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2 **A systematic review and evaluation of Zika virus forecasting and prediction research during a**
3 **public health emergency of international concern**

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21 **Short title:** Zika virus forecasting and prediction studies: a systematic review and evaluation

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23

24 **Abstract**

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27 **INTRODUCTION:** Epidemic forecasting and prediction tools have the potential to provide
28 actionable information in the midst of emerging epidemics. While numerous predictive studies
29 were published during the 2016-2017 Zika Virus (ZIKV) pandemic, it remains unknown how
30 timely, reproducible and actionable the information produced by these studies was. **METHODS:**
31 To improve the functional use of mathematical modeling in support of future infectious disease
32 outbreaks, we conducted a systematic review of all ZIKV prediction studies published during the
33 recent ZIKV pandemic using the PRISMA guidelines. Using MEDLINE, EMBASE and grey
34 literature review, we identified studies that forecasted, predicted or simulated ecological or
35 epidemiological phenomenon related to the Zika pandemic that were published as of March 01,
36 2017. Eligible studies underwent evaluation of objectives, data sources, methods, timeliness,
37 reproducibility, accessibility and clarity by independent reviewers. **RESULTS:** 2034 studies were
38 identified, of which n = 73 met eligibility criteria. Spatial spread, R_0 (basic reproductive number)
39 and epidemic dynamics were most commonly predicted, with few studies predicting Guillain-
40 Barré Syndrome burden (4%), sexual transmission risk (4%) and intervention impact (4%). Most
41 studies specifically examined populations in the Americas (52%), with few African- specific
42 studies (4%). Case count (67%), vector (41%) and demographic data (37%) were the most
43 common data sources. Real-time internet data and pathogen genomic information were used in
44 7% and 0% of studies, respectively, and social science and behavioral data were typically absent

45 in modeling efforts. Deterministic models were favored over stochastic approaches. Forty
46 percent of studies made model data entirely available, 29% provided all relevant model code,
47 43% presented uncertainty in all predictions and 54% provided sufficient methodological detail
48 allowing complete reproducibility. Fifty-one percent of predictions were published after the
49 epidemic peak in the Americas. While the use of preprints improved the accessibility of ZIKV
50 predictions by a median 119 days sooner than journal publication dates, they were used in only
51 30% of studies. **CONCLUSIONS:** Many ZIKV predictions were published during the 2016-2017
52 pandemic. The accessibility, reproducibility, timeliness, and incorporation of uncertainty in
53 these published predictions varied and indicates that there is substantial room for
54 improvement. To enhance the utility of analytical tools for outbreak response, it is essential to
55 improve the sharing of model data, code, and preprints for future outbreaks, epidemics and
56 pandemics.

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58 **Author summary:** Researchers published many studies which sought to predict and forecast
59 important features of Zika virus (ZIKV) infections and their spread during the 2016-2017 ZIKV
60 pandemic. We conducted a comprehensive review of such ZIKV prediction studies and
61 evaluated their aims, the data sources they used, which methods were used, how timely they
62 were published, and whether they provided sufficient information to be used or reproduced by
63 others. Of the 73 studies evaluated, we found that the accessibility, reproducibility, timeliness,
64 and incorporation of uncertainty in these published predictions varied and indicates that there
65 is substantial room for improvement. We identified that the release of study findings before
66 formal journal publication ('pre-prints') increased the timeliness of Zika prediction studies, but

67 note they were infrequently used during this public health emergency. Addressing these areas
68 can improve our understanding of Zika and other outbreaks and ensure that forecasts can
69 inform preparedness and response to future outbreaks, epidemics and pandemics.

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71 **Introduction:**

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73 Zika virus (ZIKV) is a positive sense RNA flavivirus primarily transmitted through the *Aedes*
74 *aegypti* mosquito (1-3). While the majority of ZIKV infections are asymptomatic or present as a
75 self-limiting febrile illness, strong evidence links ZIKV infection with microcephaly and a range
76 of other birth defects including limb deformity and retinopathy (4, 5). ZIKV is also associated
77 with Guillian-Barre syndrome, and a spectrum of other neurological disorders including
78 meningoencephalitis and acute myelitis (6-9). ZIKV was discovered in Uganda in a febrile non-
79 human primate in 1947 (10), and the first human case was detected in Nigeria in 1953 (11).
80 ZIKV outbreaks were detected in South East Asia and the Pacific Islands in the early 21st century
81 (12-16) followed by wide spread epidemics in the Americas from late 2014 onward with a
82 cumulative count of 583,144 suspected and 223,336 laboratory-confirmed Zika cases reported
83 across 49 countries and territories by the end of 2017 (17, 18).

84

85 The Director-General of the World Health Organization declared the ZIKV pandemic a public
86 health emergency of international concern (PHEIC) on February 1, 2016 (19). The urgency for
87 immediate, coordinated global response was further accelerated by the Olympic and
88 Paralympic games set to take place in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil during August 2016 (20). As public

89 health and medical research efforts for Zika increased across the Americas, scientists developed
90 mathematical models to anticipate further outbreak spread, evaluate possible control
91 measures, and gain insight into outbreak dynamics. These models used a range of data sources
92 including case counts, vector abundance and distribution, population age structure, human
93 mobility, climate information, viral sequence and serological data, and internet 'big data'
94 streams. A range of statistical and mathematical models predicted the spread and other
95 epidemic dynamics of ZIKV, as well as the burden of its complications (21-26).

96
97 While the WHO PHEIC status was lifted in November 2016 and the neotropical Zika pandemic
98 has waned, the forecasting activities during the pandemic have not been systematically
99 examined, particularly whether the studies were published in a manner and time-frame that
100 was actionable during the Zika pandemic (27). Such an exercise is critical, not only due to the
101 ongoing risk of Zika globally (28), but also to inform modeling efforts for future major
102 epidemics. We therefore undertook a systematic review to identify all published ZIKV
103 prediction and forecasting studies during a time period which encompassed the PHEIC period
104 and the peak and waning phase of the epidemic in the Americas. The first aim of this systematic
105 review was to identify all published models that predicted, forecasted or simulated any
106 ecological or epidemiological phenomenon about the Zika pandemic and describe the predicted
107 phenomena, the range of data sources used and the modeling methods employed. This first
108 aim sought to characterize the methods and data employed to answer key questions during the
109 epidemic and to identify potentially underutilized data or methods. The second aim was to
110 evaluate key scientific characteristics of these studies, including (i) accessibility and timeliness

111 of the publication, (ii) reproducibility of the methods and access to the statistical code and data,
112 and (iii) clarity of the presentation of the prediction results, including uncertainty in prediction
113 estimates. The third aim was to describe the funding structure and major contributing sectors,
114 such as government, industry, non-governmental organizations, or academia, behind these
115 publications.

116

117 **Methods**

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119 The PRISMA and Cochrane systematic review guidelines were adopted (29). A panel of 12
120 investigators developed the systematic review protocol including the eligibility criteria and the
121 data abstraction tool. No formal protocol was published for this systematic review.

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123 *Literature search strategy:*

124

125 We conducted a literature review using EMBASE and MEDLINE (PubMed) to identify all
126 potentially eligible studies, which predicted or forecasted phenomenon of the ZIKV pandemic.

127 In MEDLINE we performed a highly sensitive search solely using the term “Zika”. A

128 complementary search in EMBASE used a more specific ontology: “Zika AND (forecasting OR

129 prediction OR model OR modeling OR modelling OR risk OR estimating OR dynamics) NOT

130 mouse”. Both database searches were limited to articles published as of March 1, 2017, and the

131 MEDLINE searching was restricted to those publications released between February 1, 2016 and

132 March 1, 2017. We complemented these database search results with ‘grey literature’,

133 including hand-searching of bibliographies of major Zika epidemiological review articles (17, 30,
134 31) and contacting experts in the field of Zika modeling to identify any studies which we may
135 have been missed by the above search strategies.

136

137 *Screening and eligibility determination:*

138

139 Using a two-reviewer system (with consensus for disagreements and conferral with a 3rd party
140 adjudicator if a consensus was unable to be reached), all articles identified through the above
141 literature search were screened by reviewing the title and abstract to remove all articles that
142 clearly did not meet the eligibility criteria (below). The full text of the remaining articles was
143 reviewed by two reviewers, with a third reviewer if a consensus was not reached by the first
144 two reviewers. Eligibility was based on the following inclusion and exclusion criteria:

145

146 *Inclusion criteria:*

147 Forecasted, predicted or simulated any epidemiological or ecological phenomenon about the
148 Zika pandemic (including studies regarding previous outbreaks and epidemics, and regions
149 outside the Americas), including but not limited to spatial spread risk, host and ecological
150 range, disease and complication burden, economic impact transmission and other epidemic
151 dynamics. We didn't require studies to explicitly present a future phenomenon risk, and we
152 included time agnostic estimations of key epidemic parameters and other phenomena.

153

154 *Exclusion criteria:*

- 155 • Did not include original analyses (e.g. review articles, perspective pieces, editorials,
156 recommendations, and guidelines)
- 157 • Duplicated studies
- 158 • Animal and mosquito in-vivo pre-clinical models (e.g mouse, non-human primates)
- 159 • *In vitro* studies
- 160 • Descriptive epidemiological publications (e.g. describing case
161 positive proportions, total case numbers, descriptive mapping of
162 incidence by geographic information systems)
- 163 • Models which only examined causality of ZIKV in Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS) or
164 microcephaly (rather than estimating risk or burden, for example)
- 165 • Studies which only modeled non-ZIKV arboviruses, unless the central aim of the study
166 was to explicitly forecast or predict ZIKV phenomenon based on the known dynamics of
167 other arboviruses

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169 *Data abstraction, collation and analysis:*

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171 Data were abstracted from the full texts by 12 reviewers (single-reviewer abstraction) across
172 the domains of (i) objectives and study population, (ii) methodology and reproducibility, (iii)
173 accessibility, timeliness and other bibliometrics of eligible studies, and (iv) author affiliation and
174 funding sources (Table S1). In addition, the availability of preprint manuscripts was assessed
175 using the pre-print search webtool *search.bioPreprint* (32), a server which identifies preprints
176 from arXiv, bioRxiv, F1000Research, PeerJ Preprints, and Wellcome Open Research.

177 Additionally, we manually searched arXiv and bioRxiv archives to confirm pre-print availability.
178 These pre-print repositories are distinct from the advanced electronic publications made
179 available by most journals after acceptance and peer review. Such 'grey literature' review
180 extended beyond the cut-off date for the main literature database searches. A two-reviewer
181 approach was used to ascertain whether eligible studies were made available as pre-print.
182 From the abstracted data, descriptive analyses (medians, IQR, ranges and proportions) and
183 limited hypothesis testing were performed using Stata version 13.0 (StataCorp, College Station,
184 TX, USA).

185

186 **Results:**

187

188 Of 2034 studies identified, 73 articles published predominantly from 2016 to 2017 met the
189 inclusion criteria (Fig 1) (20-26, 28, 33-97). The most commonly predicted phenomena were
190 spatial spread (34%), followed by R_0 (basic reproductive number) or R_E (effective reproductive
191 number) (29%), epidemic dynamics (peak size/timing, final size and trajectory) (28%),
192 microcephaly burden (15%), and vector competence and ecology (12%) (Table 1). Most of the
193 geographically resolved predictions were concentrated in the Americas (42%) and Asia-Pacific
194 (21%), while few studies were from Africa (4%). Across 73 studies, the most commonly used
195 data were infection case counts, vector data, and demographic data, followed by climate,
196 meteorological, earth science and transport data (Table 2). Genomic data was not used in any
197 of the studies and few studies used novel real-time internet data streams such as those
198 harnessing open access social media and internet-search engine platforms.

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Only 40% of studies made all relevant source data entirely accessible, while more than 20% of the eligible studies did not make any source data available either directly (e.g. an associated data repository) or indirectly (e.g. a citation or web-link) (Table 2). The visual display of model output was at least partly clear and accurate in 95% of the studies. Over a third of the studies did not present estimates of prediction uncertainty. Approximately half of the studies did not entirely present methods with a level of detail to allow reproducibility. Over 60% of the studies did not provide any computational code used for the analyses. We classified more models as deterministic (76%) as opposed to stochastic. It should be emphasized we only ultimately evaluated whether a model was deterministic versus stochastic.

The large majority of published manuscripts were freely accessible (e.g. without a paywall), although 4% were published with paid access only (Table 3). Less than one third of manuscripts were posted on rapid preprint servers (e.g. bioRxiv (98), prior to publication in a peer-reviewed journal. The median time from journal submission to e-journal publication time was 93.5 days, with the maximum time greater than 1 year. This included delays after manuscript acceptance, 25% of the studies had delays of more than 24 days between acceptance and publication (Table 3). Most of the prediction studies were published late in the epidemic, well after the peaks in reported Zika cases (Fig 2, Fig 3). Submitting manuscripts to preprint servers made results available earlier by a median of 119 days (maximum 331 days, IQR 30 – 177 days) (Table 3). This shift led to more results being available close the time of the 2016 South America and Central America epidemic peaks and prior to the epidemic peak in the Caribbean and the 2017 peak in

221 Central America (Fig 2, Fig 3). Comparing the impact factor of journals accepting studies which
222 were posted as preprints (versus the impact factor of those journals accepting studies which
223 were not posted as pre-prints), there was no significant difference (median impact factor 4.37
224 vs. 4.45 respectively; $p = 0.84$ by Mann-Whitney U test).

225

226 Over 90% of the studies included authors with academic affiliations (Table 4). Government
227 affiliated authors participated in a minority of studies, although this may simply reflect “in-
228 house” operational models not being published through journals. Among studies with
229 identifiable funding sources, funding was divided among several sources, though the most
230 common was the United States government, which funded or partially funded 50% of the
231 studies (Table 4). However, many of those studies and other had a variety of funding sources,
232 85% had at least one non-U.S. government source. Non-governmental organizations were the
233 second most common source, being included in 35% of the studies.

234

235 **Discussion:**

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237 Public health agencies, policy-makers, and other stakeholders are carefully examining the
238 response to Zika. Such ‘lessons-learned’ exercises have been fruitful for prior pandemics and
239 outbreaks, including Ebola, SARS, MERS-CoV, pH1N1, and chikungunya viruses. These exercises
240 have included introspection, analysis, and recommended action with respect to research, public
241 health and policy agendas (99-104). To date, public health ‘lessons-learned’ activities related to
242 the Zika PHEIC have focused on improved ethics preparedness for rapid research during public

243 health emergencies (105), identification of other high-epidemic-risk pathogens with relatively
244 inadequate countermeasure investment (106), expedited approaches to vaccine and other
245 medical countermeasure development (107), rapid data-sharing and material transfer (108-
246 110), and enhancing the role of media communication during epidemics (111).

247

248 In contrast to existing reviews on models developed during the ZIKV pandemic, which described
249 specific contributions of modeling (112) or validated analytical assessment of results (113), this
250 systematic review focused on capturing lessons that could improve the functional use of
251 mathematical modeling in support of future infectious disease outbreaks. Extending an
252 approach used by Chretien et al. in their evaluation of Ebola models, we focused on aspects of
253 the studies that likely are particularly relevant to their usefulness during an outbreak (103). This
254 included modeling methods and input data, timeliness and accessibility of the publications,
255 reproducibility (e.g. provision of data and code), and the communication of uncertainty.

256

257 Our systematic review identified a large number of Zika models that predicted a wide range of
258 epidemiological and ecological phenomena. The most commonly predicted phenomena were
259 spatial spread, R_0 , epidemic dynamics, microcephaly burden, and vector competence. Notably
260 few of the studies modeled the impact or cost-effectiveness of interventions, sexual
261 transmission risk, or GBS burden. Not surprisingly, the majority of the studies were set in the
262 Americas where most of the cases were reported during the pandemic. Notably one of the
263 global gaps for understanding ZIKV dynamics is Africa, where ZIKV was discovered, is endemic,
264 and poses a risk of future epidemics (114-116).

265

266 The leading data types for the examined studies were conventional case counts, vector,
267 demographic, climate and transport data. This finding reflects not only the availability but also
268 the importance of such data. Case count data in particular are often hard to access but critical
269 to many modeling approaches. Rapid sharing of case count data during international public
270 health emergencies, as well as open, curated, rapidly accessible baseline demographic, human
271 mobility, climate, and environmental datasets are essential to quickly leverage modeling and
272 forecasting efforts (109). Our review also identified several relatively underused data streams.
273 First, socioeconomic and behavioral data were conspicuously absent. The lack of behavioral
274 components in these models is concerning given the importance of these factors on disease
275 dynamics. Second, real-time internet-based data-streams, such social-media and internet
276 search-engine data, were used in a minority of ZIKV prediction studies identified in this
277 systematic review. The limited use of internet 'big data' in the models suggests that either
278 these data are of lower value for epidemic forecasting or that methods have yet to be
279 developed to efficiently extract important information from them. Such data streams may be
280 more commonly used in forecasting in the future as their strengths and weakness become
281 clearer (117).

282

283 Genomic data were absent from these published models. During the pandemic, sequencing
284 platforms were employed to generate data critical to diagnostic and countermeasure
285 development (118), but our systematic review revealed that these data were not incorporated
286 into prediction frameworks during the first year of ZIKV pandemic. This may reflect that early

287 molecular epidemiology studies aimed to reconstruct the invasion and evolution of ZIKV rather
288 than forecasting future changes (119, 120). Some phylodynamic studies were published after
289 the time period of the systematic review, with interesting results highlighting the possibility for
290 phylogenetic data to provide unique insight into epidemic dynamics and possibly forecasting
291 (120-122). The relative delay of these studies (relative to other to those using other data
292 sources) echoes a similar time lag of phylogenetic studies during the 2015 Ebola epidemic (103).
293 The lack of phylogenomic studies captured by this review also suggests that substantial
294 bottlenecks still exist in using these data sources in epidemic response, despite advances in
295 mobile near “real-time” sequencing technologies (118). In the future, as new methods are
296 developed, and genomic data become more readily available, the use of these data will likely
297 become more common in prospective forecasting frameworks.

298
299 Our systematic review did not delve deeply into modeling approaches, but did identify a
300 preponderance of deterministic as opposed to stochastic models. Both categories of models
301 have pros and cons and their use is often informed by the specific question being addressed, in
302 addition to data availability (123). Deterministic models may generally be easier to produce, but
303 they do have limitations for intrinsically stochastic processes like epidemics, such as
304 underestimating uncertainty (124). Uncertainty is particularly important in this context where
305 uncertainties are generated by the epidemic itself, data collection, and analytical approaches.
306 Moreover, forecasts are ideally used to inform the mobilization of resources to save lives, a
307 context in which clearly characterizing uncertainties is paramount. This is also a clear area for
308 improvement in model output reporting; only 43% of studies completely reporting uncertainty.

309

310 Our review also provided a unique evaluation of the more functional aspects of published
311 predictions and forecasts. We determined that the visual clarity of model output was high but
312 indicate room for improvement in publishing datasets used for model fitting and validation,
313 sharing computational code for others to potentially rapidly implement the model, presenting
314 estimates of prediction uncertainty, and methodological detail to allow the study to be
315 reproduced. The variable quality in sharing model code and methodological detail shown here
316 does suggest that epidemic model reporting consensus guidelines, which establish a minimum
317 standard for the reporting of epidemic modeling, may be valuable. A recent review of the
318 modeling efforts for the Ebola epidemic also called for standardization of modeling practice
319 (103). Many other fields of biomedical research have established reporting guidelines to
320 improve research quality and implementation (125-128). While reporting guidelines have been
321 proposed for population health model on a broader scale (129), none have been established for
322 epidemics.

323

324 This review also indicated that a majority of studies (60%) did not completely disclose the data
325 they used. To the extent permissible with ethical and privacy constraints, publishing the
326 aggregated data used to fit and validate models is critical. Not only would sharing data support
327 full reproducibility, but sharing would also enable other researchers to use data in their own
328 complementary modeling efforts. Modelers could therefore help answer calls for increased
329 data sharing during public health emergencies (103, 109, 130). Exploring how data can be

330 shared more openly and quickly during a public health emergency would be useful, as this
331 remains a challenge.

332
333 Many studies identified in this review were published on a time-scale that was relevant to the
334 Zika response. However, a large number of predictions were published well after the epidemic
335 peaks, limiting their ability to inform the response. Nonetheless, those studies may well be used
336 to inform other preparedness activities and contributed to the general knowledge of the
337 biology, epidemiology and/or ecology of ZIKV. Further, results may have been informally shared
338 with public health officials or other relevant decision makers prior to publication. Similar delays
339 to publication have also been noted in an analysis of modeling efforts during the 2015 Ebola
340 epidemic, which noted a median publication lag of around three months [103].

341
342 We identified two modifiable bottlenecks in the dissemination of results. First, delays from
343 acceptance to journal publication were generally minimal (median 15 days), but a quarter of
344 the evaluated studies had greater than 24 days delay from journal acceptance to publication.
345 Immediate posting of accepted papers, as practiced by many journals, could cut this time down
346 substantially. Second, we found that only 30% of studies were made available as preprints prior
347 to peer review despite endorsements of preprints by major public agencies, funders, and
348 journals. Those posted were available a median of 119 days prior to peer-reviewed publication.
349 An analysis of preprints for all Zika publications over a similar time period found similar
350 publication delays but much lower overall preprint use compared to the studies analyzed here
351 (3.4% versus 30%) (131). This greater adoption may indicate a changing preprint culture which

352 was also reflected by our finding that preprint posting did not have a demonstrable effect on
353 the impact factor of the journal in which the study was published, and we suggest that pre-
354 prints be more frequently used in future public health emergencies, echoing other similar
355 recent arguments (131).

356

357 Our review also provided a unique analysis of the funding sources and author affiliations of the
358 published ZIKV prediction and forecast efforts across the ZIKV pandemic. These results
359 indicated a range of stakeholders. We note that while academia contributed to the greatest
360 volume of published studies, our search strategy would not have captured in-house models
361 developed by US federal agencies or other unpublished models which may have provided direct
362 operational support.

363

364 This systematic review has three important weaknesses. First, due to scale, a completely
365 independent two-reviewer system was not used for abstracting most of the data and for
366 evaluation of aspects such as reproducibility. Second, we did not formally search for preprint
367 manuscripts as part of the literature searching phase of the systematic review, only assessing
368 whether eligible manuscripts had corresponding preprints. We may have therefore missed
369 important research that had been posted but not yet peer-reviewed. Lastly, we had to restrict
370 the time frame for publications to consider in the review. This restriction again led to missing
371 studies, some of which may have already been published but not yet posted in EMBASE or
372 MEDLINE.

373

374 Overall, the review identified several areas of improvement such as providing data and code,
375 developing reporting standards, posting preprints, and communicating uncertainty. Addressing
376 these areas can improve our understanding of Zika and other outbreaks and ensure that
377 forecasts can inform preparedness and response to future outbreaks, epidemics and
378 pandemics.

379

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381

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735 **Supporting Information Legends:**

736 **Table S1.** Data abstraction and study evaluation tool used by reviewers

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740 **Tables:**

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Table 1. Objectives and study population of eligible studies

	n	% ^a
Total number of studies	73	100
Zika-related phenomenon forecasted or predicted ^b		
Predicted microcephaly burdens	11	15
Gullain-Barre syndrome burden	3	4
Epidemic peak size	4	5
Epidemic peak timing	4	5
Epidemic curve trajectory	8	11
Epidemic final size	5	7
Spatial spread	25	34

742	Force of infection	7	10
	Cost-effectiveness	2	3
	Intervention impact	3	4
	Case fatality ratio	0	0
	R_o or R_{eff}	21	29
	Sexual transmission risk	3	4
	Vector competence / ecology	9	12
	Other ^c	2	3
	Geographic region in which predictions made ^d		
	Africa	3	4
	Americas (excluding Continental USA)	31	42
	Asia – Pacific	15	21
	Continental USA	7	10
	Europe	4	5
	Global	18	24

^aDenominator excludes those studies where unable or no basis to judge

^bSome studies predicted more than one phenomenon

^cEcological determinants of vector minimum abundance rate (n=1); epidemic size and number of infectious at time of first microcephaly case detected (n=1)

^dSome studies included >1 geographic category

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Table 2. Data sources, methodology and reproducibility of eligible studies

	N	% ^a
Data types used^b		
Case count	49	67
Demographic	27	37
Genomic sequence data	0	0
Climate, meteorological and earth science	21	29
Transport	14	19
Economic	7	10
Vector	30	41
Internet search engine, social media or news-wire scraping data	5	7
Other ^c	9	12
Relevant data made available		
Entirely	29	40
Partially	27	37
Not at all	16	22
Model type(s) used in analysis^d		
Stochastic	21	29
Deterministic	56	76
Availability of statistical modeling computational code (e.g. R script provided)		
Entirely	21	29
Partly	7	10
Not at all	45	62
Clear and accurate visual display of the model output		
Entirely	49	67
Partly	20	27

Not at all	4	5
Estimates of prediction uncertainty provided (e.g. confidence intervals) provided		
Entirely	31	43
Partly	13	18
Not at all	28	39
Methods presented with a level of detail that allowed the study to be reproduced		
Entirely	37	54
Partially	28	41
Not at all	4	6

^aDenominator excludes those studies where unable or no basis to judge

^bSome studies used multiple data types

^cViremia duration and dynamics (n=3); sexual contact network (n=2); semen viral persistence (n=2), non-human primate demographics (n=1), mammalian diversity (n=1)

^dSome studies used both stochastic and deterministic models

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Table 3. Accessibility, timeliness and other bibliometrics of eligible studies

	n	% ^d
Open access ^a	68	96
Pre-print access ^b	22	30
	median	IQR (range)
Journal impact factor	4.37	2.65 - 7.62 (1.48 – 79.26)
Submission to acceptance time, days	83	44 - 112 (0 - 256)
Acceptance to publication time, days ^c	15	7 - 24 (-255 - 279) ^e
Submission to publication time, days	93.5	47 - 141 (1 - 389)

^aIncludes non-journal open access websites. Open access defined as able to be viewed without any payment or institutional journal license

^bBiorxiv n = 19, ResearchGate n=1, *Bull WHO* rapid journal pre-acceptance pre-print n = 2

^cNegative values exist as *Bull WHO* articles published upon receipt (within 24 hrs) and then accepted later

^dDenominator may vary in cases where these metrics were unable to be determined

^ePublication time based on electronic journal version where available

Table 4. Author affiliation and funding source of eligible studies

Affiliation of authors ^a	n	%
Academia	68	93
Govt (US)	14	19
Govt (non-US)	19	26
Industry ^b	4	5
NGO	14	19
Other type of organization ^c	4	5
Funding source ^d	n	% ^e
USG		
CDC	1	2
DHS	2	4
DoD	3	6
LANL	1	2
NASA	1	2
NIH	21	39
NSA	2	4
NSF	12	22
USAID	1	2
USDA	3	6
Other USG ^f	1	2
Any USG	27	50
Any Non-US Govt	46	85
Any Industry	3	6

Any NGO	19	35
Any international normative body	6	11
Other ^g	6	11

^aMultiple affiliations associated with some studies

^bScientific contracting/consulting (n = 3), spatial epidemiology software (n =1)

^cWorld Health Organization (n=2), European Centers for Disease Control (n=1), HealthMap (n=1)

^dMultiple funding streams associated with some studies

^eUnable to be determined or unfunded in a number studies, denominator = 54

^fState Dept of Health (TX)

^gAcademic intramural funding (n = 5)

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755 **Figure 1.** PRISMA flow-chart indicating the number of studies identified, screened and

756 confirmed for eligibility into this systematic review

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758 **Figure 2.** Comparative trends of reported Zika cases in Latin American and publication times of

759 Zika prediction studies. Zika case counts were obtained from <https://andersen-lab.com/> with

760 permission

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762 **Figure 3.** Comparative trends in publication times of ZIKV prediction studies with and without
763 the use of preprints.

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


Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3