

1 **A global resource for genomic predictions of antimicrobial resistance and**
2 **surveillance of *Salmonella* Typhi at Pathogenwatch**

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1 **Abstract**

2 Background: Microbial whole-genome sequencing (WGS) is now increasingly used to
3 inform public health investigations of infectious disease. This approach has transformed
4 our understanding of the global population structure of *Salmonella enterica* serovar Typhi
5 (*S. Typhi*), the causative agent of typhoid fever. WGS has been particularly informative for
6 understanding the global spread of multi-drug resistant (MDR) typhoid. As WGS capacity
7 becomes more decentralised, there is a growing opportunity for collaboration and sharing
8 of surveillance data within and between countries to inform disease control policies. This
9 requires freely available, community driven tools that reduce the barriers to access
10 genomic data for public health surveillance and that deliver genomic data on a global
11 scale.

12 Methods: Here we present the Pathogenwatch (<https://pathogen.watch/styphi>) scheme for
13 *S. Typhi*, a web application enabling the rapid identification of genomic markers of
14 antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and contextualization with public genomic data to identify
15 high-risk clones at a population level. Data are delivered in single genome reports or in
16 collections of genomes combined with geographic and other data using trees, maps and
17 tables.

18 Results: We show that the clustering of *S. Typhi* genomes in Pathogenwatch is
19 comparable to established bioinformatics methods, and that genomic predictions of AMR
20 are largely concordant with phenotypic drug susceptibility data. We demonstrate the public
21 health utility of Pathogenwatch with examples selected from over 4,300 public genomes
22 available in the application.

23 Conclusions: Pathogenwatch democratizes genomic epidemiology of *S. Typhi* by providing
24 an intuitive entry point for the analysis of WGS and linked epidemiological data, enabling
25 international public health monitoring of the emergence and spread of high risk clones.

26

27 **Keywords:** *Salmonella* Typhi, typhoid fever, enteric fever, antimicrobial resistance,
28 genomics, whole-genome sequencing, surveillance, genomics, epidemiology, public
29 health.

1 **Introduction**

2 Bacterial pathogens have the potential for rapid evolution and adaptation (1). The ability to
3 rapidly sequence microbial genomes directly from the field is facilitating the tracking of
4 pathogen evolution in real-time and in a geographical context. Genomic surveillance
5 provides the opportunity to identify the emergence of genetic signatures indicating
6 antimicrobial resistance (AMR), or adaptation to host, facilitating early intervention and
7 minimising wider dissemination. Consequently, genomic data has the ability to transform
8 the way in which we manage the emergence of microbes that pose a direct threat to
9 human health in real time.

10 Although pathogen genomic data is being generated at a remarkable rate, we need to
11 bridge the gap between genome sciences and public health with tools that make these
12 data broadly and rapidly accessible to those who are not expert in genomics. To maximise
13 the impact of ongoing surveillance programs, these tools need to quickly highlight high-risk
14 clones by assigning isolates to distinct lineages and identifying genetic elements
15 associated with clinically relevant features such as AMR or virulence. In this way, new
16 isolates can be examined against the backdrop of a population framework that is
17 continuously updated and that enables both the contextualisation of local outbreaks and
18 the interpretation of global patterns.

19 *Salmonella enterica* subsp. *enterica* serovar Typhi (*S. Typhi*) causes typhoid (enteric)
20 fever, a disease that affects approximately 20-30 million people every year (2, 3). The
21 disease is predominant in low-income communities where public health infrastructure is
22 poorly resourced. Similar to other infections, typhoid treatment is compromised by the
23 emergence of *S. Typhi* with resistance to multiple antimicrobials, including those currently
24 used for treatment (3). Until recently, epidemiological investigations and surveillance of
25 typhoid fever have employed alternative molecular techniques such as pulse-field gel
26 electrophoresis (PFGE (4)), multi-locus sequence typing (MLST (5)), multiple-locus
27 variable-number tandem-repeat (VNTR) analysis (MLVA (6)), and phage-typing (4), which
28 offer limited resolution for a bacterium that exhibits very limited genetic variability. Whole
29 genome sequencing (WGS) has proven key to identify *S. Typhi* high-risk clones by linking
30 the population structure to the presence of AMR elements. For example, the recent
31 resurgence of multi-drug resistant (MDR) typhoid (defined as resistance to all the historical
32 first-line agents chloramphenicol, ampicillin and co-trimoxazole) has been explained in part
33 by the global spread of an MDR *S. Typhi* lineage known as haplotype H58 or subclade

1 4.3.1 (7, 8), which is associated with both acquired AMR genes (conferring MDR) and
2 fluoroquinolone resistance mutations (7, 9).

3 WGS is increasingly being implemented in local and national public health laboratories,
4 and web applications can provide rapid analysis and access to actionable information for
5 infection control in the context of a global population framework. Online resources are
6 available for *Salmonella enterica* species for the identification of acquired AMR
7 mechanisms (10) and for *in silico* typing and visualisation of genome variation and
8 relatedness based on WGS data (11, 12). Here, we describe Typhi Pathogenwatch, a web
9 application to support genomic epidemiology and public health surveillance of *S. Typhi*
10 through the rapid identification and linking of genetic lineages with AMR determinants.
11 Typhi Pathogenwatch rapidly places new genomes within the population context, predicts
12 their genotype according to established nomenclatures (5, 8, 11), and detects the
13 presence of AMR determinants and plasmid replicon genes to assess public health risk.
14 Typhi Pathogenwatch displays this information interactively, allowing users to link
15 lineages, AMR patterns, geographical data and other metadata to quickly determine if
16 similar strains have been previously identified, where and when. Furthermore, results can
17 be downloaded or shared via a web address containing a unique collection identifier. This
18 approach allows the rapid incremental addition of new data and can be used to underpin
19 the international surveillance of typhoid, MDR and other public health threats.

1 **Methods**

2

3 **The Pathogenwatch application**

4 The Pathogenwatch user interface is a React (13) single-page application with styling
5 based on Material Design Lite (14). Phylocanvas (15) is used for phylogenetic trees,
6 Leaflet (16) is used for maps, and Sigma (17) is used for networks. The Pathogenwatch
7 back-end, written in Node.js, consists of an API service for the user interface and four
8 “Runner” services to perform analysis: species prediction, single-genome analyses, tree-
9 building, and core genome multi-locus sequence typing (cgMLST) clustering. Runner
10 services spawn Docker containers for queued tasks, streaming a FASTA file or prior
11 analysis through standard input and storing JSON data from standard output. Data storage
12 and task queuing/synchronisation are performed by a MongoDB cluster.

13

14 **S. Typhi genome assemblies and data privacy**

15 Genome assemblies can be uploaded by the user in FASTA format or assembled *de novo*
16 from high-throughput short read data with the Pathogenwatch pipeline using SPAdes (18),
17 as described in the Pathogenwatch documentation (19). Sequence data and metadata
18 files uploaded by the user are kept private to the user account unless explicitly requested
19 to be publicly shared. Genomes can be grouped into collections and kept private or set to
20 be made available to collaborators through a web link. Users can also integrate private
21 and potentially confidential metadata into the display without uploading it to the
22 Pathogenwatch servers. This private metadata will not be shared even if the collection is
23 set to be shared via web link (20).

24 Genomes from published studies with geographical localisation metadata and short read
25 data on the European Nucleotide Archive (ENA) are available as public data and
26 accessible to all users for browsing and for contextualisation of their own datasets. At the
27 time of submission, 4389 public *S. Typhi* genomes from 26 studies were available
28 (Additional File 1: Supplementary Table S1). The sequences of 2490 public genomes were
29 generated at the Wellcome Sanger Institute with Illumina HiSeq technology and
30 assembled as previously described (21). Briefly, FASTQ files were used to create multiple
31 assemblies using VelvetOptimiser v2.2.5 and Velvet v1.2 (22). An assembly improvement
32 step was applied to the assembly with the best N50, and contigs were scaffolded using

1 SSPACE (23) and sequence gaps filled using GapFiller (24). For the remaining 1899
2 public genomes the FASTQ files were downloaded from the ENA and assembled with
3 Velvet as above, as well as with SPAdes v3.9.0 (18) and a range of k -mer sizes of 66-90%
4 of the read length (in increments of 4). A total of 814 Velvet assemblies and 1068 SPAdes
5 assemblies were included based on comparisons of the assembly stats and the
6 Pathogenwatch core genome stats with both methods. Seventeen public genomes were
7 excluded as neither assembly method produced a satisfactory draft genome based on the
8 assembly stats and/or GC content. The public genomes metadata submitted to the ENA or
9 made available as supplementary information in the corresponding publications was made
10 available in the Metadata table (e.g., country/location, collection year/date, run and study
11 accessions and PMID).

12

13 **Characterisation and genotyping of *S. Typhi* genomes with Pathogenwatch**

14 For both user-uploaded and public genomes, Pathogenwatch outputs a taxonomy
15 assignment, a map of their locations, and assembly quality metrics. The taxonomy
16 assignment is the best match to a microbial version of the RefSeq genome database
17 release 78, as computed with Mash (25) ($k=21$, $s=400$). Details of the *speciator* tool can be
18 found in the documentation (26).

19 Pathogenwatch also provides compatibility with *Salmonella* serotyping (SISTR (12)), multi-
20 locus sequence typing (MLST (5)), core-genome MLST (cgMLST (11)) and *S. Typhi*
21 single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP)-based genotyping (GenoTyphi (8)). Detailed
22 descriptions of the implementation of the typing tools can be found in the documentation
23 (27).

24 The MLST and cgMLST schemes are periodically downloaded from Enterobase (28) and
25 (29), respectively. Samples are typed as described in the documentation
26 (<https://cgps.gitbook.io/pathogenwatch/technical-descriptions/typing-methods/mlst> and
27 <https://cgps.gitbook.io/pathogenwatch/technical-descriptions/typing-methods/cgmlst>).
28 Exact allele matches are reported using their allele ID. Multiple allele hits for a gene are
29 reported if present. Inexact allele matches and novel STs are reported by hashing the
30 matching allele sequence and the gene IDs, respectively.

31 Pathogenwatch implements SISTR (Salmonella In Silico Typing Resource (12)), which
32 produces serovar predictions from WGS assemblies by determination of antigen gene and

1 cgMLST gene alleles using *blastn* v2.2.31+. Pathogenwatch uses the *cgmlst_subspecies*
2 and *serovar* fields from the SISTR JSON output to specify the serovar.

3 GenoTyphi assigns *S. Typhi* genomes to a predefined set of clades and subclades based
4 on a curated set of SNPs (8) that is regularly updated as novel lineages of epidemiological
5 interest are identified (30). Pathogenwatch uses an in-house implementation designed to
6 work with assembly output. The *blastn* v2.2.30 program is used to align the query loci and
7 identify positions of diagnostic SNPs, which are then processed according to the rules of
8 the GenoTyphi scheme (31). The genotype assignment and the number of diagnostic
9 SNPs identified on the assemblies are reported.

10 The plasmid replicon marker sequences are detected in the user and public genome
11 assemblies with *Inctyper*, which uses the PlasmidFinder Enterobacteriaceae database
12 (32). Details of the *Inctyper* tool can be found in the documentation (33).

13

14 **Generation of the *S. Typhi* core genome library**

15 Pathogenwatch supports SNP-based neighbour joining trees of *S. Typhi* both for user
16 genomes (collection trees) and public genomes (population tree and subtrees). The trees
17 are inferred using a curated core gene library of 3284 *S. Typhi* genes (34) generated from
18 a pan-genome analysis of 26 complete or high-quality draft genomes (Additional File 1:
19 Supplementary Table S2) with Roary (35) and identity threshold of 95%. The core gene
20 families were realigned using MAFFT v7.2.2.0 (36), and filtered or trimmed according to
21 the quality of the alignments. The gene with the fewest average pairwise SNP differences
22 to the other family members was selected as the representative for each family. We then
23 selected 19 reference genomes (Additional File 1: Supplementary Table S2) belonging to
24 different genotypes according to the population structure previously described (8). The
25 gene families were then searched against each of the 19 reference genomes and filtered
26 according to the following rules: a) only universal families with complete coverage of the
27 representative were kept; b) all paralogues were removed; c) overlapping gene families
28 were merged into a single, contiguous pseudo-sequence. A BLAST (37) core library was
29 then built with the representative genes, and a profile of variant sites determined for the
30 core genes present in each reference genome. Each of the 4389 public genomes was
31 then clustered with its closest reference genome based on this profile of variant sites, thus

1 constituting each of the 19 population subtrees that Pathogenwatch employs to
2 contextualise user-uploaded genomes.

3

4 **Typhi Pathogenwatch genome clustering**

5 The relationships between genomes are represented with trees (dendrograms) based on
6 the genetic distance computed from substitution mutations in the core gene library, as
7 described in detail in the documentation (38). User-provided assemblies are queried
8 against the *S. Typhi* core gene library with *blastn* v2.2.30 (37) using an identity threshold
9 of 90%. The core gene set of each query assembly is compared to the reference genome
10 core that has the most variant sites in common. An overall relative substitution rate is
11 determined, and loci that contain more variants than expected assuming a Poisson
12 distribution are filtered out. Pairwise distances between assemblies (including user-
13 provided and reference) are scored via a distance scoring algorithm that compares all
14 variant positions from all pairs of core gene sets, SNPs are counted (generating a
15 downloadable pairwise difference matrix) and normalised by the relative proportion of the
16 core present (generating a downloadable pairwise score matrix). The pairwise score matrix
17 is then used to infer a midpoint-rooted neighbour-joining tree using the Phangorn v2.4.0
18 (39) and Ape v5.1 (40) R packages. Trees are computed for the user assemblies only
19 (collection tree), and for the user assemblies and public assemblies assigned to the same
20 reference genome (public data subtrees), all of which are downloadable in Newick format.

21 We benchmarked the Pathogenwatch clustering method against other methods of SNP-
22 based tree inference with three subsets of published genomes: Dataset I) 118 genomes
23 spanning the population diversity of *S. Typhi* defined by GenoTyphi (Additional File 2:
24 Supplementary Table S3); Dataset II) 138 closely related genomes, from a recent clonal
25 expansion of the multidrug-resistant haplotype H58 within Africa (Additional File 2:
26 Supplementary Table S4); and Dataset III) 43 strains from clade 3.2 including CT18, the
27 first completed *S. Typhi* genome, which remains reference of choice for most population
28 genomics studies (Additional File 2: Supplementary Table S5). For each subset a tree was
29 generated with four different methods: 1) Pathogenwatch; 2) maximum likelihood (ML) with
30 RAxML v8.2.8 (41) on SNPs extracted from an alignment of concatenated core genes
31 generated using Roary (35); 3) neighbour joining (NJ) with FastTree (42) using the option
32 `-noml` on the same alignment as 2); and 4) ML with RAxML v8.2.8 on SNPs extracted

1 from a previously published CT18-guided alignment (7). Five hundred bootstrap replicates
2 were computed for the ML trees (methods 2 and 4). We compared the trees thus
3 generated using the tree comparison software Treescape v1.10.18 (Kendall-Colijn
4 distance, now available as Treespace (43)) and the Tanglegram algorithm of Dendroscope
5 (44). The tree files used in the tree comparisons are provided in (45).

6 Genomes can also be clustered in Typhi Pathogenwatch based on their cgMLST profile
7 using single linkage clustering. Distance scores are calculated between each pair of
8 samples by identifying the genes which have been found in both samples and by counting
9 the number of differences in the alleles. The SLINK algorithm (46) is used to quickly group
10 genomes into clusters at a given threshold. For a given genome, users are able to see
11 how many other genomes it is clustered with at a range of distance thresholds, view the
12 structure of the cluster as a network graph, and view the metadata and analysis for
13 sequences in that cluster.

14

15 **Genomic predictions of antimicrobial resistance**

16 Pathogenwatch predicts the presence of genes and single point mutations conferring AMR
17 by querying genome assemblies using PAARSNP v2.4.9 with *blastn* v2.2.30 (37) and a
18 curated *S. Typhi* database of genes and mutations (Additional File 1: Supplementary
19 Table S6 (47)) known to confer resistance to ampicillin (AMP), chloramphenicol (CHL),
20 broad-spectrum cephalosporins (CEP), ciprofloxacin (CIP), sulfamethoxazole (SMX),
21 trimethoprim (TMP), the combination antibiotic co-trimoxazole (sulfamethoxazole-
22 trimethoprim, SXT), tetracycline (TCY), azithromycin (AZM), colistin (CST) and
23 meropenem (MEM). For details of the implementation see Pathogenwatch documentation
24 (48)

25 PAARSNP also provides a prediction of AMR phenotype inferred from the combination of
26 identified mechanisms. To benchmark the genotypic resistance predictions, we used a set
27 of 1316 genomes from 16 published studies (Additional File 1: Supplementary Table S1)
28 with drug susceptibility information available for at least one of the twelve antibiotics
29 reported by Typhi Pathogenwatch. The drug susceptibility data reported was
30 heterogeneous across the studies (minimum inhibitory concentration (MICs), disk diffusion
31 diameters, and/or susceptible/intermediate/resistant (SIR)). We first compared the Typhi
32 Pathogenwatch antibiotic resistance predictions to the drug susceptibility phenotype (SIR

1 interpretation provided by the studies) of 1316 genomes, grouping the Resistant and
2 Intermediate classifications as non-susceptible. For each antibiotic, the sensitivity,
3 specificity, positive predictive value (PPV) and negative predictive value (NPV) for
4 detection of known resistance determinants, and their 95% confidence intervals (CI) were
5 calculated with the epi.tests function of the epiR v1.0-14 package (49). False negative
6 (FN) and false positive (FP) results were further investigated with alternative methods by
7 querying the genome assemblies with Resfinder (10) and/or by mapping and local
8 assembly of the sequence reads to the Bacterial Antimicrobial Resistance Reference
9 Gene Database (Bioproject PRJNA313047) with ARIBA (50).

10 Seven studies reported ciprofloxacin MICs for a total of 889 *S. Typhi* strains, albeit
11 interpreted with different breakpoint guidelines and versions (Additional File 2:
12 Supplementary Table S1). We compared the Typhi Pathogenwatch ciprofloxacin
13 resistance predictions (SIR) for each observed combination of genetic AMR determinants
14 against the MIC values re-interpreted with the ciprofloxacin breakpoints for *Salmonella*
15 spp. from CLSI M100 30th edition (susceptible MIC ≤ 0.06 ; intermediate MIC = 0.12 to 0.5;
16 resistant MIC ≥ 1 (51)) with a script that is available at (45) .

17

1 **Results**

2

3 **Overview of the Typhi Pathogenwatch application**

4 We have developed a public health focused application for *S. Typhi* genomics that uses
5 genome assemblies to perform three essential tasks for surveillance and epidemiological
6 investigations, i.e., (i) placing isolates into lineages or clonal groups, (ii) identifying their
7 closest relatives and linking to their geographic distribution, and (iii) detecting the presence
8 of genes and mutations associated with AMR. These data can aid the local investigator to
9 rapidly identify a potential source of transmission and to predict AMR phenotypes.

10 The Pathogenwatch application can be accessed at <https://pathogen.watch/styphi>, where
11 users can create an account and upload and analyse their genomes (Figure 1 (52)). User
12 data remains private and stored in their personal account. Pathogenwatch provides
13 compatibility with typing information for MLST (5), cgMLST (11), *in silico* serotyping
14 (SISTR (12)), a SNP genotyping scheme (GenoTyphi (8)), and plasmid replicon
15 sequences (32). The results for a single genome are displayed in a genome report that
16 can be downloaded as a PDF. The results for a collection of genomes can be viewed
17 online and downloaded as trees and tables of genotypes, AMR predictions, assembly
18 metrics, and genetic variation. Results can also be accessed at a later date and shared via
19 a collection ID embedded in a unique weblink, thus facilitating collaborative surveillance.

20

21 **Clustering genomes into lineages with Pathogenwatch**

22 A fundamental process for interpreting large genomic datasets is to identify the nearest
23 neighbours to the genome(s) under investigation. The pairwise genetic distance between
24 isolates provides an operational unit for genomic surveillance, which we can combine with
25 epidemiological metadata to make inferences during an investigation or for routine
26 surveillance. Typhi Pathogenwatch clusters user genomes based on their genetic distance
27 and displays their relationships in a collection tree.

28 We benchmarked the Pathogenwatch clustering method against established methods of
29 SNP-based tree inference, i.e. maximum likelihood or neighbour-joining trees inferred from
30 core genome SNPs or whole-genome SNPs. We used three sets of published genomes: I)
31 118 genomes spanning the population diversity of *S. Typhi* defined by GenoTyphi (8); II)

1 138 closely related genomes, from a clonal expansion of 4.3.1 within Africa (7); and III) 43
2 strains from clade 3.2 including CT18, the genome of choice for reference-guided
3 population genomics studies (8). The Pathogenwatch trees clustered the diverse genomes
4 from subset I according to genotype assignments (Additional File: Supplementary Figure
5 S1a), and detected phylogeographic signal in the closely related genomes of subset II
6 (Additional File: Supplementary Figure S1b), in agreement with previous studies. In
7 addition, we found that the Typhi Pathogenwatch clustering algorithm produced trees
8 comparable to the established methods based on visualisations of the tree space and tree
9 topology (Additional File 3: Supplementary Figure S2).

10

11 **Contextualisation with public data**

12 Pathogenwatch contextualises the user-uploaded genomes with public genomes using a
13 population tree of 19 diverse genome references (Additional File 3: Supplementary Figure
14 S3) to guide the SNP-based clustering of user and public genomes into subsets of closely
15 related genomes (population subtrees). Therefore, Pathogenwatch can display user
16 genomes in the context of the most relevant public data, facilitating visualisation and
17 interpretation. A previous investigation of a typhoid outbreak in Zambia exemplifies the
18 value of this integrated contextualisation (53). This retrospective study identified clonal
19 diversity and a two repertoires of AMR genes within outbreak organisms, which belonged
20 to haplotype H58 (genotype 4.3.1). The study also identified an isolate from Central Africa
21 as the nearest neighbour to the Zambian genomes among the only 5 genomes from 4.3.1
22 available for comparison at the time. Using Pathogenwatch, the clonal diversity of the
23 outbreak strains can be rapidly contextualised with the 2500 H58 genomes available at the
24 time of publication. This revealed two different clusters with close relationships to
25 contemporary genomes from neighbouring countries Malawi and Tanzania (Figure 2a-b)
26 that are also characterised by different *dfrA* genes (Figure 2c-d). The integration of
27 genomic data and associated metadata from different studies in Pathogenwatch facilitates
28 the contextualisation of a local outbreak via the web and without the need for
29 bioinformatics expertise.

30 Users interested in exploring the public genomes without creating their own collections can
31 browse the public data as a whole (54) or view by published study (55). At the time of
32 submission, Typhi Pathogenwatch included 4389 public genomes from 26 published

1 articles (Additional File 1: Supplementary Table S1). The average length of the genome
2 assemblies was 4,787,922 bp (sd = 85492, range = 4535,494 – 5,211,763), the average
3 N50 was 196,001 bp (sd = 130667, range = 19,527 – 4,806,333), the average number of
4 contigs was 59.3 (sd = 43.44, range = 1 – 633), the average number of non-ATCG
5 characters was 1,841.1 (sd = 3,718, range = 1 – 48,002) and the GC content was 52.0%
6 (sd = 0.1, range = 51.4 - 52.4). The genomes spanned the years 1905 to 2019, the
7 majority of which were from 2000 onwards (N=3,795, 86.49%). Seventy-seven countries
8 were reflected by the public genomes, with the largest representations from the Indian
9 subcontinent (N=1,602, 36.50%), the United Kingdom (N=629, 14.33%) and Southeast
10 Asia (N=570, 12.99%, Additional File 3: Supplementary Figure S4). Over 97% of the
11 genomes were classified as either ST1 (68.2%) or ST2 (29.0%) using the 7-locus
12 *Salmonella* MLST scheme, with the remaining 2.8% divided between 33 rare STs
13 (Additional File 1: Supplementary Table S7). Similarly, over half of the genomes (N=2,500,
14 57.0%) belonged to the globally dominant MDR genotype 4.3.1, which is further
15 discriminated into five genotypes with different temporal distributions and relative
16 abundance (Additional File 3: Supplementary Figure S5).

17

18 **Genomic predictions of antimicrobial resistance**

19 Typhi Pathogenwatch provides resistance predictions for antimicrobials relevant to
20 treatment of typhoid fever by querying genome assemblies with BLAST (37) and a curated
21 library of known AMR genes and mutations (Additional File 1: Supplementary Table S6).
22 To benchmark the Typhi Pathogenwatch predictions, we compared the genotypic
23 resistance genotypes to the available drug susceptibility phenotypes (SIR interpretation) of
24 1316 genomes, grouping the Resistant and Intermediate classifications as insusceptible.
25 The sensitivity of the Pathogenwatch genotypic predictions was at least 0.96 for all
26 antibiotics with a computed value (Table 1); at the time of writing, there were no
27 insusceptible isolates described for colistin or meropenem. The false negative (FN) calls
28 for ampicillin (N=4), cephalosporins (N=2), chloramphenicol (N=6), and sulfamethoxazole-
29 trimethoprim (N=7) corresponded to genomes for which no resistance gene was reported
30 in the original genome studies (56-58), nor by an alternative bioinformatics method (50), in
31 agreement with Pathogenwatch phenotype. For all of the 49 FN calls for ciprofloxacin, the
32 Pathogenwatch genotypic predictions agree with the sequence analyses reported in the
33 original genome studies (30, 58), in which no QRDR mutations or *qnr* genes were

1 detected. Only mutations outside of the quinolone-resistance determining region (QRDR)
2 of *parE* (A364V, N=17) or *gyrA* (D538N, N=2) were detected in 20 genomes. These
3 mutations have not as yet been shown to induce ciprofloxacin resistance and were
4 therefore excluded from the Pathogenwatch AMR library.

5 The specificity of the Pathogenwatch genotypic predictions was at least 0.95 for most
6 antimicrobials (Table 1), with the exception of ciprofloxacin, for which the specificity was
7 0.66 (95% confidence interval 0.58-0.73), showing that a third of the ciprofloxacin
8 susceptible isolates were reported as insusceptible by Pathogenwatch. A closer inspection
9 of the 57 false positive (FP) results showed that Pathogenwatch reported one (N=55), two
10 (N=2) or three (N=1) mutations in the QRDR of *gyrA*, *gyrB* and/or *parC*, most frequently
11 the single mutations *gyrA*_S83F (N=25) and *gyrB*_S464F (N=16). For 54 of these cases,
12 the same mutations were reported in the original genome studies. For the remaining three
13 genomes, no mutations were reported in the original studies, but we confirmed the
14 presence of *gyrB*_S464F (N=2) or *gyrB*_S464Y (N=1) in the assemblies using Resfinder
15 (10). Similarly, we confirmed the Pathogenwatch identification of *bla*_{TEM-1}, *catA1*, or *sul1-*
16 *dfrA7* for all 47 of the FP calls for ampicillin (N=8), chloramphenicol (N=14), and
17 sulfamethoxazole-trimethoprim (N=25), respectively, either from the original genome
18 studies or with Resfinder.

19 The additive effect of QRDR mutations on ciprofloxacin susceptibility has been previously
20 described (59). In addition, the presence of three non-synonymous mutations in the *gyrA*
21 (S83F and D87N) and *parC* (S80I) genes was previously associated with ciprofloxacin
22 resistance and fluoroquinolone treatment failure (59, 60) and was predictive of
23 ciprofloxacin resistance in a study of reference laboratory isolates (61). Pathogenwatch
24 thus reports this specific combination of mutations as resistant on the Antibiotics table with
25 a red circle, while any other single, double or triple QRDR mutation is reported as
26 decreased susceptibility (intermediate, yellow circle). We evaluated the ciprofloxacin MICs
27 of 889 *S. Typhi* isolates from nine previous studies against the different combinations of
28 resistance mechanisms identified by Pathogenwatch. Overall, the distribution of MIC
29 values was consistent with the genomic predictions of AMR from Pathogenwatch (Figure
30 3). The MIC values linked to some of the mechanisms, however, straddled two or even all
31 three SIR categories, explaining many of the differences observed between phenotype
32 and genotypic predictions. The isolates with 1 or 2 QRDR mutations had intermediate
33 MICs against ciprofloxacin, and support reporting as intermediate in Pathogenwatch. The

1 highest ciprofloxacin MIC values were observed for the combination of *gyrA*_S83F-
2 *gyrA*_D87N-*parC*_S80I mutations, reported as resistant by Pathogenwatch. However, the
3 triple combination *gyrA*_S83F-*gyrA*_D87G-*parC*_E84K was represented by 9 isolates with
4 MICs in both the resistant (N=6) and the intermediate (N=3) ranges, and is reported by
5 Pathogenwatch as intermediate. Further susceptibility testing of isolates with this
6 combination of mutations is needed to refine genotypic predictions. Likewise, several other
7 mechanisms potentially conferring insusceptibility to ciprofloxacin were found in the public
8 genomes but had with no or little associated MIC data, including seven additional triple
9 mutations (Additional File 1: Supplementary Table S8, Additional File 3: Supplementary
10 Figure S6).

11 Genomic predictions of AMR are presented in three interactive and downloadable tables,
12 Antibiotics, Genes, and SNPs, which display the predicted resistance profile, AMR genes
13 and AMR-associated chromosomal SNPs found for each genome in the collection,
14 respectively. The user can overlay the genotypic predictions on the tree and the map
15 views for one or multiple antibiotics/genes/SNPs, thus intuitively linking resistance with
16 genome clustering and geographic location. For example, the distribution of genomic
17 predictions of ciprofloxacin resistant, MDR, or extremely drug resistant (XDR, defined as
18 MDR + ciprofloxacin resistant) *S. Typhi* on the map and on the tree of 4389 public
19 genomes highlight the lineages that represent a particular challenge to treatment and their
20 geographical distribution (Additional File 3: Supplementary Figure S7). A summary of the
21 genomic predictions of MDR and XDR *S. Typhi* highlights the differences in the distribution
22 of high-risk clones by region, year and genotype, as inferred from the public genomes
23 (Additional File 3: Supplementary Figure S8).

24 In addition, Pathogenwatch presents a granular picture of the different genetic
25 mechanisms behind resistance to an antibiotic. For example, the distinct distribution of
26 trimethoprim-resistance gene *dfrA15* in West Africa associated with genotype 3.1.1, and of
27 *dfrA7* across Central and East Africa, associated with genotypes 2.5.1 and 4.3.1.1,
28 respectively (62) (Additional File 3: Supplementary Figure S9). The most frequent AMR
29 genes in the public collection of 4389 genomes associated with an MDR phenotype were
30 *bla*_{TEM-1} (ampicillin, N=1460), *catA1* (chloramphenicol, N=1406), *sul1* (sulfamethoxazole,
31 N=1447), and *dfrA7* (trimethoprim, N=1232). Notably, *bla*_{CTX-M-15} was the most frequent
32 gene coding for an extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (N=92, Additional File 3:
33 Supplementary Figure S10). The distribution of the sequence identity values of acquired

1 AMR genes found in the public genomes showed only minor deviations from being
2 identical to the AMR library representatives (Additional File 3: Supplementary Figure S11).
3 Several plasmids have been implicated in the dissemination of drug-resistant *S. Typhi*.
4 Notably, the MDR phenotype is linked to a composite transposon carrying multiple
5 resistance genes, either located in IncH1 plasmids or integrated into the chromosome (7).
6 An IncY plasmid that confers resistance to fluoroquinolones and third-generation
7 cephalosporins was detected in XDR *S. Typhi* from an outbreak in Pakistan (56), while
8 plasmids belonging to at least five different Inc types have been described in a recent pan-
9 African study (62). Pathogenwatch identifies plasmid replicon marker sequences in the
10 user genomes and reports them on the Typing table on the collection view for multiple
11 genomes (Figure 1). A more detailed output is included in the single genome report, where
12 any resistance genes found on the same assembled contig as the replicon marker
13 sequence are also indicated. Pathogenwatch reported between one and four plasmid
14 replicon marker sequences in a third of the public genomes (1,571/4,389, 35.79%,
15 Additional File 3: Supplementary Figure S12a). Predictably, plasmid replicon markers were
16 more frequent in genomes with predicted genotypic resistance, in particular those
17 organisms that were resistant to multiple antimicrobials (Additional File 3: Supplementary
18 Figure S12b). Notably, the cryptic plasmid pHCM2, which does not carry resistance genes
19 (63), was the most common replicon detected amongst genomes in which acquired
20 resistance genes were not detected. The distribution of replicon genes showed that the
21 combination of IncH1A and IncH1B(R27) was prevalent in MDR genomes from Southeast
22 Asia and East Africa belonging to clade 4.3.1, while the same combination with the
23 addition of IncFIA(HI1) was more prevalent in West Africa, and associated with clade 3.1
24 (Additional File 3: Supplementary Figure 12b-d). The IncH1A and IncH1B(R27) detect
25 fragments of the *repA2* and *repA* genes, respectively, of the IncH11 conjugative plasmid
26 which has historically been associated with the majority of MDR typhoid (7). IncFIA(HI1)
27 detects fragments of the *repE* gene that is present in a subset of IncH11 plasmids,
28 including the plasmid sequence type PST2 variant common in *S. Typhi* 3.1 in West Africa,
29 but is lacking from the PST6 variant that is widespread in *S. Typhi* 4.3.1 in East Africa and
30 Asia (62).

31

32 **Maximising the utility of genomic data**

1 Pathogenwatch makes the public WGS data easily accessible and searchable, and also
2 constitutes a growing resource to which new data can be added. While genomic
3 predictions of AMR are based on known mechanisms, the predictions can easily be
4 updated as new mechanisms are discovered. Azithromycin is one of the last oral treatment
5 options for typhoid for which resistance is currently uncommon, of particular importance in
6 endemic areas with high rates of fluoroquinolone-resistance and outbreaks of XDR *S.*
7 *Typhi*. A non-synonymous point mutation in the gene encoding the efflux pump AcrB
8 (R717Q) was recently singled out as a molecular mechanism of resistance to azithromycin
9 in *S. Typhi* (64). Pathogenwatch detected the *acrB_R717Q* mutation in a collection of 12
10 Bangladeshi genomes of genotype 4.3.1.1 isolated between 2013 and 2016 in which this
11 mutation was first described (Figure 4). Notably, Pathogenwatch also detected the
12 *acrB_R717Q* mutation in three additional genomes, two from isolates recovered in
13 England in 2014 (no travel history available (65)), and one from an isolate recovered in
14 Samoa in 2007 (7). The Samoan genome 10349_1_30_Sam072830_2007 was typed as
15 genotype 3.5.4, while the English genomes 65343 and 32480 (no travel information
16 available) belonged to genotypes 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1, respectively. Genome 65343 was
17 closely related to the cluster of 12 genomes from Bangladesh where this mutation was first
18 described, while genome 32480 belonged to a small cluster of five genomes from India or
19 with travel history to India. Thus, reanalysis of public data with Pathogenwatch showed
20 that the *acrB_R717Q* mutation has emerged in multiple genetic backgrounds, in multiple
21 locations, and as early as 2007.

22

23 **Pathogenwatch applied to rapid risk assessment**

24 Typhoid fever is rare in countries with a good infrastructure for the provision of clean water
25 and sanitation infrastructure, with most cases arising from travel to endemic areas (66).
26 Ceftriaxone-resistant typhoid fever was recently reported in developed countries and
27 associated with travel to Pakistan (67-69). These ceftriaxone resistant isolates were
28 associated to the recent outbreak of XDR *S. Typhi* in the Sindh province of Pakistan by the
29 epidemiological data, the antibiograms, and information derived from WGS of the clinical
30 isolate, such as presence of resistance genes, and mobile genetic elements. In some
31 cases the genomes were contextualised with retrospective genomes by building a
32 phylogenetic tree using an existing bioinformatic pipeline (67, 68) .

1 We exemplify how Pathogenwatch facilitates this analysis with the genome from the
2 isolate recovered in Canada (PHL5950, accession RHPM00000000 (69)). Pathogenwatch
3 provides a printable genome report (Additional File 3: Supplementary Figure S13)
4 including genotyping and *in silico* serotyping information, predicted resistance profile, and
5 the presence of resistance genes and mutations. In addition, Pathogenwatch places the
6 genome within the Pakistani XDR outbreak (Figure 5) and shows the close genetic
7 relatedness (between 3 and 8 pairwise differences) of the isolates via the downloadable
8 score matrix.

9

10 **Pathogenwatch as a tool for international collaboration in typhoid surveillance**

11 As WGS capacity becomes a reality in typhoid endemic countries, there is a growing
12 opportunity for local genomic surveillance and for collaboration across borders. This is
13 underscored by the growing number of genomes from the Indian Subcontinent (Additional
14 File 3: Supplementary Figure S3), where epidemic clone 4.3.1 (H58) and the nested clade
15 of fluoroquinolone-resistant triple mutants belonging to genotype 4.3.1.2 (H58 lineage II)
16 have been shown to have originated (7, 60)). The triple mutants were first reported in
17 Nepal (isolated in 2013-2014) and linked to isolates from India from 2008-2012 (60). More
18 recent surveillance studies in India showed that this lineage was still prevalent in *S. Typhi*
19 isolates collected in Nepal in 2016 and in India in 2016-2017 (30, 70). The public data
20 integrated in Pathogenwatch showed that (at the time of writing) this lineage is
21 represented by 195 public genomes from seven countries (India, Bangladesh, Nepal,
22 Pakistan, Myanmar, Japan, and United Kingdom, Figure 6a, (7, 58, 59, 65, 70-73)) and
23 from as early as 2006 (Japan, with travel history to India, Figure 6b (71)). Linking the tree
24 and the map highlights distinct clusters of genomes that show evidence of transmission
25 across borders, for example between India-Pakistan and India-Nepal (Figure 8c-d). In
26 addition, three isolates recovered in 2016 in India were reported to be resistant to
27 cephalosporins, linked to the presence of the *bla*_{SHV-12} gene (74); Pathogenwatch detected
28 *bla*_{SHV-12}, *qnrB* and the IncX3 plasmid replicon in these genomes. Another previous study
29 reported an IncN replicon in three genomes from the United Kingdom (two with travel
30 history to India) that also carried resistance genes *dfrA15* (trimethoprim), *sul1*
31 (sulfamethoxazole), and *tetA(A)* (tetracycline) (59). Pathogenwatch identified the same
32 AMR genes and plasmid replicon in these genomes, and also in two closely related
33 genomes from Japan with travel history to Nepal and India (Figure 6b). Altogether, these

1 observations suggest that this lineage circulating in South Asia and linked to treatment
2 failure with fluoroquinolones, can acquire plasmids with additional AMR genes, with the
3 concomitant risk of the clonal expansion of a lineage that poses additional challenges to
4 treatment.

1 **Discussion**

2

3 Our understanding of the *S. Typhi* population structure, including MDR typhoid has
4 improved dramatically since the introduction of WGS, which provides a level of
5 discrimination much needed for a human-adapted pathogen that exhibits very limited
6 genetic variability. Progress towards the widespread implementation of WGS for
7 epidemiological investigations and integrated routine surveillance within public health
8 settings needs to be accompanied by i) active surveillance programs in endemic regions;
9 ii) implementation of WGS at laboratories in endemic regions; iii) analysis of WGS data
10 with fast, robust and scalable tools that deliver information for public health action; iv)
11 dissemination of WGS data through networks of collaborating reference laboratories at the
12 national, international and global scales; and v) provision of WGS data and associated
13 metadata through continuously growing databases that are amenable to interaction and
14 interpretation (75). Here, we described Typhi Pathogenwatch, a web application for the
15 genomic surveillance and epidemiology of *S. Typhi*, which enhances the utility of public
16 WGS data and associated metadata by integration into an interactive resource that users
17 can browse, or query with their own WGS data.

18 Rapid, timely access to information on local patterns of AMR may inform treatment
19 regimens, which could ultimately lead to a reduction in morbidity and mortality associated
20 with enteric fever as this is much greater in the absence of effective antimicrobial therapy
21 (76) . Typhi Pathogenwatch provides a general framework for genomic predictions of AMR
22 and of related strain clusters, and is accessible to users of all bioinformatics skills levels.
23 This enables users with an understanding of genomics but no bioinformatics training to
24 conduct surveillance and epidemiological investigations using WGS. Furthermore, it allows
25 experienced bioinformaticians to rapidly perform the essential tasks listed in the results
26 section, thus freeing up time for more advanced downstream analyses.

27 We demonstrated that genomic predictions of AMR are largely concordant with the
28 resistance phenotype (overall concordance 96.34%, Table 1), but with the added value of
29 immediate contextualisation with location, time and population structure in an interactive
30 visualisation with which to easily explore these aspects. A previous study of 332 isolates
31 analysed in a single reference laboratory reported only 0.03% discordant results (61)
32 versus 3.66% from our data. Our results, however, amalgamated published susceptibility

1 data from thirteen different studies conducted in eight different countries. The availability of
2 consistent laboratory antimicrobial susceptibility testing data is key for the periodic
3 benchmarking and refinement of genomic predictions of AMR (77), in particular for
4 ciprofloxacin due to the diverse combinations of mechanisms (Additional File 1:
5 Supplementary Table S8). It should also be noted that Pathogenwatch was developed with
6 a focus on surveillance, not for clinical decision making.

7 Novel mechanisms of AMR can easily be added to the curated Pathogenwatch AMR
8 library, and the growing collection of public genomes can be retrospectively screened,
9 potentially revealing the presence of a newly identified gene or mutation in genomes from
10 isolates previously collected (Figure 4). This illustrates how the provision of public genomic
11 data through Pathogenwatch maximises reusability from which new insights into novel
12 AMR mechanisms can be derived.-The utility of maintaining a regularly updated archive of
13 WGS data that can be rapidly ‘mined’ for the presence of newly discovered AMR gene was
14 elegantly illustrated before by the retrospective discovery of the colistin resistance gene
15 *mcr-1* in *S. enterica* and *Escherichia coli* genomes from Public Health England (78).
16 Pathogenwatch extends this utility to the Typhi entire community, thus democratizing the
17 reusability of the genomic data.

18 Contextualizing new genomes with existing data is now a routine part of genomic
19 epidemiology, as it can complement epidemiological investigations to, among many
20 applications, place the new genomes in or out of an outbreak, link to past outbreaks, and
21 determine if the success of a resistant phenotype is the result of a single clonal expansion
22 or multiple independent introductions (79). Using the publicly available genomes, we
23 provided examples of the utility of Pathogenwatch to contextualise user-uploaded
24 genomes for outbreak investigation in endemic areas (Figure 2) or for the management of
25 patients in non-endemic countries with travel history to endemic areas (Figure 5).

26 Analysing new genomes in the context of global genomes involves the retrieval, storage
27 and bioinformatic analysis of large amounts of sequence data and linked metadata, which
28 is time-consuming at the least, and largely unfeasible for hospitals or public-health
29 agencies with limited computing infrastructure. Pathogenwatch bridges this gap and
30 provides contextualisation with the closest-related genomes guided by the *S. Typhi*
31 population tree (Additional File 3: Supplementary Figure S3) and subtrees.

32 The interpretation of the genomic context relies heavily on the completeness of the public
33 collection used for contextualisation, and this in turn depends on the establishment of

1 local, national and international surveillance programs for the real-time management of
2 emerging lineages that pose a direct threat to human health. The International Typhoid
3 Consortium collected and sequenced around 40% of the global genomes available in
4 Pathogenwatch for comparison (7, 8), but ongoing surveillance and WGS are needed to
5 maintain a relevant, contemporary genome collection. Additionally, this requires retrieval
6 and curation of the genome data and associated metadata, as Pathogenwatch does not
7 currently support automated submissions.

8 Pathogenwatch can facilitate collaborative surveillance in endemic areas via data
9 integration and shared collections for the early detection and containment of high-risk
10 clones (Figure 6). Collections can be set to off-line mode to work while disconnected from
11 the internet, which may be advantageous in settings with unreliable internet connections.
12 Despite recent efforts to promote data openness in times of pandemics (80, 81), several
13 challenges to sharing genomic data and linked metadata remain in both the academic and
14 public-health settings (75). User-uploaded genomes and metadata remain in the
15 Pathogenwatch user account, and collections also remain private unless the user
16 specifically shares them via a collection URL. Moreover, Pathogenwatch offers a private
17 metadata option to work with confidential information.

18 Recent improvements in our understanding of the disease burden and the dissemination
19 of AMR, and the development of new typhoid conjugate vaccines have bolstered efforts to
20 employ routine vaccination for the containment of typhoid fever (82). Routine surveillance
21 coupled with WGS can inform decisions on suitable settings for the introduction of
22 vaccination programs and on the evolution of pathogens in response to them (83, 84).
23 Pathogenwatch could be linked to routine genomic surveillance around typhoid vaccination
24 initiatives to monitor the population dynamics in response to the deployment of new
25 vaccines.

26 While other tools have been developed for the analysis of WGS data of the *Salmonella*
27 *enterica* species, such as the comprehensive database Enterobase (11) and the *in silico*
28 typing resource SISTR (12), the *S. Typhi* analysis framework of Pathogenwatch has been
29 developed with a focus on the epidemiology of this human-adapted serovar and AMR. The
30 modular architecture allows new functionalities to be added to cater to the community
31 needs.

32

1 **Conclusions**

2 Typhi Pathogenwatch combines accurate genomic predictions of AMR with genomic and
3 geographic context within an easy to use interface for delivered for the community and to
4 support ongoing typhoid surveillance programs.

5

6 **List of abbreviations**

7 AMR: antimicrobial resistance

8 cgMLST: core-genome multi-locus sequence typing

9 PFGE: pulse-field gel electrophoresis

10 MDR: multi-drug resistant

11 MLST: multi-locus sequence typing

12 MLVA: multiple-locus variable-number tandem-repeat analysis

13 QRDR: quinolone resistance determining region

14 VNTR: multiple-locus variable-number tandem-repeat

15 XDR: extremely-drug resistant

16 WGS: whole-genome sequencing

17

18 **Declarations**

19 Ethics approval and consent to participate

20 Not applicable.

21

22 Consent for publication

23 Not applicable.

24

25 Availability of data and materials

26 The genome data and linked metadata presented are available from:

27 <https://pathogen.watch/collection/07lsscrbhu2x-public-genomes>,

28 <https://pathogen.watch/collection/g5pbucot6e58-hendriksen-et-al-2015>, and

29 <https://pathogen.watch/collection/11sok8nrzts-wong-et-al-2018-idcases-15e00492>

30 The tree comparison nexus files are available from

31 https://gitlab.com/cgps/pathogenwatch/publications/styphi/benchmark_tree

1 The AMR benchmarking input files and script are available from
2 https://gitlab.com/cgps/pathogenwatch/publications/styphi/benchmark_AMR

3 4 Competing interests

5 The authors declare no competing interests.

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15 16 Authors' contributions

17 DMA conceived the Pathogenwatch application. CY, RJG, KA, BT, AU and DMA
18 developed the Pathogenwatch application. SA drafted the manuscript. SA, DMA, KEH, SB,
19 and GD contributed to the conception and design of the work, data interpretation, and
20 substantially revised the manuscript. SA, CY, VKW, ZAD, SN, AJP, JAK, SEP and FM
21 contributed to the acquisition and interpretation of data. SA, CY and LSB analysed the
22 data. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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29

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
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1 **Figures**

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
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
Figure 1. Workflow of the Typhi Pathogenwatch application. Input assemblies or sequence reads and metadata files can be uploaded via drag-and-drop onto the Upload page. Once the analyses completed, the genomes are listed on the Genomes page with Pathogenwatch outputs for speciation and MLST. Clicking on a genome name on the list pops up a Genome Report. The user can create collections of genomes. The Collection view displays the user genomes clustered by genetic similarity on a tree, their location on a map, a timeline, as well as tables for metadata, typing and AMR. The Population view displays the user genomes by their closest reference genome in the population tree. Clicking on one of the highlighted nodes (purple triangles) opens the Population subtree view, which contextualises the user genomes with the closest public genomes.



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Figure 2. Pathogenwatch provides genomic context for outbreak investigations. **a-b** Genomes from an outbreak in Zambia (purple markers on tree and map) are linked by genetic relatedness to genomes from neighbouring countries Malawi and Tanzania (grey markers) forming 2 separate groups of 16 (**a**) and 4 (**b**) outbreak genomes, respectively. The number of pairwise differences (range) between outbreak and related genomes as downloaded from the Pathogenwatch score matrix are indicated on the bottom-right of the tree panel. **c-d** Differential distribution of trimethoprim resistance genes *dfrA7* (**c**) and *dfrA14* (**d**) across the two clades containing outbreak genomes. The data is available at <https://pathogen.watch/collection/g5pbucot6e58-hendriksen-et-al-2015>.


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Figure 3. Distribution of minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) values (mg/L) for ciprofloxacin in a collection of *S. Typhi* isolates with different combinations of genetic mechanisms that are known to confer resistance to this antibiotic. Only combinations observed in at least 5 genomes are shown. Dashed horizontal lines on the violin plots mark the CLSI clinical breakpoint for ciprofloxacin. Point colours inside violins represent the genotypic AMR prediction by Pathogenwatch on each combination of mechanisms. Barplots on the top show the abundance of genomes with each combination of mechanisms. Bar colours represent the differences between the predicted and the observed SIR (i.e. red for a predicted susceptible mechanism when the observed phenotype is resistant).

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Figure 4. Pathogenwatch data reusability. Fifteen genomes carrying the *acrB*_R717Q mutation recently linked to azithromycin resistance in *S. Typhi* are shown in red on the tree of 4389 public genomes and on the map. The presence of the mutation is indicated by the red circles on the SNPs table. Three of these genomes (tree labels) belong to isolates collected before the mutation was first described and are shown in more detail in the bottom panels. The data is available at <https://pathogen.watch/collection/07lsscrbhu2x-public-genomes>

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



Figure 5. Rapid risk assessment of typhoid fever cases in non-endemic regions. Pathogenwatch places genome PHL5950 from an isolate recovered in Canada and with travel history to Pakistan within the XDR-outbreak in Pakistan (red markers). The data is available at

<https://pathogen.watch/collection/11Isok8nrzts-wong-et-al-2018-idcases-15e00492>

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Figure 6. Pathogenwatch to for collaborative international surveillance of *S. Typhi*. **a** Pathogenwatch highlights 195 ciprofloxacin-resistant triple mutants on the public data tree and map by simultaneously selecting the mutations *gyrA*_S83F, *gyrA*_D87N, and *parC*_S80I on the SNPs table. **b** Detailed visualisation of the triple mutants showing the temporal distribution of the genomes on the timeline. Magenta arrowhead: 3 genomes from India with *bla*_{SHV-12}, *qnrB* and an *IncX3* replicon. Purple arrowhead: 4 genomes with *sul1*, *dfrA15*, *tetA(A)* and an *IncN* replicon from the UK and Japan. Selecting individual clades on the tree shows distinct clades that span neighbouring countries India-Pakistan (**c**) and India-Nepal (**d**). The data is available at <https://pathogen.watch/collection/07lsscrbhu2x-public-genomes>

Tables

Antibiotic	Total	TN	TP	FN	FP	Sensitivity (95% CI)	Specificity (95% CI)	PPV (95% CI)	NPV (95% CI)	VME rate	ME rate	Concordance (%)
AMP	875	461	402	4	8	0.99 (0.97-1.00)	0.98 (0.97-0.99)	0.98 (0.96-0.99)	0.99 (0.98-1)	0.01	0.02	98.63
CEP	348	256	90	2	0	0.98 (0.92-1.00)	1.00 (0.99-1.00)	1.00 (0.96-1.00)	0.99 (0.97-1.00)	0.02	0	99.43
CHL	913	518	375	6	14	0.98 (0.97-0.99)	0.97 (0.96-0.99)	0.96 (0.94-0.98)	0.99 (0.98-1.00)	0.02	0.03	97.81
CIP	1282	111	1065	49	57	0.96 (0.94-0.97)	0.66 (0.58-0.73)	0.95 (0.93-0.96)	0.69 (0.62-0.76)	0.04	0.32	91.73
SXT	912	513	367	7	25	0.98 (0.96-0.99)	0.95 (0.93-0.97)	0.94 (0.91-0.96)	0.99 (0.97-0.99)	0.02	0.05	96.49
TCY	44	40	4	0	0	1.00 (0.40-1.00)	1.00 (0.91-1.00)	1.00 (0.40-1.00)	1.00 (0.91-1.00)	0	0	100
AZM	156	144	12	0	0	1.00 (0.74-1.00)	1.00 (0.97-1.00)	1.00 (0.74-1.00)	1.00 (0.97-1.00)	0	0	100
CST	41	41	0	0	0	-	1.00 (0.91-1.00)	-	1.00 (0.91-1.00)	-	0	100
MEM	132	132	0	0	0	-	1.00 (0.97-1.00)	-	1.00 (0.97-1.00)	-	0	100

Table 1. Benchmark analysis of Typhi Pathogenwatch AMR predictions for ampicillin (AMP), chloramphenicol (CHL), broad-spectrum cephalosporins (CEP), ciprofloxacin (CIP), sulfamethoxazole-trimethoprim (SXT), tetracycline (TCY), azithromycin (AZM), colistin (CST) and meropenem (MEM). The total number of comparisons, true negatives (TN), true positives (TN), false negatives (FN), false positives (FN), sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value (PPV), negative predictive value (NPV), very major error (VME) rate, major error (ME) rate, and concordance are shown. Confidence intervals (95%) are shown in parenthesis.