In for a pound, in for a penny: How the opportunity to gain reward influences the competition for memory resources

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Abstract

When people encounter items that they believe will help them gain reward, they later remember them better than those that do not. While it is adaptive to preferentially remember experiences that will be useful later, it is unknown how the competition for memory resources is implemented in time, through the processes of encoding, consolidation, and retrieval. In two experiments we promised participants £1 for remembering some pictures, but only 10 pence for remembering others. Their ability to describe the pictures was tested after one minute and after 24 hours. Memory at immediate test showed effects of list composition, suggesting local competition at encoding and/or retrieval. These results are consistent with our recently-proposed emotional Context Maintenance and Retrieval model, supporting it as a general account of motivated memory. In contrast, relative to this baseline, more valuable memories were not preferentially retained following delay, suggesting no detectable role of competition for consolidation.

Introduction

It is paramount to remember information that can help us attain our goals and increase our subjective utility. Because memory resources are limited, it is adaptive for the brain to prioritise experiences that can be leveraged to obtain rewards and avoid punishments over less-important experiences (Gershman & Daw, 2017). This intuition was expressed by Sherlock Holmes, Arthur Conan Doyle's timeless protagonist, when (justifying his ignorance of astronomy) he remarked that "It is of the highest importance… not to have useless facts elbowing out the useful ones". Holmes' intuition agrees with rational considerations, which suggest that if memory resources are limited, it is best to hold on to the most valuable information, compared globally against all other information (Anderson & Schooler, 1991). But how such competition plays out in practice is not so simple, for at least two reasons. First, experiences are encountered sequentially rather than all at once, meaning that a rational agent must decide which memories to retain without knowing the full set of competitors. Second, Holmes' picture of the mind as a storeroom of fixed, limited capacity is grossly oversimplified: memories can compete, interfere with each other and promote each other at many stages of encoding, consolidation, and retrieval. For a rational analysis it's not clear to what extent each of these stages represents a meaningful resource bottleneck. Both of these considerations suggest that competition may occur locally, only among items that are close to each other on some contextual dimension, such as time (the preceding or following items) or space (various objects in the same scene). Our research question, therefore, concerns the scope of the competition of reward-predicting information for memory resources.

To answer this question it is useful to consider how the opportunity to maximise

utility influences the cognitive mechanisms that underlie successful recall. In an

experimental setting where remembering some items earn more money or 'points',

high-value items are attended preferentially and remembered better (e.g. Ariel &

Castel, 2014; Lee, Greening, & Mather, 2015; for review see Mather & Sutherland,

2011), although some only observe memory facilitation in delayed tests (e.g.

Montagrin, Brosch, & Sander, 2013; Spaniol, Schain, & Bowen, 2014). It is less clear

how increased attention to high-value items influences memory formation. The

emotional Context Maintenance and Retrieval model (eCMR), a variant of retrieved-

context models that describes the influence of emotional value on free recall (Talmi,

Lohnas, & Daw, in press), suggests that the extra attention participants allocate to

high-value items binds items more tightly to their encoding context. When asked to

freely recall these items later this tighter binding enhances the competitive

advantage of high-value items against low-value items, but makes it difficult to link

them to a new context later on (Madan, Fujiwara, Gerson, & Caplan, 2012). This

account assumes a global competition during encoding, but a local competition

during recall.

There is evidence for local competition for recall from experiments with

emotionally-arousing words, sentences, and pictures: all items that are known to

capture attention preferentially, and which might heuristically be interpreted as

fitness-relevant. In these experiments memory for emotional items typically

increases, and memory for neutral ones decreases, when emotional and neutral

items are presented and recalled together, in 'mixed' lists (Barnacle, Tsivilis,

Schaefer, & Talmi, 2017; Hadley & MacKay, 2006; MacKay et al., 2004; Talmi, Luk,

McGarry, & Moscovitch, 2007), or when the emotional item is the 'oddball' among

neutral ones (Hurlemann et al., 2005; Mather & Knight, 2009). The recall advantage

of emotional items is less pronounced and sometimes disappears altogether when

emotional and neutral items are presented and recalled separately, in 'pure' lists.

eCMR simulates these situations successfully (Talmi, Lohnas, & Daw, in press).

There is also evidence that recalling items that are not personally valued, but attract

attention because they are bizarre, is enhanced because of local completion for

retrieval, not because of competition for encoding resources (McDaniel, Dornburg, &

Guynn, 2005). It is unknown, at present, whether these accounts generalise to

information that predicts reward directly and explicitly. To whatever extent

competition for memory resources is global in nature, high-value items should out-

compete low-value items regardless of the local context of the list in which they were

presented. Indeed, it would be irrational for a fully informed observer to allocate

encoding or retrieval resources to low-value items.

In this paper we test this prediction by examining memory for stimuli whose later

recall explicitly predicts high and low reward, encoded in pure and mixed lists. In two

experiments, our participants viewed lists of neutral pictures that were presented

framed or unframed. They knew that they could gain larger monetary reward by

recalling framed items on later test. The critical manipulation was the arrangement of

framed and unframed items in the list, such that some lists included both item types

(mixed) and some only one (pure). We did not expect that the list arrangement would

influence the attention participants pay to framed, compared to unframed, pictures,

because the frame provides a clear signal of which stimulus type should be

prioritised (Mather, Clewett, Sakaki, & Harley, 2017; Mather & Sutherland, 2011).

Importantly, in the global context of the experiment – and, indeed, the participant's

day outside the laboratory – remembering framed pictures promised more reward

than average, certainly more reward than unframed pictures. If the competition for

memory resources is global, rational participants should recall the framed pictures

better than unframed pictures regardless of the list in which they were presented, in

both mixed and pure lists; recall will mirror the priority assigned to these stimuli

during encoding. By contrast, if the competition for recall is local, as predicted by

eCMR, the recall advantage for high- over low-value items will be observed only in

mixed lists, but eliminated when they are studied and tested in pure lists, a pattern

called a 'list composition effect'. Confirming this prediction would support eCMR as a

general model of motivated memory, across very different operationalisations of

value.

Because the degree of competition for retrieval resources is independent of the

timing of the memory test, eCMR predicts a list-composition effect both when

memory is tested immediately and when it is tested after a delay. By contrast,

theories of modulated consolidation ascribe enhanced memory for items that are

highly emotional or that are associated with reward to competition for resources

during memory storage (Lisman, Grace, & Duzel, 2011; McGaugh, 2013; Yonelinas

& Ritchey, 2015). There is evidence that the consolidation of hippocampal memory

traces of items that are emotionally-arousing, or that are associated with high

reward, is modulated by noradrenaline or dopamine, respectively, over the course of

the hours and days after encoding. Even in experiments where participants are

unlikely to allocate resources strategically to high-value items, for instance when

encoding is incidental, the reward associated with some items is thought to trigger

dopaminergic neuromodulation, so that these items are forgotten more slowly, and

are recalled more readily in a delayed test (Bunzeck, Dayan, Dolan, & Duzel, 2010;

Mason, Ludwig, & Farrell, 2017; Montagrin et al., 2013; Patil, Murty, Dunsmoor,

Phelps, & Davachi, 2017; Spaniol et al., 2014). Modulated consolidation theories

imply competition for resources during consolidation, where high-value items will be

forgotten more slowly. Crucially, this prediction holds irrespective of the list in which

items were presented. Despite decade-long interest in list composition effects, to our

knowledge this effect has never been tested with a prolonged retention interval. In

Experiment 2 we examine this hypothesis by testing half of the lists only after 24

hours.

109   **Methods**

Materials

Stimuli consisted of pictures retrieved from freely-available databases, adjusted

in size to 280x210 pixels. In addition, the experiments used 9 printed sheets with 36

easy arithmetic subtraction and addition problems for the distractor task, with one

sheet assigned randomly to each block. The experiment was implemented using

Cogent200 on a MATLAB platform.

Experiment 1. Stimuli consisted of 48 pictures of clothing and 48 pictures of

stationary. Pictures were retrieved from the Bank of Standardized Stimuli (Brodeur,

Dionne-Dostie, Montreuil, & Lepage, 2010; Brodeur, Guérard, & Bouras, 2014) and

from Food-Pics (Blechert, Meule, Busch, & Ohla, 2014; scores for pictures drawn

from the Food-pic database were converted from a 1-100 scale to the BOSS 1-5

scale). Pictures from the two categories were matched for familiarity (clothing:

M=4.30, SD=.32; stationary: M=4.39, SD=.35) and complexity (clothing: M=2.29,

SD=.37; stationary: M=2.30, SD=.49). Each list included 8 pictures from each

category. In the pure list condition they were all either framed with a grey square, or

unframed. In the mixed list condition, 4 pictures of each type were framed and 4

unframed. The assignment of pictures to conditions was randomised for every

participant.

Experiment 2. Stimuli consisted of 16*9 pictures from 9 different categories:

clothing, animals, cityscapes, food, household objects (non-kitchen), kitchen objects,

landscapes, office items, and people. They were drawn from the same sources as in

Experiment 1, as well as the Nencki Affective Picture System (Marchewka, Zurawski,

Jednoróg, & Grabowska, 2014), ImageNet (image-net.org), and internet sources.

None had an overt emotional tone. While categories and pictures differed on multiple

attributes, they were randomly assigned to conditions for each participant,

eliminating the danger of systematic error. Each list included 16 pictures, which all

belonged to a single semantic category. The Clothing list was always used in the

practice block; otherwise, allocation of list to condition was randomised for each

participant. In the pure list condition all pictures were either framed or unframed; in

the mixed list condition 8 pictures were framed and 8 unframed.

Procedure

Participants were tested individually, in a quiet room, in the presence of a single

experimenter. Each experiment began with instructions and practice, delivered on

PowerPoint. The experiment comprised of a number of blocks. Each block included

a picture task and a distractor task (see below). The allocation of picture lists to the

picture task in each block, the order of pictures in each list, and the order of blocks

were randomised for each participant.

Experiment 1 included 6 blocks, 2 with pure lists of framed pictures, 2 with pure

lists of unframed pictures, and 2 with mixed lists where half the pictures were framed

and the other half unframed. All blocks ended with a free recall test (see below).

Experiment 2 included 8 blocks, 2 with pure lists of framed pictures, 2 with pure

lists of unframed pictures, and 4 with mixed lists. Half of the blocks in each of these

three conditions were assigned to the immediate memory condition, and ended with

a free recall test. The other half was assigned to the delayed memory condition and

did not include a free recall test. To increase engagement throughout session 1,

participants were also told that one of the lists that will *not* be tested immediately will

be tested at the end of session 1. To maintain credibility, session 1 always began

with an additional practice block, which appeared to participants to be part of the

experiment proper. The practice block always used the same Clothing list, and

included only the picture and the distractor task. Session 1 always ended with a

delayed free recall test (see below) of that list. To decrease rehearsal between

sessions, participants were told that they will perform different tasks in session 2.

At the end of session 1 one block (in Experiment 1, only one of those blocks

allocated to the immediate memory condition) was selected randomly, and

participants were paid according to their free recall performance - £1 for each framed

picture they recalled (if there were any in that block) and 10 pence for each

unframed picture they recalled. Participants were informed of this and were explicitly

told that their goal is to maximise their monetary reward.

Instructions and practice. Participants were given detailed instructions about

each of the tasks. They practiced each of the tasks using a set of 16 additional

pictures (3 framed). During the practice block a lower reward rate was in effect (10

pence vs. 1 penny). At the end of the practice block participants were given feedback

about their performance and paid any money they earned.

Picture task. Each picture was individually presented. It was presented centrally,

on a white background, for 2s followed by a blank screen for 3.5, 4 or 4.5s

(randomised ISI) before the next picture presentation. Participants were asked to

view the pictures and try to commit them to memory.

Distractor task. Participants were given 60s to complete as many arithmetic

questions as possible. They were informed that to qualify for reward they must (1)

complete at least eight questions (2) those two that are randomly selected for

checking must be completed accurately.

Free recall test. Participants were given a few minutes to describe in writing

each of the pictures they remembered (3 minutes in Experiment 1, 4 minutes in

Experiment 2). They were prompted to keep trying if they stopped before the time. A

beep signalled the start and end of the memory task. Participants were instructed

that each description should include three details about the picture, separated by a

comma; e.g. "A plant, spikey leaves, in round pot".

Delayed free recall. Participants were shown the title of the category of the list

from one block, and given 4 minutes to recall the pictures from that block. In session

1, only the practice block was tested in this way. In session 2, all 8 experimental

blocks were tested, one after the other.

Results

The analysis reported here follows exactly on the analytic approach we have used in

previous work. That work led to the prediction that we would find an interaction

between list type and reward. Therefore, the four comparisons that ensue – within

lists (high vs. low reward, in pure and mixed lists separately) and across lists (high

and low reward in mixed vs. pure lists) are all planned contrasts. To be conservative

we corrected these for familywise error by using a Bonferroni-corrected p-value

threshold of p<.0125.

Experiment 1. The average free recall data are depicted in Figure 1. They were

analysed with a 2 (list: pure, mixed) x 2 (reward: high, low) repeated-measures

ANOVA. The effect of list type was not significant, but the interaction with reward

was significant and large, $F(1,28)=20.09$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta2 =.42$, qualifying the

significant main effect of reward, $F(1,28)=10.71$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta2 =.28$. These

results reveal a reward-dependent list-composition effect. Planned paired t-tests

showed that the effect of reward was only significant in the mixed list condition,

$t(28)=4.38$, $p<.001$, where participants recalled high-rewarded items earlier than low-

rewarded items (Figure 1). There was evidence for greater-than-chance temporal

contiguity effects in the recall of mixed lists, $t(28)=3.62$, $p=0.001$, but recall did not

cluster based on reward, $t=1$, or semantic category, $t<1$ (see Polyn, Norman, &

Kahana, 2009 for the calculation of these scores). There was no significant

difference between recall of pure lists, $t<1$ or between memory for high-rewarded

items in mixed and pure lists, $t(28)=1.69$, $p>.1$. Low-rewarded items were recalled

less well in mixed lists, $t(28)=4.72$, $p<.001$. The average recall of mixed lists,

collapsing across reward (M=41.27, SD=12.48) was numerically lower than the

average recall of unrewarded pure lists (M=43.86, SD=13.79).

Experiment 2. The average free recall data were analysed with a 2 (delay:

immediate, delayed) x 2 (list: pure, mixed) x 2 (reward: high, low) repeated-

measures ANOVA. This analysis only includes lists that were tested once – either

immediately (session 1) or only after a delay (only tested in session 2). The three-

way interaction was significant and large, $F(1,37)=19.19$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta2 = .34$.

We unpacked this interaction with two separate repeated-measures ANOVAs. The

first was a list-by-reward analysis which focused on average recall in the immediate

condition; these data are depicted in Figure 1. Its aim was to examine whether this

experiment replicated Experiment 1. The effect of list type was not significant, $F<1$,

but the interaction with reward was significant and large, $F(1,37)=27.15$, $p<.001$,

partial $\eta2 =.42$, qualifying the significant main effect of reward, $F(1,37)=39.60$,

$p<.001$, partial $\eta2 =.52$, which was also observed in Experiment 1. Planned paired t-

tests showed that as in Experiment 1, the effect of reward was only significant in the

mixed list condition, $t(37)=7.66$, $p<.001$, where participants again recalled high-

rewarded items earlier than low-rewarded items (Figure 1). The temporal contiguity

effects here were at chance, but participants had a greater-than-chance propensity

to recall high-rewarded (and low-rewarded) items together $t(36)=2.31$, $p=.03$.

Clustering according to reward overwhelmingly predicted the recall advantage of

high-reward over low-reward items, $r=.75$, $p<.001$. By contrast, there was no

difference between the recall of the two pure lists, $t<1$. As in Experiment 1, low-

rewarded items were recalled less well in mixed compared to pure lists, $t(37)=4.84$,

$p<.001$. However, while in Experiment 1 high reward did not increase memory, here

recall of high-rewarded items was better than their recall in pure lists $t(37) = 4.96$,

$p<.001$. The average recall of mixed lists, collapsing across reward (M=26.64,

SD=8.92) was equivalent to the average recall of unrewarded pure lists (M=26.32,

SD=15.32), t<1.

The list composition effect was less pronounced in the delayed test (Figure 2).

Indeed, after a delay the interaction between list type and reward was small in size

and not statistically significant, $F(1,37)=3.31$, $p=.077$, partial $\eta2 =.08$, while the effect

of reward was significant, $F(1,37)=26.28$, $p<.001$, partial $\eta2 =.41$. Importantly,

planned paired t-tests showed that the effect of reward was only significant in the

mixed list condition, $t(37)=4.10$, $p<.001$, but not in the pure list condition, $t(37)=1.99$,

$p=0.054..$

Decreases in average recall between the immediate and the delayed test are

depicted in Figure 2. To understand whether reward modulated forgetting we

computed proportional forgetting scores [(average immediate recall – average

delayed recall)/ average immediate recall]. Proportional forgetting scores were

computed for each list-by-reward condition, and therefore necessitated excluding 6

participants who did not recall any items immediately in one of these four conditions

(resulting in a sample of N=32). This calculation was carried out twice. First, we

examined lists that were only tested once - immediately or after a delay, i.e. in

session 1 or 2, but not both. Proportional forgetting scores of high and low reward

items in pure and mixed lists were remarkably similar. They were analysed with a

list-by-reward repeated-measures ANOVA. While forgetting was substantial,

approximating 60%, it was the same in all conditions, so none of the factors were

significant, F<1. Next we examined proportional forgetting of the same lists. In this

analysis we calculated proportional forgetting scores using the same formula, but

here using the average immediate recall from session 1 and the average delayed

recall of the same lists after a delay (session 2). Forgetting of items that were

already recalled once in session 1 was lower than forgetting of items that were never

recalled, approximating 20%, but again, none of the factors were significant, F<1.

272   **Discussion**

In two experiments, participants only recalled high-value items more than low-value

items when they were studied and recalled together, in a mixed list, but not when

they were studied and recalled separately, in pure lists. This result supports our

hypothesis that the competition for memory resources is local in nature, constrained

by the context specified by the task set (here, the temporal context of the previous

list). It aligns with a core prediction of eCMR, supporting it as a general model of

motivated memory.

This is the first demonstration of a list-composition effect with a manipulation of

reward. These results concur with previous findings where between-group

manipulations of motivation failed to increase free recall, source memory, and

recognition (Ngaosuvan & Mantila, 2005; Nilsson, 1987). While previous studies

could only document a null effect of subjective motivation on memory, and check that

the manipulation worked by collecting subjective ratings of motivation, the list-

composition paradigm allowed us to document a significant interaction between list

type and value, ensuring that the same manipulation of motivation that did not result

in significant effects in pure lists influenced recall significantly in mixed lists. The null

effect of value in pure lists does not mean that there is no effect of value on memory

in that condition; the significant interaction shows that it is smaller than the effect in

mixed lists.

The remarkable similarity between the list-composition effects obtained with

emotional pictures in our previous work (summarised in Table 1 in Talmi et al., 2018)

and high-value pictures here suggests that they result from the same mechanism.

eCMR explains enhanced recall for emotional information as resulting from the

interplay of encoding, storage, and retrieval processes. In eCMR, items that are

encoded in the same way – through similar encoding operations - share a 'source'

context. Emotional items trigger unique cognitive, affective and physiological

changes, which distinguish their source context from that of neutral items. During

encoding, preferential attention to emotional items binds them more strongly to their

source context. During retrieval, when the context is used to probe memory,

increased connection strength gives emotional items an advantage over neutral

ones, allowing them to win the competition for recall.

Translating eCMR to the experiments reported here is not completely

straightforward. In eCMR, recalling an item with a particular source context updates

the source context of the retrieval probe, thereby promoting the recall of other items

with the same source context. This is evident in experiments using emotional stimuli

where recall clusters around the emotional category(Long, Danoff, & Kahana, 2015;

Talmi et al., 2007), but it was is less evident here. The difference may be due to the

fact that in experiments with emotional and neutral stimuli the high-value "emotional"

category is also a cohesive semantic category of distressing scenes, and the low-

value items are either unrelated to the emotional ones and to each other, or, when

semantic relatedness is controlled, related to each other but not to the emotional

category. By contrast, here the semantic and value categories were orthogonal; for

example, in the mixed lists half of the 'office' items were framed and half were

unframed. It is possible that the presence of strong semantic associations between

list items masked an effect of clustering based on reward.

. The comparison between high- and low-value items is particularly important

here, because the opportunity to gain is thought to be associated with dopamine

release, and many believe that it underlies the memory-enhancing effect of reward

even in immediate tests (Rouhani, Norman, & Niv, 2018), and even more so after a

delay (Adcock, Thangavel, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Knutson, & Gabrieli, 2006; Bunzeck et

al., 2010; Mason, Farrell, Howard-Jones, & Ludwig, 2017; Mason, Ludwig, et al.,

2017; Patil et al., 2017; Spaniol et al., 2014). Here the forgetting rate of items that

participants encoded, but did not immediately recall, was equivalent regardless of

whether these items predicted high or low reward. The same was true for the

forgetting rate of items that participants encoded and recalled immediately. These

results suggest that to the extent that dopaminergic neuromodulation occurs in

experiments that reward participants monetarily for remembering, it does not

enhance delayed recall substantially, at least not when people know broadly what

kind of items they are expected to recall. Note that the latter proviso likely

characterises most emotional memory experiments, where participants generally can

report that they've seen some "nasty" and some "normal" scenes. The non-

significant effect of reward on forgetting aligns with the general finding in cognitive

psychology that manipulations that increase immediate memory do not attenuate

proportional forgetting rates (Loftus, 1985; Slamecka, 1985). While a variety of

forgetting scores have been proposed in the literature (Wixted, 1990), it is, of course,

imperative to take immediate performance into account when it differs between

critical conditions, as it did here, and proportional forgetting scores achieve this goal.

341  Our experiments show that reward does not enhance memory globally, and does

342 not make items more resistant to forgetting. The bias to attend reward-predicting

343 information increases its competitive advantage only if it competes for recall with

344 other, less-important information. Crucially, memory for reward-predicting information

345 is not any better than memory for any other information unless the two compete for

346 recall. This finding could have implications for the design of reward schemes in

347 educational settings, because it suggests that motivating learners to commit a subset

348 of material to memory by promising a prize is unlikely to enhance memory for that

349 material – unless an assessments happens to also include material that learners did

350 not prioritise, in which case the memory advantage for former will be at the cost of

351 the latter. If further research supports eCMR as a model of motivated memory the

352 model can be used to predict how reward schemes might be best employed to

353 support learning.

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Figure captions

Figure 1. Average immediate free recall as a function of reward and list composition. High and low reward are presented in dark and light grey, respectively.

Top: immediate memory test in Experiments 1.

Middle: immediate memory test in Experiment 2.

Bottom: Recall probability as a function of output order in Experiment 1(left) and 2 (right). * p<.001. ns p>0.05.

Figure 2. Forgetting of high and low-reward items over 24 hours.

Top and middle plots. These depict average immediate and delayed free recall in Experiment 2 for items presented in mixed and pure lists. The immediate memory results are the same in both plots, but the delayed memory results are shown for items only tested once, after 24 hours (**top**) or twice, both immediately and after a delay (**middle**).

Bottom. Proportional forgetting scores in these two cases.

Figure 1.

Figure 2.