

1 Neural encoding of task-dependent errors during adaptive learning

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13 **Abstract**

14 Effective learning requires using errors in a task-dependent manner, for example adjusting to
15 errors that result from unpredicted environmental changes but ignoring errors that result from
16 environmental stochasticity. Where and how the brain represents errors in a task-dependent
17 manner and uses them to guide behavior are not well understood. We imaged the brains of
18 human participants performing a predictive-inference task with two conditions that had different
19 sources of errors. Their performance was sensitive to this difference, including more choice
20 switches after fundamental changes versus stochastic fluctuations in reward contingencies. Using
21 multi-voxel pattern classification, we identified task-dependent representations of error
22 magnitude and past errors in posterior parietal cortex. These representations were distinct from
23 representations of the resulting behavioral adjustments in dorsomedial frontal, anterior cingulate,
24 and orbitofrontal cortex. The results provide new insights into how the human brain represents
25 errors in a task-dependent manner and guides subsequent adaptive behavior.

26

27 **Introduction**

28 Errors often drive adaptive adjustments in beliefs that inform behaviors that maximize
29 positive outcomes and minimize negative ones (Sutton & Barto, 1998). A major challenge to
30 error-driven learning in uncertain and dynamic environments is that errors can arise from
31 different sources that have different implications for learning. For example, a bad experience at a
32 restaurant that recently hired a new chef might lead you to update your belief about the quality of
33 the restaurant, whereas a similar experience at a well-known restaurant with a chef that has long
34 been your favorite might be written off as a one-time bad night. That is, the same errors should
35 be interpreted differently in different contexts. In general, errors that represent fundamental
36 changes in the environment or that occur during periods of uncertainty should probably lead you
37 to update your beliefs and change your behavior, whereas those that result from environmental
38 stochasticity are likely better ignored (d'Acremont & Bossaerts, 2016; Li, Nassar, Kable, & Gold,
39 2019; Nassar, Bruckner, & Frank, 2019; O'Reilly et al., 2013).

40 Neural representations of key features of these kinds of dynamic, error-driven learning
41 processes have been identified in several brain regions. For example, several studies focused on
42 variables derived from normative models that describe the degree to which individuals should
43 dynamically adjust their beliefs in response to error feedback under different task conditions,
44 including the probability that a fundamental change in the environment just occurred (change-
45 point probability, or CPP, which is a form of surprise) and the reducible uncertainty associated
46 with estimates of environmental features (relative uncertainty, or RU). Correlates of these
47 variables have been identified in dorsomedial frontal (DMFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal
48 (DLPFC) cortex and medial and lateral posterior parietal cortex (PPC) (Behrens, Woolrich,
49 Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; McGuire, Nassar, Gold, & Kable, 2014; Nassar, McGuire, Ritz, &
50 Kable, 2019). These and other studies also suggest specific roles for these different brain regions
51 in error-driving learning, including representations of surprise induced by either state changes or
52 outliers (irrelevant to state changes) in the PPC that suggest a role in error monitoring (Nassar,
53 Bruckner, et al., 2019; O'Reilly et al., 2013), and representations of variables more closely
54 related to belief and behavior updating in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (McGuire et al., 2014;
55 O'Reilly et al., 2013). However, these previous studies, which typically used continuous rather
56 than discrete feedback, were not designed to identify neural signals related to a key aspect of

57 flexible learning in uncertain and dynamic environments: responding to the same kinds of errors
58 differently in different conditions.

59 To identify such task-dependent neural responses to errors, we adapted a paradigm from
60 our previous single-unit recording study (Li et al., 2019). In this paradigm, we generated two
61 different dynamic environments by varying the amount of noise and the frequency that change-
62 points occur (i.e., hazard rate; Behrens et al., 2007; Glaze, Kable, & Gold, 2015; Nassar et al.,
63 2012; Nassar, Wilson, Heasley, & Gold, 2010). In one environment, noise was absent and the
64 hazard rate was high, and thus errors unambiguously signaled a change in state. We refer to this
65 high hazard/low noise condition as the *unstable* environment, because most errors can be
66 attributed to volatility. In another environment, noise was high and the hazard rate was low, and
67 thus small errors were ambiguous and could indicate either a change in state or noise. We refer to
68 this low hazard/high noise condition as the *noisy* environment, because most errors can be
69 attributed to stochasticity. Thus, effective learning requires treating errors in the two conditions
70 differently, including adjusting immediately to errors in the unstable environment but using the
71 size of errors and recent error history as cues to aid interpretation of ambiguous errors in the
72 noisy environment.

73 In our previous study, we found many single neurons in the anterior cingulate cortex
74 (ACC) or posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) that responded to errors or the current condition, but
75 we found little evidence that single neurons in these regions combined this information in a task-
76 dependent manner to discriminate the source of errors or drive behavior. In the current study, we
77 used whole-brain fMRI and multi-voxel pattern classification to identify task-dependent neural
78 responses to errors and activity predictive of behavioral updating in the human brain. The results
79 show task-dependent encoding of error magnitude and past errors in PPC and encoding of
80 behavioral shifts in frontal regions including ACC, DMFC, DLPFC and orbitofrontal cortex
81 (OFC), which provide new insights into the distinct roles these brain regions play in representing
82 errors in a task-dependent manner and using errors to guide adaptive behavior.

83

84 **Results**

85 Sixteen human participants performed a predictive-inference task (Figure 1A) while
86 fMRI was used to measure their blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) brain activity. The
87 task required them to predict the location of a single rewarded target from a circular array of ten

88 targets. The location of the rewarded target was sampled from a distribution based on the
89 location of the current best target and the noise level in the current condition. In addition, the
90 location of the best target could change according to a particular, fixed hazard rate (H). Two
91 conditions with different noise levels and hazard rates were conducted in separate runs. In the
92 noisy condition (Figure 1B–C), the rewarded target would appear in one of the five locations
93 relative to the location of the current best target, and the hazard rate was low ($H = 0.02$). In the
94 unstable condition (Figure 1D–E), the rewarded target always appeared at the location of the best
95 target, and the hazard rate was high ($H = 0.35$). On each trial, participants made a prediction by
96 looking at a particular target, and then were given explicit, visual feedback about their chosen
97 target and the rewarded target. Effective performance required them to use this feedback in a
98 flexible and task-dependent manner, including typically ignoring small errors in the noisy
99 condition but responding to small errors in the unstable condition by updating their beliefs about
100 the best-target location.

101

102 *Behavior*

103 Nearly all of the participants' choice patterns were consistent with a flexible, task-
104 dependent learning process (closed symbols in Figure 2). On average, they learned the location
105 of the best target after a change in its location more quickly and reliably in the unstable than the
106 noisy condition (Figure 2A). This flexible learning process had two key signatures. First, target
107 switches (i.e., predicting a different target than on the previous trial) tended to follow errors of
108 any magnitude in the unstable condition but only errors of high magnitude (i.e., when the chosen
109 target was 3, 4, or 5 targets away from the rewarded target) in the noisy condition (sign test for
110 H_0 : equal probability of switching for the two conditions; error magnitude of 1: median = -0.35,
111 interquartile range (IQR) = [-0.62, -0.25], $p < 0.001$; error magnitude of 2: median = -0.30, IQR =
112 [-0.70, -0.11], $p < 0.001$; Figure 2B–C). Second, target switches depended on error history only
113 for low-magnitude errors (i.e., when the chosen target was 1 or 2 targets away from the rewarded
114 target) in the noisy condition but not otherwise (sign test for H_0 : switching was unaffected when
115 recent history contained fewer errors; error magnitude of 1: median = -0.29, IQR = [-0.42, -0.10],
116 $p = 0.004$; error magnitude of 2: median = -0.25, IQR = [-0.38, -0.14], $p < 0.001$; Figure 2D–F).

117 We accounted for these behavioral patterns with a reduced Bayesian model that is similar
118 to ones we have used previously to model belief updating in a dynamic environment (open

119 symbols in Figure 2; Tables 1 and 2). This model provides a framework to interpret and use
120 errors differently according to the current task conditions, as defined by hazard rate and noise
121 level. The decision-maker's trial-by-trial updates are governed by ongoing estimates of the
122 probability that the best target changed (change-point probability, or CPP) and reducible
123 uncertainty about the best target's location (relative uncertainty, or RU). Both quantities are
124 influenced by the two free parameters in the model, subjective estimates of the task hazard rate
125 and noise level, which were fitted separately in each condition for each participant. As expected,
126 the fitted hazard rates were higher in the unstable condition than in the noisy condition, although
127 both tended to be higher than the objective values, as we have observed previously (Nassar et al.,
128 2010). However, the fitted noise estimates were not reliably different between the noisy and
129 unstable conditions (Table 2). As we observed in our previous study (Li et al., 2019), the
130 subjective estimates of noise level were high in the unstable condition despite the objective
131 absence of noise.

132 We also tested several alternative models but they did not provide as parsimonious
133 descriptions of the data (Figure 2 – figure supplement 2, and Tables 1 and 2). Notably, an
134 alternative model that assumed a condition-specific fixed learning rate also assumed errors were
135 treated differently in the two conditions but did not include trial-by-trial adjustments of learning
136 rates used by the reduced Bayesian model. Although this model performed better than the
137 reduced Bayesian model in the unstable condition, it cannot capture participants' behaviors in the
138 noisy condition, where dynamically integrating both current and past errors is required for
139 adapting trial-by-trial behavior. Other hybrid models performed worse than the reduced Bayesian
140 model in both conditions.

141

142 *Neural representation of CPP and RU*

143 The two key internal quantities in the reduced Bayesian model are CPP and RU, both of
144 which contribute to processing errors in a task-dependent manner (Figure 2 – figure supplement
145 3). CPP increases as the current error magnitude increases and achieves large values more
146 quickly in the unstable condition because of the higher hazard rate. These dynamics lead to a
147 greater probability of switching targets after smaller errors in the unstable condition. RU
148 increases on the next trial after the participant makes an error and does so more strongly in the
149 noisy condition because of the lower hazard rate. These dynamics lead to a greater probability of

150 target switches when the last trial was an error, which is most prominent for small errors in the
151 noisy condition. Thus, CPP and RU each account for one of the two key signatures of task-
152 dependent learning that we identified in participants' behavior, with CPP driving a task-
153 dependent influence of error magnitude and RU driving a task-dependent influence of error
154 history on target switches.

155 Though not the main focus of this study, we were able to replicate our previous findings
156 regarding the neural representations of CPP and RU (McGuire et al., 2014). Similar to our
157 previous study, we found activity that was positively correlated with the levels of CPP and RU
158 across DLPFC and PPC (Figure 2 – figure supplement 3 and 4). The regions of DLPFC and PPC
159 that were responsive to both CPP and RU were a subset of those identified as showing this
160 conjunction in our previous study. Because CPP and RU both contribute to responding to errors
161 in a task-dependent manner, the brain regions that responded to both variables are good
162 candidates for encoding errors in a task-dependent manner. In the following analyses, we aimed
163 to directly identify task-dependent neural representations of error magnitude and error history, as
164 well as activity that predicts subsequent shifts in behavior.

165

166 *Task-dependent neural representation of errors*

167 We used multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to identify error-related neural signals that
168 were similar and different for the two task conditions. Given the two key signatures of flexible
169 learning that we identified in behavior, we were especially interested in identifying neural
170 representations of error magnitude and past errors that were stronger in the noisy than the
171 unstable condition.

172 We found robust, task-dependent representations of the magnitude of the error on the
173 current trial in PPC. Consistent with the task-dependent behavioral effects, this representation of
174 error magnitude was stronger in the noisy than the unstable condition (Figure 3 and Table 3).
175 Specifically, we could classify correct versus error feedback on the current trial across almost the
176 entire cortex, in both the unstable and noisy conditions. However, for error trials, we could
177 classify error magnitude (in three bins: 1, 2, 3+ targets away from the rewarded target) only for
178 the noisy condition and most strongly in the lateral and medial parietal cortex and in the occipital
179 pole. In a parallel set of analyses, we found that univariate activity in PPC also varied in a task-

180 dependent way, responding more strongly to error magnitude in the noisy than the unstable
181 condition (Figure 3 – figure supplement 1).

182 We also found robust, task-dependent representations of past errors in PPC. These
183 representations also were stronger in the noisy than the unstable condition, particularly on trials
184 for which past errors had the strongest influence on behavior. Specifically, we could classify
185 correct versus error on the previous trial in PPC for both task conditions (Figure 4). This
186 classification of past errors depended on the outcome of the current trial. We separated trials
187 according to whether the current feedback was correct or an error, or whether the error
188 magnitude provided ambiguous (error magnitudes of 1 or 2) or unambiguous (error magnitudes
189 of 0 or 3+) feedback in the noisy condition (Figure 4). We found reliable classifications of past
190 errors in the lateral and medial parietal cortex in both conditions for correct trials and trials with
191 error magnitudes of 0 or 3+. Moreover, these representations depended on the current condition,
192 and, consistent with behavioral effects of error history, were stronger for error trials and trials
193 with error magnitudes of 1 or 2 in the noisy than in the unstable condition (Table 3). These task-
194 dependent signals for past errors were not clearly present in univariate activity (Figure 4 – figure
195 supplement 1). An additional conjunction analysis across MVPA results showed that PPC
196 uniquely encoded task-dependent error signals for both error magnitude of the current trials and
197 past errors when the current trial's error magnitude was 1 or 2 (Table 3).

198

199 *Neural prediction of subsequent changes in behavior*

200 Although PPC responds to errors in a task-dependent manner that could be used for
201 determining behavioral updates, we did not find that activity in this region was predictive of the
202 participants' future behavior. Instead, we found such predictive activity more anteriorly in the
203 frontal lobe. Specifically, we investigated whether multi-voxel neural patterns could predict
204 participants' target switches on the subsequent trial. We focused on the trials with small error
205 magnitudes (1 or 2) in the noisy condition, because these were the only trial types that
206 participants consistently exhibited an intermediate probability of switching (20–80%, Figure 2).
207 We found that activity patterns in large cluster encompassing motor cortex, OFC, ACC, DMFC,
208 and DLPFC could predict subsequent stay/switch decisions (Figure 5, Table 4). We also
209 evaluated this result with different approaches to cluster formation that were more or less

210 spatially specific (Figure 5 – figure supplement 1). We did not find any regions where univariate
211 activity reliably predicted participants’ subsequent behavior (Figure 5 – figure supplement 2).

212

213 **Discussion**

214 We identified task-dependent neural representations of errors in humans performing
215 dynamic learning tasks. Participants were required to learn in two different dynamic
216 environments. In the unstable condition (high hazard rate and low noise), errors unambiguously
217 indicated a change in the state of the environment, and participants reliably updated their
218 behavior in response to errors. In contrast, in the noisy condition (low hazard rate and high noise),
219 small errors were ambiguous, and participants used both the current error magnitude and recent
220 error history to distinguish between those errors that likely signal change-points and those likely
221 arising from environmental noise. Using MVPA, we showed complementary roles of PPC and
222 prefrontal regions (including motor cortex, OFC, ACC, DMFC and DLPFC) in the outcome-
223 monitoring and action-selection processes underlying these flexible, task-dependent behavioral
224 responses to errors. Neural patterns in PPC encoded the magnitude of errors and past errors,
225 more strongly in the noisy than the unstable condition. These task-dependent neural responses to
226 errors in PPC were not reliably linked to subsequent changes in behavior. In contrast, neural
227 patterns in prefrontal regions could predict subsequent changes in behavior (whether participants
228 switch their choice on the next trial or not) in response to ambiguous errors in the noisy
229 condition.

230

231 *Task-dependent behavior adaptation*

232 Consistent with previous studies of ours and others (d’Acromont & Bossaerts, 2016;
233 McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar, Bruckner, et al., 2019; Nassar et al., 2012; Nassar et al., 2010;
234 O’Reilly et al., 2013; Purcell & Kiani, 2016), human participants adapted their response to errors
235 differently in different environments. In the unstable condition, participants almost always
236 switched their choice after errors and quickly learned the new state after change-points. In
237 contrast, in the noisy condition, participants ignored many errors and only slowly learned the
238 new state after change-points. In this condition, participants had to distinguish true change-points
239 from environmental noise, and they used error magnitude and recent error history as a cue for
240 whether the state had recently changed or not. These flexible and task-dependent responses to

241 errors could be accounted for by a reduced Bayesian model (McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar et al.,
242 2012; Nassar et al., 2010). This model assumes that participants use approximately optimal
243 inference processes but can have subjective estimates of environmental parameters (hazard rate,
244 noise) that depart from their true values.

245

246 *Neural representation of change-point probability and relative uncertainty*

247 In the reduced Bayesian model, beliefs and behavior are updated dynamically according
248 to two key internal quantities, CPP and RU. Replicating our previous work (McGuire et al.,
249 2014), we identified neural activity correlated with both CPP and RU in PPC and DLPFC. This
250 replication shows the robustness of these neural representations of CPP and RU across
251 experimental designs that differ dramatically in their visual stimuli and motor demands, yet share
252 the need to learn in dynamic environments with similar statistics. We extended those findings to
253 show that some brain regions that encode both CPP, which in the model accounts for task-
254 dependent behavioral responses to error magnitude, and RU, which in the model accounts for
255 task-dependent behavioral responses to recent error history, also encode errors in a task-
256 dependent manner or predict subsequent behavioral updates.

257

258 *Task-dependent neural representation of errors*

259 Advancing beyond previous work, we identified task-dependent encoding of errors in
260 neural activity in the PPC. Mirroring the task dependence of behavior, the multivariate neural
261 pattern in PPC encoded current error magnitude more strongly in the noisy condition than in the
262 unstable condition and encoded past errors more strongly on trials that provided ambiguous
263 feedback in the noisy condition. These same regions of PPC have been shown previously to
264 represent errors, error magnitudes, surprise and salience (Fischer & Ullsperger, 2013; Gläscher,
265 Daw, Dayan, & O'Doherty, 2010; McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar, Bruckner, et al., 2019; Nassar,
266 McGuire, et al., 2019; O'Reilly et al., 2013; Payzan-LeNestour, Dunne, Bossaerts, & O'Doherty,
267 2013). In addition, these regions have been shown to integrate recent outcome or stimulus history
268 in human fMRI studies (FitzGerald, Moran, Friston, & Dolan, 2015; Furl & Averbach, 2011) and
269 in animal single neuron recording studies (Akrami, Kopec, Diamond, & Brody, 2018; Brody &
270 Hanks, 2016; Hanks et al., 2015; Hayden, Nair, McCoy, & Platt, 2008; Hwang, Dahlen,
271 Mukundan, & Komiyama, 2017). Our results extend on these past findings by demonstrating that

272 the neural encoding of error magnitude and error history in PPC is modulated across different
273 conditions in precisely the manner that could drive adaptive behavior.

274 These whole-brain fMRI results complement our previous results recording from single
275 neurons in ACC and PCC in the same task (Li et al., 2019). In that study, we identified single
276 neurons in both ACC and PCC that encoded information relevant to interpreting errors, such as
277 the magnitude of the error or the current condition. However, we did not find any neurons that
278 combined this information in a manner that could drive adaptive behavioral adjustments. Our
279 whole-brain fMRI results suggest that PPC would be a good place to look for task-dependent
280 error representations in single neurons, including a region of medial parietal cortex slightly
281 dorsal to the PCC area we recorded from previously.

282

283 *Neural representations of task-dependent behavioral updating*

284 Also advancing beyond previous work, we identified neural activity predictive of
285 behavioral updates across the frontal cortex, including DLPFC. In the noisy condition, small
286 errors provided ambiguous feedback that could reflect either a change in state or environmental
287 noise. Accordingly, after small errors in the noisy condition, participants exhibited variability
288 across trials in whether they switched from their current choice on the subsequent trial or not. In
289 these ambiguous situations, the multivariate neural pattern in large cluster in frontal cortex,
290 including motor cortex, OFC, ACC, DMFC and DLPFC, predicted whether people switched or
291 stayed on the subsequent trial. These results extend previous findings that the multivariate
292 pattern in frontal cortex, particularly ACC and medial PFC, can decode subsequent switching
293 versus staying in a reversal learning task (Hampton & O'Doherty, 2007). These results suggest a
294 dissociation between PPC regions that monitor error information in a task-dependent manner and
295 frontal regions that may use this information to update beliefs and select subsequent actions.

296 This ability to decode subsequent choices might arise from different kinds of
297 representations in different areas of frontal cortex. Whereas motor and premotor regions may
298 reflect the change in action plans, other frontal regions might reflect changes in abstract
299 representations of belief states. Medial PFC is involved in performance monitoring,
300 distinguishing errors from different sources such as actions and feedback (Ullsperger,
301 Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014), registering a hierarchy of prediction errors from those due to
302 environmental noise to those due to a change in the environmental state (Alexander & Brown,

2015), and interacting with lateral PFC to guide subsequent behavioral adjustments in response to errors (Alexander & Brown, 2015). Consistent with this role, activity in DMFC also reflects the extent of belief updating in dynamic environments (Behrens et al., 2007; Hampton, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2006; McGuire et al., 2014; O’Reilly et al., 2013). OFC and DMFC encode the identity of the current latent state in a mental model of the task environment and neural representations in these regions changes as the state changes (Chan, Niv, & Norman, 2016; Hunt et al., 2018; Karlsson, Tervo, & Karpova, 2012; Nassar, McGuire, et al., 2019; Schuck, Cai, Wilson, & Niv, 2016; Wilson, Takahashi, Schoenbaum, & Niv, 2014). Activity in inferior frontal junction reflects the updating of task representations (Brass & Cramon, 2004; Derrfuss, Brass, Neumann, & von Cramon, 2005). Neural activity in frontopolar cortex (Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006) and DMFC (Blanchard & Gershman, 2018; Kolling, Behrens, Mars, & Rushworth, 2012; Kolling et al., 2016; Muller, Mars, Behrens, & O’Reilly, 2019) increases during exploratory choices, which occur more frequently during periods of uncertainty about the most beneficial option. In a recent study, we identified distinct representations of latent states, uncertainty, and behavioral policy in distinct areas of frontal cortex during learning in a dynamic environment (Nassar et al., 2019). Our results extend these past findings and demonstrate the role of these frontal regions in adjusting behavior in response to ambiguous errors.

320

321 *Caveats*

322 A few caveats should be considered when interpreting our results. First, we had relatively
323 small number of participants in this study (n=16). Although we control the false positive rates
324 through permutation tests that have been validated empirically (Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson,
325 2016), it is possible that we lacked the statistical power to detect some effects, and so null results
326 should be interpreted with caution. Second, in this study, we created two qualitatively different
327 task conditions by manipulating both the noise levels and hazard rates. Thus, we cannot attribute
328 any behavioral or neural differences across conditions specifically to changes in either noise
329 levels or hazard rates alone, but rather to how the combinations of these two variables affect the
330 interpretation and use of small errors. Future studies can manipulate hazard rate and noise
331 independently to examine their independent contributions to adaptive learning.

332

333 *Conclusion*

334 People adapt their behavior in response to errors in a task-dependent manner,
335 distinguishing between errors that indicate change-points in the environment versus noise. Here
336 we used MVPA to identify two distinct kinds of neural signals contributing to these adaptive
337 behavioral adjustments. In PPC, neural patterns encoded error information in a task-dependent
338 manner, depending on error magnitude and past errors only under conditions where these were
339 informative of the source of error. In contrast, activity in frontal cortex could predict subsequent
340 choices that could be based on this information. These findings suggest a broad distinction
341 between outcome monitoring in parietal regions and action selection in frontal regions when
342 learning in dynamic and uncertain environments.

343

344 **Materials and Methods**

345 *Participants*

346 All procedures were approved by University of Pennsylvania Internal Review Board. We
347 analyzed data from sixteen participants (9 females, 7 males, mean age = 23.5, SD = 4.3, range =
348 18–33 years) recruited for the current study. One additional participant was excluded from
349 analyses because of large head movements during MRI scanning (>10% of timepoint-to-
350 timepoint displacements were >0.5 mm). All participants provided informed consent before the
351 experiment. Participants received a participation fee of \$15, as well as extra incentives based on
352 their performance (mean = \$15.09, SD = \$2.26, range = \$8.5–17.5).

353

354 *Task*

355 Participants performed a predictive-inference task during MRI scanning. On each trial,
356 participants saw a noisy observation sampled from an unobserved state. The participants' goal
357 was to predict the location of the noisy observation. To perform this task well, however, they
358 should infer the location of the current state.

359 In this task (Li et al., 2019), there were 10 targets aligned in a circle on the screen (Figure
360 1A). At the start of each trial, participants had to fixate a central cross for 0.5 seconds to
361 initialize the trial. After the cross disappeared, participants could choose one of 10 targets (red)
362 by looking at it within 1.5 seconds and keeping fixation on the chosen target for 0.3 seconds.
363 Then, an outcome would be shown for 1 second. During the outcome phase, a green dot
364 indicated the chosen target. A purple or cyan target indicated the rewarded target, with color

365 denoting 10 or 20 points of reward value, respectively. At the end of experiment, every 75 points
366 were converted to \$0.25 as participants' extra incentives.

367 Participants performed this task in two dynamic conditions separated into two different
368 runs: a high-noise/low-hazard ("noisy") condition and an low-noise/high-hazard ("unstable")
369 condition. In the noisy condition, the rewarded target could be one of five targets, given the
370 underlying state (Figure 1B). The rewarded target probabilities for the relative locations ($[-2, -1,$
371 $0, 1, 2]$) of the current state were $[0.05, 0.15, 0.6, 0.15, 0.05]$. Thus, the location of the current
372 state was most likely rewarded, but nearby targets could also be rewarded. Occasionally, the
373 state would change its location with a hazard rate of 0.02 (Figure 1C). When a change-point
374 happens, the new state would be selected among the ten targets based on a uniform distribution.
375 In the unstable condition, there was no noise (Figure 1D). That is, the location of the state would
376 be always rewarded. However, the state was unstable, as the hazard rate in this condition was
377 0.35 (Figure 1E). There were 300 trials in each run.

378

379 *Behavior analysis*

380 We investigated how participants used error feedback flexibly across different conditions.
381 Before the behavioral analysis, we removed two different kinds of trials. First, we removed trials
382 in which participants did not make a choice within the time limit (Unstable: median number of
383 trials = 10.5, range = 1–83; Noisy: median = 10, range = 2–88). Second, we also removed trials
384 in which the location of the chosen target was not on the shortest distance between the previously
385 chosen and previously rewarded targets (Unstable: median = 3, range = 0–24; Noisy: median =
386 17, range = 5–37). All of the belief updating models we tested predict that participants' choice
387 should be along the shortest distance between the previously chosen target and the previously
388 rewarded target. That is, participants should update in a clockwise direction, if the shortest
389 distance to rewarded target was clockwise of the chosen target. Otherwise, they should update in
390 a counterclockwise direction. We removed trials where participants' update was in the opposite
391 direction of the rewarded target (which would correspond to a learning rate < 0) and trials where
392 participants' update was beyond the location of the rewarded target (which would correspond to
393 a learning rate > 1), as this behavior cannot be captured by any of the belief updating models we
394 tested. Further, this behavior might suggest that participants had lost track of the most recently
395 chosen or rewarded targets.

396 First, we investigated how fast participants learned the location of the current state. For
397 each condition and participant, we binned trials from trial 0 to trial 20 after change-points. Then,
398 we calculated the probability of choosing the location of the current state for each bin.

399 Second, we examined how different magnitudes of errors lead to shifts in behavior. For
400 each condition and participant, we binned trials based on the current error magnitude (from 0 to
401 5). Then, for each bin, we calculated the probability that participants switch their choice to
402 another target on the subsequent trial. We hypothesized participants would have a lower
403 probability of switching after small error magnitudes (1 or 2) in the noisy condition than in the
404 unstable condition since such errors could be due to environment noise in the noisy condition but
405 would signal a state change in the unstable condition.

406 Third, we further investigated how error history influenced participants' behavioral shifts.
407 Similarly, we binned trials based on the current error magnitude and the error history of the last
408 three trials. Here, we used four bins of error magnitudes (0, 1, 2, 3+). Based on the outcome of
409 correct or error on the last three trials, there were 8 types of error history. For each error
410 magnitude, we calculated the probability of switching for each type of error history. We
411 hypothesized that participants in the noisy condition would tend to switch their choice after small
412 errors more if they had made more errors recently. To test this hypothesis, we ordered the 8 types
413 of error history based on the number of recent errors and calculated the slope of probability of
414 switching against the order of error history. A negative slope means that participants tend to
415 switch as they receive more recent errors.

416

417 *Behavior modeling*

418 We fit several different computational models to participants' choices to evaluate which
419 ones could best account for their behavior in the task.

420

421 *Reduced Bayesian (RB) model*

422 Previous studies have shown that a reduced Bayesian model, which approximates the full
423 Bayesian ideal observer, could account well for participants' behavior in dynamic environments
424 similar to the current task (McGuire et al., 2014; Nassar et al., 2012; Nassar et al., 2010). In this
425 model, belief is updated by a delta rule:

426

427
$$\delta_t = x_t - B_t \quad (1)$$

428
$$B_{t+1} = B_t + \alpha_t \delta_t \quad (2)$$

429

430 where B_t is the current belief and x_t is the current observation. The new belief (B_{t+1}) is formed
431 by updating the old belief according to the prediction error ($x_t - B_t$) and a learning rate (α_t).
432 The learning rate controls how much a participant revises their belief based on the prediction
433 error. In this model, the learning rate is adjusted on a trial-by-trial basis according to:

434

435
$$\alpha_t = \Omega_t + (1 - \Omega_t)\tau_t \quad (3)$$

436

437 where Ω_t is the change-point probability and τ_t is the relative uncertainty. That is, α_t is high as
438 either Ω_t or τ_t is high. The change-point probability is the relative likelihood that the new
439 observation represents a change-point as opposed to a sample from the currently inferred state
440 (Nassar et al., 2010):

441

442
$$\Omega_t = \frac{U(x_t|1, 10)^H}{U(x_t|1, 10)^H + f_p(x_t|\gamma_t, B_t)^{(1-H)}} \quad (4)$$

443

444 where H is the hazard rate, $U(x_t|1, 10)$ is the probability of outcome derived from a uniform
445 distribution, and $f_p(x_t|\gamma_t, B_t)$ is the probability of outcome derived from the current predictive
446 distribution. That is, $U(x_t|1, 10)$ reflects the probability of outcome when a change-point has
447 occurred while $f_p(x_t|\gamma_t, B_t)$ reflects the probability of outcome when the state has not changed.
448 The predictive distribution is an integration of the state distribution and the noise distribution:

449

450
$$f_p(X|\gamma_t, B_t) = C \times P(X|B_t)^{\gamma_t} \times P(X|B_t) \quad (5)$$

451

452 where X is a random variable determining the locations of target, $P(X|B_t)$ is the noise
453 distribution in the current condition, $P(X|B_t)^{\gamma_t}$ is the state distribution, γ_t is the expected run
454 length after the change-point, and C is a normalizing constant to make the sum of probabilities in
455 the predictive distribution equal one. Thus, the uncertainty of this predictive distribution comes
456 from two sources: the uncertainty of the state distribution (σ_s^2) and the uncertainty of the noise

457 distribution (σ_N^2). The uncertainty of the state distribution would decrease as the expected run
458 length increases.

459 The expected run length reflects the expected number of trials that a state remains stable,
460 and thus is updated on each trial based on the change-point probability (Nassar et al., 2010):

461
462
$$\gamma_{t+1} = (\gamma_t + 1)(1 - \Omega_t) + \Omega_t \quad (6)$$

463
464 where the expected run length is a weighted average conditional on the change-point probability.
465 If no change-point occurs (i.e., change-point probability is low), the expected run length would
466 increase, leading the uncertainty of the state distribution to decrease. That is, as more
467 observations from the current state are received, participants are more certain about the location
468 of the current state. However, if the change-point probability is high, which signals a likely
469 change in the state, the expected run length would be reset to 1. Thus, the uncertainty of the state
470 distribution becomes large. Participants are more uncertain about the current state after a change-
471 point.

472 The other factor influencing the learning rate is the relative uncertainty, which is the
473 uncertainty regarding the current state relative to the irreducible uncertainty or noise (McGuire et
474 al., 2014; Nassar et al., 2012):

475
476
$$\tau_{t+1} = \frac{\Omega_t \sigma_N^2 + (1 - \Omega_t) \sigma_S^2 + \Omega_t (1 - \Omega_t) [\delta_t (1 - \tau_t)]^2}{\Omega_t \sigma_N^2 + (1 - \Omega_t) \sigma_S^2 + \Omega_t (1 - \Omega_t) [\delta_t (1 - \tau_t)]^2 + \sigma_N^2} \quad (7)$$

477
478 The three terms in the numerator contribute to the uncertainty about the current state. The
479 first term reflects the uncertainty conditional on the change-point distribution; the second term
480 reflects the uncertainty conditional on the non-change-point distribution; and the third term
481 reflects the uncertainty due to the difference between the two distributions. The denominator
482 shows the total variance which is the summation of the uncertainty about the current state and the
483 noise. As more precise observations are received in a given state, this relative uncertainty would
484 decrease.

485 To fit the reduced Bayesian model to behavior, we assumed that participants can depart
486 from the ideal observer by having subjective estimates of the key environmental variables,
487 hazard rate and noise, that may differ from the true value of these variables. During model fitting,

488 the subjective noise distribution was estimated with the von Mises distribution, which is a
489 circular Gaussian distribution:

490

$$491 \quad P(x_t | B_t, K) = \frac{e^{K \cos(x_t - B_t)}}{\sum_{i=1}^{10} e^{K \cos(x_i - B_t)}} \quad (8)$$

492

493 where B_t is the location of the current belief, x_i is the location of target, and K controls the
494 uncertainty of this distribution. When K is 0, this is a uniform distribution. As K increases, the
495 uncertainty decreases. The denominator is used as a normalization term to make sure the sum of
496 all the probabilities equals one. Thus, there are two free parameters in this model: hazard rate (H ,
497 in Eq. 4) and noise level (K , in Eq. 8). The range of hazard rate is between 0 and 1 and the noise
498 level is greater than or equal to zero.

499

500 Fixed learning rate (fixedLR) model

501 We also consider an alternative model in which participants used a fixed learning rate in
502 each of the two dynamic conditions. That is, the learning rate is the same over all trials in a
503 condition. This model has one free parameter, the fixed learning rate (α_{fixed}), for each condition
504 (Eq. 2). The fixed learning rate is between 0 and 1.

505

506 Hybrid of RB model and fixedLR model

507 Furthermore, we consider a hybrid model, in which the learning rate on each trial is a
508 mixture of the learning rates from the RB model and the fixedLR model:

509

$$510 \quad \alpha_t = w\alpha_{RB} + (1 - w)\alpha_{fixed} \quad (9)$$

511

512 where α_{RB} is the learning rate from the RB model and is varied trial by trial according to Ω_t and
513 τ_t , α_{fixed} is the learning rate from the fixedLR model and w reflects the weight to integrate these
514 two learning rates. In this model, there are four free parameters: hazard rate, noise level, fixed
515 learning rate and weight. The weight is between 0 and 1.

516

517 Hybrid of RB model and P_{stay}

518 Finally, we consider a hybrid model, which combines the RB model with a fixed
519 tendency to stay on the current target regardless of the current observation. Such a fixed
520 tendency to stay was observed in monkeys in our previous study (Li et al., 2019). Here the belief
521 is updated by:

$$522 \quad B_{t+1} = B_t + [(1 - P_{stay}) \times \alpha_t (X_t - B_t) + P_{stay} \times 0] \quad (10)$$

524
525 where P_{stay} is the probability that participants stay on the current target. This model has three
526 free parameters: hazard rate, noise level and the probability of stay. The probability of stay is
527 between 0 and 1.

528 529 Model fitting and comparison

530 Each model was fitted to data from each participant and within each condition separately.
531 Optimal parameters were estimated by minimizing the mean of the squared error (MSE) between
532 a participant's prediction and the model prediction.

$$533 \quad MSE = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^n (B_t - \widehat{B}_t)^2}{n} \quad (11)$$

534
535 where t is the trial, n is the total number of included trials, B_t is a participant's prediction on trial
536 t , and \widehat{B}_t is the model prediction on trial t .

537
538 Because each model used a different number of parameters and each participant had a
539 different number of included trials, we used Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to compare
540 the performance of different models:

$$541 \quad BIC = n \ln(MSE) + k \ln(n) \quad (12)$$

542
543 where n is the number of included trials and k is the number of free parameters in a model. A
544 model with lower BIC performs better.

545
546
547 *MRI Data Acquisition and Preprocessing*

548 We acquired MRI data on a 3T Siemens Prisma with a 64-channel head coil. Before the
549 task, we acquired a T1-weighted MPRAGE structural image (0.9375 X 0.9375 X 1 mm voxels,
550 192 X 256 matrix, 160 axial slices, TI = 1,100 ms, TR = 1,810 ms, TE = 3.45 ms, flip angle = 9°).
551 During each run of the task, we acquired functional data using a multiband gradient echo-planar
552 imaging (EPI) sequence (1.9592 X 1.9592 X 2 mm voxels, 98 X 98 matrix, 72 axial slices tilted
553 30° from the AC-PC plane, TR = 1,500 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 45°, multiband factor = 4).
554 The scanning time (mean = 24.14 minutes, SD = 1.47, range = 21.85-30.00) for each run was
555 dependent on the participants' pace. After the task, fieldmap images (TR = 1,270 ms, TE = 5 ms
556 and 7.46 ms, flip angle = 60°) were acquired.

557 Data were preprocessed using FMRIB's Software Library (FSL) (Jenkinson, Beckmann,
558 Behrens, Woolrich, & Smith, 2012; Smith et al., 2004). Functional data were motion corrected
559 using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002), high-pass filtered with a
560 Gaussian-weighted least square straight line fitting of $\sigma = 50$ s, undistorted and warped to MNI
561 space. To map the data to MNI space, boundary-based registration was applied to align the
562 functional data to the structural image (Greve & Fischl, 2009) and fieldmap-based geometric
563 undistortion was also applied. In addition, the structural image was normalized to the MNI space
564 (FLIRT). Then, these two transformations were applied to the functional data.

565

566 *fMRI analysis: univariate activity correlated with CPP and RU*

567 Using similar procedures to our previous study (McGuire et al., 2014), we examined the
568 effects of CPP and RU on univariate activity. Both the current study and the previous study
569 investigate the computational process and neural mechanisms during learning in dynamic
570 environments. The underlying task structures (which involved noisy observations and sudden
571 change-points) are similar between the two studies, but the two studies used very different visual
572 stimuli and motor demands. We specifically focused on the noisy condition in the current study
573 because it was more similar to the underlying structure, in terms of noisy observations and
574 hazard rate of change-points, to our previous study.

575 We investigated the factors of CPP, RU, reward values and residual updates. The trial-by-
576 trial CPP and RU were either estimated from the RB model with subjective estimates of hazard
577 rate and noise (as this was the best-fitting model in the current study, analyses presented in
578 Figure 2 – Supplement 3) or from the RB model with true estimates of hazard rate and noise (as

579 this corresponds to how correlates of CPP and RU were identified in our previous study, analyses
580 presented in Figure 2 – Supplement 4). The residual update reflects the difference between the
581 participants' update and the predicted update, and is estimated from a behavioral regression
582 model in a similar manner as our previous study:

$$583 \quad \text{Update}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \delta_t + \beta_2 \delta_t \Omega_t + \beta_3 \delta_t (1 - \Omega_t) \tau_t + \beta_4 \delta_t \text{Reward} + \varepsilon \quad (13)$$

584
585 where Update_t is the difference between B_{t+1} and B_t , δ_t is the error magnitude, both Ω_t and τ_t
586 were derived from the RB model, and the reward value indicated whether a correct response
587 earned a large or a small value on that trial.

588
589 Then, a general linear model using these four factors was implemented on the neural data.
590 Here we further smoothed the preprocessed fMRI data with a 6 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. We
591 included several trial-by-trial regressors of interest in the GLM: onsets of outcome, CPP, RU,
592 reward value, and residual update. Six motion parameters were also included as confounds. To
593 control false-positive rates (Eklund et al., 2016), statistical testing was implemented through one-
594 sample cluster-mass permutation tests with 5,000 iterations. The cluster-forming threshold was
595 uncorrected voxel $p < 0.01$. Statistical testing was then based on the corrected cluster p value. For
596 the conjunction analyses, we used the same procedure as the previous study (McGuire et al.,
597 2014). We kept regions that passed the corrected threshold and showed the same sign of effects.
598 For these conjunction tests, we only kept regions that have at least 10 contiguous voxels.

599 Because the number of participants was fewer in this study ($n=16$) than in the previous
600 study ($n=32$), we might have lower power to detect effects in the whole-brain analyses. Thus, we
601 also implemented ROI analyses. We selected seven ROIs that showed the conjunction effects of
602 CPP, RU and reward value in the previous study (McGuire et al., 2014) and tested the effects of
603 CPP and RU in these ROIs.

604 We found previously that for a similar task, the presence or absence of reward on a given
605 trial influenced both belief-updating behavior and some aspects of its neural representation
606 (McGuire et al., 2014). To further examine those effects, here we included two different earnable
607 values (10 versus 20 points). However, we did not find any significant effects of earnable values
608 on either belief updating (β_4 in Eq. 13 was not significantly different than zero) or neural activity
609 (for the contrast of high versus low earnable value). We therefore do not further consider the

610 effects of this manipulation in the current report. We speculate that this lack of an effect
611 contrasts from our earlier finding because here we used high versus low earnable values, whereas
612 in that study we used the presence versus absence of earnable value.

613

614 *fMRI analysis: multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA)*

615 We implemented MVPA to understand the neural representation of error signals and
616 subsequent choices. Our analyses focus on the multi-voxel pattern when participants received an
617 outcome. Before implementing MVPA, we estimated trial-by-trial beta values using the
618 unsmoothed preprocessed fMRI data. We used the general linear model (GLM) to estimate the
619 beta weights for each trial (Mumford, Turner, Ashby, & Poldrack, 2012). In each GLM, the first
620 regressor is the trial of interest and the second combines the rest of trials in the same condition.
621 These two regressors were then convolved with a gamma hemodynamic response function. In
622 addition, six motion parameters were included as control regressors. We repeated this process
623 (one GLM per trial) to estimate trial-by-trial beta values for all the trials in the two conditions.
624 We then used these beta values as observations for MVPA. A whole-brain searchlight was
625 implemented (Kriegeskorte, Goebel, & Bandettini, 2006). In each searchlight, a sphere with the
626 diameter of 5 voxels (10 mm) was formed, and the pattern of activity across the voxels within the
627 sphere were used to run MVPA.

628 A support vector machine (SVM) with a linear kernel was used to decode different error
629 signals and choices in our whole-brain searchlight analysis. We implemented SVM through the
630 LIBSVM toolbox (Chang & Lin, 2011). To avoid overfitting, we used 3-fold cross-validation,
631 with one fold used as testing data and the other two as training data. Training data were used to
632 train the classifier and then this classifier was used on testing data to examine the classification
633 accuracy. In linear SVM, a free parameter c regularizes the trade-off between decreasing training
634 error and increasing generalization. Thus, during the training of classifier, the training data were
635 further split into 3-folds to select the optimal value of the parameter c through cross-validation.
636 We pick the optimal value for c from [0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100, 1000] and this optimal
637 parameter should maximize the cross-validation accuracy. Then, we used the optimal parameter
638 c to train the model again based on the entire training data and calculated the classification
639 accuracy on the testing data. We repeated this procedure with each of the three folds held out as
640 testing data and calculated the average of the classification accuracy. To minimized the influence

641 of different number of trials for each category on the classification accuracy, we used balanced
642 accuracy. For balanced accuracy, we first calculated the classification accuracy within each
643 category, and then averaged the accuracies across all categories. The baseline balanced accuracy
644 was also validated via permutations with 5,000 iterations. For each permutation, each trial was
645 randomly assigned one category with a probability proportional to the number of trials in that
646 category among all the trials. We then used the average of balanced accuracy across these
647 iterations as the baseline accuracy. The baseline accuracy for two categories was 50% and for
648 three categories was 33%.

649 We first examined how the multi-voxel neural pattern on the current trial could
650 discriminate correct versus error on the current trial or error magnitudes on error trials. For the
651 analysis of error magnitudes, we split trials into three bins of error magnitude: 1, 2, and 3+.

652 We next examined how the multi-voxel neural pattern on the current trial could
653 discriminate whether the previous trial was an error or not. We also investigated how the
654 classification of past errors differs conditional on the type of the current trial. We classified trial
655 $t-1$ as correct or error separately for four different types of current trials: correct trials, error trials,
656 trials with error magnitudes of 0 or 3+ and trials with error magnitudes of 1 or 2. We
657 differentiated between trials with error magnitudes of 0 or 3+ and trials with error magnitudes of
658 1 or 2 because error magnitudes of 0 or 3+ provide unambiguous evidence regarding a change of
659 state in the noisy condition while error magnitudes of 1 or 2 provide ambiguous evidence about a
660 change of the state in the noisy condition.

661 Lastly, we examined how the multi-voxel neural pattern on the current trial could classify
662 the choice on the next trial. In this analysis, we focused only on the trials with error magnitudes
663 of 1 or 2 in the noisy condition, because only under these conditions were participants similarly
664 likely to switch versus stay. For these trials, we examined whether the multi-voxel pattern on the
665 current trial predicted whether the participant stayed or switched on the next trial.

666 After obtaining the classification accuracy for each participant, we subtracted the baseline
667 accuracy from the classification accuracy. Before conducting a group-level test, we smoothed
668 these individual accuracy maps with a 6 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. To control false-positive
669 rates (Eklund et al., 2016), statistical testing was implemented through one-sample cluster-mass
670 permutation tests with 5,000 iterations. We used uncorrected voxel $p < 0.01$ to form a cluster and
671 estimated the corrected cluster p value for each cluster. For comparison, we report our results

672 using other cluster-forming procedures in supplemental analyses. For the conjunction analyses,
673 we used the same procedure described above.
674

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679

680

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
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
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Figure 1


Overview of task and experimental design. (A) Sequence of the task. At the start of the trial, participants look at a cross in the center of the screen and maintain fixation for 0.5 sec to initialize the trial. After the cross disappears, participants choose one of 10 targets (red) by looking at it within 1.5 sec and then holding fixation on the chosen target for 0.3 sec. During the outcome phase (1 sec), a green dot inside the target indicates the participants' choice. The rewarded target is shown in purple or cyan to indicate the number of earnable points as 10 or 20, respectively. (B) Probability distribution of the rewarded target location in the noisy condition. Target location is relative to the location of the state (generative mean). The rewarded target probabilities for the relative locations of $[-2, -1, 0, 1, 2]$ are $[0.05, 0.15, 0.6, 0.15, 0.05]$. (C) Example of trials in the noisy condition. The states change occasionally with a hazard rate of 0.02. (D) Probability distribution of the rewarded target location in the unstable condition. Because there is no noise in this condition, the rewarded target is always at the location of the state. (E) Example of trials in the unstable condition. The states change frequently with a hazard rate of 0.35.



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Figure 2

Behavioral results. (A) Probability of choosing the best target after change-points. Symbols and error bars are mean±SEM across subjects (solid symbols) or simulations (open symbols). (B) Relationship between error magnitude and switch probability. Symbols and error bars are as in A. (C) The distribution of switch probabilities for small errors (magnitude of 1 or 2) in both conditions. Each data point represents one participant. Distributions for all error magnitudes are shown in Figure 2 – Figure Supplement 1. (D) Probability of switch as a function of current error magnitude and error history in the unstable condition. Different colors represent different error histories for the past 3 trials. A correct trial is marked as O, and an error trial is marked as X. For example, XOO implies that trial t-1 was an error trial, and trial t-2 and trial t-3 were correct trials. Symbols and error bars are mean±SEM across subjects. (E) Probability of switch as a function of current error magnitude and error history in the noisy condition. Symbols and error bars are as in D. (F) The distribution of the slopes of switch probability against error history for small errors (magnitude of 1 or 2) in both conditions. Each data point represents one participant. Distributions for all error magnitudes are shown in Figure 2 – Figure Supplement 1.




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Figure 3


852 Representations of error and error magnitude. For error versus correct analyses, multi-voxel neural
853 patterns were used to classify whether the response on the current trial was correct or an error. For error
854 magnitude analyses, multi-voxel neural patterns were used to classify different error magnitudes (1, 2, 3+)
855 conditional on the current trial being an error. Accuracies were calculated and compared with the baseline
856 accuracy within each subject and then tested at the group level. The representation of current error
857 magnitude is stronger in parietal cortex in the noisy condition than the unstable condition. The cluster-
858 forming threshold was an uncorrected voxel $p < 0.01$ ($t = 2.6$), with cluster extent corrected for multiple
859 comparisons using non-parametric permutation tests.



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Figure 4


Representations of errors on the previous trial conditional on different types of current trials (columns). Multi-voxel neural patterns were used to classify correct responses versus errors on the previous trial. This analysis was repeated for different types of current trials: all feedback, correct feedback, error feedback, error magnitude of 0 or 3+, and error magnitude of 1 or 2. The representation of past errors is stronger in parietal cortex in the noisy condition than the unstable condition when the current trial is an error or the current error magnitude is 1 or 2. The cluster-forming threshold was an uncorrected voxel $p < 0.01$ ($t = 2.6$), with cluster extent corrected for multiple comparisons using non-parametric permutation tests.



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Figure 5


Representations of subsequent behavioral choices (switch versus stay) after ambiguous small errors in the noisy condition. **(A)** Overlap of results for switch versus stay on the next trial and error magnitude on the current trial. Multi-voxel neural patterns were used to classify whether participants switch their choice to another target or stay on the same target on the next trial. We focused on the most ambiguous errors (error magnitude of 1 or 2 in the noisy condition). Above-chance classification performance was found in a large cluster encompassing the frontal lobe. The cluster-forming threshold was an uncorrected voxel $p < 0.01$ ($t = 2.6$), with cluster extent corrected for multiple comparisons using non-parametric permutation tests. **(B)** Overlap of results for switch versus stay on the next trial and past error conditional on error magnitude of 1 or 2 on the current trial.



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Figure 2 - Figure supplement 1


Distributions of behavior as a function of error magnitude. (A) Distributions of switch probability as a function of error magnitude. Each data point represents one participant. (B) Distributions of slopes of switch probability against error history as a function of error magnitude. Each data point represents one participant.



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Figure 2 - Figure supplement 2

Behavioral data and predictions from different models. (A) Probability of choosing the best target after change-points. (RB: reduced Bayesian; fixedLR: fixed learning rate; P_{stay}: fixed tendency to stay) (B) The relationship between error magnitude and switch probability. (C) Probability of switch as a function of current error magnitude and error history in the unstable condition. (D) Probability of switch as a function of current error magnitude and error history in the noisy condition. Symbols and colors are as in Figure 2.




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Figure 2 - Figure supplement 3

Reduced Bayesian model applied to behavioral and imaging data. (A) Model prediction for CPP. We calculated CPP from the fitted reduced Bayesian model, which incorporates subjective estimates of hazard rate and noise for each condition. The value of CPP increases as the current error magnitude increases in both conditions, but with a stronger dependence on the outcome of the previous trial in the noisy condition. (B) Model prediction for RU. We calculated RU from the fitted reduced Bayesian model, which incorporates subjective estimates of hazard rate and noise for each condition. The value of RU is minimally affected by the current error magnitude. Instead, a past error tends to increase RU. (C) Model prediction for probability of switching choices. Increasing CPP causes the probability of switching to increase more steeply as the current error magnitude increases in the unstable condition versus in the noisy condition. For small errors (error magnitude of 1 and 2) in the noisy condition, the probability of switching is further influence by RU, which is affected by past errors. (D) Neural representation of CPP and RU. CPP selective effect represents the conjunction of CPP>0 and CPP>RU. RU selective effect represents the conjunction of RU>0 and RU>CPP. The results were thresholded based on uncorrected voxel $p<0.01$ ($t=2.6$). (E) ROI analysis for CPP and RU. These ROIs were selected based on the common


918 regions of CPP, RU, and reward effects in McGuire et al. (2014). Significance was tested by a sign test.
919 * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.
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Figure 2 - Figure supplement 4

Neural representations of CPP and RU from the approximately ideal observer, which is the reduced Bayesian model with true hazard rate and noise, for direct comparison to analyses in McGuire et al. (2014), which used covariates constructed from the ideal rather than the fitted model. (A) Neural representation of CPP and RU in the current study and in McGuire et al. (2014). CPP selective effect represents the conjunction of CPP>0 and CPP>RU. RU selective effect represents the conjunction of RU>0 and RU>CPP. The results were thresholded based on uncorrected voxel $p<0.01$ ($t=2.6$). (B) ROI analysis for CPP and RU. These ROIs were selected based on the common regions of CPP, RU and reward effects in McGuire et al. (2014). Significance was tested by a sign test. * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$.




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937 **Figure 3 - Figure supplement 1**


938 Univariate representations of error and error magnitude. A GLM was implemented on the preprocessed
 939 fMRI data (smoothed with 6 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel). The trial-by-trial regressors of interest that
 940 were included in the GLM were: onset of correct trials, earnable value on correct trials, onset of error
 941 trials, error magnitude on error trials, switch or stay on error trials and earnable value on error trials. We
 942 focused on the effects of error (which is the difference between the onset of error trials and the onset of
 943 correct trials) and error magnitude. Group t -values are shown. For statistical testing, we implemented one-
 944 sample cluster-mass permutation tests with 5,000 iterations. The cluster-forming threshold was
 945 uncorrected voxel $p < 0.01$ ($t = 2.6$).
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Figure 4 - Figure supplement 1


Univariate representations of error on the previous trial conditional on different types of current trials (columns). Several GLMs were implemented on the preprocessed fMRI data (smoothed with 6 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel). First, we examined errors on the previous trial across all trials. The trial-by-trial regressors of interest that were included in the GLM were: onset of trials, error on trial t , error on trial $t-1$, error on trial $t-2$, and error on trial $t-3$. We focused on the effect of error on trial $t-1$. Second, we separated the analysis of past errors conditional on the current trial being correct or an error. The trial-by-trial regressors of interest that were included in the GLM were: onset of current correct trials, errors on trial $t-1$, $t-2$, or $t-3$ conditional on the current trial being correct, onset of current error trials, errors on trial $t-1$, $t-2$, or $t-3$ conditional on the current trial being an error. We focused on the effects of error on trial $t-1$ conditional on the current trial being correct or an error. Third, we separated errors conditional on error magnitudes of 0 or 3+ or error magnitudes of 1 or 2. The trial-by-trial regressors of interest that were included in the GLM were: onset of current trials with error magnitudes of 0 or 3+, errors on trial $t-1$, $t-2$ or $t-3$ conditional on the current trial error magnitude of 0 or 3+, onset of current trials with error magnitudes of 1 or 2, errors on trial $t-1$, $t-2$ or $t-3$ conditional on the current trial error magnitude of 1 or 2. We focused on the effects of errors on trial $t-1$ conditional on the current trials error magnitude of 0 or 3+ or error magnitude of 1 or 2. Group t -values are shown. For statistical testing, we implemented one-sample cluster-mass permutation tests with 5,000 iterations. The cluster-forming threshold was uncorrected voxel $p < 0.01$ ($t = 2.6$).



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Figure 5 - Figure supplement 1

Representations of subsequent behavioral choices (switch versus stay) thresholded via threshold-free cluster enhancement (TFCE) or with a cluster-forming threshold of $p < 0.001$. (A) Overlap of results for switch versus stay on the next trial and error magnitude on the current trial. We implemented two types of cluster-forming approaches: TFCE and uncorrected voxel $p < 0.001$. First, significance testing was implemented through permutation tests with threshold-free cluster enhancement (FSL's randomize), which does not require a pre-defined cluster-forming threshold. The result of switch versus stay showed little spatial specificity. For the purpose of display, the results were thresholded based on uncorrected voxel $p < 0.03$ ($t=2$). Second, we used a cluster-forming threshold of uncorrected voxel $p < 0.001$ ($t=3.73$) and tested the significance of the formed cluster via one-sample cluster-mass permutation tests with 5,000 iterations. The results showed high spatial specificity and several previously identified regions were still significant: middle cingulate cortex [14, -8, 30], right insula [38, 4, 2], medial OFC [-4, 50, -10], left premotor cortex [-62, 2, 24] and left superior temporal gyrus [-50, -32, 12]. (B) Overlap of results for switch versus stay on the next trial and past error conditional on error magnitude of 1 or 2 on the current trial. The two types of cluster-forming approaches are shown.



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Figure 5 - Figure supplement 2

Univariate GLM for switch versus stay on small error trials (magnitudes of 1 or 2) in the noisy condition. A GLM was implemented with several trial-by-trial regressors of interest: onset of trials with error magnitude of 0, onset of trials with error magnitude of 3+, onset of trials with error magnitudes of 1 or 2 followed by switching, onset of trials with error magnitudes of 1 or 2 followed by staying. We tested the effects of the difference between switch and stay for small errors. For statistical testing, we implemented one-sample cluster-mass permutation tests with 5,000 iterations. The cluster-forming threshold was uncorrected voxel $p < 0.01$ ($t = 2.6$). There were no significant clusters. For the demonstration, the results were shown with uncorrected voxel $p < 0.01$.

998 Table 1
 999 BIC of behavior models

Model	Condition	BIC improvement by RB model
Reduced Bayesian model (RB)	Unstable	
	Noisy	
Fixed learning rate model (fixedLR)	Unstable	5.06 [3.63, 5.71]**
	Noisy	-21.05 [-76.63, 0.20] [†]
RB + fixedLR	Unstable	-9.83 [-11.20, -8.07]***
	Noisy	-4.64 [-10.51, 0.89]
RB + P _{stay}	Unstable	-5.20 [-5.65, -3.68]**
	Noisy	-5.55 [-5.65, -2.67]*

1000 Values are shown as median [IQR]. A negative value means that the RB model performed better
 1001 than the alternative model. Significance was tested by a sign test. [†] $p < 0.08$, ** $p < 0.01$,
 1002 *** $p < 0.001$.
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1004 Table 2

1005 Parameters of behavior models

Model	Parameter	Unstable	Noisy	Unstable > Noisy
RB	H	0.82 [0.64, 0.90]	0.33 [0.11, 0.50]	0.37 [0.24, 0.62]***
	K	0.59 [0.03, 2.22]	1.86 [1.22, 2.32]	-0.23 [-1.97, 0.71]
fixedLR	α_{fixed}	0.96 [0.86, 0.97]	0.63 [0.37, 0.73]	0.33 [0.19, 0.49]***
RB + fixedLR	H	0.07 [0.00, 0.86]	0.03 [0.00, 0.19]	0.03 [-0.03, 0.77]
	K	11.19 [2.78, 18.01]	3.22 [2.28, 9.90]	5.13 [-4.91, 16.10]
	α_{fixed}	0.96 [0.75, 1.00]	0.88 [0.23, 1.00]	0.02 [-0.12, 0.52]
	w	0.38 [0.16, 0.81]	0.71 [0.52, 0.87]	-0.28 [-0.57, 0.22]
RB + P _{stay}	H	0.73 [0.64, 0.88]	0.31 [0.06, 0.53]	0.27 [0.15, 0.66]**
	K	8.42 [0.73, 30.42]	2.19 [1.62, 9.09]	2.71 [-2.60, 23.94]
	P _{stay}	0.01 [0.00, 0.05]	0.01 [0.00, 0.13]	0.00 [-0.11, 0.03]

1006 Parameter values are shown as median [IQR]. Difference of parameter values between the two
 1007 conditions was tested by a sign test. ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

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1009 Table 3

1010 Summary of fMRI results: error magnitude and past error

Cluster index	#Voxels	Region	Peak <i>t</i>	Peak <i>x</i>	Peak <i>y</i>	Peak <i>z</i>
Error magnitude: noisy versus unstable						
1	21032	R Precuneus	5.22	16	-56	12
		R Angular gyrus	5.17	44	-70	32
		L Precuneus	5.08	-18	-58	20
		Occipital pole	5.07	2	-98	-2
		L Superior parietal lobule	4.91	-10	-66	48
		R Occipital cortex	4.69	26	-76	18
		L Occipital cortex	4.54	-38	-86	26
		R Superior parietal lobule	4.44	44	-44	54
		Posterior cingulate cortex	4.43	2	-46	20
Past error on current error magnitude of 1 or 2: noisy versus unstable						
1	1881	Posterior cingulate cortex	4.79	12	-24	52
		R Superior parietal lobule	4.04	32	-38	54
		R Precuneus	3.58	6	-54	70
		L Superior parietal lobule	3.54	-16	-54	62
Conjunction: Error magnitude & Past error on current error magnitude of 1 or 2						
1	304	R Superior parietal lobule	3.41	38	-40	52
2	103	R Precuneus	3.02	2	-58	70
3	81	L Superior parietal lobule	3.23	-18	-56	72

1011

1012 Table 4

1013 Summary of fMRI results: behavior change

Cluster index	#Voxels	Region	Peak <i>t</i>	Peak <i>x</i>	Peak <i>y</i>	Peak <i>z</i>
Switch versus stay on error magnitude of 1 or 2 in the noisy condition						
1	12042	Middle cingulate cortex	4.35	14	-8	30
		R Insula	4.33	38	4	2
		Medial orbitofrontal cortex	4.24	-4	50	-10
		R Frontal pole	4.11	40	46	0
		R Inferior frontal gyrus	4.11	48	26	10
		L Frontal pole	4.01	-24	52	-2
		Dorsomedial frontal cortex	3.96	0	26	34
		Posterior cingulate cortex	3.93	2	-28	50
		R Primary motor cortex	3.91	48	-6	50
		Anterior cingulate cortex	3.51	0	48	20
2	3134	L Premotor cortex	4.43	-62	2	24
		L Superior temporal gyrus	4.28	-50	-32	12
		L Inferior frontal junction	3.72	-38	4	28
		L Postcentral gyrus	3.61	-50	-26	44

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