not at the same brightness and

contrast settings to clearly show localization of tagged proteins. 4^P indicates Wtf4^{poison}, TL is

transmitted light, and the scale bar is 4 μm. **F.** Cartoons of C-terminal truncation mutants of *S.*

cryophilus wtf1 (*wtf1-1*)*, S. osmophilus wtf41* (*wtf41-1*)*,* and *S. octosporus wtf25* (*wtf25-3*)*.* **G.**

Spot assays of cells serially diluted and plated on SC-URA and SC Gal-URA plates and grown

at 30˚C for 3 days. Each strain carries either an empty [*URA3*] plasmid (EV), or the indicated

wtf^{poison}-mEos allele under the control of a galactose-inducible promoter. The horizontal breaks

in the images for each plate are due to rearrangements of the image to facilitate easy

comparison. All strains were grown on the same plates (i.e., one SC-Ura or SC Gal-Ura plate).

1268

S4 Figure. **Reducing assembly with NT* tag increases Wtf25^{poison} toxicity.**

A. Cartoon of alleles used in this experiment (B-E). The NT* tag has a general anti-aggregation

property [33]. **B-C.** Spot assays of cells serially diluted on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-Ura

plates and grown at 30˚C for 4 days. Each strain carries both a [*URA3*] and a [*TRP1*] plasmid.

The plasmids are either empty (EV) or carry the indicated *wtf25* alleles under the control of

galactose-inducible promoters. In B, the horizontal break in the image of each plate is due to a

rearrangement of the image to facilitate easy comparison. All strains within a panel were grown

on the same plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-Ura or SC Gal-Trp-Ura plate for panel B). **D.**

Representative images of the same strains shown in C were induced with galactose media for 4

hours at 30˚C to express the indicated Wtf25^{poison}-mEos proteins and/or Wtf25^{antidote}-mCherry.

The images are not at the same brightness and contrast settings to clearly show localization of

tagged proteins. 25^P indicates Wtf25^{poison}, 25^A indicates Wtf25^{antidote}, TL is transmitted light, and

the scale bar is 4 µm. **E**. Pearson's Correlation between mCherry and mEos signal in cells from

D expressing the specified proteins. N>100, p>0.05, t-test.

1283

S5 Figure. Reducing Wtf^{poison} assembly with MBP tag affects toxicity.

A. Cartoon of alleles used in this experiment (B-C). MBP is the *E. coli* <u>M</u>altose <u>B</u>inding <u>P</u>rotein

[75]. **B.** Spot assay of cells serially diluted and plated on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-Ura

plates and grown at 30˙C for 4 days. Each strain carries both an empty [*TRP1*] plasmid and a

[*URA3*] plasmid that is either empty (EV) or carries the indicated *wtf^{poison}-mEos* allele under the

control of a galactose-inducible promoter. The horizontal break in the image of each plate is due

to rearrangement of the image to facilitate easy comparison. All strains were grown on the same

plates (i.e., one SC Gal-Trp-Ura plate or SC-Trp-Ura). **C.** Representative images of the same

strains depicted in B induced with galactose media for 4 hours at 30˙C to express the indicated

mEos-tagged proteins. The images are not at the same brightness and contrast settings to

clearly show localization of tagged proteins. 4^P indicates Wtf4^{poison}, 25^P indicates Wtf25^{poison}, TL

is transmitted light, and the scale bar is 4 µm. **D.** AmFRET values for three technical replicates

of the specified Wtf^{poison}-mEos alleles and monomer-mEos (negative control). The median is

indicated with a solid line and the bars represent the interquartile range. For easier comparison,

the values were normalized so that Wtf4^{poison} had a median of 1 in each experiment. Statistical

significance: ns p>0.016, *p<0.016, t-test with Bonferroni correction. Find p-values in S2 Data.

1300

S6 Figure. The fluorescence signal intensity of expressed Wtf^{poison} proteins does not

correlate with toxicity.

A-F Acceptor fluorescence intensity (in arbitrary units, a.u.) of similarly sized live cells across all

Wtf DAmFRET experiments in this study, with the line indicating the median of the population.

Data represented here is from the following experiments: A corresponds to Fig 2B, B

corresponds to S3 Fig E, C corresponds to S4 Fig D, D corresponds to Fig 4C, E corresponds

alleles in S4 Fig, and F corresponds to S5 Fig D respectively. The Y-axis is scaled to a log10

scale. The data are color coded, with toxic poisons in teal, and non-toxic alleles in orange.

1309

S7 Figure. Limited modularity of the Wtf4^{antidote}-specific domain.

A. Cartoon of *wtf4^{antidote}* exon 1 and mutants that relocate, or both relocate and mutate the exon.

Wild-type PY motifs are shown in orange and mutated (PY to PA) motifs are in red. **B.** AmFRET

values for three technical replicates of the specified mEos-tagged proteins and monomer-mEos

(negative control). The median is indicated with a solid line and the bars represent 1.5 times the

interquartile range. For easier comparison, the values were normalized so that Wtf4^{poison} had a

median of 1 in each experiment. Statistical significance: ns p>0.0125, *p<0.0125, t-tests with

Bonferroni correction. Find p-values in S2 Data. **C-E.** Spot assays of cells serially diluted on SC-

Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-Ura plates and grown at 30°C for 3 days. Each strain carries both a

[*URA3*] and a [*TRP1*] plasmid. The plasmids are either empty (EV) or carry the indicated *wtf4*

alleles under the control of galactose-inducible promoters. The horizontal breaks in the images

of each plate in panels C and E are due to rearrangements of the images to facilitate easy

comparison. All strains within a panel were grown on the same plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-Ura or

SC Gal-Trp-Ura plate for panel C). **F.** Representative images of the same strains shown in C

induced with galactose media for 4 hours at 30°C to express the Wtf4^{poison}-mEos, Wtf4 exon1-

mCherry, or both proteins. **G.** Representative images of the same strains shown in D were

induced with galactose media for 4 hours at 30°C to the indicated *wtf4* alleles. **H.** Representative

images of the same strains shown in E induced with galactose media for 4 hours at 30°C to

express the indicated *wtf4* alleles. In F-H, arrows in the transmitted light images indicate

vacuoles. The images are not at the same brightness and contrast settings to clearly show

localization of the tagged proteins. 4^P indicates Wtf4^{poison}, 4^A indicates Wtf4^{antidote}, Ex1 is Wtf4

exon1, TL is transmitted light, and the scale bar is 4 μm.

1332

S8 Figure. Effective neutralization of Wtf25^{poison} requires more than a physical connection

to a Wtf^{antidote}.

A. Cartoon of constructs used in this experiment. *S. octosporus* Wtf25^{poison} was tagged at the C-

terminus with either mCherry or GBP-mCherry (GBP: GFP-binding protein). *S. octosporus*

Wtf25^{antidote} was tagged with mEos or GFP. *S. cryophilus* Wtf1^{antidote} was tagged with GFP. *S.*

cryophilus Wtf1^{poison} was tagged with mCherry. **B.** Experimental set up and summary of the

results shown in C and D. In a matching Wtf protein pair (top), poison-antidote interaction and

rescue of poison toxicity is observed. In the mismatched pair (bottom), interaction between GFP

and GBP results in a forced interaction between the poison and the antidote (shown in D). This

interaction is insufficient to rescue the mismatched poison (shown in C). **C.** Spot assay of cells

serially diluted and plated on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-Ura plates and grown at 30°C for 3

days. Each strain carries both a [*URA3*] and a [*TRP1*] plasmid. The plasmids are either empty

(EV) or carry the indicated *wtf* alleles under the control of galactose-inducible promoters. The

horizontal breaks in the images of each plate are due to rearrangements of the image to

facilitate easy comparison. All strains within a panel were grown on the same plates (i.e., one

SC-Trp-Ura or SC Gal-Trp-Ura plate). **D.** Representative images the strains depicted in C were

induced in galactose for 4 hours at 30°C to express the indicated Wtf proteins. The images are

not at the same brightness and contrast settings to clearly show localization of tagged proteins.

25^P indicates Wtf25^{poison}, 25^A- indicates Wtf25^{antidote}, 1^P indicates Wtf1^{poison}, 1^A indicates

Wtf1^{antidote}, TL indicates transmitted light, and the scale bar is 4 μm.

1353

S9 Figure. *wtf4* coding sequence repeats are dispensable, but can affect antidote rescue.

A. Cartoon of exon 3 and exon 6 coding sequence repeat deletion mutants of *S. kambucha*

wtf4. **B-C.** Logo for amino acids encoded by the repeats found in exon 3 (B) and exon 6 (C) of

S. pombe wtf genes from [20]. The sequence of the amino acids encoded in each repeat region

in *S. kambucha wtf4* is shown below each logo. **D.** Spot assay of cells serially diluted and plated

on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-Ura plates and grown at 30°C for 3 days. Each strain carries

both a [*URA3*] and a [*TRP1*] plasmid. The plasmids are either empty (EV) or carry the indicated

wtf4 alleles under the control of galactose-inducible promoters. The horizontal break in the

image of each plate is due to rearrangements of the images to facilitate easy comparison. All

strains within a panel were grown on the same plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-Ura or SC Gal-Trp-Ura

plate). **E.** Representative images of the same strains as depicted in D were induced in galactose

for 4 hours at 30°C to express the indicated Wtf4 proteins. The images are not at the same

brightness and contrast settings to clearly show localization of tagged proteins. The arrows in

the TL panels highlight vacuoles. 4^P indicates Wtf4^{poison}, 4^A indicates Wtf4^{antidote}, TL indicates

transmitted light, and the scale bar is 4 μm. **F**. Pearson's Correlation between mEos and

mCherry signal in cells expressing the specified constructs from E. N>100, n.s. p>0.05,

***p<0.001, t-test.

1371

S10 Figure. Coding sequence repeat mutants do not interact with wildtype Wtf4 proteins

functionally.

A. Cartoon of coding sequence repeat mutants of *S. kambucha wtf4.* **B-E.** Spot assays of cells

serially diluted on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-Ura plates and grown at 30°C for 3 days. Each

strain carries both a [*URA3*] and a [*TRP1*] plasmid. The plasmids are either empty (EV) or carry

the indicated *wtf4* alleles under the control of galactose-inducible promoters. The horizontal

breaks in the images in within a panel are due to rearrangements of the images to facilitate easy

comparison. All strains within a panel were grown on the same plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-Ura or

SC Gal-Trp-Ura plate in panel B).

1381

S11 Figure. Swapping *wtf* CDS repeats across species affects Wtf25 antidote rescue.

A. Cartoon of a coding sequence repeat mutant of *S. octosporus wtf25*. **B**. Logo representing

the amino acids encoded by the repeats found in exon 4 of *S. octosporus wtf* genes from [19].

C. The amino acids encoded by the exon 4 repeats of *S. octosporus wtf25* and by the 6 repeats

of *S. kambucha wtf4*. **D.** Spot assay of cells serially diluted and plated on SC-Trp-Ura and SC

Gal-Trp-Ura plates and grown at 30°C for 3 days. Each strain carries both a [*URA3*] and a

[*TRP1*] plasmid. The plasmids are either empty (EV) or carry the indicated *wtf25* alleles under

the control of galactose-inducible promoters. The horizontal breaks in the images are due to

rearrangements of the images to facilitate easy comparison. All strains within a panel were

grown on the same plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-Ura or SC Gal-Trp-Ura plate). **E.** Representative

images of the same strains depicted in D were induced in galactose for 4 hours at 30°C to

express the indicated Wtf25 proteins. The images are not at the same brightness and contrast

settings to clearly show localization of tagged proteins. The arrows in the TL panel highlight

vacuoles. 25^P indicates Wtf25^{poison}, 25^A indicates Wtf25^{antidote}, TL indicates transmitted light, and

the scale bar is 4 μm.

1397

S12 Figure. *S. octosporus wtf25* coding sequence repeats are functionally dispensable

for poison toxicity but promote antidote rescue.

A. Cartoon of *S. octosporus wtf25* exon 4 coding sequence repeat deletion mutant. **B.** Logo for

the amino acids encoded by the repeats found in exon 4 of *S. octosporus wtf* genes from [19] **C.**

Spot assay of cells serially diluted and plated on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-Ura plates and

grown at 30°C for 4 days. Each strain carries both a [*URA3*] and a [*TRP1*] plasmid. The

plasmids are either empty (EV) or carry the indicated *wtf25* alleles under the control of

galactose-inducible promoters. The horizontal breaks in the images are due to rearrangements

of the images to facilitate easy comparison. All strains within a panel were grown on the same

plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-Ura or SC Gal-Trp-Ura plate). **D.** Representative images the same

strains depicted in C were induced in galactose for 4 hours at 30°C to express the indicated

Wtf25 proteins. The images are not at the same brightness and contrast settings to clearly show

localization of tagged proteins. The arrows in the TL panels highlight vacuoles. 25^P indicates

Wtf25^{poison}, 25^A indicates Wtf25^{antidote}, TL indicates transmitted light, and the scale bar is 4 μm.

1412

S13 Figure. Idiosyncratic poison and antidote compatibility between wild-type and

truncation alleles of *wtf4*.

A. Cartoon of *S. kambucha wtf4* C-terminal truncation mutants. **B.** Spot assay of cells serially

diluted and plated on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-Ura plates and grown at 30°C for 3 days.

Each strain carries both a [*URA3*] and a [*TRP1*] plasmid. The plasmids are either empty (EV) or

carry the indicated *wtf4* alleles under the control of galactose-inducible promoters. The

horizontal breaks in the images are due to rearrangements of the images to facilitate easy

comparison. All strains within a panel were grown on the same plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-Ura or

SC Gal-Trp-Ura plate). **C.** Representative images the strains depicted in B were induced in

galactose for 4 hours at 30°C to express the indicated Wtf4 proteins. The images are not at the

same brightness and contrast settings to clearly show localization of tagged proteins. The

arrows in the TL panels highlight vacuoles. 4^P indicates Wtf4^{poison}, 4^A indicates Wtf4^{antidote}, TL

indicates transmitted light, and the scale bar is 4 μm.

1426

S14 Figure. C-terminus truncation alleles of diverged Wtf^{poison}s are rescued by their

corresponding wild-type Wtf^{antidote}s.

A. Cartoon of *S. cryophilus wtf1*, *S. osmophilus wtf41*, and *S. octosporus wtf25* C-terminal

truncation mutants. **B-D.** Spot assays of cells serially diluted on SC-Trp-Ura and SC Gal-Trp-

Ura plates and grown at 30°C for 3 days. Each strain carries both a [*URA3*] and a [*TRP1*]

plasmid. The plasmids are either empty (EV) or carry the indicated

wtf alleles under the control of galactose-inducible promoters. The horizontal breaks in the

images within a panel are due to rearrangements of the images to facilitate easy comparison.

All strains within a panel were grown on the same plates (i.e., one SC-Trp-Ura or SC Gal-Trp-

Ura plate).

1437

S1 Table. Overview of *wtf* alleles and their phenotypes in this study. Columns 1-2 describe

the allele names and their construction. Columns 3-4 describe the toxicity of the poison and

antidote proteins encoded by the corresponding allele. Column 5 notes if the mutant antidote

can rescue the corresponding poison allele. Column 6-7 note if the specific antidote allele can

rescue the wild-type poison (Column 6), or if the specific poison can be rescued by the wild-type

antidote (Column 7). Column 9 notes if the corresponding antidote can rescue other poison

alleles. Column 10 notes the AmFRET values are comparable to the wild-type Wtf4^{poison}-mEos

or monomer-mEos. Finally, column 11 notes the figures/supplemental figures where these

alleles can be found. Rows are separated based on the wild-type allele that the mutants were

constructed from, where applicable. ND indicates that the specified experiment was not done.

1448

1449 **S2 Table. Yeast strains used in this study.** Column 1 is the figure where these strains were

1450 used, Column 2 is the name of the yeast strain and column 3 is the genotype of the strain. If the

1451   strain was constructed in this study, column 4 has the details on how the strain was constructed.

1452   If the strain was constructed in another study, column 5 notes the references for the same.

1453

1454   **S3 Table. Plasmids used in this study.** Column 1 denotes if the plasmids were used for strain

1455   construction or cloning, and the specific wild-type alleles that the plasmids correspond to.

1456   Column 2 is the name of the plasmid and column 3 is a short description of the plasmid. If the

1457   plasmid was not constructed in this study, column 4 references the studies the plasmids were

1458   constructed in.

1459

1460   **S4 Table. Oligos used in this study.** Column 1 denotes the name of the oligo and column 2

1461   has the sequence of the oligos. If the oligo was not constructed in this study, column 3

1462   references the studies the oligos were used in.

1463

S5 Table. Overview of features across *wtf* driver genes. Column 1 denotes the *wtf* driver

gene, and columns 2-8 describe specific features of each gene and their encoded proteins.

Column 2 notes if the gene has been shown to drive in fission yeast or been shown to encode

for functional Wtf poison and antidote proteins in *S. cerevisiae*. Column 3 notes the number of

exons in the gene, and column 4 notes the size of the Wtf[antidote] protein in amino acids. If the

antidote sequence had a predicted coiled-coil domain, column 4 notes the size and location in

the antidote protein as described in [15]. Column 5 notes the numbers of PY motifs (L/PPXY;

[24]) in exon 1. While some Wtf[antidote] proteins also have an additional PY motif in exon 2, we

didn't include that information here since those motifs are shared by the corresponding poison

proteins as well. Column 6 notes the number of predicted transmembrane domains predicted by

TMHMM2.0 [71,72]. Column 7 notes the length of the exon 3 coding sequence repeats (if

present) in amino acids. Column 8 notes the length of the exon 4/6 coding sequence repeats (if

present) in amino acids. NA (not applicable) here indicates that the repeats were not present in

the Wtf protein. Column 8 mentions the reference(s) where these genes/encoded proteins were

characterized.

1479

S6 Table. Overview of predicted transmembrane domains of Wtf[antidote] proteins. The

results from the TMHMM2.0 [71,72] analysis of Wtf[antidote] proteins encoded by *wtf* driver genes in

S5 table are detailed here. Find the specific results of the analyses, including the number of

amino acids in the predicted transmembrane domains, probability of the N-terminal being

internal to the membrane (N-in), the specific location and the length of the predicted

transmembrane domains.

1486

1487   **S1 Data. Raw Data for Pearson's Correlation tests performed in this study.** Each sheet

1488   contains the raw data for the Pearson's Correlation tests and the statistical analysis

1489   corresponding to the tests performed in Fig 4F, S4 Fig E, Fig 6F and S9 Fig F respectively. See

1490   Methods for how this analysis was performed.

1491

S2 Data. Raw Data for AmFRET plots presented in this study. Each sheet contains the raw

data and the statistical analysis for the AmFRET plots of different Wtf^{poison}-mEos proteins,

Wtf4^{antidote}-mEos, *S. kambucha wtf4* Exon1-mEos and monomer-mEos proteins in Fig 2B, S2

Fig E, S3 Fig D, Fig 4C, S5 Fig, S6 Fig D and S7 Fig B respectively. The corresponding raw

data for the Acceptor fluorescence intensity presented in S6 Fig for each of these experiments

are found next to the relevant AmFRET data. See Methods for how this analysis was performed.

1498

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1502

1503   **Data Availability**

1504   All relevant data are within the manuscript and the Supporting Information Files. Additional raw

1505   data and images can be found at the Stowers Original Data Repository. Instructions for

1506   accessing data from the Stowers original data repository via FTP can be found at

1507   https://www.stowers.org/research/publications/odr#ftp.

1508

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1516

1517   **Competing interests**

1518 I have read the journal's policy, and the authors of this manuscript have the following competing

1519 interests: NLN, SEZ: Inventor on patent application based on *wtf* meiotic drivers. Patent

1520 application serial 62/491,107. The other authors declare that no competing interests exist.

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1765

A

B

C

%Amino Acid Identity of *S. pombe* Wtf^antidote proteins

D

Constructed *wtf4* mutants

Figure 2

A

Distributed Amphifluoric FRET (DAmFRET)

Cell expressing Protein-mEos

Limiting Photo-conversion (or)

Excitation → Emission
Acceptor
Donor

Excitation → Emission
Acceptor
FRET

B

Normalized AmFRET

Wtf4ᴾ Wtf1ᴾ Wtf19ᴾ Wtf41ᴾ Wtf25ᴾ Wtf61ᴾ Monomer

C

Plasmids	SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
[URA3]		
EV		
S. kambucha wtf4poison-mEos		
S. cryophilus wtf1poison-mEos		
S. osmophilus wtf41poison-mEos		
S. osmophilus wtf19poison-mEos		
S. octosporus wtf61poison-mEos		
S. octosporus wtf25poison-mEos		

D

	EV	*S. kambucha* Wtf4poison	*S. cryophilus* Wtf1poison	*S. osmophilus* Wtf41poison	Wtf19poison	*S. octosporus* Wtf25poison	Wtf61poison
TL							
mEos							
Merge +TL							

Figure 3

A Constructs

Repressed by Doxycyline

FTH1 — mEosNB

Induced by Galactose

Wtf^poison — mEos

B Experimental setup

Media used

(i) SC-URA

(ii) SC Gal-URA +Dox

(iii) SC Gal-URA

mEosNB-FTH1 (24-mer)

Wtf^poison-mEos

Wtf^poison-mEos +mEosNB-FTH1

Construct(s) expressed

C

	S. kambucha Wtf4^poison	*S. cryophilus* Wtf1^poison	*S. osmophilus* Wtf41^poison	*S. octosporus* Wtf61^poison	*S. octosporus* Wtf25^poison
	+Dox -Dox	+Dox -Dox	+Dox -Dox	+Dox -Dox	+Dox -Dox

TL

Unmixed mEos

Merge +TL

D

Plasmids [URA3]	(i) SC-URA	(ii) SC Gal-URA+Dox	(iii) SC Gal-URA
EV			
S. kambucha wtf4^poison-mEos			
S. cryophilus wtf1^poison-mEos			
S. osmophilus wtf41^poison-mEos			
S. octosporus wtf61^poison-mEos			
S. octosporus wtf25^poison-mEos			

Figure 4

A   *S. kambucha wtf4*

B

	Plasmids		SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
[*URA3*]	+	[*TRP1*]		
EV	+	*EV*		
wtf4^poison^-mEos	+	*EV*		
wtf4-20^poison^-mEos	+	*EV*		

C

D

	Plasmids		SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
[*URA3*]	+	[*TRP1*]		
EV	+	*EV*		
wtf4^poison^-mEos	+	*EV*		
EV	+	*wtf4^antidote^-mCh*		
wtf4^poison^-mEos	+	*wtf4^antidote^-mCh*		
wtf4-20^poison^-mEos	+	*EV*		
wtf4-20^poison^-mEos	+	*wtf4^antidote^-mCh*		

E   *S. kambucha wtf4*

F

Figure 5

Figure 6

A — *S. kambucha wtf4* — Coding sequence repeat mutants

Allele

wtf4+
wtf4-4
wtf4-5

■ Exon 6 repeats ▤ Exon 6 repeats scrambled
Ⓐ Exon 6 repeats replaced with Ala

B — Exon 6 repeat consensus

probability
Amino acid

C — 10AA

wtf4+   IGNIGRAFRG
wtf4-4 FGRARGIGNI
wtf4-5 AAAAAAAAAA

D

Plasmids			SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
[URA3]	+	[TRP1]		
EV	+	EV		
wtf4^poison-mEos	+	EV		
EV	+	wtf4^antidote-mCh		
wtf4^poison-mEos	+	wtf4^antidote-mCh		
wtf4-4^poison-mEos	+	EV		
EV	+	wtf4-4^antidote-mCh		
wtf4-4^poison-mEos	+	wtf4-4^antidote-mCh		
wtf4-5^poison-mEos	+	EV		
EV	+	wtf4-5^antidote-mCh		
wtf4-5^poison-mEos	+	wtf4-5^antidote-mCh		

F

Correlation

n.s
*** ***

Wtf4^poison+Wtf4^antidote
Wtf4-4^poison+Wtf4-4^antidote
Wtf4-5^poison+Wtf4-5^antidote

E — *S. kambucha wtf4*

Columns: EV+EV, 4^P+EV, 4^A+EV, 4^P+4^A, 4-4^P+EV, 4-4^A+EV, 4-4^P+4-4^A, 4-5^P+EV, 4-5^A+EV, 4-5^P+4-5^A

Rows: TL, mEos, mCherry, Merge, Merge+TL

S2 Figure

A Allele — Exon deletion mutants
- wtf4+
- wtf4-11
- wtf4-12
- wtf4-13
- wtf4-14

B Allele — Predicted TMD mutants
- wtf4+
- wtf4-8
- wtf4-9
- wtf4-10

■ Predicted TMD

C Allele — Conserved region mutant
- wtf4+
- wtf4-16

■ Conserved region

D

Plasmids	SC-LEU-URA	SC Gal-LEU-URA
[URA3]		
EV		
wtf4^{poison}-mEos		
wtf4-8^{poison}-mEos		
wtf4-9^{poison}-mEos		
wtf4-10^{poison}-mEos		
wtf4-11^{poison}-mEos		
wtf4-12^{poison}-mEos		
wtf4-13^{poison}-mEos		
wtf4-14^{poison}-mEos		
wtf4-16^{poison}-mEos		

E Normalized AmFRET

x-axis: 4^P, 4-8^P, 4-12^P, 4-13^P, 4-14^P, 4-16^P, Monomer

F *S. kambucha wtf4*

Columns: EV, 4^P, 4-8^P, 4-9^P, 4-10^P, 4-11^P, 4-12^P, 4-13^P, 4-14^P, 4-16^P

Rows: TL, mEos, Merge +TL

S3 Figure

A C-terminal truncation mutants

Allele

wtf4+
wtf4-17 — 10AA
wtf4-18 — 20AA
wtf4-15 — 29AA

B

Allele	Exon 5	Exon 6
Wtf4+	FLE	GIGNIGRAFRGANDNNDIPLGEMEVESEV
Wtf4-17	FLE	GIGNIGRAFRGANDNNDIP
Wtf4-18	FLE	GIGNIGRAF
Wtf4-15	FLE	

Exon 6 CDS repeats

C

Plasmids [URA3]	SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
EV		
wtf4^poison-mEos		
wtf4-17^poison-mEos		
wtf4-18^poison-mEos		
wtf4-15^poison-mEos		

D Normalized AmFRET

4^P 4-17^P 4-18^P 4-15^P Monomer

E *S. kambucha wtf4*

	EV	4^P	4-17^P	4-18^P	4-15^P
TL					
mEos					
Merge +TL					

F C-terminus Truncation Mutants

Allele

S. cryophilus wtf1+
wtf1-1 — 10AA
S. osmophilus wtf41+
wtf41-1 — 10AA
S. octosporus wtf25+
wtf25-3 — 10AA

G

Plasmids [URA3]	SC-URA	SC Gal-URA
EV		
wtf4^poison-mEos		
wtf4-17^poison-mEos		
wtf1^poison-mEos		
wtf1-1^poison-mEos		

Plasmids [URA3]	SC-URA	SC Gal-URA
EV		
wtf4^poison-mEos		
wtf4-17^poison-mEos		
wtf41^poison-mEos		
wtf41-1^poison-mEos		

Plasmids [URA3]	SC-URA	SC Gal-URA
EV		
wtf4^poison-mEos		
wtf4-17^poison-mEos		
wt25^poison-mEos		
wtf25-3^poison-mEos		

A

S. octosporus wtf25

wtf25^poison-mEos

wtf25-4^poison-mEos

wtf25^antidote-mCh

B

Plasmids			SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
[*URA3*]	+	[*TRP1*]		
EV	+	*EV*		
wtf25^poison-mEos	+	*EV*		
wtf25-4^poison-mEos	+	*EV*		

C

Plasmids			SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
[*URA3*]	+	[*TRP1*]		
EV	+	*EV*		
wtf25^poison-mEos	+	*EV*		
EV	+	*wtf25^antidote-mCh*		
wtf25^poison-mEos	+	*wtf25^antidote-mCh*		
wtf25-4^poison-mEos	+	*EV*		
wtf25-4^poison-mEos	+	*wtf25^antidote-mCh*		

D

S. octosporus wtf25

EV+EV, 25^P+EV, 25^A+EV, 25^P+25^A, 25-4^P+EV, 25-4^P+25^A

TL, mEos, mCherry, Merge, Merge +TL

E

Correlation

n.s.

Wtf25^poison+Wtf25^antidote

Wtf25-4^poison+Wtf25^antidote

A

Allele

Poison-poison assembly mutants

wtf4-21^poison — MBP – | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

wtf25-5^poison — MBP – | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

B

Plasmids	SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
[URA3]		
EV		
wtf4^poison-mEos		
wtf4-21^poison-mEos		

Plasmids	SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
[URA3]		
EV		
wtf25^poison-mEos		
wtf25-5^poison-mEos		

C

	EV	*S. kambucha* wtf4		*S. octosporus* wtf25	
		4^P	4-21^P	25^P	25-5^P
TL					
mEos					
Merge +TL					

D

S7 Figure

S8 Figure

A *S. kambucha wtf4*

Allele / Coding Sequence Repeat mutants: wtf4+, wtf4-1, wtf4-2, wtf4-3

Exon 3 CDS repeats (green) / Exon 6 CDS repeats (pink)

B Exon 3 repeat consensus

One repeat unit

AQCIKVTVIFL AQCVKVTAVGL

S. kambucha wtf4

C Exon 6 repeat consensus

One repeat unit

IGNIGRAFRG

S. kambucha wtf4

D

Plasmids		
[URA3]	+	[TRP1]
EV	+	EV
wtf4^poison-mEos	+	EV
EV	+	wtf4^antidote-mCh
wtf4^poison-mEos	+	wtf4^antidote-mCh
wtf4-1^poison-mEos	+	EV
EV	+	wtf4-1^antidote-mCh
wtf4-1^poison-mEos	+	wtf4-1^antidote-mCh
wtf4-2^poison-mEos	+	EV
EV	+	wtf4-2^antidote-mCh
wtf4-2^poison-mEos	+	wtf4-2^antidote-mCh
wtf4-3^poison-mEos	+	EV
EV	+	wtf4-3^antidote-mCh
wtf4-3^poison-mEos	+	wtf4-3^antidote-mCh

SC-TRP-URA   SC Gal-TRP-URA

F Correlation

Wtf4^poison +Wtf4^antidote / Wtf4-1^poison +Wtf4-1^antidote / Wtf4-2^poison +Wtf4-2^antidote / Wtf4-3^poison +Wtf4-3^antidote

*** , *** , n.s

E *S. kambucha wtf4*

EV+EV, 4^P+EV, 4^A+EV, 4^P+4^A, 4-1^P+EV, 4-1^A+EV, 4-1^P+4-1^A, 4-2^P+EV, 4-2^A+EV, 4-2^P+4-2^A, 4-3^P+EV, 4-3^A+EV, 4-3^P+4-3^A

Rows: TL, mEos, mCherry, Merge, Merge+TL

A *S. octosporus wtf25*

B Exon 4 repeat consensus

C One repeat unit

D

E

A

S. octosporus wtf25

B Exon 4 repeat consensus

C

D **S. octosporus wtf25**

A

Allele / C-terminal truncation mutants

wtf4+

wtf4-17 — 10AA

wtf4-18 — 20AA

wtf4-15 — 29AA

B

Plasmids			SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
[*URA3*]	+	[*TRP1*]		
EV	+	*EV*		
wtf4^{poison}-mEos	+	*EV*		
EV	+	*wtf4^{antidote}-mCh*		
wtf4^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf4^{antidote}-mCh*		
wtf4-18^{poison}-mEos	+	*EV*		
EV	+	*wtf4-18^{antidote}-mCh*		
wtf4-18^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf4-18^{antidote}-mCh*		
EV	+	*wtf4-17^{antidote}-mCh*		
wtf4^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf4-17^{antidote}-mCh*		
wtf4-18^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf4-17^{antidote}-mCh*		
wtf4-18^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf4^{antidote}-mCh*		
wtf4^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf4-18^{antidote}-mCh*		
EV	+	*wtf4-15^{antidote}-mCh*		
wtf4^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf4-15^{antidote}-mCh*		
wtf4-18^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf4-15^{antidote}-mCh*		

C

S. kambucha wtf4

A

Allele	C-terminus Truncation Mutants

S. cryophilus wtf1+

wtf1-1

10AA

S. osmophilus wtf41+

wtf41-1

10AA

S. octosporus wtf25+

wtf25-3

10AA

B

Plasmids			SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
[*URA3*]	+	[*TRP1*]		
EV	+	*EV*		
wtf1^{poison}-mEos	+	*EV*		
EV	+	*wtf1^{antidote}-mEos*		
wtf1^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf1^{antidote}-mEos*		
wtf1-1^{poison}-mEos	+	*EV*		
wtf1-1^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf1^{antidote}-mEos*		

C

Plasmids			SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
[*URA3*]	+	[*TRP1*]		
EV	+	*EV*		
wtf41^{poison}-mEos	+	*EV*		
EV	+	*wtf41^{antidote}-mEos*		
wtf41^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf41^{antidote}-mEos*		
wtf41-1^{poison}-mEos	+	*EV*		
wtf41-1^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf41^{antidote}-mEos*		

D

Plasmids			SC-TRP-URA	SC Gal-TRP-URA
[*URA3*]	+	[*TRP1*]		
EV	+	*EV*		
wtf25^{poison}-mEos	+	*EV*		
EV	+	*wtf25^{antidote}-mEos*		
wtf25^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf25^{antidote}-mEos*		
wtf25-3^{poison}-mEos	+	*EV*		
wtf25-3^{poison}-mEos	+	*wtf25^{antidote}-mEos*		