Simulating emotions: An active inference model of emotional state inference and emotion concept learning

Ryan Smith,[1] Thomas Parr,[2] Karl J. Friston,[2]

[1]Laureate Institute for Brain Research, Tulsa, OK, USA

[2]Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, WC1N 3BG, UK

Corresponding Author Information:

Ryan Smith

Laureate Institute for Brain Research

6655 S Yale Ave, Tulsa, OK 74136, USA

Email: rsmith@laureateinstitute.org

Abstract

The ability to conceptualize and understand one's own affective states and responses – or "emotional awareness" (EA) – is reduced in multiple psychiatric populations; it is also positively correlated with a range of adaptive cognitive and emotional traits. While a growing body of work has investigated the neurocognitive basis of EA, the neurocomputational processes underlying this ability have received limited attention. Here, we present a formal Active Inference (AI) model of emotion conceptualization that can simulate the neurocomputational (Bayesian) processes associated with learning about emotion concepts and inferring the emotions one is feeling in a given moment. We validate the model and inherent constructs by showing (i) it can successfully acquire a repertoire of emotion concepts in its "childhood", as well as (ii) acquire new emotion concepts in synthetic "adulthood," and (iii) that these learning processes depend on early experiences, environmental stability, and habitual patterns of selective attention. These results offer a proof of principle that cognitive-emotional processes can be modeled formally, and highlight the potential for both theoretical and empirical extensions of this line of research on emotion and emotional disorders.

Keywords: Emotion Concepts; Trait Emotional Awareness; Learning; Computational Neuroscience; Active Inference

Simulating emotions: An active inference model of emotional state inference and emotion concept learning

The ability to conceptualize and understand one's affective responses has become the topic of a growing body of empirical and theoretical work within the cognitive and neural sciences (Barrett, 2017; Lane, Weihs, Herring, Hishaw, & Smith, 2015; Panksepp, Lane, Solms, & Smith, 2017; R. Smith et al., 2015; R. Smith & Lane, 2015, 2016; R. Smith, Lane, et al., 2017; R. Smith, Lane, Alkozei, et al., 2018; R. Smith, Lane, Sanova, et al., 2018; R. Smith, Quinlan, et al., 2017; R. Smith, Sanova, Alkozei, Lane, & Killgore, 2018; R. Smith, Thayer, Khalsa, & Lane, 2017; Wright, Riedel, Sechrest, Lane, & Smith, 2017). Attempts to operationalize this cognitive-emotional ability have led to a range of overlapping constructs, including trait emotional awareness (Lane & Schwartz, 1987), emotion differentiation or granularity (Kashdan, Barrett, & McKnight, 2015; Kashdan & Farmer, 2014), and alexithymia (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994a, 1994b). This work is motivated to a large degree by the clinical relevance of emotion conceptualization abilities. In the literature on emotional awareness, for example, lower levels of conceptualization ability have been associated with several psychiatric disorders as well as poorer physical health (Baslet, Termini, & Herbener, 2009; Berthoz, Ouhayoun, & Parage, 2000; Bydlowski et al., 2005; Consoli et al., 2010; Donges et al., 2005; Frewen et al., 2008; Lackner, 2005; Levine, Marziali, & Hood, 1997; Moeller et al., 2014; A. Subic-Wrana, Beetz,

Paulussen, Wiltnik, & Beutel, 2007; C. Subic-Wrana, Bruder, Thomas, Lane, & Köhle, 2005); conversely, higher ability levels have been associated with a range of adaptive emotion-related traits and abilities (Barchard & Hakstian, 2004; Bréjard, Bonnet, & Pedinielli, 2012; Ciarrochi, Caputi, & Mayer, 2003; Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990; Lane et al., 1996; Lane, Sechrest, Riedel, Shapiro, & Kaszniak, 2000). Multiple evidence-based psychotherapeutic modalities also aim to improve emotion understanding as a central part of psycho-education in psychotherapy (Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2016; Hayes & Smith, 2005).

One recent neurocognitive model – termed the "three-process model" (TPM; (R. Smith, Kaszniak, Katsanis, Lane, & Nielsen, 2019; R. Smith, Killgore, & Lane, 2018)) – has sought to characterize a range of processes that contribute to emotion episodes, and how individual differences in these processes could contribute to trait differences in the deployment of emotion concepts to understand affective responses (and in the subsequent use of these concepts to guide adaptive decision-making). The TPM distinguishes the following three processes:

1. Affective response generation: a process in which somatovisceral and cognitive states are automatically modulated in response to an affective stimulus (whether real, remembered, or imagined) in a context-dependent manner, based on an (often implicit) appraisal of the significance of that stimulus for the survival and goal-achievement of the individual.

2. Affective response representation: a process in which the somatovisceral component of an affective response is subsequently perceived via afferent sensory processing, and then conceptualized as a particular emotion (e.g., sadness, anger, etc.) in consideration of all other available sources of information (e.g., stimulus/context information, current thoughts/beliefs about the situation, etc.).
3. Conscious access: a process in which the representations of somatovisceral percepts and emotion concept representations may or may not be held in working memory – constraining the use of this information in goal-directed decision-making (e.g., verbal reporting, selection of voluntary emotion regulation strategies, etc.).

The TPM has also proposed a tentative mapping to the brain in terms of interactions between large-scale neural networks serving domain-general cognitive functions. Some support for this proposal has been found within recent neuroimaging studies (R. Smith, Alkozei, et al., 2017; R. Smith, Bajaj, Dailey, et al., 2018; R. Smith, Lane, et al., 2017; R. Smith, Lane, Alkozei, et al., 2018; R. Smith, Lane, Sanova, et al., 2018; R. Smith, Sanova, Alkozei, et al., 2018). However, the neurocomputational implementation of these processes has not been thoroughly considered. The computational level of description offers the promise of providing more specific and mechanistic insights, which could potentially be exploited to inform and improve pharmacological and psychotherapeutic interventions. While previous theoretical work has applied active inference concepts to emotional phenomena (Barrett &

Simmons, 2015; Clark, Watson, & Friston, 2018; Joffily & Coricelli, 2013; Seth, 2013; Seth & Friston, 2016; R. Smith, Thayer, et al., 2017; R. Smith, Weihs, Alkozei, Killgore, & Lane, 2019), no formal modeling has yet been performed. In this manuscript, we aim to take the first steps in constructing an explicit computational model of emotion inference (i.e., affective response representation) as described within the TPM (subsequent work will focus on affective response generation and conscious access processes). Specifically, we present a simple Active Inference model (Friston et al., 2016; Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2017) of emotion conceptualization, formulated as a Markov Decision Process. We then outline some initial insights afforded by simulations using this model.

In what follows, we first provide a brief review of active inference. We will place a special emphasis on deep generative models that afford the capacity to explain multimodal (i.e., interoceptive, proprioceptive and exteroceptive) sensations that are characteristic of emotional constructs. We then introduce a particular model of emotion inference that is sufficiently nuanced to produce synthetic emotional processes but sufficiently simple to be understood from a 'first principle' account. We then establish the validity of this model using numerical analyses of emotion concept learning during (synthetic) neurodevelopment. We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this work; particularly for future applications.

An Active Inference model of emotion conceptualization

A primer on Active Inference

Active Inference (AI) starts from the assumption that the brain is an inference machine that approximates optimal probabilistic (Bayesian) belief updating across all biopsychological domains (e.g., perception, decision-making, motor control, etc.). AI postulates that the brain embodies an internal model of the world (including the body) that is "generative" in the sense that it is able to simulate the sensory data that it should receive if its model of the world is correct. This simulated (predicted) sensory data can be compared to actual observations, and deviations between predicted and observed sensations are used to update the model. On short timescales (e.g., a single trial in a perceptual decision-making task) this updating corresponds to perception, whereas on longer timescales it corresponds to learning (i.e., updating expectations about what will be observed on subsequent trials). One can see these processes as ensuring the generative model (embodied by the brain) remains an accurate model of the world (Conant & Ashbey, 1970).

Action (be it skeletomotor, visceromotor, or cognitive action) can be cast in similar terms. For example, actions can be chosen to resolve uncertainty about variables within a generative model (i.e., sampling from domains in which the model does not make precise predictions). This can prevent future deviations from predicted outcomes. In addition, the brain must continue to make certain

predictions simply in order to survive. For example, if the brain did not in some sense continue to "expect" to observe certain amounts of food, water, shelter, social support, and a range of other quantities, then it would cease to exist (McKay & Dennett, 2009); as it would not pursue those behaviors leading to the realization of these expectations (c.f. 'the optimism bias' (Sharot, 2011)). Thus, there is a deep sense in which the brain must continually seek out observations that support – or are internally consistent with – its own continued existence. As a result, decision-making can be cast as a process in which the brain infers the sets of actions (policies) that would lead to observations most consistent with its own survival-related expectations (i.e., its "prior preferences"). Mathematically, this can be described as selecting policies that maximize a quantity called "Bayesian model evidence" – that is, the probability that sensory data would be observed under a given model. In other words, because the brain is itself a model of the world, action can be understood as a process by which the brain seeks out evidence for itself – sometimes known as self-evidencing (Hohwy, 2016).

In a real-world setting, directly computing model evidence becomes mathematically intractable. Thus, the brain must use some approximation. AI proposes that the brain instead computes a quantity called "free energy." Unlike model evidence, computing free energy is mathematically tractable. Crucially, free energy provides a bound on model evidence, such that minimization of free energy is equivalent to maximizing model evidence. Therefore, decision-making will be approximately (Bayes) optimal if it operates by inferring (and enacting) the policy

that will minimize expected free energy – and thereby maximize evidence for the brain's internal model. Interestingly, expected free energy can be mathematically decomposed into terms reflecting uncertainty and prior preferences, respectively. This decomposition dictates that any agent that minimizes expected free energy will first select exploratory policies that minimize uncertainty in a new environment. Once uncertainty is resolved, the agent then selects policies that exploit that environment to maximize its prior preferences. The formal mathematical basis for AI has been detailed elsewhere (Friston, FitzGerald, et al., 2017), and the reader is referred there for a full mathematical treatment.

When a generative model is formulated as a partially observable Markov decision process, active inference takes a particular form. Specifically, specifying a generative model in this context requires specifying the allowable policies, hidden states of the world (that the brain cannot directly observe but must infer), and observable outcomes, as well as a number of matrices that define the probabilistic relationships between these quantities. The 'A' matrix specifies which outcomes are generated by each combination of hidden states (i.e., a likelihood mapping indicating the probability that a particular set of outcomes would be observed given a particular hidden state). The 'B' matrix encodes state transitions, specifying the probability that one hidden state will evolve into another over time. Some of these transitions are controlled by the agent, according to the policy that has been selected. The 'D' matrix encodes prior expectations about the initial hidden state of the world. The 'E' matrix encodes prior expectations about which policies will be

chosen (e.g., frequently repeated habitual behaviors will have higher prior expectation values). Finally, the 'C' matrix encodes prior preferences over outcomes. Outcomes and hidden states are generally factorized into multiple outcome *modalities* and hidden state *factors*. This means that the likelihood mapping (the 'A' matrix) plays an important role in modeling the interactions among different hidden states at each level of a hierarchical model when generating the outcomes at the level below. In what follows, we describe how this type of generative model was specified to perform emotion inference and concept learning.

A model of emotion inference and concept learning

In this paper we focus on the second process in the TPM – affective response representation – in which a multifaceted affective response is generated and the ensuing (exteroceptive, proprioceptive and interoceptive) outcomes are used to infer or represent the current emotional state. The basic idea is to equip the generative model with a space of emotion concepts (i.e., latent or hidden states) that generate the interoceptive, exteroceptive and proprioceptive consequences (at various levels of abstraction) of being in a particular emotional state. Inference under this model then corresponds to inferring that one of several possible emotion concepts is the best explanation for the data at hand (e.g., "my unpleasant feeling of increased heart rate and urge to run away must indicate that I am afraid to give this speech"). Crucially, to endow emotion concept inference with a form of mental action (Limanowski & Friston, 2018; Metzinger, 2017), we also included a state

corresponding to *attentional set*. This latent state determines the modality-specific evidence that gains access to belief-updating about the emotional state (e.g., such that an individual would need to pay attention to their body to learn about their level of autonomic arousal). In general, this access is determined by the probabilistic precision or specificity afforded various streams of sensory evidence; here, encoded by the precision of the likelihood mapping from states to outcomes (i.e., the fidelity of the relationship between each state and each set of outcomes within the 'A' matrix).

In our model, we used relatively high level 'outcomes' (i.e., themselves standing in for lower-level representations) to summarise the products of belief updating at lower levels of a hierarchical model. These outcomes were domain-specific, covering interoceptive, proprioceptive and exteroceptive modalities. A full hierarchical model would consider lower levels, unpacked in terms of sensory modalities; however, the current model, comprising just two levels, is sufficient for our purposes. The bottom portion of Figure 1A (in grey) acknowledges the broad form that these lower-level outcomes would be expected to take. The full three-process model would also contain higher levels corresponding to conscious accessibility. This is indicated by the grey arrows at the top of Figure 1A.



Figure 1. (A) Displays the levels of hidden state factor 1 (emotion concepts) and their mapping to different lower-level representational contents (here modelled as outcomes). Each emotion concept generated different outcome patterns (see text for details), although some were more specific than others (e.g., HAPPY generated high and low arousal equally; denoted by thin dotted connections). The A-matrix encoding these mappings is depicted in the upper right (lighter color = higher probability). The B-matrix in the upper left illustrates an identity mapping between emotion states, such that emotions were stable within trials. The precision of this matrix (i.e., implicit beliefs about emotional stability) could be adjusted via passing this matrix through a softmax function with different temperature parameter values. This model simulates the affective response representation process within the three-process model of emotion episodes (R. Smith, Killgore, & Lane, 2018)**. The grey arrows/boxes at the bottom and top of the figure denote other processes within the three-process model (i.e., affective response generation and conscious accessibility) that are not explicitly modeled in the current work.**

Crucially, attentional set was treated as a (mental) action that determines the outcome modality or domain to which attention was selectively allocated. Effectively, the agent had to decide which lower-level representations to selectively attend to (i.e., which sequential attention policy to select) in order to figure out what emotional state she was in. Mathematically, this was implemented via interactions

in the likelihood mapping – such that being in a particular attentional set selected one and only one precise mapping between the emotional state factor and the outcome information in question. Formally, this implementation of mental action or attentional set is exactly the same used to model the exploration of a visual scene using overt eye movements (Mirza, Adams, Mathys, & Friston, 2016). However, on our interpretation, this epistemic foraging was entirely covert; hence mental action (c.f., the premotor theory of attention; (Posner, 2016; Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umiltá, 1987; D. Smith & Schenk, 2012)).

Figure 1A and 1B illustrate the resulting model. The first hidden state factor was a space of emotion concepts (SAD, AFRAID, ANGRY, and HAPPY). The second hidden state factor was attentional focus, and the 'B' matrix for this second factor allowed state transitions to be controlled by the agent. The agent could choose to attend to three sources of bodily (interoceptive/proprioceptive) information, corresponding to affective valence (pleasant or unpleasant sensations), autonomic arousal (e.g., high or low heart rate), and motivated proprioceptive action tendencies (approach or avoid). The agent could also attend to two sources of exteroceptive information, including the perceived situation (involving social rejection or a crowded event) and subsequent beliefs about responsibility (attributing agency/blame to self or another). These different sources of information are based on a large literature within emotion research, indicating that they are jointly predictive of self-reported emotions and/or are important factors in affective processing (Barrett, 2017; Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011; Harmon-

Jones, Gable, & Peterson, 2010; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008; Russell, 2003; Scherer, 2009; Siemer, Mauss, & Gross, 2007).

Our choice of including valence in particular reflects the fact that our model deals with high levels of hierarchical processing (this choice also enables us to connect more fluently with current literature on emotion concept categories). In this paper, we are using labels like 'unpleasant' as pre-emotional constructs. In other words, although affective in nature, we take concepts like 'unpleasant' as contributing to elaborated emotional constructs during inference. Technically, valenced states provide evidence for – or are a consequence of – emotional state inference at a higher level. Based on previous work (Clark et al., 2018; Joffily & Coricelli, 2013), we would expect pleasant and unpleasant valence to correspond to unexpected increases (pleasant) and decreases (unpleasant) in expected free energy at a lower hierarchical level of processing, reflecting unexpected changes in precision over policies (e.g., unpleasantness would correspond to reduced implicit confidence in how to act in order to maintain the body within homeostatic ranges). Explicitly modelling these lower-level dynamics in a deep temporal model will be the focus of future work.



Figure 1. (B) Displays the levels of hidden state factor 2 (focus of attention) and its mapping to representational outcomes. Each focus of attention mapped deterministically (the A-matrix was a fully precise identity matrix) to a "location" (i.e., an internal source of information) at which different representational outcomes could be observed. The B-matrix in the upper left illustrates that the agent could choose to shift its attention from one internal representation to another to facilitate inference. The final attentional shift in the trial was toward a (proprioceptive) motor response to report an emotion (i.e., at whatever point in the trial the agent became sufficiently confident, at which point the state could not change until the end of the trial), which was either correct or incorrect. The agent preferred (expected) to be correct and not to be incorrect. Because policies (i.e., sequences of implicit attentional shifts and subsequent explicit reports) were selected to minimize expected free energy, emotional state inference under this model induces a sampling of salient representational outcomes and subsequent report – under the prior preference that the report would elicit the outcome "correct".

In the simulations we report here, there were 6 time points in each epoch or trial of emotion inference. At the first time point, the agent always began in an uninformative initial state of attentional set (the "start" state). The agent's task was to choose what to attend to, and in which order, to infer her most likely emotional state. When she became sufficiently confident, she could choose to respond (i.e.,

reporting that she felt sad, afraid, angry, or happy). In these simulations the agent selected "shallow" one-step policies, such that she could choose what to attend to next – to gain the most information. Given the number of time points, the agent could choose to attend to up to four of the five possible sources of outcome information before reporting her beliefs about her emotional state. The 'A' matrix mapping attentional focus to attended outcomes was an identity matrix, such that the agent always knew which lower-level information she was currently attending to. This may be thought of as analogous to the proprioceptive feedback consequent on a motor action.

The 'B' matrix for hidden emotional states was also an identity matrix, reflecting the belief that emotional states are stable within a trial (i.e., if you start out feeling sad, then you will remain sad throughout the trial). This sort of probability transition matrix in the generative model allows evidence to be accumulated for one state or another over time; here, the emotion concept that provides the best explanation for actively attended evidence in the outcome modalities. The 'A' matrix – mapping emotion concepts to outcomes – was constructed such that certain outcome combinations were more consistent with certain emotional states than others: SAD was probabilistically associated with unpleasant valence, either low or high arousal (e.g., e.g., lying in bed lethargically vs. intensely crying), avoidance motivation, social rejection, and self-attribution (i.e., self-blame). AFRAID generated unpleasant valence, high arousal, avoidance, other-blame (c.f., fear often being associated with its perceived external cause), and either

social rejection or a crowded event (e.g., fear of a life without friends vs. panic in crowded spaces). ANGRY generated unpleasant valence, high arousal, approach, social rejection, and other-blame outcomes. Finally, HAPPY generated pleasant valence, either low or high arousal, either approach or avoidance (e.g., feeling excited to wake up and go to work vs. feeling content in bed and not wanting to go to work), either self- or other-blame, and a crowded event (e.g., having fun at a concert). Although this mapping from emotional states to outcomes has some face validity, it should not be taken too seriously. It was chosen primarily to capture the ambiguous and overlapping correlates of emotion concepts, and to highlight why adaptive emotional state inference and emotion concept learning can represent difficult problems.

If the 'A' matrix encoding state-outcome relationships was completely precise (i.e., if the contingencies above were deterministic as opposed to probabilistic), sufficient information could be gathered through (at most) three attentional shifts; but this becomes more difficult when probabilistic mappings are imprecise (i.e., as they more plausibly are in the real world). Figure 2 illustrates this by showing how the synthetic subjects confidence about her state decreases as the precision of the mapping between emotional states and outcomes decreases (we measured confidence here in terms of the accuracy of responding in relation to the same setup with infinite precision). Changes in precision were implemented via a temperature parameter of a softmax function applied to a fully precise version of likelihood mappings between emotion concepts and the 5 types of lower-level

information that the agent could attend to (where a higher value indicates higher precision). For a more technical account of this type of manipulation, please see (Parr & Friston, 2017a).

Figure 2 additionally demonstrates how reporting confidence decreases with decreasing precision of the 'B' matrix encoding emotional state transitions, where low precision corresponds to the belief that emotional states are labile. Interestingly, these results suggest that expectations about emotional lability would reduce the ability to understand or infer one's own emotions. From a Bayesian perspective, this result is very sensible: if we are unable to use past beliefs to contextualise the present, it is much harder to accumulate evidence in favour of one hypothesis about emotional state relative to another. Under moderate levels of precision, our numerical analysis demonstrates that the model can conceptualize the multimodal affective responses it perceives with high accuracy.



Figure 2. Displays the accuracy of the model (percentage of correct inferences over 30 trials) under different levels of precision for two parameters (denoted by temperature values for a softmax function controlling the specificity of the A and B matrices for hidden state factor 1; higher values indicate higher precision). As can be seen, the model performs with high accuracy at moderate levels of precision. However, its ability to infer its own emotions becomes very poor if the precision of either matrix becomes highly imprecise. Accuracy here is defined in relation to the response obtained from an agent with infinite precision – and can be taken as a behavioural measure of the quality of belief updating about emotional states.

Figure 3 illustrates a range of simulation results from an example trial under moderately high levels of 'A' and 'B' matrix precision (temperature parameter = 2 for each). The upper left plot shows the sequence of (inferred) attentional shifts (note: darker colours indicate higher probability beliefs of the agent, and cyan dots indicate the true states). In this trial, the agent chose a policy in which it attended to valence (observing "unpleasant"), then beliefs (observing "other-blame"), then action (observing "approach"), at which time she became sufficiently confident and

chose to report that she was angry. The lower left plot displays the agent's posterior beliefs about her emotional state across the trial, in this case inferring that it was angry. The lower right and upper right plots display simulated neural responses (based on the neural process theory that accompanies this form of active inference; (Friston, FitzGerald, et al., 2017)), in terms of single-neuron firing rates (raster plots) and local field potentials, respectively.



Figure 3. This figure illustrates a range of simulation results from one representative trial under high levels of A- and B- matrix precision (temperature parameter = 2 for each matrix). (Upper Left) Displays a sequence of chosen attentional shifts. The agent here chose a policy in which it attended to valence, then beliefs, then action motivation, and then chose to report that it was angry. Darker colors indicate higher confidence (probability estimates) in the model about its actions, whereas the cyan dot indicates the true action. (Bottom left) Displays the agent's posterior beliefs about its emotional state across the trial. Here the agent correctly inferred that it was angry. (Lower Right/ Upper Right) Plots simulated neural responses in terms of single-neuron firing rates (raster plots) and local field potentials (rates of change in neural firing), respectively. Here each neuron's activity codes the probability of occupying a particular hidden state at a particular point in time during the trial.

The simulations presented in Figures 2 and 3 make some cardinal points. First, it is fairly straightforward to simulate emotion processing in terms of emotional state inference. This rests upon a particular sort of generative model that can generate outcomes in multiple modalities. The recognition of an emotional state corresponds to the inversion of such models – and therefore necessarily entails multimodal integration. We have also seen that this form of belief updating – or evidence accumulation – depends sensitively on what sort of evidence is actively attended. This equips the model of emotion concept representation with a form of mental action, which speaks to a tight link between emotion processing and attention to various sources of evidence from within the body – and beyond. The physiological plausibility of this emotion inference process has been briefly considered in terms of simulated responses. In the next section, we turn to a more specific construct validation, using empirical phenomenology from neurodevelopmental studies of emotion.

Simulating the influence of early experience on emotional state inference and emotion concept learning

Having confirmed that our model could successfully infer emotional states – if equipped with emotion concepts – we are now in a position to examine emotion

concept learning. Specifically, we investigated the conditions under which emotion concepts could be acquired successfully and the conditions under which this type of emotion learning and inference fails.

Can emotion concepts be learned in childhood?

The first question we asked was whether our model could learn about emotions if it started out with no prior beliefs about how emotions structure its experience. To answer this question, we first ran the model's 'A' matrix (mapping emotion concepts to attended outcome information) through a softmax function with a temperature parameter of 0, creating a fully imprecise likelihood mapping. This means that each hidden emotional state predicted all outcomes equally (effectively, none of the hidden states within the emotion factor had any consequences). Then we generated a set of 200 observations (i.e., 50 for each emotion concept, evenly interleaved) based on the outcome statistics of the moderately precise model described above (the "generative process"), and examined the changes in the model's reporting accuracy over time. This analysis was repeated at several levels of outcome ('A' matrix) and transition ('B' matrix) precision in the generative process – to explore how changes in the predictability or consistency of observed outcome patterns affected the model's ability to learn. In this model, learning was implemented through updating (concentration) parameters for the model's 'A' matrix after each trial. The model could also learn prior expectations for being in different emotional states, based on updating

concentration parameters for its 'D' matrix after each trial (i.e., the emotional state it started in). For details of these free energy minimizing learning processes, please see (Friston et al., 2016).

We observed that the model could successfully reach 100% accuracy (with minor fluctuation) when both outcome and transition precisions in the generative process were moderately high (i.e., when the temperature parameters for the 'A' and 'B' matrix of the generative process were 2). The top panel in Figure 4 illustrates this by plotting the percentage accuracy across all emotions during learning over 200 trials (in bins of 10 trials), and for each emotion (in bins of 5). As can be seen, the model steadily approaches 100% accuracy across trials. The middle and lower panels of Figure 4 illustrate the analogous results when outcome precision and transition precision were lowered, respectively. The precision values chosen for these illustrations ('A' precision = 1.5, 'B' precision = 0.5) represent observed "tipping points" at which learning began to fail (i.e., at progressively lower precision values learning performance steadily approached 0% accuracy). As can be seen, lower precision in either the stability of emotions over time or the consistency between observations and emotional states confounded learning. Overall, these findings provide a proof of principle that this sort of model can learn emotion concepts, if provided with a representative and fairly consistent sample of experiences in its "childhood."



Figure 4. This figure illustrates simulated "childhood" emotion concept learning, in which the agent started out with no emotion concept knowledge (a uniform likelihood mapping from emotional states to outcomes), and needed to learn the correct likelihood mapping over 50 interleaved observations of the outcome patterns associated with each emotion concept (200 trials total). Left panels show changes in accuracy over time in 20-trial bins, at different levels of outcome pattern precision (i.e., 'A' and 'B' matrix precision, reflecting the consistency in the mapping between emotions and outcomes and the stability of emotional states over time, respectively). Right panels show the corresponding results for each emotion separately (5-trial bins). (Top) With moderately high precision (temperature parameter = 2 for both 'A' and 'B' matrices), learning was successful. (Middle and Bottom) With reduced 'A' precision or 'B' precision (respectively), learning began to fail.

Can a new emotion concept be learned in adulthood?

We then asked whether a new emotion could be learned later, after others had already been acquired (e.g., as in adulthood). To answer this question, we again initialized the model with a fully imprecise 'A' matrix (temperature parameter = 0),

and set the precision of the 'A' and 'B' matrices of the generative process to the levels at which "childhood" learning was successful (i.e., temperature parameter = 2 for each). We then exposed the model to 150 observations that only contained the outcome statistics associated three of the four emotions (50 for each emotion, evenly interleaved). We again allowed the model to accumulate experience in the form of concentration parameters for its 'D' matrix – allowing it to learn strong expectations for the emotional states it repeatedly inferred it was in. After these initial 150 trials, we then exposed the model to 200 further trials – using the outcome statistics under all four emotions (50 for each emotion, evenly interleaved). We then asked whether the emotion that was not initially necessary to explain outcomes could be acquired later, when circumstances change.

We first observed that, irrespective of which three emotions were initially presented, accuracy was high by the end of the initial 150 trials (i.e., between 80-100% accuracy for each of the 3 emotion concepts learned). The upper and middle panels of Figure 5 illustrate the accuracy over the subsequent 200 trials as the new emotion was learned. As can be seen in the upper left and right sections of Figure 5, ANGRY and SAD were both successfully learned. Interestingly, performance for the other emotions appeared to temporarily drop and then increase again as the new emotion concept was acquired.



Figure 5. This figure illustrates emotion concept learning in "adulthood", where three emotion concepts had already been learned (in 150 previous trials not illustrated) and a fourth was now needed to explain patterns of outcomes (over 200 trials, 50 of which involved the new emotion in an interleaved sequence). The top four plots illustrate learning for each of the four emotion concepts. ANGRY and SAD were successfully acquired. HAPPY was also successfully acquired, but interfered with previous SAD concept learning. As shown in the bottom left, this was ameliorated by providing the model with more "childhood" learning trials before the new emotion was introduced. AFRAID was not successfully acquired. This was (partially) ameliorated by first flooding the model with repeated observations of AFRAID-consistent outcomes before interleaving it with the other emotions, as displayed in the bottom right. All simulations were carried out with moderately high levels of precision (temperature parameter = 2 for both 'A' and 'B' matrices).

The middle left section of Figure 5 demonstrates that HAPPY could also be successfully learned; however, it appeared to interfere with prior learning for SAD. Upon further inspection, it appeared that SAD may not have been fully acquired in the first 150 trials (only reaching 80% accuracy near the end). We therefore chose to examine whether an "extended" or "emotionally enriched" childhood might prevent this interference, by increasing the initial learning trial number from 150 to

225 (75 interleaved exposures to SAD, ANGRY, and AFRAID outcome patterns). As can be seen in the lower left panel of Figure 5, HAPPY was quickly acquired in the subsequent 200 trials under these conditions, without interference with previous learning.

Somewhat surprisingly, the model was unable to acquire the AFRAID concept in its "adulthood" (Figure 5, middle right). To better understand this, for each trial we computed the expected evidence for each state, under the distribution of outcomes expected under the generative process (using bar notation to distinguish the process from the model) given a particular state, ($E_{\bar{P}(o|s)}[(o|s)]$). This was based on the reasoning that, if we treat the different emotional states as alternative models to explain the data, then the likelihood of data given states is equivalent to the evidence for a given state. Figure 6 plots the log transform of this expected evidence for each established emotion concept expected under the distribution of outcomes that would be generated if the 'real' emotional state were AFRAID (right panel) and contrasts it with the analogous plot for HAPPY (left panel), which was a more easily acquired concept (we took the logarithm of this expected evidence [or likelihood] to emphasize the lower evidence values; note that higher [less negative] values correspond to greater evidence in these plots).

As can be seen, in the case of HAPPY the three previously acquired emotion concepts had a relatively low ability to account for all observations, and so HAPPY was a useful construct in providing more accurate explanations of observed

outcomes. In contrast, when learning AFRAID the model was already confident in its ability to explain its observations (i.e., the other concepts already had much higher evidence than in the case of HAPPY), and the "AFRAID" outcome pattern also provided moderate evidence for ANGRY and SAD (i.e., the outcome patterns between AFRAID and these other emotion concepts had considerable overlap). In this context, greater evidence for an unexplained outcome pattern would be required to "convince" the agent that its currently acquired concepts were not sufficient. Based on this insight, we examined ways in which the model could be given stronger evidence that its current conceptual repertoire was insufficient to account for its observations. We first observed that we could improve model performance by "flooding" the model with an extended pattern of only AFRAID-consistent outcomes (i.e., 100 trials in a row), prior to reintroducing the other emotions in an interleaved fashion. As can be seen in Figure 5 (bottom right), this led to successful acquisition of AFRAID. However, it temporarily interfered with previous learning of the HAPPY concept. We also observed that by instead increasing the number of AFRAID learning trials from 200 to 600, the model eventually increased its accuracy to between 40% and 80% across the last 10 bins (last 50 trials) – indicating that learning could occur, but at a much slower rate.



Figure 6. (Left) The log expected probability of outcomes under the HAPPY outcome distribution, given each of the four emotion concepts in the agent's model (i.e., given the 'A' matrix it had learned) at each of 200 learning trials, $E_{\bar{P}(o|s=HAPPY)}[P(o|s)]$ (note: the bar over P indicates the generative process distribution). (Right) The analogous results for the AFRAID outcome pattern. These plots illustrate that HAPPY may have been more easily acquired than AFRAID because the agent was less confident in the explanatory power of its current conceptual repertoire when it began to observe the HAPPY outcome pattern than when it began to observe the AFRAID outcome pattern. This also shows that the AFRAID outcome pattern provided some evidence for SAD and ANGRY in the agent's model, likely due to outcome pattern overlap between AFRAID and these other two concepts.

Overall, these results confirmed that a new emotion concept could be learned in synthetic "adulthood," as may occur, for example, in psycho-educational interventions during psychotherapy. However, these results also demonstrate that this type of learning can be more difficult. These results therefore suggest a kind of "sensitive period" early in life where emotion concepts are more easily acquired.

Can maladaptive early experiences bias emotion conceptualization?

The final question we asked was whether unfortunate early experiences could hinder our agent's ability to adaptively infer and/or learn about emotions. Based on

the three-process model (R. Smith, Killgore, & Lane, 2017), it has previously been suggested that at least two mechanisms could bring this about:

1. Impoverished early experiences (i.e., not being exposed to observations with the representative outcome statistics that would facilitate emotion concept learning).
2. Having early experiences that reinforce maladaptive cognitive habits (e.g., selective attention biases), which can hinder adaptive inference (if the concepts have been acquired) and learning (if the concepts have not yet been acquired).

We chose to examine both of these possibilities below.

Non-representative early emotional experiences. To examine the first mechanism (involving the maladaptive influence of "unrepresentative" early experiences), we used the same learning procedure and parameters described in the previous sections. In this case, however, we exposed the agent to 200 outcomes generated by a generative process with outcome statistics such that one emotion was effectively 50 times more likely than the others to occur, and then examined the model's ability to learn to infer new emotions in a subsequent 200 trials. For each emotion used for the initial exposure, Table 1 details the percentage of time each of the four emotions was reported in the subsequent 200 trials, as well as accuracy for each emotion in the final trial bins.

As can be seen, the effects were fairly distinct for different emotions. For example, early exposure to many outcomes consistent with AFRAID strongly biased inference early on (i.e., reporting AFRAID 44% of the time overall). However, accuracy in the final trial bins was high across emotions, suggesting this early biasing could be overcome. In contrast, many early HAPPY experiences did not bias inference toward HAPPY, but it did completely prevent the model's ability to learn SAD. Interestingly, several early SAD experiences instead biased inference toward ANGER. While somewhat nuanced, these results in general support the notion that having unrepresentative or insufficiently diverse early emotional experiences could hinder future learning.

Table 1. Emotional State Inference Biases. The percentage of time each of the four emotions was reported in 200 trials after repeated exposure to a single emotion, and the reporting accuracy for each emotion in the final trial bin. See main text for a more detailed description.

Initial Emotion	**SAD**	**AFRAID**	**ANGRY**	**HAPPY**
Report Percentage				
SAD	13%	8%	24.5%	0.05%
AFRAID	28%	44%	23%	41%
ANGRY	41.5%	23%	32.5%	33%
HAPPY	17.5%	25%	20%	25.5%
Accuracy (final bin)				
SAD	80%	80%	80%	0%
AFRAID	80%	100%	60%	100%

ANGRY	100%	100%	100%	100%
HAPPY	20%	80%	40%	100%
Total	80%	100%	70%	70%

Maladaptive Attention Biases. To examine the second mechanism proposed by the three-process model (involving maladaptive patterns in habitual attention allocation), we equipped the model's 'E' matrix with high prior expectations over specific policies, which meant that it was 50 times more likely to attend to some information and not to other information. This included: (i) an "external attention bias," where the agent had a strong habit of focusing on external stimuli and its beliefs about self- and other-blame; (ii) an "internal attention bias," where the agent had a strong habit of only attending to valence and arousal; and (iii) a "somatic attention bias," where the agent had a strong habit to attend only to its arousal level and the approach vs. avoid modality.

Figure 7 shows how these different attentional biases promote false inference. On the left, the true state is AFRAID, and the externally focused agent first attends to the stimulus (social rejection) and then to its beliefs (other-blame); however, without paying attention to its motivated action (avoid), it falsely reports that it feels ANGRY instead of AFRAID (note that, following feedback, there is a retrospective inference that afraid was more probable; similar retrospective inferences after feedback are also shown in the other two examples in Figure 7). In

the middle, the true state is ANGRY, and the internally focused agent first attends to valence (unpleasant) and then to arousal (high); however, without paying attention to its action tendency (approach), it falsely reports that it is AFRAID. On the left, the true state is SAD, and the somatically focused agent attends to its motivated action (avoid) and to its arousal (high); however, without attending to its beliefs (self-blame) it falsely reports that it is AFRAID instead of SAD.

Importantly, these false reports occur in an agent that has already acquired very precise emotion concepts. Thus, this does not represent a failure to learn, but simply the effect of having learned poor habits for mental action.



Figure 7. This figure illustrates single trial effects of different attentional biases, each promoting false inference in a model that has already acquired precise emotion concepts (i.e., temperature parameter = 2 for both 'A' and 'B' matrices). External attention bias was implemented by giving the agent high prior expectations ('E' matrix values) that she would attend to the stimulus and to her beliefs. Internal attention bias was implemented by giving the agent high prior expectations that she would attend to valence and arousal. Somatic attention bias was implemented by giving the agent high prior expectations that she would attend to arousal and action motivation. See the main text for a detailed description of the false inferences displayed for each bias.

The results of these examples were confirmed in simulations of 40 interleaved emotion trials (10 per emotion) in an agent who had already acquired precise emotion concepts (temperature parameter = 2 for both 'A' and 'B' matrices; no learning). In these simulations, we observed that the externally focused agent had 100% accuracy for SAD, 10% accuracy for AFRAID, 100% accuracy for ANGRY, and 60% accuracy for HAPPY. The internally focused agent had 100% accuracy for SAD, 50% accuracy for AFRAID, 60% accuracy for ANGRY, and 100% accuracy for

HAPPY. The somatically focused agent had 10% accuracy for SAD, 100% accuracy for AFRAID, 100% accuracy for ANGRY, and 0% accuracy for HAPPY. Thus, without adaptive attentional habits, the agent was prone to misrepresent its emotions.

In our final simulations, we examined how learning these kinds of attentional biases in childhood could hinder emotion concept learning. To do so, we used the same learning procedure describe in section 3.1. However, in this case we simply equipped the agent with the three different attentional biases ('E' matrix prior distributions over policies) and assessed its ability to learn emotion concepts over the 200 trials. The results of these simulations are provided in Figure 8. A somatic attention bias primarily allowed the agent to learn two emotion concepts, which corresponded to ANGER and FEAR. However, it is worth highlighting that the low accuracy for the other emotions means that their respective patterns were subsumed under the first two. Thus, it is more accurate to say that the agent learned two affective concepts, which largely predicted only approach vs. avoidance. In contrast, the internally biased agent easily acquired the distinction between pleasant (HAPPY) and unpleasant emotions (all lumped into ANGER) and began to learn a third concept that distinguished between low vs. high arousal (i.e., SAD vs. ANGRY). However, it did not conceptualize the distinction between approach and avoidance (i.e., ANGRY vs. AFRAID). Lastly, the externally focused agent was somewhat labile in its concept acquisition; by the end, it could not predict approach vs. avoidance, but it possessed externally focused concepts with content along the lines of "the state I am in when I'm socially rejected and think it's my fault vs.

someone else's fault" (SAD vs. ANGRY) and "the state I am in when at a crowded event" (HAPPY). These results provide strong support for the role of attentional biases in subverting emotional awareness.



Figure 8. Illustration of the simulated effects of each of the three attention biases (described in the legend for Figure 6) on emotion concept learning over 200 trials (initialized with a model that possessed a completely flat 'A' matrix likelihood distribution). Each bias induces aberrant learning in a different way. See the main text for a detailed description and interpretation.

Discussion

The active inference formulation of emotional processing we have presented represents a first step toward the goal of building quantitative computational models of the ability to learn, recognize, and understand (be "aware" of) one's own emotions. Although this is clearly a toy model, it does appear to offer some insights, conceptual advances, and possible predictions.

First, in simulating differences in the precision (specificity) of emotion concepts, some intuitive but interesting phenomena emerged. As would be expected, differences in the specificity of the content of emotion concepts – here captured by the precision of the likelihood mapping from states to outcomes (i.e., the precision of what pattern of outcomes each emotion concept predicted) – led to differences in inferential accuracy. This suggests that those with more precise emotion concepts would show greater understanding of their own affective responses. Perhaps less intuitively, beliefs about the stability of emotion concepts – here captured by the precision of expected state transitions – also influenced inferential accuracy. This predicts that a belief that emotional states are more stable (less labile) over time would also facilitate one's ability to correctly infer what they are feeling. This appears consistent with the low levels of emotional awareness or granularity observed in borderline personality disorder, a disorder characterized by emotional instability (Levine et al., 1997; Suvak et al., 2011).

Next, in simulating emotion concept learning, a few interesting insights emerged. Our simulations first confirmed that emotion concepts could successfully

be learned, even when their content was cast (as done here) as complex, probabilistic, and highly overlapping response patterns across interoceptive, proprioceptive, exteroceptive, and cognitive domains. This was true when all emotion concepts needed to be learned simultaneously (as in childhood; see (Hietanen, Glerean, Hari, & Nummenmaa, 2016; Widen & Russell, 2008)), and was also true when a single new emotion concept was learned after others had already been acquired (as in adulthood during psycho-educational therapeutic interventions; e.g., see (Barlow et al., 2016; Burger et al., 2016; Hayes & Smith, 2005; Lumley et al., 2017)).

These results depended on whether the observed outcomes during learning were sufficiently precise and consistent. One finding worth highlighting was that emotion concept learning was hindered when the precision of transitions among emotional states was too low. This result may be relevant to previous empirical results in populations known to show reduced understanding of emotional states, such as those with autism (Erbas, Ceulemans, Boonen, Noens, & Kuppens, 2013; Silani et al., 2008) and those who grow up in socially impoverished or otherwise adverse (unpredictable) environments (Colvert et al., 2008; Lane, Anderson, & Smith, 2018). In autism, it has been suggested that overly imprecise beliefs about state transitions may hinder mental state learning, because such states require tracking abstract behavioral patterns over long timescales (Haker, Schneebeli, & Stephan, 2016; Lawson, Mathys, & Rees, 2017; Lawson, Rees, & Friston, 2014). Children who grow up in impoverished environments may not have the opportunity

to interact with others to observe stable patterns in other's affective responses; or receive feedback about their own (Lane et al., 2018; Pears & Fisher, 2005; R. Smith, Killgore, et al., 2017). Our results successfully reproduce these phenomena – which represent important examples of mental state learning that may depend on consistently observed outcome patterns that are relatively stable over time.

As emotion concepts are known to differ in different cultures (Russell, 1991), our model and results may also relate to the learning mechanisms allowing for this type of culture-specific emotion categorization learning. Specifically, the "correct" and "incorrect" social feedback in our model could be understood as linguistic feedback from others in one's culture (e.g., a parent labeling emotional reactions for a child using culture-specific categories). If this feedback is sufficiently precise, then emotion concept learning could proceed effectively – even if the probabilistic mapping from emotion categories to other perceptual outcomes is fairly imprecise (i.e., which appears to be the case empirically; (Barrett, 2006, 2017)).

Another insight worth highlighting was that learning was more difficult when the agent had already acquired previous concepts but entertained the possible existence of new emotions it had not already learned. An interesting observation was that, in some cases (e.g., learning SAD), new learning temporarily interfered with old learning before being fully integrated into the agent's cognitive repertoire (an effect – termed retroactive interference – that has been extensively studied empirically within learning and memory research; (Darby & Sloutsky, 2015;

Martínez, Villar, Ballarini, & Viola, 2014)). In the case of learning HAPPY, we found that more extensive learning in the model's "childhood" was necessary to prevent this type of interference, with respect to previous acquisition of the concept SAD. A second interesting observation was that AFRAID was very difficult to learn after the other concepts were fully acquired. This appeared to be because the agent had already learned to be highly confident about the explanatory power of her current conceptual repertoire (combined with the fact that AFRAID had considerable outcome overlap with SAD and ANGRY). It was necessary to provide the model with a persistent "flooding" of observations consistent with the new emotion to reduce its confidence sufficiently to acquire a new concept. Overall, these results predict that emotion concept learning should be more difficult in adulthood, and that emotion learning may have a kind of "sensitive period" in childhood (as supported by previous empirical findings; e.g., (Colvert et al., 2008; Pears & Fisher, 2005)).

The manner in which concept learning was implemented in these simulations may also have more general implications. Typically in Active Inference simulations, the state space structure of a model is specified in advance (e.g., (Mirza et al., 2016; Parr & Friston, 2017b; Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Mathys, Dolan, & Friston, 2015)). Our model was instead equipped with "blank" hidden states devoid of content (i.e., these states started out predicting all outcomes with roughly equal probability in the simulated learning). Over multiple exposures to the observed outcomes, these blank hidden states came to acquire conceptual content that captured distinct statistical patterns in the lower-level affective response

components of the model. In some current neural process theories (Bastos et al., 2012; Friston, FitzGerald, et al., 2017; Friston, Rosch, Parr, Price, & Bowman, 2018; Parr & Friston, 2018), distinct cortical columns are suggested to represent distinct hidden states. Under such theories, our learning model would suggest that the brain might contain "reserve" cortical columns available to capture new patterns of lower-level covariance if/when they begin to be observed in interaction with the world. To our knowledge, no direct evidence of such "reserve neurons" has been observed, although the generation of new neurons (with new synaptic connections) is known to occur in the hippocampus (Chancey et al., 2013). There is also the well-known phenomenon of "silent synapses" in the brain, which can persist into adulthood and become activated when new learning becomes necessary (e.g., see (Chancey et al., 2013; Funahashi, Maruyama, Yoshimura, & Komatsu, 2013; Kerchner & Nicoll, 2008)). Another interesting consideration is that, during sleep, it appears that many (but not all) synaptic strength increases acquired in the previous day are attenuated (Tononi & Cirelli, 2014). This has been suggested to correspond to a process of Bayesian model reduction, in which redundant model parameters are identified and removed to prevent model over-fitting and promote selection of the most parsimonious model that can successfully account for previous observations (Hobson & Friston, 2012). This also suggests that increases in "reserve" representational resources available for state space expansion (as in concept learning) could perhaps occur after sleep. In short, the acquisition of new concepts, emotion-related or otherwise, speaks to important issues in structure learning. The approach used here offers one solution to the question of how to expand a model,

which could complement work on strategies for reducing a model (Friston, Lin, et al., 2017).

A final insight offered by our model pertains to the possibility that maladaptive emotional state inference could be due to early experience. We demonstrated this in two ways. First, we simulated exposure to a large number of single emotion-provoking situations in childhood, promoting precise and highly engrained prior expectations for being in a single emotional state, as well as preferential learning of the respective outcome patterns for that state over others. We found that different kinds of "unrepresentative" (single-emotion) outcome patterns in early experience had different and nuanced effects. Overall, however, these results supported the idea that later emotional state inferences and emotion concept learning could be compromised by this type of maladaptive early experience. This could potentially relate to cognitive bias learning, such as the negative interpretation biases characteristic of mood and anxiety disorders (which have been interpreted within computational frameworks; (Mogg & Bradley, 2005; R. Smith, Akozei, Killgore, & Lane, 2017)).

Second, we examined the possibility that maladaptive cognitive habits could hinder emotional awareness. Here, we demonstrated that such habits can promote false emotional state inference and can hinder emotion concept learning. Specifically, we found that different types of external, internal, and somatic biases led to the acquisition of coarser-grained emotion concepts that failed to distinguish

between various elements of affective responses. Aside from its relevance to cognitive biases more generally, these results could also explain certain empirical phenomena in emotional awareness research, such as the finding that males tend to score lower on emotional awareness measures than females (Wright et al., 2017). Specifically, while a genetic contribution to such findings is possible, it is also known that many cultures reinforce emotion avoidance in boys more than in girls in childhood (Chaplin, Cole, & Zahn-Waxler, 2005; Diener & Lucas, 2004; Fivush, Brotman, Buckner, & Goodman, 2000), and can promote beliefs that paying attention to emotions is a sign of weakness or that emotional information simply carries little pragmatic value. This type of learning could plausibly reinforce biased patterns of attention similar to those simulated here. Thus, our simulations suggest an interesting, testable mechanism by which such (potentially socialization-based) differences may arise.

In closing, it is important to note that this model is deliberately simple and is meant only to represent a proof of principle that emotion inference and learning can be modeled within a neurocomputational framework from first principles. We chose a particular pattern of state-outcome mappings to simulate the content of emotion concepts, but this is unlikely to represent a fully accurate depiction of human emotion concepts or the outcomes they predict. Further, human agents (or at least some of them) are likely to have a much richer space of both emotion and non-emotion concepts available for explaining their patterns of internal experience in conjunction with other beliefs and exteroceptive evidence (e.g., a pattern of low

arousal, unpleasant valence, and avoidance in many contexts could also be explained by the concept of sickness rather than sadness). A more complete model would take into account many different possible conceptual interpretations of this sort. In addition, our simulations only attempted to capture the second process within the three-process model (i.e., affective response representation; (R. Smith, Killgore, & Lane, 2018)). Incorporating the other two processes (affective response generation and conscious access) would undoubtedly induce additional dynamics (including explicit brain-body interactions) that could alter or nuance the simulation results we have provided. Modeling these additional processes will be an important goal of future work. With these limitations in mind, however, this approach to computationally modeling emotion-related processes appears promising with respect to the initial insights it can offer. It can illustrate selective information integration in the service of conceptual inference, it can successfully simulate concept learning and some of its known vulnerabilities, and it can highlight maladaptive interactions between cognitive habits, early experience, and the ability to understand and be aware of one's own emotions later in life, all of which may play important roles in the development of emotional pathology. Finally, it highlights the potential for future empirical work in which tasks could be adapted to the broad structure of such models, which would allow investigation of individual differences in emotion processing as well as its neural basis. In other words, once we have a validated model of these emotion-related processes – at the subjective and neuronal level – we can, in principle, fit the model to observed responses and

thereby phenotype subjects in terms of their emotion-related beliefs states (Schwartenbeck & Friston, 2016).

References

Bagby, R., Parker, J., & Taylor, G. (1994a). The twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale—I. Item selection and cross-validation of the factor structure. *Journal of Psychosomatic Research*, *38*(1), 23–32.

Bagby, R., Parker, J., & Taylor, G. (1994b). The twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale—II. Convergent, discriminant, and concurrent validity. *Journal of Psychosomatic Research*, *38*(1), 33–40.

Barchard, K., & Hakstian, A. (2004). The nature and measurement of emotional intelligence abilities; basic dimensions and their relationships with other cognitive abilities and personality variables. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, *64*, 437–462.

Barlow, D., Allen, L., & Choate, M. (2016). Toward a Unified Treatment for Emotional Disorders - Republished Article. *Behavior Therapy*, *47*(6), 838–853. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2016.11.005

Barrett, L. (2006). Are Emotions Natural Kinds? *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *1*(1), 28–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2006.00003.x

Barrett, L. (2017). *How emotions are made: The secret life of the brain*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Barrett, L., Mesquita, B., & Gendron, M. (2011). Context in Emotion Perception. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *20*(5), 286–290. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721411422522

Barrett, L., & Simmons, W. (2015). Interoceptive predictions in the brain. *Nature Reviews. Neuroscience*, *16*(7), 419–429. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3950

Baslet, G., Termini, L., & Herbener, E. (2009). Deficits in emotional awareness in schizophrenia and their relationship with other measures of functioning. *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, *197*(9), 655.

Bastos, A., Usrey, W., Adams, R., Mangun, G., Fries, P., & Friston, K. (2012). Canonical microcircuits for predictive coding. *Neuron*, *76*(4), 695–711. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.038

Berthoz, S., Ouhayoun, B., & Parage, N. (2000). Etude preliminaire des niveaux de conscience emotionnelle chez des patients deprimes et des controles. (Preliminary study of the levels of emotional awareness in depressed patients and controls.). *Annals of Medical Psychology (Paris)*, *158*, 665–672.

Bréjard, V., Bonnet, A., & Pedinielli, J. (2012). The role of temperament and emotional awareness in risk taking in adolescents. *L'Encéphale: Revue de Psychiatrie Clinique Biologique et Thérapeutique*, *38*(1), 1–9.

Burger, A., Lumley, M., Carty, J., Latsch, D., Thakur, E., Hyde-Nolan, M., … Schubiner, H. (2016). The effects of a novel psychological attribution and emotional awareness and expression therapy for chronic musculoskeletal pain: A preliminary, uncontrolled trial. *Journal of Psychosomatic Research*, *81*, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychores.2015.12.003

Bydlowski, S., Corcos, M., Jeammet, P., Paterniti, S., Berthoz, S., Laurier, C., … Consoli, S. (2005). Emotion-processing deficits in eating disorders. *International Journal of Eating Disorders*, *37*, 321–329.

Chancey, J., Adlaf, E., Sapp, M., Pugh, P., Wadiche, J., & Overstreet-Wadiche, L. (2013). GABA depolarization is required for experience-dependent synapse unsilencing in adult-born neurons. *The Journal of Neuroscience : The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience*, *33*(15), 6614–6622. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0781-13.2013

Chaplin, T., Cole, P., & Zahn-Waxler, C. (2005). Parental Socialization of Emotion Expression: Gender Differences and Relations to Child Adjustment. *Emotion*, *5*(1), 80–88. https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.5.1.80

Ciarrochi, J., Caputi, P., & Mayer, J. (2003). The distinctiveness and utility of a measure of trait emotional awareness. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *34*, 1477–1490.

Clark, J., Watson, S., & Friston, K. (2018). What is mood? A computational perspective. *Psychological Medicine*, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291718000430

Colvert, E., Rutter, M., Kreppner, J., Beckett, C., Castle, J., Groothues, C., … Sonuga-Barke, E. (2008). Do Theory of Mind and Executive Function Deficits Underlie the Adverse Outcomes Associated with Profound Early Deprivation?: Findings from the English and Romanian Adoptees Study. *Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology*, *36*(7), 1057–1068. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10802-008-9232-x

Conant, C., & Ashbey, W. (1970). Every good regulator of a system must be a model

of that system. *International Journal of Systems Science*, *1*(2), 89–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207727008920220

Consoli, S., Lemogne, C., Roch, B., Laurent, S., Plouin, P., & Lane, R. (2010). Differences in emotion processing in patients with essential and secondary hypertension. *American Journal of Hypertension*, *23*, 515–521.

Darby, K., & Sloutsky, V. (2015). The cost of learning: interference effects in memory development. *Journal of Experimental Psychology. General*, *144*(2), 410–431. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000051

Diener, M., & Lucas, R. (2004). Adults Desires for Childrens Emotions across 48 Countries: Associations with Individual and National Characteristics. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *35*(5), 525–547. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022104268387

Donges, U., Kersting, A., Dannlowski, U., Lalee-Mentzel, J., Arolt, V., & Suslow, T. (2005). Reduced awareness of others' emotions in unipolar depressed patients. *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, *193*(5), 331–337.

Erbas, Y., Ceulemans, E., Boonen, J., Noens, I., & Kuppens, P. (2013). Emotion differentiation in autism spectrum disorder. *Research in Autism Spectrum Disorders*, *7*(10), 1221–1227. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rasd.2013.07.007

Fivush, R., Brotman, M., Buckner, J., & Goodman, S. (2000). Gender Differences in Parent–Child Emotion Narratives. *Sex Roles*, *42*(3), 233–253. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007091207068

Frewen, P., Lane, R., Neufeld, R., Densmore, M., Stevens, T., & Lanius, R. (2008). Neural correlates of levels of emotional awareness during trauma script-

imagery in posttraumatic stress disorder. *Psychosomatic Medicine*, *70*(1), 27–31.

Friston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., O Doherty, J., & Pezzulo, G. (2016). Active inference and learning. *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews*, *68*, 862–879. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.06.022

Friston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., & Pezzulo, G. (2017). Active Inference: A Process Theory. *Neural Computation*, *29*(1), 1–49. https://doi.org/10.1162/NECO_a_00912

Friston, K., Lin, M., Frith, C., Pezzulo, G., Hobson, J., & Ondobaka, S. (2017). Active Inference, Curiosity and Insight. *Neural Computation*, *29*(10), 2633–2683. https://doi.org/10.1162/neco_a_00999

Friston, K., Rosch, R., Parr, T., Price, C., & Bowman, H. (2018). Deep temporal models and active inference. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews*, *90*, 486–501. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.NEUBIOREV.2018.04.004

Funahashi, R., Maruyama, T., Yoshimura, Y., & Komatsu, Y. (2013). Silent synapses persist into adulthood in layer 2/3 pyramidal neurons of visual cortex in dark-reared mice. *Journal of Neurophysiology*, *109*(8), 2064–2076. https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00912.2012

Haker, H., Schneebeli, M., & Stephan, K. (2016). Can Bayesian Theories of Autism Spectrum Disorder Help Improve Clinical Practice? *Frontiers in Psychiatry*, *7*, 107. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2016.00107

Harmon-Jones, E., Gable, P., & Peterson, C. (2010). The role of asymmetric frontal cortical activity in emotion-related phenomena: A review and update. *Biological Psychology*, *84*(3), 451–462.

https://doi.org/10.1016/J.BIOPSYCHO.2009.08.010

Hayes, S., & Smith, S. (2005). *Get Out of Your Mind and Into Your Life: The New Acceptance and Commitment Therapy*. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications.

Hietanen, J., Glerean, E., Hari, R., & Nummenmaa, L. (2016). Bodily maps of emotions across child development. *Developmental Science*, *19*(6), 1111–1118. https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.12389

Hobson, J., & Friston, K. (2012). Waking and dreaming consciousness: neurobiological and functional considerations. *Progress in Neurobiology*, *98*(1), 82–98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pneurobio.2012.05.003

Hohwy, J. (2016). The Self-Evidencing Brain. *Noûs*, *50*(2), 259–285. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12062

Joffily, M., & Coricelli, G. (2013). Emotional Valence and the Free-Energy Principle. *PLoS Computational Biology*, *9*(6), e1003094. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003094

Kashdan, T., Barrett, L., & McKnight, P. (2015). Unpacking Emotion Differentiation: Transforming Unpleasant Experience by Perceiving Distinctions in Negativity. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *24*(1), 10–16. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721414550708

Kashdan, T., & Farmer, A. (2014). Differentiating emotions across contexts: comparing adults with and without social anxiety disorder using random, social interaction, and daily experience sampling. *Emotion*, *14*(3), 629–638. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0035796

Kerchner, G., & Nicoll, R. (2008). Silent synapses and the emergence of a

postsynaptic mechanism for LTP. *Nature Reviews. Neuroscience*, *9*(11), 813–825. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2501

Lackner, J. (2005). Is IBS a problem of emotion dysregulation? Testing the levels of emotional awareness model. In *Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychosomatic Society*.

Lane, R., Anderson, F., & Smith, R. (2018). Biased Competition Favoring Physical Over Emotional Pain: A Possible Explanation for the Link Between Early Adversity and Chronic Pain. *Psychosomatic Medicine*, *80*(9), 880–890. https://doi.org/10.1097/PSY.0000000000000640

Lane, R., Quinlan, D., Schwartz, G., Walker, P., & Zeitlin, S. (1990). The Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale: a cognitive-developmental measure of emotion. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *55*(1–2), 124–134. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.1990.9674052

Lane, R., & Schwartz, G. (1987). Levels of emotional awareness: a cognitive-developmental theory and its application to psychopathology. *American Journal of Psychiatry*, *144*, 133–143.

Lane, R., Sechrest, L., Reidel, R., Weldon, V., Kaszniak, A., & Schwartz, G. (1996). Impaired verbal and nonverbal emotion recognition in alexithymia. *Psychosomatic Medicine*, *58*(3), 203–210.

Lane, R., Sechrest, L., Riedel, R., Shapiro, D., & Kaszniak, A. (2000). Pervasive emotion recognition deficit common to alexithymia and the repressive coping style. *Psychosomatic Medicine*, *62*, 492–501.

Lane, R., Weihs, K., Herring, A., Hishaw, A., & Smith, R. (2015). Affective agnosia:

Expansion of the alexithymia construct and a new opportunity to integrate and extend Freud's legacy. *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews*, *55*, 594–611. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.06.007

Lawson, R., Mathys, C., & Rees, G. (2017). Adults with autism overestimate the volatility of the sensory environment. *Nature Neuroscience*, *20*(9), 1293–1299. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.4615

Lawson, R., Rees, G., & Friston, K. (2014). An aberrant precision account of autism. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, *8*, 302. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00302

Levine, D., Marziali, E., & Hood, J. (1997). Emotion processing in borderline personality disorders. *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, *185*, 240–246.

Limanowski, J., & Friston, K. (2018). "Seeing the Dark": Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *9*, 643. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00643

Lindquist, K., & Barrett, L. (2008). Constructing emotion: the experience of fear as a conceptual act. *Psychological Science*, *19*(9), 898–903. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02174.x

Lumley, M., Schubiner, H., Lockhart, N., Kidwell, K., Harte, S., Clauw, D., & Williams, D. (2017). Emotional awareness and expression therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, and education for fibromyalgia: a cluster-randomized controlled trial. *Pain*, *158*(12), 2354–2363. https://doi.org/10.1097/j.pain.0000000000001036

Martínez, M., Villar, M. E., Ballarini, F., & Viola, H. (2014). Retroactive interference of object-in-context long-term memory: Role of dorsal hippocampus and medial

prefrontal cortex. *Hippocampus*, *24*(12), 1482–1492. https://doi.org/10.1002/hipo.22328

McKay, R., & Dennett, D. (2009). The evolution of misbelief. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, *32*(06), 493. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09990975

Metzinger, T. (2017). The Problem of Mental Action. In T. Metzinger & W. Wiese. (Eds.), *Philosophy and Predicitive Processing*.

Mirza, M., Adams, R., Mathys, C., & Friston, K. (2016). Scene Construction, Visual Foraging, and Active Inference. *Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience*, *10*, 56. https://doi.org/10.3389/fncom.2016.00056

Moeller, S., Konova, A., Parvaz, M., Tomasi, D., Lane, R., Fort, C., … RZ, G. (2014). Functional, Structural, and Emotional Correlates of Impaired Insight in Cocaine Addiction. *JAMA Psychiatry*, *71*(1), 61. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2013.2833

Mogg, K., & Bradley, B. (2005). Attentional Bias in Generalized Anxiety Disorder Versus Depressive Disorder. *Cognitive Therapy and Research*, *29*(1), 29–45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-005-1646-y

Panksepp, J., Lane, R., Solms, M., & Smith, R. (2017). Reconciling cognitive and affective neuroscience perspectives on the brain basis of emotional experience. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews*, *76*, *Part B*, 187–215. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.09.010

Parr, T., & Friston, K. (2017a). Uncertainty, epistemics and active inference. *Journal of the Royal Society, Interface*, *14*(136). https://doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2017.0376

Parr, T., & Friston, K. (2017b). Working memory, attention, and salience in active

inference. *Scientific Reports*, *7*(1), 14678. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-15249-0

Parr, T., & Friston, K. (2018). The Anatomy of Inference: Generative Models and Brain Structure. *Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience*, *12*, 90. https://doi.org/10.3389/fncom.2018.00090

Pears, K., & Fisher, P. (2005). Emotion understanding and theory of mind among maltreated children in foster care: Evidence of deficits. *Development and Psychopathology*, *17*(01), 47–65. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579405050030

Posner, M. (2016). Orienting of attention: Then and now. *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (2006)*, *69*(10), 1864–1875. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2014.937446

Rizzolatti, G., Riggio, L., Dascola, I., & Umiltá, C. (1987). Reorienting attention across the horizontal and vertical meridians: Evidence in favor of a premotor theory of attention. *Neuropsychologia*, *25*(1), 31–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/0028-3932(87)90041-8

Russell, J. (1991). Culture and the categorization of emotions. *Psychological Bulletin*, *110*(3), 426–450. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.110.3.426

Russell, J. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion. *Psychological Review*, *110*(1), 145–172.

Scherer, K. (2009). The dynamic architecture of emotion: Evidence for the component process model. *Cognition & Emotion*, *23*(7), 1307–1351. https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930902928969

Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T., Mathys, C., Dolan, R., & Friston, K. (2015). The Dopaminergic Midbrain Encodes the Expected Certainty about Desired Outcomes. *Cerebral Cortex*, *25*(10), 3434–3445. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhu159

Schwartenbeck, P., & Friston, K. (2016). Computational Phenotyping in Psychiatry: A Worked Example. *ENeuro*, *3*(4), ENEURO.0049-0016.2016. https://doi.org/10.1523/ENEURO.0049-16.2016

Seth, A. (2013). Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, *17*(11), 565–573. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.09.007

Seth, A., & Friston, K. (2016). Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences*, *371*(1708).

Sharot, T. (2011). The optimism bias. *Current Biology*, *21*(23), R941–R945. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.CUB.2011.10.030

Siemer, M., Mauss, I., & Gross, J. (2007). Same situation--Different emotions: How appraisals shape our emotions. *Emotion*, *7*(3), 592–600. https://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.7.3.592

Silani, G., Bird, G., Brindley, R., Singer, T., Frith, C., & Frith, U. (2008). Levels of emotional awareness and autism□: An fMRI study Levels of emotional awareness and autism□: An fMRI study. *Psychology*, *3*(2), 97–112. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470910701577020

Smith, D., & Schenk, T. (2012). The Premotor theory of attention: Time to move on?

Neuropsychologia, *50*(6), 1104–1114. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA.2012.01.025

Smith, R., Akozei, A., Killgore, W., & Lane, R. (2017). Nested Positive Feedback Loops in the Maintenance of Major Depression: An integration and extension of previous models. *Brain, Behavior, and Immunity*, (In Press). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bbi.2017.09.011

Smith, R., Alkozei, A., Bao, J., Smith, C., Lane, R., & Killgore, W. (2017). Resting state functional connectivity correlates of emotional awareness. *NeuroImage*, *159*, 99–106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.07.044

Smith, R., Bajaj, S., Dailey, N., Alkozei, A., Smith, C., Sanova, A., … Killgore, W. (2018). Greater cortical thickness within the limbic visceromotor network predicts higher levels of trait emotional awareness. *Consciousness and Cognition*, *57*, 54–61.

Smith, R., Braden, B., Chen, K., Ponce, F., Lane, R., & Baxter, L. (2015). The neural basis of attaining conscious awareness of sad mood. *Brain Imaging and Behavior*, *9*(3), 574–587. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11682-014-9318-8

Smith, R., Kaszniak, A., Katsanis, J., Lane, R., & Nielsen, L. (2019). The importance of identifying underlying process abnormalities in alexithymia: Implications of the three-process model and a single case study illustration. *Consciousness and Cognition*, *68*, 33–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.CONCOG.2018.12.004

Smith, R., Killgore, W., & Lane, R. (2017). The structure of emotional experience and its relation to trait emotional awareness: a theoretical review. *Emotion*. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000376

Smith, R., Killgore, W., & Lane, R. (2018). The structure of emotional experience and its relation to trait emotional awareness: A theoretical review. *Emotion*, *18*(5), 670–692. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000376

Smith, R., & Lane, R. (2015). The neural basis of one's own conscious and unconscious emotional states. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews*, *57*, 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.08.003

Smith, R., & Lane, R. (2016). Unconscious emotion: A cognitive neuroscientific perspective. *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews*, *69*, 216–238. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.08.013

Smith, R., Lane, R., Alkozei, A., Bao, J., Smith, C., Sanova, A., … Killgore, W. (2017). Maintaining the feelings of others in working memory is associated with activation of the left anterior insula and left frontal-parietal control network. *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience*, *12*(5), 848–860. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsx011

Smith, R., Lane, R., Alkozei, A., Bao, J., Smith, C., Sanova, A., … Killgore, W. (2018). The role of medial prefrontal cortex in the working memory maintenance of one's own emotional responses. *Scientific Reports*, *8*, 3460. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-21896-8

Smith, R., Lane, R., Sanova, A., Alkozei, A., Smith, C., & Killgore, W. (2018). Common and Unique Neural Systems Underlying the Working Memory Maintenance of Emotional vs. Bodily Reactions to Affective Stimuli: The Moderating Role of Trait Emotional Awareness. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, *12*, 370. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2018.00370

Smith, R., Quinlan, D., Schwartz, G., Sanova, A., Alkozei, A., & Lane, R. (2017). Developmental contributions to Emotional Awareness. *Journal of Personality Assesment*, (In Press). https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2017.1411917

Smith, R., Sanova, A., Alkozei, A., Lane, R., & Killgore, W. (2018). Higher levels of trait emotional awareness are associated with more efficient global information integration throughout the brain: a graph-theoretic analysis of resting state functional connectivity. *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience*, *13*(7), 665–675. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsy047

Smith, R., Thayer, J. F., Khalsa, S. S., & Lane, R. D. (2017). The hierarchical basis of neurovisceral integration. *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews*, *75*. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.02.003

Smith, R., Weihs, K., Alkozei, A., Killgore, W., & Lane, R. (2019). An embodied neurocomputational framework for organically integrating biopsychosocial processes: An application to the role of social support in health and disease. *Psychosomatic Medicine*. https://doi.org/10.1097/PSY.0000000000000661

Subic-Wrana, A., Beetz, M., Paulussen, J., Wiltnik, J., & Beutel, M. (2007). Relations between attachment, childhood trauma, and emotional awareness in psychosomatic inpatients. In *Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychosomatic Society (March)*. Budapest, Hungary.

Subic-Wrana, C., Bruder, S., Thomas, W., Lane, R., & Köhle, K. (2005). Emotional awareness deficits in inpatients of a psychosomatic ward: a comparison of two different measures of alexithymia. *Psychosomatic Medicine*, *67*(3), 483–489.

Suvak, M., Litz, B., Sloan, D., Zanarini, M., Barrett, L., & Hofmann, S. (2011). Emotional

granularity and borderline personality disorder. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, *120*(2), 414–426. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021808

Tononi, G., & Cirelli, C. (2014). Sleep and the Price of Plasticity: From Synaptic and Cellular Homeostasis to Memory Consolidation and Integration. *Neuron*, *81*(1), 12–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.NEURON.2013.12.025

Widen, S., & Russell, J. (2008). Children acquire emotion categories gradually. *Cognitive Development*, *23*(2), 291–312. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.01.002

Wright, R., Riedel, R., Sechrest, L., Lane, R., & Smith, R. (2017). Sex differences in emotion recognition ability: The mediating role of trait emotional awareness. *Motivation and Emotion*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-017-9648-0