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No effect of monetary reward in a visual working memory task

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NOTE

This is a revision of an earlier reviewed manuscript, but because of an unusually long delay on our end in finishing the revision, we had to submit it as a new manuscript. In case you are one of the original Reviewers, please see the “Responses to the Reviewers” that we attached as a Supplement. Changes compared to the original manuscript are indicated in red.

ABSTRACT

Previous work has shown that humans distribute their visual working memory (VWM) resources flexibly across items: the higher the importance of an item, the better it is remembered. A related, but much less studied question is whether people also have control over the *total* amount of VWM resource allocated to a task. Here, we approach this question by testing whether increasing monetary incentives results in better overall VWM performance. In **three** experiments, subjects performed a delayed-estimation task on the Amazon Turk platform. **In the first two experiments**, four groups of subjects received a bonus payment based on their performance, with the maximum bonus ranging from \$0 to \$10 between groups. We found no effect of the amount of bonus on intrinsic motivation or on VWM performance in either experiment. **In the third experiment, reward was manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis using a within-subjects design. Again, no evidence was found that VWM performance depended on the magnitude of potential reward.** These results suggest that **encoding quality** in visual working memory is insensitive to monetary reward, which has implications for resource-rational theories of VWM.

35 INTRODUCTION

36 A central question in research on human visual working memory (VWM) is how much
37 flexibility exists in how the system distributes its resource across encoded items (Luck & Vogel,
38 2013; Ma et al., 2014). The answer to this question partly depends on how one conceptualizes
39 the nature of VWM resource. One class of models postulates that VWM consists of a small
40 number of “slots” that each provide an indivisible amount of encoding resource (e.g., (Awh et
41 al., 2007; Cowan, 2001; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Rouder et al., 2008; Zhang & Luck, 2008)). Since
42 the number of slots is typically assumed to be very small (3 or 4), these models allow for
43 virtually no flexibility in resource allocation. A competing class of models conceptualizes
44 VWM as a continuous resource (e.g., (Bays & Husain, 2008; Fougne et al., 2012; Keshvari et
45 al., 2013; Shaw, 1980; van den Berg et al., 2012; Wilken & Ma, 2004)), sometimes in
46 combination with a limit on the number of encoded items (Sims et al., 2012; van den Berg et
47 al., 2014). Since a continuous resource can be divided into arbitrarily small packages, these
48 models allow for a high degree of flexibility in resource allocation.

49 Several recent studies have found evidence for flexibility in VWM resource allocation.
50 First, it has been found in multiple experiments that when one item in a stimulus array is more
51 likely to be selected for test than other items (i.e., have a higher “probing probability”), subjects
52 remember this item with better precision (Bays, 2014; Bays et al., 2011; Emrich et al., 2017;
53 Gorgoraptis et al., 2011; Yoo et al., 2018; Zokaei et al., 2011). **Similarly, people remember**
54 **items associated with a higher reward better than items associated with a lower reward**
55 **(Klyszejko et al., 2014).** In addition, it has been reported that subjects can make a tradeoff
56 between the number of items in VWM and the quality with which they are encoded (Fougne,
57 Cormiea, Kanabar, & Alvarez, 2016; however see Zhang & Luck, 2011). **By allocating more**
58 **resources to the more important items within a display, subjects in these studies increased their**
59 **performance compared to what it would have been if they had encoded all items within each**
60 **display with the same precision. This suggests that VWM resource allocation may be driven by**
61 **a rational policy.**

62 We recently formalized this suggestion by modeling VWM as a rational system that
63 balances the amount of invested resource against expected task performance: the more there is
64 at stake, the more resource is allocated for encoding (van den Berg & Ma, 2018). This
65 “resource-rational” interpretation of VWM predicts two kinds of flexibility in the allocation of
66 VWM resource. First, items of unequal importance are assigned unequal amounts of encoding
67 resource. **For example, when one item in a memory array is more likely to be probed, the**
68 **resource-rational strategy would be to encode it with higher precision than the other items. In**

69 support of this prediction, we found that the model provided excellent quantitative fits to data
70 from previous experiments that varied probing probabilities (Bays, 2014; Emrich et al., 2017).
71 A second prediction made by the model is that *tasks* of unequal importance are assigned unequal
72 amounts of *total* resource: the higher the incentive to perform well on a task, the more VWM
73 resource a subject should be willing to invest. In support of the second kind of flexibility, it has
74 been found that subjects who are encouraged to “try to remember all items” in a change
75 detection task have higher estimated numbers of slots than subjects who are told to “just do
76 your best” or to “focus on a subset” (Bengson & Luck, 2016). Moreover, there is evidence that
77 people can flexibly trade off resources between auditory and visual working memory based on
78 the amount of reward associated with each task (Morey et al., 2011). Finally, there are
79 indications that retro-cueing can increase net VWM capacity (Myers et al., 2018).

80 In the present study, we examine whether the precision with which people encode a set
81 of stimuli in VWM depends on the amount of monetary reward they get for good performance.
82 We performed three experiments in which subjects earned a performance-contingent monetary
83 bonus on top of a base payment. When encoding is costly, a rational observer should adjust its
84 total amount of invested VWM resource to the amount of performance-contingent bonus: the
85 higher the potential bonus, the more effort should be put into the task. We did not find evidence
86 for such an effect in any of the experiments. In opposition to the prediction following from a
87 resource-rational theory of VWM (Van den Berg & Ma, 2018), the present results suggests that
88 encoding precision in VWM is insensitive to monetary reward.

89

90 **EXPERIMENT 1**

91

92 **Data and code availability**

93 All data, Matlab analysis scripts to reproduce figures of results, and JASP files with statistical
94 analyses are available at <https://osf.io/mwz27/>.

95

96 **Recruitment**

97 Subjects were recruited on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform, where the experiment was
98 posted as a “Human Intelligence Task”. The experiment was visible only to subjects who were
99 located in the USA, had not participated in the experiment before, and had an approval rate of
100 95% or higher. A total of 355 subjects signed up, of which 156 were disqualified due to failing
101 the post-instruction quiz (see below). The remaining 199 subjects were randomly assigned to
102 four groups ($n=49, 47, 47, 46$) that differed in the total amount of bonus they could earn by

103 performing well (\$0, \$2, \$6, \$10). Besides the bonus, subjects received a \$1 base payment. The
104 experiment was approved by the Institutional Review Board of New York University.

105

106 Stimuli and task

107 On each trial, the subject was presented with 1, 2, 4, 6, or 8 Gabor patches, which were placed
108 along an invisible circle around a central fixation point (Figure 1A). We refer to the number of
109 presented items as the set size, which varied from trial to trial in a pseudo-random manner. The
110 orientation of each patch was drawn independently from a uniform distribution over all possible
111 orientations. The stimulus appeared for 50 milliseconds and was followed by an empty screen
112 with a duration of 1 second (memory period). Thereafter, a randomly oriented Gabor patch
113 appeared at one of the previous stimulus locations, whose initial orientation was randomly
114 drawn and could be adjusted through mouse movement. The task was to match the orientation
115 of this probe stimulus with the remembered orientation at that location. **Only one item was**
116 **probed on each trial.** After submitting the response, the error between the correct orientation
117 and the reported orientation, ϵ , was converted into an integer score between 0 and 10, with more
118 points assigned for smaller errors (see Appendix for a visualization of the scoring function).
119 Feedback was provided after each trial by showing the obtained score and two lines that
120 corresponded with the correct and responded orientations.

121




Figure 1 | Experimental procedure. (A) Illustration of a single trial in Experiment 1 (not to scale). Subjects were briefly presented with 1, 2, 4, 6, or 8 Gabor patches, which they had to keep in memory during the delay period. Thereafter, a randomly oriented Gabor patch would appear at one of the previous stimulus locations. The task was to match the orientation of this stimulus with the remembered orientation of the stimulus that had appeared earlier at this location. The procedure in Experiment 2 was the same, except that no feedback was shown. (B) Instructions provided to the subjects in Experiment 1.

122

123

124 **Procedure**

125 At the start of the experiment, subjects received written instructions about the task and about
126 how their performance would be scored (Figure 1B). Next, they were informed about the bonus
127 payment. For a subject in the condition with a maximum bonus of \$10, the text in this screen
128 would read “*After the experiment, we will randomly select **THREE** trials and use the **HIGHEST**
129 **score among the three to decide how much bonus you will receive [...]** You will receive \$1 for
130 **each point you get on a trial. For example, if your highest score among the three trials is 7**
131 **points, then your actual bonus is \$7. You will not receive any bonus if you get 0 points!**”.
132 Thereafter, they performed 15 practice trials that were identical to trials in the actual
133 experiment. After finishing these trials, a multiple-choice quiz was presented with three
134 questions to test the subject’s understanding of the task and the potential bonus payment.
135 Subjects who failed on at least one of these questions were disqualified from the experiment.
136 The remaining subjects performed 250 trials of the delayed-estimated task with the five set sizes
137 pseudo-randomly intermixed. To check if subjects were paying attention, we asked them at
138 three points in the experiment to press the space bar within 4 seconds (**catch trials**). Subjects
139 who at least once failed to do this were presumably not paying attention and were therefore
140 excluded from the analyses.*

141

142 **Results**

143 Data from 10 subjects were excluded from the analyses because they failed to respond to at
144 least one of the three **catch trials**. Of the remaining 189 subjects, another 35 were excluded
145 because they had response error distributions that did not significantly differ from a uniform
146 distribution, as assessed by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with a significance level of 0.05. **The**
147 **final group on which we performed the analysis thus consisted of 154 subjects, with 37, 41, 38,**
148 **and 38 in the \$0, \$2, \$6, and \$10 conditions, respectively. To test for effects of reward level on**
149 **VWM performance, we computed for each subject the circular variance¹ of the response error**
150 **distribution at each set size** (Figure 2A, left). We performed a Bayesian Repeated-Measures
151 ANOVA (JASP Team, 2018; Rouder et al., 2012) on these measures, with set size as a within-
152 subjects factor and bonus level as a between-subjects factor. The results indicated extremely

¹ The circular variance was computed as $1 - R$, where R is the length of the resultant vector of the subject’s estimation errors, measured as the circular distance between the true orientation and the response.

153 strong evidence for a main effect of set size ($BF_{\text{incl}=\infty}$), but evidence *against* a main effect of
154 bonus level ($BF_{\text{excl}=21}$)².

155

156 Discussion

157 The results of Experiment 1 showed no evidence of an effect of performance-contingent reward
158 on VWM performance. One possible explanation of this null result is that resource allocation
159 in VWM is insensitive to monetary reward. However, there are at least two factors in the
160 experimental design that may have interfered with the reward manipulation. First, subjects
161 received trial-to-trial feedback. Being constantly confronted with their own performance may
162 have motivated them to perform as well as possible regardless of the amount of bonus they
163 could earn. Second, since the bonus was mentioned only at the beginning of the experiment,
164 subjects may have performed the task without having the bonus strongly on their minds. To
165 address these potential confounds, we ran a second experiment in which subjects did not receive
166 trial-to-trial feedback and were reminded regularly of the bonus.

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


Figure 2 | Effect of monetary reward level on memory precision and self-reported motivation scores in Experiments 1 and 2. (A) Subject-averaged circular variance of the estimation error distribution as a function of the amount of potential bonus in Experiments 1 (left) and 2 (right). (B) Intrinsic Motivation Inventory scores as a function of the amount of potential bonus, split by item category. Error bars indicate 1 s.e.m.

169

170

² BF_{incl} measures how likely the data are in models that *include* the factor compared to how likely they are in models *exclude* the factor. Likewise, $BF_{\text{excl}} (=1/BF_{\text{incl}})$ measures how likely the data are in models that *exclude* the factor compared to how likely they are in models that *include* the factor.

171 **EXPERIMENT 2**

172

173 **Recruitment**

174 A new cohort of subjects was recruited on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. The
175 experiment was visible only to subjects who were located in the USA, had not participated in
176 the experiment before, and had an approval rate of 95% or higher. A total of 241 subjects signed
177 up, of whom 41 were disqualified due to failing the post-instruction quiz. The remaining 200
178 subjects were randomly assigned to four groups ($n=52, 48, 50, 50$) that again differed in the
179 amount of potential bonus payment. The base payment was \$5 and the potential bonus amounts
180 were \$0.50, \$1, \$2, and \$4. The experiment was approved by the Institutional Review Board of
181 New York University.

182

183 **Stimuli and procedure**

184 The stimuli and procedure for Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1, except for the
185 following differences. First, subjects were reminded of the bonus four times in the instruction
186 screen (compared to only once in Experiment 1) and during the task itself the following message
187 appeared after every 50 trials: “*You have completed X% of the Experiment. Remember that you*
188 *have the chance to earn a \$Y bonus!*”, where X and Y were determined by the number of
189 completed trials and the amount of bonus, respectively. Second, no performance feedback was
190 given, neither during practice nor during the actual experiment. Third, the length of the practice
191 phase was reduced to 10 trials, but three “walk-through trials” were added at the start in which
192 subjects were fully guided with additional written instructions. Lastly, after the experiment,
193 subjects rated 20 items that we had selected from the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (McAuley
194 et al., 1989; Ryan, 1982). **We only included the subscales “Interest/Enjoyment” (7 items, such**
195 **as “This activity was fun to do”), “Perceived competence” (6 items, such as “I was pretty skilled**
196 **at this activity”), and “Perceived Choice” (7 items, such as “I did this activity because I wanted**
197 **to”) in our questionnaire. Subjects rated these items on a Likert scale from 1 (“not at all true”)**
198 **to 7 (“very true”). An overview of all items is found in the Appendix.**

199

200 **Results**

201 Data from 27 subjects were excluded because they failed to respond to one of the **catch trials**
202 (9 subjects) or had a response error distribution that did not significantly differ from a uniform
203 distribution according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (18 subjects). **After these exclusions, we**
204 **had 47, 42, 44, and 40 subjects in \$0.50, \$1, \$2, and \$4 conditions, respectively.** We performed

205 the same statistical analyses as in Experiment 1 on the data from the remaining 173 subjects
206 (Figure 2A, right). Again, we found extremely strong evidence for a main effect of set size
207 ($BF_{incl}=\infty$) and evidence *against* a main effect of bonus level ($BF_{excl}=2.9$). Hence, it seems
208 unlikely that the absence of an effect in Experiment 1 was due to subjects being unaware of the
209 potential bonus payment or due to presence of trial-to-trial feedback.

210 Next, we assessed whether bonus size affected the subjects' scores on the intrinsic
211 motivation inventory questions (Figure 2B). Using Bayesian one-way ANOVAs, we found that
212 there was no effect in any of the three categories: $BF_{10}=0.275$ for mean "interest" scores,
213 $BF_{10}=0.174$ for mean "perceived competence" scores, and $BF_{10}=0.034$ for mean "perceived
214 choice" scores. Nevertheless, we noticed that there was considerable variation in the intrinsic
215 motivation scores across subjects, especially in the "Interest" and "Perceived competence"
216 categories (Figure 3A). Therefore, we next tested if there was an effect of motivation scores on
217 VWM performance. To this end, we grouped subjects from Experiment 2 into "low motivation"
218 and "high motivation" subgroups by using a median split on each of the three categories of the
219 Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (Figure 3B). To examine whether scores in any of the three
220 categories is predictive of VWM performance, we performed a repeated-measures Bayesian
221 ANOVA with set size as within-subjects factor and motivation score ("low" and "high") as a
222 between-subjects factor. All three tests provided evidence for the null hypothesis that there was
223 no performance difference between subjects in the low and high motivation subgroups (Interest:
224 $BF_{excl}=8.3$; Perceived competence: $BF_{excl}=4.8$; Perceived choice: $BF_{excl}=4.8$).

225

226 Discussion

227 The aim of Experiment 2 was to test whether the null effect from Experiment 1 persists if we
228 remove trial-by-trial feedback and remind subjects more often of the potential bonus. We found
229 that this was the case: again, there was no effect of monetary reward on VWM performance.
230 This further strengthens the hypotheses that VWM resource allocation is independent of
231 monetary reward. We also found that intrinsic motivation did not depend on the amount of
232 monetary reward. **Therefore, our present results are limited to the realm of external motivation
233 manipulations. It would be useful to also test for effects in a design where intrinsic motivation
234 is experimentally manipulated.**

235 **In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, we manipulated reward using a between-subjects
236 design. Hence, for each subject the expected reward was the same for each item on each trial.
237 However, there are previous indications that effects of monetary reward on cognitive
238 performance are *relative* rather than absolute, which can be detected using within-subject**

239 designs in which reward is manipulated trial-by-trial (e.g. Chiew & Braver, 2016; Engelmann
240 et al., 2009; Etzel et al., 2016; Hall-McMaster et al., 2019; Kleinsorge & Rinkebar, 2012;
241 Locke & Braver, 2008; Poh et al., 2019; Shen & Chun, 2011). To test whether VWM encoding
242 quality is affected by relative reward levels, we performed a third experiment in which reward
243 was varied on a trial-by-trial level.
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


Figure 3 | Comparison of VWM performance between subjects with low and high scores on the Intrinsic Motivation Inventory (IMI). (A) Distribution of average IMI scores, split by question category. (B) Circular variance of the response error plotted separately for subjects with below-median and above-median scores on the IMI questionnaire.

247

248

249 **EXPERIMENT 3**

250

251 **Preregistration**

252 We preregistered the methods of Experiment 3 at the Open Science Foundation platform (URL:
253 <https://osf.io/dkzax>). The report below is in accordance with the preregistration, except when
254 explicitly indicated otherwise.

255

256 **Recruitment**

257 A third cohort of subjects was recruited on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. The
258 experiment was visible only to subjects who were located in the USA, had not participated in
259 the experiment before, and had an approval rate of 95% or higher. Data was collected from a
260 total of 201 subjects, which were randomly assigned to two groups that differed in how the final
261 payment was calculated (see below for details).

262
263 **Stimuli and procedure**

264 Experiment 3 was similar to Experiments 1 and 2, but with a few important differences. Just as
265 in the first two experiments, the instructions at the start of the experiment informed subjects
266 that they would score points on each trial and that their score would be converted into a
267 monetary bonus. Subjects received a score between 0 and 10 points on each trial, depending on
268 how close their response was to the correct response. The mapping between the absolute error,
269 ε (in degrees), and the score, s , was similar as in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Appendix). In the
270 instructions, this mapping was visualized to the subject by showing an example error
271 corresponding to each of the 11 possible scores, similar to the way feedback was provided in
272 Experiment 1 (Figure 1A). Subjects were also informed that each trial had a *score multiplier*
273 that could take values 1, 2, and 4. The multiplier was visualized as a text “1x”, “2x”, or “4x” at
274 the center of the screen. To ensure that subjects would not forget about the multiplier, the text
275 stayed on the screen throughout the entire trial (it also served as a fixation marker). The
276 subject’s response score was on each trial multiplied by the trial’s score multiplier. At the end
277 of the trial, the error was visualized using two lines (Figure 1A) and feedback about the gained
278 score was provided by showing “[multiplier] x [response score] = [multiplied score]” at the
279 fixation location (e.g., “2 x 6 = 12”).

280 After reading the instructions, subjects were presented with three walk-through trials
281 (one for each multiplier). These self-paced trials explained once again the relation between the
282 response error and the score as well as the role of the score multiplier. Next, they performed 18
283 practice trials that were identical to the experimental trials, but which were not included in the
284 analyses. Thereafter, they were presented with three multiple-choice questions to check if they
285 had understood the task and the way that their payment was calculated. Subjects who failed to
286 answer all three questions correctly, were disqualified from performing the experiment.
287 Subjects who passed the quiz would next start the main experiment, which consisted of 40 trials
288 for each combination of set size (1, 3, or 6) and multiplier (1x, 2x, 4x), presented in random
289 order (360 trials in total). Note that here we reduced the number of trials from 50 (in the

290 preregistration) to 40, which was done to keep the experiment duration to approximately an
291 hour. After performing the experiment, subjects were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 to 5
292 how much effort they you put in trials with a 1x, 2x, and 4x score multiplier (they provided
293 three ratings, one for each multiplier).

294

295 **Two payment conditions (between-subject factor)**

296 Since we measure hundreds of trials per subject, the expected reward per trial is quite low. A
297 risk of this is that at the level of a single trial, subjects may perceive the expected bonus as so
298 low that it is not really different from getting no bonus at all. Therefore, we divided subjects
299 into two groups which differed in how their monetary bonus was calculated. In the first group,
300 the bonus was calculated based on the summed score across *all* trials, with every 8 points being
301 worth 1 cent. In the second group, the bonus was based on the total score of 9 trials (3 for each
302 multiplier) that would randomly be selected after the experiment, with each 20 points being
303 worth \$1. These numbers were chosen such that the maximum total reward as well as the
304 expected reward under guessing were the same in both groups. However, subjects in the second
305 group may have felt that there was more at stake on any given trial than subjects in the first
306 group (“what if this is one of the bonus trials?”). Note that the bonus calculations differed
307 slightly from how we had formulated them in the preregistration (“Every 15 points in your total
308 multiplied scores is worth 2 cents” for the all-trials group and “Every 15 points in your total
309 multiplied score is worth \$1” for the nine-random-trials group), but the underlying idea was
310 still the same.

311

312 **Results**

313 A total of 52 subjects were excluded because they failed to respond to one or more of
314 the catch trials. Another 49 subjects were excluded because a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test failed
315 to reject the hypothesis (at a $p < 0.05$ level) that their response error distribution was uniform,
316 suggesting that they submitted random responses. The analyses reported below were performed
317 on the 100 remaining subjects (with 52 and 48 in the first and second payment group,
318 respectively). Unfortunately, due to a technical error, the post-experiment questionnaire data
319 were collected for only a few of the subjects; we did not use these data in any of our analyses.

320 We performed a Bayesian ANOVA with performance (measured as the circular
321 variance of the response error) as the dependent variable, multiplier and set size as within-
322 subject factors, and payment condition as a between-subject factor. The results revealed

323 extremely strong evidence for a set size effect ($BF_{incl} > 10^{13}$), but no evidence for an effect of
324 payment condition ($BF_{excl} = 9.0$) or multiplier ($BF_{excl} = 38$) (Figure 4).

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


Figure 4 | Effect of monetary reward level on memory precision in Experiment 3. (A) Subject-averaged circular variance of the estimation error distribution as a function of the trial-by-trial score multiplier. Payment Condition 1 refers to the group of subjects whose bonus was calculated on the score summed across all trials and Payment Condition 2 to the group whose bonus was calculated on 9 randomly selected trials. Error bars indicate 1 s.e.m.

327

328

329 While not specified in the preregistration, we also performed a linear mixed modelling
330 analysis using the *lme4* package for R (Bates et al., 2015). This analysis is possibly more
331 powerful in detecting effects, because it can deal with individual differences in baseline
332 performance. Set size, multiplier, and payment condition were specified as fixed effects and the
333 intercept for subjects as a random effect. To estimate the evidence for an effect, we performed
334 a Chi-square test between the full model and the model with the effect removed. Consistent
335 with the ANOVA, this provided strong evidence for an effect of set size ($p < 0.0001$), but no
336 evidence for an effect of multiplier ($p=0.14$) or payment condition ($p=0.56$).

337 Next, we analyzed the data at the level of individuals by performing the model-based
338 analysis as planned in the preregistration. For each subject, we first fitted a variable-precision
339 model (van den Berg et al., 2014, 2012) in which mean encoding precision, \bar{J} , depended only
340 on set size, N , through the power-law relation $\bar{J}(N) = \bar{J}_1 N^\alpha$, where parameter \bar{J}_1 determined
341 the precision at set size 1 and parameter α how fast precision decreases with set size,
342 respectively. We compared the goodness of fit of this model to a variant in which encoding
343 precision also depended on the reward level, by fitting \bar{J}_1 separately for trials with multipliers
344 1, 2, and 4 (thus introducing two additional parameters). The second model has an AIC value
345 that is on average only 3.11 ± 0.21 points lower than that of the first model, which indicates

346 that the models describe the data approximately equally well. In other words, the model
347 comparison result is consistent with the above statistical analyses and indicates that there is no
348 evidence for an effect of reward level on encoding precision.

349

350 **Discussion**

351 As in the first two experiments, we did not find any indications for an effect of monetary reward
352 level on VWM performance. The main difference with the first two experiments is that
353 Experiment 3 manipulated relative rather than absolute reward, by varying the potential
354 monetary bonus from trial to trial. Another new manipulation in this experiment was the way
355 in which bonus was calculated: for half the subjects the bonus was based on *all* trials while for
356 the other half it was based on 9 randomly selected trials. We found no effect of this
357 manipulation either on VWM precision, which makes it less likely that the null effects are due
358 to subjects perceiving the per-trial bonus as too low to have any effect on their motivation.

359

360 **CONCLUSION**

361 In three experiments, we found no evidence that encoding precision in VWM depends
362 on performance-contingent monetary reward. One could argue that our null effects may have
363 been the result of using a “flawed” experimental design and that we would have found effects
364 if we had done the “right” experiment. Even so, the fact that we found no effect in three different
365 experiments that varied a large number of experimental factors would limit the generality of
366 any relation that may exist between monetary reward and working memory performance; if
367 money has an effect on VWM precision, quite specific conditions seem to be required to detect
368 it. We consider multiple explanations for the apparent dissociation between monetary reward
369 and VWM performance.

370 First, the bonuses may have been too small to cause an effect. We believe this to be
371 unlikely, especially in Experiment 1, where the bonus could increase the earnings in one of the
372 groups by a factor 11 (\$10 bonus in addition to \$1 base payment).

373 Second, subjects might not have had the bonus payments strongly enough on their minds
374 when performing the task. While this explanation could be plausible in Experiment 1 – where
375 subjects were informed about the bonus only at the very beginning of the experiment – it seems
376 implausible in Experiments 2 and 3, where they were regularly reminded of it.

377 Third, we may inadvertently have biased our subject sample to “over-performers”, by
378 only recruiting subjects who had a high approval rate on the Amazon Turk. The desire to
379 maintain a high approval rate may have worked as a strong incentive for these subjects to

380 perform well, regardless of the amount of performance-related bonus they could earn. However,
381 we know of at least two other studies that have found effects of monetary reward on
382 performance in Amazon Turk subjects with high approval rates, albeit using non-memory tasks
383 (Caplin et al., 2020; Dellavigna & Pope, 2018).

384 Fourth, the present study only manipulated *external* reward. An interesting direction for
385 further study would be to test for effects of *intrinsic* motivation on VWM performance, for
386 example by “gamifying” the experiment - using concepts such as leaderboards, achievements,
387 and levels – which have shown to have positive effects in other contexts such as education and
388 learning (Hamari et al., 2014).

389 Finally, it may be that VWM uses a fixed amount of resource, independent of the task
390 at hand. This explanation is consistent with another recent study that also found no effect of
391 reward on total capacity in an orientation estimation task similar to ours (Brissenden et al.,
392 2021). However, it is inconsistent with yet another recent study that did find an effect, albeit
393 with modest effect sizes and only in one of their two subject groups (Manga et al., 2020).
394 Moreover, the idea of a fixed capacity contradicts previous evidence suggesting that the amount
395 of allocated resource depends on task instructions (Bengson & Luck, 2016), set size (van den
396 Berg & Ma, 2018), and cueing condition (Myers et al., 2018). Moreover, this kind of rigidity
397 would stand in stark contrast to the flexibility with which VWM resource is divided among
398 items within a trial when items have varying importance (Bays, 2014; Bays et al., 2011; Emrich
399 et al., 2017; Gorgoraptis et al., 2011; Yoo et al., 2018; Zokaei et al., 2011). Altogether, VWM
400 seems to be a flexible system that can adjust its capacity to certain external factors, but monetary
401 reward does not may not be one of them.

402

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542

543 **APPENDIX**

544

545 **Model predictions**

546 Figure A1 presents results from a simulation analysis using our earlier proposed resource-
547 rational model of visual working memory (van den Berg & Ma, 2018), applied to a single-probe
548 delayed-estimation task (Blake et al., 1997; Prinzmetal et al., 1998; Wilken & Ma, 2004). The
549 results reveal that the model predicts strong effects of both set size and reward level on the
550 circular variance of the estimation error, as well as an interaction effect.

551




Figure A1 | Effect of reward on the circular variance of the estimation error in a delayed-estimation task, as predicted by a resource-rational model of visual working memory. The predictions were obtained by simulating responses of the model presented in (Van den Berg & Ma, 2018). Simulations were performed at five set sizes (separate lines) and 5 reward levels (x-axis). Each of the simulations was performed six times, with run using the maximum-likelihood parameters of one of the six subjects in experiment E4 of that paper (which used an orientation task, as in the present paper). Error bars represent ± 1 SEM across the six runs. A two-way Bayesian ANOVA on the simulation data show strong evidence for an effect of both set size ($BF_{\text{incl}} > 10^{13}$) and reward level ($BF_{\text{incl}} > 10^8$), as well as for an interaction effect ($BF_{\text{incl}} = 98$).

552

553

554 Scoring functions

555 In all three experiments, subjects received points on each trial based on the accuracy of their

556 estimate. In Experiment 1, errors were mapped to scores through the function $s = \left\lceil 10 \cdot e^{-\frac{\varepsilon^2}{800}} \right\rceil$,

557 where ε is the error in degrees and $\lceil \cdot \rceil$ indicates rounding to the nearest integer (Fig A1, black).

558 In Experiments 2 and 3, the function were $s = 10 - \left\lceil \frac{|\varepsilon|}{5} \right\rceil$ and $s = 10 - \left\lceil \frac{|\varepsilon|}{4} \right\rceil$, respectively, giving

559 highly similar mappings as in Experiment 1 (Figure A1, red and green).

560




Figure A2 | Scoring functions used in the three experiments.

561

562

563 Questionnaire items in Experiment 2

564 Subjects in Experiment 2 filled out a questionnaire with the following items from the Intrinsic
565 Motivation Inventory (McAuley et al., 1989; Ryan, 1982):

566

567 • Interest/Enjoyment

- 568 ○ I enjoyed doing this activity very much
- 569 ○ This activity was fun to do.
- 570 ○ I thought this was a boring activity. (R)
- 571 ○ This activity did not hold my attention at all. (R)
- 572 ○ I would describe this activity as very interesting.
- 573 ○ I thought this activity was quite enjoyable.
- 574 ○ While I was doing this activity, I was thinking about how much I enjoyed it.

575

576 • Perceived Competence

- 577 ○ I think I am pretty good at this activity.
- 578 ○ I think I did pretty well at this activity, compared to other students.
- 579 ○ After working at this activity for a while, I felt pretty competent.
- 580 ○ I am satisfied with my performance at this task.
- 581 ○ I was pretty skilled at this activity.
- 582 ○ This was an activity that I couldn't do very well. (R)

583

584 • Perceived Choice

- 585 ○ I believe I had some choice about doing this activity.

586 ○ I felt like it was not my own choice to do this task. (R)

587 ○ I didn't really have a choice about doing this task. (R)

588 ○ I felt like I had to do this. (R)

589 ○ I did this activity because I had no choice. (R)

590 ○ I did this activity because I wanted to.

591 ○ I did this activity because I had to. (R)

592

593 Subjects rated these items on a Likert scale from 1 to 7. Scores on items indicated with an (R)

594 were reversed before entering them into the analysis.

595