1 Social network analysis and the implications for

2 **Pontocaspian biodiversity conservation in Romania and**

3 Ukraine: A comparative study

4 Aleksandre Gogaladze^{1,2*}, Niels Raes³, Koos Biesmeijer^{2,4}, Camelia Ionescu⁵, Bianca Pavel⁶,

5 Mikhail O. Son⁷, Natalia Gozak⁸, Vitaliy Anistratenko⁹, Frank P. Wesselingh¹.

- 6
- 7 1. Department of Marine Biodiversity, Naturalis Biodiversity Center, Leiden, The
 8 Netherlands
- 9 2. Institute of Environmental Sciences, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands
- Department for International Collaboration on Biodiversity Infrastructures, Naturalis
 Biodiversity Center, Leiden, The Netherlands
- 12 4. Department of Biodiversity Dynamics, Naturalis Biodiversity Center, Leiden, The13 Netherlands
- 14 5. WWF Romania, Bucharest, Romania
- 15 6. Constanta Branch of the National Research and Development Institute for Marine
- 16 Geology and Geoecology, Constanta, Romania
- 17 7. Institute of Marine Biology, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Odessa, Ukraine
- 18 8. WWF in Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine

19 9. Department of Invertebrate Fauna and Systematics, Schmalhausen Institute of Zoology,

20 National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine

21 * E-mail: aleksandre.gogaladze@naturalis.nl (AG)

22

23 Abstract

24 Romania and Ukraine share the Black Sea coastline, the Danube Delta and associated habitats, 25 which harbor the unique Pontocaspian biodiversity. Pontocaspian biota represents endemic 26 aquatic taxa adapted to the brackish (anomalohaline) conditions, which evolved in the Caspian 27 and Black Sea basins. Currently, this biota is diminishing both in the numbers of species and 28 their abundance because of human activities. Consequently, its future persistence strongly 29 depends on the adequacy of conservation measures. Romania and Ukraine have a common 30 responsibility to effectively address the conservation of this biota. The socio-political and legal 31 conservation frameworks, however, differ in the two countries - Romania is a member of the 32 European Union (EU), thus complying with the EU environmental policy, whereas Ukraine is an 33 EU-associated country. This may result in differences in the social network structure of stakeholder institutions with different implications for Pontocaspian biodiversity conservation. 34 35 Here, we study the structure and implications of the social network of stakeholder organizations 36 involved in conservation of Pontocaspian biodiversity in Romania, and compare it to Ukraine. 37 We apply a mix of qualitative and quantitative social network analysis methods to combine the 38 content and context of the interactions with relational measures. We show that the social 39 networks of stakeholder organizations in Romania and Ukraine are very different. Structurally, in 40 Romanian network there is a room for improvement through e.g. more involvement of

governmental and non-governmental organizations and increased motivation of central
stakeholders to initiate conservation action, whereas Ukrainian network is close to optimal.
Regardless, both networks translate into sub-optimal conservation action and the road to optimal
conservation is different. We end with sketching implications and recommendations for
improved national and cross-border conservation efforts.

47 Introduction

48 Pontocaspian (PC) biota is a unique, endemic flora and fauna which includes mollusks, 49 crustaceans, planktonic groups (e.g. dinoflagellates and diatoms) and fish species. This 50 biodiversity evolved in brackish (anomalohaline) conditions of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea 51 basins over the past 2.5 million years [1,2] and nowadays PC communities inhabit the Northern 52 Black Sea, Sea of Azov, Caspian Sea and adjacent river and lake systems, stretching across the 53 vast political and administrative boundaries of the surrounding countries [3]. Currently, PC biota 54 is decreasing in numbers of species and abundances as a result of human activities and their 55 future persistence strongly depends on the adequacy of conservation measures [1,4,5]. Romania 56 and Ukraine hold an important part of the PC habitats. PC species in Romania are limited to the 57 Razim-Sinoe-Babadag lake complex [6,7], the area along the Danube River and the Black Sea 58 coastal zone, which together form the Danube Delta and have the status of Biosphere Reserve. In 59 Ukraine, PC communities occur in the coastal lakes, deltas and estuaries from the Danube Delta 60 to the Dnieper estuary as well as estuarine/coastal habitats in the northern Sea of Azov [8-10]. The two countries share the responsibility of conserving the shared PC habitats and the 61 62 associated threatened biota [7,9,11,12], however, they have very different socio-political settings 63 and cultural background - Romania became member of the European Union (EU) in 2007, thus

64 complying with the EU environmental policy, and Ukraine is an association agreement signatory65 non-EU country since 2017.

66

67 In both countries Pontocaspian species are threatened and the conservation measures are urgently 68 required. In the past 30 years, the number, abundance and distribution ranges of PC species have 69 decreased dramatically in Romania as a result of human influence [6,7]. In Ukraine, PC species 70 are declining as a result of habitat fragmentation caused by dam and deep sea shipping lane 71 constructions [13,14]. Some of the PC species (e.g. some mollusk and sturgeon species) are of 72 national concerns in both countries - they are recognized to be threatened and in need of 73 conservation [6,9,11,12]. Yet, Indications exist that strong conservation measures are not in 74 place to preserve these species and populations continue to decrease in both countries [6-8].

75

76 Biodiversity conservation is a complex task which involves different interests of various actors, 77 therefore, it is crucial that all types of stakeholder organizations are involved and interact at 78 different stages of the process [15]. Exchange of scientific information, knowledge and 79 managing experiences among the stakeholder organizations is an important part of these 80 interactions and determine the positive outcomes for biodiversity conservation [16-18]. Social 81 network analysis (SNA) is a commonly used tool to map and quantify these interactions. Social 82 networks, defined as the sets of relationships among the stakeholder organizations, work as 83 channels to facilitate the flow of information and provide opportunities for joint action and collaboration [19-21]. SNA uses a combination of mathematical formulae and models to describe 84 85 and quantify the existing links among organizations [18]. In recent years, SNA has gained

increased attention across a variety of domains including biodiversity conservation [22-24] and
proved to be very informative for conservation planning [25].

88

89 The social network structure has implications for biodiversity conservation. Social networks can 90 vary in their properties, for example, the number of connections, the structural position of 91 individual stakeholders or the frequency of interactions, and there is no single structure of the 92 network that will be most beneficial in all contexts [26,27]. There are, however, certain network 93 properties which are thought to facilitate effective management of natural resources and effective 94 conservation of biodiversity. For example, a high number of connections in a network was 95 shown to enable improved spread of information relevant to biodiversity conservation [28,29]. 96 Similarly, strong connections, which are frequent connections, are desirable for effective 97 conservation as they indicate high levels of trust [30-33]. Weak connections, which are the less 98 frequent connections, on the other hand, facilitate the transfer of novel information as they tend 99 to connect dissimilar actors [34,35]. Furthermore, the networks in which only one or a limited 100 number of organizations have a central position (holding the majority of relational ties) are more 101 effective for quick mobilization of resources and decision making in the initial phase of 102 conservation action [36,37]. On the other hand, networks with more organizations in a central 103 position are more suitable for long-term environmental planning and complex problem-solving 104 [30]. In summary, whether a network is optimal or not depends on the local context, the 105 organizations involved in the process, and the phase of the conservation process [30,38,39].

107 Merely the structural analysis of a network (SNA) may not be sufficient to fully understand all 108 the processes and dynamics within the network. Therefore, qualitative analysis of the data 109 provided by the stakeholders is very important to inform and explain the results of the SNA [40]. 110 Oualitative data on the nature and the content of reported interactions as well as the conditions 111 external to the network properties, such as the funding schemes, stability and functioning of 112 organizations, the implementation capacity and the governance arrangements, amongst others 113 provide a deeper understanding of how the network functions and translates into conservation 114 action [39]. Combining the structural analysis of the network data with the qualitative analysis is 115 referred to as the mixed-method approach. The mixed-methods approach has been applied in the 116 context of biodiversity conservation and discussed in more detail by different social scientists 117 [24,41].

118

119 Here we employ the mixed-method approach, to study the information sharing network of 120 stakeholders, which are involved in Pontocaspian biodiversity conservation and related 121 information exchange in Romania and compare it to a similar earlier study from Ukraine (S3 122 Appendix). This study is part of the Horizon 2020 'Pontocaspian Biodiversity Rise and Demise' 123 (PRIDE) program (http://www.pontocaspian.eu/) which was designed to generate scientific 124 knowledge on PC biota and guide effective conservation action. We assess whether the different 125 socio-political contexts in these two countries result in differences in the social network structure 126 of stakeholders, the content of the interactions and the external social variables which may help or hinder the functioning of the network. Importantly, we aim to find how the differences and/or 127 128 similarities in the two networks translate into PC biodiversity conservation. We conclude the 129 paper with recommendations for improved national and cross boundary conservation efforts.

130 This study contributes to the knowledge on biodiversity conservation and inter-

131 organizational structure of stakeholder institutions in two countries that are politically and

132 culturally different. The combination of quantitative (SNA) and the qualitative analysis provides

- 133 important additional insights into the network characteristics.
- 134

135 Materials and Methods

136 Stakeholder identification and prioritization

137 We identified 23 stakeholder institutions in Romania for inclusion in the study, where a 138 stakeholder was defined as an organization who influences or is influenced by the PRIDE 139 research [15]. After engagement, stakeholders which were found to lack any activity or interest 140 in (conservation of) Pontocaspian biodiversity, were omitted, resulting in a final list of 17 141 institutions (Table 1; Fig 1). We assigned these stakeholders to different categories based on 142 their function and responsibilities: Academic, governmental and non-governmental organizations 143 and a protected area administration (Table 1) following the earlier study from Ukraine (S3 144 Appendix). The Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve Authority (DDA) is a local administration of 145 the biosphere reserve which was under the Ministry of Environment of Romania by the time of 146 the interview, was transferred and since July 2017 acted under the Romanian Government but is 147 now back to being under the Ministry of Environment. This institution has many functions but 148 most importantly administers the Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve. In the analyses we group the 149 DDA with the other governmental organizations. For Ukraine, we used the dataset compiled 150 earlier consisting of 22 stakeholders of which nine were academic institutions, five governmental 151 organizations, three non-governmental organizations and five protected areas (S3 Appendix).

152

153 Table 1. List of the 17 selected stakeholders divided into four stakeholder categories.

ID	Abbreviation	Category	Organization name	Department/Service
1	CMSN	Acad	CMSN Constanța	Delfinariu, Constanta
2	GAM	Acad	Grigore Antipa National Museum of Natural History	
3	GEcM	Acad	GeoEcoMar Constanta	
4	IBB	Acad	Institute of Biology Bucharest, Romanian Academy	Department of Microbiology
5	OUC	Acad	Ovidius University of Constanta	The Faculty of Natural and Agricultural Sciences
6	DDNI	Acad	The Danube Delta National Institute for Research and Development	Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable use of Natural Resources
7	NIMR	Acad	The National Institute of Marine Research and Development "Grigore Antipa"	
8	UB	Acad	University of Bucharest	Department of Paleontology
9	AZS	Acad	Marine Biological Station of Agigea	

10	LAC	Gov	Local Environmental Protection	
			Agency in Constanta	
11	ANPA	Gov	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural	National Agency for
			Development of Romania	Fisheries and
				Aquaculture
12	MOE	Gov	Ministry of environment of Romania	Biodiversity
				Directorate
13	MWF	Gov	Ministry of Waters and Forests	Department for Water,
				Forests and Fishery
14	MN	NGO	ONG Mare Nostrum	
15	OC	NGO	SEOPMM Oceanic Club	
16	WWF	NGO	WWF in Romania	
17	DDA	Pa/Gov	Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve	
			Authority	

- 154 Acad represents academic institutions; Gov, governmental organizations; NGO, non-
- 155 governmental organizations; Pa, protected areas.
- 156
- 157 **Fig 1. Map of the study area.** The black stars on the map represent the stakeholder institutions
- 158 (IDs in Table 1). Green areas indicate major Pontocaspian habitats.

159

160 Data collection

We obtained the social network and qualitative data using a survey questionnaire (S1 Appendix).
We interviewed the staff members of the institutions or relevant departments during July 2017.
Each stakeholder organization was interviewed about each other organization from the list using
the same questions.

165

166 Qualitatively, we compiled narratives on the context and the content of existing professional 167 links among the stakeholders (both, general and Pontocaspian biodiversity related) and the 168 perceived sufficiency of these links. We extracted the meaning and the content of the interactions 169 from the interviews and no prior data was used. Quantitatively, we collected data on the 170 frequency of those links which were related to PC biodiversity (as defined by the interviewed 171 stakeholders). We used the frequency of contact as a measure of strength (weight) of the 172 relationship (see [37] [42]). We defined five weight categories ranging from no contact to very 173 frequent contact (0-4) and integrated the definitions in the questionnaire as a table (S1 Appendix) 174 so that the interviewees could use it for ranking the strength of the interactions. Answers to the 175 question allowed the generation of a weighted, directed, information and knowledge transfer 176 network.

178 Analysis

179 **Qualitative analysis**

We used the 'inductive approach' for qualitative analysis, so the themes (recurrent unifying concepts or statements about the content/subject of the inquiry) were determined based on the collected data and not the prior knowledge or assumptions [43,44]. The themes were established from the collected interviews based on repetitions [45]. We used a 'constant comparison' method to refine the dimensions of established themes and to identify the new themes [46]. We then counted the identified themes and determined their relative importance based on the order of frequency.

187

188 Social network analysis

189 We translated the collected interviews into an adjacency matrix, a square matrix reporting 190 weights (strength) of all the relational ties. We considered only the confirmed information 191 sharing links - relational links described similarly by both stakeholders involved. The 192 unconfirmed links (14% of all the reported relationships) were considered unreliable and omitted 193 from the study. The values of tie-strengths of confirmed relationships between pairs of 194 stakeholders did not always match. In the case of bi-directional information exchange, tie values 195 were left as reported by the stakeholders. In the case of unidirectional information transfer we 196 selected the lowest and therefore conservative tie value. We imputed the missing network data 197 using the imputation-by-reconstruction method [47]. The preconditions for employing this 198 method are: 1) respondents shall be similar to non-respondents, and 2) the obtained description 199 of the relational link (from the respondent) shall be reliable. A Chi-squared test revealed no 200 significant differences in the distribution of weights of received relationships between the

respondents and non-respondents (*p*-value = 0.92), meaning that respondents are similar to nonrespondents. Furthermore, the confirmation rate (proportion of relational links described
similarly by both nodes involved) was 85 % indicating that the descriptions of relational links
(provided by the respondents) can be considered as reliable. Therefore, we used the
reconstruction method to impute the missing ties in the network. We visualized the sociogram
using the CRAN R package 'igraph' [48].

207

208 We calculated the basic network characteristics such as number of actors and relational ties, 209 graph density and centralization using CRAN R package 'igraph' [48]. The mean shortest 210 distance was calculated using the CRAN R package 'tnet' [49] because the 'igraph' package 211 does not take edge weights into account when measuring the shortest distance. Graph density is 212 the extent to which nodes are connected to each other in the network. It is calculated by dividing 213 the number of existing ties by all the possible ties in a network [18,50]. Network centralization is 214 the extent to which certain actors are more connected in the network than the others [18,51]. A 215 centralized network is one where only one or few actors are having the majority of the ties. Such 216 a network has a high overall centralization score (on a 0 to 1 scale, 0 being completely 217 decentralized and 1 fully centralized). Shortest distance is a minimum number of steps that the 218 nodes are away from each other in a network; in weighted networks the tie weights are taken 219 under consideration [52]. We used frequency of contact as a measure of strength of the 220 relationship and defined strong relationships as the weights higher or equal to 3 on a scale 221 ranging from no contact to very frequent contact (S1 Appendix).

222

223 We measured the centrality of individual nodes using degree centrality and betweenness 224 centrality values. Degree centrality is the number of connections a particular actor has with all 225 the other actors in a network [53]. We calculated the degree of a node through an in-degree and 226 out-degree values. In-degree of a node is the number of in-coming links to it from the other 227 nodes in a network and the out-degree of a node is the number of out-going links from this node 228 to the other nodes in a network [54]. Furthermore, we measured and used the node strength 229 values (extension of the degree centrality to the sum of tie weights when analyzing weighted 230 networks) to determine the size of the nodes in a sociogram [33,55,56]. Betweenness centrality 231 measures the extent to which a node is among other nodes in a network [53]. For weighted 232 networks the betweenness centrality measure is based on algorithm of shortest path distance 233 [57,58] which was lately further developed to integrate the cost of intermediary nodes in the 234 formulae [52]. We calculated node-level statistics using the CRAN R package 'tnet' [49] which 235 considers tie weights and corrects for the number of intermediary nodes. We regarded the central 236 stakeholders as the ones with centrality scores higher than the third quartile threshold values 237 [23,42,59].

238

We measured brokerage combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. Brokers are the nodes which are between other nodes in a network and have the power to control the flow of information [34,60,61]. Quantitatively, brokerage was measured through the betweenness centrality and the Burt's constraint metric [34,60]. Betweenness centrality locates the brokers structurally, with respect to all the other actors in the network. Burt's constraint, however, is a local measure of brokerage based on the triadic closure principle. A node connecting two disconnected nodes in an incomplete triad has a power to broker. Such nodes have low Burt's

246 constraint score, i.e. their behavior is not constrained by the other disconnected nodes in a triad 247 [17,61]. Qualitatively, we examined the network narratives and searched for the evidence that the 248 stakeholders are actually engaging in brokering behavior. Brokering behavior in the context of 249 biodiversity conservation implies the mobilization of information, deliberation between different 250 types of stakeholders and potentially the mediation through working groups to address 251 conservation issues [62]. In our study, we regarded the stakeholders with high betweenness 252 scores, which also accounted for low Burt's constraint values, and were involved in brokering 253 behavior as brokers. We used only the strong ties (≥ 3) to calculate betweenness centrality and 254 Burt's constraint metric as they reflect regular contacts. We calculated Burt's constraint utilizing 255 CRAN R package 'igraph' [48].

256

257 A null-model test was used to identify the presence of 'network homophily' in the network. 258 'Network homophily' is the selective linking between actors based on specific attributes, in our 259 case the category of stakeholder institutes [63]. With a null-model test, we tested whether 260 densities within and between stakeholder groups (defined by the stakeholder category) were 261 significantly higher or lower than the random expectation. We randomly assigned nodes to the 262 stakeholders proportional to the true network and subsequently assessed the stakeholder's within 263 and between group densities replicated 1000 times, resulting in 1000 stakeholder group density 264 values. We ranked the obtained 1000 random values from low to high and compared the actual 265 within and between group densities to the randomized results. If the actual density values were 266 larger than the upper or smaller than the lower 2.5% threshold value of the random distribution, 267 we regarded the true within or between group densities to be significantly higher or lower than 268 expected by random chance.

269

270 Ethics statement

271 The social network analysis of stakeholder organizations which we conduct here is not subject to 272 ethical screening as it is, for example, for medical and/or socio-medical studies, which provide 273 personal data. As such, we did not seek a priori ethics review nor is there any established 274 procedure within our organization (Naturalis Biodiversity Center) which we could follow. We 275 informed all participants prior to the interviews that they were being interviewed on behalf of the 276 organization which they were affiliated to, and that the results would be part of a publication, 277 assuring them that no participant would be individually identifiable and asked them whether they 278 objected. All the interviewed stakeholders understood and did not object to analyses and 279 publication of their responses.

280

281 **Results**

Here we report on the results from the conservation network from Romania, which we will compare to the Ukrainian network (S3 Appendix). Out of the 17 Romanian institutions 15 were interviewed (covering 88% of the network data): 14 through face to face in-depth interviews and 1 through an electronic questionnaire via email. From the missing two institutions one was met, but interviewing was not possible (Table 1). The remaining institution could not be reached.

288 Network functionality and content of interactions

289 The studied network in Romania interacts on multiple levels on a variety of topics (S2 290 Appendix). Unlike in Ukraine, the majority of interactions in Romania were based on projects. 291 Some of the joint projects were described as "the EU funded projects" by the stakeholders (S2 292 Appendix). In other cases, the source of financing was not specified. Outside the projects, the 293 exchange of comprehensive data in Romania was subject to payment, because detailed 294 information was not freely available. In some cases, relationships were reported to be unclear 295 due to recent changes in institutional arrangements and governance. Exchange of data involving 296 the payment and unclear relationships due to institutional rearrangements were also reported to 297 be reasons for insufficient collaboration (discussed in detail below under the 'Perceived 298 sufficiency of collaboration').

299

300 In Romania, like in Ukraine, Pontocaspian species played a role in just a few of the inter-301 organizational relations (S2 Appendix). The exchange of information with regard to PC 302 biodiversity was mostly project-based in Romania. These projects, however, mostly focused on 303 the flagship species such as sturgeons (e.g. 'LIFE for Danube Sturgeons' project). Furthermore, 304 monitoring according to the EU Habitats Directive (Article 17), includes the PC habitats and 305 sturgeon species. Outside the projects the exchange of information mostly occurred through joint 306 scientific work (fieldwork, publications) or was subject to payment for data. The majority of the 307 relationships related to PC biodiversity involved PC habitats or species as a minor component of 308 the interaction.

309

310 Network structure

311 The Stakeholder network in Romania was not well connected (Table 2; Fig 2) with a total 312 number of 57 relational ties out of 272 potential ties resulting in a network edge density measure 313 of 21% (Table 2). For comparison, the PC network in Ukraine had the edge density value of 41 314 %. On average each organization in Romania had 7 relational ties with other stakeholders in the 315 network, while in Ukraine each stakeholder had 17 ties. This resulted in bigger mean distance 316 between stakeholders in the Romanian network compared to Ukraine (2.5 in Romania vs 1.5 in 317 Ukraine). The Romanian network had a lower degree of centralization score (22%) than the 318 Ukrainian network (38%). However, based on individual node statistics (presented below) we 319 define both networks to be centralized networks. The correlation of incoming and outgoing ties, 320 although positive in both networks, was lower in Romania compared to Ukraine (rho = 0.31 in 321 Romania vs. rho = 0.78 in Ukraine) indicating that information exchange is in general less 322 reciprocated in Romania (Table 2). When governmental organizations (including the DDA) were 323 omitted from the Romanian network, the correlation increased (rho = 0.79), suggesting that the 324 governmental organizations received information from multiple sources but did not share 325 similarly. In Ukraine, the exclusion of governmental organizations from the analysis did not 326 make a big difference (rho = 0.76 after exclusion) suggesting that governmental organizations in 327 Ukraine were more open to sharing information. The majority of all the relationships were strong 328 (weights 3 or 4) in both countries (56% in Romania and 61% in Ukraine).

330 Table 2. Network statistics for Romanian stakeholder network compared to the Ukrainian

331 stakeholder network (S3 Appendix).

Network data	Romania	Ukraine
Total actors	17	22
Total No. of ties	57	191
Mean degree	7	17
Density (%)	21	41
Degree of centralization (%)	22	38
Tie reciprocity (rho)	0.31	0.78
Tie reciprocity (rho) excluding	0.79	0.76
the Gov. organizations		
Strong/weak ties (%)	56/44	61/39
Mean shortest distance	2.5	1.5

332

333 Fig 2. Sociogram of Romanian stakeholders involved in Pontocaspian biodiversity

conservation and conservation planning. Nodes represent organizations (see Table 1 for

institution descriptions). The size of the nodes corresponds to the node strength (sum of weights

of all its links). Arrows represent relationships between the nodes. The black arrows, ties with

337 values \geq 3, represent strong relationships. The gray arrows, ties with value < 3, represent weak

338 relationships.

340 Central stakeholders

341 We found five central stakeholders in Romania and six in Ukraine, based on degree centrality 342 scores (Table 3). In both networks three academic institutions out of nine had a degree centrality 343 score higher than or equal to the third quartile threshold value (>9 in Romania and >20 in 344 Ukraine), indicating high involvement of these organizations in the exchange of relevant 345 information. Unlike in Ukraine, where the major decision-making organization (Ministry of 346 Ecology) was the most central stakeholder, in Romania, the analogous institution (Ministry of 347 Environment) was not actively involved in exchange of relevant information. Instead, the Local 348 Environmental Protection Agency in Constanta (LAC) was the central governmental institution 349 with high degree centrality score. The Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve Authority (DDA) in 350 Romania and the Danube Biosphere Reserve Administration (DBR) in Ukraine were both active 351 in the network with high degree centrality scores. The non-governmental organizations were 352 marginally involved and had few connections in both countries. All the central stakeholders in 353 Ukraine had more strong than weak connections. In Romania this was also the case with an 354 exception of GEcM which had equal amount of weak and strong ties.

355

Table 3. Node-specific measures for the network. The values in the brackets under the 'Degree centrality' represent the in-degree and out-degree measures respectively. In bold are the values higher than, or equal to the third quartile threshold (lower or equal to the first quartile threshold in case of 'Burt's constraint'). Burt's constraint values for AZS and OC are not defined (NA) as the calculation was based only on strong ties (\geq 3).

Abbreviation	Legal	Degree	Strong/weak	Betweenness	Burt's
	status	centrality	ties	centrality	constraint
DDNI	Acad	13 (4, 9)	7/6	62	30
NIMR	Acad	12 (6, 6)	8/4	84	25
DDA	Pa/Gov	12 (9, 3)	8/4	39	26
GEcM	Acad	10 (4, 6)	5/5	7	39
LAC ††	Gov	9 (7, 2)	5/4	13	36
GAM	Acad	8 (3, 5)	5/3	32	36
ANPA ††	Gov	8 (3, 5)	4/4	51	34
IBB	Acad	7 (3, 4)	3/4	20	56
OUC	Acad	7 (2, 5)	5/2	20	37
MOE	Gov	7 (5, 2)	2/5	0	66
MWF	Gov	6 (3, 3)	3/3	27	60
WWF	NGO	5 (3, 2)	3/2	36	56
UB	Acad	3 (1, 2)	3/0	0	56
AZS	Acad	2 (1, 1)	0/2	0	NA
MN	NGO	2 (1, 1)	2/0	0	50
OC	NGO	2 (1, 1)	0/2	0	NA
CMSN	Acad	1 (1, 0)	1/0	0	100

361 ^{††} Institutions that could not be interviewed for which relationships were imputed

363 Four of the six central stakeholders in Romania (DDNI, NIMR, DDA and ANPA) had a 364 structurally favorable position to act as brokers based on both the betweenness centrality and the 365 Burt's constraint scores (Table 3). Qualitative data, however, showed that these structurally well-366 positioned organizations were not engaging in brokering behavior with regard to Pontocaspian 367 biodiversity (see below). In Ukraine, on the other hand, two out of four structurally well 368 positioned organizations were found to actually engage in brokering behaviors. The major 369 decision-making organization (Ministry of Ecology) was the biggest broker of the Ukrainian 370 network, followed by an academic institution (Institute of Marine Biology). The Ministry of 371 Ecology in Ukraine was found to have various working groups relevant to PC biodiversity 372 conservation, to actively communicate and exchange information and bring otherwise 373 disconnected stakeholders together for conservation planning. Similarly, the Ukrainian Institute 374 of Marine Biology (IMB) which is a scientific curator for several protected areas coordinated 375 their research and connected them, which were otherwise disconnected or very weakly connected 376 (S3 Appendix).

377

378 WWF accounted for high betweenness values in both networks; however, they did not directly 379 bridge many disconnected nodes (indicated by their high Burt's constraint scores). The 380 qualitative data showed that WWF Romania and WWF in Ukraine were actively involved in the 381 conservation of sturgeon species through the enforcement of conservation laws and awareness 382 raising. They had large number of volunteers in both countries and sometimes brought the 383 otherwise disconnected stakeholder organizations together for joint conservation action. Their 384 work, however mostly focused on charismatic PC species and the wider PC taxa was absent from 385 their conservation agenda.

386

387 Network homophily

388 Across the Romanian network, different stakeholder categories had various tie densities, but 389 connectedness was not significantly higher than expected from the null-model test, indicating the 390 absence of network homophily (Table 4). In Ukraine, we found strongly connected academic 391 institutions with significantly higher within group density value than expected by chance 392 suggesting network homophily. The non-governmental organizations were marginally involved 393 in the exchange of Pontocaspian information in both, Romanian and Ukrainian networks. In 394 Romania, NGOs were significantly less connected to the academic institutions than expected by 395 chance and had no links among themselves. In Ukraine, NGOs were also significantly less 396 connected to academic organizations and had only two links among themselves (Table 4). The 397 density values within and between other groups of stakeholders were not significantly different 398 from random expectation. The academic organizations had more strong than weak connections 399 among themselves in both networks indicating regular exchange of information within this 400 group. Furthermore, they were strongly connected with the governmental organizations in 401 Romania, but less so in Ukraine. Governmental organizations were more strongly connected to 402 each other in Ukraine than in Romania, and strongly connected with the NGOs in both countries. 403 Most of the very few connections NGOs had with each other and with academia were strong in 404 Ukraine, unlike in Romania.

405

Table 4. Density of the ties within and between stakeholder categories in Romania and
Ukraine. The values in brackets under the 'Category (No. ties RO vs. UA)' represent the number
of existing relational ties in Romania and in Ukraine.

	Romania		Ukraine	
Category (No. ties Ro vs. UA)	Density(%)	No. ties	Density(%)	No. ties
		strong /weak		strong /weak
Gov-Gov (6 vs. 10)	30	2/4	50	6/4
Acad-Acad (19 vs. 47)	26	12/7	65*	35/12
Acad-Gov (23 vs. 28)	12	13/10	15	13/15
Gov-NGO (7 vs. 12)	12	5/2	21	8/4
Acad-NGO (2 vs. 10)	1.5*	0/2	8*	6/4
NGO-NGO (0 vs. 2)	NA	NA	33	2/0

409 An * indicates significant difference from random expectation (p < 0.05) according to the null-410 model test.

411

412 **Perceived sufficiency of collaboration**

413 In both networks, the majority of the relationships among the interviewed stakeholders were 414 described to be sufficient to exchange information and to achieve effective collaboration (54% in 415 Romania vs. 68% in Ukraine), the remainder to be insufficient (Table 5). Some of the reasons for 416 insufficient relationships were similar in both countries. For example, 'budget constraints' was 417 the most prominent factor in both countries limiting more intense collaboration (26% in Romania 418 vs. 45% in Ukraine). 'Lack of interconnection' was another factor reported in both countries 419 (16% in Romania vs. 8% in Ukraine) to complicate collaboration. 'Lack of interconnection' 420 referred to the situation in which one party is interested and eager to have more 421 collaboration/exchange of information, while the other party is not responding due to, for

422	example, different interests or priorities. Other reasons given for insufficient collaboration were
423	different in two countries. Importantly, free exchange of data was common in Ukraine, but was
424	indicated as a limiting factor in Romania (20%) as it was not freely available. Similarly,
425	'political constraints' (18%), 'institutional turnover' (14%) and 'institutional competition' (6%)
426	were reported only in Romania as factors hampering the establishment of relationships and
427	collaboration. 'Political constraints' mostly referred to governmental organizations being
428	influenced by politics, and being closed for consultations with the academic sector or non-
429	governmental organizations. The 'legal limitations' which in Ukraine mostly referred to the
430	contradicting national laws (S3 Appendix) were not mentioned in Romania.

431

432 Table 5: Perceived sufficiency of reported professional interactions among stakeholder

433 organizations in Romania and Ukraine. The sub-themes in italics are under the theme

434	'Insufficient'.

Perceived relationships	Romania	Ukraine
Sufficient (%)	54	68
Insufficient (%)	46	32
Budget constraints (%)	26	45
<i>Limited exchange of information (%)</i>	20	NA
Political constraints (%)	18	NA
Lack of interconnection (%)	16	8
Institutional turnover (%)	14	NA
Institutional competition (%)	6	NA

Legal limitations (%)	NA	29
Unknown (%)	NA	13
Employee turnover	NA	5

435

436 **Discussion**

437 Conservation of Pontocaspian (PC) biodiversity is critically dependent on adequacy of 438 conservation measures and the coordination of actions across their distribution range - the 439 Northern part of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea region. This paper aims to assess the 440 adequacy of the stakeholder networks for conservation in two countries responsible for a large 441 part of the native range of PC biota. We compare the social network structures of stakeholders 442 involved in biodiversity conservation in Romania and Ukraine, based on new data from the 443 former and the older data from the latter (S3 Appendix). First we discuss the implications of the 444 new, Romanian results for effective conservation and compare it then to Ukraine. We examine 445 the challenges within, as well as beyond the network structure for optimal PC biodiversity 446 conservation and provide recommendations for improved cross border conservation efforts. 447

448 Implications of the Romanian network properties

Both the interviewees and the literature [6,7] indicate that Pontocaspian biodiversity is declining in Romania and conservation measures are not always in place, suggesting that the studied network translates into sub-optimal conservation action [6,7,10]. The structure of the conservation network may be one of the underlying factors (Table 2; Fig 2). The Romanian network properties such as few connections, low tie reciprocity, and unrealized potential of 454 central stakeholders, suggest suboptimal PC biodiversity conservation conditions. Conservation 455 action is further challenged by external social variables such as instability of the institutional 456 arrangements and governance as well as funding limitations and political constraints (Table 5). 457 Interestingly, stakeholder interactions rarely target conservation of PC biodiversity directly (S2 458 Appendix). This indicates a low priority for the conservation of PC biota. Many links relevant to 459 biodiversity conservation in general may benefit PC species indirectly, while some links target 460 PC flagship species such as sturgeons. For example, biodiversity monitoring activities (according 461 to the EU Habitat Directive) include PC habitats and the "LIFE for Danube Sturgeons" project is 462 specifically targeting sturgeon conservation.

463

464 The Romanian network is centralized, with few stakeholders across different stakeholder 465 categories holding the key positions (Tables 2 and 3; Fig 2). Whether a centralized network is 466 suitable for effective conservation action depends on the phase of the conservation process 467 [30,38]. Decentralized networks are in general suitable for long-term environmental planning 468 and complex problem solving, due to the need of multiple stakeholders (across the disciplines) 469 contributing to the solution of a problem, providing different knowledge and perspectives [30]. A 470 more centralized network (with one or few very central stakeholders) can be effective in the 471 initial phase of the conservation process when resources need mobilization and the coordination 472 of joint action is required. In Romania (and also in the Ukraine) research on Pontocaspian 473 biodiversity has a long history [6,9], but the translation of research outputs to conservation action 474 is relatively novel and not always in place [6,9,64]. We suggest that in the current phase of PC 475 biodiversity conservation in Romania a centralized network is likely an optimal network. 476 Although, it is instrumental that the central actors use their abilities and structurally favorable

477 positions in practice to take a coordinating role in resolving conservation challenges.

Additionally, more involvement of an influential decision-making organization, such as the Ministry of Environment, would be desirable for the network to effectively address conservation action. In general, the central organizations in Romanian network do not exploit their positions to initiate collective action. For example, while DDNI, NIMR and DDA are potentially the brokers in the network (Table 3), we found no evidence, of any action related to brokerage. This may be due to lack of appropriate incentives or the limited knowledge on the need for conservation of PC biodiversity.

485

486 Not all stakeholder categories are well embedded in the structure of the Romanian conservation 487 network. For example, the NGOs are marginally involved in the network (Table 4) and 488 governmental organizations have limited numbers of reciprocated ties (Table 2). This may 489 suggest low motivation of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders to engage in 490 Pontocaspian conservation action [65]. The marginal involvement of NGOs has been observed in 491 earlier study in Romania in the Natura 2000 governance network [66]. The lack of reciprocated 492 communication (governmental stakeholders receiving information from multiple sources but not 493 sharing back to the network) may be indicative of strong hierarchy [67]. This idea is supported 494 by interviewees, which mention 'political constraints' and 'lack of interconnection' as factors 495 limiting collaboration (Table 5). Effective biodiversity conservation requires information 496 exchange between diverse stakeholder categories [32,37]. Therefore, more involvement of NGOs 497 and governance actors may benefit conservation of PC biodiversity.

498

499 The optimal functioning of the network is further challenged by the external conditions such as 500 funding scarcity, political constraints and institutional turnover (Table 5). Funding for 501 conservation is scarce and limits collaboration. Beyond the few funded projects, information is 502 not often exchanged and data availability is limited. In addition, scientific organizations that hold 503 most biodiversity information (e.g. DDA, DDNI and GAM), are insufficiently funded by the 504 government and data quality, availability and persistence is dependent on their success to find 505 additional funding. Limited funding discourages collaboration and increases competition. For 506 example, several stakeholders involved in research and conservation have their own research 507 vessels (e.g. NIMR, GEcM, OC) which are expensive to maintain, yet they do not coordinate 508 their activities because they are competing for funds. Furthermore, the institutional alignment of 509 stakeholder organizations is not stable in Romania, complicating the maintenance of relations 510 and building trust. For example, the Ministry of Environment (MOE) and Ministry of Waters 511 used to be one, but were recently split up; the DDA was transferred from the MOE to central 512 government by the time of the interview but is now back to being under the MOE; and the 513 Marine Biological Station of Agigea became independent after being a research station of the 514 University of Iasi. These changes complicate the formation and maintenance of relationships. 515 Continuous institutional reforms to adjust to the EU structures has been reported to not always 516 have positive outcomes in Romania [68]. Finally, 'political constraints' and 'lack of 517 interconnection' exacerbate the lack of exchange of information in Romania.

518

519 Comparing Romania and Ukraine

520 The Romanian network properties can be compared with those of Ukraine (S3 Appendix) as the
521 data collection has followed identical approaches. The Romanian network is slightly smaller (we

522 identified 17 stakeholder organizations compared to 22 in Ukraine). Importantly, the surface area 523 of Pontocaspian habitats in Ukraine is much larger than in Romania. PC species are in need of 524 conservation, however, targeted conservation is limited in both countries and seem suboptimal. 525 Conservation actions in Romania are mostly project based (and often EU-funded), unlike in 526 Ukraine. While information exchange in Ukraine is common outside the formal projects, this is 527 not the case in Romania. In Ukraine, academic institutions (under the NASU), are not allowed by 528 law to sell data and are obliged to share information for free. Furthermore, all the protected areas 529 and academic organizations are obliged to share the biodiversity related information with the 530 Ministry of Ecology (MENR) – sometimes directly (through specific requests) or indirectly 531 (through different departments of Regional Administrations). The MENR and other 532 governmental organizations, in turn, are open to communicating the information back to the 533 network (S3 Appendix). This results in much more free exchange of information and data and in 534 a higher number of reciprocated connections in Ukraine compared to Romania. Data and 535 information sharing are preconditions for effective conservation action, and the Ukrainian 536 network seems to be better set-up to achieve it.

537

The network properties and reported interactions are very different in two countries. In Ukraine, the network is structurally strong with many connections, highly reciprocated ties and clearly defined broker institutions (S3 Appendix). In Romania, the network is structurally weaker. The content of interactions is not favorable in either of the countries for effective Pontocaspian biodiversity conservation, as this biota is not a direct target of interactions. Both Ukrainian and Romanian networks are centralized; the difference is that in Ukraine the major decision-making organization (Ministry of Ecology) is also in the most central position. The analogous

545 organization from Romania (MOE) is not one of the central stakeholders. This may suggest that 546 on the governmental level PC biodiversity conservation has a lower priority in Romania, since 547 the Ministry is the major decision making and coordinating organization for biodiversity 548 conservation and conservation planning in both countries. Additionally, the Ministry of 549 Environment and other governmental organizations in Romania are less involved in consistent, 550 bi-directional exchange of information (Table 2) compared to Ukraine indicating more openness 551 of Ukrainian governmental organizations to collaboration. Similarly, the central stakeholders are 552 not exploiting their favorable positions in Romania as much as they do in Ukraine, suggesting 553 lack of incentive for Romanian stakeholders to initiate PC biodiversity related conservation 554 action, which, in turn may be due to the project-based interactions in Romania and limited 555 funding availability for non-charismatic PC species. Funding scarcity for the non-charismatic PC 556 species can also explain the marginal involvement of NGOs in both countries. 557

558 In both countries, there are limited funding options available for biodiversity conservation and 559 the sources of funding are diverse. The main difference is that in Romania collaboration declines 560 when a project is over, while in Ukraine organizations continue to collaborate and exchange 561 information beyond projects. This may be partly because they have legal obligations to do so. 562 From network narratives, we learned that Romanian stakeholders are involved in many more 563 projects than Ukrainian stakeholders, and many of these projects are EU funded. Yet, the 564 Romanian network is less dense than the Ukrainian one. This finding may indicate that the 565 network in Romania is more reactive rather than proactive.

566

567 Legal limitations in Ukraine are complicating collaboration and, in some cases, result in 568 unfavorable institutional alignments which is not the case in Romania. Legal limitations in 569 Ukraine refer to the contradicting laws creating confusion in research methodology and 570 collaboration frameworks. It also refers to uncoordinated action of regional administrations (i.e. 571 not in line with the Ministry of Ecology) such as issuing permissions and acting without 572 consulting the Ministry (S3 Appendix). The legal limitations were not reported to be 573 complicating collaboration and exchange of information in Romania, which may suggest more 574 consistency in the policies in Romania, which in turn may be resulting from the processes of 575 harmonization to the EU Acquis. In Ukraine, refining the national legislation and approximation 576 to the EU Directives were mentioned several times by the stakeholders as they narrated about the 577 content of their interactions. Therefore, improvements can be expected in the coming years in 578 Ukraine with regard to the national legislation which are likely to result in more coordinated 579 action among stakeholder organizations. Finally, while the institutional reforms are common in 580 Romania, the Ukrainian network is very stable (Table 5). Specific reasons underlying the 581 institutional turnover in Romania were not mentioned by the interviewed stakeholders but the 582 fact itself was reported to be a challenge for establishing relationships and conducting consistent 583 work.

584

In summary, the road to optimal Pontocaspian biodiversity conservation is different in Ukraine and Romania. In Ukraine, the network is structurally close to optimal, which is a necessary base for effective conservation, but the conservation is mostly challenged because of the untargeted approach and external social variables such as funding scarcity and inconsistent policy frameworks. These external challenges are not specific to PC biodiversity, but concern the entire

590	biodiversity in Ukraine. In Romania, there is a room for improvement within the structure of the
591	network as well as beyond. Within the network, more involvement of governmental
592	organizations in the coordinating roles, and engagement of central, information holding
593	organizations in the brokering behavior could result in a stronger network with a higher potential
594	for optimal conservation action. Beyond the network, funding scarcity, political constraints,
595	institutional turnover and difficulty of detailed information exchange are the obstacles. The
596	common challenge in both countries is that PC biodiversity conservation has a low priority and
597	awareness raising is necessary.

598

599 Coordinating joint Pontocaspian biodiversity conservation

600 actions

601 Romania and Ukraine share the Danube Delta, the Black Sea coastline and associated habitats in 602 which Pontocaspian biota occurs which may benefit from a coordinated action of both countries. 603 Some of the PC species, e.g. the sturgeon species, are mobile and not limited to the 604 administrative and political boundaries. Furthermore, PC species have a patchy distribution in 605 Ukraine and Romania and face similar pressures in these two countries. Cross-border 606 collaboration is therefore instrumental to achieve common conservation objectives and optimal 607 conservation action. Sharing the management experiences and best practices among the 608 organizations from both countries can help to the development of common organizational 609 awareness and embolden joint efforts and understanding.

610

611 The great significance of cross-border collaboration has been recognized by international
612 conventions and the EU, which resulted in several cross-border cooperation projects [69]. In our

613 interviews we did not specifically address cross-border collaboration between Romania and 614 Ukraine with regard to PC biodiversity, but from the network narratives we learned that 615 institutions in both countries are aware of each other and some collaboration exists. Main 616 established programs relevant to PC biodiversity conservation are the cross-border cooperation 617 (within the European Neighborhood Instrument - https://www.euneighbours.eu/en) and the LIFE 618 program of the EU. The former includes "Black Sea", "Danube", and other bilateral or trilateral 619 (+ Moldova) ecological programs with large budgets. Usually in their formulations the term 620 "Pontocaspian" does not exist, but the projects mainly concern the habitats of the PC fauna 621 (Danube Delta and Prut River, Lower Dniester and the Black Sea coastline of Ukraine, Romania 622 and Bulgaria). The LIFE program targets the Danube sturgeons. For other PC taxa we did not 623 find evidence for deep collaboration. PRIDE was a pioneering EU funded project which 624 attempted to broaden the sturgeon network in Ukraine to include other PC taxa in the awareness 625 raising activities of WWF in Ukraine. It is important that there are more projects in future, which can extend the current Pontocaspian networks in Ukraine and Romania to the entire PC biota. 626 627 Such projects can be expected to raise awareness and increase the interest of governmental and 628 non-governmental organizations to collaborate more and exchange the relevant information. 629

630 **Conclusions**

We conducted this study as part of the PRIDE project to examine the current inter-organizational structure of stakeholders in Romania and understand the implications of network characteristics for the threatened Pontocaspian biodiversity conservation. We compare the results from Romania to an earlier study from Ukraine as these two countries share the responsibilities to conserve Pontocaspian habitats and species but their legal and political frameworks are different. We 636 found that the social networks of stakeholder organizations in Romania and Ukraine are very 637 different - both, the structure as well as the content and the context of interactions differ. 638 Structurally, Ukrainian network is strong, whereas in the Romanian network there is a room for 639 improvement, through e.g. more involvement of governmental and non-governmental 640 organizations and increased motivation of central stakeholders to initiate conservation action. 641 Regardless, both networks translate into sub-optimal Pontocaspian biodiversity conservation 642 action and the road to effective conservation is different in two countries. In an earlier study in 643 Ukraine, we concluded that the maintenance of existing network is a necessary base, and can be 644 expected to result in optimal conservation action if the content of interactions (through 645 awareness raising and capacity building) and external social variables (funding and legal 646 limitations) are improved. In Romania, the external social variables (institutional turnover, 647 political constraints and funding scarcity) have a higher influence on the network structure than 648 in Ukraine resulting in complicated data exchange, fewer connections and a hierarchical 649 governance system. The current network structure therefore cannot be expected to be effective in 650 addressing the Pontocaspian biodiversity conservation without the involvement of governmental 651 and central stakeholder organizations in coordinating roles. Fostering the cross-border 652 collaboration through new calls for project proposals, which involve wider Pontocaspian taxa, 653 will likely increase the awareness and interest of different types of stakeholders to engage more 654 in the conservation action related to this biota. Extending the Sturgeon networks to the other, 655 non-charismatic Pontocaspian species may be a preferable course to initiate such action.

657 Acknowledgments

658 We would like to thank Professor Marius Stoica and Lea Rausch from the University of 659 Bucharest, and Dr. Luis Ovidiu Popa, Alberto Martinez Gandara, Oana Paula Popa and Ana-660 Maria Krapal from the Grigore Antipa National Museum of Natural History for their invaluable 661 assistance and support in Romania and helping to arrange meetings with stakeholders. We also 662 thank all the interviewed stakeholders for finding time to meet and for providing honest and 663 thorough answers to the survey questions. We acknowledge Cristina Sandu from the 664 International Association for Danube Research for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We would like to also acknowledge our colleagues from Naturalis Biodiversity Center: 665 666 Nieke Knoben, for the assistance in developing the questionnaire and Caroline van Impelen for 667 organizational support.

668

669 Author contributions

670 Conceptualization: AG, NR, KB, FPW. Data collection: AG. Formal analysis: AG, NR.

671 Methodology: AG, NR, KB, FPW. Validation: NR, KB, CI, BP, MOS, NG, VA, FPW. Writing –

672 Original Draft: AG, NR, KB, FPW. Writing – Review & Editing: CI, BP, MOS, NG, VA.

673

674 **References**

Grigorovich IA, Therriault TW, MacIsaac HJ. History of aquatic invertebrate invasions in
 the Caspian Sea. Marine bioinvasions: Patterns, processes and perspectives: Springer; 2003. p.
 103-15.

Marret F, Leroy S, Chalié F, Françoise F. New organic-walled dinoflagellate cysts from
recent sediments of Central Asian seas. Review of Palaeobotany and Palynology. 2004;129(12):1-20.

3. Wesselingh FP, Neubauer TA, Anistratenko VV, Vinarski MV, Yanina T, ter Poorten JJ,
et al. Mollusc species from the Pontocaspian region–an expert opinion list. ZooKeys.
2019;827:31.

4. Therriault TW, Docker MF, Orlova MI, Heath DD, MacIsaac HJ. Molecular resolution of
the family Dreissenidae (Mollusca: Bivalvia) with emphasis on Ponto-Caspian species, including
first report of Mytilopsis leucophaeata in the Black Sea basin. Molecular phylogenetics and
evolution. 2004;30(3):479-89.

688 5. Grinevetsky SR, Zonn IS, Zhiltsov SS, Kosarev AN, Kostianoy AG. The Black Sea
689 Encyclopedia: Springer; 2016.

6. Popa OP, Sarkany-Kiss A, Kelemen BS, Iorgu EI, Murariu D, Popa LO. Contributions to
the knowledge of the present Limnocardiidae fauna (Mollusca: Bivalvia) from Romania.
Travaux du Muséum National d'Histoire Naturelle "Grigore Antipa. 2009;52:7-15.

693 7. Velde Svd, Jorissen EL, Neubauer TA, Radan S, Pavel AB, Stoica M, et al. A
694 conservation palaeobiological approach to assess faunal response of threatened biota under

natural and anthropogenic environmental change. Biogeosciences. 2019;16(12):2423-42.

Anistratenko VV, Anistratenko O. New finds of "Red Data Book" molluscs of the PontoCaspian biogeographic complex. Materials to the Fourths Edition of the Red Data Book of
Ukraine, Animal World. Conservation Biology in Ukraine. Vol. 1. Kiev, Ukraine. 2018. p. 1920.

9. Anistratenko VV. *Turricaspia lincta* Milaschevitch, 1908. In: Akimov IA, editor. Red
Data Book of Ukraine Animal World. Third Edition ed: Globalconsulting, Kiev, Ukraine.; 2009.
p. 290.

10. Anistratenko VV. On the taxonomic status of the highly endangered Ponto-Caspian
gastropod genus Caspia (Gastropoda: Hydrobiidae: Caspiinae). Journal of Natural History.
2013;47(1-2):51-64.

Munasypova-Motyash IA. *Hypanis laeviuscula* (Milachevitch, 1916). In: Akimov IA,
editor. Red Data Book of Ukraine Animal World. Third Edition ed: Globalconsulting, Kiev,
Ukraine.; 2009. p. 306.

Munasypova-Motyash IA. *Hypanis plicata* (Milashevitch, 1916). In: Akimov IA, editor.
Red Data Book of Ukraine Animal World. Third Edition ed: Globalconsulting, Kiev, Ukraine.;
2009. p. 307.

712 13. Semenchenko VP, Son MO, Novitsky RA, Kvatch YV, Panov VE. Alien

713 macroinvertebrates and fish in the Dnieper River basin. Russian journal of biological invasions.

714 2015;6(1):51-64.

715	14.	Zhulidov AV.	, Kozhara AV.	, van der Velde G.	Leuven RS	Son MO.	Gurtovay	ya TY.	, et al

- 716 Status of the invasive brackish water bivalve Mytilopsis leucophaeata (Conrad,
- 717 1831)(Dreissenidae) in the Ponto-Caspian region. 2018.
- 15. Durham E, Baker H, Smith M, Moore E, Morgan V. BiodivERsA Stakeholder
- 719 Engagement Handbook. BiddivERsA: Paris, France. 2014.
- 16. Cash DW, Clark WC, Alcock F, Dickson NM, Eckley N, Guston DH, et al. Knowledge
- 721 systems for sustainable development. Proceedings of the national academy of sciences.

722 2003;100(14):8086-91.

Francis RA, Goodman MK. Post-normal science and the art of nature conservation.
Journal for Nature Conservation. 2010;18(2):89-105.

18. Wasserman S, Faust K. Social network analysis: Methods and applications: Cambridge
university press; 1994.

19. Ernoul L, Wardell-Johnson A. Governance in integrated coastal zone management: a

social networks analysis of cross-scale collaboration. Environmental Conservation.

729 2013;40(3):231-40.

Haythornthwaite C. Social network analysis: An approach and technique for the study of
information exchange. Library & information science research. 1996;18(4):323-42.

732	21.	Barnes ML, Lynham J, Kalberg K, Leung P. Social networks and environmental
733	outcon	nes. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 2016;113(23):6466-71.
734	22.	Sandström A, Rova C. Adaptive co-management networks: a comparative analysis of two
735	fishery	v conservation areas in Sweden. Ecology and Society. 2010;15(3).
736	23.	Yamaki K. Applying social network analysis to stakeholder analysis in Japan's natural
737	resour	ce governance: two endangered species conservation activity cases. Journal of Forest
738	Resear	rch. 2017;22(2):83-90.
739	24.	Hauck J, Schmidt J, Werner A. Using social network analysis to identify key stakeholders
740	in agri	cultural biodiversity governance and related land-use decisions at regional and local level.
741	Ecolog	gy and Society. 2016;21(2).
	<u></u>	

Mills M, Álvarez-Romero JG, Vance-Borland K, Cohen P, Pressey RL, Guerrero AM, et
al. Linking regional planning and local action: Towards using social network analysis in
systematic conservation planning. Biological Conservation. 2014;169:6-13.

745 26. Bodin Ö, Crona B, Ernstson H. Social networks in natural resource management: what is
746 there to learn from a structural perspective? Ecology and Society. 2006;11(2).

747 27. Bodin Ö, Crona BI. The role of social networks in natural resource governance: What
748 relational patterns make a difference? Global Environmental Change. 2009;19(3):366-74.

749	28.	Weimann G. On the importance of marginality: One more step into the two-step flow of
750	commu	inication. American Sociological Review. 1982:764-73.
751	29.	Abrahamson E, Rosenkopf L. Social network effects on the extent of innovation
752	diffusio	on: A computer simulation. Organization science. 1997;8(3):289-309.
753	30.	Crona B, Bodin Ö. What you know is who you know? Communication patterns among
754	resourc	e users as a prerequisite for co-management. Ecology and society. 2006;11(2).
755	31.	Newman L, Dale A. Network structure, diversity, and proactive resilience building: a
756	respon	se to Tompkins and Adger. Ecology and society. 2005;10(1).
757	32.	Newman L, Dale A. Homophily and agency: creating effective sustainable development
758	networ	ks. Environment, Development and Sustainability. 2007;9(1):79-90.
759	33.	Opsahl T, Colizza V, Panzarasa P, Ramasco JJ. Prominence and control: the weighted
760	rich-cl	ub effect. Physical review letters. 2008;101(16):168702.
761	34.	Burt RS. The social capital of structural holes. The new economic sociology:
762	Develo	pments in an emerging field. 2002;148:190.
763	35.	Granovetter MS. The strength of weak ties. American journal of sociology.
764	1973;7	8(6):1360-80.

36. Leavitt HJ. Some effects of certain communication patterns on group performance. The
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 1951;46(1):38.

767 37. Prell C, Hubacek K, Reed M. Stakeholder analysis and social network analysis in natural
768 resource management. Society and Natural Resources. 2009;22(6):501-18.

769 38. Olsson P, Folke C, Hahn T. Social-ecological transformation for ecosystem management:

the development of adaptive co-management of a wetland landscape in southern Sweden.

Ecology and Society. 2004;9(4).

39. Cowling RM, Wilhelm-Rechmann A. Social assessment as a key to conservation success.
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS 32 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, NEW YORK, NY 100132473 USA; 2007.

40. Herz A, Peters L, Truschkat I, editors. How to do qualitative strukturale Analyse? The
qualitative interpretation of network maps and narrative interviews. Forum Qualitative
Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research; 2015.

41. Kowalski AA, Jenkins LD. The role of bridging organizations in environmental

management: examining social networks in working groups. Ecology and Society. 2015;20(2).

Paletto A, Hamunen K, De Meo I. Social network analysis to support stakeholder
analysis in participatory forest planning. Society & natural resources. 2015;28(10):1108-25.

782 43. Ryan GW, Bernard HR. Techniques to identify themes. Field methods. 2003;15(1):85783 109.

44. Bradley EH, Curry LA, Devers KJ. Qualitative data analysis for health services research:

developing taxonomy, themes, and theory. Health services research. 2007;42(4):1758-72.

45. Bogdan R, Taylor SJ. Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods. John Wiley & Sons,
787 New York; 1975.

46. Glaser BG, Strauss AL, Strutzel E. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for
Qualitative Research New York Aldine De Gruyter. Inc; 1967.

47. Stork D, Richards WD. Nonrespondents in communication network studies: Problems
and possibilities. Group & Organization Management. 1992;17(2):193-209.

792 48. Csardi G, Nepusz T. The igraph software package for complex network research.

793 InterJournal, Complex Systems. 2006;1695(5):1-9.

49. Opsahl T. Structure and evolution of weighted networks: Queen Mary, University ofLondon; 2009.

50. Scott J. Social network analysis: A handbook. 1991.

Freeman LC, Roeder D, Mulholland RR. Centrality in social networks: II. Experimental
results. Social networks. 1979;2(2):119-41.

52. Opsahl T, Agneessens F, Skvoretz J. Node centrality in weighted networks: Generalizing
degree and shortest paths. Social networks. 2010;32(3):245-51.

801 53. Freeman LC. Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification. Social networks.

802 1978;1(3):215-39.

803 54. Kleinberg JM, editor Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment. In Proceedings
804 of the ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms; 1998: Citeseer.

805 55. Barrat A, Barthélemy M, Vespignani A. Weighted evolving networks: coupling topology
806 and weight dynamics. Physical review letters. 2004;92(22):228701.

807 56. Newman ME, Girvan M. Finding and evaluating community structure in networks.
808 Physical review E. 2004;69(2):026113.

809 57. Brandes U. A faster algorithm for betweenness centrality. Journal of mathematical
810 sociology. 2001;25(2):163-77.

811 58. Dijkstra EW. A note on two problems in connexion with graphs. Numerische
812 mathematik. 1959;1(1):269-71.

59. Grilli G, Garegnani G, Poljanec A, Ficko A, Vettorato D, De Meo I, et al. Stakeholder
analysis in the biomass energy development based on the experts' opinions: the example of
Triglav National Park in Slovenia. Folia Forestalia Polonica. 2015;57(3):173-86.

816 60. Burt RS. Structural holes and good ideas. American journal of sociology.

817 2004;110(2):349-99.

818 61. Burt RS. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Harvard University

819 Press, Cambridge, MA. 1992.

62. Fazey I, Evely AC, Reed MS, Stringer LC, Kruijsen J, White PC, et al. Knowledge
exchange: a review and research agenda for environmental management. Environmental
Conservation. 2013;40(1):19-36.

823 63. Newman ME. The structure and function of complex networks. SIAM review.
824 2003;45(2):167-256.

825 64. Cuttelod A, Seddon M, Neubert E. European red list of non-marine molluscs:

826 Publications office of the European Union Luxembourg; 2011.

827 65. Hossu CA, Ioja IC, Nita MR, Hartel T, Badiu DL, Hersperger AM. Need for a cross828 sector approach in protected area management. Land Use Policy. 2017;69:586-97.

Manolache S, Nita A, Ciocanea CM, Popescu VD, Rozylowicz L. Power, influence and
structure in Natura 2000 governance networks. A comparative analysis of two protected areas in
Romania. Journal of environmental management. 2018;212:54-64.

- 832 67. Lazega E, Quintane E, Casenaz S. Collegial oligarchy and networks of normative
- 833 alignments in transnational institution building. Social Networks. 2017;48:10-22.
- 834 68. Vasile V. 12. Romania: A country under permanent public sector reform. Public Sector

835 Shock. 2013:449.

- 836 69. The World Bank study team. Draft Danube Delta Integrated Sustainable Development
- 837 Strategy (2030), REPORT 2.2. 2014.




Fig 1

