Title: Subjectively perceived control drives affective, neural, and motivational markers of self-related

outcome valuation

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22   **Abstract**

Experiencing one's own life as controllable is essential for human well-being. Based on the theory that

subjectively perceived control (SPC) hinges on the attribution of events to the self, we test the effects of

SPC on the affective evaluation of task outcomes, neural dynamics, and ensuing behavioral preferences.

In three independent studies we show that SPC increases dynamics in self-evaluative affect and engages

brain networks processing self-referential information in the cortical midline. Specifically, the

ventromedial prefrontal cortex tracks both outcome value and SPC and covaries with self-evaluative affect.

Furthermore, high SPC and greater affective dynamics relate to greater functional coupling between the

ventral striatum and cortical midline structures during outcome consumption. Finally, we show that these

affective reactions promote motivation and the subjective value of controllable tasks. Our investigations

emphasize the importance of subjective models of how behavior leads to desired outcomes for positive

affect and intrinsic motivation.

Introduction

The subjective experience of being in control of one's environment is essential for well-being (Leotti, Iyengar, & Ochsner, 2010; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryff, 1989). The importance of control beliefs has been formulated in influential theories (Ajzen, 2002; Bandura, 1977; Rotter, 1966) and demonstrated in decades of empirical studies. Control beliefs can thereby determine whether individuals will show effort (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002), make career choices (Guay, Senecal, Gauthier, & Fernet, 2003), and are more generally considered to be a protective factor for various psychiatric phenomena (Kadden & Litt, 2011; Muris, 2002; Weisz, Weiss, Wasserman, & Rintoul, 1987). In contrast, the conviction of having no control and thus being at the mercy of one's environment has been linked to learned helplessness and major depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus, & Seligman, 1986), a debilitating psychiatric condition that is characterized by attenuated affect, reduced levels of motivated behavior and diminished self-esteem (World Health Organization, 1993).

Having opportunities to choose is a fundamental prerequisite of exerting control (Leotti et al., 2010). Choice opportunities allow to pick between options with different value (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Kable & Glimcher, 2007), and thus are a means for maximizing the probability of achieving desired outcomes, avoiding potential hazards, and reducing uncertainty (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). The importance of exerting control over one's environment has stimulated the idea that having choices per se carries intrinsic value (Leotti et al., 2010). Studies have demonstrated that humans favor choice options that are followed by a second choice over those that are not (Bown, Read, & Summers, 2003), or prefer tasks with more over those with fewer choice options (Suzuki, 1997). Relatedly, humans prefer stimuli selected freely during a preceding task over those that a computer had selected for them, despite equal monetary value of the stimuli (Cockburn, Collins, & Frank, 2014). Neuroscience studies also support the notion that choices have intrinsic value. Despite a lack of response-outcome-contingency, it has been shown that choices are preferred over non-choices, and cues signaling an upcoming choice were associated with increased activity in the ventral striatum (VS; Leotti & Delgado, 2011, 2014), a region

implicated in dopaminergic reward processing (O'Doherty, Buchanan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Pagnoni,

Zink, Montague, & Berns, 2002).

Although having choices is the condition precedent for exerting control, the lynchpin of theory

and empirical evidence relating subjectively perceived control (SPC) to well-being are self-related thoughts

and subjective models of whether an outcome can be achieved due to the capabilities of the agent (Ajzen,

2002; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryff, 1989). The experience of SPC should increase if internal models of behavior

are available that explain how actions – if executed correctly – yield a specific outcome (Ly, Wang, Bhanji,

& Delgado, 2019), in contrast to settings in which the available choices are unrelated to the outcomes

obtained (Leotti & Delgado, 2011, 2014). For the experience of SPC it is one thing betting on a color in a

game of roulette and another shooting a penalty even in the unlikely case of similar outcome probabilities.

Since in the latter situation the scoring of a goal can be attributed to the self, own efforts, and abilities,

SPC should be more pronounced with broader implications for self-related affect and motivation (Tracy &

Robins, 2004; Williams & DeSteno, 2008).

Theories on self-conscious affect predict that differences in SPC shift the valuation of outcomes

and result in distinct patterns of affective experience (Ferguson, Stegge, Eyre, Vollmer, & Ashbaker, 2000;

Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Precisely, the attribution of outcomes to controllable and internal

causes (Rotter, 1966) is a necessary condition for the experience of the self-conscious affect of pride (Tracy

& Robins, 2007b). The concept of pride essentially hinges on a subjective model of control – the belief that

an outcome was caused by one's own actions – resulting in self-approval in case the event is relevant for

personal goals (Leary, 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2007a). Pride experiences thus underlie self-esteem (Tracy,

Cheng, Robins, & Trzesniewski, 2009), foster intrinsic motivation (Williams & DeSteno, 2008), and thus

mediate the contribution of SPC to well-being (Ryff, 1989; Tracy et al., 2009). In contrast, positive events

caused by uncontrollable factors such as winning a lottery also drive affective dynamics such as

momentary happiness (Rutledge, de Berker, Espenhahn, Dayan, & Dolan, 2016; Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan,

& Dolan, 2014), but do not have similar consequences in terms of self-relevance and motivation (Williams

& DeSteno, 2008). In this line, earnings that have been obtained through own efforts and labor are valued

more than windfall gains (Norton, Mochon, & Ariely, 2012), thereby contributing to the effort paradox

that the value of effort sometimes exceeds its costs (Inzlicht, Shenhav, & Olivola, 2018).

In the present study we test how SPC impacts the affective valuation of outcomes, how this relates

to shifts in neural processing of objectively similar task outcomes and provide evidence that the subjective

value of control is related to affective dynamics. To do so, we introduce a novel paradigm that in addition

to mere choice (Leotti & Delgado, 2011) extends the concept of SPC to an experimental condition allowing

subjects to attribute task outcomes to their own performance (Ly et al., 2019), while controlling outcome

probabilities. This is a key step since with increasing SPC outcomes also get more predictable and less

uncertain in everyday life (Ajzen, 2002; Bandura, 1977; A. Clark, 2013; Huys & Dayan, 2009).

As predicted by theory, affective and especially pride dynamics should be most strongly modulated

by outcomes if these are perceived to depend on one's own behavior. Aside from the ventral striatum,

prior evidence suggests the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) to be a key cortical interface for

integrating SPC in outcome valuation. The vmPFC has extensive connections with the ventral tegmental

area, the amygdala and the striatum (Kim et al., 2011; Price, 2007), is associated with domain general

computations of value (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero & Rangel, 2014) and has been linked to behavioral

control and persistence in the face of failure (Bhanji & Delgado, 2014; Maier & Seligman, 2016; Salomons,

2004). The vmPFC belongs to structures of the cortical midline implicated in self-related processing (CMS;

Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; van der Meer, Costafreda, Aleman,

& David, 2010). Specifically, the vmPFC has been associated with the generation of affective meaning

(Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011; Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012), the value of revealing information about

the self (Tamir & Mitchell, 2012), and updating of self-esteem and self-relevant optimistic beliefs

(Kuzmanovic, Jefferson, & Vogeley, 2016; Will, Rutledge, Moutoussis, & Dolan, 2017). These findings

suggest the vmPFC to serve a central function for the SPC-dependent valuation of task outcomes and

associated self-related affective dynamics.

In a series of three consecutive experiments with independent samples (total *N*=129) we

systematically manipulate levels of SPC beyond having a choice or not. We use a novel paradigm inducing

low, medium, and high SPC (LC, MC, HC) via, respectively, a non-choice task, a choice task, and a

performance-based task that allows attributing outcomes to the self. Across all three conditions, rates of

successes (WIN) and non-successes (noWIN) are kept at 50% (see figure 1). In study 1 we test whether

affective responses to outcomes depend on SPC as predicted by theory. In study 2, we replicate and extend

study 1 by characterizing affective and neural dynamics in response to outcomes obtained at different

levels of SPC during task execution. We focus our analyses on brain regions processing reward value and

self-referential processes, specifically the vmPFC. As a last step, in study 3 we predict the subjective value

of SPC based on the dynamics of self-related positive affect by introducing an adaptive preference task.

Our results support the broad impact of SPC on affect, motivated behavior and underlying brain function.

We find that the value of control is associated with self-related affective responses and may even outweigh

a monetary detriment entailed by preferences for control.

Figure 1. Overview about the experimental paradigm and the three studies. **A** Trial structure of the task. A fixation cross was followed by a cue indicating that the participant has to find the brightest square within either turquoise or yellow (high control, HC), choose between yellow and turquoise (medium control, MC), or play a gamble by clicking on the grey square in the middle (low control, LC; only presented in study 1). After the cue, the task grid occurred and was followed by a delay and task outcomes. Pride and happiness ratings regarding the preceding outcome were presented after the outcome phase. **B** Overview of the three studies. The task was presented in each study with varying numbers of trials and conditions. **C** In study 3, after the main task, 96 trials of a choice task were presented. The choice options offered to play either HC or MC with adaptively changing amounts of money determined using a staircase algorithm. Participants were informed that some of the chosen options would be actually presented and that the associated monetary gain would be awarded at the end of the experiment. **D** Subjectively perceived control (SPC) ratings for each study. *d* = Cohen's *d*. Values in brackets represent lower and upper bounds of 90% confidence intervals. HC=high control. MC=medium control. LC=low control. Errorbars are +/- 1 standard error of the mean.

 Results

Study 1: Subjectively Perceived Control Differentiates Affective Dynamics Of Pride And Happiness

Study 1 directly manipulated levels of subjectively perceived control (SPC) above and beyond

having a choice or not. In brief, we presented participants (*N*=40) with a grid of one centered grey square

and 32 surrounding squares that were separated into two parts of shaded colors (see figure 1). This

allowed to implement three different conditions that were pseudorandomly presented and cued before

each trial. On the lowest level of SPC, successes (WIN outcomes; 0.20 €) and non-successes (noWIN

outcomes; 0.00 €) depended on an automated gamble which was initiated by clicking on the grey square

(low control, LC; see figure 1). On the medium level of SPC, WIN and noWIN outcomes allegedly depended

on the correct choice between the two colors (medium control, MC). On the highest level of SPC, WIN and

noWIN outcomes depended on whether subjects were able to identify the brightest square within the

shades of one color (high control, HC). Unknown to the participants, across all three conditions outcome

probabilities were held constant at 50% by predefined feedback (see methods for details). Each condition

was presented 30 times, i.e. a total of ninety trials was presented, and ratings of both pride and happiness

were acquired after each outcome. After completion of the experimental tasks, subjects rated their SPC

together with subjective experience of outcome probabilities for the different conditions.

Subjects experienced the HC condition as more controllable than the other conditions (main effect

of condition: $F(1.74, 76.72)=133.97$, $p<.001$; planned comparisons: HC>MC: $t(39)=11.21$, $p<.001$, $d=1.77$,

90% CI=[1.35; 2.18]; MC>LC: $t(39)=3.60$, $p<.001$ $d=0.57$, 90% CI=[0.29; 0.85]; Bonferroni-corrected for

Figure 2. Task effects on emotion ratings in study 1 **A** Emotion ratings from study 1, separate for pride and happiness, high, medium and low control as well as outcome valence. **B** Scatterplots depict reactivity to WIN vs noWIN outcomes for happiness (left) and pride (right) in dependence of SPC condition (x-axis: HC; y-axis (top): LC; y-axis (bottom): MC). Top and bottom rows depict relationships between emotion reactivity in LC and HC, as well as MC and HC, respectively. Histograms in top right corners visualize the differences in emotion reactivity between HC and LC (top row), or HC and MC (bottom row). HC=high control. MC=medium control. LC=low control. *d*=Cohen's *d*. Values in brackets represent 90% confidence intervals for *d*.

multiple comparisons, one-sided). As predicted by theory, the dynamics in the pride experiences induced

by succeeding (WIN vs noWIN) depended more strongly on the level of SPC than it was the case for

happiness ratings (condition*affect*outcome valence: $F(1.29,50.10)=11.44$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2_p=.23$; figure 2, for

full rmANOVA effects, see Supplement 1 – table S1). Paired comparisons showed that affect ratings were

higher for WIN than for noWIN outcomes for both happiness (LC: $t(39)=7.85$, $p<.001$; MC: $t(39)=8.16$,

$p<.001$; HC: $t(39)=9.74$, $p<.001$) and pride (LC: $t(39)=3.29$, $p<.001$; MC: $t(39)=4.41$, $p<.001$; HC: $t(39)=7.37$,

$p<.001$, all *p*-values one-sided and Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons). These differences were

larger in HC than in MC (pride: $t(39)=6.97$, one-sided $p<.001$; happiness: $t(39)=4.64$, two-sided $p<.001$),

and larger in MC than in LC for pride ($t(39)=3.03$, one-sided $p=.013$), but not happiness ($t(39)=2.24$, two-

sided $p=.093$, all *p*-values corrected for multiple comparisons), showing that SPC drives affective dynamics

in general. Importantly, the pride response (i.e. the difference [HC:WIN-HC:noWIN]-[MC:WIN-MC:noWIN])

increased more strongly from MC to HC than the happiness response ($t(39)=3.69$, one-sided $p<.001$), while

no difference was found when comparing pride and happiness responses between LC and MC (t(39)=1.57,

one-sided p=.124, Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons). These findings demonstrate that SPC

depends on contexts in which behavior can be guided by internal models that explain how outcomes can

be achieved through own actions. If such self-attribution is possible, SPC increases beyond having a choice

or not, effectively increasing the self-relevance of outcomes and changing their affective valuation, driving

pride more strongly than happiness. In contrast, merely choosing without any knowledge of how choices

lead to outcomes may be rewarding in itself (Leotti & Delgado, 2011), but falls short of SPC as defined in

classic theories and has little impact on self-related affect.

Study 2: The VMPFC Links SPC To Its Affective Consequences

In study 2 we replicated and extended study 1 by characterizing the neural correlates of SPC and

its impact on affective dynamics in response to outcomes. Subjects (N=39) underwent fMRI scanning while

performing the identical MC and HC conditions from study 1, which there showed strongest effects with

regards to the affective response to SPC and should be contrasted for developing theory and the

neuroscience of SPC. A total of 80 trials were presented, with ratings of either pride or happiness (24 each)

acquired after every second to third outcome.

Subjectively perceived Control shapes affective Dynamics. The results of study 2 replicated those

of study 1 (figure 3). Subjects experienced much higher SPC in HC than in MC (paired-sample t-tests:

t(37)=9.85, p<.001, d=1.60, 90% CI=[1.19; 2.00]), and affect ratings differed between tasks with different

levels of SPC (rmANOVA: main effect of condition: F(1,38)=8.38, p=.006, η_p^2=.18). Comparably to study 1,

pride responses to task outcomes differed from those for happiness in dependence of SPC

(condition*outcome valence*affect: F(1,38)=9.08, p=.005, η_p^2=.19). As before, we computed the affective

responses separately for pride and happiness ([HC:WIN–HC:noWIN] – [MC:WIN–MC:noWIN]). The

resulting pride response was significantly larger than the happiness response (t(38)=3.01, one-sided

p=.005), emphasizing how self-related positive affect hinges on the subjective belief that outcomes

depend on one's own actions (for full rmANOVA effects, see Supplement 1 – table S2).

Figure 3. Task effects on emotion ratings in study 2 **A** Emotion ratings from study 2, separate for pride and happiness, high and medium control as well as outcome valence. **B** Scatterplots depict reactivity to WIN vs noWIN outcomes for happiness (left) and pride (right) in dependence of SPC condition (x-axis: HC; y-axis: MC). Histograms in top right corners visualize the differences in emotion reactivity between HC and MC. HC=high control. MC=medium control. *d*=Cohen's *d*. Values in brackets represent 90% confidence intervals for *d*.

Neural Responses to SPC. Receiving a positive outcome (WIN>noWIN) yielded significant

activations in regions associated with processing of value (as indicated by ROI-analyses using the

VALUE¬SELF mask, covering areas associated with the term "value", but not "self-referential"; created

using Neurosynth; Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011; see methods). Specifically, we

observed significant activation clusters with peaks in bilateral ventral striatum (VS; left: x,y,z (mm): -14,8,-

10, *t*(114)=8.18; *Z*=7.24, *k*=235; right: 16,4,-12, *t*(114)=7.69; *Z*=6.89, *k*=233; all coordinates in MNI space),

anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; -2,44,-6, *t*(114)=6.71; *Z*=6.15, *k*=108), superior medial frontal gyrus (-2,58,0,

t(114)=8.14; *Z*=7.21, *k*=61), and vmPFC (4,48,-2, *t*(114)=5.59; *Z*=5.24, *k*=12; all p-values <.05, FWE-

corrected within the VALUE¬SELF mask; for whole-brain effects see Supplement 2).

Receiving outcomes attributable to one's own actions (HC>MC) yielded significant activations in

CMS (ROI-analysis using the SELF¬VALUE mask, covering regions associated with the term "self-

referential" but not "value"; Yarkoni et al., 2011), with peaks in left vmPFC (-8,50,-12, t(114)=6.34; Z=5.85,

k=27), and left ACC (-2,38,4, t(114)=6.27; Z=5.80, k=108). In addition, this contrast yielded significant

effects in posterior CMS, specifically the left cuneus (-8,-58,20, t(114)=6.61; Z=6.07, k=208), extending to

precuneus (-6,-50,6, t(114)=5.60; Z=5.25, k=14; all p-values <.05, small-volume FWE-corrected). These

findings indicate, that, as expected, cortical regions associated with processing of self-relevant information

are engaged when outcomes are obtained in task environments that are perceived as controllable and

thus provide information about the subjects' capabilities (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Tracy & Robins,

2007b).

Figure 4. BOLD effects of the MRI task. **A** HC>MC (blue-green) and **B** WIN>noWIN (red-yellow) displayed at p<.05, whole-brain FWE-corrected. Blue and red outlines represent masks for SELF¬VALUE and VALUE¬SELF, respectively. Barplots on the left represent average effects across participants for all voxels inside HC>MC clusters. Barplots on the right depict average effects across participant s for all voxels inside WIN>noWIN clusters. Errorbars are +/- 1 standard error of the mean.

Next, we were interested in the additive effects of SPC and success, thus describing specific neural

correlates of receiving positive outcomes under high SPC (three-way conjunction of [HC:WIN>HC:noWIN]

∩ [HC:WIN>MC:WIN] ∩ [HC:WIN>MC:noWIN]; figure 5). This analysis revealed that the left vmPFC,

specifically, is more strongly engaged when subjects' successes are attributable to their own actions (-

4,48,-10, *t*(114)=3.45; *Z*=3.36, *k*=11, *p*=.023, FWE-corrected within the SELF∩VALUE mask, covering regions

associated with both "self-referential" and "value", according to Neurosynth; Yarkoni et al., 2011). The

additivity of the effect in this region is illustrated by the common of responses to winning (WIN>noWIN: -

2,48,-4, t(114)=7.60; Z=6.82, k=193; p<.05, FWE-corrected) as well as task controllability (HC>MC; -8,48,-

12, t(114)=6.13; Z=5.69, k=162, p<.05, small-volume FWE-corrected). The localization of this effect thus

mirrors how the processing of value and self-reference converges in the vmPFC (D'Argembeau, 2013; Will

et al., 2017).

Figure 5. Additive effect of winning under high control and parametric effects of emotion ratings. **A** Activations show the specific effect of HC:WIN (i.e. 3-way conjunction [HC:WIN>HC:noWIN] ∩ [HC:WIN>MC:WIN] ∩ [HC:WIN>MC:noWIN], displayed at *p*<.005, uncorrected. The conjunction contrast survived small-volume FWE-correction at *p*<.05 inside the SELF∩VALUE mask in vmPFC. Bar plot represents differences of neural activation in vmPFC between HC:WIN and the other three outcomes. **B** Parametric modulation effect of happiness (red-yellow) and pride ratings (blue-green) at outcome presentation, displayed at *p*<.001, uncorrected for illustrative purposes. Bar plot shows group-level parameter estimates of the parametric modulations, averaged across all voxels inside the SELF∩VALUE mask. Violet outlines show SELF∩VALUE mask. Errorbars are +/- 1 standard error of the mean. *d*=Cohen's *d*. Values in brackets are lower and upper bound of of 90% confidence interval for *d*.

Parametric Effects of affective Dynamics. We next aimed to link BOLD responses of task outcomes

to intra-individual dynamics in the experiences of pride and happiness. (figure 5). We found that within-

subject dynamics in happiness were significantly correlated with neural activity within the VALUE¬SELF

mask at outcome presentation (16,2,-12, *t*(38)=4.55, *Z*=4.04, *k*=3, *p*=.022), as well as the SELF∩VALUE mask

(left vmPFC; -2,48,-4, *t*(38)=4.60, *Z*=4.08, *k*=47, *p*=.002). Within-subject variability in pride ratings showed

more extended significant effects in the SELF¬VALUE mask (dorsal medial prefrontal cortex dmPFC; -

2,56,2, $t(38)$=5.96, Z=4.98, k=122, p=.001) and the VALUE¬SELF mask (dmPFC; -2,56,0, $t(38)$=6.15, Z=5.09,

k=22, p<.001). In addition, variability in pride ratings correlated significantly with BOLD responses in the

SELF∩VALUE mask (left vmPFC; -4,48,-6, $t(38)$=4.83, Z=4.24, k=94, p=.001; all p-values small-volume FWE-

corrected; see Supplements 2). Notably, pride ratings covaried more strongly with neural activity in vmPFC

than happiness ratings (paired-sample t-test on mean beta estimates for all voxels inside the SELF∩VALUE

mask: $t(38)$=1.951, one-sided p=.029, d=.31, CI=[.04 .58]), indicating that neural activity in vmPFC is more

strongly linked to affective experience when the causes of such experiences allow self-evaluation and

might bear implications for one's future behavior (Roy et al., 2012; Tracy & Robins, 2004).

Functional Connectivity in Dependence of SPC. Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis

demonstrated that when task outcomes were received in the HC condition, functional connectivity

increased between the left VS and left vmPFC (6,48,-14, $t(37)$=3.80; Z=3.47, k=48, p=.017; small-volume-

corrected within the SELF∩VALUE mask). Though much more spatially extended in the CMS, this effect

partly converged with the additive effects of success and SPC reported above. Beyond that, the left VS

BOLD signal was more strongly associated with responses in the left angular gyrus (left AG) during outcome

presentation in the HC as compared to the MC condition (-46,-70,38, $t(37)$=5.64; Z=4.76, k=24, p=.001

small-volume FWE-corrected inside the SELF¬VALUE mask, surviving whole brain FWE-correction: -44,-

70,40, $t(37)$=5.67, Z=4.78, p=.035). The equivalent analyses for the right VS showed significant effects in

left superior frontal gyrus (-18,38,46, $t(38)$=4.59; Z=4.07, k=4, p=.028, small-volume FWE-corrected inside

the SELF¬VALUE mask), but not in vmPFC (4,38,-4, $t(38)$=3.23; Z=3.02, p=.069, small-volume FWE-

corrected inside the SELF∩VALUE mask). At a more lenient exploratory threshold, for both left and right

VS, we observed spatially extended connectivity changes in regions covered by the SELF¬VALUE and

SELF∩VALUE masks, such as the left AG, the dmPFC, ACC, and the vmPFC (p<.001; see Supplement 2).

These findings align with the notion that outcome-related information processed in regions such as the

ventral striatum (Pagnoni et al., 2002) are more strongly integrated with self-related representations in

high SPC contexts, allowing to relate one's own actions to ensuing outcomes.

Figure 6. Increased functional connectivity with left VS in response to outcomes obtained under high subjectively perceived control tasks. **A** ROI analysis showed increased coupling between left VS and the left AG, the dmPFC and precuneus (small-volume FWE-corrected at *p*<.05). Effects in are displayed at *p*<.005, whole-brain, for illustrative purposes. See Supplement 2 for full connectivity coordinates. **B Top** Bivariate correlations between pride response (i.e. [HC:WIN - HC:noWIN] - [MC:WIN - MC:noWIN]) and estimates of functional connectivity from left AG, dmPFC and precuneus. Eigenvariates of clusters within the SELF¬VALUE mask consisting of voxels showing significantly increased functional connectivity with VS at *p* < .0005 (uncorrected) were computed for the three regions highlighted in A. *p-value*s are one sided and false-discovery-rate corrected. **Bottom** Analyses for happiness response equivalent to the ones performed for pride ratings. *r* = Pearson correlation coefficient. Values in brackets are 90% confidence intervals and shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

Based on the assumption that stronger integration of self- and outcome-related processing should

relate to more pronounced pride responses, we performed additional exploratory analyses on the SPC-

dependent connectivity dynamics. These showed that the observed increases of connectivity with the VS

correlated significantly with the behaviorally measured pride response, at least in the left AG (*r*=.37,

p=.032; dmPFC: *r*=.23, *p*=.080; precuneus: *r*=.23, *p* =.080, FDR-corrected one-sided *p*-values; figure 6, see

methods for details). This implies that pride dynamics relate to changes in functional coupling of the VS

with brain regions associated with self-referential processes. The equivalent analyses for the happiness

response did not show any significant effects (left AG: *r*=.08, *p*=.582; dmPFC: *r*=.02, *p*=.582; precuneus: *r*=-

.03, *p* =.582; FDR-corrected one-sided *p*-values). However, we note that these correlations did not differ

significantly between pride and happiness (left AG: Hotelling's *t*(35) = 1.84, *p*=.088; dmPFC: Hotelling's

$t(35) = 1.29$, $p=.102$; precuneus: Hotelling's $t(35) = 1.60$, $p=.088$; FDR-corrected one-sided p-values). While

general positive affect has recently been shown to relate to neural activity also elicited by surprising and

uncontrollable task outcomes (Rutledge et al., 2016, 2014) these data demonstrate that positive affect is

also considerably shaped by perceived control over task outcomes. Precisely, SPC increases self-relevance

of task outcomes, driving activity in CMS and dynamics of self-related affect upon outcome reception

(D'Argembeau, 2013; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Tracy & Robins, 2007b). These shifts in affective and

neural dynamics effectively display as increased reports of pride experiences (Lindquist, 2013), which

relate to activity in the vmPFC as shown above and are assumed to bear implications for future behavior

(Roy et al., 2012; Tracy & Robins, 2007b).

Study 3: Pride As An Affective Marker For The Subjective Value Of Control

In study 3 we aimed to predict behavior based on SPC-related affective experiences of pride. We

show that participants' preference for controllable tasks is related to their pride response, even at a

monetary cost. Subjects (N=50) completed a total of 64 trials of MC and HC (32 each), with pride ratings

acquired after 40 outcome presentations. Following the task presented in study 2 (hereafter: the main

task), we subsequently assessed whether subjects preferred HC or MC when different monetary amounts

were offered. We employed an adaptive staircase algorithm (Leek, 2001) thus varying the offers presented

for HC and MC on every trial in a fashion allowing to identify each subject's decision point. To increase the

relevance of the task, subjects were informed that at random intervals some trials were going to be

executed right after their choice. The chosen option, i.e. HC or MC with the associated potential payoffs,

could then be played and the sum earned through successful task completion was awarded at the end of

the experiment. Eight trials were pseudorandomly selected and presented to the subjects after the

respective choice, however without the presentation of task outcomes.

Figure 7. The experience of pride in response to high SPC affects subjective value of choices. **Top left** Pride ratings for study 3, separate for high and low control, as well as outcome valence. **Top right** Pride reactivity to WIN vs noWIN outcomes, separately for HC (x-axis) and MC (y-axis). Histogram depicts difference between HC and MC. *d*=Cohen's *d*. Values in brackets represent lower and upper bound of 90% confidence interval for *d*. **Bottom left** Probability to choose HC in choice task of study 3 as a logistic function of log-transformed relative option values (log(€HC/€MC)). More positive values on horizontal axis indicate higher monetary value of HC relative to MC. Thin grey lines represent individual participants' choice functions. Thick black line represents hypothetical choice behavior based on sample medians for β_0 and β_1. Boxplot represents participant' probabilities to choose HC, given that both options have equal values. **Bottom right** Relationship of pride response and choice behavior in study 3. *rho*=Spearman's rho. Values in brackets are lower and upper bound of 90% confidence interval for *rho.*

Confirming studies 1 and 2, subjects experienced higher SPC in HC than in MC (*t*(49)=11.35, *p*<.001,

d=1.61, 90% *CI*=[1.25; 1.95]). Again, pride reactivity to outcomes differed between HC and MC

(condition*outcome valence: *F*(1,49)=35.98, *p*<.001, η_p^2=.42; figure 7). Specifically, pride was rated higher

for WIN than for noWIN outcomes (MC: *t*(49)=7.15, one-sided *p*<.001; HC: *t*(49)=12.37, one-sided *p*<.001,

Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons). In addition, the difference in affect ratings between WIN

and noWIN outcomes was larger in the HC condition than in the MC condition (*t*(49)=6.00, one-sided

p<.001; see table S3 for full results of rmANOVA).

In the choice task, the mean percentage of choices in favor of the HC option was 58.1% (*SD*=10.2

%), which was significantly higher than chance (*t*(49)=5.62, one-sided *p*<.001). The mean value of the

chosen MC options was 1.19€ (*SD*=.09€) and that of the chosen HC options was 1.03€ (*SD*=.07€; paired *t*-

test: *t*(49)=8.20, one-sided *p*<.001), indicating that participants had a preference for the HC task, despite

having a 13.4% smaller payoff than for the MC options.

In order to better characterize the choice behavior, we assessed the model parameters of a logistic

choice model fit to each participant's data (see methods). Across participants, the mean value of the

models intercept β_0 was significantly negative (M=-3.49, SD=4.18, t(49)=-6.00, one-sided p<.001)

indicating that participants preferred the HC option over the MC option, if both options offered equal

monetary payoffs. Similarly, β_1 was significantly negative (M=-17.21, SD=19.67; t(49)=-6.19, one-sided

p<.001), showing that across participants, as expected, the probability for choosing HC increased with

higher monetary gain for HC relative to MC (figure 7). Since β_0 is directly convertible into the probability

to select HC given equal monetary payoffs of the two options, we will base the following analyses on this

more intuitive measure. More specifically, if the nominal monetary offer for both options was equal, there

was a strong preference for HC, with over 90% of the participants preferring the controllable over the less

controllable option (MD=95.1%, IQR=20.48, figure 7), which was significantly above 50% (Wilcoxon signed-

rank W=1182, one-sided p<.001). Importantly, the subjects' probability to choose HC given equal expected

values for HC and MC remained significantly above 50% (MD=65.98%, IQR=50.48, Wilcoxon signed-rank

W=863, one-sided p=.015) even when considering differences in expected outcome probabilities, by

controlling for differences in subjectively perceived winning histories, that deviated from the objectively

presented outcome rates of 50% for the two tasks (see Methods).

A further goal of study 3 was to demonstrate that participants' preference for HC over MC varies

in dependence of the affective dynamics during the main task. As expected, individuals who had a more

positive pride response showed a stronger preference for HC in the choice task, given equal values of the

two choice options (Spearman's rho=.47, one-sided p<.001; figure 7). This association remained significant

even after controlling for various control variables such as expended effort or perceived winning

probabilities (see Supplement 1 - table S4). This extends previous results showing that mere choice is

preferable to not having choices by highlighting the notion of instrumental control over the outcomes for

building preferences (Ly et al., 2019), and emphasizing that self-related positive affect is a relevant factor

for motivated behavior (Williams & DeSteno, 2008).

Studies 1 – 3: Interindividual Variability In SPC Predicts Pride Response

Aggregating data from all 129 participants, we finally tested whether interindividual differences in

the degree to which the task could stimulate control beliefs were associated with self-related affective

experiences. Across the three studies, participants who perceived more control in HC compared to MC

also showed stronger pride responses (Spearman's *rho*=.25, one-sided *p*=.003; figure 8), supporting the

notion of how individual differences in the experience of SPC drive self-conscious positive affect (Tracy &

Robins, 2004, 2007b).

Figure 8. Association of pride response and individual differences in SPC. The scatterplot depicts the relationship between SPC and pride response across all three studies. Dark blue indicates data point belongs to study 1, intermediate blue to study 2, and light blue to study 3. Raw controllability ratings were transformed to a range between 0 and 100, across SPC conditions, before computing the difference between HC and MC in each study. For study 1, raw control and pride ratings were averaged across LC and MC. The pride response is the interaction term for pride ([HC:WIN–HC:noWIN] - [MC:WIN–MC:noWIN]). Histograms depict counts for difference in perceived control (top), and pride response (right). Values in brackets represent lower and upper bounds of the 90% confidence interval for *rho*.

Discussion

By employing a novel experimental paradigm, we demonstrate that the perception of control over

task execution, i.e. its potential mastery, has intrinsic value and unique affective consequences. Precisely,

subjectively perceived control (SPC) differentiates self-conscious positive affect – i.e. pride – from more

unspecific positive affect – i.e. happiness – when receiving task outcomes. Using functional magnetic

resonance imaging, we furthermore characterize brain regions involved in altered valuation of outcomes

of controllable tasks. When outcomes are received in a high SPC task we see increased activity in brain

regions of the cortical midline, such as the medial prefrontal cortex and precuneus, that are associated

with self-related processing (D'Argembeau, 2013; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004). Here, the vmPFC seems to

play a key role in tracking both, reward value as well as self-relevance. In addition, these regions are

functionally more strongly coupled to brain regions processing reward information, i.e. ventral striatum,

when outcomes depend on one's own behavioral performance. In a final step, we highlight the subjective

value of the emerging self-related affect, as people discount monetary gains to perceive control over task

execution in dependence of their pride response during task execution.

Overall, our findings from three independent samples provide evidence for the link between SPC

and the affective reaction of pride. This concords with psychological theories of self-conscious affect,

stating that SPC allows attributing task outcomes to internal causes, such as one's abilities (Ryan & Deci,

2000; Tracy & Robins, 2004). As noted by Tracy and Robins (2007), self-evaluative processes are crucial to

the understanding of self-conscious affect like pride, differentiating them from other affect constructs

such as happiness. While positive affect was generally increased in response to successes under high SPC

this was particularly the case for pride responses and less so for participants' reports of happiness which

conceptually does not necessarily include evaluative process of self-worth (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy

& Robins, 2004). Since in potentially controllable contexts outcomes are informative about one's abilities,

participants can use these outcomes to infer to what extent they succeed at actually exerting control.

Regarding affective responses, this was reflected by the fact that pride was most prominent during high

SPC trials.

Importantly, individuals with stronger SPC-dependent pride responses preferred to partake in the

task offering high SPC over another, less controllable one. Concordant with earlier findings (Leotti &

Delgado, 2011; Weidman, Tracy, & Elliot, 2016; Williams & DeSteno, 2008), and substantiating the claim

that self-conscious affect is central in the guidance of future behavior (Tracy & Robins, 2007), this finding

underlines the motivational effects of pride (Leary, 2007). Strikingly, preferring to choose an opportunity

to exert control outweighed a monetary detriment entailed by this choice behavior. Collectively, this

indicates that the development of behavioral preferences is partially driven by the extent to which an

individual perceives contexts to be controllable and how succeeding in such contexts manifests in the

experience of self-related affect, such as pride. That is, the experience of mastering a task might elicit

feelings of pride and competence that increase the probability of choosing to perform the same or similar

behaviors later on, dovetailing nicely with theories linking experiences of competence to intrinsic

motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000).

Guided by automated meta-analysis (Yarkoni et al., 2011), we show that these effects of SPC on

outcome processing are mediated via two distinctive, but connected brain networks associated with the

processing of value and self-related information. Outcomes from tasks with high SPC were associated with

activity in brain regions linked to self-related information processing, such as CMS (Northoff & Bermpohl,

2004), since outcomes in controllable tasks are informative about one's abilities and thus inherently self-

relevant. This is an important amendment to previous evidence and underscores that control beliefs need

to be understood beyond having a choice or not in order to understand how subjects develop self-esteem

(Tracy et al., 2009) and concepts of their own capabilities in acting on the environment (Ryan & Deci, 2000).

Our findings thus are in line with other studies showing that ACC is implicated in monitoring self-initiated

actions (Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2004) or vmPFC being involved in outcome monitoring, especially when

events are relevant to the individual (Denny et al., 2012). However, while paralleling these earlier findings,

our data also provide novel insights by relating these processes to the concept of self-conscious affect.

First, in the condition eliciting the strongest pride, i.e. when receiving outcomes indicating success in a

controllable task, the vmPFC was significantly more active than in any other condition. Second, under high

SPC, regions associated with processing self-related information such as left AG, vmPFC, and dmPFC, were

more strongly coupled to VS, which is implicated in the processing of reward information (Pagnoni et al.,

2002), and these effects correlated with behaviorally measured pride responses across subjects. Third,

intraindividual variability in pride covaried more strongly than happiness with neural activity in vmPFC.

Collectively, these findings support the notion that self-related positive affect might depend on the

integration of outcome information with self-representations, mediated via regions of the cortical midline

and AG, mirroring findings of studies investigating other types of self-conscious affect (Müller-Pinzler et

al., 2015).

Regarding the relationship of affect and neural processing, Rutledge et al. (2014) more recently

linked moment-to-moment variability of happiness to errors in reward prediction, which in turn is

associated with activity in the VS. In a follow-up study, the same authors highlighted the importance of

investigating "instrumental control" for a deeper understanding of well-being (Rutledge et al., 2016). Our

study takes a first step in this direction by manipulating SPC, underlining its importance for differentiated

affective experience and downstream motivational effects that manifest in behavioral preferences.

However, our study design does not allow explicit modeling of reward expectations and associated reward

prediction errors. While recent work suggests how SPC and prediction error processing might interact

(Cockburn et al., 2014; Huys & Dayan, 2009; Ly et al., 2019), explicit neuroscientific investigations of their

interplay are lacking. Thus, future studies should directly test how prediction error signaling relates to SPC

and affective dynamics and how these processes are mediated neurally (Rutledge et al., 2016; Seth, 2013).

Our findings replicate and extend previous work on the value of control (Leotti & Delgado, 2011;

Suzuki, 1997) by demonstrating that participants preferred a controllable task over an uncontrollable one,

reflecting differences in subjective value that are likely processed by vmPFC (Bartra et al., 2013). This is

supported by previous studies showing activation differences in vmPFC for the anticipation of choice vs.

non-choice (Leotti & Delgado, 2011). However, the core feature of our study was a condition supplying

participants with an internal model of how their behavior maps to outcomes, extending the concept of

SPC beyond merely having a choice (Ly et al., 2019). Rather, the high SPC condition in our task suggested

that the subjects' performance determined whether or not a goal was reached. This condition yielded the

strongest affective reactivity to outcomes, which was reflected in activity changes in the vmPFC within

subjects and increased functional coupling of the vmPFC with VS. Hence, vmPFC might serve the

integration of outcome information with representations of one's abilities (Chavez & Heatherton, 2013;

D'Argembeau, 2013; Kuzmanovic et al., 2016), potentially driving differences in behavioral preferences for

subjectively more or less controllable tasks (Bartra et al., 2013; Ly et al., 2019; Maier & Seligman, 2016).

Future research could follow this path by assessing directly how SPC-dependent outcome valuation

translates into behavioral preferences in subsequent choice situations and how this might be mediated

neurally by processing of subjective value in the vmPFC.

Pride experiences in response to outcomes that can be attributed to the self foster self-esteem.

Thereby they effectively shape meta-cognitive beliefs about oneself and estimates of one's social status

(Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Tracy et al., 2009). A recent study investigated updating of state

self-esteem in response to evaluation through others (Will et al., 2017) and found these updates to be

positively correlated with activity in vmPFC. Comparably, in a study in which participants were asked to

imagine or remember pride-associated events, significant activations in the medial prefrontal cortex were

found that extended into vmPFC (Gilead, Katzir, Eyal, & Liberman, 2016). Furthermore, two recent studies

have supported this role of vmPFC in the updating of self-related beliefs (Kuzmanovic et al., 2016;

Kuzmanovic, Rigoux, & Tittgemeyer, 2018). In this perspective, the vmPFC activation and affective

dynamics we observed in response to outcomes from controllable tasks might reflect correlates of short-

term updating beliefs about one's abilities. If subjects experience pride this might contribute to updating

their concepts of their own capabilities in a specific environment. In the long run, such positive self-

evaluations support self-esteem and help individuals with developing an understanding of their worthiness

(Wigfield, Eccles, Mac Iver, Reuman, & Midgley, 1991).

From a broader perspective the findings described here have implications for learned helplessness

and psychiatric conditions, such as major depressive disorder (Maier & Seligman, 2016; Nolen-Hoeksema

et al., 1986). Our results emphasize that lower SPC is associated with reduced attribution of positive

outcomes to the self, relating to decreased pride experiences. Further, these reductions in self-related

affective responses align with diminished preferences for tasks offering opportunities for exerting control.

These dependencies might contribute to reduced self-esteem in the long run (Tracy et al., 2009) and

reduced motivation to show goal-directed actions (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1986; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Such

processes could therefore causally relate to depressive episodes, which are centrally defined by negative

views of the self and lack of motivation (World Health Organization, 1993). In contrast to states of reduced

SPC, other psychiatric phenomena such as pathological gambling are characterized by a marked increase

in SPC, even in contexts offering no objective evidence for action-outcome contingencies (L. Clark et al.,

2013; Joukhador, Blaszczynski, & Maccallum, 2004; Langer, 1975). In this regard, our data hint at a possible

role of affective reactions to (un)controllable events in mediating the development of gambling addictions

(Wickwire, Whelan, & Meyers, 2010). Individuals who perceive control over objectively uncontrollable

events might experience positive self-related affect once a desired outcome – such as cracking a one-

armed bandit – is obtained, and might thus be at greater risk of developing gambling addictions. Therefore,

the findings presented here provide a first hint for future clinical research to refocus on perturbed beliefs

of control over the environment to understand affective and motivational symptoms as well as altered

neural dynamics associated with psychiatric conditions.

In conclusion, the three studies provide unequivocal evidence that SPC over task execution

impacts the valuation of the respective outcomes, resulting in entangled positive self-conscious affect and

behavioral preference for environments with greater perceived control. While based on a classical

understanding of control beliefs (Ajzen, 2002; Bandura, 1977) the present studies add to our

understanding of how outcomes that have been achieved through one's own actions recruit neural

systems involved in computations of reward value and self-relatedness (D'Argembeau, 2013). Increased

interactions of the ventral striatum and cortical midline structures, as well as responses of the vmPFC that

track both SPC-dependent shifts in outcome processing and self-conscious positive affect thereby provide

first links to how the experience of SPC drives motivation and future behavior (Ly et al., 2019). On a more

general note, our studies underline the need for the neurosciences to consider how behavior and

subjective experiences are shaped by beliefs individuals hold, that regard how their actions relate to events

in the world they live in and constantly interact with. Taking further steps in this direction promises to

deepen our understanding of affect, motivation, and underlying neural dynamics with important

implications for scientific models of behavioral control, general well-being, and psychiatry (Huys & Dayan,

2009; Ly et al., 2019; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Ryff, 1989).

| 463 | **Material and Methods** |

Participants

A total of 154 participants took part in the three studies (mean age: 23.41 years; SD: 3.41; range, 18-37; 77 females). All experimental designs were approved by the ethics committee of the University of Lübeck, Germany (AZ 16-133). Participants had to be right-handed, speak fluent German, have no deficits in color vision, normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and no pre-existing psychiatric or neurological conditions. Psychology students (study 1: in the second or later year of university) were not invited. In study 2, contraindications for fMRI scanning (e.g. pregnancy, metal parts inside the body) were additional exclusion criteria. All participants gave written informed consent prior to participation in the study, were debriefed after completion of the experimental session, and received monetary compensation or partial course credit for participation. See table 1 for details on the individual samples.

Design and Procedure

Description of the main experimental Task. In the main experimental task we manipulated SPC over task outcomes across three levels (low, medium and high control; in the following LC, MC and HC). The tile task displayed a grid-pattern of two halves of turquoise and yellow squares surrounding a single

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for study samples

	n	age in years			female/male
		M	*SD*	range	
Study 1	40	23.33	3.11	18-31	14/26
Study 2	39	23.31	3.87	18-37	32/7
Study 3	50	23.55	3.34	18-32	30/19
overall	129	23.41	3.41	18-37	77/52

Note. In study 1, the post-experimental interview indicated that 9 out of 49 tested participants did not believe the cover story (i.e. they informed us that they did not believe that feedback depended on their behavior but was manipulated), who were therefore excluded from further analysis. In study 2, 10 out of 49 tested participants had to be excluded due to various reasons (did not believe the cover story: 6 / excessive motion: 1 / technical problems: 3). For study 3, 6 out of 56 tested participants had to be excluded from the analysis (did not believe the cover story: 4 / could not fit choice function because subject chose only one option: 1 / already participated in fMRI study: 1). *M*=mean. *SD*=standard deviation.

grey square in the center (figure 1). On each trial, orientation of halves (left-right or upper-lower

arrangement) and brightness of squares within each half was pseudo-randomly defined. On each trial,

three, four or five squares on each half (targets) were assigned a brightness that was considerably higher

than the remaining ones (distractors). Targets never appeared side by side. Crucially, while there were

random differences in brightness of all distractor squares, the brightness of target squares was kept near

identical rendering a definite identification of the brightest square within one half impossible. The

brightness of the grey square in the center remained constant across the experiment.

Perceived controllability of task outcomes was manipulated in a within-participants design. In the

low control (LC) condition, participants were instructed to *click* on the central grey square. In 50% of trials

clicking the square was pseudo-randomly followed by a win and in the other 50 % by a no win outcome (in

the following: WIN and noWIN). In the medium control (MC) condition, participants were instructed to

choose one color (i.e. yellow or turquoise) by clicking on any square of that color. Again, in 50% of trials

choosing a half was pseudo-randomly followed by either a WIN or a noWIN outcome. In the high control

(HC) condition, participants were instructed to *identify* the brightest square of either the yellow or

turquoise half of the grid. Again, in 50% of trials the identification of the putatively brightest square was

pseudo-randomly followed by either a WIN or a noWIN outcome.

In each study, given that no mistakes were made (i.e., response was fast enough, and participant

did not click on background instead of a square, and a square of the correct color was clicked in the HC

condition), an equal amount of trials was presented for every combination of outcome valence (WIN,

noWIN) and control (LC, MC, HC in study 1; MC, HC in studies 2 & 3).The number of ratings was equally

distributed across combinations of outcome valence and SPC condition and the same for pride and

happiness. SPC regarding each condition (HC, MC, and LC; "How strongly could you influence / control the

outcome in the different tasks?", ranging from "very strongly" to "not at all"; see below) was rated after

the main task using 5-point Likert-type scales in studies 1 & 2, while a continuous horizontal rating scale

was used in study 3.

All subjects in a given study were tested in the same laboratory room and lighting conditions were

held constant by lowering the window blinds and setting the dimmable electric lights to the same level.

Brightness of the 3-5 brightest squares was randomly set on each trial within these pre-defined limits in

studies 1 & 2. In study 3, instead of creating a unique display by setting the previously described

parameters randomly on each trial, a predefined pool of 100 grid stimuli was used, which was shuffled and

therefore randomly assigned to each condition for each subject.

In each study, presentation of WIN and noWIN outcomes was manipulated, so that the overall

probability of receiving each outcome would be fixed to 50% for every condition. In case a square was

clicked that was not defined as belonging to the set of brightest squares on a given HC trial, a noWIN was

presented in order to maintain credibility of the task. The predefined sequence of WIN and noWIN

outcomes was designed in a way that no more than four WIN or noWIN trials appeared consecutively

across conditions, and that no more than two WIN or noWIN trials appeared consecutively within

conditions. Additionally, no condition appeared more than two times in a row. This was done in order to

maintain an expectation of receiving a WIN (noWIN) outcome close to 50% across the course of the task.

All experimental stimuli were presented using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) for

Matlab (Mathworks Inc, Natick, MA). Post-experimental interviews were administered using computerized

questionnaires presented in Sosci Survey (Sosci Survey GmbH, München, Germany).

Association of perceived Control with the affective Experience of Pride (Study 1). Prior to the

main experiment, and after a short demonstration of the three task conditions, participants completed a

practice session (see below) so that they could learn a) the timing of the task, and b) that they would

receive approximately 50% WIN and 50% noWIN feedbacks in all three conditions.

After the practice session and prior to the main task, participants completed two trials of every condition

including one WIN and one noWIN outcome each, and ratings of pride and happiness in order to learn the

timing of the complete trial structure. Subsequently, participants performed a total of 90 trials (figure 1B)

of the experimental task. The sequence of conditions and outcome valence in each condition was

predefined, such that no condition appeared more than twice in a row. Additionally, no more than four

consecutive WIN or noWIN trials were presented across conditions, and no more than two repetitions of

the same outcome valence appeared within conditions. Ratings of pride and happiness were displayed

side-by-side after each trial and visualized as thermometers initiated at 0 and ranging to 100. Participants

could rate their subjective feelings of pride and happiness in any order by clicking on the corresponding

levels of the two thermometers and confirming their ratings using a *done*-button on the bottom of the

screen.

536   **Neural Foundations of processing Rewards in controllable Environments and Pride (Study 2).**

The procedure in the study 2 largely followed that of the study 1, with a few changes. First, the LC condition

was not presented in the fMRI in order to reduce scanning time and to perform a more conservative

comparison between the MC and HC conditions that both had a component of choice. A total of 80 trials

were presented, followed by a rating of either pride or happiness (figure 1B) on each or every second trial.

If no mistakes were committed, this yielded a total of 24 ratings each for pride and happiness, 12 for each

condition, and 6 for every combination of WIN/noWIN and condition. For approximately half of the

participants, the trials on which pride and happiness were rated were switched. In case a mistake was

committed, both the feedback and the rating on that trial were replaced by a warning and a prolonged

inter-trial-interval (ITI) until the planned onset time for the next trial was reached.

546   After a short explanation of the task outside the scanner, the practice session in the fMRI study

was done inside the fMRI scanner and followed the same structure as in the study 1, as did the post-

experimental interview and debriefing. Participants completed all tasks with an fMRI-compatible

computer mouse (NAtA TECHNOLOGIES, Coquitlam, Canada) and their right arm rested on a tilted

mousepad supported by an adjustable armrest. ITIs were pseudo-randomly jittered between 3-5 seconds

during which a fixation cross was presented in the center of the screen. Following a 1 second cue, the task

was presented for 4.75 seconds and after a 4 second delay, the outcome was presented for 3 seconds. On

each or every second trial, participants were asked to rate within 4 seconds either how proud or how

happy they felt regarding the preceding outcome. Ratings were given on a horizontal rating scale initiated

at an intermediate position ("somewhat") and ranged from "not at all" to "very" (figure 1), and converted

to values ranging from 0 through 100.

Pride as an affective Marker for the SV of Control (Study 3). Study 3 consisted of two behavioral

paradigms (figure 1B). After an initial demonstration of the task and a practice session, 64 trials of the

main task were presented, and pride ratings were collected on 40 pseudo-randomly selected trials.

Thereafter, participants completed a choice task in which on each of 96 trials they were given a choice

between performing either the MC or the HC condition. Importantly, each choice option was associated

with varying amounts of money (see below for details). For instance, a subject could have the choice

between participating in the MC condition for a potential gain of 1 € or, alternatively, participate in the HC

condition for a potential gain of 0.9 €. On eight pseudo-randomly selected trials, participants performed

the chosen task, and were informed that after the experiment they would receive the sum of all

successfully completed trials. No outcomes were presented during this part of the experiment to avoid

influencing the participants' expectation of succeeding.

The algorithm we used to determine the potential monetary gains of the choice options on each

trial followed the logic of an adaptive staircase algorithm for the detection of perceptual detection

thresholds as used in psychophysics (Leek, 2001). Specifically, on each trial, one of the two choice options

was selected as the *reference* and assigned a value of 1€, while the other option was assigned another

value that was either higher or lower than the reference value. E.g., if this *comparison value* was higher

than the reference value on a given trial and the participant picked the higher value, the comparison value

was decreased by a predefined fraction in the following trials until the participant changed her decision

and chose the option with the reference value. In this fashion we aimed to find the point at which each

individual participant valued both choice options equally. A description of the staircase-algorithm we

employed is detailed below.

Table 2. Reaction times and number of valid trials

	condition	Median reaction times (ms)		Number of valid trials		Number of trials planned
		M	SD	M	SD	
Study 1	LC	751	89	29.10	1.11	30
	MC	778	101	29.05	0.93	30
	HC	820	90	28.56	1.19	30
Study 2	MC	1428	380	38.80	1.30	40
	HC	2041	400	38.13	1.99	40
Study 3	MC	1223	325	30.76	1.24	32
	HC	1218	322	31.54	0.73	32

Note. ms = milliseconds; *M* = mean; *SD* = standard deviation; LC = low control; MC = medium control; HC = high control.

Between the main task and the choice task, participants gave a number of ratings regarding their

experience of the task. These ratings included the participants' estimate of the percentage of WIN and

noWIN outcomes they had received during the different conditions in the main task, or they thought they

would receive if they continued to perform the same conditions in the future.

Practice Task (studies 1, 2, & 3). The practice task preceding the main experiment was conducted

in order to minimize differences in outcome expectations between the three conditions. During the

practice session, participants completed 15 trials of each condition without any feedback during the first

twelve trials. Instead, subjects received manipulated feedback during the last three trials of the different

conditions, indicating that they had "won" (LC), "chosen correctly" (MC), or "found the brightest square"

(HC) in approximately 50% of the preceding trials. Precisely, there were three sets of feedback percentages

(46, 50, 54 / 47, 50, 53 / 48, 50, 52), that were randomly assigned to the task condition based on the

subject ID and the order of each set was randomized for each condition and every subject. In case a subject

made too many mistakes (i.e. responded too slowly, clicked on the background, clicked a square of the

incorrect color in the HC condition, or did not click on the grey square in the LC condition on more than ¼

of the completed practice trials) after the first eleven practice trials of a condition, the subject was

informed about this by an on-screen message and the respective practice block was repeated. Before the

start of the practice session, subjects were informed that depending on their performance in the practice

blocks, they would be assigned to one of three groups gaining either 10, 15 or 20 €-cents on each correct

trial of the main task and that the better they performed the more money they could gain during the main

task. After the practice session, all subjects were informed that they had been assigned to the 20-cent

group (irrespective of their performance).

Description of Ratings. In study 1, ratings of both pride and happiness were administered after

every outcome, using thermometer-like rating scales, ranging from 0 through 100, and initialized at 0 (see

figure 1). Subjects could decide which affect to rate first and completed their rating by clicking a *done-*

button. In study 2, either pride or happiness ratings were administered after a given trial, with a total of

24 ratings for each affect (6 for each combination of outcome valence (WIN, noWIN) and control (MC, HC).

For 20 out of the 39 subjects included in the analyses in study 2, the predefined assignment of pride and

happiness ratings to a given outcome was switched. In study 3, only pride was rated after a total of 40

trials, equally distributed over all combinations of outcome valence and control. In studies 2 and 3 ratings

were administered using horizontal rating bars, asking subjects how strongly they felt a given affect with

regard to the preceding outcome. Scales ranged from *not at all* through *somewhat* to *very* and were

initialized at *somewhat*, i.e. a neutral position.

Ratings of subjectively perceived control (SPC) in studies 1 and 2 were assessed using a paper-

pencil 5-point Likert scale asking participants "How strongly could you influence the outcome in the

different tasks?", with the different options being: "very strongly", "strongly", "neutral", "weakly", "very

weakly" (in German: 1. "Wie stark glaubst du konntest du das Ergebnis in den verschiedenen

Bedingungen beeinflussen?"; „sehr stark", „stark", „mittel", „wenig", „sehr wenig"). In study 3, two items

were used to assess SPC, with the first item asking the same question as in studies 1 and 2. The second

item asked "How strongly could you control the outcome in the different tasks?" (German: "Wie stark

konntest du das Ergebnis in den verschiedenen Aufgaben kontrollieren?"). In study 3, a horizontal rating

bar ranging from "very weakly" through "somewhat" to "very strongly" was displayed after the main task,

similar to the affect ratings and initialized at a neutral position (i.e. "somewhat"). In study 3, ratings from

both items were averaged for each condition in order to measure SPC.

In addition to ratings measuring SPC, after the main task in study 3, a set of additional questions was

asked – separately for MC and HC – that was later used to statistically control the relationship between

the pride response and choice behavior (see tables 1 and 3). All questions were asked using a horizontal

rating bar like the ones used for the affect ratings and the SPC ratings in study 3 and all answers were

initialized at a neutral position and recoded to range from 0 to 100.

Choice Task (Study 3). The algorithm we used to determine the potential monetary gains of the

choice options on each trial followed the logic of an adaptive staircase algorithm for the detection of

perceptual detection thresholds as used in psychophysics (Leek, 2001). More specifically, on each trial,

one of the two choice options was selected as the *reference* and assigned a value of 1€, while the other

option was assigned another value that was either higher or lower than the reference value, called the

comparison value. This comparison value was changed on each trial by a certain step size in a specific

manner detailed below.

In the beginning of the task, two step sizes were used: 33 cents and 17 cents. Additionally, the

comparison value could either be smaller or larger than the reference value and was initially calculated by

3*step size, giving four sets of initial comparison values: 1.99€, 1.51€, 0.49€, 0.01€. Since either HC or MC

could be the reference value on a given trial, we obtained a total of 8 initial starting values, defining 8 so-

called comparison sets.

Table 3. Items regarding subjects' experience of the experimental task

Variable	Item
subjectively received %WIN	How often do you think that you guessed correctly / identified the brightest square in the different tasks? (in percent)
difficulty (inv.)	How easy were the different tasks for you?
effort	How much effort did you put into the different tasks?
fun	How much fun did you have doing the different tasks?
exciting	How exciting / thrilling do you think the different tasks were?
exhausting	How exhausting were the different tasks?

The task was programmed to contain four phases of 24 trials each that were not explicitly

conveyed to the participants. In the first phase, only those comparison sets were used that started with a

step size of 17 cents (i.e. comparison values starting at 1.51€ or 0.49€). In the second phase, two thirds of

the trials belonged to these sets, while one third were trials starting with comparison values of 1.99€ or

0.01€ (i.e. step sizes of 33 cents). In the third phase of the task, two thirds of the trials belonged to the

comparison sets with a step size of 33 cents and all of the trials in the fourth phase belonged to this set.

In each phase, 2 trials were randomly selected to be actually played by the subject (being HC or

MC, depending on the subject's choice), without showing an outcome. Subjects were informed that in the

end, they would receive the amount gained from those trials on which they succeeded (i.e. found the

brightest square in HC; selected the correct color In MC). However, they truly received 50% of the amounts

they chose and played for during the decision task.

If on a given trial the comparison value (e.g. HC = 1.99€) was higher than the reference value (e.g.

MC = 1€) and the subject picked the choice option with the (higher) comparison value, the comparison

value was decreased by the current step size (e.g. 33 cents) in the following trials of the same comparison

set until the subject changed her decision and picked the option with the reference value. As an example,

the MC condition could be defined as the reference (1 €), while the initial comparison value of HC could

be 1.99 €. Choosing HC for 1.99 € would lead to a decrease of the comparison value to 1.66 € on the next

trial of this comparison set. The comparison value would be decreasing as long as HC is preferred over MC.

At some point, e.g. when HC has a value of .67 €, the subject might prefer MC (having a value of 1€). Now,

the comparison value is *increased* until the subject's decision changes a second time, and the comparison

value starts to decrease again, this time by a smaller fraction than before (*previous step size*/1.25),

therefore iteratively approximating the point at which the subjective value of both options are subjectively

equal for this participant. On each trial, a random amount between -5 and 5 cents was added to the values

in order to decrease monotony of the task. The highest offered value was 1.99€ and the lowest was 0.01€.

662 **FMRI Data Acquisition.** Participants were scanned using a 3T Siemens MAGENTOM Skyra scanner

663 (Siemens, München, Germany) at the Center of Brain, Behavior, and Metabolism (CBBM) at the University

664 of Lübeck, Germany. After four dummy-scans allowing for equilibration of T1 saturation effects, 768

665 volumes with 39 near-axial slices in ascending order were acquired for each participant using echo-planar-

666 imaging (voxel size=3*3*3 mm, 68*68 matrix, 20% interslice-gap, TR=2000 ms, TE=25 ms, 90° FA, iPAT=2).

667 In addition, a high-resolution anatomical T1 image was acquired that was used for coregistration (voxel

668 size=1*1*1 mm, 256*256 matrix, TR=1900 ms, TE=2.44 ms, 9°FA).

670 **Statistical Analyses**

671 The statistical analyses of subject ratings were performed using JASP version 0.9 (JASP Team,

672 2019). MRI data were analyzed using SPM12 (Ashburner et al., 2013), and the logistic choice models in

673 study 3 were fitted using Matlab R2016a. The comparison of correlations between PPI-effects and affective

674 responses in study 2, as well as FDR-correction of p-values regarding these correlations were performed

675 in R (R Core Team, 2013; see below).

676 **Manipulation Checks.** In order to verify that subjects could not reliably detect the brightest

677 square, we computed how many times in the entire experiment the brightest square of a given color would

678 be found given a subject performed at chance level. For instance, if in a given trial three squares were

679 defined to be the brightest squares, there was a chance of 1/3 to find the brightest square. We computed

680 the level of chance performance for each subject individually, accounting for the fact that by chance, the

681 number of trials in which 3, 4, or 5 squares were the brightest could vary between subjects (due to the

682 design of the experimental task). We performed paired t-tests in each study, comparing the number of

683 times each subject found the brightest square with the level of chance performance. These analyses

684 indicated, that in no study performance exceeded chance level. In fact, in every study, subjects performed

685 significantly worse than chance (study 1: $t(39)$ = -33.931, p < .001; study 2: $t(38)$ = -2.311, p = .026; study

686 3: $t(49)$ = -2.762, p = .008).

The objective rates of receiving WIN and noWIN outcomes did not deviate significantly from 50%

in any study (study 1: LC: M=50.45%, SD=1.78, t(39)=1.601, two-sided p=.117, MC: M=50.26%, SD=1.29,

t(39)=1.272, two-sided p=.211, HC: M=50.01%, SD=2.20, t(39)=0.030, two-sided p=.977; study 2: MC:

M=50.10%, SD=1.14, t(38)=0.556, two-sided p=.581, HC: M=49.88%, SD=1.70, t(38)=-0.437, two-sided

p=.664; study 3: MC: M=50.55%, SD=1.42, t(49)=0.275, two-sided p=.784, HC: M=50.00%, SD=1.15,

t(49)=0.0005, two-sided p=.999), nor were there any significant differences in outcome rates between

conditions (study 1: F(2,78)=0.572, p=.567; study 2: t(38)=-0.703, two-sided p=.487; study 3: t(49)=-0.234,

two-sided p=.839).

Participants' subjective reports of the perceived percentages of WIN and noWIN outcomes did not

differ from 50% in studies 1 and 2 (study 1: LC: M=51.60%, SD=12.36, t(39)=0.818, two-sided p=.418, MC:

M=48.23%, SD=6.60, t(39)=-1.70, two-sided p=.097, HC: M=50.70%, SD=14.78, t(39)=.300, two-sided

p=.766; study 2: MC: M=48.13%, SD=6.37, t(37)=-1.808, two-sided p=.079, HC: M=52.07%, SD=10.29,

t(37)=1.216, two-sided p=.232), nor were there any significant differences between conditions (study 1:

F(2,78)=.982, two-sided p=.379; study 2: t(37)=-1.936, two-sided p=.061). Surprisingly, in study 3 subjects

reported having received significantly less than 50% WIN outcomes in MC (M=46.66%, SD=11.75%, t(49)=-

2.011, two-sided p=.049, d=-0.28, 90% CI=[-.57, -.0002]), and significantly more than 50% WIN outcomes

in HC (M=54.51%, SD=12.07%, t(49)=2.640, p=.011, two-sided, d=0.37, 90% CI=[.09, .66]), contradicting

the objective outcome rates. We therefore controlled the results of study 3 for differences between

conditions regarding subjective outcome rates.

Analysis of affective Dynamics in Studies 1, 2, and 3. For each participant, we calculated the mean

ratings of pride or happiness (study 3: only pride), separately for each combination of condition (LC (only

study 1), MC, HC) and outcome valence (WIN, noWIN), for all valid trials (i.e. excluding those in which the

participant either clicked on the background or did not respond fast enough). The resulting variables were

then taken as dependent variables in repeated measures analyses of variance (rmANOVA), using the

factors condition, outcome valence, and affect (factor affect only in studies 1 & 2). Paired comparisons

were then used to disentangle significant effects of interest.

Correlation of SPC and Pride Response across Studies. In order to perform a more direct test

regarding the relationship between SPC and pride, we computed the pride response from the data of each

study ([HC:WIN–HC:noWIN] − [MC:WIN–MC:noWIN]). Hence, a positive pride response indicated that

participants reported greater outcome-dependent differences in pride under HC than under MC.

Additionally, after transforming the control ratings from each study to values between 0 and 100 across

HC and MC, we computed the difference between control ratings for the different levels of SPC. For this

analysis, control ratings and pride ratings from study 1 were averaged across LC and MC. Non-parametric

correlation analysis (Spearman's rho) was used to test the relationship between the pride response and

differences in SPC between HC and MC.

Analysis of Choice Data in Study 3. We predicted the probability for each subject to choose the

HC option on a given trial by fitting a logistic model to the choice data. We calculated the ratio of the

potential monetary gain for the HC option (e.g. 1.37 €) to the one for the MC option (e.g. 1.01 €) on each

of the 96 trials and transformed this ratio to log-space (e.g. log(1.37/1.01)=.3049). Thus, positive values of

the resulting predictor variable indicate a higher potential gain for HC than for MC on a given choice trial,

negative values indicate a relatively higher potential gain for MC, and a value of zero indicate equality of

gains for the two options.

Considering the general form of logistic models,

$$p(choose\ BRIGHTNESS|X = x_1) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(\beta_0\ +\ \beta_1 * X_1)}$$

participants with parameters β_0 and β_1 both equaling zero would have a 50% probability of choosing HC

on a given trial, regardless of the value of X_1 (X_1 being the log-transformed ratio of the monetary values

offered for HC and MC). Assuming equal offers for HC and MC, negative values of β_0 indicate that a

participant has a preference for HC over MC, while positive values of β_0 indicate a preference for MC over

HC. With more negative values of β_1, the probability of a participant choosing HC therefore increases more

steeply, the higher the potential gain in the HC option, relative to MC.

Participants reported having received WIN outcomes more often in HC than in MC (see

Supplement 1 - table S4), contradicting objective outcome rates. To control for differences in the

subjective outcome rates, we again fit the logistic functions to each subjects' choice data, now

incorporating subjective outcome probabilities in the prediction. First, each monetary amount offered for

either HC or MC on a given trial was multiplied with the subjectively rated percentage of WINs obtained

in the respective condition (e.g. 1.23€ * 52% WINs in HC = 0.64€). The ratio of these expected values on

each trial was then log-transformed and used to predict the subjects' choices on each trial. The subjects'

probability to choose HC given equal expected values for HC and MC remained significantly above 50%

(*MD*=65.98%, *IQR*=50.48, Wilcoxon signed-rank *W*=863, one-sided *p*=.015), i.e., even when controlling for

differences in subjective winning histories for the two tasks, a preference for HC remained.

Analysis of FMRI Data (Study 2). fMRI data were analyzed using SPM12 (Ashburner et al., 2013)

in MATLAB R2015a. All functional volumes were slice-time corrected, spatially realigned, and normalized

using the forward deformation fields as obtained using the unified segmentation approach by

coregistration of the anatomical T1-image to the mean functional image of each individual participant

(Ashburner et al., 2013). Normalized images were resliced with a voxel size of 2*2*2 mm and smoothed

with an 8-mm full-width-at-half-maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel. To remove drift, functional images

were high-pass-filtered at 1/128 Hz.

Statistical analyses were performed in a two-level, mixed-effects approach. The first-level general

linear model (GLM) for each participant included a total of 8 regressors defining the onsets and duration

of the two task phases (MC, HC), the four feedback phases (MC:WIN, MC:noWIN, HC:WIN, HC:noWIN),

and two regressors modelling the phases for pride and happiness ratings. In addition, the six realignment

parameters from the preprocessing as well as their first derivatives were included as regressors of no

interest to account for noise due to head movement.

For the analyses at the second level, we focused on the outcome phase of the task by

implementing a within-participants ANOVA including the individual first-level contrast images for MC:WIN,

MC:noWIN, HC:WIN, and HC:noWIN. Using this approach we computed main effects of condition (HC>MC)

and outcome valence (WIN>noWIN), as well as their interaction ((HC:WIN>HC:noWIN) >

(MC:WIN>MC:noWIN)).

GLM Analysis including Pride and Happiness Ratings as parametric Modulators. We performed a

second GLM analysis which included two predictors modelling the onsets and durations of the MC and the

HC task on each trial, three different predictors for the task outcomes, and two predictors modelling the

onsets and durations of the pride and happiness ratings. The first of the three outcome predictors

modelled those task outcomes after which pride was rated. The second one modelled those task outcomes

after which happiness was rated. For each of these predictors the respective affect ratings on each trial

were included as parametric modulations to model variability in neural responses related to the subjective

ratings of pride or happiness on each trial. The third outcome regressor modelled those trial outcomes

that were not followed by any affect rating, and thus was not parametrically modulated. As before, the six

realignment parameters as well as their first derivatives were included to account for noise due to head

movement. The first-level contrast images for the parametric modulations of pride and happiness were

then taken to a group-level within-subjects ANOVA in SPM12 (Ashburner et al., 2013).

Psychophysiological Interactions (PPI). In addition to the standard GLM approach, we additionally

performed psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses on the first level and aggregated the resulting

contrast images for the PPI effect on the second level using one-sample t-tests in order to investigate

changes in functional connectivity between brain regions identified in the within-participants ANOVA.

Precisely, we investigated whether functional connectivity of regions activated more strongly for WIN than

for noWIN would differ between outcomes of a HC as compared MC. For each individual participant, we

defined 4-mm radius spherical ROIs, centered at the nearest local maximum for the contrast WIN>noWIN

and located within 6 mm from the group maximum for the same contrast, separately for the left and right

VS, which is a central structure associated with the processing of rewarding outcomes (Delgado, 2007;

Pagnoni et al., 2002). By computing the first eigenvariate for all voxels within each of the two individual

spheres that showed a positive effect for WIN>noWIN, we extracted the time course of activations and

constructed PPI terms using the contrast HC>MC (Ashburner et al., 2013). One participant was excluded

from the PPI analysis for right VS, because no voxels survived the predefined threshold for eigenvariate

extraction. The PPI term, along with the activation time course from the (left or right) VS and a regressor

modelling the effect of HC>MC was included in a new GLM for each participant that additionally modelled

the two task phases (grids for HC or MC) and rating phases (pride and happiness) as well as the six

realignment parameters from preprocessing and their first derivatives. First level contrast images of the

(left or right) VS PPI analyses were aggregated for all participants in order to test for changes in functional

connectivity on the group level using one-sample t-tests.

Rationale for Masking Procedures. We created a set of masks used for region-of-interest (ROI)

analyses by performing automated meta-analyses using Neurosynth (Yarkoni et al., 2011) for the terms

self referential and *value*, comprising activation foci of 166 and 470 studies, respectively. Using the SPM12

image calculator (Ashburner et al., 2013), we created three mutually exclusive image masks, showing brain

regions associated with a) the term *self referential*, but not *value* (SELF¬VALUE), b) with the term *value*,

but not *self referential* (VALUE¬SELF), and c) the conjunction of both terms (SELF∩VALUE, covering regions

where both meta-analyses showed overlapping effects). This rationale is in line with a recent meta-analysis

showing substantial overlap between regions associated with processing of SV and self-referential

processes (Acikalin, Gorgolewski, & Poldrack, 2017). These masks were then limited to include only clusters

with 5 or more contiguous voxels. For a given contrast, we first tested whether there were significant

activations within the regions covered by the masks of interest. Subsequently, we tested whether the same

contrast showed significant activations on the whole-brain level in order to detect regions activated that

were located outside of our a-priori masks.

Linking SPC-dependent Neural Connectivity to interindividual Variability in affective Responses.

We hypothesized that individuals showing stronger functional connectivity between VS and regions associated with self-related processing when receiving HC outcomes than when receiving MC outcomes, should display larger pride responses. We obtained an estimate of individual functional connectivity strengths by computing the eigenvariate across participants from the three largest clusters inside the SELF¬VALUE mask showing significant PPI effects at $p<.0005$ (uncorrected at peak level). These three clusters were located in left AG (k=50 voxels), dmPFC (k=89) and precuneus (k=33; figure 6). Next, we correlated pride responses with estimates of functional connectivity in each of the three clusters, applying FDR correction for multiple comparisons on the resulting p-values (using the *p.adjust* function in R; R Core Team, 2013). An equivalent analysis was performed for the happiness responses. We then compared these correlations between pride and happiness using the *cocor* package (Diedenhofen, 2016) in R, again applying FDR-correction for multiple comparisons.

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Competing Interests

All authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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