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Demonstrating and disrupting well-learned habits

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23 **Abstract**

24 Researchers have exerted tremendous efforts to empirically study how habits form and dominate
25 at the expense of deliberation, yet we know very little about breaking these rigid habits to restore
26 goal-directed control. In a three-experiment study, we first illustrate a novel approach of
27 studying well-learned habits, in order to effectively demonstrate habit disruption. In Experiment
28 1, we use a Go/NoGo task with familiar color-response associations to demonstrate outcome-
29 insensitivity when compared to novel, more flexible associations. Specifically, subjects perform
30 more accurately when the required mapping is the familiar association of green–Go/red–NoGo
31 than when it is red–Go/green–NoGo, confirming outcome-insensitive, habitual control. As a
32 control condition, subjects show equivalent performance with unfamiliar color-response
33 mappings (using the colors blue and purple mapped to Go and NoGo responses). Next, in
34 Experiments 2 and 3, we test a motivation-based feedback manipulation in varying magnitudes
35 (i.e., performance feedback with and without monetary incentives) to break the well-established
36 habits elicited by our familiar stimuli. We find that although performance feedback prior to the
37 contingency reversal test is insufficient to disrupt outcome-insensitivity in Experiment 2, a
38 combination of performance feedback and monetary incentive is able to restore goal-directed
39 control in Experiment 3, effectively breaking the habits. As the first successful demonstration of
40 well-learned habit disruption in the laboratory, these findings provide new insights into how we
41 execute and modify habits, while fostering new and translational research avenues that may be
42 applicable to treating habit-based pathologies.

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46 **Introduction**

47 When categorizing motivated behaviors, habits are distinguished from goal-directed
48 actions in that they are performed reflexively in response to a triggering cue, without
49 consideration of the consequences [1]. These habitual behaviors are less cognitively taxing than
50 their goal-directed counterparts, allowing for their utilization in instances where the resource-
51 consuming reflection of potential outcomes may not be ideal [2–4]. For example, looking both
52 ways before crossing a street is an action best elicited habitually, and ideally should persist
53 despite the absence of oncoming traffic. In contrast, the optimal motivational control system for
54 commuting to a new destination would be outcome-reliant, reflective, and thus resource-
55 consuming goal-directed performance.

56 For decades, the motivational bases of behavioral control (i.e., goal-directed and habitual
57 actions) have been investigated in rodent models. In a typical study examining habitual control, a
58 neutral stimulus (e.g., a visual cue, or the context of the chamber) signals hungry rats to press a
59 lever in pursuit of a food outcome. This behavioral training period is often followed by a
60 devaluation procedure—the rat is allowed free-access to the food, promoting satiation and
61 diminishing the food’s value (hence the term *devaluation*). In a subsequent, unrewarded,
62 extinction phase, the experimenter can then assess whether the trained lever-press action is
63 flexible and goal-directed (i.e., strong responses when animal is hungry but diminished responses
64 when satiated), or rigid and habitual (i.e., persistent responses regardless of satiation) [5].
65 Generally, over-training of the stimulus—response—outcome association tends to render actions
66 habitual. Thus, an over-trained rat persists in pressing the lever despite a diminished value in
67 outcome, suggesting that the actions are driven by the preceding cue or the chamber context. In
68 contrast, value-driven goal-directed control survives following moderate experience with the

69 stimulus–response–outcome chain [6]. Motivational control testing in humans has followed suit
70 with similar operant conditioning paradigms, in which a primary or a secondary reward is
71 devalued to determine whether actions are cue or value driven [7–12]. Another widely-used
72 example is the sequential decision task, in which subjects respond to probabilistic multi-step
73 associative sequences and recruit model-based (i.e., goal-directed; taking into account the
74 cognitive model of the task environment) or model-free (i.e., similar to habits; actions based
75 solely on history of reward receipt) strategies to maximize gain and minimize loss [13].

76 These methods have undoubtedly contributed a great deal to our understanding of habits;
77 however, such paradigms are limited in critical aspects. Indeed, the habit experience has been a
78 difficult construct to effectively capture via behavioral paradigms in humans [14–16]. First, in
79 contemporary paradigms, including those based on outcome-devaluation and sequential decision-
80 making, the agent must develop a newly formed habit. Accordingly, the tools at our disposal
81 facilitate the study of novel, lab-developed habits, while leaving incomplete our understanding of
82 well-learned habits that are more representative of daily experiences. For example, especially in
83 outcome-devaluation tasks involving valued and devalued food rewards, testing whether a
84 behavior is habitual relies on several critical factors. The demonstration of a habit may depend
85 on successful over-training of a new cue–response–outcome association that develops a strong
86 enough link between the cue and the response to guide behavior [11]. Furthermore, the
87 effectiveness of the devaluation procedure where a food outcome is selectively fed to diminish
88 its value may become problematic in humans for reasons not encountered in rats, such as demand
89 characteristics, and hesitation to eat copious amounts of junk food in a potentially socially
90 intimidating lab setting. Lastly, the experimenter makes assumptions of comparable food
91 palatability, in that the agent must value the food options similarly prior to selective devaluation

92 for any value-based manipulation to be effective [11]. These lab-generated habits are also
93 arduous to develop via over-training, especially in expensive neuroimaging contexts. More
94 importantly, the strength of the trained habit would be insufficient for a meaningful investigation
95 of the habit-breaking process, in that even multi-day training is often measured in minutes to
96 hours [11,17]. Thus, the current tools provide a costly platform that only captures the
97 unidirectional shift from goal-directed to habitual control [18]. In other words, although these
98 novel, lab-created associations permit the study of habit formation and execution, we are limited
99 in our tools to investigate habit disruption with similar efficacy.

100 Despite tremendous efforts directed towards understanding habit formation and
101 expression, a wider gap in the literature remains regarding the breaking of habits. Accessing the
102 shift from habitual to goal-directed control may ultimately facilitate interventions that remediate
103 rigid and maladaptive behaviors, yet we are not currently methodologically equipped to tackle
104 this translational research avenue with a rich toolkit. Accordingly, we propose that developing a
105 novel habit from an action–outcome contingency is not a pre-requisite for studying the
106 motivational basis for habits, but that an existing, more robust habit could be examined in the lab
107 with less effort. An effective approach may involve using salient cues that elicit well-established,
108 habit-like behaviors that are impervious to their consequences. For instance, the colors red and
109 green have highly specific “stop” and “go” associations, possibly strengthened in a variety of
110 contexts including traffic lights, visual signals of danger and safety, and childhood games, songs,
111 and stories [19]. The familiar red–stop and green–go contingencies have previously been
112 transformed into Go/NoGo tasks to assess response inhibition via perseverative errors (i.e.,
113 NoGo accuracy) [19–21]. Similarly, we can test for behavioral rigidity by assessing performance
114 when these contingencies are congruent with daily experiences versus when adjusted to reflect

115 outcomes incongruent with most real-world scenarios. Thus, instead of devaluing the palatability
116 of a primary reward, we render a well-learned association inappropriate for optimal task
117 performance. The agent must override a prepotent red stimulus–stop response with an
118 incongruent green stimulus–stop response to achieve the intended, correct outcome. A more
119 pronounced accuracy impairment when managing incongruencies within this well-learned color-
120 response mapping, compared to changes in a newly-acquired mapping, would permit us to
121 conclude that these familiar stimuli evoke outcome-insensitive actions, the hallmark of habitual
122 behavior. Upon establishing that these familiar stimuli elicit habitual control, we can then
123 provide the platform to study habit disruption by testing manipulations that protect against
124 mapping-related performance impairments—essentially overriding the habitual response by
125 engaging cognitive control processes. The motivational control framework identifies habits as
126 cue-dependent, and goal-directed behaviors as those contingent on the outcome [1]. Accordingly,
127 a previously goal-directed behavior is rendered habitual when the associative strength of the
128 stimulus–response component governs actions, rendering the outcome inessential for action
129 execution. A promising strategy for restoring goal-directed control may be via boosting the
130 salience of the outcome—for instance, by enhancing the link between the response and outcome.

131 Providing opportunities for performance tracking and administering other forms of
132 performance-based feedback (e.g., primary and secondary rewards) have been used extensively
133 in enhancing behavioral output [22,23]. For instance, the delivery of performance tracking
134 information combined with a monetary reward successfully improved performance on a visual
135 task [23]. A combination of primary and secondary rewards (e.g., juice and monetary incentives)
136 has also been documented to improve goal-directed performance on a cued task-switching
137 paradigm via motivational enhancement [24]. The promise of a future reward contingent on

138 performance has sufficed in improving performance during task-switching, and accelerating
139 responses during a reaction time task with congruent and incongruent stimuli [25,26].
140 Furthermore, trial-by-trial, transient monetary incentives (i.e., increasing reward magnitudes
141 from low to high across trials) have served as salient performance boosters in tasks that taxed
142 executive control, as well as visual perception [27]. Taken together with the finding that
143 performance-contingent monetary rewards engage top-down control on task-switching [28],
144 performance tracking and performance-contingent rewards may be prime candidates for
145 enhancing goal-directed behavioral control. Thus, we propose that boosting motivation via
146 performance-contingent feedback (e.g., intrinsic and extrinsic rewards that promote task
147 performance improvements) may serve as a useful tool in restoring flexibility in otherwise rigid
148 behaviors.

149 To achieve the goal of demonstrating and breaking a well-established habit, we introduce
150 in Experiment 1 our novel Go/NoGo task that capitalizes on the familiar Green–Go, Red–NoGo
151 associations people typically develop throughout the course of their lives. If the red–stop and
152 green–go associations are well-learned, outcome-insensitive habits, there should be within-
153 subject decrements in performance on an incongruent mapping of color to response (green–stop,
154 red–go) compared to the well-learned congruent mapping (red–stop, green–go). That is, if
155 participants are responding habitually, they should be more accurate when withholding responses
156 to the red NoGo cue, and more likely to make errors of commission (e.g., responding to green
157 cue when instructed to withhold responding), than if they are responding in a goal-directed
158 manner. In comparison, there should be no such within-subject differences between novel color–
159 response mappings (e.g. blue–stop, purple–go vs. purple–stop, blue–go). Then, in Experiments 2
160 and 3, we explore strategies to disrupt the well-learned red-stop, green-go habit by amplifying

161 the salience of the action outcomes. Specifically, we use cumulative performance-contingent
162 feedback to remediate the incongruity-related impairment—in an effort to restore goal-directed
163 control in the face of habit-eliciting stimuli by reducing outcome-insensitive responses.

164 **Experiment 1**

165 **Methods**

166 **Participants**

167 We recruited 50 undergraduate students (32 female, 18 male participants; $M_{\text{age}}=20.28$,
168 $SD_{\text{age}}=2.96$) from the Rutgers University-Newark campus for course credit. All subjects provided
169 informed consent. Study protocols were approved by the Rutgers University Institutional Review
170 Board. Participants were excluded if they reported having color-blindness.

171 **Materials and Procedures**

172 Participants were administered the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS) [29], and randomly
173 assigned to one of two stimulus type conditions (Familiar or Novel stimuli). They underwent a
174 Go/NoGo task in which either Green and Red (Familiar condition) or Purple and Blue (Novel
175 condition) traffic lights comprised Go and NoGo signals. Participants were instructed to respond
176 as quickly and accurately to these stimuli as possible using the keyboard. A second phase
177 followed in which the color-response contingencies were swapped (see Fig 1). Note that in the
178 Familiar condition, the Green-Go/Red-NoGo mapping was considered “congruent” with
179 associations in everyday life, while the Red-Go/Green-NoGo mapping was considered
180 “incongruent.” We assumed that the Novel stimuli have no well-established Go or NoGo
181 associations in daily life. The order in which participants underwent the two phases of the task
182 was counterbalanced to ensure that the results could not be attributed to a specific order of
183 managing the contingencies. Thus, we were able to examine the rigidity of our Familiar

184 behavioral contingencies hypothesized to elicit outcome-insensitive responses in relation to a
185 Novel stimulus set. An exit survey with demographic information concluded the study.

186

187 **Fig 1. Go/NoGo task with familiar and novel lights.** Participants are assigned to Familiar or
188 Novel conditions. In the Familiar condition, subjects complete two phases: one where green
189 signals Go and red signals NoGo (“congruent” mapping) and one where red signals Go and
190 green signals NoGo (“incongruent” mapping). In the Novel condition, participants complete two
191 similar phases, but the colors are blue and purple, for which there should be no strong pre-
192 existing associations with “stop” and “go” responses. We predicted more commission errors in
193 the Familiar condition for incongruent than congruent mappings, indicating outcome
194 insensitivity, with no such within-subject differences expected in the Novel condition. Phase
195 orders were counterbalanced across subjects.

196

197 Each phase comprised 100 Go and 20 NoGo trials (5:1 Go-NoGo ratio). The Go/NoGo
198 stimuli remained onscreen for 400 milliseconds (ms), and each response produced a brief
199 “correct” or “incorrect” text slide that offset after 400 ms (e.g., failure to withhold response in a
200 NoGo trial produced the “incorrect” text slide). Go responses had to be performed before
201 stimulus offset to be registered as correct by pressing the “1” key on the keyboard. The inter-trial
202 intervals varied randomly between 1200 and 2400 ms to ensure engagement with the task. All
203 participants completed a brief practice session (six correct Go or NoGo responses) using the
204 same stimuli as the first phase. This practice session was conducted with the experimenter
205 present to ensure the comprehension of instructions.

206 If these familiar associations elicit habitual, cue-driven behavioral control, subjects in the
207 Familiar condition should experience a significant impairment in NoGo accuracy task demands
208 when incongruent with lifelong experiences (Green–NoGo), compared to when they are
209 congruent with lifelong experiences (Red-NoGo). In contrast, because the blue and purple
210 stimuli are not expected to have strong Go or NoGo associations, participants in the Novel
211 condition should show similar performance levels for both color–response mappings, illustrating
212 the flexibility of responses executed towards the novel stimuli.

213 **Data Analysis**

214 Because the moderate ratio of Go to NoGo signals was expected to produce pre-potent
215 Go responses [30], NoGo accuracy served as the primary measure of interest. As a secondary
216 measure of outcome-sensitivity, identical analyses were performed using Go accuracy as
217 dependent variable (DV). A mixed ANOVA with a DV of NoGo accuracy, Condition (Familiar
218 or Novel stimulus conditions) as a between-subjects factor, and Mapping (congruent or
219 incongruent mapping in the Familiar, and arbitrary color–response mapping in the Novel
220 condition) as a within-subjects factor, was performed using Age, Gender, and Impulsivity (BIS
221 score) as covariates. Post-hoc t-tests were employed to detect mapping-related differences in
222 both conditions. We also performed a confirmatory omnibus test containing information from
223 both conditions—a hierarchical multiple regression to test the predictive strength of the
224 Condition variable on mapping-related impairment. We summarize these omnibus regression
225 data below, but refer readers to the supplement for details (S1 and S2 Tables). Similar analyses
226 were performed with Go response time (RT) as DV to further explore the data.

227 To determine sample size for our study, we performed an *a priori* power analysis using
228 the effect size from an existing study examining Go/NoGo contingency change [31]. A within-

229 group comparison of commission errors due to contingency change—one similar to the primary
230 analyses reported above—determined that 12 participants would be needed per group to reach
231 80% statistical power. We adjusted this sample size in accordance with our two between-subjects
232 factors that yielded four groups, (two Condition levels and two Order levels – that is, the
233 counterbalanced orders in which participants completed the two phases of the task), warranting a
234 sample size of 50.

235 **Results**

236 **Primary index of outcome-sensitivity: NoGo accuracy**

237 To examine whether Condition (Familiar or Novel) predicted outcome-sensitivity, we
238 performed a repeated measures ANOVA using NoGo accuracy as the DV, Condition as a
239 between-subjects factor, Mapping as a within-subjects factor, controlling for Age, Gender, and
240 Impulsivity as covariates. We found no main effect of Condition, $F(1,45) = 0.99, p = .325, \eta_p^2 =$
241 $.02$, or Mapping, $F(1,45) = 0.10, p = .748, \eta_p^2 < .01$. but as evident in Fig 2, we found a
242 significant Condition x Mapping interaction. $F(1,45) = 8.65, p = .005, \eta_p^2 = .16$. The congruent
243 mapping produced higher accuracy compared to the incongruent mapping, which was not
244 different from performance to the novel stimuli. Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests further revealed
245 a significant difference in NoGo accuracy in the Familiar condition, $t(24) = 3.53, p = .002$,
246 suggesting that the congruent “Red–NoGo” mapping elicits fewer errors of commission
247 compared to the incongruent “Green–NoGo” mapping—a difference indicative of outcome-
248 insensitive, habitual control. Contingency change yielded no differences in errors of commission
249 between phases in the Novel condition, supporting the labile nature of newly learned
250 associations, $t(24) = -0.88, p = .387$.

251

252 **Fig 2. Familiar stimuli elicit mapping-related impairments in NoGo accuracy.** The
253 congruent mapping produces higher accuracy compared to the incongruent mapping, which is
254 not different from performance to the novel stimuli. Specifically, participants make significantly
255 fewer errors of commission when the NoGo signal is red compared to green. There is no
256 difference in accuracy in the Novel condition when the NoGo signal is purple vs. blue. Condition
257 x Mapping interaction: $p = .005$. Error bars depict standard error of mean (SEM). Color of bars
258 reflects NoGo stimulus colors.

259

260 The omnibus regression test confirmed the significant effect of Condition. When
261 controlling for participants' age, gender, and self-reported impulsivity, the inclusion of the
262 Condition regressor in the hierarchical multiple regression model explained an additional 15.5%
263 of the variance in outcome-sensitivity: $\beta_{\text{Condition}} = -0.40$, $p = .006$, $\Delta R^2 = .15$, indicating
264 differential outcome-sensitivity across Familiar and Novel conditions. The details of this
265 omnibus regression test and beta weights of all model parameters can be found in the supplement
266 (S1 Table).

267 **Secondary index of outcome-sensitivity: Go accuracy**

268 A mixed-design ANOVA controlling for Age, Gender, and Impulsivity as covariates,
269 using Go accuracy as the DV revealed no main effect of Condition, $F(1,45) = 0.19$, $p = .667$, η_p^2
270 $< .01$, or Mapping, $F(1,45) = 2.93$, $p = 0.094$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$, but a near-significant Condition x
271 Mapping interaction at $F(1,44) = 3.93$, $p = .054$, $\eta_p^2 = .08$ (Fig 3). Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests
272 suggested a Go accuracy impairment only in the Familiar condition, $t(24) = 3.10$, $p = .005$,

273 whereas no mapping-related Go impairment was observed in the Novel condition, $t(24) = 0.28$, p
274 $= .785$.

275

276 **Fig 3. Familiar stimuli elicit mapping-related impairments in Go accuracy.** Subjects
277 perform worse when the Go signal is red compared to green. No such differences are seen in the
278 Novel condition, when Go signal is blue vs. purple. Condition x Mapping interaction: $p = .054$.
279 Error bars depict standard error of mean. Color of bars reflects Go stimulus colors.

280

281 The omnibus regression test also confirmed the role played by Condition on our
282 secondary assay of outcome-sensitivity, Go accuracy. Controlling for participants' age, gender,
283 and impulsivity scores, the inclusion of the Condition regressor significantly predicted mapping-
284 related Go accuracy changes: $\beta_{\text{Condition}} = -0.27$, $\Delta R^2 = .07$, $p = .049$ (see S2 Table for details).
285 Lastly, similar analyses performed with Go RT as DV yielded no significant results (all $ps >$
286 $.05$).

287 These Go accuracy data lend support to the hypothesis that while red and green stimuli
288 are rigid and habitual in triggering stop/go actions, blue and purple stimuli are not strongly
289 associated with either of the stop/go outcomes, but instead are labile and sensitive to the changes
290 in action-outcome contingencies.

291 **Discussion**

292 This experiment demonstrates that habitual behavior that capitalizes on existing, non-lab-
293 derived associations, can be demonstrated in the lab. By using the strong links between the
294 green-go and red-stop associations in a Go/NoGo task, we were able to quantify the degree of

295 flexibility to well-stamped in cue–response–outcome associations. Importantly, our results
296 suggest that responses are more outcome-insensitive (i.e., habitual) when the stimulus meanings
297 are congruent with our experiences with traffic lights in daily life (i.e., when a traffic light
298 indicating “stop” is red, rather than green, blue or purple). We note that incongruency-related
299 impairments alone are not enough to conclude that a response is habitual; rather this conclusion
300 must be verified by a comparison of the habitual associations (i.e., green–go, red–stop) with the
301 novel control condition Go/NoGo associations (i.e., purple–go, blue–stop). Specifically, these
302 red and green light stimuli triggered outcome-insensitive actions as evidenced by an accuracy
303 impairment when Go and NoGo contingencies were incongruent with their well-established
304 meanings outside of the lab. In contrast, the novel purple–go and blue–stop contingencies are not
305 well-established in one’s daily experiences, and their associative strength is limited to the
306 participant’s brief experience in the lab. Therefore, compared to the familiar stimuli, the actions
307 evoked by the novel stimuli are more flexible to contingency changes, as reflected by similar
308 NoGo and Go accuracy scores for blue vs. purple.

309 It can be argued that if these familiar red and green stimuli elicit outcome-insensitive
310 habits, one should also display lower accuracy rates to green-NoGo compared to blue or purple-
311 NoGo contingencies. However, our results above suggest that green-NoGo performance is
312 similar to those elicited by the novel stimuli. The comparable performance here may be due to
313 between-subject designs requiring more power compared to within-subject designs [36], thus
314 making it more difficult to detect a potential decrement in green-NoGo accuracy. We further
315 examine the unexpected pattern observed here in Experiments 2 and 3, with the prediction that
316 with sufficient power, the green-NoGo mapping will indeed elicit lower accuracy rates compared
317 to either Novel condition NoGo mapping.

318 Assessing motivational control, which attributes the source of one’s actions to either a
319 preceding cue or its consequences, has long relied on experimental manipulations of outcome
320 value. Rodent and human studies employing outcome-devaluation procedures of food rewards
321 have depended on the subjects’ comparable palatability of the foods used in the research, as well
322 as the development of an outcome-insensitive habit via over-training of these action-outcome
323 contingencies [11,32]. Other researchers have made use of the instructed devaluation of
324 outcomes, and computational investigations of choice strategy categorizations of model-based
325 and model-free performance [10]. Although tremendously effective in their own avenues, a
326 common area outside of the reach of these tasks is well-learned habits that better represent real
327 world scenarios.

328 Our Go/NoGo task with familiar and novel stimuli provides new possibilities in studying
329 habits. We demonstrate habits in a lab setting using stimuli that do not require lengthy training
330 sessions to develop strong stimulus–response associations. This time- and cost-effective
331 paradigm can serve as an especially useful tool in studying habits in expensive neuroimaging
332 contexts. Perhaps more importantly, taking advantage of well stamped-in cue–response
333 associations to study habits promises to contribute to translational science via new research
334 avenues. For instance, although contemporary paradigms have proved fruitful in studying the
335 formation and expression of habits, the nature of the tasks do not facilitate the investigation of
336 habit disruption. Novel associations that have become outcome-insensitive following limited,
337 lab-specific experience may not be rigid enough to represent real-world behaviors, and breaking
338 these weak habits may not be translationally valuable.

339 **Experiment 2**

340 We attempt the breaking of well-learned habits in Experiment 2, in which we boost
341 motivation via cumulative performance feedback prior to contingency reversal. Because the
342 motivational control framework attributes habits to be driven by antecedent cues and goal-
343 directed actions to be guided by resulting outcomes, we hypothesized that amplifying the
344 salience of the outcome may promote goal-directed performance at the expense of habitual
345 control, thus aiding in breaking the well-learned habit.

346 **Methods**

347 **Participants**

348 We recruited 100 undergraduate students (67 female and 33 male participants;
349 $M_{\text{Age}}=20.26$, $SD_{\text{Age}}=3.05$) from the Rutgers University-Newark campus. All participants
350 provided informed consent and received course credit for their participation. Study protocols
351 were approved by the Rutgers University Institutional Review Board. Participants were excluded
352 if they reported having color-blindness.

353 **Procedures**

354 For the Go/NoGo task, participants were randomly assigned to a Feedback Group or No
355 Feedback Group, and within each group, participants were randomly assigned to either Novel or
356 Familiar condition, as in Experiment 1.

357 **Feedback Group:** After completing the BIS, participants underwent a similar Go/NoGo
358 task to the one described in Experiment 1. Accordingly, each phase comprised 100 Go and 20
359 NoGo trials (5:1 Go–NoGo ratio). As reported in Experiment 1, all stimuli remained on the
360 screen for 400 ms, and responses produced brief feedback slides consisting of “correct” or

361 “incorrect” that offset after 400 ms (e.g., failure to withhold response in a NoGo trial produced
362 the “incorrect” text slide). Go responses had to be performed before stimulus offset to be
363 registered as correct by pressing the “1” key on the keyboard. The inter-trial intervals varied
364 randomly between 1200 and 2400 ms to ensure engagement with the task. All subjects
365 completed a brief practice session (six correct Go or NoGo responses) using the same stimuli
366 that comprised the task. This practice session was conducted with the experimenter present to
367 ensure the comprehension of instructions.

368 In the Familiar condition, participants were instructed to “Go” on green traffic light
369 stimuli as quickly and accurately as possible, and withhold responses to the red traffic light.
370 Next, a cumulative performance feedback manipulation followed, in which we displayed
371 subjects’ percent NoGo accuracy scores on the screen. Participants were informed that the
372 percentage score reflected their performance thus far (they were not informed that the score only
373 reflected NoGo accuracy), and in the next phase of the task, the Go and NoGo signals would be
374 reversed, such that they would need to make a response as quickly and accurately as possible to
375 the red traffic light, and refrain from responding to the green traffic light. Identical feedback and
376 task instructions were provided to the participants in the Novel condition regarding the change in
377 contingencies of the purple–Go and blue–NoGo associations. It should be noted that Experiment
378 1 reports differential mapping-related impairments across Familiar and Novel conditions
379 regardless of the order in which phases were completed (S1-S2 Tables). Therefore, unlike
380 Experiment 1, the phase orders in Experiment 2 were not counterbalanced, in that all participants
381 in the Familiar condition underwent the congruent (Green–Go, Red–NoGo) mappings first,
382 followed by the incongruent mappings; all participants in the Novel condition underwent the
383 Purple–Go, Blue–NoGo mapping first, and these mappings were reversed in the second phase.

384 This change in experimental protocol enabled rendering the congruent contingency as baseline
385 for participants in the Familiar group, and testing whether the presence of a mid-experiment
386 performance manipulation affected subsequent incongruent task performance. An exit survey
387 consisting of demographic questions concluded the experiment.

388 No Feedback Group: Participants in the No Feedback group underwent the same
389 procedures as the Feedback group, except that no cumulative performance feedback was
390 provided at any point. This No Feedback group served as a control condition for the Feedback
391 group, as well as an internal replication of Experiment 1.

392 **Data Analysis**

393 To examine the role of Feedback, mixed-design ANOVAs with NoGo accuracy as DV,
394 Feedback as a between-subjects and Mapping as a within-subjects factor were performed for
395 each Condition, using the controlled variables Age, Gender, and Impulsivity as covariates. Post-
396 hoc t-tests were carried out to examine mapping-related accuracy differences in both Feedback
397 groups. As a secondary measure of outcome-sensitivity, identical analyses were performed using
398 Go accuracy as a DV. Similar analyses were performed with Go RT as DV to further explore the
399 data. It should be noted that we did not test for a three-way Condition x Feedback x Mapping
400 interaction with any of our DVs, because our primary interest was determining whether
401 cumulative performance feedback has any effect on motivational control, not necessarily whether
402 this effect differs based on the familiarity of the stimuli. For example, we would not expect
403 cumulative feedback to promote accuracy improvements in the Familiar Condition while
404 impairing performance in the Novel condition.

405 Building from Experiment 1, we performed a confirmatory omnibus hierarchical multiple
406 regression to test the predictive strength of the Condition and Feedback variables on mapping-

407 related impairment. The summary of the omnibus regression test is reported below, and its
408 details can be found in the supplement (S3-S4 Tables).

409 We performed a power analysis using the effect size of the Condition x Mapping
410 interaction in Experiment 1 ($\eta_p^2 = .16$) and determined that a sample of 12 participants per group
411 would be sufficient to reach 80% statistical power to detect the effect of differential accuracy
412 rates due to Condition. We opted for this interaction value for our investigation of the role of
413 feedback, because we wanted our feedback-related assertions to be grounded in predictions of a
414 replicated effect of habitual performance to familiar, and goal-directed performance to novel
415 stimuli. To further increase statistical power due to the addition of a Feedback group per
416 condition, we increased our sample size to 25 per group—a total of 100 undergraduate students.

417 **Results**

418 **Primary index of outcome-sensitivity: NoGo accuracy**

419 We hypothesized that performance feedback may be a salient factor that can potentially
420 restore goal-directed control when managing these well-established associations. However,
421 cumulative performance feedback did not break the habits elicited by these familiar stimuli. We
422 performed a mixed-design ANOVA using NoGo accuracy as the DV, and Age, Gender, and
423 Impulsivity as covariates. We found no main effect of Feedback, $F(1,45) = 0.08, p = .778, \eta_p^2$
424 $<.01$, or Mapping, $F(1,45) = 1.96, p = .169, \eta_p^2 = .04$, and we also found that no significant
425 Feedback x Mapping interaction exists : $F(1,45) = 0.08, p = .776, \eta_p^2 < .01$ (see Fig 4). Post-hoc
426 t-tests revealed significant incongruency-related impairments in both Feedback, $t(24) = 2.72, p =$
427 $.012$, and No Feedback, $t(24) = 3.16, p = .004$, groups, indicating that cumulative performance
428 feedback did not prevent habitual control from dominating in the Familiar condition. Although
429 we were unable to break habits as hypothesized here, our findings lend support to the rigidity of

430 these well-learned associations that persevere in the face of an otherwise salient motivational
431 manipulation, performance feedback [33,34].

432

433 **Fig 4. Performance feedback does not significantly disrupt well-established habits.**

434 (A) In the Familiar condition, both Feedback and No Feedback groups suffer an incongruency-
435 related impairment ($p = .776$) in NoGo accuracy. (B) NoGo accuracy in the Novel condition is
436 not significantly improved by performance feedback (sig. interaction of $p = .033$, non-sig. post-
437 hoc t-tests: $p > .05$). Error bars denote SEM. Color of bars reflects NoGo stimulus colors.

438

439 We performed a similar ANOVA to determine whether cumulative performance tracking
440 improved goal-directed control of novel associations. As seen in Fig 4, we did not find a main
441 effect of Feedback, $F(1,45) = 0.40$, $p = .528$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$, or Mapping, $F(1,45) = 0.60$, $p = .442$, η_p^2
442 $= .01$, yet found a Feedback x Mapping interaction on NoGo accuracy in the Novel Condition
443 when controlling for Age, Gender, and Impulsivity as covariates: $F(1,45) = 4.84$, $p = .033$, $\eta_p^2 =$
444 $.10$. In sum, these results suggest that performance feedback alone may not be a salient enough
445 manipulation to restore goal-directed control.

446 **Secondary index of outcome-sensitivity: Go accuracy**

447 We performed a mixed-design ANOVA of the Familiar condition data using Go accuracy
448 as DV, Feedback as a between-, and Mapping as a within-subjects factor, with Age, Gender, and
449 Impulsivity as covariates. We found no significant main effect of Feedback $F(1,45) = 0.10$, $p =$
450 $.751$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$, or Mapping, $F(1,45) = 0.14$, $p = .705$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$, but found a significant Feedback
451 x Mapping interaction: $F(1,45) = 4.73$, $p = .035$, $\eta_p^2 = .09$ (Fig 5), suggesting that Go accuracy

452 was affected differentially by performance feedback. Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests of Go
453 accuracy across phases yielded evidence for an incongruency-related impairment in the No-
454 Feedback group, $t(24) = 3.22, p = .004$, but not in the Feedback group, $t(24) = 1.14, p = .265$.
455 Indeed, the omnibus hierarchical regression model attributes Condition and Feedback regressors
456 a significant role in predicting Go accuracy change ($\beta_{\text{Condition}} = -0.32, p = .001, \beta_{\text{Feedback}} = 0.28, p$
457 $= .003; \Delta R^2 = .18$).

458

459 **Fig 5. Performance feedback protects against habitual Go actions.** (A) When
460 participants received cumulative feedback on their performance, the Go accuracy impairment
461 otherwise observed without feedback was prevented when managing Familiar stimuli (Feedback
462 x Mapping interaction $p = .035$). (B) Performance feedback did not significantly improve Go
463 accuracy in the Novel condition (Feedback x Mapping interaction $p = .117$). Error bars denote
464 SEM. Color of bars reflects Go stimulus colors.

465

466 Despite the significant Feedback regressor in the omnibus test, we did not observe a
467 significant improvement effect due to cumulative performance feedback in the Novel condition
468 Go accuracy results. A mixed-design ANOVA using Go accuracy as the DV, Feedback as the
469 between-, and Mapping as the within-subjects factor, with Age, Gender, and Impulsivity as
470 covariates revealed no significant main effect of Feedback, $F(1,45) = 3.53, p = .067, \eta_p^2 = .07$, or
471 Mapping, $F(1,45) = 3.14, p = .083, \eta_p^2 = .06$, and no significant Feedback x Mapping interaction:
472 $F(1,45) = 2.56, p = .117, \eta_p^2 = .05$ (Fig 5). Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests suggest an
473 improvement effect only in the Feedback group: $t(24) = -2.39, p = .025$ with feedback, $t(24) =$
474 $0.32, p = .749$ without feedback. Given the lack of significant Feedback x Mapping interaction in

475 the Novel condition, we refrain from speculating further about the effect of cumulative
476 performance feedback on goal-directed Go responses. Similar analyses performed with Go RT as
477 DV yielded no significant findings (all $ps > .05$).

478 **Discussion**

479 In sum, we report that cumulative performance feedback is not sufficient to disrupt the
480 well-learned habits elicited by the familiar stimuli used in our task. However, supplementary
481 analyses using accessory measures of behavioral control (i.e., familiar Go accuracy), suggest that
482 feedback may be a useful tool in enhancing behavioral flexibility. Therefore, these patterns
483 warrant further examination of feedback to disrupt habitual control.

484 We conclude that cumulative performance feedback was not salient enough to break
485 habits according to our primary analyses, yet our findings were valuable in two ways. First, the
486 validity of our Go/NoGo task using well-learned associations to study habits relies on the rigidity
487 of these green-go and red-stop associations. The persistent habitual control exhibited here
488 despite the delivery of performance feedback lends credence to the associative strength of our
489 familiar stimuli. Next, given the modest signs of performance improvement due to the
490 presentation of performance information, early reports of combined (i.e., performance tracking
491 and monetary incentives) feedback's positive effects on performance, and the beneficial effects
492 of performance-contingent feedback on behavioral flexibility [23–27], we were motivated to
493 enhance the salience of the provided feedback to break well-learned habits. In Experiment 3, we
494 further amplified the salience of the outcome by pairing performance-contingent cumulative
495 feedback with a bonus monetary reward prior to changing Go and NoGo contingencies. We
496 studied the effects of monetary and cumulative performance feedback on Go/NoGo task

497 performance, and whether this amplification of outcome salience resulted in the breaking of a
498 well-learned habit, and improvement of novel, goal-directed performance.

499 **Experiment 3**

500 The promising but insufficient effect of cumulative performance feedback on the
501 motivational control of action motivated us to examine the combined effect of performance and
502 monetary input. Thus, we implemented in our mid-experiment performance feedback
503 manipulation a cash bonus. We hypothesized that this bonus, combined with performance
504 tracking information, would enhance goal salience and promote cognitive control processes to
505 override habitual control. Experimental procedures were identical to those described in
506 Experiment 2, with the addition of awarding participants in the Feedback group a surprise \$5
507 cash bonus before the change in Go/NoGo mappings.

508 **Methods**

509 **Participants**

510 To test the effects of dual feedback, we recruited the same number of participants for
511 Experiment 3 as in Experiment 1. One-hundred participants (76 female, 24 male participants;
512 $M_{\text{age}}=19.74$, $SD_{\text{age}}=2.79$) from the Rutgers University-Newark undergraduate research subject
513 pool were recruited for course credit. All participants provided informed consent. Study
514 protocols were approved by the Rutgers University Institutional Review Board. Participants were
515 excluded if they reported having color-blindness.

516 **Procedures**

517 After completing BIS, participants underwent a similar Go/NoGo task to the one
518 described in Experiment 2, where they were randomly assigned to Feedback and No Feedback

519 groups, and Familiar and Novel conditions. As in Experiment 2, each phase comprised 100 Go
520 and 20 NoGo trials (5:1 Go–NoGo ratio), and the stimuli remained on the screen for 400 ms. Go
521 and NoGo responses (or lack thereof) produced brief feedback slides consisting of “correct” or
522 “incorrect” that offset after 400 ms (e.g., failure to withhold response in a NoGo trial produced
523 the “incorrect” text slide). Go responses had to be performed before stimulus offset to be
524 registered as correct by pressing the “1” key on the keyboard. The inter-trial intervals varied
525 randomly between 1200 and 2400 ms to ensure engagement with the task. All participants
526 completed a brief practice session prior to the task, similar to the previous two experiments.

527 Identical to Experiment 2, in the Familiar condition’s first phase, participants were
528 instructed to “Go” on green traffic light stimuli as quickly and accurately as possible, and
529 “NoGo” on red traffic light stimuli. Next, a monetary and cumulative performance feedback
530 manipulation followed, in which we displayed participants’ cumulative NoGo accuracy as a
531 percentage score on the screen. Participants were informed that the percentage score reflected
532 their performance thus far. Additionally, unique to Experiment 3, the experimenter left the room,
533 and returned briefly after with a \$5 bill, and informed the participant that this money was earned
534 because of performance thus far in the task. Unbeknownst to the participants, the cash bonus was
535 not actually contingent on performance. The participant was then informed that the Go and
536 NoGo signals would be reversed, such that they would need to make a response as quickly and
537 accurately as possible to the red traffic light, and refrain from responding to the green traffic
538 light. Identical performance and monetary feedback information and reversal instructions were
539 provided to the participants in the Novel condition regarding the reversal of purple–Go and blue–
540 NoGo responses. An exit survey containing demographic questions concluded the experiment.

541 Participants in the No Feedback group underwent the same procedures as the Feedback
542 group, except for the feedback manipulation, in that participants received no cumulative
543 performance or monetary feedback.

544 **Data Analysis**

545 To reveal the potential effect of dual feedback on motivational control, we performed
546 mixed-design ANOVAs with NoGo accuracy as the DV, Feedback as a between- and Mapping
547 as a within-subjects factor for each Condition, using the Age, Gender, and Impulsivity variables
548 as covariates. Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests were carried out when necessary to examine
549 mapping-related accuracy differences in both Feedback groups. As a supplemental measure of
550 outcome-sensitivity, identical tests were performed using Go accuracy as the DV. Similar
551 analyses were performed with Go RT as DV to further explore the data. Identical to Experiment
552 2, we performed a confirmatory omnibus hierarchical multiple regression to test the predictive
553 strength of the Condition and Feedback variables on outcome-sensitivity. The summary of the
554 omnibus regression test are reported below, and the details can be found in the supplement (S5
555 and S6 Tables). Lastly, to further explore whether green-NoGo (i.e., the color-response mapping
556 that is incongruent with daily experiences) elicits lower accuracy rates compared to either Novel
557 color-response mapping with sufficient power, we pooled Experiment 2 and 3 data (due to their
558 identical No-Feedback procedures) and performed independent-samples t-tests to compare
559 green-NoGo accuracy to purple- and blue-NoGo accuracy in the No-Feedback conditions.

560 **Results**

561 **Primary index of outcome-sensitivity: NoGo accuracy**

562 We tested the role of dual feedback in disrupting habitual control to familiar stimuli by
563 performing a mixed-design repeated measures ANOVA on data from the Familiar condition,

564 using NoGo accuracy as the DV. We found no main effect of Feedback, $F(1,45) = 0.75, p = .390,$
565 $\eta_p^2 = .10,$ or Mapping, $F(1,45) = 1.51, p = .225, \eta_p^2 = .03,$ but found a significant Feedback x
566 Mapping interaction when controlling for Age, Gender, and Impulsivity: $F(1,45) = 5.24, p =$
567 $.027, \eta_p^2 = .10$ (see Fig 6). This interaction suggests differential impairment based on the
568 availability of cumulative performance and monetary feedback, such that the lack of feedback
569 when managing familiar stimuli resulted in a significantly larger incongruency-related decrement
570 in NoGo accuracy. Post-hoc t-tests confirmed a significant impairment in the No-Feedback
571 group, $t(24) = 5.25, p < .001,$ replicating our findings from Experiments 1 and 2, but no
572 significant effect in the Feedback group $t(24) = 1.92, p = .067.$

573

574 **Fig 6. Monetary and performance feedback disrupt habits while improving goal-**
575 **directed performance to newly-learned stimuli.** (A) Providing performance and monetary
576 feedback prevents the incongruency-related impairment normally indicative of habitual control
577 (Feedback x Mapping interaction: $p = .027$). (B) Dual feedback also improves goal-directed
578 control of novel associations significantly (Feedback x Mapping interaction: $p = .038$). Error bars
579 denote SEM. Color of bars reflects NoGo stimulus colors.

580

581 To understand whether dual feedback enhanced goal-directed performance to newly-
582 learned associations, we performed similar analyses on the Novel condition data. The mixed-
583 design ANOVA, when controlling for Age, Gender, and Impulsivity as covariates, yielded no
584 main effect of Feedback, $F(1,45) = 0.10, p = .756, \eta_p^2 < .01,$ or Mapping, $F(1,45) = 0.42, p =$
585 $.522, \eta_p^2 = .01;$ however, we found a significant Feedback x Mapping interaction on NoGo
586 accuracy in the Novel condition: $F(1,45) = 4.55, p = .038, \eta_p^2 = .09$ (Fig 6). Post-hoc t-tests

587 revealed significant improvement of NoGo accuracy in the Feedback group, $t(24) = -2.32$, $p =$
588 $.029$, which was not observed in the No-Feedback group, $t(24) = 0.08$, $p = .938$.

589 Consistent with these significant Feedback x Mapping interactions in both Familiar and
590 Novel conditions, our omnibus hierarchical regression model revealed Condition and Feedback
591 regressors to be significant predictors of outcome-sensitivity. Combined, Condition and
592 Feedback explained 26.6% of the variance in mapping-related NoGo accuracy change ($\beta_{\text{Condition}} =$
593 -0.43 , $p < .001$, $\beta_{\text{Feedback}} = 0.28$, $p = .003$; $\Delta R^2 = .27$). These data suggest that the differential
594 mapping-related NoGo impairment observed in Experiment 2 was replicated in Experiment 3,
595 and importantly, that dual feedback is able to significantly predict improvements in performance.
596 The entirety of the omnibus test can be found in the supplement (S5 Table).

597 **Secondary index of outcome-sensitivity: Go accuracy**

598 As a supplementary assay of behavioral control, we analyzed Go accuracy using similar
599 statistical procedures. We input Go accuracy as a DV, Feedback as a between-, and Mapping as a
600 within-subjects factor, with Age, Gender, and Impulsivity as covariates into a mixed-design
601 ANOVA. For the Familiar condition, we found no significant main effect of Feedback $F(1,45) =$
602 2.36 , $p = .131$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$, a significant main effect of Mapping, $F(1,45) = 4.15$, $p = .048$, $\eta_p^2 =$
603 $.08$, but no significant Feedback x Mapping interaction: $F(1,45) = 2.52$, $p = .119$, $\eta_p^2 = .05$ (Fig
604 7), suggesting that Go accuracy was not significantly affected by dual feedback in the Familiar
605 condition. However, post-hoc paired-samples t-tests revealed incongruency-related impairments
606 in Go actions specific to the No Feedback group: $t(24) = 2.58$, $p = .017$ without feedback vs.
607 $t(24) = 0.10$, $p = .925$ with dual feedback. Given the lack of interaction, we refrain from asserting
608 that dual feedback disrupts habitual Go actions—our secondary assay of outcome-sensitivity.

609

610 **Fig 7. Dual feedback improves goal-directed Go accuracy.** (A) Dual feedback did not
611 have a significant effect on the incongruency-related Go accuracy impairment when managing
612 well-learned cues ($p = .119$). (B) Dual feedback improved goal-directed Go responses to novel
613 associations ($p = .012$). Error bars denote SEM. Color of bars reflects Go stimulus colors.

614

615 We then tested the effect of dual feedback on Go accuracy in the Novel condition to
616 determine whether our enhanced feedback manipulation improved goal-directed control when
617 managing the contingency changes in newly-learned associations. We performed a mixed-design
618 repeated measures ANOVA using Go accuracy as the DV, Feedback as the between-, and
619 Mapping as the within-subjects factor, with Age, Gender, and Impulsivity as covariates. This
620 ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of Feedback, $F(1,45) = 5.49, p = .024, \eta_p^2 = .11$, and
621 no significant effect of Mapping, $F(1,45) = 0.49, p = .488, \eta_p^2 = .01$; however, it revealed a
622 significant Feedback x Mapping interaction: $F(1,45) = 6.93, p = .012, \eta_p^2 = .13$ (see Fig 7). Post-
623 hoc t-tests of each Feedback group confirms that monetary incentives paired with cumulative
624 performance feedback significantly improved newly-learned Go associations that are executed
625 by the goal-directed system: $t(24) = -4.86, p < .001$ with dual feedback, $t(24) = -0.51, p = .616$
626 with no feedback.

627 Our omnibus hierarchical regression model reveals that Condition and Feedback
628 regressors significantly predict mapping-related Go accuracy changes. These regressors in sum
629 account for 21% of the variance in the DV ($\beta_{\text{Condition}} = -.36, p < .001, \beta_{\text{Feedback}} = .28, p = .004$;
630 $\Delta R^2 = .21$). These values suggest that Go accuracy is selectively impaired in the Familiar
631 condition, and Feedback is able to promote goal-directed Go actions. Due to the non-significant

632 Condition x Mapping interaction in the Familiar condition data, we restrict the scope of our dual
633 feedback assertions on Go accuracy to the Novel condition. Details of the omnibus regression
634 can be found in the supplement (S6 Table). Lastly, similar analyses performed with Go RT as
635 DV yielded no significant findings (all $ps > .05$).

636 Finally, when we combine No-Feedback groups in Experiments 2 and 3 where
637 participants undergo identical procedures, we find that the green-NoGo mapping ($M_{\text{Green}} = 64.30$,
638 $SD_{\text{Green}} = 20.35$) yields significantly lower accuracy rates than either novel stimulus ($M_{\text{Blue}} =$
639 75.40 , $SD_{\text{Blue}} = 15.87$, $M_{\text{Purple}} = 74.10$, $SD_{\text{Purple}} = 16.03$) despite the between-subjects design
640 (green vs. blue: $t(98) = 3.04$, $p = .003$; green vs. purple: $t(98) = 2.67$, $p = .009$). This result
641 suggests that with sufficient power, we are able to detect that the incongruent color-response
642 mapping yields impaired performance in comparison to the newly-learned color-response
643 contingencies.

644 **Discussion**

645 Collectively, our Experiment 3 findings suggest that a global motivational boost
646 involving amplified performance and monetary feedback produces a habit-breaking effect that
647 restores goal-directed control. Without feedback, we observe a significant impairment in NoGo
648 and Go accuracy when familiar green and red light stimuli demand responses incongruent with
649 daily experiences. We find that this outcome-insensitive habit (i.e., inflexible, cue-driven
650 behavior that persists despite the outcome) of the green-go and red-stop actions is disrupted
651 when participants are provided dual feedback, such that the significant incongruency-related
652 NoGo impairment otherwise seen without feedback is prevented. Moreover, our dual feedback
653 manipulation also improves goal-directed control when managing newly-learned associations, as
654 evidenced by significant enhancements to NoGo and Go performance in the Novel group.

655 Possibly, cumulative performance feedback may be enhancing intrinsic motivation. The
656 percentage score may provide individuals the opportunity to track task performance
657 improvements, potentially boosting motivation to improve task-competence [35]. Paired with the
658 extrinsic reward of a monetary bonus, the dual feedback provided in our experiment may be
659 producing a global increase in motivation, resulting in more deliberate control of otherwise
660 inflexible behaviors.

661 Importantly, the beneficial effect of such feedback generalizes to more flexible goal-
662 directed performance, as we observe a significant improvement in NoGo and Go accuracy scores
663 to novel blue-go and purple-stop contingencies when participants are provided dual feedback.
664 Without feedback, we find no mapping-related difference in accuracy to novel stimuli, serving as
665 support for the flexible nature of these newly-learned associations that can readily be reassigned
666 per changes in one's environment. These findings identify dual feedback as a powerful predictor
667 of motivational control enhancement.

668 **General Discussion**

669 In a three-experiment study, we introduce a novel Go/NoGo task that capitalizes on
670 familiar, well stamped-in associations of red-stop and green-go to elicit habitual control, and
671 establish dual feedback (i.e., monetary reward paired with cumulative performance tracking) as
672 an intervention to break these well-learned habits to restore goal-directed control. The familiar
673 stimuli in our task evoke a color-response habit that is evident in our participants' difficulty
674 overriding the well-established red-stop and green-go associations. We found that the familiar
675 stimuli yield persistent instrumental responses even when these contingencies are manipulated to
676 render green-go and red-stop color-responses disadvantageous for task performance. We also
677 report enhanced goal-directed control (i.e., a disruption of the color-response habits) due to dual

678 feedback, lending support to the effectiveness and scope of our performance enhancing feedback
679 manipulation.

680 Accordingly, an important goal of our study was to establish our paradigm as a tool that
681 captures real-world habits. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated the rigidity of the familiar green–
682 go and red–stop contingencies compared to the newly-learned, flexible associations. The
683 outcome-insensitive responses elicited by the familiar stimuli were reflected by a significant
684 mapping-related impairment not observed when participants managed novel stimuli.
685 Specifically, participants had more difficulty with the green-NoGo association in relation to red-
686 NoGo, whereas variations in color-response mappings did not produce significant differences
687 when managing novel associations (e.g., blue-NoGo or purple-NoGo). It is worth mentioning
688 that the habits demonstrated here are not effector specific, in that we do not assert whether red
689 and green light stimuli trigger actions that are alike those that may be triggered in a driving
690 context (e.g., a foot-press response at red, or foot-release at green). Rather, the familiar stimuli
691 used in our task may be evoking a general approach and avoid response, which, in the context of
692 the task, is mapped onto Go and NoGo responses.

693 If these familiar red and green stimuli elicit outcome-insensitive habits, it may be argued
694 the color-response mapping that is incongruent with daily experiences should display the lowest
695 accuracy rates. However, in Experiment 1, green-NoGo accuracy was comparable to those of
696 blue or purple-NoGo mappings. This pattern may be due to between-subject designs requiring
697 more power than within-subject designs [36], thus making it more difficult to detect a potential
698 decrement in green-NoGo accuracy. To test this hypothesis, we combined the data from the No-
699 Feedback groups in Experiments 2 and 3, where participants underwent identical procedures. We
700 found that the green-NoGo mapping produced significantly lower accuracy rates than either

701 novel color-response mapping despite the between-subjects design. Furthermore, in a version of
702 this task that employs a within-subject design in which all participants manage familiar and
703 novel Go/NoGo contingencies, we indeed report significantly lower accuracy rates to green as a
704 NoGo stimulus compared to all other colors (Ceceli et al., in press).

705 We then tested the strength of the habits evoked in our paradigm by introducing a
706 motivation-based intervention: cumulative performance feedback. This type of feedback was not
707 successful in preventing habitual control, supporting the notion that these existing habits are rigid
708 enough to prevail even in the face of a motivational intervention. Nonetheless, performance
709 feedback was able to produce promising results via secondary assays of behavioral flexibility.
710 Namely, the prevention of habitual “Go” actions motivated the augmentation of our feedback
711 manipulation to amplify its effect on motivational control. In Experiment 3, our combined
712 delivery of performance and monetary feedback prevented the mapping-related impairment that
713 is the result of a habit-dominated action control system, possibly improving goal-directed control
714 by enhancing the salience of the outcome. In sum, we demonstrated well-existing habits, tested
715 the limits of their associative strength, and provided the foundation for better understanding the
716 restoration of goal-directed control.

717 Many habit paradigms that emulate the outcome-insensitive nature of habits have in
718 common a shortcoming that limits generalizability to the typical habit experience: difficulty
719 capturing well-learned habits in the lab that can provide a platform for studying habit disruption.
720 Habit strength is limited by the participants’ brief exposure to experimental paradigms, and
721 targeting these behaviors that are rendered inflexible in the lab may not be representative of
722 habits encountered in the real world [18]. Perhaps due to these difficulties, well-learned habits
723 and habit disruption research have been relatively better-represented in field experiments

724 compared to the laboratory setting. For example, several field studies have examined the efficacy
725 of interventions to change various presentations of daily habits, such as recycling and snacking
726 habits [37–39]. However, recent efforts to bridge lab and field experiments have shown
727 promising results. Although not an experiment of habit disruption, in a recent report, the slips-of-
728 action task in the lab was examined alongside a more ecologically-relevant representation of
729 habits—namely the habit of using one’s house keys. In this study, participants demonstrated an
730 outcome-insensitive habit by making key choice errors, such that they persisted in choosing the
731 incorrect key following a change in key covers. The attentional underpinnings of this behavior
732 significantly correlated with slips of action performance, underlining the importance of focusing
733 on well-established behaviors for an improved empirical approach to habit research [40].

734 One strategy that has proven beneficial in tackling habit change is implementation
735 intentions, which provides individuals with an if-then plan (i.e., “if X happens, I will do Y”; or in
736 a lab task, “if I see stimulus X, I will press Y”)—an aid to override unwanted or inflexible
737 behaviors [41]. In the lab, implementation intentions have produced promising results, albeit
738 with limited efficacy in disrupting strong habits. For instance, Webb and colleagues trained
739 participants for five days on a target detection task, and successfully disrupted this lab-automated
740 association using implementation intentions. However, this planning strategy did not break
741 unwanted smoking habits, lending credence to the idea that the experimental resources at our
742 disposal may not be sufficient in effectively stopping well-established habits [42]. Although this
743 study approached habitual control from an attentional rather than a value-driven perspective,
744 paralleling evidence from the motivational control literature has recently been reported. In
745 another lab study, Verhoeven et al. employed planning strategies within a single experimental
746 session to reduce action slips in an outcome-devaluation task [43]. Implementation intentions

747 were more effective than goal-intentions (an outcome-based planning strategy, such as “I will not
748 press for outcome X”) in reducing action slips when managing abstract images as outcomes,
749 suggesting that implementation intentions may serve as a promising strategy in studying habit
750 disruption—however, effective paradigms to demonstrate well-learned, outcome-insensitive
751 habits, and an intervention to disrupt them are needed. In our study, we developed a task that
752 allowed us to directly capture ecologically significant, well-established habits via the familiar
753 green–go and red–stop associations. We present our Go/NoGo task with familiar and novel
754 stimuli as a strong candidate for demonstrating habitual behaviors—bridging the success of field
755 studies with the rigor and controllability of lab experimentation. We also illustrate that a salient
756 feedback-based intervention may be utilized to shift cue-driven performance to become value-
757 driven, laying the foundation to translational applications.

758 Our work also asserts that the use of familiar stimuli may circumvent the obstacles of
759 training length and stimulus–response strength in habit research—an important step in improving
760 paradigms to foster effective habit disruption strategies. A few prior studies have considered a
761 similar approach. In a study investigating habits in substance use disorder, McKim and
762 colleagues induced stimulus familiarity by pre-training a set of stimuli, and tested the strength of
763 the familiar versus novel stimulus sets on a subsequent day via the reversal of a sub-set of these
764 contingencies [17]. They found that compared to healthy controls, individuals with substance use
765 disorder performed better in well-learned stimulus–response execution, yet exhibited
766 impairments in managing contingency reversal. In accord with these findings, our study reveals
767 that when managing contingencies that have been well-established throughout development—
768 beyond an experimental pre-training stage—the recruitment of the habit system may also be
769 evident in healthy individuals. Similarly, developmental and clinical researchers have used

770 familiar green and red stimuli in Go/NoGo tasks with children suffering from attention
771 deficit/hyperactivity disorder, as well as healthy adults to reduce task demands, and justified
772 their decision by identifying these colors as having developmental relevance [19,20]. These prior
773 reports highlight the utility of capitalizing on existing associations when examining habits,
774 especially for clinical examinations of behavioral rigidity. Thus, we further contribute to the
775 literature by introducing a task that requires minimal familiarity training, and by the inclusion of
776 a motivational strategy to disrupt the familiarity-driven outcome-insensitivity. These
777 contributions may be especially useful for optimizing costly fMRI designs, and benefit future
778 translational neuroscience work that aims to reveal the neural bases of habit disruption.

779 The science of habits is a domain with direct clinical applications. The treatment of habit-
780 based pathologies (e.g., obsessive-compulsive disorder) are within the scope of the habit
781 literature, yet our field's disproportionate focus on the formation of rigid behaviors, rather than
782 overcoming well-formed habits, limits the translational impact of our research [44]. Indeed,
783 several studies have highlighted the habitual aspects of various clinical disorders, as well as their
784 underlying neural mechanisms [e.g., 7,8,17,45–50]. Researchers have further employed
785 neurotransmitter depletion to emulate the biochemical profiles of psychopathologies to detect
786 action control deficits [9,51,52]. Sub-clinical symptom presentation has also been investigated
787 from the perspective of action control [53–56]. Furthermore, the multi-faceted role of stress in
788 dictating motivated behaviors has been extensively demonstrated under acute, chronic,
789 interaction of acute and chronic, and pharmacologically induced stress hormone reactivity [57–
790 64]. Therefore, although researchers have characterized numerous contexts in which habits are
791 prevalent, interventions that restore goal-directed motivational control have not been examined
792 with similar vigor. As we demonstrate the habit-breaking effects of pairing monetary reward

793 with cumulative performance feedback to amplify the salience of goals, we highlight the need for
794 research avenues that not only identify goal-directed control deficits in clinical disorders, but
795 work toward restoring these deficits to improve treatment strategies and quality of life.

796 **Conclusions**

797 The disproportionate focus on habit formation and expression in the literature motivated
798 us to direct our efforts to an area of habit research that has been less-explored: habit disruption.
799 Although much research now confirms the habitual aspects of various pathologies, studies
800 examining the restoration of these behavioral rigidities are relatively scarce. Here, we introduce a
801 task that allows us to examine a more complete signature of motivational control by capturing
802 well-learned habits and newly-learned goal-directed behaviors, as well as the possibility to test
803 manipulations that may restore deliberate control. This method may be especially beneficial for
804 understanding the neural markers of motivational control in healthy and compromised
805 populations, as it capitalizes on existing associations that do not require extended lab-training.
806 We also underline the efficacy of feedback in disrupting well-learned habits and promoting
807 outcome-driven, goal-directed behaviors. This motivation-based manipulation may further
808 inform the mechanisms underlying the habit disruption process—a translationally valuable
809 research domain with direct clinical relevance.

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1001

1002 **Supporting information**

1003 **S1 Table. Summary of the Hierarchical Multiple Regression Model for Outcome-**
1004 **Insensitivity as Assayed by Δ NoGo_Accuracy.** Top layer of table depicts all regressors
1005 included in the hierarchical model and their respective statistics. Bottom layer of table, Model
1006 Summary Statistics, depicts the predictive strength of each model. Delta R^2 (ΔR^2) and
1007 corresponding F_{change} values denote the specific improvement of Model 2 over Model 1 in
1008 predicting the dependent variable. Toler. = Tolerance; VIF = Variance Inflation Factor.
1009 Significant p-values (alpha = .05) depicted in bold typeface.

1010 **S2 Table. Summary of the Hierarchical Multiple Regression Model for Outcome-**
1011 **Insensitivity as Assayed by Δ Go_Accuracy.** Top layer of table depicts all regressors included
1012 in the hierarchical model and their respective statistics. Bottom layer of table, Model Summary
1013 Statistics, depicts the predictive strength of each model. Delta R^2 (ΔR^2) and corresponding F_{change}
1014 values denote the specific improvement of Model 2 over Model 1 in predicting the dependent
1015 variable. Toler. = Tolerance; VIF = Variance Inflation Factor. Significant p-values (alpha = .05)
1016 depicted in bold typeface.

1017 **S3 Table. Summary of the Hierarchical Multiple Regression Model for Outcome-**
1018 **Insensitivity as Assayed by Δ NoGo_Accuracy.** Top layer of table depicts all regressors
1019 included in the hierarchical model and their respective statistics. Bottom layer of table, Model
1020 Summary Statistics, depicts the predictive strength of each model. Delta R^2 (ΔR^2) and
1021 corresponding F_{change} values denote the specific improvement of Model 2 over Model 1 in
1022 predicting the dependent variable. Toler. = Tolerance; VIF = Variance Inflation Factor.
1023 Significant p-values (alpha = .05) depicted in bold typeface.

1024 **S4 Table. Summary of the Hierarchical Multiple Regression Model for Outcome-**
1025 **Insensitivity as Assayed by Δ Go_Accuracy.** Top layer of table depicts all regressors included
1026 in the hierarchical model and their respective statistics. Bottom layer of table, Model Summary
1027 Statistics, depicts the predictive strength of each model. Delta R^2 (ΔR^2) and corresponding F_{change}
1028 values denote the specific improvement of Model 2 over Model 1 in predicting the dependent

1029 variable. Toler. = Tolerance; VIF = Variance Inflation Factor. Significant p-values (alpha = .05)
1030 depicted in bold typeface.

1031 **S5 Table. Summary of the Hierarchical Multiple Regression Model for Outcome-**
1032 **Insensitivity as Assayed by Δ NoGo_Accuracy.** Top layer of table depicts all regressors
1033 included in the hierarchical model and their respective statistics. Bottom layer of table, Model
1034 Summary Statistics, depicts the predictive strength of each model. Delta R^2 (ΔR^2) and
1035 corresponding F_{change} values denote the specific improvement of Model 2 over Model 1 in
1036 predicting the dependent variable. Toler. = Tolerance; VIF = Variance Inflation Factor.
1037 Significant p-values (alpha = .05) depicted in bold typeface.

1038 **S6 Table. Summary of the Hierarchical Multiple Regression Model for Outcome-**
1039 **Insensitivity as Assayed by Δ Go_Accuracy.** Top layer of table depicts all regressors included
1040 in the hierarchical model and their respective statistics. Bottom layer of table, Model Summary
1041 Statistics, depicts the predictive strength of each model. Delta (Δ) values denote the specific
1042 improvement of Model 2 over Model 1 in predicting the dependent variable. Toler. = Tolerance;
1043 VIF = Variance Inflation Factor. Significant p-values (alpha = .05) depicted in bold typeface.


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
Familiar Condition

Novel Condition


Phase 1: Instrumental response made to Go, and withheld to NoGo signals.




Phase 2: Go signals become NoGo signals and vice versa.







Familiar stimuli elicit mapping-related impairments in NoGo accuracy






Familiar stimuli elicit mapping-related impairments in Go accuracy





A**Familiar****B****Novel**

A**Familiar****B****Novel**

A**Familiar****B****Novel**