Bayesian Model Selection Maps for group studies using M/EEG data

Clare D. Harris[1]†*, Elise G. Rowe[2]†, Roshini Randeniya[1]*, Marta I. Garrido[1,3,4,5]

[1]Computational Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory, Queensland Brain Institute, The University of
Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

[2]Tsuchiya Lab, School of Psychology, Faculty of Medicine, Nursing and Health Science, Monash
University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

[3]School of Mathematics and Physics, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

[4]Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Integrative Brain Function, Monash
University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

[5]Centre for Advanced Imaging, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia

† Equal first authorship

* Correspondence:
Clare D. Harris
clare.harris@uqconnect.edu.au

Keywords: EEG, MEG, Bayes, PPMs, BMS, code:matlab, code:spm

Abstract

Predictive coding postulates that we make (top-down) predictions about the world and that we
continuously compare incoming (bottom-up) sensory information with these predictions, in order to
update our models and perception so as to better reflect reality. That is, our so-called "Bayesian brains"
continuously create and update generative models of the world, inferring (hidden) causes from
(sensory) consequences. Neuroimaging datasets enable the detailed investigation of such modelling
and updating processes, and these datasets can themselves be analysed with Bayesian approaches.
These offer methodological advantages over classical statistics. Specifically, any number of models
can be compared, the models need not be nested, and the 'null model' can be accepted (rather than only
failing to be rejected as in frequentist inference). This methodological paper explains how to construct
posterior probability maps (PPMs) for Bayesian Model Selection (BMS) at the group level using
electroencephalography (EEG) or magnetoencephalography (MEG) data. The method has only
recently been used for EEG data, after originally being developed and applied in the context of
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) analysis. Here, we describe how this method can be
adapted for EEG using the Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) software package for MATLAB. The
method enables the comparison of an arbitrary number of hypotheses (or explanations for observed
responses), at each and every voxel in the brain (source level) and/or in the scalp-time volume (scalp
level), both within participants and at the group level. The method is illustrated here using mismatch
negativity (MMN) data from a group of participants performing an audio-spatial oddball attention task.
All data and code are provided in keeping with the Open Science movement. In so doing, we hope to
enable others in the field of M/EEG to implement our methods so as to address their own questions of
interest.

1   Introduction

The statistical testing of hypotheses originated with Thomas Bayes (Neyman and Pearson, 1933),
whose famous eponymous theorem (Bayes and Price, 1763) can be written in terms of probability
densities as follows:

41
$$p(\boldsymbol{\theta}|\boldsymbol{y}) = \frac{p(\boldsymbol{y}|\boldsymbol{\theta})p(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{p(\boldsymbol{y})} \qquad (\boldsymbol{Eq.\,1})$$

where θ denotes unobserved parameters, y denotes observed quantities, and $p(\theta|y)$ denotes the
probability p of the unknown parameters θ, given ("|") the set of observed quantities y. More generally,
p(event|knowledge) denotes the probability of an event given existing knowledge. In other words,
Bayes conceptualises statistics as simply the plausibility of a hypothesis given the knowledge available
(Meinert, 2012).

Bayes' theorem allows one to update one's knowledge of the previously-estimated (or "prior")
probability of causes, to a new estimate, the "posterior" probability of possible causes. This process
can be repeated indefinitely, with the prior being recursively updated to the new posterior each time.
This gives rise to multiple intuitive and useful data analysis methods, one of which is the explained in
detail in this paper.

Even when it first appeared, Bayes' theorem was recognised as an expression of "common sense," a
"foundation for all reasonings concerning past facts," (Bayes and Price, 1763). Centuries later,
neuroscientific evidence suggests that Bayes theorem may not only explain our "common sense" and
internal reasoning processes, but may be common to all our senses: it can actually explain the way in
which we use our various senses to perceive the world. That is, Bayesian statistics can be used to
accurately model and predict the ways in which our own brains process information (Dayan et al.,
1995; Feldman and Friston 2010; Friston, 2012; Hohwy, 2013). This has given rise to the concepts of
predictive coding and the Bayesian brain. In this context, it is unsurprising that Bayesian approaches
to statistics have high face validity (Friston and Penny, 2003). This allows for intuitive descriptions of
probability and enables experimental results to be relatively easily understood and communicated both
within and between scientific communities, as well as to the general public (Dunson, 2001).

Despite the intuitiveness of Bayesian approaches, however, the mainstay of hypothesis-testing since
the twentieth century (Vallverdú, 2008) has instead been classical or frequentist statistics, which
conceptualises probability as a 'long-run frequency' of events, and which has dominated most
approaches to neuroimaging analysis to date (Penny et al., 2007). For example, creating statistical
parametric maps (SPMs), which is a popular method of analysing neuroimaging data, mainly involves
frequentist approaches (Friston and Penny, 2003).

In frequentist statistics, the null hypothesis (that there is no relationship between the causes and the
data) is compared with one alternative hypothesis; the null is then either rejected in favour of the
alternative hypothesis, or it fails to be rejected – it can never be directly "supported." Rejection of the
null depends on the somewhat unintuitive p-value, which communicates how likely it is that the effect
(of at least the size seen in the experiment), would be seen in the absence of a true effect, if the
experiment were repeated many times. This is a more complex and counterintuitive way of
communicating results compared to Bayesian statistics (where the probability of the hypothesis in
question is what is being estimated and communicated).

Also, unfortunately, multiple different models cannot be compared at once, and the null and the
alternative models need to be nested for frequentist statistical tests to be feasible (Rosa et al., 2010).
These features cause frequentist statistics to be less useful in certain contexts, compared to the
approaches enabled by Bayesian statistics.

In recent decades, Bayesian approaches are becoming increasingly recognised for their superior utility
for addressing certain questions and in specific data analysis situations, as explained below (Beal, 2003;
Rosa, et al., 2010; Penny and Ridgway, 2013). Importantly, with Bayesian approaches to data analysis,
any number of models can be compared, the models need not be nested, and the 'null model' can be
accepted (Rosa et al., 2010). The fact that Bayesian hypothesis-testing also allows researchers to
evaluate the likelihood of the null hypothesis is crucially important in light of the replication crisis in
psychology and neuroscience (Hartshorne, 2012; Larson and Carbine, 2017; Szucs et al., 2017).
Importantly, results supporting the null hypothesis are equally noteworthy or reportable as other results
within Bayesian statistics. The use of Bayesian statistics may also ameliorate some statistical power-
related problems documented in the literature (Dienes, 2016).

Even though Bayesian statistics has gained popularity in the context of 'accepting the null', its strength
lies beyond this, in the sense that it enables the relative quantification of any number of *alternative*
models (or hypotheses). In Bayesian Model Selection (BMS), models are compared based on the
probability of observing a particular dataset given each model's parameters. The probability of
obtaining observed data, y, given model m, $p(y|m)$, is known as the model evidence. In BMS, an
approximation of the model evidence is calculated for multiple models; the model evidences are then
compared to determine which model returns the highest probability of generating the particular dataset
in question (Rosa et al., 2010).

A computationally efficient and relatively accurate (Penny et al., 2009) method of approximating the
model evidence is to use variational Bayes (VB). If each participant in the dataset is assumed to have
the same model explaining their data, then this is called a fixed effects (FFX) approach. If, on the other
hand, every participant is permitted to have their own (potentially different) model, this is called a
random effects (RFX) approach.

An elegant approach to succinctly communicating results is to use Posterior Probability maps (PPMs),
which provide a visual depiction of the spatial and/or temporal locations in which a particular model
is more probable than the alternatives considered, given the experimental data in question. The
development of PPMs is essentially the Bayesian alternative to the creation of SPMs (Friston and
Penny, 2003). PPMs may display the posterior probability of the models (the probability that a model
explains the data), or, alternatively, they may be displayed as Exceedance Probability Maps (EPMs),
which are maps of the probabilities that a model (say *k)* is *more* likely compared to all other (*K*) models
considered (Rosa et al., 2010). (EPMs will be identical to posterior probability maps in cases where
there are only two models being considered, as in this study.) EPMs are useful in that they allow us to
directly quantify which model is more probable than the other/s considered.

The data analysis method that forms the focus of this paper is Posterior Probability Mapping with an
RFX approach to VB. First introduced (Rosa et al., 2010) for functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), the method has recently been adapted for inference using electroencephalography (EEG) data
(Garrido et al., 2017). In their study, Garrido and colleagues (2017) used variational Bayes to
approximate the log of the model evidence for each voxel (in space and time) in every participant, in
order to construct PPMs at the group level. They did this in the context of comparing between two
computational models describing the relationship between attention and prediction in auditory

processing. While that paper focused on using this Bayesian methodology to address an important
neuroscientific question, the precise way in which Rosa and colleagues' (2010) methods were adapted
for use with EEG data have not been formally described to date – leading to the purpose of this paper.

Here, we describe in a tutorial-like manner how to build and compare PPMs for EEG and/or
magnetoencephalography (MEG) data (M/EEG), using an RFX approach to VB. This approach
provides useful ways of displaying the probabilities of different models at different times and brain
locations, given any set of neuroimaging data (as done in (Garrido et al., 2017)) using the Statistical
Parametric Mapping (SPM) software package for MATLAB. Furthermore, in keeping with the Open
Science movement, we provide the full EEG dataset (https://figshare.com/s/1ef6dd4bbdd4059e3891)
and the code (https://github.com/ClareDiane/BMS4EEG) to facilitate future use of the method. In so
doing, we hope that this paper and its associated scripts will enable others in the field of M/EEG to
implement our methods to address their own questions of interest.

2   Theory

In frequentist hypothesis testing, what is actually being tested is the null hypothesis (i.e. that there is
no relationship between the variables of interest; Friston, 2007b). If it is assumed that there is a linear
relationship between the causes and data, then the relationship between the causes (x) and data (y) can
be represented as below (Friston, 2007b):

138
$$y = x\theta + \varepsilon \qquad (Eq.\,2)$$

where y denotes data, x denotes causes and ε is an error term. The null hypothesis is that the relationship
between the causes and data does not exist, that is, $\theta = 0$. The null hypothesis is compared to one
alternative hypothesis; the null is then either rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis, or it fails
to be rejected – it can never be directly "supported."

Using the frequentist framework, one cannot test multiple models at once (unlike what can be done
when using Bayesian approaches). (In this setting, a model corresponds to a particular mixture of
explanatory variables in the design matrix x.) Even if one only wishes to test one model against the
null, however, frequentist statistics still gives rise to problems unless the null and alternate models are
nested. When the variables in one model cannot be expressed as a linear combination of the variables
in another model, the two models are said to be non-nested (McAleer, 1995). Non-nested models
usually arise when model specifications are subject to differences in their auxiliary assumptions or in
their theoretical approaches, and can still be dealt with by making specific modifications to frequentist
approaches (McAleer, 1995; Horn, 1987). However, there are many situations where Bayesian
approaches are more appropriate for non-nested models than adapted frequentist inference (Rosa et al.,
2010). Indeed, Penny et al. (2007), showed that functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
haemodynamic basis sets are best compared using Bayesian approaches to non-nested models (Penny
et al., 2007).

Furthermore, Bayesian approaches to statistics have long been recognised for their relative advantages
outside of the realm of neuroimaging. In clinical trials, Bayesian experimental design techniques and
interim analyses have been found to improve trials' statistical power, cost-effectiveness and clinical
outcomes (e.g. Trippa et al., 2012; Connor et al., 2013), compared to when classical approaches are
used alone. Bayesian statistics are also especially useful in the worlds of computational physics
(Mohammad-Djafari, 2002) and biology (Needham et al., 2007), and in machine learning (Lappalainen
and Miskin, 2000).

The aim of BMS is to adjudicate between models using each one's *model evidence*. Also written as
$p(y|m)$, the model evidence is defined as the probability (p) of obtaining observed data (denoted y)
given the model (denoted m). It is given by the following integral:

166
$$p(y|m) = \int p(y|\theta, m)p(\theta|m)d\theta \qquad (Eq. 3)$$

This integral is usually intractable, so numerous methods have been developed to approximate it. As
Blei et al., (2017) succinctly summarise, there are two main ways to solve the problem of
approximating the integral above. One is to sample a Markov chain (Blei et al., 2017), and the other is
to use optimisation. The conversion of an integration problem into an optimisation problem is due to
Richard Feynman, who introduced variational free energy in the setting of path integral problems in
quantum electrodynamics (Feynman et al., 2010; Feynman and Brown, 1942). By inducing a bound on
the integral above – through an approximate posterior density (please see below) – one converts an
intractable integration problem into a relatively straightforward optimisation problem, that can be
solved using gradient descent.

Some of the specific approximation methods that have been used to date include Annealed Importance
Sampling (AIS; Neal, 1998; Penny and Sengupta, 2016), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
measures (Rissanen, 1978; Penny, 2012), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) measures (Akaike, 1980;
Penny, 2012), and finally, the variational Free Energy (F), which was first applied to the analysis of
functional neuroimaging time series by Penny, Kiebel and Friston (2003) and which is explained in
this paper (Rosa et al., 2010). These methods have varying degrees of accuracy and computational
complexity, and have been studied in detail elsewhere (Beal and Ghahramani, 2003; Penny et al., 2004;
Penny, 2012). The variational Free Energy provides a relatively high level of accuracy, without a great
computational cost (Rosa et al., 2010), and so it is unsurprising that it is widely used in neuroimaging
(Rosa et al., 2010). The Free Energy formula is (Penny et al., 2003):

186
$$F = \int q(\theta|y)log\frac{p(y,\theta)}{q(\theta|y)}d\theta \qquad (Eq. 4)$$

where $q(\theta|y)$ is an (initially) arbitrary distribution of the parameters θ given the data at each voxel y,
$p(y,\theta)$ denotes the joint probability of the data and the parameters occurring, and $d\theta$ simply denotes
that the integral given by F is with respect to the model parameters θ.

The "variational" term in variational Free Energy, and in variational Bayes (VB), refers to the branch
of calculus (the calculus of variations) that deals with maximising or minimising functionals, or
integrals. The utility of variational calculus in neuroimaging analysis has been reviewed in numerous
other papers (Friston et al., 2008). In brief, the aim in variational Bayes is to maximise the functional
given by the equation above. The reason for doing this is that it provides information about the model
evidence. More specifically, the Free Energy relates to the log of the model evidence (or log-model
evidence) as described by the following equation, known as the fundamental equation of variational
Bayes (Penny et al., 2003):

198
$$\log p(y|m) = F(m) + KL(q(\theta)||p(\theta|y, m)) \qquad (Eq. 5)$$

where $\log p(y|m)$ is the log-model evidence, F is the variational Free Energy, and $KL(q(\theta)||p(\theta|y,m))$ is
the Kullback-Leibler divergence, or relative information, with respect to the approximate distribution

$q(\theta)$ and the distribution that is diverging from it, namely the true distribution, $p(\theta|y,m)$, as further
described below.

The reason why Free Energy can be used as an approximation of the model evidence is better
understood in light of the meaning of the second term in the fundamental VB equation, the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence (Penny et al., 2003). The equation for this is:

206
$$KL = \int q(\theta|y) \log \frac{q(\theta|y)}{p(\theta|y)} d\theta \qquad (Eq.\,6)$$

where all terms listed here have the same meanings as defined in earlier paragraphs. The KL divergence
is also known as KL information, and this is because it is a measure of the information "difference" or
divergence between two distributions. It can be derived by considering the so-called cross-entropy and
entropy of the two distributions respectively, as outlined below (Carter, 2011). The concept of "relative
entropy" is essentially "average information," with "information" being defined as Shannon (1984)
originally introduced:

213
$$I(p) = \log_b\left(\frac{1}{p}\right) = -\log_b(p) \qquad (Eq.\,7)$$

where $I(p)$ is the information given by observation of an event of probability p, and $\log_b(1/p)$ is the
logarithm (in base b) of the inverse of the probability of that event. The formula above is used to derive
the "average information," also sometimes referred to a relative entropy, from a set of events. A related
concept is the "cross entropy" between two distributions (see Carter, 2011); and the difference between
the cross entropy and the entropy of the original/true distribution is equivalent to the KL divergence.
Being a measure of information, the KL divergence has the property that it is non-negative;
consequently, the lowest value it can take is zero.

The KL divergence between two distributions is zero only if the two distributions are equivalent. The
closer KL is to zero, the less dissimilar the two distributions are. Thus, minimising KL is equivalent to
maximising F, and F is said to provide a lower bound on the log-evidence. The aim of VB learning is
to maximise F so that the approximate posterior thereby becomes as close as possible to the true
posterior (Penny et al., 2007).

If (and only if) the KL divergence is zero, then F is equal to the log-model evidence. The free energy
thus provides a *lower bound* on the log-evidence of the model, which is why iteratively optimising it
allows us to proceed with BMS using F as an *approximation* of the log-model evidence (Penny et al.,
2007). As the KL divergence is minimised by an iterative process of optimisation, F becomes an
increasingly "tighter" lower bound on the desired (actual) log-model evidence; owing to this, BMS can
proceed using F as a "surrogate" for the log-model evidence (Rosa et al., 2010). The iterations continue
until improvements in F are very small (below some desired threshold). This method of estimating the
log-model evidence is implemented in the second script described in the Implementation section
("BMS2_ModelSpec_VB.m").

Although it has been summarised here, it is also worth noting that VB is further fleshed out in multiple
other research papers (Penny et al., 2003; Friston et al., 2007; Friston and Penny, 2007; Penny et al.,
2007) and tutorials (Lappalainen and Miskin, 2000). In *Statistical Parametric Mapping,* Friston
(2007a) provides the mathematical derivations for the fundamental equation of variational Bayes, and
his colleagues provide a full explanation of its application to BMS (Penny et al., 2007).

The application of VB in the context of fMRI analysis has been described in detail elsewhere (Rosa et
al., 2010; Stephan et al., 2009; Penny et al., 2007). Penny and colleagues (2007) used Bayesian
spatiotemporal models of within-subject log-model evidence maps for fMRI data, in order to make
voxel-wise comparison of these maps and thereby to make inferences about regionally specific
effects. Rosa and colleagues (2010) developed their approach by combining the methods described by
Penny et al. (2007) with those of Stephan et al. (2009), who used an RFX approach to VB, as described
below.

After the log-model evidence has been estimated as described above, given uniform priors over models,
one can then estimate posterior model probabilities by comparing model-evidences between models.
The ratio between model evidences, or Bayes factor (BF), can be used to estimate posterior model
probabilities. A BF greater than 20 is equivalent to a posterior model probability greater than 0.95
(Kass and Raftery, 1995), which is reminiscent of the typical p-value smaller than 0.05. The product
of Bayes factors over all subjects is called the Group Bayes Factor (GBF), and it gives the relative
probability that one model (relative to another) applies to the entire group of subjects. That is, it rests
on the assumption that the data were generated by the same model for all participants, and that data are
conditionally independent over subjects. This is known as fixed effects (FFX) inference, and it is not
as robust to outliers as random effects (RFX) inference, which does not assume that the data were
necessarily generated by the same model for each participant (Stephan et al., 2009).

Stephan et al. (2009) developed a novel VB approach for group level methods of Bayesian model
comparison that used random effects instead of fixed effects analysis at the group level. They did this
by treating models as random variables whose probabilities can be described by a Dirichlet distribution
(which is conjugate to the multinomial distribution) with parameters that are estimated using the log-
model evidences over all models and subjects (as described below). Once the optimal Dirichlet
parameters have been estimated, they can be used to calculate posterior probabilities or exceedance
probabilities of a given model for a randomly-selected participant. This is what is done in the third
script ("BMS3_PPMs.m", described in the Implementation section below), and the underlying
mathematics is explained briefly below.

In the RFX approach introduced by Stephan et al. (2009), we assume that the probabilities of the
different models (or hypotheses) are described by the following Dirichlet distribution:

$$p(r|\alpha) = Dir(r, \alpha) = \frac{1}{Z(\alpha)} \prod_k r_k^{\alpha_k - 1}$$

$$(Eq. 8)$$

$$Z(\alpha) = \frac{\prod_k \Gamma(\alpha_k)}{\Gamma(\sum_k \alpha_k)}$$

where r represents the probabilities $r = [r_1, \ldots., r_K]$ of K different models (or hypotheses), and $\alpha = [\alpha_1$
$, \ldots., \alpha_K]$ are related to unobserved "occurrences" of models in the population. This distribution is part
of a hierarchical model: the next level depends on model probabilities, r, which are described by the
Dirichlet distribution.

In the next level of the hierarchical model, we assume that the probability that a particular model
generated the data of a particular subject, is given by a multinomial variable m_n whose probability
distribution is as follows:

278
$$p(m_n|r) = \prod_k r^{m_{nk}} \qquad (\textbf{\textit{Eq}}.\,\textbf{9})$$

279   where m_n is the multinomial variable that describes the probability that model k generated the data of
280   subject n given the probabilities r.

281   Finally, in the lowest level of this hierarchical model, the probability of the data in the nth subject,
282   given model k, over all parameters (ϑ) of the selected model (i.e. the marginal likelihood of the data in
283   the nth subject, obtained by integrating over the parameters of the model) is given by:

284
$$p(y_n|m_{nk}) = \int p(y|\vartheta)p(\vartheta|m_{nk})d\vartheta \qquad (\textbf{\textit{Eq}}.\,\textbf{10})$$

The goal is to invert this hierarchical model, that is, work backwards from data (y_n) find the parameters
of the Dirichlet distribution (which then allows the calculation of the expected posterior probability of
obtaining the kth model for any randomly selected subject, as shown below). This model inversion is
done using a VB approach in which the Dirichlet distribution is approximated with a conditional
density, $q(r) = Dir(r, \alpha)$. Stephan et al. (2009) show that the following algorithm yields the optimal
parameters of the conditional density $q(r) = Dir(r, \alpha)$:

291
$$\alpha = \alpha_0$$

292   Until convergence

293
$$u_{nk} = exp\left(\ln p(y_n|m_{nk}) + \Psi(\alpha_k) - \Psi\left(\sum_k \alpha_k\right)\right)$$

$$(\textbf{\textit{Eq}}.\,\textbf{11})$$

294
$$\beta_k = \sum_n \frac{u_{nk}}{\sum_k u_{nk}}$$

295
$$\alpha = \alpha_0 + \beta$$

end

where α are "occurrences" of models in the population; α_0 is the Dirichlet prior, which, on the
assumption that no models have been "seen" *a priori*, is set as $\alpha_0 = [1,...,1]$ so that all models are
equally probable to begin with; u_{nk} is the non-normalised belief that model k generated the data y_n for
subject n (for the derivation of this line, please see Stephan et al., 2009); Ψ is the digamma function
$\Psi(\alpha_k) = \frac{\delta \log \Gamma(\alpha_k)}{\delta \alpha_k}$; β_k is the expected number of subjects whose data are believed to be generated by
model k (so-called "data counts"); and the last line, $\alpha = \alpha_0 + \beta$ essentially obtains the parameters of
the Dirichlet distribution by starting with the Dirichlet prior α_0 and adding on "data counts" β (Stephan
et al., 2009).

Once the Dirichlet parameters have been optimised as per the algorithm above, this can be used for
model comparisons at the group level. One way of comparing models is to simply compare the
parameter estimates α. Another way is to calculate the multinomial parameters, $\langle r_k \rangle$, that encode the
posterior probability of model k being selected for a randomly chosen subject in the group:

309
$$\langle r_k \rangle = \alpha_k / (\alpha_1 + \cdots + \alpha_K) \qquad (\boldsymbol{Eq.\,12})$$

310   where r_k is the probability of the model; the numerator of the fraction, α_k, is the "occurrence" of model
311   k; and the denominator $(\alpha_1 + \cdots + \alpha_K)$ is the sum of all model "occurrences." This was how the PPMs
312   were generated in the third script ("BMS3_PPMs.m") below.

313   Another option for comparing models after the optimal Dirichlet parameters have been found, is to
314   calculate the exceedance probability for a given model, as follows:

315
$$\varphi_k = p \left(\prod_{j \neq k} r_k > r_j | y ; \alpha \right) \qquad (\boldsymbol{Eq.\,13})$$

where φ_k is the exceedance probability for model k, that is, the probability that it is more likely than
any of the other models considered; r_k is the probability of model k; r_j is the probability of all other
models considered; y represents the data and α represents the Dirichlet parameters.

Having introduced this RFX approach to VB, Stephan and colleagues (2009) then used both simulated
and empirical data to demonstrate that when groups are heterogeneous, fixed effects analyses fail to
remain sufficiently robust. Crucially, they also showed that RFX is robust to outliers, which can
confound inference under FFX assumptions, when those assumptions are violated. Stephan et al. thus
concluded that although RFX is more conservative than FFX, it is still the best method for selecting
among competing neurocomputational models.

325	**3**	**Methods**

326	**3.1**	**Experimental design**

This experiment is a direct replication of that performed by Garrido et al. (2017), apart from the
omission of a 'divided attention' condition. As they describe in greater detail in their paper, Garrido et
al. (2017) utilised a novel audio-spatial attention task during which attention and prediction were
orthogonally manipulated; this was done to evaluate the effect of surprise and attention in auditory
processing (Garrido et al., 2017). The authors compared two models (shown in Figure 1) which may
explain the effect attention has on the neural responses elicited by predicted and unpredicted events.

[Figure 1 about here]

The original study supported the model in which attention boosts neural responses to both predicted
and unpredicted stimuli, called the Opposition Model (Garrido et al., 2017). Prediction attenuates
neural activity, while attention enhances this activity. Since these effects occur in opposite directions
or have opposing effects, the researchers named the model (describing these effects) the Opposition
Model. According to this model, attention improves the accuracy of predictions by precision weighting
prediction errors more heavily. Thus, in light of this model, attention and prediction work together (in
opposite directions) to improve our ability to make more accurate representations of the sensorium.

Our current study attempted to replicate the above-mentioned study with an independent dataset and
employing the Bayesian methods that resembled the original study as closely as possible. The only
difference was that the divided-attention condition was not administered because it was not required
for the implementation and description of the BMS steps. It is hoped that the detailed description of
our methods, adapted from those originally developed for fMRI by Rosa et al. (2010), prove to be
useful for other EEG and/or MEG researchers. Furthermore, a replication study such as this one has
the additional benefit of being responsive to the persisting replication crisis that continues to pose a
significant problem for neuroscience and psychology (Hartshorne, 2012; Larson and Carbine, 2017;
Szucs et al., 2017).

To this end we employed BMS to adjudicate between two competing hypotheses (see Figure 1),
namely:

(1) Attention increases (boosts) neural responses to both predicted and unpredicted stimuli. This is
formalised in the Methods section and is then called Model One – the Opposition Model.

(2) Attention boosts neural responses to predicted stimuli more than it boosts responses to unpredicted
stimuli. This causes predicted attended stimuli to generate the highest neural responses, followed by
attended unpredicted stimuli. This is formalised in the Methods section and is then called Model Two
– the Interaction Model.

3.2   Participants

Twenty-one healthy adults (aged between 19-64 years, M = 25.00 years, SD= 9.83, nine females) were
recruited via the University of Queensland's Psychology Research Participation Scheme (SONA).
Exclusion criteria included any history of mental or neurological disease, any previous head injury
resulting in unconsciousness, or an age outside the prescribed range (18-65 years). All participants
gave both written and verbal informed consent to both the study and to having their de-identified data
made available in publicly distributed databases. Participants completed practice blocks of stimulus
presentation prior to undergoing the EEG recording, in order to enable them to withdraw if they found
the task unpleasant or excessively challenging. (No participants wished to withdraw.) Participants were
monetarily compensated for their time. This study was approved by the University of Queensland
Human Research Ethics Committee.

3.3   Task description

Participants wore earphones with inner-ear buds (Etymotic, ER3) and were asked to follow instructions
on a computer screen. Participants were asked to pay attention to the sound stream in either the left or
the right ear (ignoring the sounds that were being played in the other ear). Gaussian white noise was
played to both ears and an oddball sequence was played to one of the ears. During a given block,
participants were tasked with listening carefully for gaps in the white noise on the side to which they
had been asked to attend. They were asked to press a "1" on the numbered keyboard when they heard
a single gap (lasting 90 ms) in the white noise, and a "2" when they heard a double gap (two 90 ms
gaps separated by 30 ms of white noise). They were asked to ignore any tones played on both the
attended and the opposite ear. This task is described in further detail, including pictorial
representations, in Garrido et al., (2017).
380

Participants listened to eight different blocks, each 190 seconds in duration. Each block contained a
total of 30 targets (15 single gaps and 15 double gaps, randomly distributed across the block, but never
occurring within 2.5 seconds of each other and never occurring at the same time as a tone). Throughout
each block there were also 50-ms-long pure tones being played in one of the ears, with a 450 ms inter-
stimulus interval. In each block there were two tones: the standard tone (either 500 Hz or 550 Hz
counterbalanced between blocks) that occurred 85% of the time, and the deviant (either 550 Hz or 500
Hz, the opposite of the standard tone and counterbalanced across blocks) that occurred 15% of the
time. All sound files were created using MATLAB (RRID:SCR_001622; The MathWorks, Inc.;
http://www.mathworks.com) with sound recordings done using Audacity ® (Audacity: Free Audio
Editor and Recorder, RRID:SCR_007198) as previously described by Garrido et al., (2017). The order
was counterbalanced such that no two participants received the same order of blocks.
392

Prior to and during the practice block/s, the volume of sound delivery was adjusted until the participant
stated that they were able to hear the white noise well enough to complete the task. For each participant,
an accuracy level was calculated, consisting of the percentage of white noise gaps that were correctly
identified (as single or double) and responded to promptly (i.e. within two seconds of the gap/s). This
was calculated separately for the practice block, which was repeated if a participant did not achieve at
least 50% accuracy. Once participants achieved above 50% accuracy, they were invited to participate
in the rest of the experiment. At the end of the experiment each participant's accuracy was again
calculated to ensure their accuracy level remained at least 50% (otherwise they were excluded from
the study). This was to ensure that participants were attending to the task as instructed.
402

3.4   EEG data acquisition

Using a standardised nylon head cap fitted tightly and comfortably over the scalp, 64 silver/silver chloride (Ag/AgCl) scalp electrodes were placed according to the international 10-10 system for electrode placement. As is usual for this system, electrodes were placed above and below the left eye and just lateral to the outer canthi of both left and right eyes, to generate the vertical electrooculogram (VEOG) and horizontal electrooculogram (HEOG) recordings respectively. Continuous EEG data were recorded using a Biosemi Active Two system at a sampling rate of 1024 Hz. The onset of targets, standards and deviants were recorded with unique trigger codes at the time of delivery to the participant. Within each block, the target triggers were used for accuracy calculations, while the standard and deviant triggers were kept as the time points around which to epoch the data at a later stage.

3.5   EEG preprocessing

Following the collection of the raw EEG data, preprocessing was completed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM) software (SPM12, RRID:SCR_007037; Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). EEG data preprocessing included referencing data to the common average of all electrodes; downsampling to 200 Hz; bandpass filtering (between 0.5 to 40 Hz); eyeblink correction to remove trials marked with eyeblink artefacts (measured with the VEOG and HEOG channels); epoching using a peri-stimulus window of -100 to 400 ms; artefact rejection (with 100 uV cut-off); low-pass filtering (40 Hz; to remove any high frequency noise from the robust averaging step) and baseline correction (-100 to 0 ms window).

Source Reconstruction

For source BMS, SPM12 software was used to obtain source estimates on the cortex by reconstructing the scalp activity using a single-shell head model. The forward model was then inverted with multiple sparse priors (MSP) assumptions for the variance components (Friston et al., 2008) under group constraints (Litvak and Friston, 2008). The entire time window of 0 to 400 ms was used to infer the most likely cortical regions that generated the data observed during this time. Images for each participant and each condition were obtained from the source reconstructions and were smoothed at full width at half maximum (FWHM) 12 x 12 x 12 mm. This source reconstruction step is available as an online script (named "BMS1_Source_ImCreate.m" and available at https://github.com/ClareDiane/BMS4EEG).

3.6   Bayesian Model Selection Maps: Implementation for M/EEG

For all data analysis steps (Table 1), we used SPM12 software package for MATLAB. We wrote in-house MATLAB scripts, integrated with SPM12 and now available online (https://github.com/ClareDiane/BMS4EEG). The online scripts are divided into three BMS scripts. In the first script (BMS1_ST_ImCreate.m for spatiotemporal BMS and BMS1_Source_ImCreate.m for source BMS), we call the preprocessed EEG data and then create images for every trial, for every condition, and for every participant. The second script (BMS2_ModelSpec_VB.m) specifies the hypotheses and implements variational Bayes (as described in the Theory section). The last script (BMS3_PPMs.m) then creates Posterior Probability Maps.

In the model specification and VB script (BMS2_ModelSpec_VB.m), we changed individual participants' data file structures in order to match the format that SPM typically requires to read fMRI data. This is done by first loading the relevant file path and then changing the file structure. Once these

newly-structured files had been saved, we next specified the models to be compared: this was done by
assigning covariate weights to describe both models (please see the instructions contained within
BMS2_ModelSpec_VB.m on Github). The Opposition Model was assigned weights of [1, 2, 2, and 3]
for the unattended predicted, attended predicted and unattended unpredicted, and attended unpredicted,
respectively. The Interaction Model was assigned weights of [1, 4, 2, and 3] for the same conditions.

These covariate weights essentially describe the assumed relationship between the different conditions
according to a given model. For example, using [1, 2, 2, and 3] as employed in the Opposition Model,
means that according to the Opposition Model, the unattended predicted condition (the first condition
with an assigned weight of 1) evokes the smallest activity, whereas the attended unpredicted (the fourth
condition with a weight of 3) has the greater activity, and both attended predicted and unattended
unpredicted (second and third conditions with an equal weight of 2) are in between the former two
conditions and indistinguishable in magnitude from each other.

We then created log-evidence images, representing the log-model evidences, for both models
(separately), for every participant (individually) at every voxel. In the case of spatiotemporal (scalp-
level) BMS, each voxel was representative of a specific spatiotemporal location within the peristimulus
time window (0 to 400 ms) and topologically across the scalp, such that the first two dimensions of the
voxel refer to the space across the scalp and the third dimension is time (as shown in Figure 2).
Conversely, in the source BMS (which began with the source reconstruction steps described above),
each voxel was representative of an inferred location in three-dimensional source space. Once log
evidence images had been created, these were smoothed with a 1 mm half-width Gaussian kernel.

In summary, one can create posterior probability maps or log evidence maps in sensor or source space.
In sensor space, this involves creating a two-dimensional image over the scalp surface and equipping
the space with a peristimulus time dimension. This creates posterior probability maps over the scalp
surface and peristimulus time, enabling one to identify regionally and temporally specific effects due
to a particular model, relative to other contrasts. Alternatively, one can create three-dimensional
posterior probability maps in source space, following source reconstruction.

The core SPM script that allows VB to be used on fMRI data is named spm_spm_vb.m and is found
in the SPM12 package, downloadable from the SPM site. This core script was edited in order to adapt
the VB method for EEG, as follows. Changes were made such that different data structures could be
read in the same way that fMRI data would usually be read. Furthermore, high-pass filtering steps were
removed as these only apply to low-frequency drifts associated with fMRI data. The specific changes
made between the original script and the altered one to be used for spatiotemporal BMS are accessible
online (goo.gl/ZVhPT7). For the source BMS steps, the same changes were left in place as outlined
above, and in addition, the required minimum cluster size was changed from 16 voxels to 0 voxels to
allow for visualisation of all clusters of any size. The specific differences between the original and
source BMS versions of the spm_spm_vb script are accessible online (goo.gl/WXAo67).

In the final step (BMS3_PPMs.m), the SPM Batch Editor was used to apply a random effects approach
to the group model evidence data in a voxel-wise manner, thus translating the log-evidence images
from the previous step into Posterior Probability Maps (similar to how Penny at al. (2007) and Rosa et
al., (2010) have produced PPMs previously for fMRI data). The maps, displayed in the Figures 2, 3
and 4, were generated by selecting threshold probabilities of 75% for the spatiotemporal maps (Figure
2) and 50% for the source maps (Figures 3 and 4). This threshold can be adjusted by the user. EPMs
can also be displayed by selecting the relevant setting in the final script (please see the instructions on
Github).

[Table 1 about here]
490

4   Results

492   The raw dataset for this study can be found on Figshare (EEG_Auditory_Oddball_Raw_Data
493   repository, https://figshare.com/s/1ef6dd4bbdd4059e3891).

494   The preprocessed dataset for this study can also be found on Figshare
495   (EEG_Auditory_Oddball_Preprocessed_Data repository,
496   https://figshare.com/s/c6e1f9120763c43e6031).

4.1   Scalp - Spatiotemporal

Figure 2 shows scalp (spatiotemporal) PPMs of the two competing models over space and time. These
maps display all posterior probabilities exceeding 75% over space and time for both models. As can
be seen in the figure, spatiotemporal BMS results revealed that Model One (the Opposition Model)
was by and large the superior model. The Opposition Model had model probabilities exceeding 75%
across the majority of later time points (with most significant clusters between 225-360 ms), and over
most frontocentral and bilateral channel locations, as shown in (**A**). On the other hand, as shown in
(**B**), the Interaction Model did have over 75% model probability centrally between 175-185 ms, which
is within the mismatch negativity (MMN) time window. These findings replicate those of Garrido et
al., (2017), and strongly support the implications discussed in great depth in that paper.

[Figure 2 about here]

4.2   Source

As shown in Figures 3, 4 and 5, source BMS results also favoured the Opposition Model, with higher
model probability over the left supramarginal gyrus (with 91% model probability over a relatively large
cluster, $K_E = 6115$), the right superior temporal gyrus (with 87% model probability over a cluster with
$K_E = 5749$) as well as over parts of the left inferior parietal lobe, right inferior parietal lobe and left
postcentral gyrus. Having said this, the Interaction Model also had two large clusters, albeit with lower
model probabilities compared to the Opposition Model's highest-probability clusters: specifically, the
Interaction Model had a cluster of size $K_E = 6346$ over the left inferior parietal lobe and a cluster of
size $K_E = 5353$ over the right inferior parietal lobe (with 74% model probability in both places).

[Figure 3 about here]

[Figure 4 about here]

[Figure 5 about here]

Figures 3 and 4 show that different brain regions are likely to perform different computations best
described by the Opposition and Interaction Models, respectively. Furthermore, Figure 5 compares the
magnitude of the calculated posterior probabilities, at the locations of the highest probability cluster
for both models. The possible functional reasons for the different anatomical locations that emerge for
the two different models may be an interesting subject for future study, but fall outside the scope of
this methods paper. In any case, the usefulness of this probability mapping approach illustrated in
Figures 2, 3 and 4, lies in the ability of pinpointing where and when given computations are likely to
be performed in the brain.

5   Discussion

This paper shows how to use RFX Bayesian model selection mapping methods for M/EEG data analysis. This method was originally developed for fMRI by Rosa and colleagues (2010), and provides a way of displaying the probabilities of different cognitive models at different timepoints and brain locations, given a neuroimaging dataset. We aimed to provide an in-depth explanation, written in a didactical manner, of the BMS and posterior probability mapping steps that were successfully used by Garrido et al. (2017) in their recent EEG paper.

Being a Bayesian approach to hypothesis-testing, the method described here provides multiple advantages over frequentist inference methods. The first of these advantages is that VB allows for comparisons between non-nested models. Consequently, it is especially useful in the context of model-based neuroimaging (Montague et al., 2004; O'Doherty et al., 2007; Rosa et al., 2010; Garrido et al., 2017). Another advantage is that the probability of the null hypothesis itself can be assessed (instead of simply being, or failing to be, rejected). A final advantage is that, although only two models were compared here, the same method can also be applied to any arbitrary number of models. For example, the analyses described here could proceed slightly differently, based on the same data but introducing another (or multiple other) model/s against which to compare the Opposition and Interaction Models. Potentially, any number of theoretically motivated models could be considered. Considering all of these advantages, the method described here should prove useful in a wide variety of M/EEG experiments.

In summary, we have shown here how to adapt Bayesian Model Selection maps, originally developed for fMRI data by Rosa and colleagues (2010), to M/EEG data analysis. It is hoped that the reporting of analytical methods such as these, as well as the availability of all the code and dataset, will not only contribute to the Open Science movement, but may also encourage other researchers to adopt this novel M/EEG data analysis method in a way that is useful for addressing their own neuroscience questions. We postulate that the use of this Bayesian model mapping of M/EEG data to adjudicate between competing computational models in the brain, both at the scalp and source level, will be a significant advancement in the field of M/EEG neuroimaging and may provide new insights in cognitive neuroscience.

6   Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial
relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

7   Author Contributions

MG designed the study and the analysis methods. ER wrote the code. CH and RR collected and
analysed the data, and organised the data and code for sharing. CH wrote the first draft of the
manuscript. ER, RR and MG edited the manuscript.

8   Funding

This work was funded by the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Integrative Brain
Function (ARC Centre Grant CE140100007) and a University of Queensland Fellowship
(2016000071) to MG. RR and CH were both supported by Research Training Program scholarships
awarded by The University of Queensland.

9   Acknowledgments

The authors thank the participants for their time. The authors are grateful to Maria Rosa for helpful
advice regarding source BMS steps, and to the two anonymous reviewers, whose helpful comments
and suggestions led to significant improvements in the paper. The authors also thank Jessica McFadyen
for help with preprocessing, Ilvana Dzafic for help with EEG data acquisition, and Jeremy Taylor for
sharing tools for visualising spatiotemporal images (shown in panels (**B**) and (**D**) in Figure 2).

10   References

Adams, R. A., Friston, K. J., & Bastos, A. M. (2015). Active inference, predictive coding and cortical architecture. In *Recent Advances on the Modular Organization of the Cortex* (pp. 97-121). Springer Netherlands.

Akaike, H. (1980). Likelihood and the Bayes procedure. Trabajos de estadística y de investigación operativa, 31(1), 143-166.

Anllo-Vento, L. (1995). Shifting attention in visual space: the effects of peripheral cueing on brain cortical potentials. *The International journal of neuroscience* 80(1-4): 353-370.

Arnott, R. S. and R. C. Alain (2002). Stepping out of the spotlight: MMN attenuation as a function of distance from the attended location. *NeuroReport* 13(17): 2209-2212.

Auksztulewicz, R. and K. Friston (2015). Attentional Enhancement of Auditory Mismatch Responses: a DCM/MEG Study. *Cerebral Cortex* 25(11): 4273-4283.

Bayes, T & Price, R. (1763). An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. by the late Rev. Mr. Bayes, frs communicated by Mr. Price, in a letter to John Canton, amfrs. *Philosophical Transactions* (1683-1775), 370-418.

Beal, M., Ghahramani, Z., 2003. The variational Bayesian EM algorithms for incomplete data: with application to scoring graphical model structures. In: Bernardo, J., Bayarri, M., Berger, J., Dawid, A. (Eds.), *Bayesian Statistics* 7. Cambridge University Press.

Boly, M., M. Garrido, O. Gosseries, M.-A. Bruno, P. Boveroux, C. Schnakers, M. Massimini, V. Litvak, S. Laureys and K. Friston (2011). Preserved Feedforward But Impaired Top-Down Processes in the Vegetative State. *Science* (Washington) 332(6031): 858-862.

Carter, T., & Fe, S. (2007). *An introduction to information theory and entropy*. Complex systems summer school, Santa Fe.

Chaumon, M., V. Drouet and C. Tallon-Baudry (2008). Unconscious associative memory affects visual processing before 100 ms. *Journal of Vision* 8(3): 10.1-10.

Chun, M. M. and Y. Jiang (1998). Contextual Cueing: Implicit Learning and Memory of Visual Context Guides Spatial Attention. *Cognitive Psychology* 36(1): 28-71.

Connor, J. T., Elm, J. J., Broglio, K. R., & ESETT and ADAPT-IT Investigators. (2013). Bayesian adaptive trials offer advantages in comparative effectiveness trials: an example in status epilepticus. *Journal of clinical epidemiology*, *66*(8), S130-S137.

Dayan, P., Hinton, G. E., Neal, R. M., & Zemel, R. S. (1995). The helmholtz machine. *Neural computation*, *7*(5), 889-904.

Dienes, Z. (2016). How Bayes factors change scientific practice. *Journal of Mathematical Psychology* 72: 78-89.

Doherty, J., A. Rao, M. Mesulam and A. Nobre (2005). Synergistic Effect of Combined Temporal and Spatial Expectations on Visual Attention. *Journal of Neuroscience* 25(36): 8259-8266.

Dunson, D. B. (2001). Commentary: practical advantages of Bayesian analysis of epidemiologic data. *American journal of Epidemiology*, *153*(12), 1222-1226.

Feldman, H., & Friston, K. (2010). Attention, uncertainty, and free-energy. *Frontiers in human neuroscience*, 4, 215-238.

Feynman, R. P., & Brown, L. M. (1942). *Feynman's thesis: a new approach to quantum theory*. World
Scientific.

Feynman, R. P., Hibbs, A. R., & Styer, D. F. (2010). *Quantum mechanics and path integrals*. Courier
Corporation.

Friston K, Penny W (2003) Posterior probability maps and SPMs. NeuroImage 19: 1240–1249.

Friston, K. (2007a). APPENDIX 1 - Linear models and inference. *Statistical Parametric Mapping*.
London, Academic Press: 589-591.

Friston, K. (2007b). CHAPTER 1 - A short history of SPM. *Statistical Parametric Mapping*. London,
Academic Press: 3-9.

Friston, K. (2012). The history of the future of the Bayesian brain. *NeuroImage* 62(2): 1230-1233.

Friston, K., Harrison, L., Daunizeau, J., Kiebel, S., Phillips, C., Trujillo-Barreto, N., Henson, R.,
Flandin, G., Mattout, J., 2008. Multiple sparse priors for the M/EEG inverse problem. *NeuroImage,*
39(3), 1104-1120.

Friston, K. and W. Penny (2007). CHAPTER 22 - Empirical Bayes and hierarchical models. *Statistical*
Parametric Mapping. London, Academic Press: 275-294.

Friston, K. and W. Penny (2007). CHAPTER 23 - Posterior probability maps. *Statistical Parametric*
Mapping. London, Academic Press: 295-302.

Friston, K. J., N. Trujillo-Barreto and J. Daunizeau (2008). DEM: A variational treatment of dynamic
systems. *Neuroimage* 41(3): 849-885.

Friston, K., S. Kiebel, M. Garrido and O. David (2007). CHAPTER 42 - Dynamic causal models for
EEG. *Statistical Parametric Mapping*. London, Academic Press: 561-576.

Garrido, M. I., C. L. J. Teng, J. A. Taylor, E. G. Rowe and J. B. Mattingley (2016). Surprise responses
in the human brain demonstrate statistical learning under high concurrent cognitive demand. *npj*
Science of Learning 16006: 1-7.

Garrido, M. I., M. Sahani and R. J. Dolan (2013). Outlier Responses Reflect Sensitivity to Statistical
Structure in the Human Brain (Statistical Learning and Outlier Detection). 9(3): e1002999: 1-10.

Garrido, M., Rowe, E., Halasz, V., & Mattingley, J. (2017). Bayesian mapping reveals that attention
boosts neural responses to predicted and unpredicted stimuli. *Cerebral Cortex*, 1-12.

Hartshorne, J. (2012). Tracking replicability as a method of post-publication open evaluation.
Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience 6(NA): 70-83.

Hohwy, J. (2013). *The predictive mind*. Oxford University Press.

Kane, N. M., S. H. Curry, S. R. Butler and B. H. Cummins (1993). Electrophysiological indicator of
awakening from coma. 341: 688-688.

Kass, R. E., & Raftery, A. E. (1995). Bayes factors. *Journal of the american statistical association,*
90(430), 773-795.

Kok, P., D. Rahnev, J. F. M. Jehee, H. C. Lau and F. P. de Lange (2012). Attention Reverses the Effect
of Prediction in Silencing Sensory Signals. *Cerebral Cortex* 22(9): 2197-2206.

Kujala, T. and R. Näätänen (2010). The adaptive brain: A neurophysiological perspective. *Progress in*
Neurobiology 91(1): 55-67.

Kullback, S., & Leibler, R. A. (1951). On information and sufficiency. *The annals of mathematical*
statistics, *22*(1), 79-86.

Lappalainen, H., Miskin, J.W., 2000. Ensemble Learning, in: Girolami, M. (Ed.), *Advances in Independent Component Analysis*. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.

Larson, M. J. and K. A. Carbine (2017). Sample size calculations in human electrophysiology (EEG and ERP) studies: A systematic review and recommendations for increased rigor. *International Journal of Psychophysiology* 111: 33-41.

Lieder, F., J. Daunizeau, M. Garrido, K. Friston and K. Stephan (2013). Modelling Trial-by-Trial Changes in the Mismatch Negativity. *PLoS Computational Biology* 9(2) e1002911: 1-16.

Litvak, V., Friston, K., 2008. Electromagnetic source reconstruction for group studies, *NeuroImage*, pp. 1490-1498.

Lv, J.-Y., T. Wang, J. Qiu, S.-H. Feng, S. Tu and D.-T. Wei (2010). The electrophysiological effect of working memory load on involuntary attention in an auditory–visual distraction paradigm: an ERP study. *Experimental Brain Research* 205(1): 81-86.

Mangun, G. R. and S. A. Hillyard (1991). Modulations of Sensory-Evoked Brain Potentials Indicate Changes in Perceptual Processing During Visual–Spatial Priming. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance* 17(4): 1057-1074.

Meinert, C. L. (2012). *Frequentist vs. Bayesian Analysis*. Hoboken, NJ, USA, Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Mohammad-Djafari, A. (2002). Bayesian inference for inverse problems. *AIP Conference Proceedings,* 617(1), 477-496.

Montague, P.R., Hyman, S.E., Cohen, J.D., Oct 2004. Computational roles for dopamine in behavioural control. *Nature* 431, 760–767.

Näätänen, R. and K. Alho (1997). Higher-order processes in auditory-change detection. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 1(2): 44-45.

Näätänen, R., T. Kujala and I. Winkler (2011). Auditory processing that leads to conscious perception: A unique window to central auditory processing opened by the mismatch negativity and related responses. *Psychophysiology* 48(1): 4-22.

Naeaetaenen, R., M. Tervaniemi, E. Sussman, P. Paavilainen and I. Winkler (2001). `Primitive intelligence' in the auditory cortex. R. Naeaetaenen. 24: 283-288.

Neal, R. (1998). Annealed importance sampling (Technical Report 9805 (revised)). Department of Statistics, University of Toronto.

Needham, C. J., Bradford, J. R., Bulpitt, A. J., & Westhead, D. R. (2007). A primer on learning in Bayesian networks for computational biology. *PLoS computational biology*, 3(8), e129.

Neyman, J. and E. S. Pearson (1933). On the Problem of the Most Efficient Tests of Statistical Hypotheses. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London*. Series A, Containing Papers of a Mathematical or Physical Character (1896-1934) 231(694): 289-337.

O'Doherty, J.P., Hampton, A., Kim, H., May 2007. Model-based fMRI and its application to reward learning and decision making. *Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci.* 1104, 35–53.

Penny, W. D. (2012). Comparing dynamic causal models using AIC, BIC and free energy. *NeuroImage,* 59(1), 319-330.

Penny, W. D., & Ridgway, G. R. (2013). Efficient posterior probability mapping using Savage-Dickey ratios. *PLoS One*, 8(3), e59655.

Penny, W. D., J. Mattout and N. Trujillo-Barreto (2007). CHAPTER 35 - Bayesian model selection and
averaging. *Statistical Parametric Mapping*. London, Academic Press: 454-467.

Penny, W. D., Trujillo-Bareto, N., & Flandin, G. (2005). Bayesian analysis of single-subject fMRI data:
SPM5 implementation. *Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging,* UCL, London.

Penny, W. D., Trujillo-Barreto, N. J., & Friston, K. J. (2005). Bayesian fMRI time series analysis with
spatial priors. *NeuroImage, 24*(2), 350-362.

Penny, W., & Flandin, G. (2005). Bayesian analysis of fMRI data with spatial priors. In *Proceedings*
of the Joint Statistical Meeting (JSM). American Statistical Association.

Penny, W., & Sengupta, B. (2016). Annealed importance sampling for neural mass models. *PLoS*
computational biology, 12(3), e1004797.

Penny, W., Flandin, G., & Trujillo-Barreto, N. (2007). Bayesian comparison of spatially regularised
general linear models. *Human brain mapping*, 28(4), 275-293.

Penny, W., Kiebel, S., & Friston, K. (2003). variational Bayesian inference for fMRI time
series. *NeuroImage, 19*(3), 727-741.

Penny, W., S. Kiebel and K. Friston (2007). CHAPTER 24 - variational Bayes. *Statistical Parametric*
Mapping. London, Academic Press: 303-312.

Penny, W.D., Stephan, K.E., Mechelli, A., Friston, K.J., (2004). Comparing dynamic causal models.
NeuroImage 22 (3), 1157–1172.

Rao, R., P. N. and D. H. Ballard (1999). Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a functional
interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects. *Nature Neuroscience* 2(1): 79-87.

Rosa, M., S. Bestmann, L. Harrison and W. Penny (2010). Bayesian Model Selection Maps for Group
Studies. *NeuroImage,* 49(1), 217-224.

Rowe, E.G., Harris C.D., Randeniya, R. and Garrido, M.I. (2018). Bayesian Model Selection Maps for
group studies using M/EEG data: EEG_Auditory_Oddball_Preprocessed_Data. Figshare. (2018)
https://figshare.com/s/c6e1f9120763c43e6031 doi: 10.6084/m9.figshare.5812764

Rowe, E.G., Harris C.D., Randeniya, R. and Garrido, M.I. (2018). Bayesian Model Selection Maps for
group studies using M/EEG data: EEG_Auditory_Oddball_Raw_Data. Figshare. (2018) ,
https://figshare.com/s/1ef6dd4bbdd4059e3891 doi: 10.6084/m9.figshare.5769141

Sallinen, M., J. Kaartinen and H. Lyytinen (1994). Is the appearance of mismatch negativity during
stage 2 sleep related to the elicitation of K-complex? *Electroencephalography and Clinical*
Neurophysiology 91(2): 140-148.

Shannon, C. E. (2001 [originally 1948]). A mathematical theory of communication. *ACM SIGMOBILE*
Mobile Computing and Communications Review, *5*(1), 3-55.

Stephan, K. E., W. D. Penny, J. Daunizeau, R. J. Moran and K. J. Friston (2009). Bayesian model
selection for group studies. *NeuroImage* 46(4): 1004-1017.

Summerfield, C. and T. Egner (2009). Expectation (and attention) in visual cognition. *Trends in*
Cognitive Sciences 13(9): 403-409.

Summerfield, J. J., J. Lepsien, D. R. Gitelman, M. M. Mesulam and A. C. Nobre (2006). Orienting
Attention Based on Long-Term Memory Experience. *Neuron* 49(6): 905-916.

Szucs, D., J. P. A. Ioannidis and E.-J. Wagenmakers (2017). Empirical assessment of published effect
sizes and power in the recent cognitive neuroscience and psychology literature. *PLoS Biology* 15(3):
1-18.

Trippa, L., Lee, E. Q., Wen, P. Y., Batchelor, T. T., Cloughesy, T., Parmigiani, G., & Alexander, B. M.
(2012). Bayesian adaptive randomized trial design for patients with recurrent glioblastoma. *Journal*
of Clinical Oncology, 30(26), 3258-3263.

Vallverdú, J. (2008). The false dilemma: Bayesian vs. frequentist. *arXiv preprint* arXiv:0804.0486.

Woolrich M, Jenkinson M, Brady M, Smith S (2004) Fully Bayesian spatio-temporal modeling of fMRI
data. IEEE Trans Med Imaging 23: 213–231.

Woolrich, M.W., Behrens, T.E., Beckmann, C.F., Smith, S.M., Jan 2005. Mixture models with adaptive
spatial regularization for segmentation with an application to fMRI data. *IEEE Trans. Med. Imaging*
24, 1–11.

Yucel, G., C. Petty, G. McCarthy and A. Belger (2005). Graded Visual Attention Modulates Brain
Responses Evoked by Task-irrelevant Auditory Pitch Changes. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*
17(12): 1819-1828.

11   Supplementary Material

Please see the Supplementary Material attached.

12   Figures

Figure 1

Figure 1: The two competing models that were evaluated using BMS. Reprinted with permission from
Garrido et al. (2017) DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhx087. Figure Published by Oxford University Press. All
rights   reserved.   Available   online   at: https://academic.oup.com/cercor/advance-
article/doi/10.1093/cercor/bhx087/3571164?searchresult=1. This figure is not covered by the Open-
Access licence of this publication. For permissions contact Journals.permissions@OUP.com

Figure 2

[Panels from left to right: A, B, C and D]

Figure 2: Scalp Posterior Probability Maps of the two competing models over space and time. (The
scalp images include the participant's nose, pointing upwards, and ears, visible as if viewed from
above.) These maps display all posterior probabilities exceeding 75% over space and time for both
models. The left sides of both panels (**A**) and (**C**) both depict the temporal information, showing the
model probabilities at each point in time from 0 ms (when the tone was played, at the top of the
diagrams) to 400 ms after the stimulus presentation (at the bottom of the diagram), across the surface
of the scalp (which traverses the width of the panels). The right sides (**B**) and (**D**) show the spatial
locations of the probability clusters which exceeded the threshold of 75% probability.

Figure 3

[Panels from left to right and then top to bottom: A, B, C and D]

Figure 3: Source Posterior Probability Map for the Opposition Model (that is, reconstructed images
representing the model inference at the group level for this model), thresholded at >50% posterior
probability. (**A**): view from the left side. (**B**): view from the left side, from the posterior (back) end.
(**C**): view from the right side. (**D**): view from above.

783 **Figure 4**

785 [Panels from left to right and then top to bottom: A, B, C and D]

786 **Figure 4:** Source Posterior Probability Map for the Interaction Model (that is, reconstructed images
787 representing the model inference at the group level for this model), thresholded at >50% posterior
788 probability. (**A**): view from the left side. (**B**): view from the left side, from the posterior (back) end.
789 (**C**): view from the right side. (**D**): view from above.

Figure 5

Figure 5: Comparison of the posterior probabilities for the two models at the location of the highest-
probability cluster of the Opposition Model (left) and the location of the highest-probability cluster of
the Interaction Model (right). The left supramarginal gyrus cluster, which was the highest probability
cluster for the Opposition Model (left), was located at Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
coordinates (62, -42, 30), while the left inferior parietal lobe cluster, which was the highest probability
cluster for the Interaction Model, was located at MNI coordinates (-54, -32, 46).

13 Table

Table 1: Step-by-step summary of method	
Task:	Suggested steps:
Saving the correct spm_spm_vb.m files	1. Find and open the spm12 folder on your computer. 2. Find the spm_spm_vb.m script in that folder, and rename this to spm_spm_vb_fMRI.m. Then add the spm_spm_vb_ST.m and spm_spm_vb_source.m scripts (saved in the associated Github repository) to your spm12 folder. 3. Before undertaking either the spatiotemporal BMS or source BMS steps, rename the currently-relevant script from the above step to spm_spm_vb.m. Once you have finished the BMS steps, rename the script back to its original name, to re-identify it as being for either the spatiotemporal ('spm_spm_vb_ST.m') or source BMS ('spm_spm_vb_source.m'). In this way, you will keep track of which spm_spm_vb.m script to use for whichever BMS steps you are about to do.
Creating spatiotemporal ("scalp") PPMs:	1. BMS script 1: Change the file paths to reflect the location of ERP data. 2. Run BMS script 1: BMS1_ST_ImCreate.m. 3. Ensure the correct spm_spm_vb.m file is saved in SPM12 folder. 4. Run BMS script 2: BMS2_ModelSpec_VB.m. 5. Run BMS script 3: BMS3_PPMs.m. Threshold is set to 0.75 and adjustable.
Creating source PPMs:	1. BMS script 1: Change the file paths to reflect location of source reconstructed images. 2. Run BMS script 1: BMS1_Source_ImCreate.m. 3. Ensure the correct spm_spm_vb.m file is saved in SPM12 folder. 4. Run BMS script 2: BMS2_ModelSpec_VB.m. 5. Replace NaNs with zeros in the LogEv.nii files: BMS2b_Source_NaNtoZeros.m. 6. Run BMS script 3: BMS3_PPMs.m. Adjust probability threshold as desired.

Prediction   **Attention**   **Response**

Opposition Model
Attention & Prediction Oppose

Interaction Model
Attention & Prediction Interact

Attended
Unattended
Predicted
Unpredicted

Spatiotemporal Posterior Probability Maps

(A) **(B)** **(C)** **(D)**

10 ms

225 ms

325 ms

345 ms

360 ms

175 ms

185 ms

Opposition Model

Interaction Model

0.5   0.75   1

Posterior probability

Opposition Model Source PPMs

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

0.5   0.75   1

Posterior probability

Interaction Model Source PPMs

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

0.5   0.75   1

Posterior probability

Most probable clusters for the two models