The Confidence-Noise Confidence-Boost (CNCB) model of confidence rating data

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Abstract

Over the last decade, different approaches have been proposed to interpret confidence rating judgments obtained after perceptual decisions. One very popular approach is to compute meta-d' which is a global measure of the sensibility to discriminate the confidence rating distributions for correct and incorrect perceptual decisions. Here, we propose a generative model of confidence based on two main parameters, confidence noise and confidence boost, that we call *CNCB model*. Confidence noise impairs confidence judgements above and beyond how sensory noise affects perceptual sensitivity. The confidence boost parameter reflects whether confidence uses the same information that was used for perceptual decisions, or some new information. This CNCB model offers a principled way to estimate a confidence efficiency measure that is a theory-driven alternative to the popular M-ratio. We then describe two scenarios to estimate the confidence boost parameter, one where the experiment uses more than two confidence levels, the other where the experiment uses more than two stimulus strengths. We also extend the model to continuous confidence ratings and describe how a non-linear mapping can be estimated between objective and subjective confidence probabilities. Altogether, the CNCB model should help interpret confidence rating data at a deeper level. This manuscript is accompanied by a toolbox that will allow researchers to estimate all the parameters of the CNCB model in confidence ratings datasets. Some examples of re-analyses of previous datasets are provided in the Appendix.

Author Summary

After each perceptual decision, humans have the ability to rate how confident they are that their decision is correct. While there is a growing number of models that attempt to explain how confidence judgments are built, there are very few objective measures of the sensitivity of these confidence judgments. We offer here a measure of confidence efficiency whose interpretation is simple. It takes a value of zero when participants are unable to evaluate the validity of their perceptual decision, a value of one when participants use the same information for their perceptual decision and their confidence judgment, and a value larger than one when participants use information for their confidence judgment that was not used for their perceptual decision. This measure of confidence efficiency is based on a generative model called CNCB that has two main parameters, confidence noise and confidence boost. These parameters again have a simple interpretation, and we show under which circumstances they can be estimated on their own. Finally, we extend the model to continuous confidence ratings.

Introduction

As humans, our sensory and cognitive capacities are limited, and thus we can only construct imperfect representations of our environment. Consequently, we cannot avoid making some errors when judging external stimuli. However, even we make a mistake, we may still have a sense of the precision of our perceptual judgment, and we can evaluate the probability that our response was correct. Such evaluations are judgments of confidence and are called Type 2 judgments, in contrast to Type 1 decisions which pertain to the primary perceptual task. Confidence judgments are a simple but essential expression of metacognition, that is the ability to evaluate and regulate our own mental processes [1]. They are most common in our daily life and they have been of interest since the early days of experimental psychology [2]. In the last decade, there has been an interest in modelling confidence performance, with a variety of approaches (for a recent comparison of these models, see [3]), but with no clear answer to the question of how to formally define and measure the efficiency with which human observers produce confidence judgments. In the present work, we address this question by specifying a generic process model for confidence ratings, in which we can define the confidence of an ideal metacognitive observer and the efficiency of human metacognitive abilities in comparison to this ideal observer [4,5].

Within the framework of Signal Detection Theory (SDT [6,7]), many studies have collected confidence ratings for the purpose of building Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves to evaluate Type 1 performance. However, these studies did not investigate how these confidence ratings were produced, they only assumed that observers used the same internal axis of evidence that they used for the Type 1 decision, and just placed additional criteria to produce graded confidence ratings. Other studies have focused on confidence itself, and its relation to decision accuracy, using metrics such as calibration (the root mean squared error between confidence and accuracy), resolution (the average confidence in correct responses minus confidence for errors), or the correlation between confidence and accuracy, which are easy to implement and to interpret but intrinsically confounded with Type 1 performance (see e.g. [8,9]). To address this limitation, Maniscalco and Lau [10] have proposed meta-d' as a measure of the sensitivity of confidence ratings, in the same units as Type 1 sensitivity. The M-ratio, defined as the ratio of meta-d' over d', has been suggested to be a measure of efficiency of confidence ratings [11], unconfounded with Type 1 performance, unlike previous measures [12]. This approach has become popular in studies of metacognition, particularly in perception and memory research. However, it suffers from two key limitations.

First, the generative process that is assumed for confidence ratings has not been explicitly clarified in this framework. As a consequence, whether the M-ratio constitutes a proper measure of efficiency remains unclear. Second, the conditions of application of the meta-d' measure are highly restricted: meta-d' can only be estimated precisely within a single difficulty level. Indeed, applying this measure to a dataset with multiple levels of difficulty leads to an artefactual inflation of metacognitive skills (see for instance [13]), as participants may have more information at their disposal than what is assumed in the analysis.

We propose a novel framework for quantifying metacognitive efficiency from confidence ratings, which addresses both issues. Our approach involves a fully specified generative model for confidence [4], which is based on elements of Signal Detection Theory [6]. In this framework, perceptual decisions are based on the comparison of some sensory evidence to a sensory criterion. Similarly, it is convenient to model confidence judgments as based on some confidence evidence, and to characterize how this confidence evidence is derived from sensory evidence. For the ideal confidence observer, who uses exactly the same information for her perceptual decisions and confidence judgments, there is a one-to-one mapping between sensory and confidence evidence. Individuals may however deviate from this ideal confidence observer in many ways, and here we highlight in particular two computational mechanisms. First, observers can use information for their confidence judgment that was not used for the perceptual decision. We call this additional information the confidence boost. Second, observers can be specifically impaired in their evaluation of confidence, above and beyond their limited sensitivity in the perceptual decision. This loss of information can be modelled as confidence noise. As our approach allows for an identification of both mechanisms, we call this model the Confidence-Noise Confidence-Boost model (hereafter CNCB).

Importantly, by specifying the generative model, we are able to model confidence judgments in empirical datasets that may involve varying levels of task difficulty, and quantify metacognitive efficiency across difficulty levels. This framework is applicable to both discrete and continuous confidence ratings, as we demonstrate below.

Results

Because we intend to compare the CNCB model to the M-ratio, we first place ourselves in the conditions of the M-ratio. The M-ratio is the ratio of meta-d' over d', where d' is the actual sensory sensitivity and meta-d' is the theoretical d' that is consistent with the confidence judgments [10]. This latter analysis imposes the constraint that there are only two possible stimuli. For instance, the stimuli could be some dots moving to the right or to the left, that we represent by their respective stimulus strengths $\mu_s = +u$ and $\mu_s = -u$, and the observer's task is to indicate whether dots are moving to the right or to the left. Here the two stimulus strengths have the same magnitude u. We also consider for now that there are only two confidence levels (high and low). We release these two constraints later.

A generative model for perceptual decisions and confidence ratings

Our generative model of decision and confidence can be summarized in two steps [4]. The first step determines the Type 1 behaviour, that is what the observer reports as their percept given the stimulus that is presented. We are guided here by classical Signal Detection Theory [6] whereby the observer has access to some sensory evidence s that is simply the stimulus strength corrupted by sensory noise $\epsilon_s \sim \mathrm{N}(0,\ \sigma_s^2)$

$$s = \mu_s + \epsilon_s \quad . \qquad \text{(Eq. 1)}$$

The Type 1 decision D is just the comparison of this sensory evidence to a sensory criterion θ_s, and it is categorical (e.g. $+1$ for 'Right' or -1 for 'Left', see **Figure 1A**)

$$D = \mathrm{sign}(s - \theta_s) \quad . \qquad \text{(Eq. 2)}$$

The second step determines the Type 2 behaviour, that is what the observer report as their confidence that their perceptual decision is correct, separately for each stimulus and each perceptual decision (**Figure 1B**). In the same vein as for the Type 1 step, we assume that the observer has access to some confidence evidence, noted w. In our framework, this confidence evidence is based on a noisy reading of the sensory evidence, with potentially additional information from the stimulus. The amount of additional information is quantified with the boost parameter α, for which a value of 1 corresponds to a perfect access to the stimulus, bypassing the impact of sensory noise on confidence judgments. Confidence noise is modelled as noise added to the confidence evidence that by default we take to be Gaussian, $\epsilon_c \sim \mathrm{N}(0,\ \sigma_c^2)$. Combining confidence noise and confidence boost produces confidence evidence

$$w = (\mu_s + (1-\alpha) \,.\, \epsilon_s - \theta_s) \,/\, \sigma_s + \epsilon_c \quad . \qquad \text{(Eq. 3)}$$

Importantly in this equation, sensory evidence is normalized by sensory noise σ_s to make confidence evidence an estimate of performance in units of internal noise, and thus independent of the sensory dimension being evaluated [4]. Sensory and confidence evidence together define a bivariate normal distribution when both sensory and confidence noise samples are normally distributed (**Figure 1C**, left plot). A confidence boundary can then be drawn on the confidence evidence axis to separate high and low confidence judgments [14].

To be a proper Type 2 judgment, one also needs to take into account the actual perceptual decision in the trial. Indeed, although they should mostly align, confidence evidence may occasionally contradict the actual perceptual decision. When this is the case, the confidence evidence is evidence that runs against the observer's initial decision. To formalize this, one can model the Type 2 judgment C as based on the product of the perceptual decision and the confidence evidence [4] as follows:

$$\begin{cases} C = \mathrm{High} & \text{if } Dw > b\,, \\ C = \mathrm{Low} & \text{if } Dw \leq b \end{cases} \quad , \qquad \text{(Eq. 4)}$$

where b is the confidence boundary between high and low confidence ratings. From the experimenter's perspective, we want to evaluate the validity of the confidence judgment, that is to compare it to the correctness of the perceptual decision. The joint probability $\mathrm{P}(C = \mathrm{High} \cap \mathrm{correct})$ of being highly confident and correct is shown on the right-hand side of **Figure 1C**. This joint probability helps us define the Type 2 hit rate $\mathrm{P}(C = \mathrm{High} \mid \mathrm{correct}) = \mathrm{P}(C = \mathrm{High} \cap \mathrm{correct}) \,/\, \mathrm{P}(\mathrm{correct})$, that is the probability of

making a high confidence judgment when the perceptual decision was correct. Likewise, we can define the Type 2 false alarm rate

$$\begin{cases} \mathrm{Hit}_2(b) = \mathrm{P}(C = \mathrm{High} \mid \mathrm{correct}) = \mathrm{P}\big(Dw > b \,\big|\, D = \mathrm{sign}(\mu_s)\big) \\ \mathrm{FA}_2(b) = \mathrm{P}(C = \mathrm{High} \mid \mathrm{incorrect}) = \mathrm{P}\big(Dw > b \,\big|\, D \neq \mathrm{sign}(\mu_s)\big) \end{cases} . \qquad \text{(Eq. 5)}$$

The Type 2 hit and false alarm rates then define the Type 2 ROC ([15,16]; **Figure 1D**). The area under the Type 2 ROC is an index of confidence sensitivity (larger is better).



Figure 1. Type 1 and Type 2 performance. **(A)** Type 1 performance. The proportion of responding 'Right' is plotted for each of the two stimuli $\mu_s = \pm 0.67$, thus providing two points on the psychometric function. In this figure, sensory noise is $\sigma_s = 1$. **(B)** Type 2 performance. For each stimulus (left and right panels), confidence probability is plotted for each confidence level ('low' and 'high'). Blue bars represent 'Right' perceptual responses (i.e. correct when $\mu_s = +0.67$), and orange bars, running downwards, 'Left' responses (i.e. incorrect when $\mu_s = +0.67$). In this figure, confidence noise is $\sigma_c = 0.5$ and confidence boost is $\alpha = 0.2$. **(C)** Left panel: joint distribution of sensory and confidence evidence for one of the two stimuli, $\mu_s = +0.67$. When the sensory criterion is $\theta_s = 0$, perceptual responses are correct when sensory evidence is positive (blue), and incorrect when it is negative (orange). The confidence boundary separates high from low

confidence judgments. It is shown as a dashed blue line for correct responses and negative dashed orange line for incorrect responses. To obtain the same fraction of high and low confidence judgments (see panels **B**), the confidence boundary was set to $b = 0.79$. Right panel: marginal confidence probability distributions for correct responses (in blue) and incorrect responses (in orange). Higher levels of confidence are shown in more saturated colours. **(D)** Type 2 ROC. The Type 2 ROC curve plots the Type 2 hit rate against the Type 2 false alarm rate. The area under the Type 2 ROC (shown in shaded grey) is a measure of confidence sensitivity.

Confidence efficiency for confidence ratings

In the CNCB model, there is a trade-off between the effects of the confidence noise and confidence boost parameters: a larger confidence noise can be compensated by a larger confidence boost to produce similar confidence sensitivities. Because of this trade-off, a given point in the Type 2 ROC space can be obtained from different pairs of confidence noise and confidence boost parameters, as shown in **Figure 2A**. We can fully characterize the set of pairs of confidence noise and confidence boost that are compatible with this Type 2 ROC point with a single value. This value is the confidence noise from the extreme pair for which confidence boost is 1 (green dot in **Figure 2B**). This extreme case corresponds to a theoretical confidence observer who uses only secondary information to make her confidence judgment, but is still subjected to confidence noise. In this case, we call the corresponding confidence noise τ_{human} the "equivalent confidence noise" for the human observer.

Confidence efficiency indicates the extent to which human participants can perform confidence judgments as well as the ideal confidence observer. The ideal confidence observer is the theoretical observer that is using exactly the same information for the perceptual decision and the confidence judgment. By definition, the ideal observer has no confidence noise ($\sigma_c = 0$) and no confidence boost ($\alpha = 0$). Just like the human observer, many pairs of confidence noise and confidence boost can produce the same Type 2 hit and false alarm rates (black curve in **Figure 2B**), and by taking the extreme pair with a confidence boost of 1, we can define an equivalent confidence noise for the ideal observer τ_{ideal} (black dot in **Figure 2B**).

The confidence efficiency η is then defined as the ratio of the squared equivalent confidence noises

$$\eta = \tau_{\text{ideal}}^2 \,/\, \tau_{\text{human}}^2 \,. \qquad \text{(Eq. 6)}$$

Because this measure of efficiency is obtained from the CNCB model, we refer to it as the *CNCB efficiency*. Below, we compare this CNCB efficiency measure to the M-ratio.



Figure 2. Trade-off between confidence noise and confidence boost. **(A)** Type 2 ROC. The blue dot shows the Type 2 hit and false alarm rates for the simulated human observer of Figure 1 ($\sigma_c = 0.5$, $\alpha = 0.2$, and $b = 0.79$). The smooth blue curve corresponds to the theoretical ROC curve obtained with the same values of confidence noise and confidence boost, but by varying the value of the confidence boundary. The dashed green curve corresponds to another observer with different confidence noise and confidence boost ($\sigma_c = 1.39$ and $\alpha = 1.0$), chosen such that Type 2 hit and false alarm rates are identical to the simulated human observer. **(B)** Equivalent pairs of confidence noise and confidence boost. The blue curve shows the pairs of confidence noise and confidence boost that are equivalent to the simulated human observer shown by the blue dot. The black curve shows the equivalent pairs of confidence noise and confidence boost for the ideal confidence observer (i.e. for whom $\sigma_c = 0$ and $\alpha = 0$). The green dot is the equivalent confidence noise for the human observer ($\tau_{\mathrm{h}} = 1.39$), and the black dot the equivalent noise for the ideal observer ($\tau_{\mathrm{i}} = 1.60$). The red and yellow curves are equivalent pairs of confidence noise and confidence boost for other simulated observers that are presented later in this paper, namely $(\sigma_c = 0.5, \alpha = 0.8)$ in red and $(\sigma_c = 2.0, \alpha = 0.2)$ in yellow.

Disentangling confidence noise and boost with multiple confidence levels

We now describe two cases where confidence noise and confidence boost can be estimated separately. The first of these cases is when the experiment contains multiple confidence levels.

When observers have the opportunity to use n levels for their confidence rating, with $(n > 2)$, they have to choose $(n - 1)$ confidence boundaries and compare their confidence evidence to these boundaries. As an illustration, we take the same perceptual task with two stimulus strengths (**Figure 3A**). For each of these stimulus strengths, we simulate an observer who is asked to rate their confidence on a 4-point scale, while trying to have the same fraction of confidence judgments for each confidence level (**Figure**

3B). These confidence judgments are obtained by setting three confidence boundaries along the confidence evidence internal space (**Figure 3C**). Therefore, when we plot Type 2 hit against false alarm rates, we obtain the Type 2 ROC that is now defined by three points (**Figure 3D**). These three points now constrain better the location of the Type 2 ROC, and thus should allow us to disentangle the confidence noise and confidence boost parameters.



Figure 3. Effect of multiple confidence levels on Type 2 ROC. **(A)** Psychometric function from two stimulus strengths $\mu_s = \pm 0.67$, with sensory noise $\sigma_s = 1$ and no sensory bias ($\theta_s = 0.0$). **(B)** For each stimulus strength (left and right panels), confidence probability is plotted for each confidence level (1 to 4). Blue bars represent 'Right' perceptual responses, and orange bars 'Left' responses (running downwards). In this figure, confidence noise is $\sigma_c = 0.5$ and confidence boost is $\alpha = 0.2$. Confidence boundaries were chosen to produce the same fraction of confidence responses in each of the four confidence levels ($b_1 = 0.27;\ b_2 = 0.79;\ b_3 = 1.35$). **(C)** Left panel: joint distribution of sensory and confidence evidence for one of the stimulus strengths ($\mu_s = +0.67$). Perceptual responses are correct to the right of the criterion (in blue), and incorrect to its left (in orange). When confidence is judged on a 4-point scale, there are three confidence boundaries are shown by the dashed lines. Right panel: confidence probabilities for correct and incorrect responses in blue and orange, respectively. Higher levels of

confidence are shown in more saturated colours. **(D)** Type 2 ROC. When confidence is rated on 4 levels, the Type 2 ROC is constrained by 3 points.

We ran simulations where we vary the number of confidence levels from 2 to 6, while keeping the constraint that each confidence level contains the same fraction of confidence judgments. Importantly, we see that confidence efficiency is still well estimated even for small numbers of confidence levels (**Figure 4A**). As expected, these simulations confirm that confidence noise (**Figure 4B**) and confidence boost (**Figure 4C**) are better estimated when there are more confidence levels. Unexpectedly, the estimation of these parameters is also possible even when there are only two confidence levels. We believe that this residual ability comes from the small sensory biases inherent of each simulation that create two distinct Type 2 ROC, and that in turn constrain the confidence noise and confidence boost parameters. We also note that the ability to identify the two confidence parameters will depend in practice not only on the number of confidence boundaries, but also on the number of trials in each confidence bin.



Figure 4. Confidence noise and confidence boost from multiple confidence levels. **(A)** CNCB efficiency estimates as a function of number of confidence levels in the simulation. The colours represent three conditions for the confidence noise and confidence boost parameters (σ_c, α), namely $(0.5, 0.2)$ in blue, $(0.5, 0.8)$ in red, and $(2.0, 0.2)$ in yellow. In all panels, solid curves show median values over 100 repeated simulations, and shaded regions represent the interquartile range. The dashed lines correspond to the median CNCB efficiency obtained for the largest number of confidence levels (presumably the best estimates). Other parameters are listed in the Methods section. **(B)** Estimated confidence noise. **(C)** Estimated confidence boost.

Disentangling confidence noise and boost with multiple stimulus strengths

Another way to estimate confidence noise and confidence boost is to use multiple stimulus strengths. As an example, let us consider the scenario where there are six stimulus strengths (**Figure 5A**). For each stimulus strength, we can extract high and low confidence judgments (**Figure 5B**), separately for 'Right' (in blue) and 'Left' perceptual decisions (in orange; confidence probability runs downwards). The confidence distributions are symmetric for positive and negative stimulus strengths because we assumed that the observer adopted the optimal sensory criterion (here $\theta_s = 0.0$; **Figure 5C**). Because of this symmetry, the six stimulus strengths produce only three Type 2 ROC curves (**Figure 5D**). Even though there is a single point on each of these ROC curves (corresponding to the division between high and low confidence judgments), these three points constrain the model better than if there was a single one, and thus allow us to disentangle the confidence noise and confidence boost parameters.



Figure 5. Effect of multiple difficulty levels on Type 2 ROC. **(A)** Psychometric function from six stimulus strengths chosen to be equally spaced between $\mu_s = -1.43$ and $\mu_s = +1.43$. In this figure, sensory noise is $\sigma_s = 1$ and sensory criterion is $\theta_s = 0.0$. **(B)** For each stimulus strength, confidence probability is plotted for each confidence level ('high' and 'low'). Blue bars represent 'Right' perceptual responses, and orange bars 'Left'

responses (running downwards). In this figure, confidence noise is $\sigma_c = 0.5$ and confidence boost is $\alpha = 0.2$. **(C)** The sensory evidence for each stimulus strength has an associated confidence evidence. The full bivariate distribution of sensory and confidence evidence is shown for one of the six stimulus strengths. Positive stimulus strengths are shown in solid lines, negative ones in dotted lines. **(D)** When the observer is unbiased ($\theta_s = 0.0$), there are now three Type II ROC curves. The three dots correspond to the Type 2 hit and false alarms rates obtained when the confidence boundary was set to equate the overall fraction of high and low confidence ratings ($b = 0.96$) over all six stimulus strengths.

To confirm this, we ran simulations where we vary the number of stimulus strengths from two to seven. We restricted the number of confidence levels to 2 ('high' and 'low') to verify that with only two stimulus strengths, confidence noise and confidence boost cannot be estimated (see **Figure 2**). We use a confidence criterion such that the two confidence levels are used equally within each simulation. The stimulus strengths are chosen to be equally spaced between -2 and 2, with these two extreme values omitted. An example with two stimulus strengths is shown in **Figure 1A**, and an example with six stimulus strengths is shown in **Figure 5A**. Importantly, we see that confidence efficiency is not biased by the number of stimulus strengths, and that it is still well estimated even for small numbers of stimulus strengths (**Figure 6A**). The estimation of confidence noise (**Figure 6B**) and confidence boost (**Figure 6C**) improves with the number of stimulus strengths, as expected. Unexpectedly, it is also not completely random when there are only two stimulus strengths, which as discussed in the previous section, may reflect small sensory biases inherent of each simulation.



Figure 6. Confidence noise and confidence boost from multiple stimulus strengths. (A) CNCB efficiency estimates as a function of number of stimulus strengths in the simulation. The colours represent three conditions for the confidence noise and confidence boost parameters (σ_c, α), namely $(0.5, 0.2)$ in blue, $(0.5, 0.8)$ in red, and $(2.0, 0.2)$ in yellow. In all panels, solid curves show median values over 100 repeated

simulations, and shaded regions represent the interquartile range. The dashed lines correspond to the median CNCB efficiency obtained for the largest number of stimulus strengths (presumably the best estimates). Other parameters are listed in the Methods section. (B) Estimated confidence noise. (C) Estimated confidence boost.

We note that including several stimulus strengths is common practice in psychophysics as this allows the experimenter to measure the full psychometric function, and thus a better estimate of sensory noise. However, in the confidence literature, the common meta-d' measure of confidence sensitivity [10] can only accommodate one stimulus for each response category, and disregarding fluctuations in stimulus strengths can lead to biased estimates with this measure [13]. Our approach, by contrast, can accommodate multiple difficulty levels, and it takes advantage of such designs to provide more refined estimates of subcomponents of the metacognitive process. We can expect that releasing the constraint on the number of stimulus strengths will enrich the design of future experiments that use confidence ratings.

Recovery of confidence noise and confidence boost

We have seen in previous sections that confidence noise and confidence boost of the CNCB model can in theory be estimated when there are more than two confidence levels, and that the CNCB efficiency can be estimated even for designs containing more than two stimulus strengths. Here, we illustrate more precisely how confidence noise and confidence boost affect CNCB efficiency and how estimated efficiency depends on the number of trials in the data, an issue that is of high practical interest.

As expected, as confidence noise increases, the CNCB efficiency decreases (**Figure 7A**), and both the confidence noise and confidence boost can be well recovered (**Figure 7B-C**). However, we observe a small bias in the recovery of the confidence parameters when both confidence noise and confidence boost are very small, suggesting that the confidence noise parameter sometimes absorbs more of the variability in the confidence judgments than necessary. Also as expected, as confidence boost increases, the CNCB efficiency increases (**Figure 7D**), and again, both confidence noise and confidence boost can be well recovered (**Figure 7E-F**).

Increasing the number of confidence judgments naturally increases the precision of the estimated confidence efficiency and the CNCB parameters (**Figure 7G-I**). From these simulations, we can observe that a coarse estimation of confidence efficiency is already available with 100 confidence judgments, but a good estimation requires about 1,000 confidence judgments (**Figure 7G**). These simulations also suggest that a good estimation of confidence noise and confidence boost parameters would require ten times more confidence judgments (**Figure 7H-I**). These quick observations would benefit from a more thorough analysis that goes beyond the scope of the present paper.



Figure 7. Parameters recovery for varying confidence noise, confidence boost, and number of confidence judgments. **(A-C)** Effect of different values of simulated confidence noise, for two different values of confidence boost ($\alpha = 0.2$ in blue, and $\alpha = 0.8$ in red). **(D-F)** Effect of different values of simulated confidence boost, for two different values of confidence noise ($\sigma_c = 0.5$ in blue, and $\sigma_c = 2.0$ in yellow). **(G-I)** Effect of the number of confidence judgments in the simulation, for three pairs of confidence noise and confidence boost parameters (σ_c, α), namely $(0.5, 0.2)$ in blue, $(0.5, 0.8)$ in red, and $(2.0, 0.2)$ in yellow. Panels show estimated confidence efficiency (A, D, G), estimated confidence noise (B, E, H), and estimated confidence boost (C, F, I). In panel (G), the dashed lines correspond to the median CNCB efficiency obtained for the largest number of confidence judgments (presumably the best estimates). In all panels, solid curves show median values over 100 repeated simulations, and shaded regions represent the interquartile range. Unless specified otherwise, simulations consisted in 10,000 confidence judgments. Other parameters are listed in the Methods section.

Comparison of CNCB efficiency and M-ratio

Since both the CNCB efficiency and the M-ratio measure derive from elements of Signal Detection Theory, although following slightly different routes, it is natural to think that they should be related. In this part, to compare CNCB efficiency and M-ratio, we limit ourselves to only 2 stimulus strengths ($\mu_s = \pm 1$). From simulations where we varied confidence noise, confidence boost, and the number of confidence judgments (**Figure 7**), we find that there is a one-to-one relationship between CNCB efficiency and M-ratio (**Figure 8**)

$$\eta \approx (\text{M-ratio})^2 \ . \qquad \text{(Eq. 7)}$$

The square in the relationship is expected given that d' is inversely related to the standard deviation of the sensory noise (and similarly for meta-d') whereas the CNCB efficiency is a ratio of squared equivalent noises. This relationship makes sense when one varies confidence noise because confidence noise has similar effects on the meta-d' and the CNCB model (**Figure 8A**). Interestingly, the relationship seems to hold also perfectly when confidence boost varies (**Figure 8B**). Further theoretical work is necessary to find a closed form derivation for the equivalence between CNCB efficiency and M-ratio.



Figure 8. Relationship between confidence efficiency and M-ratio. **(A)** Data from simulated experiments shown in **Figure 7A**, where confidence noise σ_c varied between 0.0 and 4.0 and confidence boost α was either 0.2 (blue) or 0.8 (red). Symbols are centred on the median of the simulations, and the ellipse has its main axes reflecting the interquartile ranges. The diagonal shows a squared relationship between M-ratio and confidence efficiency in log-log coordinates (see Eq. 7). **(B)** Data from simulated experiments shown in **Figure 7D**, where confidence noise σ_c was either 0.5 (blue) or 2.0 (yellow) and confidence boost α varied between 0.0 and 1.0. **(C)** Data from simulated experiments shown in **Figure 7G**, for three pairs of confidence noise and confidence boost parameters (σ_c, α), namely $(0.5, 0.2)$ in blue, $(0.5, 0.8)$ in red, and $(2.0, 0.2)$ in yellow. The largest ellipse corresponds to simulations with 100 trials, the intermediate sized with 1,000, and the smallest with 10,000.

Even though Eq. 7 provides a nice and simple equivalence relationship between CNCB efficiency and M-ratio, further investigation reveals that this relationship breaks down when we introduce Type 1 biases. Perceptual biases arise from sensory criteria that are not placed at their optimal location (**Figure 9A**). It is known that M-ratios are not fully independent of sensory criteria ([12]; **Figure 9B**). This is due in part to the fact that when there is a bias in sensory criterion, each sensory strength generates its own Type 2 ROC curve, and the meta-d' computation needs to find a way to integrate these two incompatible sets of confidence into a single model. Under the same simulated conditions, the CNCB model however naturally takes into account the sensory criterion, and CNCB confidence efficiency appears to be more robust to biases in sensory criteria (**Figure 9C**). We note also that confidence noise (**Figure 9D**) and confidence boost (**Figure 9E**) can be recovered well irrespective of the sensory criteria.



Figure 9. Effect of sensory criteria. **(A)** Probability densities for sensory strengths $\mu_s = \pm 0.67$. Perceptual decisions are made relative to a biased sensory criterion (here, $\theta_s = -1.0$). **(B)** M-ratio as a function of different values of sensory criteria. The colours represent three conditions for the confidence noise and confidence boost parameters (σ_c, α), namely $(0.5, 0.2)$ in blue, $(0.5, 0.8)$ in red, and $(2.0, 0.2)$ in yellow. Continuous lines and shaded areas show the medians and interquartile ranges, respectively, over 100 repeated simulations. The dashed lines correspond to the median M-ratio obtained for the optimal sensory criterion ($\theta_s = 0.0$), presumably providing the best estimates. The M-ratio is strongly biased by non-optimal sensory criteria. **(C)** CNCB efficiency estimates for the

same conditions as in (B). The CNCB efficiency seems stable across sensory criteria. **(D)** Estimated confidence noise. **(E)** Estimated confidence boost. Other parameters are listed in the Methods section.

Continuous confidence ratings

As the number of confidence levels increases, one approaches the extreme case where confidence is rated on a continuous scale. This scenario is typically obtained when observers are asked to use a continuous scale, say between 0 and 100, to report their subjective probability that their perceptual decision was correct. This special case deserves its own treatment because one needs to model how subjective probabilities are possibly biased.

When estimating probabilities, human participants are often over-estimating small probabilities and under-estimating large probabilities. To model this kind of biases, we adhere to the proposal of Zhang & Maloney [17] to use the following family of probability distortions

$$\mathrm{Lo}\big(\pi(p)\big) = \gamma\,\mathrm{Lo}(p) + (1-\gamma)\,\mathrm{Lo}(p_0)\ , \qquad \text{(Eq. 8)}$$

where p denotes the true (objective) probability, $\pi(p)$ denotes the corresponding distorted (subjective) probability, p_0 is a constant (the fixed point of the transformation), and Lo is the log-odds function

$$\mathrm{Lo}(p) = \log\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right)\ . \qquad \text{(Eq. 9)}$$

The parameter γ in this family of distortions allows us to capture an overestimation of small probabilities and underestimation of large probabilities (when $\gamma < 1$) or the reverse pattern (when $\gamma > 1$). Default parameter values that produce a non-biased relationship between objective and subjective probabilities are $\gamma = 1$ and $p_0 = 0.5$ (**Figure 10A**). This non-biased relationship produces highly skewed distributions of confidence ratings towards high confidence (**Figure 10B**).

Using this family of probability distortions is a compact way to model the infinite number of confidence boundaries using only two parameters (γ and p_0). An example of such probability distortions is shown in **Figure 10C**, and the associated distribution of confidence ratings is shown in **Figure 10D**.



Figure 10. Continuous confidence ratings. **(A)** Non-biased relationship between objective and subjective confidence probabilities. **(B)** Confidence ratings for the two categories of stimuli ($\mu_s = \pm 0.67$). The blue distribution corresponds to perceptual responses 'Right' (i.e. correct when $\mu_s = +0.67$, and incorrect when $\mu_s = -0.67$), and the orange distributions to responses 'Left' (running downwards). With the non-biased relationship in (A), confidence ratings are strongly skewed towards high confidence levels. For these simulations, $\sigma_c = 0.5$ and $\alpha = 0.2$. **(C)** Log-odds transformation between objective and subjective confidence probabilities with $\gamma = 0.5$ and $p_0 = 0.4$. **(D)** With the biased relationship in (C), and the same confidence noise and confidence boost parameters as in (B), confidence ratings are more concentrated in the middle of the range of confidence levels. Other parameters are listed in the Methods section.

When such probability distortions are introduced between objective and subjective confidence judgments, the CNCB efficiency can be estimated nonetheless, and it is robust to variations in the distortion parameter (**Figure 11A**). Importantly, confidence noise and confidence boost can also be recovered very well, independently of γ (**Figure 11B**,**C**), both when small probabilities were over-estimated ($\gamma < 1$) and large probabilities were over-estimated ($\gamma > 1$). At the same time, the parameters of the probability distortion (γ and p_0) can be recovered very well in all the simulations (**Figure 11D**,**E**).



Figure 11. Recovery and influence of probability transformation. **(A)** Confidence efficiency for different values of the γ parameter. **(B)** Estimated confidence noise. **(C)** Estimated confidence boost. **(D)** Recovery of the γ parameter of the log-odds transformation. **(E)** Recovery of the p_0 parameter of the log-odds transformation for different values of the γ parameter. When $\gamma = 1$,the parameter p_0 is undetermined. The colours represent three conditions for the confidence noise and confidence boost parameters (σ_c, α), namely $(0.5, 0.2)$ in blue, $(0.5, 0.8)$ in red, and $(2.0, 0.2)$ in yellow. In all panels, solid curves show median values over 100 repeated simulations, and shaded regions represent the interquartile range. Other parameters are listed in the Methods section.

General discussion

In a world full of uncertainty, being able to evaluate the quality of one's own decisions is an essential skill to optimize behaviour. For instance, observers use their sense of confidence to guide how much effort they will put in a task [18-20], or which task they will prioritize [21,22]. Evaluations of confidence are also useful when combining information from multiple sources: to optimize a collective decision, individuals should weigh their private information by the confidence they have in it [23,24].

Yet, evaluating oneself is also challenging. Confidence judgments can be biased towards underconfidence or overconfidence [25], and individuals greatly vary in their ability to predict the accuracy of their decisions (see e.g. [26]). Importantly, whereas the issue of overconfidence has triggered a large interest, well beyond cognitive psychology (e.g. [27]), the notion of metacognitive sensitivity has been so far more confidential.

One possible reason may have been the difficulty to converge on a single measure of confidence sensitivity in the prior literature, in comparison to overconfidence bias which can be simply calculated as the average confidence minus the average performance for each individual. The introduction of the meta-d' measure [10], by addressing the confound between metacognitive sensitivity and performance, presented a significant improvement on this matter. However, constraints remained regarding the designs in which this measure can be applied. We believe that allowing researchers to release the constraints of a single magnitude of difficulty level and of a finite confidence scale when analysing metacognitive sensitivity is an important contribution of the present work.

By relying on a fully specified generative model of confidence judgments, our method also allows for a principled definition of the efficiency with which observers make confidence ratings. The CNCB model was introduced in our prior work to account for a particular paradigm to study confidence, the confidence forced choice [4]. Here, we extend its application to model confidence ratings on discrete or continuous scales, allowing the analysis of various experimental paradigms within a common framework. This effort to develop a common modelling framework across experimental paradigms is considered an important objective in the domain of metacognition [28]. One possible direction for future work to extend further the generality of the present approach could be to expand the CNCB model to accommodate for more than 2 choice options at the Type 1 level, and possibly to continuous Type 1 responses. General Recognition Theory already exists as a generalization of Signal Detection Theory to multiple response categories [29], and considering situations with more than two choices has been instrumental in discriminating between theories of confidence [30]. Another possible direction is to refine the present modeling approach, by considering non-Gaussian confidence noise [31-33], or confidence noise that would reflect a mis-estimation of the sensory noise that we used to normalize our confidence evidence in Eq. 3 [34].

In the present work, we have emphasized confidence noise and confidence boost as important parameters in our model, which both impact metacognitive efficiency but in opposite directions. We

have described the conditions under which the resulting parameter indeterminacy can be lifted, such that one can separately estimate confidence noise and confidence boost. These involve having more than two confidence levels or more than one magnitude of stimulus strength. Separating confidence noise from confidence boost should allow researchers to characterize variations of metacognition more precisely. For instance, prior research has shown that metacognitive efficiency can be degraded under stress [35] or under complex multitasking [36,37]. Conversely, it can be improved after meditation training [38], or simply by asking observers to re-evaluate their initial confidence judgment [39]. One could wonder whether such phenomena are mediated by a change in confidence noise only, in confidence boost only, or whether they involve changes in both parameters. It will be also interesting to reanalyze previous datasets with the current framework (see some examples in the Appendix).

More generally, specifying the generative model for confidence judgments may allow researchers to ask novel questions or to shed new light on past topics about the computational bases of confidence judgments. For instance, one recurring question has been whether confidence is calculated before or after the decision is made, and many studies have provided evidence for postdecisional contributions to confidence (e.g. [40-44]). Early measures of confidence efficiency, in particular the M-ratio, offered only a global measure of confidence performance that merged together different sources of inefficiencies [45]. Recent efforts have started to disentangle these different sources (e.g. [46]). The CNCB approach presented here is in this perspective, offering a tool to separate two very different components that affect confidence efficiency (reflected by the confidence noise and the confidence boost parameters), while at the same time linking these factors to a global measure (the CNCB confidence efficiency).

To conclude, we have presented a computational model that allows to measure the efficiency of confidence ratings while varying the difficulty of the perceptual task. Our approach is set up in the domain of perceptual decisions. We hope that it can inspire other domains (see [47]) in which confidence judgments are of interest.

Acknowledgments

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The Matlab toolbox that implements the CNCB model is available here [48]:
https://github.com/mamassian/cncb/

Materials and Methods

Default parameter values

Unless otherwise noted, all the simulations in this manuscript were obtained with the following parameters. The two sensory levels were $\mu_s = \pm 0.67$, sensory noise was $\sigma_s = 1.0$, and the sensory criterion was placed at the optimal location $\theta_s = 0.0$. These values were chosen so that they lead to 75% correct, a targeted level of performance that is often chosen by experimenters. Confidence noise was set by default to $\sigma_c = 0.5$ and confidence boost to $\alpha = 0.2$. The number of confidence levels was set to 4, with confidence boundaries chosen to equate the number of confidence choices in each confidence level. A simulated experiment was based on 10,000 trials, and plots show median and inter-quartile ranges over 100 such simulated experiments. To reduce the likelihood of local minima, the fits started with 4 different initial values for the confidence noise and confidence boost, obtained by crossing two values of $\sigma_c = \{0.5, 2.0\}$ and two values of $\alpha = \{0.25, 0.75\}$, and the best fit was chosen to be the one that had the maximum log-likelihood.

Fitting procedure

With real data that are necessarily noisy, there will never be a perfect match between the predictions of the model and the data. For each stimulus strength i, and each perceptual decision j on this stimulus, there are n probabilities $P_{i,j}(k)$ of choosing a particular confidence rating, where k varies between 1 and n if there are n confidence levels. By definition, we have

$$\sum_{k=1}^{n} P_{i,j}(k) = 1 \ . \qquad \text{(Eq. 10)}$$

We are trying to best match the distributions of confidence ratings $P_{i,j}(k)$ between the human data and the model. Because the $P_{i,j}(k)$ probabilities can be sometimes very small and thus be difficult to fit, we fit the model instead to the cumulative probabilities $Q_{i,j}(k) = \sum_{u=1}^{k} P_{i,j}(u)$. The constraint in Eq. 10 means that $Q_{i,j}(n) = 1$, and thus for any pair of stimulus strength i and perceptual decision j, there are only $(n-1)$ cumulative probabilities to fit.

We find the best match by maximum likelihood estimation. For each stimulus strength i and perceptual decision j, we note $n_{i,j}(k)$ the number of human confidence judgments rated to be less than or equal to k. The likelihood that the model produces a cumulative probability $Q_{i,j}(k)$ given the human ratings $n_{i,j}(k)$ is assumed to be driven by a binomial distribution

$$L_{i,j}(k) = n_{i,j}(k)\ \log\Big(Q_{i,j}(k)\Big) + \Big(n_{i,j}(n) - n_{i,j}(k)\Big)\Big(1 - \log\Big(Q_{i,j}(k)\Big)\Big) \ . \qquad \text{(Eq. 11)}$$

In that equation of the likelihood, we have dropped the binomial coefficient which is a constant that cancels out in model comparison. We then try to maximize the total likelihood $L = \sum_i \sum_j \sum_{k=1}^{(n-1)} L_{i,j}(k)$.

A useful metrics for the goodness of fit is the Deviance obtained from computing the likelihood of the saturated model (i.e. the upper bound on the likelihood derived from using the actual human data as a model)

$$L_s = \sum_i \sum_j \sum_{k=1}^{(n-1)} \left[n_{i,j}(k) \ \log\left(\frac{n_{i,j}(k)}{n_{i,j}(n)}\right) + \left(n_{i,j}(n) - n_{i,j}(k)\right) \left(1 - \log\left(\frac{n_{i,j}(k)}{n_{i,j}(n)}\right)\right)\right]. \qquad \text{(Eq. 12)}$$

The Deviance is then $G^2 = -2(L - L_s)$, with lower values indicating better fits. The Deviance is approximately distributed as a χ^2 statistics with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of parameters between the saturated and the CNCB models. A good model is one that is not statistically different from the saturated model.

Full generative model

In our previous work [4], we have considered two additional parameters, namely β a confidence bias parameter (the underestimation of sensory noise in the scaling of confidence evidence), and θ_c a confidence criterion (the bias for confidence evidence relative to the sensory criterion). We have disregarded these two parameters here for simplicity, but they might be relevant in some cases (for a thorough discussion of these parameters, see [4]).

Self-consistency

In the main text, Type 2 hit and false alarm rates are defined relative to the correctness of the perceptual decision. However, correctness is arguably not the best goal that participants are trying to estimate, since without feedback, participants have no way to know that they achieved this goal. Instead of correctness, we might prefer to use self-consistency that refers to the stability of a perceptual decision [4, 49]. In that case, Eq. 5 above becomes

$$\begin{cases} \mathrm{Hit}_2(b) = \mathrm{P}(C = \mathrm{high} \mid \text{self-consistent}) = \mathrm{P}\big(Dw > b \,\big|\, D = \mathrm{sign}(\mu_s - \theta_s)\big) \\ \mathrm{FA}_2(b) = \mathrm{P}(C = \mathrm{high} \mid \text{self-inconsistent}) = \mathrm{P}\big(Dw > b \,\big|\, D \neq \mathrm{sign}(\mu_s - \theta_s)\big) \end{cases}. \qquad \text{(Eq. 13)}$$

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Appendix

In this appendix, we take three examples of confidence rating studies from the literature and apply the CNCB model described in the main text.

Bang et al. (2019; Experiment 2, Task 1)

The first example is a study by Bang et al. [50]. In one of the experiments (Experiment 2, Task 1), the authors studied how well participants performed over the course of a block of trials both in their perceptual decisions and their confidence judgments. For each trial, participants (N=149) were first asked to make a coarse orientation discrimination of a noisy Gabor patch ("left" or "right" tilt) and then a confidence rating on a 4-point scale. Within a block of 97 trials, participants get better in the perceptual task (a form of perceptual learning), but, interestingly, they simultaneously get worse in evaluating their own performance as shown by the decreasing CNCB efficiency (**Figure 12A**). This result correlates very well with the original finding that used the M-ratio as a measure of confidence efficiency [50].

The CNCB framework allows us to go one step further and to estimate confidence noise and confidence boost in this experiment. The CNCB model fits the data well for most trials. For instance, for the trial in the middle of the block (#49), the analysis of the Deviance showed that the model fit was not statistically different from the best possible fit ($chi2(7) = 8.96$, $p = 0.256$; **Figure 12B**). Looking at confidence noise, we find that it decreases with trial number within a block (**Figure 12C**), thus explaining the decrease in confidence efficiency. Interestingly, there also seems to be an increase of confidence boost, especially at the beginning of the block of trials (**Figure 12D**). This suggest that over the block, participants actually did learn to use some information about the stimulus above and beyond what they used to reach their perceptual decision. This increase in confidence boost should have improved their confidence efficiency, but it seems that the increase in confidence noise was even larger, so overall confidence efficiency decreased. Of course, the experiment from Bang et al. [50] was not designed to be analysed in terms of confidence noise and confidence boost, so any re-interpretation of their data is purely speculative.



Figure 12. CNCB analysis of Bang et al. [50], Experiment 2, Task 1 (coarse discrimination). **(A)** The CNCB efficiency is decreasing over the block of trials. Each dot corresponds to the efficiency for a particular trial for a participant pooled across all observers. The solid line is the running average over 10 consecutive trials. **(B)** Goodness of fit of the CNCB model for the middle trial number (#49) in the block. Each dot (n=16) is one confidence choice probability for a pair of stimulus strength and perceptual decision. Dot size is proportional to the total number of human confidence judgments for this pair of stimulus strength and perceptual decision. **(C)** The confidence noise increased over the block of trials. **(D)** The confidence boost also increased over the block of trials.

Faivre et al. (2018; Experiment 1)

The second example is a multi-sensory study by Faivre et al. ([51]; Experiment 1) where participants used a continuous scale to report their confidence. For each modality (audio, tactile, visual), each participant (N=15) first performed 400 trials on a perceptual decision followed by a confidence judgment on a continuous full scale from 0 to 1. Given that staircases were used to present the stimuli, we did not assume that there was a single stimulus strength, but instead split these stimulus strengths into 4 quantiles. For the purpose of estimating the goodness of fit, we divided the confidence ratings in 4

quartiles. We found that the CNCB model was a good fit for most of the participants in all three modalities. For the participant shown in **Figure 13A**, the analysis of the Deviance led to chi2(20) = 14.7, p = 0.794 for the auditory modality, chi2(20) = 20.1, p = 0.449 for the tactile modality, and chi2(20) = 20.2, p = 0.448 for the visual modality. This analysis reveals that for this participant the fit of the CNCB model was not significantly different from the best possible fit in all the modalities.

We were particularly interested in the potential non-linear mapping between our model confidence probabilities and participants' reported confidence. We find that the γ parameter was less than 1 for most participants (**Figure 13B**). A value of γ less than 1 means that participants avoided to make extremely low or high confidence judgments. We might expect that a given participant is going to adopt the same non-linear mapping between objective and subjective confidence across all sensory modalities, and indeed, the γ parameters were similar across modalities: mean values 0.38 for audio, 0.58 for tactile, and 0.49 for visual. However, there were no significant correlations across participants apart from one that approached significance (Pearson correlations were R=0.074 (p=0.793) between audio and tactile, 0.206 (0.461) between audio and visual, and 0.513 (0.051) between tactile and visual). More work, with more participants, is needed to address the question of whether individual participants have a single non-linear probability transformation across tasks and across sensory modalities.



Figure 13. CNCB analysis of Faivre et al. [51], Experiment 1. **(A).** Goodness of fit of the CNCB model for a prototypical participant (#3). Each dot (n=32) is one confidence choice probability for a pair of stimulus strength and perceptual decision. Dot size is proportional

to the total number of human confidence judgments for this pair of stimulus strength and perceptual decision. The three panels correspond to different modalities, audio (red), tactile (green), and visual (blue). **(B).** The plots show the non-linear mapping between objective and subjective confidence probabilities for the three modalities. Individual participants (N=15) are shown as grey lines, and the mean across participants as solid coloured lines.

Shekhar & Rahnev (2021; Experiment 4)

The last example is an experiment that was specifically designed to test the validity of different confidence models [31]; see also [3, 46]). In that experiment (Experiment 4 of Shekhar & Rahnev [31]), each of the 20 participants ran a large number of trials (2,800). The perceptual task was to discriminate the orientation (left or right tilt) of a Gabor patch whose contrast could take one of three values. These three stimulus strengths were interleaved within a block of trials. Simultaneously with the perceptual decision, participants had to report their confidence in this decision using a continuous half-scale from 50 to 100 (the scale was duplicated in mirror symmetry so that participants could use the left side to report a left tilt of the Gabor, and the right side for a right tilt).

We apply the CNCB model to each participant individually, but simultaneously to the three stimulus strengths and directly to the continuous confidence ratings (**Figure 14A**). To evaluate the goodness of fit, we quantize the continuous confidence ratings in 12 bins, and for a prototypical participant, the analysis of the Deviance showed that the likelihood of CNCB model was significantly different from the likelihood of the saturated model ($chi2(128) = 667$, $p < 0.001$; **Figure 14B**). We note that because a half-scale was used, the model presents a peak at the lower end of the confidence scale (rating of 50) that reflects when the model believed that the perceptual decision was wrong, whereas the human data do not present such a peak. Given that participants were requested to report simultaneously their perceptual decision and their confidence judgment, it is likely that if their confidence was less than 50%, they would have switched their perceptual response. If this was indeed the strategy used by the participants, a possibly better model would be obtained by folding the model confidence choices that are less than 50% over the actual range available to the participants (and switching the corresponding fraction of perceptual responses). However, such an analysis goes beyond the purpose of the current manuscript.



Figure 14. CNCB analysis of Shekhar & Rahnev [31], Experiment 4. **(A)** Goodness of fit to confidence ratings of participant #15 whose confidence judgments were quantized in 12 bins. Each dot (n=144) is one confidence choice probability for a pair of stimulus strength and perceptual decision. Dot size is proportional to the total number of human confidence judgments for this pair of stimulus strength and perceptual decision. **(B)** Comparison of confidence judgments of participants #15 shown as histograms and the CNCB model shown as continuous lines. Blue traces are for responses “right tilt” and orange traces (running downwards) are for responses “left tilt”.