

1 **Large-scale, high-resolution comparison of the core visual object**  
2 **recognition behavior of humans, monkeys, and state-of-the-art deep**  
3 **artificial neural networks**

4  
5 Abbreviated title: Comparing object recognition behavior in humans, monkeys, and machines

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33

34 **AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS**

35 E.B.I., R.R., and J.J.D. designed the experiments. E.B.I., K.S., R.R., and K.K. carried out the  
36 experiments. R.R., E.B.I., and P.B. performed the data analysis and modeling. R.R., E.B.I., and  
37 J.J.D. wrote the manuscript.

38

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46

47 **ABSTRACT**

48

49 Primates—including humans—can typically recognize objects in visual images at a  
50 glance, even in the face of naturally occurring identity preserving image transformations such as  
51 changes in viewpoint. A primary neuroscience goal is to uncover neuron-level mechanistic  
52 models that quantitatively explain this behavior, not only predicting average primate  
53 performance, but also predicting primate performance for each and every image. Here, we  
54 applied this stringent behavioral prediction test to the leading mechanistic models of primate  
55 vision (specifically, deep, convolutional, artificial neural networks; ANNs) by directly  
56 comparing their behavioral patterns, at high resolution over a large number of object  
57 discrimination tasks, against those of humans and rhesus macaque monkeys. Using high-  
58 throughput data collection systems for human and monkey psychophysics, we collected over one  
59 million behavioral trials for 2400 images of 24 broadly sampled basic-level objects, resulting in  
60 276 binary object discrimination tasks. Consistent with previous work, we observed that state-of-  
61 the-art deep, feed-forward, convolutional ANNs trained for visual categorization (termed  
62 DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models) accurately predicted primate patterns of object-level confusion (e.g. how often  
63 a camel is confused with a dog, on average). However, when we examined behavioral  
64 performance for individual images within each object discrimination task, we found that all of  
65 the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models were significantly non-predictive of primate performance. We found that  
66 this prediction failure was not accounted for by simple image attributes, nor was it rescued by  
67 simple model modifications. These results show that current DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models cannot account for  
68 the image-level behavioral patterns of primates, even when images are not optimized to be  
69 adversarial. This suggests that new ANN models are needed to more precisely capture the neural  
70 mechanisms underlying primate object vision, and that high-resolution, large-scale behavioral  
71 metrics could serve as a strong constraint for discovering such models.

72

73

74 **SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT**

75

76           Recently, specific feed-forward deep convolutional artificial neural networks (ANNs)  
77 models have dramatically advanced our quantitative understanding of the neural mechanisms  
78 underlying primate core object recognition. In this work, we tested the limits of those ANNs by  
79 systematically comparing the behavioral responses of these models with the behavioral responses  
80 of humans and monkeys, at the resolution of individual images. Using those high-resolution  
81 metrics, we found that all tested ANN models significantly diverged from primate behavior.  
82 Going forward, these high-resolution, large-scale behavioral metrics could serve as a strong  
83 constraint for discovering better ANN models of the primate visual system.

84

## 85 INTRODUCTION

86

87 Primates—both human and non-human—can typically recognize objects in visual images  
88 at a glance, even in the face of naturally occurring identity-preserving transformations such as  
89 changes in viewpoint. This view-invariant visual object recognition ability is thought to be  
90 supported primarily by the primate ventral visual stream (DiCarlo, Zoccolan et al. 2012), a deep  
91 hierarchical neural network (NN) of visual cortical areas. Thus, a primary neuroscience goal is to  
92 construct computational models that quantitatively explain the mechanisms underlying this  
93 ability, i.e. to discover artificial neural networks (ANNs) that accurately predict neuronal firing  
94 rate responses at all levels of the ventral stream, as well as its behavioral output. With respect to  
95 this goal, specific models within a large family of deep, convolutional neural networks (DCNNs)  
96 have been put forth as the leading ANN models of the ventral stream (Yamins and DiCarlo  
97 2016). Specifically, the best such models are DCNNs optimized by supervised training on large-  
98 scale category-labeled image-sets (ImageNet) to match human-level object categorization  
99 performance (Krizhevsky, Sutskever et al. 2012, LeCun, Bengio et al. 2015); we refer to this  
100 sub-family of DCNN models as  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  models (to denote ImageNet-Categorization pre-  
101 training), so as to distinguish them from all possible models in the DCNN family, and more  
102 broadly, from the super-family of all ANNs. To date, it has been shown that  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  models  
103 display internal feature representations that are highly similar to neuronal representations in mid  
104 (V4) and high level cortical (IT) areas of the primate ventral visual stream (Yamins, Hong et al.  
105 2013, Cadieu, Hong et al. 2014, Khaligh-Razavi and Kriegeskorte 2014, Yamins, Hong et al.  
106 2014), and they also exhibit output patterns that are remarkably similar to the behavioral patterns  
107 of pairwise object confusions of primates in the domain of basic-level core object recognition  
108 (Rajalingham, Schmidt et al. 2015). As such,  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  models may provide a quantitative  
109 account of the neural mechanisms underlying primate core object recognition behavior.

110

111 However, several studies have shown that the  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  models can diverge drastically  
112 from humans in object recognition behavior, especially with regards to particular images  
113 optimized to be adversarial to these networks (Goodfellow, Shlens et al. 2014, Nguyen, Yosinski  
114 et al. 2015). Recent work demonstrated that such adversarial images are likely not isolated  
115 instances, suggesting that  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  models may not match humans across larger image domains

116 (Goodfellow, Shlens et al. 2014). Related work has shown that specific image distortions (e.g.  
117 adding noise, blurring, inverting) are disproportionately challenging to current DCNNs, as  
118 compared to humans (Dodge and Karam 2017, Geirhos, Janssen et al. 2017, Hosseini, Xiao et al.  
119 2017). Such image-specific failures of the current ANN models would likely not be captured by  
120 object-level behavioral metrics, such as the pattern of pairwise object confusions mentioned  
121 above (Rajalingham, Schmidt et al. 2015), that are computed by pooling over hundreds of  
122 images and thus are not sensitive to the fact that some images of an object are more challenging  
123 than other images of the same object. That limitation of prior work is due largely to data scale:  
124 reliable behavioral performance estimation requires many (20+) repeated measurements to assess  
125 behavioral discriminability per experimental condition, and large-scale measurements at the  
126 image-level are comprised of many such conditions (e.g. 2400 images with 23 distractor choices  
127 per image results in 55200 conditions for measuring discrimination performance). To overcome  
128 this limitation of prior work, we expanded the scale of our data collection to approximately 1.8  
129 million trials from humans and monkeys, and we developed new behavioral metrics to reliably  
130 measure and characterize behavior at the resolution of images. Here, we directly compared  
131 leading DCNN models to primates—human and rhesus macaque monkeys—over the domain of  
132 core object recognition behavior at the high resolution of individual images.

133  
134 We focused on “core invariant object recognition”—the ability to identify objects in  
135 visual images in the central visual field during a single, natural viewing fixation (DiCarlo and  
136 Cox 2007, DiCarlo, Zoccolan et al. 2012), operationalized as images of high view uncertainty  
137 presented in the central 10° of the visual field for durations under 200ms. For this study, we  
138 further restricted our sampled object discrimination tests within that domain to “basic-level”  
139 object discriminations, as defined previously (Rosch, Mervis et al. 1976), and to rigid object  
140 transformations. Within this domain, we collected over a million behavioral trials to make large-  
141 scale, high-resolution measurements of human and monkey behavior using high-throughput  
142 psychophysical techniques—including a novel home-cage behavioral system for monkeys. These  
143 data enabled us to systematically compare all systems at progressively higher resolution. At  
144 lower resolutions, we replicated previous findings that humans, monkeys, and DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models  
145 all share a common pattern of object level confusion (Rajalingham, Schmidt et al. 2015).  
146 However, at the high resolution of individual images, we found that the behavior of each and

147 every one of the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models was significantly different from human and monkey behavior.  
148 This model prediction failure could not be easily rescued by modifications, such as primate-like  
149 retinal input sampling or additional model training. Taken together, these results show that  
150 current DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models do not fully account for the image-level behavioral patterns of primates,  
151 even when images are not optimized to be adversarial, suggesting that new ANN models are  
152 needed to more precisely capture the neural mechanisms underlying primate object vision. To  
153 this end, large-scale, high-resolution behavioral metrics such as those produced here could serve  
154 as a strong top-down constraint for efficiently discovering such models.

155

## 156 **MATERIALS & METHODS**

157

### 158 *Visual images*

159 We examined basic-level, core object recognition behavior using a set of 24 broadly-  
160 sampled objects that we previously found to be highly reliably labeled by independent human  
161 subjects, based on the definition of basic-level proposed by (Rosch, Mervis et al. 1976). For each  
162 object, we generated 100 naturalistic synthetic images by first rendering a 3D model of the object  
163 with randomly chosen viewing parameters (2D position, 3D rotation and viewing distance), and  
164 then placing that foreground object view onto a randomly chosen, natural image background. To  
165 do this, each object was first assigned a canonical position (center of gaze), scale (~2 degrees)  
166 and pose, and then its viewing parameters were randomly sampled uniformly from the following  
167 ranges for object translation ([-3,3] degrees in both h and v), rotation ([-180,180] degrees in all  
168 three axes) and scale ([x0.7, x1.7]). Backgrounds images were sampled randomly from a large  
169 database of high-dynamic range images of indoor and outdoor scenes obtained from Dosch  
170 Design ([www.doschdesign.com](http://www.doschdesign.com)). This image generation procedure enforces invariant object  
171 recognition, rather than image matching, as it requires the visual recognition system (human,  
172 animal or model) to tackle the “invariance problem,” the computational crux of object  
173 recognition (Ullman and Humphreys 1996, Pinto, Cox et al. 2008). Using this procedure, we  
174 previously generated 2400 images (100 images per object) rendered at 1024x1024 pixel  
175 resolution with 256-level gray scale and subsequently resized to 256x256 pixel resolution for  
176 human psychophysics, monkey psychophysics and model evaluation (Rajalingham, Schmidt et  
177 al. 2015). In the current work, we focused our analyses on a randomly subsampled, and then

178 fixed, sub-set of 240 images (10 images per object; here referred to as the “primary test  
179 images”). Figure 1A shows the full list of 24 objects, with two example images of each object.

180  
181 Because all of the images were generated from synthetic 3D object models, we had  
182 explicit knowledge of the viewpoint parameters (position, size, and pose) for each object in each  
183 image, as well as perfect segmentation masks. Taking advantage of this feature, we characterized  
184 each image based on these high-level viewpoint attributes as well as its low-level image  
185 attributes (i.e. pixel-wise distributional statistics computed from the final rendered image).  
186 Viewpoint attributes consisted of size, eccentricity and relative pose of the object in the image.  
187 For each synthetic object, we first defined its “canonical” 3D pose vector, based on independent  
188 human judgments. To compute the relative pose (RP) attribute of each image, we estimated the  
189 difference between the object’s 3D pose and its canonical 3D pose. Pose differences were  
190 computed as distances in unit quaternion representations: the 3D pose (rxy, rxz, ryz) was first  
191 converted into unit quaternions, and distances between quaternions  $q_1, q_2$  were estimated as  
192  $\cos^{-1}|q_1 \cdot q_2|$  (Huynh 2009). Low-level image attributes included mean luminance of the  
193 image, segmentation index of the object from the background in the image, and spatial frequency  
194 content of the image background. The mean luminance was computed as the mean of all pixel  
195 intensities for each image. To compute the segmentation index, we measured the absolute  
196 difference in intensity between the mean of the pixel intensities corresponding to the object and  
197 the mean of the background pixel intensities in the vicinity of the object (specifically, within 25  
198 pixels of any object pixel, analogous to computing the local foreground-background luminance  
199 difference of a foreground object in an image). To compute an attribute characterizing the  
200 background spatial frequency (BSF), we first converted each image’s background (prior to  
201 placing the foreground object) into the frequency domain using a 2D FFT, which we summarized  
202 using the spectral centroid. Figure 5C shows example images with varying attribute values for  
203 the three viewpoint attributes and the three low-level attributes.

204

### 205 *Core object recognition behavioral paradigm*

206 As in our previous work (Rajalingham, Schmidt et al. 2015), the behavioral task  
207 paradigm consisted of a interleaved set of binary discrimination tasks. Each binary  
208 discrimination task is an object discrimination task between a pair of objects (e.g. elephant vs.

209 bear). Each such binary task is balanced in that the test image is equally likely (50%) to be of  
210 either of the two objects. On each trial, a test image is presented, followed by a choice screen  
211 showing canonical views of the two possible objects (the object that was not displayed in the test  
212 image is referred to as the “distractor” object, but note that objects are equally likely to be  
213 distractors and targets). Here, 24 objects were tested, which resulted in 276 binary object  
214 discrimination tasks. To neutralize feature attention, these 276 tasks are randomly interleaved  
215 (trial by trial), and the global task is referred to as a basic-level, core object recognition task  
216 paradigm.

217

### 218 *Testing human behavior*

219 All human behavioral data presented here were collected from 1476 human subjects on  
220 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) performing this task paradigm. Subjects were instructed to  
221 report the identity of the foreground object in each presented image from among the two objects  
222 presented on the choice screen (Fig 1B). Because all 276 tasks were interleaved randomly (trial-  
223 by-trial), subjects could not deploy feature attentional strategies specific to each object or  
224 specific to each binary task to process each test image.

225

226 Figure 1B illustrates the time course of each behavioral trial, for a particular object  
227 discrimination task (zebra versus dog). Each trial initiated with a central black point for 500 ms,  
228 followed by 100 ms presentation of a test image containing one foreground object presented  
229 under high variation in viewing parameters and overlaid on a random background, as described  
230 above (see *Visual images* above). Immediately after extinction of the test image, two choice  
231 images, each displaying a single object in a canonical view with no background, were shown to  
232 the left and right. One of these two objects was always the same as the object that generated the  
233 test image (i.e., the correct object choice), and the location of the correct object (left or right) was  
234 randomly chosen on each trial. After clicking on one of the choice images, the subject was  
235 queued with another fixation point before the next test image appeared. No feedback was given;  
236 human subjects were never explicitly trained on the tasks. Under assumptions of typical  
237 computer ergonomics, we estimate that images were presented at 6–8° of visual angle in size,  
238 and the choice object images were presented at  $\pm 6$ –8° of eccentricity along the horizontal  
239 meridian.



240

241 We measured human behavior using the online Amazon MTurk platform (see Figure 1C),  
242 which enables efficient collection of large-scale psychophysical data from crowd-sourced  
243 “human intelligence tasks” (HITs). The reliability of the online MTurk platform has been  
244 validated by comparing results obtained from online and in-lab psychophysical experiments  
245 (Majaj, Hong et al. 2015, Rajalingham, Schmidt et al. 2015). We pooled 927,296 trials from  
246 1472 human subjects to characterize the aggregate human behavior, which we refer to as the  
247 “pooled” human (or “archetypal” human). Each human subject performed only a small number  
248 of trials (~xx) on a subset of the images and binary tasks. All 2400 images were used for  
249 behavioral testing, but in some of the HITs, we biased the image selection towards the 240  
250 primary test images ( $1424 \pm 70$  trials/image on this subsampled set, versus  $271 \pm 93$  trials/image on  
251 the remaining images, mean  $\pm$  SD) to efficiently characterize behavior at image level resolution.  
252 Images were randomly drawn such that each human subject was exposed to each image a  
253 relatively small number of times ( $1.5 \pm 2.0$  trials/image per subject, mean  $\pm$  SD), in order to  
254 mitigate potential alternative behavioral strategies (e.g. “memorization” of images) that could  
255 potentially arise from a finite image set. Behavioral metrics at the object-level (B.O1, B.O2, see  
256 Behavioral Metrics) were measured using all 2400 test images, while image-level behavioral  
257 metrics (B.I1n, B.I2n) were measured using the 240 primary test images. (We observed  
258 qualitatively similar results for those metrics using the full 2400 test images, but we here focus  
259 on the primary test images as the larger number of trials leads to lower noise levels).

260

261 Four other human subjects were separately recruited on MTurk to each perform a large  
262 number of trials on the same images and tasks ( $53,097 \pm 15,278$  trials/subject, mean  $\pm$  SD).  
263 Behavioral data from these four subjects was not included in the characterization of the pooled  
264 human described above, but instead aggregated together to characterize a distinct held-out  
265 human pool. This held-out human pool serves to provide a “gold-standard” for benchmarking all  
266 other candidate models.

267

268 *Testing monkey behavior*

269 Five adult male rhesus macaque monkeys (*Macaca mulatta*, subjects *M, Z, N, P, B*) were  
270 tested on the same basic-level, core object recognition task paradigm described above, with

271 minor modification as described below. All procedures were performed in compliance with  
272 National Institutes of Health guidelines and the standards of the Massachusetts Institute of  
273 Technology Committee on Animal Care and the American Physiological Society. To efficiently  
274 characterize monkey behavior, we used a novel home-cage behavioral system developed in our  
275 lab (termed MonkeyTurk, see Fig. 1C). This system leveraged a tablet touchscreen (9" Google  
276 Nexus or 10.5" Samsung Galaxy Tab S) and used a web application to wirelessly load the task  
277 and collect the data (code available at <https://github.com/dicarlo/lab/mkturk>). Analogous to the  
278 online Amazon Mechanical Turk, which allows for efficient psychophysical assays of a large  
279 number (hundreds) of human users in their native environments, MonkeyTurk allowed us to test  
280 many monkey subjects simultaneously in their home environment. Each monkey voluntarily  
281 initiated trials, and each readily performed the task a few hours each day that the task apparatus  
282 was made available to it. At an average rate of ~2,000 trials per day per monkey, we collected a  
283 total of 836,117 trials from the five monkey subjects over a period of ~3 months.

284  
285 Monkey training is described in detail elsewhere (Rajalingham, Schmidt et al. 2015).  
286 Briefly, all monkeys were initially trained on the match-test-image-to-object rule using other  
287 images and were also trained on discriminating the particular set of 24 objects tested here using a  
288 separate set of training images rendered from these objects, in the same manner as the main  
289 testing images. Two of the monkey subjects (Z and M) were previously trained in the lab  
290 setting, and the remaining three subjects were trained using MonkeyTurk directly in their home  
291 cages and did not have significant prior lab exposure. Once monkeys reached saturation  
292 performance on training images, we began the behavioral testing phase to collect behavior on  
293 test images. Monkeys did improve throughout the testing phase, exhibiting an increase in  
294 performance between the first and second half of trials of  $4\% \pm 0.9\%$  (mean  $\pm$  SEM over five  
295 monkey subjects). However, the image-level behavioral pattern of the first and second half of  
296 trials were highly consistent to each other (B.II consistency of  $0.85 \pm 0.06$ , mean  $\pm$  SEM over five  
297 monkey subjects), suggesting that monkeys did not significantly alter strategies (e.g. did not  
298 “memorize” images) throughout the behavioral testing phase.

299  
300 The monkey task paradigm was nearly identical to the human paradigm (see Figure 1B),  
301 with the exception that trials were initiated by touching a white “fixation” circle horizontally

302 centered on the bottom third of the screen (to avoid occluding centrally-presented test images  
303 with the hand). This triggered a 100ms central presentation of a test image, followed  
304 immediately by the presentation of the two choice images (Fig. 1B, location of correct choice  
305 randomly assigned on each trial, identical to the human task). Unlike the main human task,  
306 monkeys responded by directly touching the screen at the location of one of the two choice  
307 images. Touching the choice image corresponding to the object shown in the test image resulted  
308 in the delivery of a drop of juice through a tube positioned at mouth height (but not obstructing  
309 view), while touching the distractor choice image resulted in a three second timeout. Because  
310 gaze direction typically follows the hand during reaching movements, we assumed that the  
311 monkeys were looking at the screen during touch interactions with the fixation or choice targets.  
312 In both the lab and in the home cage, we maintained total test image size at ~6 degrees of visual  
313 angle, and we took advantage of the retina-like display qualities of the tablet by presenting  
314 images pixel matched to the display (256 x 256 pixel image displayed using 256 x 256 pixels on  
315 the tablet at a distance of 8 inches) to avoid filtering or aliasing effects.

316  
317 As with Mechanical Turk testing in humans, MonkeyTurk head-free home-cage testing  
318 enables efficient collection of reliable, large-scale psychophysical data but it likely does not yet  
319 achieve the level of experimental control that is possible in the head-fixed laboratory setting.  
320 However, we note that when subjects were engaged in home-cage testing, they reliably had their  
321 mouth on the juice tube and their arm positioned through an armhole. These spatial constraints  
322 led to a high level of head position trial-by-trial reproducibility during performance of the task  
323 paradigm. Furthermore, when subjects were in this position, they could not see other animals as  
324 the behavior box was opaque, and subjects performed the task at a rapid pace 40 trials/minute  
325 suggesting that they were not frequently distracted or interrupted. The location of the upcoming  
326 test image (but not the location of the object within that test image) was perfectly predictable at  
327 the start of each behavioral trial, which likely resulted in a reliable, reproduced gaze direction at  
328 the moment that each test image was presented. And the relatively short (but natural and high  
329 performing (Cadieu, Hong et al. 2014)) test image duration (100 ms) insured that saccadic eye  
330 movements were unlike to influence test image performance (as they generally take ~200 ms to  
331 initiate in response to the test image, and thus well after the test image has been extinguished).

332

333 *Testing model behavior*

334 We tested a number of different deep convolutional neural network (DCNN) models on  
335 the exact same images and tasks as those presented to humans and monkeys. Importantly, our  
336 core object recognition task paradigm is closely analogous to the large-scale ImageNet 1000-way  
337 object categorization task for which these networks were optimized and thus expected to perform  
338 well. We focused on publicly available DCNN model architectures that have proven highly  
339 successful with respect to this benchmark over the past five years: AlexNet (Krizhevsky,  
340 Sutskever et al. 2012), NYU (Zeiler and Fergus 2014), VGG (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014),  
341 GoogleNet (Szegedy, Zaremba et al. 2013), Resnet (He, Zhang et al. 2016), and Inception-v3  
342 (Szegedy, Zaremba et al. 2013). As this is only a subset of possible DCNN models, we refer to  
343 these as the  $DCNN_{IC}$  (to denote ImageNet-Categorization) visual system model sub-family. For  
344 each of the publicly available model architectures, we first used ImageNet-categorization-trained  
345 model instances, either using publicly available trained model instances, or training them to  
346 saturation on the 1000-way classification task in-house. Training took several days on 1-2 GPUs.  
347 The final feature layer of ImageNet trained  $DCNN_{IC}$  models corresponds to the probability  
348 output of this 1000-way classification task. We adapted these ImageNet-trained models to our  
349 24-way object recognition task by re-training the final class probability layer, while holding all  
350 other layers fixed. In practice, this was done by extracting features from the penultimate layer of  
351 each  $DCNN_{IC}$  (i.e. top-most prior to class probability layer), on the same images that were  
352 presented to humans and monkeys, and training back-end multi-class logistic regression  
353 classifiers to estimate the output class probability for each image. This procedure is illustrated in  
354 Figure 1C. To estimate the hit rate of a given image in a given binary classification task, we  
355 renormalized the 24-way class probabilities of that image, considering only the two relevant  
356 classes, to sum to one. Object-level and image-level behavioral metrics were computed based on  
357 these hit rate estimates (as described in *Behavioral Metrics* below).

358  
359 From these analyses, we selected the most consistent  $DCNN_{IC}$  architecture (Inception-  
360 v3), fixed that architecture, and then performed post-hoc analyses in which we varied: the input  
361 image sampling, the initial parameter settings prior to training, the filter training images, the type  
362 of classifiers used to generate the behavior from the model features, and the classifier training  
363 images. To examine input image sampling, we re-trained the Inception-v3 architecture on images

364 from ImageNet that were first spatially filtered to match the spatial sampling of the primate  
365 retina (i.e. an approximately exponential decrease in cone density away from the fovea) by  
366 effectively simulating a fish-eye transformation on each image. These images were at highest  
367 resolution at the “fovea” (i.e. center of the image) with gradual decrease in resolution with  
368 increasing eccentricity. To examine the analog of “inter-subject variability”, we constructed  
369 multiple trained model instances (“subjects”), where the architecture and training images were  
370 held fixed (Inception-v3 and ImageNet, respectively) but the model filter weights initial  
371 condition and order of training images were randomly varied for each model instance. To  
372 examine the effect of model training, we fine-tuned an ImageNet-trained Inception-v3 model on  
373 a synthetic image set consisting of ~6.9 million images of 1049 objects (holding out 50,000  
374 images for model validation). These images were generated using the same rendering pipeline as  
375 our test images, but the objects were non-overlapping with the 24 test objects presented here. We  
376 tested the effect of different classifiers to generate model behavior by testing both multi-class  
377 logistic regression and support vector machine classifiers. Additionally, we tested the effect of  
378 varying the number of training images used to train those classifiers (20 versus 50 images per  
379 class).

380

### 381 *Behavioral metrics*

382 We measured the object recognition behavior of humans, macaques and DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models  
383 using many test images in 276 interleaved binary object discrimination tasks (see above) To  
384 analyze these behavioral data, we here introduce four behavioral (*B*) metrics of increasing  
385 richness, but requiring increasing amounts of data to measure reliably. Each behavioral metric  
386 computes a pattern of unbiased behavioral performance, using a sensitivity index:  $d' =$   
387  $Z(\text{HitRate}) - Z(\text{FalseAlarmRate})$ , where  $Z$  is the inverse of the cumulative Gaussian  
388 distribution. The various metrics differ in the resolution at which hit rates and false alarm rates  
389 are computed. Table 1 summarizes four behavioral metrics, varying the hit-rate resolution  
390 (image-level or object-level) and the false-alarm resolution (one-versus-all or one-versus-other).  
391 Briefly, the one-versus-all object-level performance metric (termed B.O1) estimates the  
392 discriminability of each object from all other objects, pooling across all distractor object choices.  
393 Since we here tested 24 objects, the B.O1 metric measured here has 24 independent values. The  
394 one-versus-other object-level performance metric (termed B.O2) estimates the discriminability of

395 each specific pair of objects, or the pattern of pairwise object confusions. Since we here tested  
396 276 interleaved binary object discrimination tasks, the B.O2 metric measure here has 276  
397 independent values (the off-diagonal elements on one half of the 24x24 symmetric matrix). The  
398 one-versus-all image-level performance metric (termed B.I1) estimates the discriminability of  
399 each image from all other objects, pooling across all 23 possible distractor choices. Since we  
400 here focused on the primary image test set of 240 images (10 per object, see above), the B.I1  
401 metric measured here has 240 independent values. Finally, the one-versus-other image-level  
402 performance metric (termed B.I2) estimates the discriminability of each image from each  
403 distractor object. Since we here focused on the primary image test set of 240 images (10 per  
404 object, see above) with 23 distractors, the B.I1 metric measured here has 5520 independent  
405 values.

406  
407 Naturally, object-level and image-level behavioral patterns are tightly linked. For  
408 example, images of a particularly difficult-to-discriminate object would inherit lower  
409 performance values on average as compared to images from a less difficult-to-discriminate  
410 object. To isolate the behavioral variance that is specifically driven by image variation and not  
411 simply predicted by the objects (and thus already captured by the B.O1 and B.O2 metrics), we  
412 estimated normalized image-level behavioral metrics by subtracting the mean performance  
413 values over all images of the same object and task. This process is schematically illustrated in  
414 Figure 3A. We focus on these normalized image-level behavioral metrics (termed B.I1n, B.I2n)  
415 for image-level comparisons between models and primates (see Results).

416  
417 *Behavioral Consistency*

418 For each visual system, we randomly split all behavioral trials into two equal halves and  
419 computed each behavioral metric on each half. To estimate the reliability of each system's  
420 behavioral pattern given the amount of data collected, we computed the Pearson correlation  
421 between behavioral patterns estimated from separate halves of the data (random split-halves of  
422 trials). To quantify the similarity between a model visual system and the human visual system,  
423 we use a measure called the noise-adjusted human "consistency" (referred to in the text as  
424 "human consistency") as previously defined (Johnson, Hsiao et al. 2002). Consistency ( $\tilde{\rho}$ ) is  
425 computed for each of the four behavioral metrics. Specifically, for each metric, we computed the

426 Pearson correlation over all the independent measurements in the metric from the model ( $\mathbf{m}$ ) and  
427 the human ( $\mathbf{h}$ ), and we then normalize that raw Pearson correlation by the geometric mean of the  
428 split-half internal reliability of the same behavioral metric measured for each system:  $\tilde{\rho}(\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{h}) =$   
429 
$$\frac{\rho(\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{h})}{\sqrt{\rho(\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{m})\rho(\mathbf{h}, \mathbf{h})}}.$$

430  
431 Since all correlations in the numerator and denominator were computed using the same  
432 amount of trial data (exactly half of the trial data), we did not need to make use of any prediction  
433 formulas (e.g. extrapolation to larger number of trials using Spearman-Brown prediction  
434 formula). This procedure was repeated 10 times with different random split-halves of trials. Our  
435 rationale for using a noise-adjusted correlation measure for consistency was to account for  
436 variance in the behavioral patterns that arises from “noise,” i.e., variability that is not replicable  
437 by the experimental condition (image and task) and thus that no model can be expected to predict  
438 (Johnson, Hsiao et al. 2002).

439  
440 *Characterization of Residuals*

441 In addition to measuring the similarity between the behavioral patterns of primates and  
442 models (using consistency analyses, as described above), we examined the corresponding  
443 differences, or “residual behavioral patterns.” Each candidate visual system model’s residual  
444 behavioral pattern was estimated as the residual of a linear least squares regression on the human  
445 pool data (one behavioral performance value per test image, thus 240 values) and we included a  
446 free intercept parameter. This procedure effectively captures the differences between human and  
447 model behavior after accounting for overall performance differences. Residual patterns were  
448 estimated on disjoint split-halves of trials, repeating 10 times with random trial permutations. We  
449 focused on the normalized one-versus-all image-level performance pattern (B.I1n) to reliably  
450 measure image-level differences between primates and models as that metric showed a clear  
451 difference between DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models and primates, and the behavioral residual can be interpreted  
452 based only the test images (i.e. we can assign a residual per image).

453  
454 To examine the extent to which the difference between each model and humans is  
455 reliably shared across different models, we measured the Pearson correlation between the  
456 residual patterns of pairs of models. Residual similarity was quantified as the proportion of

457 shared variance, defined as the square of the noise-adjusted correlation between residual patterns  
458 (the noise-adjustment was done as defined in equation above). Correlations of residual patterns  
459 were always computed across distinct split-halves of data, to avoid introducing spurious  
460 correlations from subtracting common noise in the human data. We measured the residual  
461 consistency between all pairs of tested models, holding both architecture and optimization  
462 procedure fixed (between instances of the ImageNet-categorization trained Inception-v3 model,  
463 varying in filter initial conditions), varying the architecture while holding the optimization  
464 procedure fixed (between all tested ImageNet-categorization trained DCNN architectures), and  
465 holding the architecture fixed while varying the optimization procedure (between ImageNet-  
466 categorization trained Inception-v3 and synthetic-categorization fine-tuned Inception-v3  
467 models). This analysis addresses not only the reliability of the failure of  $DCNN_{IC}$  models to  
468 predict human behavior (deviations from humans), but also the relative importance of the  
469 characteristics defining similarities within the model sub-family (namely, the architecture and the  
470 optimization procedure). We first performed this analysis for behavioral patterns over the 240  
471 primary test images, and subsequently zoomed in on subsets of images that humans found to be  
472 particularly difficult. This image selection was made relative to the distribution of image-level  
473 performance of held-out human subjects (B.I1 metric from four subjects); difficult images were  
474 defined as ones with performance below the 50<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> percentiles of this distribution.

475  
476 To examine whether the difference between each model and humans can be explained by  
477 simple human-interpretable stimulus attributes, we regressed each  $DCNN_{IC}$  model's residual  
478 pattern from image attributes, including viewpoint attributes (e.g. object size, eccentricity, pose)  
479 and pixel attributes (e.g. mean luminance, background spatial frequency, segmentation-index).  
480 Briefly, we constructed a design matrix from the image attributes (using individual attributes,  
481 groups of attributes, or all attributes), and used multiple linear least squares regression to predict  
482 the image-level residual pattern. The multiple linear regression was tested using two-fold cross-  
483 validation over trials. The relative importance of each attribute (or groups of attributes) was  
484 quantified using the proportion of explainable variance (i.e. variance remaining after accounting  
485 for noise variance) explained from the residual pattern.

486  
487 *Primate zone*



488           In this work, we are primarily concerned with the behavior of an “archetypal human”,  
489 rather than the behavior of any given individual human subject. We operationally defined this  
490 concept as the common behavior over many humans, obtained by pooling together trials from a  
491 large number of individual human subjects and treating this human pool as if it were acquired  
492 from a single behaving agent. Due to inter-subject variability, we do not expect any given  
493 human or monkey subject to be perfectly consistent (i.e. have consistency of 1.0) with this  
494 archetypal human. Given current limitations of monkey psychophysics, we are not yet able to  
495 measure the behavior of very large number of monkey subjects at high resolution and  
496 consequently cannot directly estimate the consistency of the corresponding “archetypal monkey”  
497 to the human pool. Rather, we indirectly estimated this consistency by first measuring  
498 consistency as a function of number of individual subjects pooled together ( $n$ ), and extrapolating  
499 the consistency estimate for pools of very large number of subjects (as  $n$  approaches infinity).  
500 Extrapolations were done using least squares fitting of an exponential function  $\tilde{\rho}(n) = a + b \cdot$   
501  $e^{-cn}$  (see Figure 4).

502  
503           For each behavioral metric, we defined a “primate zone” as the range of consistency  
504 values delimited by consistency estimates  $\tilde{\rho}_{M\infty}$  and  $\tilde{\rho}_{H\infty}$  as lower and upper bounds respectively.  
505  $\tilde{\rho}_{M\infty}$  corresponds to the extrapolated estimate of consistency relative to the human pool of a  
506 large (i.e. infinitely many subjects) pool of rhesus macaque monkeys;  $\tilde{\rho}_{H\infty}$  is by definition equal  
507 to 1.0. Thus, the primate zone defines a range of consistency values that correspond to models  
508 that accurately capture the behavior of the human pool, at least as well as an extrapolation of our  
509 monkey sample. In this work, we defined this range of behavioral consistency values as the  
510 criterion for success for computational models of primate visual object recognition behavior.

511  
512           To make a global statistical inference about whether models sampled from the  $DCNN_{IC}$   
513 sub-family meet or fall short of this criterion for success, we attempted to reject the hypothesis  
514 that, for a given behavioral metric, the human consistency of  $DCNN_{IC}$  models is within the  
515 primate zone. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the empirical probability that the distribution  
516 of human consistency values, estimated over different model instances within this family, could  
517 produce human consistency values within the primate zone. Specifically, we estimated a p-value  
518 for each behavioral metric using the following procedure: We first estimated an empirical

519 distribution of Fisher-transformed human consistency values for this model family (i.e. over all  
520 tested  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  models and over all trial-resampling of each  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  model). From this  
521 empirical distribution, we fit a Gaussian kernel density function, optimizing the bandwidth  
522 parameter to minimize the mean squared error to the empirical distribution. This kernel density  
523 function was evaluated to compute a p-value, by computing the cumulative probability of  
524 observing a human consistency value greater than or equal to the criterion of success (i.e. the  
525 Fisher transformed  $\tilde{\rho}_{M\infty}$  value). This p-value indicates the probability that human consistency  
526 values sampled from the observed distribution would fall into the primate zone, with smaller p-  
527 values indicating stronger evidence against the hypothesis that the human consistency of DCNN  
528 models is within the primate zone.

529

## 530 RESULTS

531

532 In the present work, we systematically compared the basic level core object recognition  
533 behavior of primates and state-of-the-art artificial neural network models using a series of  
534 behavioral metrics (B) ranging from low to high resolution within a two-alternative forced  
535 choice match-to-sample paradigm. The behavior of each visual system, whether biological or  
536 computational, was tested on the same 2400 images (24 objects, 100 images/object) in the same  
537 276 interleaved binary object recognition tasks. Each system's behavior was characterized at  
538 multiple resolutions (see *Behavioral metrics* in Methods) and directly compared to the  
539 corresponding behavioral metric of the archetypal human (defined as the average behavior over a  
540 large pool of human subjects tested; see Methods). The overarching logic of this study is that, if  
541 two visual systems are equivalent, they should produce statistically indistinguishable behavioral  
542 metrics (B).

543

### 544 *Object-level behavioral comparison*

545 We first examined the pattern of one-versus-all object-level behavior (termed “B.O1  
546 metric”) computed across all images and possible distractors. Since we tested 24 objects here,  
547 the B.O1 metric vector is 24 dimensional. Figure 2A shows the B.O1 metric vector for the  
548 pooled human (pooling  $n=1472$  human subjects), pooled monkey (pooling  $n=5$  monkey  
549 subjects), and several  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  models as 24-dimensional vectors using a color scale. Each bin

550 corresponds to the system's discriminability of one object against all others that were tested (i.e.  
551 all other 23 objects). The color scales span each pattern's full performance range, and warm  
552 colors indicate lower discriminability. For example, red indicates that the tested visual system  
553 found the object corresponding to that element of the vector to be very challenging to  
554 discriminate from other objects (on average over all 23 discrimination tests, and on average over  
555 all images). Figure 2B directly compares the B.O1 metric vector computed from the behavioral  
556 output of two visual system models—a pixel model (top panel) and a DCNN<sub>IC</sub> model (Inception-  
557 v3, bottom panel)—against that of the human BO1 metric vector. We observe a tighter  
558 correspondence to the human behavioral pattern for the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> model visual system than for  
559 the baseline pixel model visual systems. We quantified that similarity using a noise-adjusted  
560 correlation between each pair of B.O1 vectors (termed *consistency*, following (Johnson, Hsiao et  
561 al. 2002)); the noise adjustment means that a visual system that is identical to the human pool  
562 will have an expected human consistency score of 1.0, even if it has irreducible trial-by-trial  
563 stochasticity; see Methods). Figure 2C shows the B.O1 human consistency for each of the tested  
564 model visual systems. We additionally tested the behavior of a held-out pool of four human  
565 subjects (black dot) and a pool of five macaque monkey subjects (gray dot), and we observed  
566 that both yielded B.O1 vectors that were highly consistent to the human pool ( $\tilde{\rho} = 0.90, 0.97$  for  
567 monkey pool and held-out human pool, respectively). We defined a range of consistency values,  
568 termed the “primate zone” (shaded gray area), delimited by extrapolated human consistency  
569 estimates of large pools of macaques and humans (see Methods, Figure 4). With respect to the  
570 B.O1 metric, all tested DCNN<sub>IC</sub> visual system models were either within or very close to this  
571 zone, while the baseline pixel visual system model and the low-level V1 visual system model  
572 were not ( $\tilde{\rho} = 0.40, 0.67$  for pixels and V1 models, respectively). Based on the B.O1 behavioral  
573 metric alone, the hypothesis that the human consistency of DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models is within the primate  
574 zone could not be rejected ( $p = 0.54$ , exact test, see Methods).

575  
576 Next, we compared the behavior of the visual systems at a slightly higher level of  
577 resolution. Specifically, instead of pooling over all discrimination tasks for each object, we  
578 computed the mean discriminability of each of the 276 pairwise discrimination tasks (still  
579 pooling over images within each of those tasks). This yields a symmetric matrix that is referred  
580 to here as the B.O2 metric. Figure 2D shows the B.O2 metric for pooled human, pooled monkey,

581 and several DCNN<sub>IC</sub> visual system models as 24x24 symmetric matrices. Each bin ( $i,j$ )  
582 corresponds to the system's discriminability of objects  $i$  and  $j$ , where warmer colors indicate  
583 lower performance; color scales are not shown but span each pattern's full range. We observed  
584 strong qualitative similarities between the pairwise object confusion patterns of all of the high  
585 level visual systems (e.g. camel and dog are often confused with each other by all three systems).  
586 This similarity is quantified in Figure 2E, which shows the consistency relative to the human  
587 pool of all examined visual system models with respect to this metric. Similar to the B.O1  
588 metric, we observed that both a pool of macaque monkeys and a held-out pool of humans are  
589 highly consistent to the human pool with respect to this metric ( $\tilde{\rho} = 0.77, 0.94$  for monkeys,  
590 humans respectively). Also similar to the B.O1 metric, we found that all DCNN<sub>IC</sub> visual system  
591 models are highly consistent with the human pool ( $\tilde{\rho} > 0.8$ ) while the baseline pixel visual  
592 system model and the low-level V1 visual system model were not ( $\tilde{\rho} = 0.41, 0.57$  for pixels, V1  
593 models respectively). Indeed, all DCNN<sub>IC</sub> visual system models are within the defined "primate  
594 zone" of human consistency. Again, based on the B.O2 behavioral metric, the hypothesis that the  
595 human consistency of the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models is within the primate zone could not be rejected ( $p =$   
596  $0.99$ , exact test).

597  
598 Taken together, humans, monkeys, and current DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models all share similar patterns  
599 of object-level behavioral performance patterns (B.O1 and B.O2 metrics) that are not shared with  
600 lower-level visual representations (pixels and V1). However, object-level performance patterns  
601 do not capture the fact that some images of an object are more challenging than other images of  
602 the same object because of interactions of the variation in the object's pose and position with the  
603 object's class. To overcome this limitation, we next examined the pattern of performances at the  
604 resolution of individual images on a subsampled set of images where we specifically obtained a  
605 large number of behavioral trials to accurately estimate image-level performance. Note that, from  
606 the point of view of the subjects, the behavioral tasks are identical to those already described. We  
607 are simply aiming to measure and compare their patterns of performance at much higher  
608 resolution.

609

610 *Image-level behavioral comparison*

611 To isolate purely image-level behavioral variance, i.e. variance that is not predicted by  
612 the object and thus already captured by the B.O1 metric, we focused our analyses on normalized  
613 image-level performance patterns. This normalization procedure is schematically illustrated in  
614 Figure 3A for the one-versus-all image-level performance pattern (240-dimensional, 10  
615 images/object) to obtain the normalized one-versus-all image-level behavioral metric (termed  
616 B.I1n metric, see Methods). Figure 3B shows the B.I1n metric for the pooled human, pooled  
617 monkey, and several DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models as 240 dimensional vectors. Each bin's color corresponds  
618 to the discriminability of a single image against all distractor options (after subtraction of object-  
619 level discriminability, see Figure 3A), where warmer colors indicate lower values; color scales  
620 are not shown but span each pattern's full range. Figure 3D shows the consistency to the human  
621 pool with respect to the B.I1n metric for all tested models. Unlike with object-level behavioral  
622 metrics, we now observe a divergence between DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models and primates. Both the monkey  
623 pool and the held-out human pool remain highly consistent with the pooled human with respect  
624 to this metric ( $\tilde{\rho} = 0.77, 0.96$  for monkeys, humans respectively), but all DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models were  
625 significantly less consistent (Inception-v3:  $\tilde{\rho} = 0.62$ ) and well outside of the defined "primate  
626 zone" of I1\_c consistency to the human pool. Indeed, based on the B.I1n behavioral metric, the  
627 hypothesis that the human consistency of DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models is within the primate zone is strongly  
628 rejected ( $p = 6.16e-8$ , exact test, see Methods).

629  
630 We can zoom in further on this metric by examining not only the overall performance for  
631 a given image but also the object confusions for each image, i.e. the additional behavioral  
632 variation that is due not only to the test image but to the interaction of that test image with the  
633 alternative (incorrect) object choice that is provided after the test image (see Fig. 1B). This is the  
634 highest level of behavioral accuracy resolution that our task design allows. In raw form, it  
635 corresponds to one-versus-other image-level confusion matrix, where the size of that matrix is  
636 the total number of images by the total number of objects (here, 240x24). Each bin ( $i,j$ )  
637 corresponds to the behavioral discriminability of a single image  $i$  against distractor object  $j$ .  
638 Again, we isolate variance that is not predicted by object-level performance by subtracting the  
639 average performance on this binary task (mean over all images) to convert the raw matrix B.I2  
640 above into the normalized matrix, referred to as B.I2n. Figure 3D shows the B.I2n metric as  
641 240x24 matrices for the pooled human, pooled monkey and top DCNN<sub>IC</sub> visual system models.

642 Color scales are not shown but span each pattern’s full range; warmer colors correspond to  
643 images with lower performance in a given binary task, relative to all images of that object in the  
644 same task. Figure 3E shows the human consistency with respect to the B.I2n metric for all tested  
645 visual system models. Extending our observations using the vector of image difficulties (B.I1n),  
646 we observe a similar divergence between primates and  $DCNN_{IC}$  visual system models on the  
647 matrix pattern of image-by-distractor difficulties (I2n). Specifically, both the monkey pool and  
648 held-out human pool remain highly consistent with the pooled human ( $\tilde{\rho} = 0.75, 0.77$  for  
649 monkeys, humans respectively), while all tested  $DCNN_{IC}$  models are significantly less consistent  
650 (Inception-v3:  $\tilde{\rho} = 0.53$ ) falling well outside of the defined “primate zone” of I2n consistency to  
651 the human pool. Once again, based on the B.I2n behavioral metric, the hypothesis that the human  
652 consistency of  $DCNN_{IC}$  models is within the primate zone is strongly rejected ( $p = 3.17e-18$ ,  
653 exact test, see Methods).

654

#### 655 *Natural subject-to-subject variation*

656 For each behavioral metric (B.O1, BO2, B.I1n, BI2n), we defined a “primate zone” as the  
657 range of consistency values delimited by consistency estimates  $\tilde{\rho}_{M\infty}$  and  $\tilde{\rho}_{H\infty}$  as lower and upper  
658 bounds respectively.  $\tilde{\rho}_{M\infty}$  corresponds to the extrapolated estimate of the human (pool)  
659 consistency of a large (i.e. infinitely many subjects) pool of rhesus macaque monkeys. Thus, the  
660 fact that a particular tested visual system model falls outside of the primate zone can be  
661 interpreted as a failure of that visual system model to accurately predict the behavior of the  
662 archetypal human at least as well as the archetypal monkey.

663

664 However, from the above analyses, it is not yet clear whether a visual system model that  
665 fails to predict the archetypal human might nonetheless accurately correspond to one or more  
666 individual human subjects found within the natural variation of the human population. Given the  
667 difficulty of measuring individual subject behavior at the resolution of single images for large  
668 numbers of human and monkey subjects, we could not yet directly test this hypothesis. Instead,  
669 we examined it indirectly by asking whether an archetypal model—that is a pool that includes an  
670 increasing number of model “subjects”—would approach the human pool. We simulated model  
671 inter-subject variability by retraining a fixed DCNN architecture with a fixed training image set  
672 with random variation in the initial conditions and order of training images. This procedure

673 results in models that can still perform the task but with slightly different learned weight values.  
674 We note that this procedure is only one possible choice of generating inter-subject variability  
675 within each visual system model type, a choice that is an important open research direction that  
676 we do not address here. From this procedure, we constructed multiple trained model instances  
677 (“subjects”) for a fixed DCNN architecture, and asked whether an increasingly large pool of  
678 model “subjects” better captures the behavior of the human pool, at least as well as a monkey  
679 pool. This post-hoc analysis was conducted for the most human consistent DCNN architecture  
680 (Inception-v3).

681  
682 Figure 4A shows the measured human consistency for each of the four behavioral  
683 metrics, for subject pools of varying size (number of subjects  $n$ ) of rhesus macaque monkeys  
684 (black) and ImageNet-trained Inception-v3 models (blue). The human consistency increases with  
685 growing number of subjects for both visual systems across all behavioral metrics. To estimate  
686 the expected human consistency for a pool of infinitely many monkey or model subjects, we fit  
687 an exponential function mapping  $n$  to the mean consistency values and obtained a parameter  
688 estimate for the asymptotic value (see Methods). We note that estimated asymptotic values are  
689 not significantly beyond the range of the measured data—the human consistency of a pool of  
690 five monkey subjects reaches within 97% of the human consistency of an estimated infinite pool  
691 of monkeys for all metrics—giving credence to the extrapolated consistency values. This  
692 analysis suggests that under this model of inter-subject variability, a pool of Inception-v3  
693 subjects accurately capture archetypal human behavior at the resolution of objects (B.O1, B.O2)  
694 by our primate zone criterion (see Figure 4A, first two panels). In contrast, even a large pool of  
695 Inception-v3 subjects still fails at its final asymptote to accurately capture human behavior at the  
696 image-level (B.I1n, B.I2n) (Figure 4A, last two panels).

697  
698 *Modification of visual system models to try to rescue their human consistency*

699 Next, we wondered if some relatively simple changes to the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> visual system  
700 models tested here could bring them into better correspondence with the primate visual system  
701 behavior (with respect to B.I1n and B.I2n metrics). Specifically, we considered and tested the  
702 following modifications to the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> model visual system that scored the highest in our  
703 benchmarks (Inception-v3): we (1) changed the input to the model to be more primate-like in its

704 retinal sampling (Inception-v3 + retina-like), (2) changed the transformation (aka “decoder”)  
705 from the internal model feature representation into the behavioral output by augmenting the  
706 number of decoder training images or changing the decoder type (Inception-v3 + SVM,  
707 Inception-v3 + classifier\_train), and (3) modified all of the internal filter weights of the model  
708 (aka “fine tuning”) by augmenting its ImageNet training with additional images drawn from the  
709 same distribution as our test images (Inception-v3 + synthetic-fine-tune). While some of these  
710 modifications (e.g. fine-tuning on synthetic images and increasing the number of classifier  
711 training images) had the expected effect of increasing mean overall performance (not shown), we  
712 found that none of these modifications led to a significant improvement in its human consistency  
713 on the behavioral metrics (Figure 4B). Thus, the failure of current DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models to accurately  
714 capture the image-level behavioral patterns of primates cannot be rescued by simple  
715 modifications on a fixed architecture.

716

717 *Looking for clues: Image-level comparisons of models and primates*

718 Taken together, Figures 2, 3 and 4 suggest that current DCNN<sub>IC</sub> visual system models fail  
719 to accurately capture the image-level behavioral patterns of humans and monkeys. To further  
720 examine this failure in the hopes of providing clues for model improvement, we examined the  
721 residual image-level behavioral patterns of all the visual system models, relative to the pooled  
722 human. For each model, we computed its residual image-level behavioral pattern as the  
723 difference (positive or negative) of a linear least squares regression of the model predictions with  
724 the human pool observations. For this analysis, we focused on the B.I1n metric as it showed a  
725 clear divergence of DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models and primates, and the behavioral residual can be interpreted  
726 based only on the test images (whereas B.I2n depends on the interaction between test images and  
727 distractor choice). We first asked to what extent the residual image-level behavioral patterns are  
728 shared between different visual system models.

729

730 Figure 5A shows the similarity between the residual image-level patterns of all pairs of  
731 models; the color of bin  $(i,j)$  indicates the proportion of explainable variance that is shared  
732 between the residual image-level patterns of visual systems  $i$  and  $j$ . For ease of interpretation, we  
733 ordered visual system models based on their architecture and optimization procedure and  
734 partitioned this matrix into four distinct regions. Each region compares the residuals of a



735 “source” model group with fixed architecture and optimization procedure (five Inception-v3  
736 models optimized for categorization on ImageNet, varying only in initial conditions and training  
737 image order) to a “target” model group. The target groups of models for each of the four regions  
738 are: 1) the pooled monkey, 2) other DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models from the source group, 3) DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models  
739 that differ in architecture but share the optimization procedure of the source group models and 4)  
740 DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models that differ slightly using an augmented optimization procedure but share the  
741 architecture of the source group models. Figure 5B shows the mean ( $\pm$ SD) variance shared in the  
742 residuals averaged within these four regions for all images (black dots), as well as for images  
743 that humans found to be particularly difficult (blue and red dots, selected based on held-out  
744 human data, see Methods). First, consistent with the results shown in Figure 3, we note that the  
745 residual image-level patterns of this particular DCNN<sub>IC</sub> model are not well shared with the  
746 pooled monkey ( $r^2=0.39$  in region 1), and this phenomenon is more pronounced for the images  
747 that humans found most difficult ( $r^2=0.17$  in region 1). However, this relatively low correlation  
748 between model and primate residuals is not indicative of spurious model residuals, as the image-  
749 level residual patterns were highly reliable between different instances of this fixed DCNN<sub>IC</sub>  
750 model, across random training initializations (region 2:  $r^2=0.79$ , 0.77 for all and most difficult  
751 images, respectively). Interestingly, residual patterns were still largely shared with other DCNN<sub>IC</sub>  
752 models with vastly different architectures (region 3:  $r^2=0.70$ , 0.65 for all and most difficult  
753 images, respectively). However, residual patterns were more strongly altered when the visual  
754 training diet of the same architecture was altered (region 4:  $r^2=0.57$ , 0.46 for all and most  
755 difficult images respectively, cf. region 3). Taken together, these results indicate that the images  
756 where DCNN<sub>IC</sub> visual system models diverged from humans (and monkeys) were not spurious  
757 but were rather highly reliable across different model architectures, demonstrating that current  
758 DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models systematically and similarly diverge from primates.

759

760 To look for clues for model improvement, we asked what, if any, characteristics of  
761 images might account for this divergence of models and primates. We regressed the residual  
762 image-level behavioral pattern of the Inception-v3 architecture on a range of image attributes.  
763 Specifically, we considered both object viewpoint attributes (the size, eccentricity, and pose of  
764 the object) and pixel attributes (mean luminance, background spatial frequency, segmentation  
765 index) of each image. We used multivariate regressions to predict the residual pattern from

766 groups of several image attributes (e.g. from all attributes), and also considered each attribute  
767 individually using univariate regressions. Figure 6A shows example images (sampled from the  
768 full set of 2400 images) with increasing attribute value for each of these six image attributes.  
769 While the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models were not directly optimized to display primate-like performance  
770 dependence on such attributes, we observed that the Inception-v3 visual system model  
771 nonetheless exhibited qualitatively similar performance dependencies as primates (see Figure  
772 6B). For example, humans (black), monkeys (gray) and the Inception-v3 model (blue) all  
773 performed better, on average, for images in which the object is in the center of gaze (low  
774 eccentricity) and large in size. The similarity of the patterns in Figure 6B between primates and  
775 the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> visual system models is not perfect but is striking, particularly in light of the fact  
776 that these models were not optimized to produce these patterns. However, this similarity is  
777 analogous to the similarity in the B.O1 and B.O2 metrics in that it only holds on average over  
778 many images. Looking more closely at the image-by-image comparison, we again found that the  
779 DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models failed to capture a large portion of the image-by-image variation (Figure 3). In  
780 particular, Figure 6C shows the proportion of variance explained by specific image attributes for  
781 the residual, patterns of monkeys (dark gray), Inception-v3 models (dark blue), and all DCNN<sub>IC</sub>  
782 models (light blue). We found that, taken together, all six of these image attributes explained  
783 only ~10% of the variance in the image-wise residual between humans and DCNN<sub>IC</sub>.  
784 Furthermore, we found that pixel attributes, rather than viewpoint attributes, contributed the  
785 majority of this explanatory power. Each individual attribute could explain at most a small  
786 amount of residual behavioral variance (<5% of the explainable variance). In sum, these analyses  
787 show that some behavioral effects that might provide intuitive clues to modify the DCNN<sub>IC</sub>  
788 models are already in place in those models (e.g. a dependence on eccentricity). But the  
789 quantitative image-by-image analyses of the remaining unexplained variance (Figure 6C) argue  
790 that the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> visual system models' failure to capture primate image-level performance  
791 patterns cannot be further accounted for by these simple image attributes and likely stem from  
792 other factors.

793

## 794 **DISCUSSION**

795

796 Broadly, our scientific goal is to discover computational models that quantitatively  
797 explain the neuronal mechanisms underlying primate invariant object recognition behavior. To  
798 this end, previous work had shown that specific artificial neural network models, drawn from a  
799 large family of deep convolutional neural networks and optimized to achieve high levels of  
800 object categorization performance on large-scale image-sets, accurately capture the coarse  
801 behavioral patterns of primates in core object recognition tasks while the internal hidden neurons  
802 of those same models also predict a large fraction of primate ventral stream neural response  
803 variance to images (Cadieu, Hong et al. 2014, Khaligh-Razavi and Kriegeskorte 2014, Yamins,  
804 Hong et al. 2014, Güçlü and van Gerven 2015, Rajalingham, Schmidt et al. 2015, Kheradpisheh,  
805 Ghodrati et al. 2016, Kubilius, Bracci et al. 2016). For clarity, we here referred to this sub-family  
806 of models as  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  (to denote ImageNet-Categorization training), so as to distinguish them  
807 from all possible models in the DCNN family, and more broadly, from the super-family of all  
808 ANNs. In this work, we directly compared leading  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  models to primates (humans and  
809 monkeys) with respect to their behavioral patterns at both object and image level resolution in  
810 the domain of core object recognition. Our primary novel result is that leading  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  models  
811 fail to fully replicate the image-level behavioral patterns of primates. An important related claim  
812 is that rhesus monkeys are more consistent with the archetypal human than any of the tested  
813  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  models.

814  
815 While it had previously been shown that  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  models can diverge from human  
816 behavior on specifically chosen adversarial images (Szegedy, Zaremba et al. 2013), a strength of  
817 our work is that we did not optimize images to induce failure but instead randomly sampled the  
818 image generative parameter space broadly. Furthermore, we showed that the failure of current  
819  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  models to accurately predict primate behavioral patterns cannot be explained by simple  
820 image attributes (e.g. object viewpoint meta-parameters and low-level image statistics) and  
821 cannot be rescued by simple model modifications (input image sampling, model training, and  
822 classifier variations). Taken together, these results expose a general failure of current  $\text{DCNN}_{\text{IC}}$  to  
823 fully replicate the image-level behavioral patterns of primates and suggest that new ANN models  
824 are needed to more precisely capture the neural mechanisms underlying primate object vision.

825

826           With regards to new ANN models, we can attempt to make prospective inferences about  
827 new and untested models from the data presented here. Based on the observed distribution of  
828 image-level behavioral consistency values for the tested DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models, one could infer that yet  
829 untested model instances sampled identically (i.e. from the same model sub-family) are highly  
830 likely to have similarly inadequate image-level behavioral consistency with primates. While we  
831 cannot rule out the possibility that at least one model instance within the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> class fully  
832 matches image-level human patterns, the probability of sampling such a model is vanishingly  
833 small ( $p < 10^{-18}$  for B.I2n consistency, estimated using exact test using Gaussian kernel density  
834 estimation, see Methods, Results). An important caveat of this inference is that we may have  
835 poorly estimated the consistency distribution, as we did not exhaustively sample this model  
836 family. In particular, if the model sampling process is non-stationary over time (e.g. increases in  
837 computational power over time allows larger models to be successfully trained), the consistency  
838 of new (yet to be sampled) models may lie outside the currently estimated distribution.  
839 Consistent with the latter, we observed that current DCNN<sub>IC</sub> cluster into two distinct  
840 “generations” separated in time (before/after the year 2015; e.g. Inception-v3 improves over  
841 Alexnet though both lie outside the primate zone in Figure 3). Thus, following this trend, it is  
842 possible that the evolution of “next-generation” models within the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> sub-family could  
843 meet the criterion for success of primate-like behavior.

844  
845           Alternatively, it is possible that new DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models would also fail to capture primate-  
846 like image-level behavior, suggesting that either the architectural limitations (e.g. convolutional,  
847 feed-forward) and/or the optimization procedure (including the diet of visual images) that define  
848 this model sub-family are fundamentally limiting. Thus, ANN model sub-families utilizing  
849 different architectures (e.g. recurrent neural networks) and/or optimized for different behavioral  
850 goals (e.g. loss functions other than object classification performance, and/or images other than  
851 category-labeled ImageNet images) may be necessary to accurately capture primate behavior. To  
852 this end, we propose that testing individual changes to the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models—each creating a new  
853 ANN model sub-family—may be the best way forward, as DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models currently best  
854 explain both the behavioral and neural phenomena of core object recognition.

855

856           To reach that goal of finding a new ANN model sub-family that is an even better  
857 mechanistic model of the primate ventral visual stream, we propose that even larger-scale, high-  
858 resolution behavioral measurements than previously used, such as expanded versions of the  
859 patterns of image-level performance presented here, could serve as a useful top-down  
860 optimization constraint. Not only do these high-resolution behavioral metrics have the statistical  
861 power to reject the currently leading ANN models, but they can also be efficiently collected at  
862 very large scale, in contrast to other constraint data (e.g. large-scale neuronal measurements).  
863 Indeed, current technological tools for high-throughput psychophysics in humans and monkeys  
864 (e.g. Amazon Mechanical Turk for humans, Monkey Turk for rhesus monkeys) enable time- and  
865 cost-efficient collection of large-scale behavioral datasets, such as the ~1 million behavioral  
866 trials obtained for the current work. These systems trade off an increase in efficiency with a  
867 decrease in experimental control. For example, we did not impose experimental constraints on  
868 subjects' acuity and we can only infer likely head and gaze position. Previous work has shown  
869 that patterns of behavioral performance on object recognition tasks from in-lab and online  
870 subjects were equally reliable and virtually identical (Majaj, Hong et al. 2015), but it is not yet  
871 clear to what extent this holds at the resolution of individual images, as one might expect that  
872 variance in performance across images is more sensitive to precise head and gaze location. For  
873 this reason, we refrain from making strong inferences from small behavioral differences, such as  
874 the difference between humans and monkeys. Nevertheless, we argue that this sacrifice in exact  
875 experimental control while retaining sufficient power for model comparison is a good tradeoff  
876 for the large-scale, high-resolution behavioral datasets that could be efficiently collected in both  
877 humans and monkeys, specifically toward the goal of constraining future models of the primate  
878 ventral visual stream.  
879

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969

970

971



972 **TABLES**

973 **Table 1**

Behavioral Metric	Hit Rate	False Alarm Rate
One-versus all object-level performance (B.O1) (24 x 1) $O_1(i) = Z(HR(i)) - Z(FAR(i)),$ $i = 1, 2, \dots, 24$	Proportion of trials when images of object $i$ were correctly labeled as object $i$ .	Proportion of trials when any image was incorrectly labeled as object $i$ .
One-versus-other object-level performance B.O2 (24 x 24) $O_2(i, j) = Z(HR(i, j)) - Z(FAR(i, j)),$ $i = 1, 2, \dots, 24$ $j = 1, 2, \dots, 24$	Proportion of trials when images of object $i$ were correctly labeled as $i$ , when presented against distractor object $j$ .	Proportion of trials when images of object $j$ were incorrectly labeled as object $i$ .
One-versus-all image-level performance B.I1 (240 x 1) $I_1(ii) = Z(HR(ii)) - Z(FAR(ii)),$ $ii = 1, 2, \dots, 240$ $j = 1, 2, \dots, 24$	Proportion of trials when image $ii$ was correctly classified as object $i$ .	Proportion of trials when any image was incorrectly labeled as object $i$ .
One-versus-other image-level performance B.I2 (240 x 24) $I_2(ii, j) = Z(HR(ii, j)) - Z(FAR(ii, j)),$ $ii = 1, 2, \dots, 240$ $j = 1, 2, \dots, 24$	Proportion of trials when image $ii$ was correctly classified as object $i$ , when presented against distractor object $j$ .	Proportion of trials when images of object $j$ were incorrectly labeled as object $i$ .

974

975 **Table 1: Definition of behavioral performance metrics.** The first column provides the name,  
 976 abbreviation, dimensions, and equations for each of the raw performance metrics. The next two  
 977 columns provide the definitions for computing the hit rate (HR) and false alarm rate (FAR)  
 978 respectively.

979

980 **FIGURE LEGENDS**

981

982 **Figure 1. Images and behavioral task.** (A) Two (out of 100) example images for each of the 24  
983 basic-level objects. To enforce true invariant object recognition behavior, we generated  
984 naturalistic synthetic images, each with one foreground object, by rendering a 3D model of each  
985 object with randomly chosen viewing parameters and placing that foreground object view onto a  
986 randomly chosen, natural image background. (B) Time course of example behavioral trial (zebra  
987 versus dog) for human psychophysics. Each trial initiated with a central fixation point for 500  
988 ms, followed by 100 ms presentation of a square test image (spanning 6-8° of visual angle).  
989 After extinction of the test image, two choice images were shown to the left and right. Human  
990 participants were allowed to freely view the response images for up to 1000 ms and responded  
991 by clicking on one of the choice images; no feedback was given. To neutralize top-down feature  
992 attention, all 276 binary object discrimination tasks were randomly interleaved on a trial-by-trial  
993 basis. The monkey task paradigm was nearly identical to the human paradigm, with the  
994 exception that trials were initiated by touching a fixation circle horizontally centered on the  
995 bottom third of the screen, and successful trials were rewarded with juice while incorrect choices  
996 resulted in timeouts of 1–2.5s. (C) Large-scale and high-throughput psychophysics in humans  
997 (top left), monkeys (top right), and models (bottom). Human behavior was measured using the  
998 online Amazon MTurk platform, which enabled the rapid collection ~1 million behavioral trials  
999 from 1472 human subjects. Monkey behavior was measured using a novel custom home-cage  
1000 behavioral system (MonkeyTurk), which leveraged a web-based behavioral task running on a  
1001 tablet to test many monkey subjects simultaneously in their home environment. Deep  
1002 convolutional neural network models were tested on the same images and tasks as those  
1003 presented to humans and monkeys by extracting features from the penultimate layer of each  
1004 visual system model and training back-end multi-class logistic regression classifiers. All  
1005 behavioral predictions of each visual system model were for images that were not seen in any  
1006 phase of model training.

1007 **Figure 2. Object-level comparison to human behavior.** (A) One-versus-all object-level  
1008 performance (B.O1) metric for the pooled human (n=1472 human subjects), pooled monkey  
1009 (n=5 monkey subjects), and several DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models. Each B.O1 pattern is shown as a 24-  
1010 dimensional vector using a color scale; each colored bin corresponds to the system's

1011 discriminability of one object against all others that were tested. The color scales span each  
1012 pattern's full performance range, and warm colors indicate lower discriminability. **(B)** Direct  
1013 comparison of the B.O1 metric vector computed from the behavioral output of a pixel visual  
1014 system model (top panel) and a DCNN<sub>IC</sub> visual system model (Inception-v3, bottom panel)  
1015 against that of the human B.O1 metric vector. **(C)** Consistency to the human pool, with respect to  
1016 the B.O1 metric, for each of the tested model visual systems. The black and gray dots correspond  
1017 to a held-out pool of four human subjects and a pool of five macaque monkey subjects  
1018 respectively. The shaded area corresponds to the "primate zone," a range of consistencies  
1019 delimited by the estimated consistency of a pool of infinitely many monkeys (see Figure 4A).  
1020 **(D)** One-versus-other object-level performance (B.O2) metric for pooled human, pooled  
1021 monkey, and several DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models. Each B.O2 pattern is shown as a 24x24 symmetric  
1022 matrices using a color scale, where each bin ( $i,j$ ) corresponds to the system's discriminability of  
1023 objects  $i$  and  $j$ . Color scales similar to (A). **(E)** Consistency to the human pool, with respect to  
1024 the B.O2 metric, for each of the tested model visual systems. Format is identical to (C).

1025 **Figure 3. Image-level comparison to human behavior.** **(A)** Schematic for computing B.I1n  
1026 metric. First, the one-versus-all image-level metric (B.I1) is shown as a 240-dimensional vector  
1027 (24 objects, 10 images/object) using a color scale, where each colored bin corresponds to the  
1028 system's discriminability of one image against all distractor objects. From this pattern, the  
1029 normalized one-versus-all image-level metric (B.I1n) is estimated by subtracting the mean  
1030 performance value over all images of the same object. This normalization procedure isolates  
1031 behavioral variance that is specifically image-driven but not simply predicted by the object. **(B)**  
1032 Normalized one-versus-all object-level performance (B.I1n) metric for the pooled human, pooled  
1033 monkey, and several DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models. Each B.I1n pattern is shown as a 240-dimensional vector  
1034 using a color scale, formatted as in (A). Color scales similar to Figure 2A. **(C)** Consistency to the  
1035 human pool, with respect to the B.I1n metric, for each of the tested model visual systems. Format  
1036 is identical to Figure 2C. **(D)** Normalized one-versus-other image-level performance (B.I2n)  
1037 metric for pooled human, pooled monkey, and several DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models. Each B.I2n pattern is  
1038 shown as a 240x24 matrix using a color scale, where each bin ( $i,j$ ) corresponds to the system's  
1039 discriminability of image  $i$  against distractor object  $j$ . Color scales similar to Figure 2A. **(E)**  
1040 Consistency to the human pool, with respect to the B.I2n metric, for each of the tested model  
1041 visual systems. Format is identical to Figure 2C.

1042 **Figure 4. Effect of subject pool size and DCNN model modifications on consistency with**  
1043 **human behavior. (A)** Accounting for natural subject-to-subject variability. For each of the four  
1044 behavioral metrics, the human consistency distributions of monkey (blue markers) and model  
1045 (black markers) pools are shown as a function of the number of subjects in the pool. The human  
1046 consistency increases with growing number of subjects for all visual systems across all  
1047 behavioral metrics. The dashed lines correspond to fitted exponential functions, and the  
1048 parameter estimate (mean  $\pm$  SE) of the asymptotic value, corresponding to the estimated human  
1049 consistency of a pool of infinitely many subjects, is shown at the right most point on each  
1050 abscissa. **(B)** Model modifications that aim to rescue the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models. We tested several  
1051 simple modifications (see Methods) to the DCNN<sub>IC</sub> visual system model that scored the highest  
1052 in our benchmarks (Inception-v3). Each panel shows the resulting human consistency per  
1053 modified model (mean  $\pm$  SD over different model instances, varying in random filter  
1054 initializations) for each of the four behavioral metrics.

1055  
1056 **Figure 5. Analysis of unexplained human behavioral variance. (A)** Residual similarity  
1057 between all pairs of human visual system models. The color of bin ( $i,j$ ) indicates the proportion  
1058 of explainable variance that is shared between the residual image-level behavioral patterns of  
1059 visual systems  $i$  and  $j$ . For ease of interpretation, we ordered visual system models based on their  
1060 architecture and optimization procedure and partitioned this matrix into four distinct regions. **(B)**  
1061 Summary of residual similarity. For each of the four regions in Figure 5A, the similarity to the  
1062 residuals of Inception-v3 (region 2 in (A)) is shown (mean  $\pm$  SD, within each region) for all  
1063 images (black dots), and for images that humans found to be particularly difficult (blue and red  
1064 dots, selected based on held-out human data).

1065  
1066 **Figure 6. Dependence of primate and DCNN model behavior on object viewpoint and pixel**  
1067 **attributes. (A)** Example images with increasing attribute value, for each of the six pre-defined  
1068 image attributes. **(B)** Dependence of performance as a function of six image attributes, for  
1069 humans, monkeys and a DCNN<sub>IC</sub> model (Inception-v3). **(C)** Proportion of explainable variance  
1070 of the residual image-level behavioral pattern of monkeys (black), an Inception-v3 model (dark  
1071 blue), and all DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models (light blue) that is accounted for by each of the pre-defined image

1072 attributes. Error-bars correspond to SD over trial re-sampling for monkeys, over different model  
1073 “subjects” for Inception-v3, and over different DCNN<sub>IC</sub> models for “Models (all)”.

1074

Figure 1







Figure 2


**A B.O1 (one-vs-all object-level performance)**




**B**



**C**



**D B.O2 (one-vs-other object-level performance)**



**E**






Figure 3


**A B.11n** (normalized one-vs-all image-level performance)




**B**



**C**



**D B.12n** (normalized one-vs-other image-level performance)



**E**






Figure 4




Figure 5






Figure 6

**A**



**B**



**C**

