

CHaRTr: An R toolbox for modeling Choices and Response Times in decision-making tasks

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Abstract

Decision-making is the process of choosing and performing actions in response to sensory cues so as to achieve behavioral goals. A sophisticated research effort has led to the development of many mathematical models to describe the response time (RT) distributions and choice behavior of observers performing decision-making tasks. However, relatively few researchers use these models because it demands expertise in various numerical, statistical, and software techniques. Although some of these problems have been surmounted in existing software packages, the packages have often focused on the classical decision-making model, the diffusion decision model. Recent theoretical advances in decision-making that posit roles for “urgency”, time-varying decision thresholds, noise in various aspects of the decision-formation process or low pass filtering of sensory evidence, have proven to be challenging to incorporate in a coherent software framework that permits quantitative evaluations among these competing classes of decision-making models. Here, we present a toolbox — *Choices and Response Times in R*, or *CHaRTr* — that provides the user the ability to implement and test a wide variety of decision-making models ranging from classic through to modern versions of the diffusion decision model, to models with urgency signals, or collapsing boundaries. Earlier versions of *CHaRTr* have been instrumental in a number of recent studies of humans and monkeys performing perceptual decision-making tasks. We also provide guidance on how to extend the toolbox to incorporate future developments in decision-making models.

Keywords: Decision making, Response Time (RT), choice, diffusion decision model, DDM, urgency-gating, AIC, BIC, model selection

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¹There are 10 figures, 7 listings, and 1 tables in this document.

1. Introduction

Perceptual decision-making is the process of choosing and performing appropriate actions in response to sensory cues to achieve behavioral goals (Freedman and Assad, 2011; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Hoshi, 2013; O'Connell et al., 2018; Shadlen and Kiani, 2013; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001). A sophisticated research effort in multiple fields has led to the formulation of cognitive process models to describe decision-making behavior (Donkin and Brown, 2018; Ratcliff et al., 2016). The majority of these models are grounded in the "sequential sampling" framework, which posits that decision-making involves the gradual accumulation of noisy sensory evidence over time until a bound (or criterion/threshold) is reached (Brunton et al., 2013; Forstmann et al., 2016; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Hanks et al., 2014; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff et al., 2016; Shadlen and Kiani, 2013). Models derived from the sequential sampling framework are typically elaborated with various systematic and random components so as to implement assumptions and hypotheses about the underlying cognitive processes involved in perceptual decision-making (Diederich, 1997a; Ratcliff et al., 2016).

The most prominent sequential sampling model of decision-making is the diffusion decision model (DDM), which has an impressive history of success in explaining the behavior of human and animal observers (e.g., Ding and Gold, 2012a,b; Forstmann et al., 2016; Palmer et al., 2005; Ratcliff et al., 2016; Tsunada et al., 2016). However, recent studies propose alternative sequential sampling models that do not involve the integration of sensory evidence over time. Instead, novel sensory evidence is multiplied by an urgency signal that increases with elapsed decision time, and a decision is made when the signal exceeds the criterion (Cisek et al., 2009; Ditterich, 2006b; Thura et al., 2012). Another line of research proposes that observers aim to maximize their reward rate and suggests that the decision boundary dynamically decreases as the time spent making a decision grows longer. Such a framework has been argued to provide a better explanation for decision-making behavior in the face of sensory uncertainty (Drugowitsch et al., 2012).

One approach to distinguish between these different models is to systematically manipulate the stimulus statistics and/or the task structure and then test whether behavior is qualitatively consistent with one or another sequential sampling model (Brunton et al., 2013; Carland et al., 2015; Cisek et al., 2009; Scott et al., 2015; Thura and Cisek, 2014). An alternative approach is to quantitatively analyze the choice and RT behavior with a large set of candidate models, and then carefully use model selection techniques to understand the candidate models that best describe the data (e.g., Chandrasekaran et al., 2017; Evans et al., 2017; Hawkins et al., 2015b; Purcell and Kiani, 2016). The quantitative modeling and model selection approach allows the researcher to determine whether a particular model component (e.g., an urgency signal, or variability in the rate of information accumulation) is important for generating the observed behavioral data. It also provides a holistic method for testing model adequacy, because the proposed model is judged on its ability to account for all available data rather than focusing on a specific subset of the data (e.g., Evans et al., 2017).

Despite the apparent benefits of model selection, there are technical and computational challenges in the application of decision-making models to behavioral data. Some researchers have surmounted these issues by simplifying the process: using analytical solutions for the predicted

42 mean RT and accuracy from the simplest form of the DDM, applied to participant-averaged
43 behavioral data (Palmer et al., 2005; Tsunada et al., 2016). However, the complete distribution
44 of RTs is highly informative, and often necessary, to reliably discriminate between the latent
45 cognitive processes that influence decision-making (Forstmann et al., 2016; Luce, 1986; Ratcliff
46 and McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff et al., 2016). Until recently, applying sequential sampling models
47 like the DDM to the joint distribution over choices and RT required bespoke domain knowledge
48 and computational expertise. This has hindered the widespread adoption of quantitative model
49 selection methods to study decision-making behavior.

50 Some recent attempts have demystified the application of cognitive models of decision-making
51 to behavioral data, providing a path for researchers to apply these methods to their own research
52 questions. For instance, Vandekerckhove and Tuerlinckx developed the Diffusion Modeling and
53 Analysis Toolbox (Vandekerckhove and Tuerlinckx, 2008), and Voss and Voss developed the
54 diffusion model toolbox (fast-dm; Voss and Voss, 2007, 2008). Modern releases have improved
55 the parameter estimation algorithms and can leverage multiple observers to perform hierarchical
56 Bayesian inference (Wiecki et al., 2013). In hBayesDM (Ahn et al., 2017) and Dynamic Models
57 of Choice (Heathcote et al., 2018) researchers can apply a range of models to behavior from
58 a wide variety of decision-making paradigms ranging from choice tasks to reversal learning and
59 inhibition tasks.

60 A common feature across all of the excellent toolboxes currently available is that they only provide
61 optimization code to apply the DDM to data, or the DDM in addition to a few alternative models.
62 As a consequence, the toolboxes provide no pathway for a researcher to rigorously compare
63 the quantitative account of the DDM to alternative theories of the decision making process,
64 including models with an urgency signal (Ditterich, 2006a), urgency-gating (Cisek et al., 2009),
65 or collapsing bounds (Hawkins et al., 2015b). Simply put, we currently have no openly available
66 and extensible toolbox for understanding choice and RT behavior using the many hypothesized
67 models of decision-making. We believe there is a critical need for examining how these different
68 models perform in terms of describing decision-making behavior.

69 The objective of this study was to address this need and provide a straightforward framework
70 to analyze a range of existing sequential sampling models of decision-making behavior. Specif-
71 ically, we aimed to provide an open-source and extensible framework that permits quantitative
72 implementation and testing of novel candidate models of decision-making. The outcome of this
73 study is *CHaRT_r*, a novel toolbox in the R programming environment that can be used to analyze
74 choice and RT data of humans and animals performing two-alternative forced choice tasks that
75 involve perceptual or other types of decision-making. R is an open source language that enjoys
76 widespread use and is maintained by a large community of researchers. *CHaRT_r* can be used to
77 analyze the RT and choice behavior of these observers, from the perspective of a (potentially
78 large) range of decision-making models and can be readily extended when new models are devel-
79 oped. These new models can be incorporated into the toolbox with minimal effort and require
80 only basic working knowledge of R and C programming; we explain the required skills in this
81 manuscript. Similarly, new optimization routines that are readily available as R packages can be
82 implemented if desired.

83 2. Methods and Materials

84 The methods are focused on the specification of various mathematical models of decision-making,
 85 and the parameter estimation and model selection processes. For reference, the symbols we use
 86 to describe the models are shown in Table 1. The naming convention for the models we have
 87 developed in *CHaRT* is to take the main architectural feature of the model and use it as a prefix
 88 to the model. The diffusion decision model, henceforth DDM, refers to the simplest sequential
 89 sampling model, cDDM refers to a DDM with collapsing boundaries (Hawkins et al., 2015b),
 90 dDDM refers to a DDM with urgency signal defined by Ditterich (2006a), uDDM refers to a
 91 DDM with a linear urgency signal, and bUGM refers to an urgency gating model (UGM) with a
 92 linear urgency signal composed of a slope and an intercept (Thura et al., 2012).

Parameter	Description
$x(t)$	State of the decision variable at time t .
dt	Time step of the decision variable.
z, s_z	Starting state of the decision variable (i.e., $x(0) = z$), and decision-to-decision variability in starting state. s_z is the range of a uniform distribution with mean (midpoint) z .
v_i, s_v	Rate at which the decision variable accumulates decision-relevant information (drift rate, v) in condition i , and decision-to-decision variability in drift rate. s_v is the standard deviation of a normal distribution with mean v_i .
$\gamma(t)$	Urgency signal that dynamically modulates the decision variable as a function of t . Can take different functional forms in different models.
a_{upper}, a_{lower}	Upper and lower response boundaries that terminate the decision process.
$a_{upper}(t), a_{lower}(t)$	Upper and lower response boundaries that vary as a function of t .
T_{er}, s_t	Time required for stimulus encoding and motor preparation/execution (non-decision time), and decision-to-decision variability in non-decision time. s_t is the range of a uniform distribution with mean (midpoint) T_{er} .
s	Within-decision variability in the diffusion process. Represents the standard deviation of a normal distribution. By convention, set to a fixed value to satisfy a scaling property of the model.
$E(t)$	Momentary sensory evidence at time t .
$\mathcal{N}(0, 1)$	Normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance.
$\mathcal{U}(l_1, l_2)$	Uniform distribution over the interval l_1 and l_2 .

Table 1: List of symbols used in the decision-making models implemented in *CHaRT*

93 2.1. Mathematical Models of Decision-Making

94 Sequential sampling models of decision-making assume that RT comprises two components (Rat-
 95 cliff and McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff et al., 2016). The first component is the decision time, which
 96 encompasses processes such as the accumulation of sensory evidence and additional decision-
 97 related factors such as urgency. The second component is the non-decision time (or residual

98 time), which involves the time required for processes that must occur to produce a response but
99 fall outside of the decision-formation process, such as stimulus encoding, motor preparation and
100 motor execution time.

101 We introduce various models of the decision-making process in approximately increasing level of
102 complexity, beginning with the simple DDM.

103 2.1.1. Simple Diffusion Decision Model (DDM)

104 The diffusion decision model (or DDM) is derived from one of the oldest interpretations of a
105 statistical test – the sequential probability ratio test (Wald and Wolfowitz, 1948) – as a model of
106 a cognitive process – how decisions are formed over time (Stone, 1960). The DDM provides the
107 foundation for the decision-making models implemented in *CHaRTr* and assumes that decision-
108 formation is described by a one-dimensional diffusion process (Fig. 1A) with the stochastic
109 differential equation

$$x(t + dt) = x(t) + vdt + s\sqrt{dt}\mathcal{N}(0, 1), \quad (1)$$

110 where $x(t)$ is the state of the decision-formation process, known as the decision variable, at time t ;
111 v is the rate of accumulation of sensory evidence, known as the drift rate; dt is the step size of the
112 process; s is the standard deviation of the moment-to-moment (Brownian) noise of the decision-
113 formation process; $\mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ refers to a random sample from the standard normal distribution. A
114 response is made when $x(t + dt) \geq a_{upper}$ or $x(t + dt) \leq a_{lower}$. Whether a response is correct or
115 incorrect is determined from the boundary that was crossed and the valence of the drift rate (i.e.,
116 $v > 0$ implies the upper boundary corresponds to the correct response, $v < 0$ implies the lower
117 boundary corresponds to the correct response). In Fig. 1a, and in all DDM models in *CHaRTr*,
118 we specify $a_{lower} = 0$ and $a_{upper} = A$, without loss of generality. z represents the starting state
119 of the evidence accumulation process (i.e., the position of the decision variable at $x(0)$) and can
120 be freely estimated between a_{lower} and a_{upper} . When we assume there is no a priori response
121 bias, z is fixed to the midpoint between a_{lower} and a_{upper} (i.e., $A/2$). The decision time is the
122 first time step t at which the decision variable crosses one of the two decision boundaries. The
123 predicted RT is given as a sum of the decision time and the non-decision time T_{er} .

124 2.1.2. DDM with Variable Starting State, Variable Drift Rate, and Variable Non-Decision Time

125 The (simple) DDM assumes a level of constancy from one decision to the next in various com-
126 ponents of the decision-formation process: it always commences with the same level of response
127 bias (z), the drift rate takes a single value (v_i , for trials in experimental condition i), and the
128 non-decision time never varies (T_{er}).

129 None of these simplifying assumptions are likely to hold in experimental contexts. For example,
130 the relative speed of correct and erroneous responses can differ, and participants' arousal may
131 exhibit random fluctuations over time, possibly due to a level of irreducible neural noise. Decades
132 of research into decision-making models suggests that these effects, and others, are often well

133 explained by combining systematic and random components in each of the starting state, drift
134 rate, and non-decision time (Fig. 1B). In *CHaRTr*, we provide variants of the DDM where all of
135 these parameters can be randomly drawn from their typically assumed distributions over different
136 trials,

$$x_j(t + dt) = x_j(t) + v_{ij}dt + s\sqrt{dt}\mathcal{N}(0, 1) \quad (2)$$

$$x_j(0) \sim \mathcal{U}(z - \frac{s_z}{2}, z + \frac{s_z}{2}) \quad (3)$$

$$v_{ij} \sim \mathcal{N}(v_i, s_v) \quad (4)$$

$$T_{er,j} \sim \mathcal{U}(T_{er} - \frac{s_t}{2}, T_{er} + \frac{s_t}{2}) \quad (5)$$

137 where i denotes an experimental condition; j denotes an exemplar trial; \mathcal{U} denotes the uniform
138 distribution. *CHaRTr* provides flexibility to the user such that they can assume the decision-
139 formation process involves none, some or all of these random components. Furthermore, it
140 provides flexibility to assume distributions for the random components beyond those that have
141 been typically assumed and studied in the literature. For example, one could hypothesize that
142 non-decision times are exponentially distributed rather than uniformly distributed (Ratcliff, 2013).

143 2.1.3. DDM with Collapsing Decision Boundaries (*cDDM*)

144 The DDM with collapsing boundaries generalizes the classic DDM by assuming that the sensory
145 evidence required to commit to a decision is not constant as a function of elapsed decision time.
146 Instead, it assumes that the decision boundaries gradually decrease as the decision-formation
147 process grows longer and longer (e.g., Bowman et al., 2012; Drugowitsch et al., 2012; Hawkins
148 et al., 2015a; Milosavljevic et al., 2010; Tajima et al., 2016). Collapsing boundaries terminate
149 slower decisions based on weaker sensory signals (i.e., lower drift rates) at earlier time points than
150 models with ‘fixed’ boundaries (i.e., simple DDM) and otherwise equivalent parameter settings.
151 The net result of collapsing boundaries is a reduction in the positive skew (right tail) of the
152 predicted RT distribution relative to the fixed boundaries DDM. This signature in the predicted
153 RT distribution holds whether there is variability in parameters across trials (Section 2.1.2) or
154 not (Section 2.1.1).

155 Collapsing boundaries allow the observer to implement a decision strategy where they do not
156 commit an inordinate amount of time to decisions that are unlikely to be correct (i.e., decision
157 processes with weak sensory signals). This allows the observer to sacrifice accuracy for a shorter
158 decision time, so they can engage in new decisions that might contain stronger sensory signals
159 and hence a higher chance of a correct response. When a sequence of decisions varies in signal-
160 to-noise ratio from one trial to the next, like a typical difficulty manipulation in decision-making
161 studies, collapsing boundaries are provably more optimal than fixed boundaries in the sense that
162 they lead to greater predicted reward across the entirety of the decision sequence (Drugowitsch
163 et al., 2012; Tajima et al., 2016). In this type of decision environment, collapsing boundaries
164 have provided a better quantitative account of animal behavior, including monkeys, who might
165 be motivated to obtain rewards to a greater extent than humans, possibly due to the operant

166 conditioning and fluid/food restriction procedures used to motivate these animals (Hawkins et
167 al., 2015a). Whether humans also aim to maximize reward is less clear.

168 Fig. 1C shows a schematic of a collapsing boundaries model. In *CHaRTr* we assume the collaps-
169 ing boundary follows the cumulative distribution function of the Weibull distribution, following
170 Hawkins et al. (2015a). The Weibull function is quite flexible and can approximate many different
171 functions that one might wish to investigate, including the exponential and hyperbolic functions.
172 We assume the lower and upper boundaries follow the form

$$a_{lower}(t) = a \left(1 - \exp \left(- \left(\frac{t}{\lambda} \right)^k \right) \right) \left(\frac{1}{2} - a' \right) \quad (6)$$

$$a_{upper}(t) = a - a_{lower}(t) \quad (7)$$

173 where $a_{lower}(t)$ and $a_{upper}(t)$ denote the position of the lower and upper boundaries at time t ; a
174 denotes the position of upper boundary at $t = 0$ (initial boundary setting, prior to any collapse);
175 a' denotes the asymptotic boundary setting, or the extent to which the boundaries collapsed
176 (the maximal possible collapse – where the upper and lower boundaries meet – can occur when
177 $a' = 1/2$); λ and k denote the scale and shape parameters of the Weibull distribution.

178 The collapsing boundaries are denoted in *CHaRTr* as cDDM. When the k parameter is fixed to
179 a particular value to aid stronger identifiability in parameter estimation (Hawkins et al., 2015a),
180 we refer to the architecture as *cfk* to denote a fixed k value, here chosen to be 3 but can be
181 modified in user implementations.

182 The collapsing boundaries, as implemented here, are symmetric, though they need not be; *CHaRTr*
183 provides flexibility to modify all features of the boundaries, including symmetry for each response
184 option, and the functional form. For instance, one might hypothesize that linear collapsing
185 boundaries are a better description of the decision-formation process than nonlinear boundaries
186 (Murphy et al., 2016; O'Connell et al., 2018). *CHaRTr* also permits DDMs with collapsing
187 boundaries to incorporate any combination of variability in starting state, drift rate, and non-
188 decision time (e.g., models of the form cDDMS_vS_zS_t and cfkDDMS_vS_zS_t).

189 2.1.4. DDM with an Urgency Signal (*uDDM*)

190 The DDM with an urgency signal assumes that the input evidence – consisting of the sensory signal
191 and noise – is modulated by an “urgency signal”. This urgency-modulated sensory evidence is
192 accumulated into the decision variable throughout the decision-formation process. As the process
193 takes longer, the urgency signal grows in magnitude, implying that sensory evidence arriving
194 later in the decision-formation process has a more profound impact on the decision-variable than
195 information arriving earlier (Fig. 1D). To make the distinction between an urgency signal and
196 collapsing boundaries clear, the DDM with an urgency signal assumes a dynamically modulated
197 input signal combined with boundaries that mirror those in the classic DDM; the DDM with
198 collapsing boundaries assumes a decision variable that mirrors the classic DDM combined with
199 dynamically modulated decision boundaries.

200 As with the collapsing boundaries, the urgency signal can take many functional forms; we have
 201 implemented two such forms in *CHaRTr*. The general implementation of the urgency signal is

$$E(t) = vdt + s\sqrt{dt}\mathcal{N}(0, 1) \quad (8)$$

$$x(t + dt) = x(t) + E(t)\gamma(t), \quad (9)$$

202 where $E(t)$ denotes the momentary sensory evidence at time t ; $\gamma(t)$ denotes the magnitude of
 203 the urgency signal at time t . Note that with increasing decision time the urgency signal magnifies
 204 the effect of the sensory signal (vdt) and the sensory noise ($s\sqrt{dt}\mathcal{N}(0, 1)$).

205 The first urgency signal implemented in *CHaRTr* follows a 3 parameter logistic function with two
 206 scaling factors (s_x, s_y) and a delay (d), originally proposed by Ditterich (2006a):

$$S_1(t) = \exp(s_x(t - d)) \quad (10)$$

$$S_2(t) = \exp(-s_x d) \quad (11)$$

$$\gamma(t) = \frac{s_y S_1(t)}{1 + S_1(t)} + \frac{1 + (1 - s_y)S_2(t)}{1 + S_2(t)}, \quad (12)$$

207 The second form of urgency signal implemented in *CHaRTr* follows a simple, linearly increasing
 208 function

$$\gamma(t) = b + mt, \quad (13)$$

209 where b is the intercept of the urgency signal. The slope is assumed to be m . As with the DDMs
 210 described above, urgency signal models can incorporate any combination of variability in starting
 211 state, drift rate and non-decision time, giving rise to a family of different decision-making models.
 212 We also allow for the possibility of variability across decisions in the intercept term of the linear
 213 urgency signal,

$$\gamma_j(t) = b_j + mt \quad (14)$$

$$b_j \sim \mathcal{U}(b - \frac{s_b}{2}, b + \frac{s_b}{2}), \quad (15)$$

214 where j denotes an exemplar trial, and b and s_b denote the mean (i.e., midpoint) and range of
 215 the uniform distribution assumed for the urgency signal.

216 In *CHaRTr*, we have assumed that the urgency signal exerts a multiplicative effect on the sensory
 217 evidence (Equation 9). One variation of urgency signal models proposed in the literature posits
 218 that urgency is added to the sensory evidence, rather than multiplied by it (Hanks et al., 2014,
 219 2011). In the one-dimensional diffusion models considered here, additive urgency signals make
 220 predictions that cannot be discriminated from a DDM with collapsing boundaries (Boehm et al.,
 221 2016). That is, for any functional form of an additive urgency signal, there is a function for the
 222 collapsing boundaries that will generate identical predictions. For this reason we do not provide
 223 an avenue for simulating and estimating additive urgency signal models in *CHaRTr*, and instead
 224 recommend the use of the DDM with collapsing boundaries.

225 2.1.5. Urgency Gating Model (UGM)

226 In a departure from the classic DDM framework, the Urgency Gating Model (UGM) proposes
227 there is no integration of evidence, at least not in the same form as the DDM (Cisek et al., 2009;
228 Thura et al., 2012; Thura and Cisek, 2014). Rather, the UGM assumes that incoming sensory
229 evidence is low-pass filtered, which prioritizes recent over temporally distant sensory evidence,
230 and this low-pass filtered signal is modulated by an urgency signal that increases linearly with
231 time (Equation 13).

232 Implementation of the UGM in *CHaRTr* uses the exponential average approach for discrete low-
233 pass filters (smoothing). The momentary evidence for a decision is a weighted sum of past and
234 present evidence, which gives rise to the UGM's pair of governing equations

$$\alpha = \frac{\tau}{\tau + dt} \quad (16)$$

$$E(t) = \alpha E(t-1) + (1 - \alpha)(vdt + s\sqrt{dt}\mathcal{N}(0, 1)), \quad (17)$$

235 where τ is the time constant of the low-pass filter, which has typically been set to relatively
236 small values of 100 or 200 ms in previous applications of the UGM, and α controls the amount
237 of evidence from previous time points that influences the momentary evidence at time t . For
238 instance, when $\alpha = 0$ there is no low-pass filtering, and when $\tau = 100ms$ (and dt is 1 ms) the
239 previous evidence is weighted by 0.99 and new evidence by 0.01.

240 The decision variable at time t is now given as

$$\gamma(t) = b + mt \quad (18)$$

$$x(t) = E(t)\gamma(t). \quad (19)$$

241 The intercept and slope of the urgency signal are set to particular values in standard applications
242 of the UGM ($b = 0$, $m = 1$), reducing equation 19 to

$$x(t) = E(t)t. \quad (20)$$

243 In *CHaRTr*, we allow for variants of the UGM where the parameters of the urgency signal are
244 not fixed. For instance, similar to the DDM with an urgency signal, we can test a UGM where
245 the intercept (b) is freely estimated from data (bUGM), and even an intercept that varies on a
246 trial-by-trial basis (Equation 14).

247 2.2. Fitting Models to Data: Parameter Estimation and Model Selection

248 2.2.1. Parameter Estimation

249 In *CHaRTr*, we estimate parameters for each model and participant independently, using Quantile
250 Maximum Products Estimation (QMPE; Heathcote and Brown, 2004; Heathcote et al., 2002).

251 QMPE uses the QMP statistic, which is similar to χ^2 or multinomial maximum likelihood esti-
252 mation and quantifies agreement between model predictions and data by comparing the observed
253 and predicted proportions of data falling into each of a set of inter-quantile bins. These bins are
254 calculated separately for the correct and error RT data. In all examples that follow, we use 9
255 quantiles calculated from the data (i.e., split the RT data into 10 bins), though the user can spec-
256 ify as many quantiles as they wish. Generally speaking, we recommend no fewer than 5 quantiles,
257 to prevent loss of distributional information, and no more than approximately 10 quantiles, to
258 prevent noisy observations in observed data especially at the tails of the distribution potentially
259 bearing undue influence on the parameter estimation routine.

260 Many of the models considered in *CHaRTr* have no closed-form analytic solution for their pre-
261 dicted distribution. To evaluate the predictions of each model, we simulate 10,000 Monte Carlo
262 replicates per experimental condition during parameter estimation. Once the parameter search
263 has terminated, we use 50,000 replicates per experimental condition to precisely evaluate the
264 model predictions and perform model selection. In *CHaRTr*, the user can vary the number of
265 replicates used for parameter estimation and model selection; in previous applications, we have
266 found these default values provide an appropriate balance between precision of the model pre-
267 dictions and computational efficiency. To simulate the models, we use Euler's method, which
268 approximates the models' representation as stochastic differential equations.

269 Alternatives to our simulation-based approach exist, such as the integral equation methods of
270 Smith (2000) or others that use analytical techniques to calculate first passage times (Gondan
271 et al., 2014; Navarro and Fuss, 2009), to generate exact distributions. We do not pursue those
272 methods in *CHaRTr* owing to the model-specific implementation required, which is inconsistent
273 with *CHaRTr*'s core philosophy of allowing the user to rapidly implement a variety of model
274 architectures.

275 We estimate the model parameters using differential evolution to optimize the goodness of fit
276 (DEoptim package in R, Mullen et al., 2011). For the type of non-linear models considered
277 in *CHaRTr*, we have previously found that differential evolution more reliably recovers the true
278 data generating model than particle swarm and simplex optimization algorithms (Hawkins et al.,
279 2015a). DEoptim also allows easy parallelization and can be used readily in the cloud with large
280 number of cores to speed the process of model estimation. However, we again provide flexibility
281 in this respect; the user can change this default setting and specify their preferred optimization
282 algorithm/s.

283 2.2.2. Model Selection

284 *CHaRTr* provides two metrics for quantitative comparison between models. Each metric is based
285 on the maximized value of the QMP statistic, which is a goodness-of-fit term that approximates
286 the continuous maximum likelihood of the data given the model.

287 The DDM is a special case of the model variants considered and will almost always fit more
288 poorly than any of the other variants. We provide model selection methods that determine if

289 the incorporation of additional components such as urgency or collapsing bounds provide an
290 improvement in fit that justifies the increase in model complexity.

291 The raw QMP statistic, as an approximation to the likelihood, can be used to calculate the Akaike
292 Information Criterion (Akaike, 1974, AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (Schwarz, 1978,
293 BIC). We provide methods to compute AIC and BIC owing to the differing assumptions underlying
294 the two information criteria (Aho et al., 2014), and differing performance with respect to the
295 modeling goal (Evans, in press).

296 *CHaRT* also provides functionality to transform the model selection metrics into model weights,
297 which account for uncertainty in the model selection procedure and aid interpretation by transfor-
298 mation to the probability scale. The weight w for model i , $w(M_i)$, relative to a set of m models,
299 is given by

$$w(M_i) = \frac{\exp(-\frac{1}{2}Z(M_i))}{\sum_{j=1}^m \exp(-\frac{1}{2}Z(M_j))}, \quad (21)$$

300 where Z is AIC, BIC, or the deviance ($-2 \times \log$ -likelihood; that is, $-2 \times$ QMP statistic). The
301 model weight is interpreted differently depending on the metric Z :

- 302 • Where Z is the log-likelihood, the model weights are relative likelihoods. Z should only
303 be used in the model weight transformation when all models under consideration have the
304 same number of freely estimated parameters.
- 305 • Where Z is the AIC, the model weights become Akaike weights (Wagenmakers and Farrell,
306 2004).
- 307 • Where Z is the BIC, and the prior probability over the m models under consideration is
308 uniform (i.e., each model is assumed to be equally likely before observing the data), the
309 model weights approximate posterior model probabilities ($p(M|Data)$, Wasserman, 2000).

310 2.2.3. Visualization: Quantile Probability Plots

311 Visualization of choice and RT data is critical to understanding observed and predicted behavior.
312 Such visualization can prove challenging in studies of rapid decision-making because each cell
313 of the experimental design (e.g., a particular stimulus difficulty) yields a joint distribution over
314 the probability of a correct response (accuracy) and separate RT distributions for correct and
315 error responses. Since most decision-making tasks manipulate at least one experimental factor
316 across multiple levels, such as stimulus difficulty, each data set is comprised of a family of joint
317 distributions over choice probabilities and pairs of RT distributions (correct, error). Following
318 convention and recommendation (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff et al., 2016), we visualize
319 these joint distributions with quantile probability (QP) plots. QP plots are a compact form to
320 display choice probabilities and RT distributions across multiple conditions.

321 In a typical QP plot, quantiles of the RT distribution of a particular type (e.g., correct responses)
322 are plotted as a function of the proportion of responses of that type. For example, consider a

323 hypothetical decision-making experiment with three different levels of stimulus difficulty; Fig. 2
324 provides a plausible example of the data from such an experiment. Now assume that for one
325 of the experimental conditions, the accuracy of the observer was 55%. To display the choice
326 probabilities, correct RTs and error RTs for this condition, the QP plot shows a vertical column
327 of N markers above the x -axis position ~ 0.55 , where the N markers correspond to the N
328 quantiles of the RT distribution of correct responses (rightmost gray bar in Fig. 2). The QP plot
329 also shows a vertical columns of N markers at the position $1 - 0.55 = 0.45$, where this set of
330 N markers correspond to the N quantiles of the distribution of error RTs (leftmost gray bar in
331 Fig. 2). This means that RT distributions shown to the right of .5 on the x -axis reflect correct
332 responses, and those to the left of .5 on the x -axis reflect error responses.

333 The default *CHaRTr* QP plot display 5 quantiles of the RT distribution: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and
334 0.9 (sometimes also referred to as five percentiles: 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, 90th). The .1 quantile
335 summarizes the leading edge of the RT distribution, the .5 quantile (median) summarizes the
336 central tendency of the RT distribution, and the .9 quantile summarizes the tail of the RT
337 distribution. The goal of visualization with QP plots, or other forms of visualization, is to enable
338 comparison of the descriptive adequacy of a model's predictions relative to the observed data.

339 3. Results

340 The results section first provides guidance on the use of *CHaRTr* and how to apply the various
341 models of the decision-making process to data. The second part of the results section illustrates
342 the use of *CHaRTr* to analyze RT and choice data from hypothetical observers, followed by a
343 case study modeling data from two non-human primates (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002). Code for
344 the *CHaRTr* toolbox is available at chartr.chandlab.org/ and will eventually be released
345 as an R library.

346 3.1. Toolbox flow

347 Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 provide flowcharts for *CHaRTr*. Fig. 3 provides an overview of the five main
348 steps involved in the cognitive modeling process. Fig. 4 provides a schematic overview of the
349 steps involved in the parameter estimation component of the process, which uses the differential
350 evolution optimization algorithm (Mullen et al., 2011).

351 The typical steps in *CHaRTr* for estimating the parameters of a decision-making model from data
352 are as follows:

- 353 Step 1: **Model Specification:** Specify models in the C programming language, and compile the
354 C code to create the shared object, `chartr-modelspec.so`, that is dynamically loaded into
355 the R workspace. Future versions of *CHaRTr* will use the Rcpp framework and will not
356 require the compilation and loading of shared objects (Eddelbuettel and François, 2011).
- 357 Step 2: **Formatting and Loading Data:** Convert raw data into an appropriate format (choice
358 probabilities, quantiles of RT distributions for correct and error trials). Save this data object

359 for each unit of analysis (e.g., a participant, different experimental conditions for the same
360 participant). Load this data object into the R workspace.

361 **Step 3: Parameter Specification:** Choose the parameters of the desired model that need to be
362 estimated along with lower and upper boundaries on those parameters (i.e., the minimum
363 and maximum value that each parameter can feasibly take).

364 **Step 4: Parameter Estimation:** Pass the parameters, model and data to the optimization algo-
365 rithm (differential evolution). The algorithm iteratively selects candidate parameter values
366 and evaluates their goodness of fit to data. This process is repeated until the goodness of
367 fit no longer improves (Fig. 4).

368 **Step 5: Model Selection:** The parameter estimates from the search termination point (i.e., the
369 point where goodness of fit no longer improves), the corresponding goodness of fit statistics
370 and model predictions are saved for subsequent model selection and visualization.

371 These 5 steps are repeated for each model and each participant under consideration. In the next
372 few sections, we elaborate on each of the steps with examples to illustrate their implementation
373 in *CHaRTr*. We note that use of *CHaRTr* requires a basic knowledge of R programming, and if
374 one wishes to design and test a new decision-making model then also C programming. Owing to
375 the many excellent online resources for both languages (a simple search of “R program tutorial”
376 will return many helpful results), we do not provide a tutorial for either language here.

377 3.1.1. Model Specification

378 The difference equation for the model variants implemented in *CHaRTr* is specified in C code in
379 the file "chartr-ModelSpec.c". An example implementation of the DDM (Section 2.1.1) is shown
380 in Listing 1. The functions take as input the various parameters that are to be optimized along
381 with various constants such as the maximum number of time points to simulate as well as the
382 time step.

```
383 // Simple Diffusion Decision Model (DDM)  
384 int DDM(double *z, double *v, double *aL, double *aU, double *s, double *dt,  
385         double *response, double *rt, double *n, double *maxTimeStep)  
386 {  
387     /*  
388         z - starting point  
389         aL - lower bound  
390         aU - upper bound  
391         v - drift rate  
392         response - response from the function  
393         rt - reaction time of the animal  
394         n - number of trials to simulate  
395         maxTimeStep - number of time steps  
396         dt = stepsize (for time usually 0.001 s, or 1 ms depending on model)  
397         s = standard deviation of noise, usually fixed as a scaling parameter  
398     */  
399     .  
400     */  
401     double rhs, x;  
402     int N, i, timeStep, MaxTimeStep;  
403
```

```
404 /* Convert some double inputs to integer types. */
405 N=(int) *n;
406 MaxTimeStep =(int) *maxTimeStep;
407 GetRNGstate();
408 rhs=sqrt(*dt)*(*s);
409 for (i=0;i<N;i++) // For each trial in the list of simulated trials
410 {
411     x=*z;
412     timeStep=0;
413     response[i]=(double) -1.0 ;
414     do
415     {
416         timeStep = timeStep+1;
417         x = x+(*dt)*(*v)+rhs*norm_rand();
418         if (x>=*aU) {
419             response[i]=(double) 1.0;
420             break ;
421         }
422         if (x<=*aL) {
423             response[i]=(double) 2.0 ;
424             break ;
425         }
426     } while (timeStep < MaxTimeStep) ;
427     rt[i]=((double) timeStep)*(*dt) - (*dt)/((double) 2.0);
428 }
429 PutRNGstate();
430 }
431 }
```

Listing 1: Source code for a function in C that implements the difference equation for the DDM.

433 Once the C code has been specified for the model, the code is compiled using the following
434 command that uses the SHLIB framework (R Core Team) at the terminal (usually ITERM in mac,
435 Terminal Emulator in linux). The command shown in Listing 2 calls the appropriate compiler
436 (clang on mac, gcc on linux), identifies the appropriate compiler to run, and loads the appropriate
437 libraries and ensures the correct options are applied during compilation to create the architecture
438 specific shared object.

```
439 $ R CMD SHLIB chartr-ModelSpec.c
440
```

Listing 2: Creating a shared library for loading the specified models into R.

442 The typical output of the command when run successfully on Linux is shown in Listing 3. The
443 output of the compilation is a shared object called *chartr-modelspec.so* that is dynamically loaded
444 into R for use with the differential evolution optimizer.

```
445 gcc -std=gnu99 -I/usr/share/R/include -DNDEBUG -fpic -g -O2 -fstack-protector-
446 strong -Wformat -Werror=format-security -Wdate-time -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -g
447 -c chartr-ModelSpec.c -o chartr-modelspec.o
448
449 g++ -shared -L/usr/lib/R/lib -Wl,-Bsymbolic-functions -Wl,-z,relro -o chartr-
450 ModelSpec.so chartr-ModelSpec.o -L/usr/lib/R/lib -lR
451
```

Listing 3: Output from the compilation of the command in Listing 2.

```
condition, response, RT
90, 1, 0.573
90, 1, 0.472
90, 1, 0.556
.
.
.
90, 0, 0.406
90, 0, 0.429
90, 0, 0.57
```

Listing 4: The required raw data format for parameter estimation in *CHaRT_r*.

```
dataDir="Example2" # directory name of data files to fit
subjnam="Subj1"
load(paste(dataDir, "/", subjnam, sep=""))
```

Listing 5: Loading data for "Subj1" for model estimation.

453 We anticipate that future versions of *CHaRT_r* will use the Rcpp framework (Eddelbuettel and
454 François, 2011), which will obviate the need for compiling and loading shared object libraries.

455 3.1.2. Formatting and Loading Data

456 To estimate the parameters of decision-making models in *CHaRT_r*, the data need to be organized
457 in a separate comma separated values (CSV) file for each participant in a simple three column
458 format: "condition, response, RT". "condition" is typically a stimulus difficulty parameter,
459 "response" is correct (1) or incorrect (0), and RT is the response time (or reaction time when
460 response time and movement can be separated). For example, in a typical file, data for a single
461 stimulus difficulty (e.g., one level of motion coherence in a random dot kinematogram) would
462 look like Listing 4.

463 The raw data are converted in "chartr-processRawData.r" to generate 9 quantiles (10 bins) of
464 correct and error RTs to be used in the parameter estimation process. It also stores the data as
465 a R list named *dat*, which includes four fields: *n*, *p*, *q*, *pb*.

- 466 • *n* is the number of correct and error responses in each condition.
- 467 • *p* is the proportion of correct responses in each condition (derived from *n*).
- 468 • *q* is the quantiles of the correct and error RT distributions in each condition.
- 469 • *pb* is the number of responses in each bin of the correct and error RT distributions in each
470 condition (derived from *n*).

471 *dat* is saved to disk as a new file. The *dat* file is loaded into the R workspace as required for the
472 model estimation procedure. Listing 5 shows R code for loading RT and choice data, as stored
473 in *dat*, for a given participant.

474 3.1.3. Parameter Specification

475 The next step in model estimation is, for each model, to specify a list of parameters that can be
476 freely estimated from data along with each parameter's lower and upper bound; we provide default
477 suggestions for the lower and upper boundaries in *CHaRTr*. Model parameters can be generated by
478 calling the function *paramsandlims* with two arguments: model name and the number of stimulus
479 difficulty levels in the experiment. The number of stimulus difficulties is internally converted into
480 drift rate parameters; for example, if there are n stimulus difficulties, then *paramsandlims* will
481 estimate n independent drift rate parameters. There is also functionality in *CHaRTr* to specify
482 fixed (non-estimated) values of some parameters, such as a drift rate of 0 for conditions with non-
483 informative sensory information (e.g., 0% coherence in a random dot kinematogram experiment).
484 *paramsandlims* returns a named list with the following fields: lowers, uppers, parnames, fitUGM.
485 These variables are used internally in the parameter estimation routines.

486 3.1.4. Parameter Estimation

487 Steps 1–3 loaded the required data, identified the desired model to fit and specified the parameters
488 of the model to be estimated. This information is now passed to the optimization algorithm
489 (differential evolution). Parameter optimization is an iterative process of proposing candidate
490 parameter values, accepting or rejecting candidate parameter values based on their goodness of
491 fit, and repeating. This process continues until the proposed parameter values no longer improve
492 the model's goodness of fit. These are assumed to be the best-fitting parameter values, or the
493 (approximate) maximum likelihood estimates. Fig. 4 provides an overview of the steps involved
494 in parameter estimation when using the differential evolution optimization algorithm (Mullen et
495 al., 2011).

496 The accompanying file "chartr-DemoFit.r" provides a complete code example for estimating the
497 parameters of a model with urgency.

498 3.1.5. Model Selection

499 Once the best-fitting parameters have been estimated from a set of candidate models, the final
500 step is to use this information to guide inference about the relative plausibility of each of the
501 models given the data. Many different levels of questions can be asked of these models. The
502 best practices for model selection are described generally in Aho et al. (2014) and for the specific
503 problem of behavioral modeling in Heathcote et al. (2015).

504 In *CHaRTr*, we provide functions for converting from the raw QMP statistic that approximates the
505 likelihood. The likelihood provides essentially a goodness-of-fit statistic that can be combined
506 with penalized model comparison metrics. This could entail comparison between two models
507 at multiple levels of granularity. For instance, the question could be, "which of the models
508 considered provides the better description of the data", or "is a DDM with variable baseline
509 better than a DDM without a variable baseline". It could also be used to compare between a

```
# In this implementation - the variability in drift rate and baseline are
  modeled using C code, the randomness in the St parameter is handled by R
DDMSvSzSt={
  out=.C("DDMSvSz",zmin=zmin,zmax=zmax,v=v,aU=aU,aL=aL,eta=eta,s=stoch.s,
        dt=dt,response=resps,rt=rts,n=nmc,maxTimeStep=maxTimeStep);
  rts=out$rt+runif(n=nmc,min=Ter-st0/2,max=Ter+st0/2);
},
```

Listing 6: R Code for estimating the RTs and choice for the model DDM $S_v S_z S_t$

510 model with collapsing boundaries and a model with drift-rate variability (O’Connell et al., 2018)
511 or between models with different forms of collapsing boundaries (Hawkins et al., 2015a). All of
512 these questions can be answered using *CHaRTr*. As a guide, we provide illustrations of model
513 selection analyses using *CHaRTr* in two case studies presented in Section 3.4. We also apply the
514 model selection analyses to the behavior of monkeys performing a decision-making task (Roitman
515 and Shadlen, 2002).

516 3.2. Extending CHaRTr

517 *CHaRTr* is designed with the goal of being readily extensible, to allow the user to specify new
518 models with minimal development time. This allows the user to focus on the models of scientific
519 interest while *CHaRTr* takes care of the model estimation and selection details behind the scenes.
520 Here, we provide an overview of the steps required to add new models to *CHaRTr*.

- 521 1. Add a new function to “chartr-ModelSpec.c” with the parameters needed to be estimated
522 for the model. Specify the model in C code, similar to Listing 1. Provide the new model
523 with a unique name (i.e., not shared with any other models in the toolbox), preferably using
524 the convention we defined above.
- 525 2. Add any new parameters of the model to the function *makeparamlist*, and to the *param-*
526 *sandlims* function in script “chartr-HelperFunctions.r”.
- 527 3. Add the name of the model to the function *returnListOfModels*, in script “chartr-HelperFunctions.r”.
- 528 4. Make sure additional parameters are passed to the functions *diffusionC* and *getpreds*, in
529 scripts “chartr-HelperFunctions.r” and “chartr-FitRoutines.r”, respectively.
- 530 5. Finally, specify in function *diffusionC* the code for generating RTs and responses to use for
531 model fitting. For example, the code for generating the RTs and responses for $DDMS_v S_z S_t$
532 is shown in the Listing 6

533 3.3. Simulating Data from Models in CHaRTr

534 Once models are specified, they can be used to generate simulated RTs and discrimination accu-
535 racy for each condition. Simulated data help refine quantitative hypotheses. They also provide
536 much greater insight into the dynamics of different decision-making models and how different
537 variables in these models modulate the predicted RT distributions for correct and error trials
538 (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008).

539 *CHaRTr* provides straightforward methods to simulate data from decision-making models and
540 generate quantile probability plots to compactly summarize and visualize RT distributions and
541 accuracy. The function *paramsandlims*, used above in the parameter estimation routine, can also
542 be used to generate hypothetical parameters to be passed to the function *simulateRTs*, which
543 generates a set of simulated RTs and choice responses. By hypothetical parameters, we mean a
544 set of reasonable starting values. An example is shown in Listing 7. These parameters can be
545 changed by the user.

```
546 source("chartr-HelperFunctions.r")  
547 nCoh = 5  
548 nmc = 50000  
549 model = "DDM"  
550 fP = paramsandlims(model, nCoh, hypoPars = TRUE)  
551 currParams = fP$hypoParams  
552 R = simulateRTs(model, currParams, n=nmc, nds=nCoh)
```

Listing 7: R code for simulating RT and choice responses from the simple diffusion decision model (DDM).

555 **Fig. 5** shows the output of "chartr-Demo.r", which simulates and visualizes choice and RT
556 data from four models in *CHaRTr*: DDM, DDMS_vS_zS_t, UGMS_v, and dDDMS_v. **Fig. 5A** shows
557 predictions of the simple DDM (see Section 2.1.1), a symmetric, inverted-U shaped QP plot
558 (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008); the symmetry implies that correct and error RTs are identically
559 distributed. As variability is introduced to the DDM's starting state (S_z) and/or drift-rate (S_v ;
560 see Section 2.1.2), the QP plot loses its symmetry (**Fig. 5B**); relative to correct RTs, error RTs
561 can be faster (due to S_z) or slower (due to S_v). **Fig. 5B** also introduced variability in non-decision
562 time (S_t), which increases the variance of the fastest responses.

563 **Fig. 5C** shows predictions of a standard variant of the UGM model (UGMS_v) that assumes variable
564 drift rate, zero intercept, a slope (β) of 1 and a time constant of 100 ms (see Section 2.1.5). The
565 urgency gating mechanism in this model reduces the positive skew of the RT distributions, and
566 leads to the prediction that error RTs are always slower than correct RTs (**Fig. 5C**; Hawkins et
567 al., 2015b). Like the UGM, the dDDMS_v model, another model of urgency (see Section 2.1.4),
568 also predicts reduced positive skew of the RT distributions. Unlike the standard UGM, however,
569 it can also predict error RTs that are faster or slower than correct RTs (**Fig. 5D**).

570 It is clear from **Fig. 5** that various features in data discriminate between various features of the
571 decision-making models: the relative speed of correct and error RTs, and critically the shape of
572 complete RT distributions. We now provide three illustrative case studies that take advantage of
573 the differential predictions of the models, demonstrating the use of *CHaRTr* for model parameter
574 estimation and selection amongst sets of competing models.

575 3.4. Case Studies

576 To illustrate the utility of the toolbox, we provide three case studies where we simulated data
577 from decision-making models in *CHaRTr* (case studies 1 and 2) or use *CHaRTr* to model data

578 collected from monkeys performing a decision-making task (case study 3). We use the case
579 studies to demonstrate the typical model estimation and selection analyses. The case studies
580 also provide a test of model and parameter recovery. That is, whether *CHaRTr* reliably selects
581 the true data-generating model, and whether it reliably estimates the parameters of the true
582 data-generating model.

583 3.4.1. Case Study 1: Hypothetical Data Generated from a DDM with Variable Drift Rate and 584 Non-Decision Time ($DDMS_{vS_t}$)

585 For our first case study we assumed the data came from hypothetical observers who made decisions
586 in a manner consistent with a DDM with variable drift rate (S_v) and variable start times (S_t). In
587 *CHaRTr*, this corresponds to simulating data from the model $DDMS_{vS_t}$, where an observer's RTs
588 exhibit variability due to both the decision-formation process and the non-decision components.
589 We simulated 300 trials for each of 5 stimulus difficulties, for 5 hypothetical participants.

590 For each model and hypothetical participant, we repeated the parameter estimation procedure 5
591 times, independently. We heavily recommend this redundant-estimation approach as it greatly
592 reduces the likelihood of terminating the optimization algorithm in local minima, which can
593 arise in simulation-based models like those implemented in *CHaRTr*. Variability occurs due to
594 randomness in simulating predictions of the model at each iteration of the optimization algorithm,
595 and randomness in the optimization algorithm itself (for similar approach, see Hawkins et al.,
596 2015a,b). We then select the best of the 5 independent parameter estimation procedures (or
597 'runs') for each model and participant (i.e., the 'run' with the highest value of the QMP statistic).
598 If computational constraints are not an issue, then we encourage as many repetitions as possible
599 of the parameter estimation procedure.

600 **Fig. 6A** shows the BICs for a set of models, obtained after using *CHaRTr* to fit the RT and
601 choice data from one of the hypothetical observers. All the BICs are reported with reference to
602 the DDM (i.e., as difference scores relative to the DDM). Thus, negative values of the BIC score
603 suggest a more parsimonious account of the data than the DDM, and positive values suggest the
604 opposite.

605 **Fig. 6B** shows the BIC-based approximate posterior model probabilities (Eq. 21) for the top six
606 models. $DDMS_{vS_t}$ provided the best account of the data; by 'best account', we mean the model
607 that provided the most appropriate tradeoff between model fit and model complexity among the
608 specific set of models under consideration, according to BIC. This suggests that *CHaRTr* can
609 successfully identify the data-generating model – a necessary test for any parameter estimation
610 and model selection analysis. We strongly recommend this form of *model recovery* analysis when
611 developing and testing any proposed cognitive model; if a candidate model cannot be successfully
612 identified in simulated data, where the true model is known, it will not be useful a model for real
613 data.

614 The models *CHaRTr* ranked 2nd to 6th were sensibly related to the data-generating model. These
615 models all assumed that observed RTs were influenced by factors other than sensory evidence

616 (such as growing impatience), which might mimic the data-generating model's RT variability
617 that arose due to factors external to the decision-formation process (variable non-decision time).
618 Although these results indicate that the $DDMS_{vS_t}$ model provided a better account of the data
619 than $cfkDDMS_{vS_t}$, $dDDMS_{vS_t}$, $cDDMS_{vS_t}$, and $DDMS_{vS_zS_t}$, they also serve as an important
620 reminder that model selection should not be used to argue for the "best" model in an absolute
621 sense. Rather, it is often most constructive to rank useful hypotheses/explanations about the
622 data that can then guide further study (Burnham et al., 2011), which is the approach we have
623 used here.

624 Fig. 6C shows the estimated parameter values for the best-fitting $DDMS_{vS_t}$ model. The pa-
625 rameter estimates were very similar to the data-generating values, with some minor over- or
626 under-estimation of the drift rate parameters. This suggests that *CHaRTr* can reasonably re-
627 cover the data-generating model *and* parameters. As above, we also strongly recommend this
628 form of *parameter recovery* analysis when developing and testing any proposed cognitive model.

629 Fig. 6D and Fig. 6E show the model selection outcomes from another hypothetical observer.
630 The best fitting model is again identified as $DDMS_{vS_t}$. A few other models also provided good
631 accounts of the data. As was the case for observer 1, these models predict variability in RTs due
632 to mechanisms outside the decision-formation process.

633 In the three other hypothetical observers that we simulated, the pattern of results returned
634 by *CHaRTr* was consistent with the results shown for the two hypothetical observers in Fig.
635 6: $DDMS_{vS_t}$ was chosen as the best fitting model for all observers. If we assume the set of
636 observers are independent (which they are in the case of our hypothetical example and usually
637 in experiments), we can average over their posterior model probabilities to obtain a group-level
638 estimate. As shown in Fig. 6F, $DDMS_{vS_t}$ is identified as the most plausible model for the data
639 across the set of observers, indicating good model recovery.

640 Fig. 7 shows QP plots of the data from two hypothetical observers overlaid on the predictions
641 from a range of models. The simple DDM predicted larger variance than was observed in data,
642 and therefore provided a poor account of the data. When the DDM is augmented with S_v and
643 S_t , it provided a much improved account of the data, capturing most of the RT quantiles and
644 the accuracy patterns. Three other models provided an almost-equivalent account of the data in
645 terms of log-likelihoods ($DDMS_{vS_zS_t}$, $cDDMS_{vS_t}$, $dDDMS_{vS_t}$), but they did so with the use of
646 more model parameters than $DDMS_{vS_t}$. This led to a larger complexity penalty for those models
647 and thus larger BICs in comparison to the $DDMS_{vS_t}$ model, as shown in the model selection
648 analysis in Fig. 6.

649 3.4.2. Case Study 2: Hypothetical Data Generated from a UGM with Variable Intercept ($bUGMS_v$)

650 In a second case study we simulated data from hypothetical observers whose decision-formation
651 process was controlled by an urgency gating model (UGM) with a variable drift rate and an
652 intercept (Cisek et al., 2009; Thura et al., 2012), termed $bUGMS_v$ in *CHaRTr*. We again assumed
653 five hypothetical subjects, five stimulus difficulties and simulated 500 trials for each of them. We

654 then fit the data with the redundant-estimation approach as in case study 1 and evaluated the
655 results of the model selection analysis, all using routines contained in *CHaRTr*.

656 **Fig. 8A** shows the BICs for the set of models considered for one hypothetical observer's data,
657 again referenced to the DDM (i.e., as difference scores relative to the DDM). Negative values
658 of the BIC score suggest a more parsimonious account of the data than the DDM, and positive
659 values suggest the opposite. **Fig. 8B** shows the BIC weights (Eq. 21) for the top six models.
660 bUGMS_v provided the best account of the data for this hypothetical observer. The models
661 *CHaRTr* ranked 2nd to 6th were also sensibly related to the data-generating model; they all
662 assumed the decision-formation process was influenced by factors other than sensory evidence,
663 such as growing impatience. The second case study reaffirms our conclusion from the first case
664 study that model selection may not be put to best use when arguing for a single "best" model
665 in an absolute sense. This is especially true when the data-generating model is not decisively
666 recovered from data.

667 Model selection sometimes fails to recover the data-generating model. **Fig. 8C** shows the top six
668 models identified by *CHaRTr* as providing the best fit to another of the hypothetical observers'
669 data; uDDMS_v provided a better fit than the generative model bUGMS_v . This result highlights
670 two important points. First, some models under some circumstances can mimic each other (i.e.,
671 generate similar predictions), which makes their identification in data difficult. Second, some
672 models may not be mimicked, but they may require very many data points to reliably recover.
673 We note that these points are not specific to *CHaRTr* – they are properties of quantitative model
674 selection in general and are an important reminder of the necessary careful steps needed when
675 aiming to select between models (Chandrasekaran et al., 2018).

676 **Fig. 8D** shows the posterior model probabilities for the different models averaged over all five
677 observers considered. Reassuringly, the most plausible model across the set of observers is the
678 generative model bUGMS_v . The next five best models are all conceptually related to the data
679 generating model. For instance, the next best model was UGMS_v which is an urgency gating
680 model with no intercept. The third best model was uDDMS_v which is a DDM model with urgency
681 but no gating. Together these results again serve as a reminder of the utility of *CHaRTr* in the
682 analysis of decision-making models, including the ability to quantitatively assess a large set of
683 conceptually similar and dissimilar models.

684 3.4.3. Case Study 3: Behavioral Data From Monkeys Reported in Roitman and Shadlen (2002)

685 To demonstrate the utility of *CHaRTr* in understanding experimental data, we use *CHaRTr* to
686 model the freely available RT and choice data from two monkeys performing a random-dot motion
687 RT decision-making task (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002). In this classic variant of the random-
688 dot motion task, the monkeys were trained to report the direction of coherent motion with eye
689 movements. The percentage of coherently moving dots was randomized from trial to trial across
690 six levels (0%, 3.2%, 6.4%, 12.8%, 25.6% and 51.2%). Monkey b completed 2614 trials and
691 Monkey n completed 3534 trials.

692 We demonstrate that *CHaRTr* replicates key findings from past analyses of these behavioral data.
693 Roitman and Shadlen (2002)'s behavioral (and neural) data were originally interpreted as a neural
694 correlate of the DDM. Later studies suggested a stronger role for impatience/urgency in these
695 data (Ditterich, 2006b; Hawkins et al., 2015b). This is the first result we wish to demonstrate
696 again using *CHaRTr*. Second, Hawkins et al. (2015a) showed that the urgency gating model
697 provides a better description of the data than the DDM. We note that recent work suggests the
698 evidence for impatience/urgency in Roitman and Shadlen (2002)'s data might be the result of
699 the particular training regime the monkeys were exposed to (Evans and Hawkins, 2019).

700 **Fig. 9A-B** shows the results from *CHaRTr*. For both monkeys, the four best-performing models
701 all included a DDM with either urgency or collapsing bounds, and the worst performing models
702 were largely DDM models without any forms of urgency. As mentioned above, for any functional
703 form of a collapsing boundary there is a form of additive urgency signal that can generate identical
704 predictions. So finding that collapsing bound models describe the data better is consistent with
705 prior observations that urgency is an important factor. Together, the results are broadly consistent
706 with those of Ditterich (2006a) and Hawkins et al. (2015b) who reported that models with forms
707 of impatience are systematically better than models without it, for Roitman and Shadlen (2002)'s
708 data. **Fig. 9C-D** shows that when the comparison is restricted to UGM and DDM models, variants
709 of the UGM better explain the behavior of the monkeys than variants of the DDM, which is
710 consistent with the findings of Hawkins et al. (2015a).

711 We can take things one step further and use *CHaRTr* to derive more insights into the behavior
712 of the monkeys in this decision-making task, by examining whether urgency or the time constant
713 of integration is a more important factor in explaining their behavior. **Fig. 10** shows quantile
714 probability plots for five models: $DDMS_{\nu}S_zS_t$, a model from the DDM class without urgency
715 but elaborated with variability in various parameters (S_{ν} , S_z , S_t), two models with Urgency and
716 variability in some parameters ($uDDMS_{\nu}S_t$, $uDDMS_{\nu}S_b$), and two UGM models with variability
717 in parameters ($bUGMS_{\nu}S_b$, $bUGMS_{\nu}S_t$). As shown in **Fig. 9**, addition of urgency dramatically
718 improved the ability of these models to account for the decision-making behavior of the two
719 monkeys. We next used *CHaRTr* for a preliminary analysis of whether the gating component
720 of the urgency gating model improves model predictions over and above urgency alone. In both
721 monkeys, we found that the data are slightly more consistent with models such as $bUGMS_{\nu}S_b$ and
722 $bUGMS_{\nu}S_t$, models that involve urgency and gating with a 100 ms time constant of integration.
723 These observations provide hypotheses for further analyses of the neural data and further targeted
724 model selection.

725 Together, the results in **Fig. 9** and **Fig. 10** highlight the ease with which *CHaRTr* can be used
726 to make insightful statements about behavior in decision-making tasks and ultimately may be a
727 stepping stone for deeper insights into mechanism (Krakauer et al., 2017).

728 4. Discussion

729 Advances in our understanding of decision making have come from three fronts: 1) through
730 novel experimental manipulations of sensory stimuli (Brody and Hanks, 2016; Cisek et al., 2009;

731 Ratcliff, 2002; Ratcliff and Rouder, 2000; Smith and Ratcliff, 2009; Thura and Cisek, 2014)
732 and/or task manipulations (Hanks et al., 2014), 2) recording neural data in a variety of decision-
733 related structures in multiple model systems (Chandrasekaran et al., 2017; Coallier et al., 2015;
734 Ding and Gold, 2012a; Hanks et al., 2015; Schall, 2001; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Thura
735 et al., 2014) and 3) developing and testing quantitative cognitive models of choices, RTs, and
736 other behavioral readouts from animal and human observers performing these decision-making
737 tasks (Ratcliff and Smith, 2015). Quantitative modeling is a lynchpin in generating novel insights
738 into cognitive processes such as decision-making. However, it has posed significant technical
739 and computational challenges to the researcher. Widespread and rapid uptake of quantitative
740 modeling requires software toolboxes that can easily implement the many sophisticated models
741 of decision-making proposed in the literature (Diederich, 1997b; Ratcliff et al., 2016; Thura et
742 al., 2012).

743 We contend that the ideal toolbox for developing and implementing cognitive models of decision-
744 making and evaluating them against choice and RT data should be simple, offer a plurality of
745 cognitive models, provide model estimation and model selection procedures, provide simple simu-
746 lation and visualization tools, and be easily extensible when new hypotheses are developed. Such
747 a view is broadly consistent with recent research that lays out the best practices for computa-
748 tional modeling of behavior (Heathcote et al., 2015; Wilson and Collins, 2019). Ready adoption
749 is also facilitated when the toolbox is implemented in an open-source, free programming language
750 obviating the need for expensive licenses. The added benefit of an open source toolbox is that
751 researchers can look "under the hood", which has at least three benefits: 1) allow a deeper level
752 of understanding of the models, 2) readily permit extension of the toolbox, and 3) catch errors
753 in implementation. At the time of development of this toolbox and submission of this study, no
754 existing toolbox has satisfied all of these criteria.

755 *CHaRTr* was guided by these pragmatic principles, and is our attempt to provide a practical tool-
756 box that encompasses a range of cognitive models of decision-making. Some of the models are
757 grounded in classic random walk and diffusion models (Ratcliff, 1978; Stone, 1960). Others incor-
758 porate modern hypotheses that decision-making behavior might involve signals such as urgency
759 (Ditterich, 2006b), collapsing boundaries (Drugowitsch et al., 2012), and variable non-decision
760 times (Ratcliff and Tuerlinckx, 2002). Since all of the source code is freely available, the toolbox
761 thus provides a framework where models that are proposed into the future can also be imple-
762 mented and contrasted against existing models. We provide a suite of functions for estimating
763 the parameters of decision-making models, methods to compare log-likelihoods, and calculating
764 penalized information criteria from these different models. Finally, the toolbox is developed in the
765 R Statistical Environment, an open source language that is maintained by an active community
766 of scientists and statisticians (R Core Team, 2016).

767 We anticipate that *CHaRTr* will provide a pathway to standardizing quantitative comparisons
768 between models and across studies, and ultimately serve as one of the reference implementations
769 for researchers interested in developing and experimentally testing candidate models of decision-
770 making processes. *CHaRTr* also codifies the various parameters of decision-making models, which
771 reflects the hypothesized latent constructs and how they interact, and provides easy access to

772 more than 20 models of behavioral performance in decision-making tasks including variants of
773 the diffusion decision model, the urgency gating model, diffusion models with urgency signals,
774 and diffusion models with collapsing boundaries. *CHaRTr* also offers pedagogical value because it
775 allows the user to effortlessly simulate the many different models of decision-making and generate
776 RT and choice data from hypothetical observers. *CHaRTr* will also allow quantitative evalua-
777 tion of the predictions of various decision-making models and help move away from qualitative
778 intuition-based predictions from these models. Finally, *CHaRTr* is also sufficiently flexible that
779 users can implement novel models with their own specific assumptions.

780 *CHaRTr* provides researchers with the resources to apply and test more than 20 different, albeit
781 overlapping, variants of decision-making models. We have argued throughout that model selection
782 techniques ought to be used as a tool for selecting families of models to guide the next generation
783 of experiments and further analyses, which is in the spirit of Burnham et al. (2011); we do not
784 believe model selection should be used to justify categorical answers ("the best model"). In this
785 sense, model selection is one tool in the whole gamut of tools that are needed to understand
786 decision-making (Chandrasekaran et al., 2018)

787 The most promising approaches for advancing our understanding of decision-making will combine
788 the rigorous model selection techniques we advocate here with novel experimental manipulations
789 of stimulus statistics (Brody and Hanks, 2016; Cisek et al., 2009; Evans et al., 2017; Thura et al.,
790 2014), task contingencies (Hanks et al., 2014; Heitz and Schall, 2012; Murphy et al., 2016; Thura
791 and Cisek, 2016), and a range of other factors. We believe that validating and advancing models of
792 decision-making will be facilitated by data that is freely available for the kinds of model estimation
793 and model selection analyses we have performed here. Here, we took advantage of the freely
794 available dataset from Roitman and Shadlen (2002). We anticipate the application of *CHaRTr*
795 to many more decision-making datasets will help to form a coherent picture of how various
796 latent cognitive processes affect the behavior of animal and human decision-making. This deeper
797 understanding of decision-making behavior (Krakauer et al., 2017) will in turn facilitate a deeper
798 understanding of decision-related neural responses (Chandrasekaran et al., 2017; Churchland et
799 al., 2008; Cisek et al., 2009; Murphy et al., 2016; O'Connell et al., 2018; Purcell and Kiani, 2016;
800 Thura et al., 2012).

801 Rigorous model selection techniques are even more relevant if we wish to make further inroads
802 into understanding the neural correlates of decision-making. In particular, discriminating between
803 multiple candidate models of decision-making is critical for neurophysiological studies of decision-
804 making that attempt to relate neural responses in decision-related structures to the features of
805 sequential sampling models (Ditterich, 2006a,b; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Hanes and Schall, 1996;
806 Heitz and Schall, 2012; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Thura et al., 2012). For example, one of
807 the most well-established tenets of the neural basis of decision-making is the gradual ramp-like
808 increase in the firing rates of individual neurons in decision-related structures such as the lateral
809 intraparietal area (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002; Shadlen and Newsome, 2001), frontal eye fields
810 (Ding and Gold, 2012a; Hanes and Schall, 1996), superior colliculus (Ratcliff et al., 2003, 2007),
811 prefrontal cortex (Kim and Shadlen, 1999) and dorsal premotor cortex (Chandrasekaran et al.,
812 2017; Coallier et al., 2015; Thura et al., 2014). However, questions still remain; for example,

813 is the ramp in a neuron's response a signature of the evidence integration process posited by a
814 DDM or is it more consistent with the presence of, say, an increasing urgency signal. It can be
815 challenging to neurally discriminate between frameworks without a clear hypothesis about 1) a
816 detailed and ideally quantitative understanding of the behavior (Krakauer et al., 2017; O'Connell
817 et al., 2018), and 2) the mapping from the underlying neural mechanisms to the observed behavior
818 (Schall, 2004). We believe *CHaRTr* and other toolboxes of its ilk will play a critical role in further
819 advancing our understanding of the neural correlates of decision-making.

820 4.1. Future directions

821 *CHaRTr* provides a powerful framework for estimating and discriminating between candidate
822 decision-making models. Nevertheless, there is considerable scope for extending its capabilities.
823 Here, we outline a few future directions we believe would make *CHaRTr*, and other toolboxes
824 that come in its wake, even more useful for decision-making researchers.

825 First, *CHaRTr* provides options to estimate sequential sampling models that assume *relative*
826 evidence is accumulated over time. A related and compelling line of research assumes a race
827 model architecture where a choice between n options is represented as a race between n evidence
828 accumulators. The $n \geq 2$ accumulators collect evidence in favor of their respective response
829 options as a dynamic race toward their respective thresholds. The first accumulator to reach
830 the threshold triggers a decision for the corresponding response option. There are a range of
831 race models that differ in details, including accumulators that are independent (e.g., Brown
832 and Heathcote, 2008; Reddi and Carpenter, 2000) or dependent (e.g., Usher and McClelland,
833 2001). Naturally, these models can be elaborated with many features of the *relative* evidence
834 accumulation models implemented in *CHaRTr*, including variable non-decision times and urgency
835 (though see Bogacz et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2014, for demonstration of the equivalence between
836 relative and absolute evidence accumulation models under certain circumstances). Incorporation
837 of race models in *CHaRTr* will be a useful extension into the future.

838 Second, the current instantiation of *CHaRTr* assumes that observers are independent. Recent
839 efforts have proposed the use of hierarchical Bayesian methods for the DDM and other decision-
840 making models (Ahn et al., 2017; Heathcote et al., 2018; Wiecki et al., 2013). Bayesian methods
841 provide two advantages over the current framework provided in *CHaRTr*. Bayesian methods of
842 parameter estimation incorporate prior knowledge into the plausible distribution of parameter val-
843 ues, and provide full posterior distributions for all model parameters. *CHaRTr* currently provides
844 only the most likely value for a parameter without any measure of its uncertainty, whereas the
845 full posterior distribution provides uncertainty in the estimate for each parameter, thus reducing
846 the likelihood of drawing over-confident conclusions. Bayesian methods are also advantageous
847 when used in contexts where there are only modest numbers of trials per observer. Hierarchi-
848 cal Bayesian models in particular can enhance statistical power by providing opportunities for
849 simultaneous estimation of the parameters of individual observers as well as the population-level
850 distributions from which they are drawn.

851 Despite these benefits, we emphasize that it is far from straightforward to extend the models

852 implemented in *CHaRTr* to Bayesian parameter estimation methods. The goal of *CHaRTr* is
853 simple and rapid implementation and testing of new models, which takes place via simulation-
854 based techniques. Bayesian methods require model likelihood functions, which can be challenging
855 to derive and may not even exist for some of the models implemented in *CHaRTr*, and as such
856 the extension to Bayesian methods is not trivial. In future work, we aim to extend the parameter
857 estimation routines in *CHaRTr* to make use of approximate Bayesian techniques.

858 Third, the framework in *CHaRTr* is currently only amenable for analyzing behavior from decision-
859 making tasks where the sensory stimulus provides constant evidence over time, albeit with noise,
860 and varies along a single dimension. However, previous research suggests that a powerful way
861 to dissociate between different models of decision-making is to use time-varying stimuli (Brody
862 and Hanks, 2016; Brunton et al., 2013; Cisek et al., 2009; Ratcliff, 2002; Ratcliff and Rouder,
863 2000; Smith and Ratcliff, 2009; Thura et al., 2014; Usher and McClelland, 2001). In a related
864 vein, there has been increased interest in combining frameworks that posit sensory stimuli are
865 optimally combined and could drive multisensory decision-making models (Chandrasekaran et
866 al., 2017; Drugowitsch et al., 2014). Future versions of *CHaRTr* will provide opportunities for
867 implementing and testing models in contexts where the sensory stimuli have temporal structure
868 (Evans et al., 2017), or involve multi-sensory integration (Chandrasekaran et al., 2017).

869 Finally, *CHaRTr* currently allows the quality of the evidence signal (drift rate) to vary with an
870 experimental factor (stimulus difficulty). In future versions of *CHaRTr*, we will provide capabilities
871 for different model parameters to vary with different experimental factors. There are a range of
872 other experimental manipulations whose effect will likely appear in model parameters other than
873 the drift rate; for example, emphasizing the speed or accuracy of decisions is most likely to affect
874 the decision boundary, or the speed with which a boundary collapses. Future versions of *CHaRTr*
875 will allow researchers to test and discriminate between these hypotheses.

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- 884 ● Abstract: 228 words
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- 886 ● Methods: 3067 words
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


Figure 1: Schematic of some sequential sampling models of decision-making incorporated in *CHaRTr*. (A) The DDM model is the simplest example of a diffusion model of decision-making. (B) A variant of the DDM with variable non-decision time (S_t), variable drift-rate (S_v) and a variable start point (S_z). (C) A DDM with collapsing bounds and variability in the non-decision time and drift rate. The function $A(t)$ takes the form of a Weibull function as defined in Equation 6. (D) A variant of the DDM with variable non-decision time and drift rate, and an “urgency signal”. This urgency signal grows with elapsed decision time, which is implemented by multiplying the decision variable by the increasing function of time $\gamma(t)$ (Equation 10, following Ditterich, 2006a). (E) UGM with variable drift rate (S_v) and variable non decision time (S_t). In the standard UGM, the urgency signal is only thought to depend on time and thus starts at 0. The sensory evidence is passed through a low pass filter (typically a 100-250 ms time constant, Carland et al., 2015; Thura et al., 2012). The sensory evidence is then multiplied by the urgency signal to lead to a decision variable that is then compared to boundaries. (F) Schematic of urgency signals with an intercept (top panel) and a variable intercept (bottom panel)




Figure 2: A quantile probability (QP) plot of choice and RT data from a hypothetical decision-making experiment with three levels of stimulus difficulty. The three difficulty levels are represented as vertical columns mirrored around the midpoint of the x -axis (.5). In this example, the lowest accuracy condition had $\sim 55\%$ correct responses, so the RTs for correct responses in this condition are located at $.55$ on the x -axis and the corresponding RTs for error responses are located at $1 - .55 = .45$ on the x -axis; these two RT distributions are highlighted in gray bars. For each RT distribution we plot along the y -axis the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, 90th percentiles (i.e., .1, .3, .5, .7, .9 quantiles), separately for correct and error responses in each of the three difficulty levels. For clarity, correct responses are shown in blue and error responses are shown in yellow.




Figure 3: CHaRT flow chart. Models are specified and once data is available, the parameters are estimated through the optimization procedure. Once parameter estimation is complete, the final goodness of fit statistic is calculated for every model under consideration, which is used for subsequent model selection analyses.

Step 4: Model Fitting and Parameter Estimation




Figure 4: Flow chart for the parameter estimation component of *CHaRTr*, which uses the differential evolution optimization algorithm (Mullen et al., 2011).




Figure 5: Quantile probability plots of data simulated from four models in *CHaRTr*. (A) DDM, (B) DDM with variable drift rates, starting state and non-decision time (DDMS_vS_zS_t), (C) Urgency gating model with variable drift rates (UGMS_v), and (D) DDM with an urgency signal defined as per Ditterich (2006a) (dDDMS_v). Gray points denote data. Lines are drawn for visualization purposes.





Figure 6: Model selection and parameter estimation outcomes from applying a range of cognitive models of decision-making to hypothetical data from two observers (case study 1). A-C shows outcomes from one hypothetical observer. D-E shows outcomes from a second hypothetical observer. Data were generated using the model $DDMS_{v,S_t}$. A) BIC values as a function of model with the DDM model as the reference. B) Akaike weights for the top six models that provided the best account of the data. *CHaRT* correctly identifies the true data-generating model ($DDMS_{v,S_t}$) as the most likely candidate for describing the data. C) Data-generative and estimated parameter values for the $DDMS_{v,S_t}$ model shown in A. Close alignment indicates *CHaRT* recovered the true parameter values. D-E shows the BIC values and posterior model probabilities from another hypothetical observer. F) Shows the average posterior model probabilities across all five hypothetical observers, assuming them to be independent. Reassuringly, $DDMS_{v,S_t}$ is identified as the most plausible model for the data.

Subj1



Subj3




Figure 7: Quantile probability (QP) plots showing correct RTs (blue) and error RTs (orange) for two hypothetical observers (case study 1), along with the model predictions (gray dots). Predictions from the four best-fitting models are shown along with the simplest model the DDM. The four best fitting models are DDMS_vS_t, cfkDDMS_vS_t, dDDMS_vS_t, cDDMS_vS_t are shown. Numbers at the top of each plot show the BIC for the model under consideration, assuming the DDM as the base (reference) model. The model DDMS_vS_t provides the best account of the data.




Figure 8: Model selection and parameter estimation outcomes from applying a range of cognitive models of decision-making to data from a hypothetical observer. Decision-making in this hypothetical observer is controlled by the model bUGMS_v. A) BIC values as a function of model with the DDM model as the reference for one hypothetical observer, Subj 3. B) Posterior model probabilities for the top six models that provided the best account of Subj 3's behavior. C) Results for another hypothetical subject. D) Results for the population of hypothetical subjects. The most probable model for this set of hypothetical observers is the generative model, bUGM S_v. However, we note that other models such as UGMS_v, and uDDMS_v provide quite good descriptions of the behavior. This result is in keeping with the general notion that model selection ought to be used as a guide to the most likely models and not necessarily to argue for a "best" model.




Figure 9: Model selection outcomes from applying a range of cognitive models of decision-making to data from two monkeys (Roitman and Shadlen, 2002). A-B shows outcomes from monkey b and n to compare models with various forms of urgency vs. simple diffusion decision models without impatience. For both monkeys, *CHaRT_r* suggests models with urgency are better candidates for describing the data than DDMs without urgency. C-D shows outcomes from the monkeys b and n when comparing UGM vs. DDM models. For both monkeys, UGM based models substantially outperform the DDM based models




Figure 10: Quantile probability (QP) plots showing data in blue (corrects) and yellow crosses (errors) for the two monkeys from Roitman and Shadlen (2002), along with the model predictions (gray dots). Predictions from DDMS_vS_zS_t are shown along with four other models uDDMS_vS_b, bUGMS_vS_b, uDDMS_vS_t, bUGMS_vS_t. Numbers at the top of each plot show the BIC for the model under consideration, assuming DDMS_vS_zS_t as the base (reference) model. For both monkeys the model bUGMS_vS_b is the best model for describing the data out of these candidate set of models