Learning when effort matters: Neural dynamics underlying updating and adaptation to changes in

performance efficacy

Ivan Grahek[1][*], Romy Frömer[1], Mahalia Prater Fahey[1], & Amitai Shenhav[1]

1. *Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, & Psychological Sciences and Carney Institute for*

   Brain Science, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA

* Corresponding author. E-mail address: ivan_grahek@brown.edu

Conflicts of interest: The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.

Abstract

To determine how much cognitive control to invest in a task, people need to consider whether exerting control *matters* for obtaining rewards. In particular, they need to account for the efficacy of their performance – the degree to which rewards are determined by performance or by independent factors. Yet it remains unclear how people learn about their *performance efficacy* in an environment. Here we combined computational modeling with measures of task performance and EEG, to provide a mechanistic account of how people (a) learn and update efficacy expectations in a changing environment, and (b) proactively adjust control allocation based on current efficacy expectations. Across two studies subjects performed an incentivized cognitive control task while their performance efficacy (the likelihood that rewards are performance-contingent or random) varied over time. We show that people update their efficacy beliefs based on prediction errors – leveraging similar neural and computational substrates as those that underpin reward learning – and adjust how much control they allocate according to these beliefs. Using computational modeling, we show that these control adjustments reflect changes in information processing, rather than the speed-accuracy tradeoff. These findings demonstrate the neurocomputational mechanism through which people learn how worthwhile their cognitive control is.

Keywords: Motivation; Cognitive control; Learning; Performance efficacy; Reward rate; EEG

1   Cognitive control is critical for achieving most goals, but it is effortful (Botvinick and

2   Cohen 2014; Shenhav et al. 2017). To decide how to invest control into a task (e.g., writing an

3   essay for a competition), a person must weigh these effort costs against the potential benefits of a

4   given type and amount of control (Manohar et al. 2015; Verguts et al. 2015; Kool and Botvinick

5   2018). One aspect of these benefits is the significance of the expected outcomes, both positive

6   (e.g., a monetary prize, social acclaim) and negative (e.g., missed revenue, social derision)

7   (Atkinson 1966; Leng et al., 2021). An equally important aspect of the expected benefits of

8   control is the extent to which control *matters* for achieving good outcomes and avoiding bad

9   ones (Frömer et al., 2021a; Shenhav et al., 2021). This can in turn be decomposed into the extent

10   to which higher levels of control translate into better performance (e.g., whether writing a good

11   essay will require substantial or only minimal control resources; *control efficacy*) and the extent

12   to which better performance translates into better outcomes (e.g., whether prizes are determined

13   by the strength of an essay or by arbitrary or even biased metrics unrelated to essay-writing

14   performance; *performance efficacy*). Whereas studies have increasingly characterized the ways

15   in which control allocation is influenced by expected outcomes (e.g., Parro et al., 2018; Leng et

16   al., 2021) and the expected efficacy of control (e.g., as a function of task difficulty; Krebs et al.,

17   2012; Vassena et al., 2014; Chiu and Egner 2019), much less is known about how people

18   estimate and adjust to the perceived efficacy of their performance in a given environment.

19   We recently showed that when participants are explicitly instructed about how

20   efficacious their performance will be on an upcoming trial, they exhibit behavioral and neural

21   responses consistent with increased control (Frömer et al., 2021a). We had participants perform a

22   standard cognitive control task (Stroop) for potential monetary rewards, and we varied whether

23   obtaining those rewards was contingent on performing well on the task (high performance

24   efficacy) or whether those rewards were determined at random (low efficacy). We showed that

25   people allocate more control when they expect to have high compared to low efficacy, reflected

26   in higher amplitudes of an EEG index of proactive control (the contingent negative variation

27   [CNV]) and in improved behavioral performance. These results demonstrate that participants

28   leverage expectations about the extent to which their performance matters when deciding how

29   much cognitive effort to invest in a task. However, in this work, participants were explicitly cued

30   with the level of performance efficacy to expect on a given trial, and those predictive cues

31   retained the same meaning across the session. Thus, how it is that people learn these efficacy

32   expectations in environments where contingencies are not instructed, and how they dynamically

33   update their expectations as contingencies change, remains unanswered.

34   Outside of the domain of cognitive control, a relevant line of work has examined how

35   people learn about the factors that determine future outcomes when selecting between potential

36   courses of action. In particular, work in this area has shown that people are able to learn about

37   and update their expectations of the likelihood that a given action will generate a given outcome

38   (action-outcome contingency; Dickinson and Balleine 1995; Moscarello and Hartley 2017; Ly et

39   al. 2019). People preferentially, and more vigorously, select actions that reliably lead to desired

40   outcomes (i.e., the more contingent those outcomes are on the action in question; Liljeholm et al.

41   2011; Manohar et al. 2017), and work in both animals (Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010) and humans

42   (Norton & Liljeholm, 2020; Dorfman et al., 2021; Ligneul et al., 2022; Morris et al., 2022) has

43   helped to characterize the neural systems that support this process of learning and action

44   selection. However, given the focus on discrete actions and their immediate relationship with

45   outcomes, research into these action-outcome contingencies is unable to capture key aspects that

46   are unique to selection of control states. Most notably, cognitive control signals (e.g., attention to

47   one or more features of the environment) are multidimensional, not immediately observable by

48   either the participant or experimenter, and their relationship with potential outcomes is

49   intermediated by the many-to-many relationship between control states and task performance

50   (Ritz et al., 2022). While there has been research into how people learn to adjust cognitive

51   control signals based on changes in their task environment, here again work has focused on how

52   people adapt to changes in outcomes (e.g., Otto and Daw 2019; Bustamante et al. 2021) and

53   changes in the relationship between control and performance (with increasing task difficulty;

54   Bugg et al. 2011; Nigbur et al. 2015; Bejjani et al. 2018; Jiang et al. 2020). The mechanisms by

55   which people learn about the relationship between performance and outcomes (performance

56   efficacy), and how they adjust their control allocation accordingly, remain largely unexplored.

57   Here, we seek to fill this gap by studying the mechanisms through which expectations of

58   performance efficacy are formed, updated, and used to guide control allocation. To do so, we

59   extend our previous approach (Frömer et al., 2021a) – which studied how behavioral and neural

60   correlates of control allocation vary when performance efficacy is explicitly cued – to examine

61   how participants learn and adapt their control under conditions where efficacy was un-cued

62   (having to instead be learned from feedback) and gradually varied across a wide range of

63   potential efficacy values over the course of the session. We use computational reinforcement

64   learning models to show that expected efficacy can be learned from feedback through iterative

65   updating based on weighted prediction errors (Sutton and Barto 2018), and model-based single-

66   trial EEG analyses to show that these efficacy prediction errors modulate a canonical neural

67   marker of reward-based learning and behavioral adjustment (Fischer and Ullsperger 2013). We

68   further provide evidence that efficacy estimates learned in this way are used to guide the

69   allocation of control. In our EEG study and a second behavioral study, participants tended to

70 perform better when efficacy was higher. We also provide evidence that a neural marker of

71 control allocation (Schevernels et al. 2014a) tends to increase with increasing model-based

72 efficacy estimates. Using a drift diffusion model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Wiecki, Sofer, &

73 Frank, 2013), in Study 2 we further show that the performance improvements related to

74 increased performance-efficacy reflect facilitation of task-related information processing

75 (reflected in increased drift rates), rather than changes in the speed-accuracy tradeoff (i.e.,

76 thresholds). Taken together, these results show that efficacy estimates can be learned and

77 updated based on feedback, leveraging general cognitive and neural mechanisms of predictive

78 inference.

79

80 **Materials and Methods**

81 **Study 1**

82 *Participants*

83 We recruited forty-one participants with normal or corrected-to-normal vision from the

84 Brown University subject pool. One participant was excluded due to technical issues. The final

85 data set included 40 participants (24 females, 16 males; median age = 19). Participants gave

86 informed consent and were compensated with course credits or a fixed payoff of $20. In

87 addition, they received up to $5 bonus that depended on their task performance ($3.25 on

88 average). The research protocol was approved by Brown University's Institutional Review

89 Board.

90 *Experimental design*

91 In the main task, taking approximately 45 minutes, participants performed 288 Stroop

92 trials (Figure 1A). Each trial started with the presentation of a cue (grey circle) that remained on

93   the screen throughout the trial. After a period of 1500 ms, a Stroop stimulus was superimposed

94   until a response was made or 1000 ms elapsed, at which time it was sequentially replaced with

95   two types of feedback presented for 1000 ms each. Each trial onset was preceded by a fixation

96   cross (randomly jittered between 1000 and 1500ms). Participants responded to the ink color of

97   the Stroop stimulus (red, green, blue, or yellow) by pressing one of four keyboard keys (D, F, J,

98   and K). Stimuli were either color words same as the ink color (congruent, n = 108) or different

99   (incongruent, n = 108), or a string of letters "XXXXX" (neutral, n= 72). Feedback informed

100   them whether they obtained a reward (reward, "$50c" or no reward, "$0c") and whether the

101   reward they received depended on their performance (performance-based feedback, a button

102   graphic), or not (random feedback, a dice graphic). In order to earn rewards in the performance-

103   based case, participants had to be both accurate and respond within an individually calibrated

104   response deadline (see details below). The order of the two types of feedback was pseudo-

105   randomized with half of the trials showing reward feedback first and the other half efficacy

106   feedback. Every 2-4 trials the feedback was followed by a probe of efficacy ("How much do you

107   think your rewards currently depend on your performance?") or reward rate ("How often do you

108   think you are currently being rewarded?") to which participants responded on a visual analog

109   scale ranging from 0 to 100. The number and timing of the probes was randomized per subject

110   resulting in a median of 45 efficacy probes (SD=3.38) and 47 reward probes (SD=2.81).

111   Efficacy (performance-based or random rewards) on each trial was sampled from a

112   binomial distribution with probabilities ranging between 0.1 and 0.9 that drifted over the course

113   of the experiment and were predetermined (Figure 1B). In order to ensure that the performance-

114   based and random trials did not differ in reward rate, reward feedback for the random trials was

115   sampled from the moving window of the reward feedback of the previous 10 performance-based

116   trials. At the beginning of the experiment a window with 8 rewards and 2 no rewards was used to

117   reflect the pre-calibrated reward rate (details below), and this moving window was then updated

118   after every trial. Thus, reward rate was not experimentally manipulated in the experiment and

119   remained constant. We confirmed that reward rate was matched across performance-based and

120   random trials by comparing reward probability between these trial types ($b = 0.01$; 95% CrI [-

121   0.07, 0.10]; $p_{b > 0} = 0.38$).

122   Prior to the main task, participants performed several practice phases of the Stroop task

123   (approximately 15 minutes). First, they practiced the mappings between colors and keyboard

124   keys (80 trials). Then they completed a short practice of the Stroop task with written feedback

125   ("correct" or "incorrect") on each trial (30 trials). Participants then completed 100 more of such

126   trials during which we individually calibrated the reaction time deadline such that participants

127   yielded approximately 80% reward rate. The reaction time calibration started from a fixed

128   deadline of 750ms and increased or decreased this threshold in order to ensure that participants

129   earn rewards on 80% of trials (i.e., that they are both accurate and below the deadline). The

130   deadline obtained in this way (M = 796ms; SD = 73ms) was used in the main experiment and

131   was not further adjusted. In the final practice phase participants were introduced to the two types

132   of feedback which they would see in the main experiment (30 trials).

133   The experimental task was implemented in Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard 1997; Pelli

134   1997; Kleiner et al. 2007) for Matlab (MathWorks Inc.) and presented on a 23 inch screen with a

135   1920 x 1080 resolution. All of the stimuli were presented centrally while the participants were

136   seated 80 cm away from the screen.

137   ***Psychophysiological recording and preprocessing***

138   EEG data were recorded at a sampling rate of 500 Hz from 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes

139   mounted in an electrode cap (ECI Inc.), referenced against Cz, using Brain Vision Recorder

140   (Brain Products, München, Germany). Vertical and horizontal ocular activity was recorded from

141   below both eyes (IO1, IO2) and the outer canthi (LO1, LO2), respectively. Impedances were

142   kept below 10 kΩ. Offline, data were processed using custom made Matlab scripts (Frömer et al.

143   2018) employing EEGlab functions (Delorme and Makeig 2004). Data were re-referenced to

144   average reference, ocular artifacts were corrected using brain electric source analyses (Ille et al.

145   2002) based on separately recorded prototypical eye movements. The cleaned continuous EEG

146   was then low pass filtered at 40 Hz and segmented into epochs around cue onset (-200 to 1500

147   ms), stimulus onset, and both efficacy and reward feedback (-200 to 800 ms). Baselines were

148   corrected to the average of each 200 ms pre-stimulus interval. Segments containing artifacts,

149   values exceeding $\pm$ 150 µV or gradients larger than 50 µV, were excluded from further analyses.

150   Single trial ERPs were then exported for further analyses in R (R Core Team 2017). The

151   late CNV was quantified between 1000 and 1500 ms post neutral cue onset (Schevernels et al.

152   2014b; Frömer et al. 2016; Frömer et al. 2021a) as the average activity over 9 fronto-central

153   electrodes (Fz, F1, F2, FCz, FC1, FC2, Cz, C1, and C2). The P3b was quantified between 350

154   and 500 ms (Fischer and Ullsperger 2013) for both reward and efficacy feedback and calculated

155   as the averaged activity over 9 centro-parietal electrodes (Pz, P1, P2, POz, PO1, PO2, CPz, CP1,

156   and CP2).

157   ***Learning models and statistical analyses***

158   **Learning models.** Participants provided their subjective estimates of efficacy and reward every

159   4-8 trials (a total of 45 estimates), and we sought to fit a learning model to these estimates to be

160 able to predict trial-by-trial adjustments in performance and neural markers of learning and

161 cognitive control allocation. In order to obtain trial-by-trial estimates of efficacy and reward rate,

162 we fitted two temporal difference learning models (Gläscher et al., 2010; Sutton & Barto, 2018)

163 to the continuous subjective estimates of efficacy and reward rate (Rutledge et al., 2014; Eldar et

164 al., 2016; Nagase et al., 2018). The first model ("1 learning rate efficacy model") assumed that

165 the estimate of efficacy for the next trial (E_{t+1}) depended on the current efficacy estimate (E_t)

166 and the prediction error (δ_t) weighted by a constant learning rate (α):

167
$$E_{t+1} = E_t + \alpha * \delta_t$$

168 Where $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$, and the prediction error is calculated as the difference between the contingency

169 feedback on the current trial (e_t) and the efficacy estimate on that trial: $\delta_t = e_t - E_t$. The model

170 started from an initial value (free parameter) and updated the model-based efficacy estimate

171 based on the binary efficacy feedback on each trial. For example, assuming a learning rate of 0.5

172 and the initial value of 0.5, the model would update the initial estimate following efficacy

173 feedback signaling "performance-based" ($e_t = 1$) to 0.75. If on the next trial contingency

174 feedback was "random" ($e_{t+1} = 0$) the model-based efficacy estimate would drop to 0.6. The

175 model was fitted separately to the subjective estimates of efficacy with only the learning rate as a

176 free parameter. The second model ("2 learning rates efficacy model") was the same as the first

177 model, but it included two learning rates: one learning rate for learning from the "performance-

178 based" feedback, and another for learning from the "random" feedback. Finally, as a baseline, we

179 also included the "intercept model" which did not update the efficacy estimate throughout the

180 experiment, but just assumed that the estimate took one constant value. Importantly, the same

181 models were fitted to obtain the model-based estimates of reward on each trial ("1 learning rate

182 reward model" and the "2 learning rate reward model"). These models were fitted using trial-by-

183   trial reward feedback and the subjective estimates of reward. The models were fit hierarchically

184   to the data using maximum likelihood estimation (using mfit (https://github.com/sjgershm/mfit).

185   To calculate the likelihood of each data point, model-based estimates (0-1 range) were compared

186   to the subjective efficacy estimates (range normalized to 0-1 range for each participant).

187   Likelihood was evaluated on trials which included a subjective estimate, as the likelihood that

188   the difference between the model-based and the empirical estimate comes from a Gaussian

189   distribution centered on 0 with a variance which was fitted as a free parameter each subject. This

190   variance parameter served as the noise in the estimates. Likelihoods were log transformed,

191   summed, and then maximized using the fmincon function in MATLAB.

192   We performed a parameter recovery study to show that the most complex model (the 2

193   learning rates model) can be successfully recovered. We simulated a dataset with the same

194   number of trials and subjective efficacy or reward probes as in the actual experiment. We used

195   the efficacy drifts presented to the actual subjects (half of the simulated subjects saw one drift,

196   and half its inverse), and we used the reward feedback sequences of two actual subjects from our

197   experiment. We simulated 200 agents which learned both efficacy and reward with the noise

198   parameter fixed to 0.2, intercept fixed to 0.5, and the positive and negative learning rates

199   sampled from a uniform distribution ranging from 0.001 to 0.5. These parameters were matched

200   based on the range of values obtained from the empirical fits to our data. As shown in Figure S1

201   we were able to very reliably recover the simulated parameters for both efficacy and reward rate

202   learning.

203   **Statistical analyses.** The efficacy and reward rate estimates obtained through fitting the learning

204   model were then used to analyze the behavioral and EEG data. To this end, we fitted Bayesian

205   multilevel regressions to predict subjective estimates of efficacy and reward rates, reaction times,

206   accuracy, as well as the CNV and P3b amplitudes. Subjective estimates of efficacy and reward

207   rate were regressed onto efficacy or reward feedback. Reaction times and accuracies were

208   regressed onto trial-by-trial model-based estimates of efficacy and reward rate, as well as trial-

209   by-trial CNV amplitude, while controlling for congruency. The P3b amplitudes were analyzed in

210   two ways: with trial-by-trial model-based estimates of efficacy and reward rate and current

211   feedback as predictors, and with model-based prediction errors and learning rates for each

212   feedback type. CNV amplitudes were regressed onto trial-by-trial model-based estimates of

213   efficacy. All of the fitted models controlled for the influence of the reward rate estimates.

214   Parallel analyses were done to predict the P3b in response to reward feedback, while controlling

215   for the efficacy estimates.

216   The regression models were fitted in R with the *brms* package (Bürkner 2016) which

217   relies on the probabilistic programming language *Stan* (Carpenter et al. 2016) to implement

218   Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms and estimate posterior distributions of model

219   parameters. The analyses were done based on the recommendations for Bayesian multilevel

220   modeling using *brms* (Bürkner 2016; Bürkner 2017; Nalborczyk and Bürkner 2019). The fitted

221   models included constant and varying effects (also known as fixed and random) with weakly

222   informative priors (except for the behavioral and CNV analyses, see below for details) for the

223   intercept and the slopes of fixed effects and the likelihoods appropriate for the modeled data (Ex-

224   Gaussian for reaction times, Bernoulli for accuracy, and Gaussian for the subjective estimates

225   and the EEG amplitudes). The fitted models included all of the fixed effects as varying effects.

226   All of the continuous predictors in the model were centered and the categorical predictors were

227   contrast coded. Four MCMC simulations ("chains"; 20,000 iterations; 19,000 warmup) were run

228   to estimate the parameters of each of the fitted models. The convergence of the models was

229 confirmed by examining trace plots, autocorrelation, and variance between chains (Gelman and

230 Rubin 1992). After convergence was confirmed, we analyzed the posterior distributions of the

231 parameters of interest and summarized them by reporting the means of the distribution for the

232 given parameter (*b*) and the 95% credible intervals (95% CrI) of the posterior distributions of

233 that model. We report the proportion of the posterior samples on the relevant side of 0 (e.g., $p_{b<0}$

234 = 0.9), which represents the probability that the estimate is below or above 0. We also report

235 Bayes factors (BF) calculated using the Savage-Dickey method (Wagenmakers et al. 2010). We

236 report the BFs in support of the alternative hypothesis against the null (BF_{10}), except for the

237 analyses of accurate RT, accuracies, and CNV amplitude in which we have informative priors

238 based on our previous study (Frömer et al. 2021a), and in which case we support the evidence in

239 favor of the null (BF_{01}).

240   To compare the positive and negative learning rates we fitted a model in which the

241 learning rates were predicted by the learning rate type (Kruschke 2013). In this model we used

242 Gaussian distributions (mean, standard deviation) as priors (intercept: (0.5,0.5); slopes: (0,0.5)).

243   We fitted two separate models to predict the subjective estimates of efficacy and reward

244 rate based on previous feedbacks. At each timepoint the estimates were predicted by the current,

245 and previous 4 feedbacks. The feedback on each of the trials (performance-based vs. random or

246 reward vs. no reward) was entered as a constant effect and the models also included the intercept

247 as a varying effect. As the subjective estimates could vary between 0 and 1, we used Gaussian

248 distributions (intercept: (0.5,0.2); slopes: (0,0.2)) as priors.

249   For predicting the P3b amplitude in response to the onset of the efficacy feedback, we

250 fitted two models. First, we fitted a model which included the model-based estimate of efficacy

251 (prior to observing the current feedback), the actual feedback, and the interaction between the

252 expected efficacy and the observed efficacy feedback. Additionally, we controlled for the reward

253 rate estimate. Second, we fitted separate models which included the model-based prediction

254 errors, the influence of the between-subject learning rates, and their interaction with the

255 prediction errors, while controlling for the estimate of the reward rate. In this analysis the

256 learning rates (one for feedback type for each subject) were mean-centered within subjects and

257 thus any effect of the learning rates is driven by the difference between the random and the

258 performance-based learning rate. For these models we selected wide Gaussian priors (intercept:

259 (5,3); slopes (0,3)). The same logic in building models was applied for the analyses of the reward

260 feedback. In these analyses we focused on the reward feedback processing and how it interacted

261 with the model-based estimates of reward rates, while controlling for the model-based estimates

262 of efficacy. We analyzed only the trials with correct responses for both the efficacy and the

263 reward feedback analyses.

264 To test the influence of efficacy on the late CNV, we fitted a model which predicted the

265 CNV based on the model-based efficacy estimates, while controlling for the effect of the reward

266 rate estimates. Drawing on the results of our previous study (Frömer et al. 2021a), this model

267 included Gaussian priors for the intercept (-0.16, 1.59) and the efficacy (-0.30, 0.73) and reward

268 (0,0.73) slopes.

269 For predicting reaction times and accuracy we fitted models which included congruency

270 (Facilitation: difference between neutral and congruent trials; Interference: difference between

271 incongruent and neutral trials) and the model-based efficacy estimates, while controlling for the

272 reward rate estimates. We used Gaussian distributions as informative priors based on our

273 previous study (Frömer et al. 2021a), for both the reaction times (intercept: (624, 58.69);

274 facilitation (15.54, 21.93), interference (61.12, 37.49); efficacy (-10.26, 19.51); reward (0,

275   19.51)) and accuracy[1] analyses (intercept: (2.11, 0.81); facilitation (-0.45, 0.64), interference (-

276   0.53, 0.81); efficacy (0.09, 0.32); reward (0, 0.32)).

277   To investigate how the late CNV influences the behavior, we fitted two models in which

278   we predicted the reaction times and accuracy based on the CNV amplitude. The prior

279   distributions for these models were weakly informative Gaussian distributions for predicting

280   both the reaction times (intercept: (650, 200); slope: (0, 50)) and accuracy (intercept: (0.7, 0.2);

281   slope: (0, 0.2)).

282   To visualize the topographies of the relevant ERP effects, we fitted the relevant models to

283   all 64 channels and then plotted the posterior estimates of the effects of interest at each electrode

284   (cf. Frömer et al., 2021b).

285   **Study 2**

286   ***Participants***

287   We recruited eighty-seven participants residing in the United States from Prolific – an

288   online platform for data collection. Participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and

289   gave informed consents. They were compensated with a fixed payoff of $8 per hour (median

290   completion time of 74 minutes) plus a monetary bonus based on points earned during the task

291   ($1 on average). The research protocol was approved by Brown University's Institutional

292   Review Board.

293   We a priori excluded participants who did not pass attention checks (N=8) or who took

294   substantially longer than the average participant to complete the study (N=2 participants who

295   took over 130 minutes), suggesting that they did not sustain attention to the experiment over that

---

[1] Note that the prior distributions are set in log-odds.

296   time. We fit our learning models to data from the remaining 77 subjects, and then excluded

297   participants whose performance suggested inattention to the overall task (based on accuracies

298   less than 70% across all trials – including the trials in which performance efficacy was low, N=6)

299   or inattention to the task feedbacks and efficacy probes (based on low learning rates (N=19), and

300   one subject with no variance in responses to reward probes). To identify participants with

301   exceedingly low learning rates, we submitted all positive and negative efficacy learning rates to

302   unsupervised Gaussian mixture models (as implemented in the Mclust package; (Scrucca et al.,

303   2016) to determine the best fitting number and shape of clusters (model comparison via BIC).

304   This procedure identified four clusters of subjects with different overall learning rates (Figure

305   S2B-C) and we excluded subjects from the first cluster as they all had very low learning rates

306   relative to the other participants (both learning rates < 0.03). The subjects excluded based on low

307   learning rates were most likely not paying attention to efficacy feedback, or were always giving

308   very similar responses to the efficacy probes (Figure S3). The final sample included 51

309   participants (31 females, 20 males; median age = 29).

310   ***Experimental design***

311   In order to better understand the computational mechanisms that lead to improved

312   behavioral performance in high efficacy states (Study 1), we wanted to fit a Drift Diffusion

313   model (DDM; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) to our behavioral data. If people allocate more

314   attention when they think they have high performance efficacy, this should be observed as an

315   increase in the drift rate (speed of evidence accumulation). However, Study 1 included a tight

316   respond deadline for earning a reward, making it more challenging to fit the DDM. To avoid this

317   issue, in Study 2 we adjusted the task to a free response paradigm which allowed us to

318   investigate drift rate and threshold adjustments (cf. Leng et al., 2021). We used this design to test

319   the hypothesis that higher efficacy estimates should predict increased drift rates.

320   Instead of single trials, participants now completed 288 intervals during which they could

321   respond to as many trials (congruent and incongruent, removing the neutral condition) as they

322   wished within a fixed time window (randomly selected between 2000, 3000, or 4000ms). Apart

323   from this, the structure of the task remained the same: participants saw a fixation cross (1000,

324   1500, or 2000ms), then completed as many trials as they wished during a fixed interval, followed

325   by the feedback (1500 ms) on how many points they earned and whether this was based on their

326   performance or awarded to them based on random chance. Note that participants now received

327   continuous reward feedback (10 points per correct response instead of the binary reward-no

328   reward in Study 1). For example, if participants completed 4 trials correctly and 2 trials

329   incorrectly within a performance-based interval they would receive 40 points and see feedback

330   informing them that the points were based on their performance. To determine the number of

331   points on random intervals, the same yoking procedure as in Study 1 was employed ensuring that

332   the amount of reward was matched between performance-based and random intervals (reward

333   amounts on random intervals were sampled from the moving average window of the past 10

334   performance-based intervals). We confirmed that the yoking procedure was successful by

335   comparing the reward amounts on the two interval types ($b = 0.00$; 95% CrI [-0.00, 0.02]; $p_{b > 0} =$

336   0.16). As in Study 1, participants were probed every 2-4 intervals to estimate either how much

337   they thought their rewards depended on their performance, or how often they were rewarded. We

338   again implemented an efficacy drift (modified, but comparable to the drift in Study 1; Figure

339   S2A), now across the 288 intervals of the task.

340   We gamified the task in order to make it more appealing for the participants. Instead of

341   the Stroop task, we used a picture-word interference task in which four grey-scaled images of

342   fruit (apple, pear, lemon, and peach) were overlaid by those fruit words. Participants responded

343   to the image, while ignoring the word, by pressing one of the 4 corresponding keys. They first

344   practiced this task, and then were introduced with a cover story telling them that they are in the

345   garden and need to water the fruit in little patches by pressing the correct keys. They were

346   instructed that they will be moving through a garden and that in some patches watering will

347   directly translate into how many points they will be earning, while in the others that will not be

348   the case (the efficacy drift). The experiment was implemented in Psiturk (Gureckis et al., 2016)

349   and the participants performed the task on their own computers and were required to have a

350   keyboard.

Learning models, Drift Diffusion model, and statistical analyses

Learning models. We fitted the same set of learning models as in Study 1, performed model

353   comparison, and got the interval-by-interval model-based estimates of performance efficacy and

354   reward. Note that in this version of the task participants earned points in each interval, unlike the

355   binary rewards (reward vs. no reward) in Study 1. This meant that the reward learning model

356   learned reward magnitudes rather than reward probabilities. However, model fitting and the

357   further analyses were the same as in Study 1.

Statistical analyses. We fitted the same Bayesian multilevel models as in Study 1 to predict the

359   influence of previous efficacy feedbacks on the subjective efficacy estimates, as well as the

360   influence of the model-based efficacy estimates on reaction times and accuracies. For the

361   analyses of the subjective efficacy estimates we used the same priors as in Study 1. For the

362   analyses of the reaction times and accuracies, we used the posterior distributions obtained in

363   Study 1 as the informative priors for the congruency, efficacy, and reward effects. The reaction

364   times and accuracy models also controlled for the effects of the average congruency level in the

365   interval and the interval length.

366   **Drift Diffusion model.** This model decomposes participant's behavior into drift rate (the speed

367   of evidence accumulation) and response threshold (the level of caution), allowing us to

368   investigate which of these two components is affected by the efficacy estimates. We fitted the

369   model using Bayesian hierarchical estimation as implemented in the HDDM package (Wiecki,

370   Sofer, & Frank, 2013). The fitted model included the main effects of efficacy and reward rate

371   estimates onto both drift rate and threshold, and included the effect of congruency on the drift

372   rate. The responses were coded as correct or incorrect, and trials with reaction times below

373   250ms were excluded. All of the effects were allowed to vary across subjects, and we ran five

374   MCMC chains (12,000 iterations; 10,000 warmup). We confirmed convergence by examining

375   trace plots and variance between chains.

376

377   **Results**

378   **Study 1**

379   To investigate how efficacy estimates are learned, and how they affect control allocation,

380   in Study 1 we recorded EEG while 40 participants performed a modified version of the Stroop

381   task (Figure 1A). Across trials we varied whether reward outcomes ($0.50 vs. $0.00) were

382   determined by a participant's performance on a given trial (responding accurately and below a

383   pre-determined response time criterion; *performance-based* trials) or whether those outcomes

384   were determined independent of performance (based on a weighted coin flip; *random* trials).

385   Over the course of the session, we gradually varied the likelihood that a given trial would be

386   performance-based or random such that, at some points in the experiment, most trials were

387   performance-based (high efficacy level), and at other points most trials had random outcomes

388   (low efficacy level) (Figure 1B). Importantly, unlike in our previous study (Frömer et al., 2021a),

389   participants were not told whether a given trial would be performance-based (maximal efficacy)

390   or random (minimal efficacy), but instead had to estimate their current efficacy level based on

391   recent trial feedback, which indicated both the reward outcome ($0.50 vs. $0.00) and how that

392   outcome was determined (performance-based [button symbol] vs. random [dice symbol]). We

393   held reward rate constant across both feedback types by yoking reward rate on random trials to

394   the reward rate on performance-based trials, and counter-balanced the time-course of the gradual

395   change in efficacy (see Methods for details). To capture changes in efficacy expectations over

396   the course of the session, we probed participants every 4-8 trials (averaging 44.3 probes per

397   participant) to report their current estimates of efficacy. These efficacy probes were interleaved

398   with probes asking participants to estimate the current reward rate, serving as foils and for

399   control analyses.

Figure 1. Manipulating expected efficacy and assessing learning in Study 1. A. Trial Schematic. On each trial participants saw a cue (gray circle), predicting the onset of a Stroop stimulus (target), and were then sequentially presented with reward and efficacy feedback. On half of the trials, efficacy feedback was presented first, and on the other half reward feedback was presented first. Every 2-4 trials participants were subsequently asked to estimate their current efficacy level ("How much do you think your rewards currently depend on your performance?") or reward rate ("How often do you think you are currently being rewarded?"). **B. Efficacy manipulation.** We let the probability of performance-based vs. random feedback continuously drift over the course of the experiment (inversed for one half of the sample). Arrows mark time points with low and high efficacy, respectively. When efficacy was low, rewards were more likely to be random, whereas when efficacy was high, rewards were more likely to be performance-based.

400

401　　*Participants dynamically update efficacy expectations based on feedback*

402　　　　　　To determine whether and how participants learned their current efficacy levels, we first

403　　analyzed the influence of previous efficacy feedback (whether outcomes on a given previous trial

404　　had been performance-based or random) on one's current subjective estimates of efficacy. We

405　　found very strong evidence that participants adjusted their subjective efficacy upward or

406　　downward depending on whether the most recent trial was Performance-Based or Random ($b =$

407　　0.14; 95% CrI [0.12, 0.16]; $p_{b < 0} = 0$; $BF_{10} > 100$), and that this remained true (but to diminishing

408　　degrees) up to five trials back (all $p_{b < 0} < 0.01$; Figure 2A; Table S1). This effect of feedback was

409　　present only for the efficacy feedback, while reward feedback did not predict the subjective

410 estimates of efficacy (Figure 2A). These results suggest that participants were dynamically

411 updating their efficacy estimates based on efficacy feedback.

Figure 2. Efficacy learning is captured by a reinforcement learning model with separate learning rates for performance-based and random feedback in Study 1. A. Efficacy estimates track recent efficacy feedback. Regression weights for the influence of the current (t) and previous contingent vs. random feedback, as well as reward feedback, on the subjective efficacy estimate. Error bars represent 50% and 95% highest density intervals. **B. A separate learning rate model captures efficacy learning best.** BICs of fitted intercept only and one learning rate model relative to two learning rate models are plotted for each participant and favor the two learning rate model. **C. Learning rate biases vary between participants.** Positive and negative learning rate estimates are plotted for all participants. Points below the diagonal indicate higher learning rates for performance-based compared to random feedback, and points above the opposite. **D. Example learning trajectories.** Subjective and model-based efficacy estimates, and a running average of the previous 5 efficacy feedbacks, for a participant with a higher learning rate for the contingent compared to random feedback (upper) and a participant with the reverse bias (lower).

412   This pattern of learning was accounted for by a standard reinforcement learning (RL)

413   algorithm, the delta-rule, according to which efficacy estimates are updated in proportion to the

414   prediction error between the expected efficacy and the efficacy feedback on a given trial (i.e.,

415   whether a given outcome was determined by performance or not) (Sutton and Barto 2018).

416   Interestingly, consistent with studies of reward learning (Niv et al. 2012; Collins and Frank 2014;

417   Lefebvre et al. 2017; Chambon et al. 2020; Garrett and Daw 2020), we found that the RL model

418   that best accounted for our data allowed efficacy estimates to be updated differently from trials

419   that were more efficacious than expected (Performance-Based feedback) than from trials that

420   were less efficacious than expected (Random feedback), by having separate *learning rates*

421   scaling prediction errors in the two cases. Even when accounting for model complexity, this Two

422   Learning Rate Efficacy model outperformed a One Learning Rate Efficacy model as well as a

423   baseline model that fits a single constant efficacy estimate and no learning (Intercept Model)

424   (Figure 2B). In addition, we were able to successfully recover the parameters of this model from

425   a simulated dataset matched to our data (see Methods and Figure S1). We found that the two

426   learning rates for this best-fit model varied across the group (Figure 2E), but did not find that one

427   was consistently higher than the other (b = 0.02; 95% CrI [-0.04, 0.08]; $p_{b < 0}$ = 0.260;

428   BF_{01}=13.55; Figure S4), despite most participants (80%) tending to learn more from

429   Performance-Based than Random trials. Finally, model-based efficacy estimates were strongly

430   related to the raw subjective estimates on trials on which participants reported efficacy (b = 0.77;

431   95% CrI [0.62, 0.91]; $p_{b < 0}$ < 0.001; BF_{01} > 100; R^2=0.50), demonstrating that the model

432   successfully captured the raw estimates. Taken together, these results show that participants

433   dynamically updated their expected efficacy based on trial-by-trial feedback, and that they did so

434   differentially based on whether the trial was more or less efficacious than expected. The fitted

435   models further enable us to generate trial-by-trial estimates of expected efficacy and efficacy

436   prediction errors, which we use in model-based analyses of behavior and neural activity below.

437   Note that in all the following analyses we control for reward estimates obtained from models fit

438   to reward feedback (for details see below).

The feedback-related P3b indexes updating of efficacy expectations

440   To investigate the neural mechanism underlying feedback-based learning of efficacy, we

441   probed the centroparietal P3b ERP component (Figure 3A), an established neural correlate of

442   prediction-error based learning (Fischer and Ullsperger 2013; Nassar et al. 2019). If the P3b

443   indexes feedback-based updating of *efficacy* predictions, as it does for reward predictions, we

444   would expect this ERP to demonstrate several key markers of such a learning signal. First, we

445   would expect the P3b to reflect the extent to which efficacy feedback (Performance-Based vs.

446   Random) deviates from the current level of expected efficacy. In other words, the P3b should

447   track the magnitude of the *unsigned efficacy prediction error (PE)* on a given trial. We tested

448   this by examining how the amplitude of the P3b to a given type of efficacy feedback varied with

449   model-based estimates of the participant's efficacy expectation on that trial, while holding the

450   expected reward rate constant (see the Methods and Materials sections for the details of the

451   experimental design and the statistical models). If the P3b signaled efficacy PE then its

452   amplitude should scale inversely with the expected probability of a given type of feedback (i.e.,

453   how *unexpected* that feedback is), thus correlating *negatively* with expected efficacy on trials

454   providing Performance-Based feedback and correlating *positively* with expected efficacy on

455   trials providing Random feedback. In addition to overall higher P3b to performance-based

456   compared to random feedback ($b = 0.86$; 95% CrI [0.42, 1.31]; $p_{b<0} = 0$; $BF_{10} = 30.86$; Figure

457   2B), we found exactly this predicted interaction between feedback type and expected efficacy (b

458    $= -2.40$; 95% CrI [-4.07, -0.74]; $p_{b > 0} = 0$; $BF_{10} = 24.40$; Figure 2B; Figure S5A; Table S2), with

459   the P3b amplitude decreasing with model-based estimates of expected efficacy on Performance-

460   Based trials (b $= -1.49$; 95% CrI [-2.72, -0.27]; $p_{b > 0} = 0.03$; $BF_{10} = 1.52$) and increasing

461   numerically, but not robustly with expected efficacy on Random trials ($b = 0.91$; 95% CrI [-0.34,

462   2.21]; $p_{b < 0} = 0.12$; $BF_{10} = 0.44$). Accordingly, when we regressed P3b amplitude on our model-

463   based estimates of trial-to-trial efficacy PE, we found a positive relationship ($b = 1.25$; 95% CrI

464   [0.35, 2.15]; $p_{b<0} = 0.01$; $BF_{10} = 5.84$; Figure 3C-left; Table S2).

Figure 3. P3b reflects dynamically changing efficacy estimates during processing of efficacy feedback in Study 1. A. ERP average for the P3b locked to the onset of the efficacy feedback separately for performance-based and random feedback. The grey area shows the time window used for quantifying the P3b. **B.** LMM predicted P3b amplitudes are plotted for performance-based and random feedback as a function of efficacy estimates. The topography shows the interaction of efficacy estimate with efficacy feedback in the P3b time window. **C.** Predicted (centered) effects of unsigned prediction errors (left) and model-based learning rates (right) on the P3b. Shaded error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Topographies display fixed-effects estimates.

465

466   In addition to tracking efficacy PEs, the second key prediction for the P3b if it indexes

467   efficacy learning, is that it should track the extent to which PEs are used to update estimates of

468   efficacy (i.e., the learning rate). In the current study, we found that participants differed in their

469   learning rates for the two forms of efficacy feedback (Performance-Based vs. Random),

470   providing us with a unique opportunity to perform a within-subject test of whether P3b tracked

471   differences in learning rate across these two conditions. Specifically, we could test whether a

472   given subject's P3b was greater in the feedback condition for which they demonstrated a higher

473   learning rate. However, we have not found conclusive evidence for the increase in P3b for the

474   within-subject feedback condition with the higher learning rate ($b = 2.00$; 95% CrI [-2.21, 6.04];

475    $p_{b<0} = 0.17$; BF = 1.08; Figure 3C-right). While, theoretically, prediction error and learning rate

476   would interact in predicting the P3b amplitude, we did not observe such an interaction here. This

477   finding is in line with previous work on reward processing (Fischer and Ullsperger 2013), which

478   has found additive effects of prediction errors and learning rate on P3b. While we found the

479   effect of prediction errors, our learning rate effect was going in the expected direction, but was

480   not conclusive.

481   ***The CNV indexes control allocation based on updated expectations of efficacy***

482   Thus far, our findings suggest that participants dynamically updated expectations of their

483   performance efficacy based on feedback, and that the P3b played a role in prediction error-based

484   updating of these expectations. Next, we tested the prediction that learned efficacy estimates

485   determine the expected benefits of control, and thus influence how much control is allocated

486   (Shenhav et al. 2013). We have previously shown that people exert more control when expecting

487   their performance to be more rather than less efficacious on the upcoming trial (Frömer et al.,

488   2021a). This was reflected in better behavioral performance and higher amplitudes of the

489   contingent negative variation (CNV; Figure 4B-left) - a slow negative fronto-central waveform

490   preceding target onset, which is increasingly negative as the amount of control allocated in

491   preparation for the task increases (Grent-'t-Jong and Woldorff 2007; Schevernels et al. 2014a).

492   Here we used the same marker of control, but, unlike in our previous study, efficacy expectations

493   were (a) learned rather than explicitly instructed; (b) varied over time rather than having a fixed

494   association with a cue; and (c) varied continuously across the range of efficacy probabilities

495   rather than alternating between maximal and minimal efficacy. We were therefore interested in

496   testing whether these dynamically varying expectations of efficacy, as estimated by our model,

497   would still exert the same influence on behavior and neural activity.

498   Consistent with our predictions and our previous findings, participants tended to perform

499   better when they expected performance to be more efficacious, responding faster on correct trials

500   with increasing model-based estimates of efficacy (Figure 4A; Figure S6A; Table S3). This

501   finding replicates the performance effects we observed using instructed cues, albeit with only

502   modest evidence (b = -16.00; 95% CrI [-34.91, 2.96]; $p_{b>0}$ = 0.05; BF_{01} = 1.68). Like in our

503   previous studies, faster responding was not explained by a change in speed-accuracy trade-off, as

504   accuracy did not decrease with increasing efficacy (b = 0.12; 95% CrI [-0.20, 0.44]; $p_{b>0}$ = 0.23;

505   BF_{01} = 1.99; Figure S6A). These analyses controlled for the standard behavioral effects related to

506   Stroop congruency (i.e., slower and less accurate responding for incongruent relative to

507   congruent trials; Figure S7), as well as for the reward rate estimates.

508   If the CNV provides an index of control allocation based on current incentive

509   expectations, it should both reflect one's latest efficacy estimate and should predict performance

510   on the upcoming trial. Our findings support both predictions. Regressing single-trial CNV

511   amplitude onto model-based efficacy estimates, and controlling for expectations of reward

512   (discussed below), we found that the CNV amplitudes had a positive relationship[2] with the

513   current efficacy expectations (b = -0.35; 95% CrI [-0.85, 0.16]; $p_{b>0}$ = 0.09; BF_{10} = 2.73; Figure

514   4B-right; Figure S5B; Table S4). However, this effect was weaker than in the previous

515   experiment with cued efficacy levels, which is to be expected given that in this experiment

516   participants had to learn their efficacy levels. As with the behavioral finding above, this result

517   provides evidence consistent with our previous CNV finding using instructed cues. We further

518   replicate our earlier finding (Frömer et al., 2021a) that larger CNV amplitude in turn predicted

519   better performance on the upcoming trial, with participants responding faster (b = 11.41; 95%

520   CrI [8.09, 14.72]; $p_{b<0}$ = 0; BF_{10} > 100; Figure 4C; Table S5) and more accurately (b = -0.07;

521   95% CrI [-0.12, -0.01]; $p_{b>0}$ = 0.01; BF_{10} = 3.14; Figure 4D; Table S5) as CNV increased.

---

[2] Note that the CNV is a negative component, thus higher CNV amplitudes (i.e., more control allocation) are more negative.

Figure 4. Efficacy estimates influence allocation of control and behavior in Study 1. A. Higher efficacy predicts faster accurate responses. **B. CNV increases with higher efficacy.** Left: Grand-average ERP for high and low efficacy estimates (median split used for plotting). The shaded area marks the time window used for CNV quantification. Time 0 corresponds to the onset of the neutral cue. Right: Predicted CNV amplitudes as a function of efficacy estimates. The topography shows the fixed effect of the efficacy estimate from the fitted linear model. **C. -D. Larger CNV amplitude predicts better performance.** Predicted accurate RT (**C.**) and accuracy (**D.**) as a function of efficacy estimates. Shaded error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Parallel learning of efficacy and reward rate

We held the amount of reward at stake constant over the course of the experiment, but the frequency of reward (reward rate) varied over the course of the session based on a participant's recent performance, and participants were sporadically probed for estimates of their reward rate (interleaved with trials that were followed by efficacy probes). Our efficacy manipulation explicitly controlled for this variability by yoking Random-Outcome feedback to a participant's recent reward rate (see methods for details). However, this additional source of variability also provided an opportunity to examine additional mechanisms of learning and adaptation in our task. As in the case of efficacy estimates, reward rate estimates were robustly predicted by reward feedback on previous trials (Table S1; Figure S8A), and this reward rate learning process was well captured by a two learning rate reward rate model (Garrett and Daw 2020; S8B-C), with the model-based estimates successfully predicting the reported subjective estimates ($b = 0.82$; 95% CrI[0.60, 1.02]; $p_{b<0} < 0.001$; $BF_{01} > 100$; $R^2=0.58$; Figure S8B-C). Updates to these reward rate estimates were reflected in P3b modulations of (unsigned) reward prediction errors and associated learning rates (Fischer and Ullsperger 2013; Figure S9; Table S6). This pattern of results provides additional evidence that efficacy learning involves similar neural and computational mechanisms as reward-based learning.

Study 2

Learned efficacy modulates control over information processing

Our findings suggest that people rely on domain-general mechanisms to learn about their performance efficacy in a given environment, and use these learned estimates of efficacy to optimize performance on their task. Specifically, in Study 1 we found that higher levels of learned efficacy are associated with faster responses, albeit with modest evidence ($b = -16.00$;

546   95% CrI [-34.91, 2.96]; $p_{b>0} = 0.05$; $BF_{01} = 1.68$). We also found that this speeding occurred on

547   correct but not incorrect trials, suggesting that these performance adjustments reflected

548   attentional control rather than adjustments to speed-accuracy tradeoffs. However, these findings

549   remain only suggestive in the absence of a formal model, and the presence of a stringent

550   response deadline in this study (individually calibrated for each subject during the practice phase

551   to ensure the reward rate of 80%; M = 796ms; SD = 73ms) presented an obstacle to fitting our

552   behavioral data to such a model without additional assumptions (e.g., regarding the form of a

553   collapsing threshold).

554   To provide further support for our proposal that learned efficacy influences control over

555   information processing, we ran an additional behavioral study (Study 2). Participants in this

556   study (N = 51) performed a web-based version of the task in Study 1, with the biggest

557   modification being that the Stroop trials (now using picture-word rather than color-word

558   interference) were performed over the course of short self-paced time intervals rather than trial

559   by trial as in Study 1. Specifically, participants were given limited time windows (2-4s) to

560   complete as many Stroop trials as they wanted to and were rewarded at the end of each interval

561   (cf. Leng et al., 2021). When rewards were performance-based, participants received a number of

562   points exactly proportional to the number of correct responses they gave during that window.

563   When rewards were random, the number of points was unrelated to performance on that interval

564   but (as in Study 1) was yoked to their performance in previous performance-contingent intervals.

565   Following our approach in Study 1, we varied the likelihood of a given interval being

566   performance-based or random over the course of the session (Figure S2A), and sporadically

567   probed participants for their subjective estimates of expected efficacy and reward rate. While in

568   most respects very similar to the paradigm in Study 1, one noteworthy feature of this self-paced

569   design is that it resulted in a much less stringent deadline for responding, thus producing reaction

570   time patterns more typical of free-response paradigms for which the traditional (fixed-threshold)

571   DDM was designed. Note that because this was an online sample we also employed additional

572   cutoff criteria to exclude inattentive participants, as detailed in the Methods section and Figures

573   S2B-C and S3.

574   Replicating the learning patterns observed in Study 1, subjective estimates of efficacy in

575   Study 2 reflected a running average over recent efficacy feedback ($b = 0.18$; 95% CrI [0.16,

576   0.20]; $p_{b<0} = 0$; $BF_{10} > 100$). This effect was again weighted towards the most recent feedback

577   but still present up to five intervals back (all $p_{b<0} < 0.01$; Figure 5A, Figure S10, and Table S7).

578   As in Study 1, this learning pattern was best captured by an RL algorithm with two learning rates

579   (Figure 5B), though positive and negative efficacy learning rates did not significantly differ from

580   one another on average ($b = 0.03$; 95% CrI [-0.03, 0.08]; $p_{b<0} = 0.260$; $BF_{01}=11.74$; Figure 5C).

581   As in Study 1, the model-based efficacy estimates successfully predicted the raw subjective

582   estimates on intervals on which participants reported their efficacy beliefs ($b = 0.86$; 95% CrI

583   [0.81, 0.90]; $p_{b<0} < 0.001$; $BF_{01} > 100$; $R^2 = 0.60$), and the same was true for the model-based

584   reward estimates predicting the subjective reward estimates ($b = 1.00$; 95% CrI[0.95, 1.04]; $p_{b<0}$

585   < 0.001; $BF_{01} > 100$; $R^2=0.66$).

586   Critically, we once again found that higher model-based estimates of efficacy predicted

587   better performance on the upcoming interval. Participants responded faster ($b = -10.25$; 95% CrI

588   [-19.86, -0.20]; $p_{b>0} = 0.02$; $BF_{01} = 2.33$) and more accurately ($b = 0.23$; 95% CrI [0.03, 0.43];

589    $p_{b>0} = 0.01$; $BF_{01} > 100$) with increasing model-based efficacy estimates (Figure 6B, Figure

590   S6B, and Table S8). To formally test whether these behavioral patterns reflected adjustments in

591   information processing (i.e., the rate of evidence accumulation once the stimuli appeared) or

592   instead reflected adjustments in speed-accuracy tradeoffs (i.e., the threshold for responding), we

593   fit these data with the hierarchical drift diffusion model (HDDM; Wiecki, Sofer, & Frank, 2013).

594   We tested whether model-based efficacy estimates predicted trial-by-changes in drift rate,

595   threshold, or both, while controlling for influences of expected reward rate on those same DDM

596   parameters. We found that higher levels of expected efficacy were associated with higher drift

597   rates ($b = 0.07$; 95% CrI [0.14, 0.43]; $p_{b < 0} = 0.00$) but were uncorrelated with threshold levels (b

598    $= -0.00$; 95% CrI [-0.04, 0.04]; $p_{b < 0} = 0.74$). Expected reward rate was not correlated with either

599   drift rate or threshold (Table S9). These results suggest that participants responded to changes in

600   performance efficacy by adjusting their attention to the task, rather than simply adjusting their

601   response threshold (i.e., becoming more or less impulsive).

602

603

Figure 5. Efficacy is learned in the same way in a modified task and influences a behavioral marker of control allocation. A. Regression weights for the influence of previous feedback type (efficacy and reward) on the subjective efficacy estimate. Error bars represent 50% and 95% highest density intervals. **B. Two learning rate model captures efficacy learning best.** Differences in BICs between the two learning rate model, and the intercept-only and one learning rate models. **C. Efficacy learning rates.** Positive and negative efficacy learning rates for each participant. **D. Higher model-based efficacy estimates predict better behavioral performance.** Higher efficacy estimates reduce reaction times (left) and improve accuracy (right). **E. Higher model-based efficacy estimates predict increased allocation of attention.** Parameter estimates from the drift diffusion model. Higher efficacy estimates increase drift rates, but not response caution (thresholds).

Discussion

604

605   To evaluate the expected benefits of investing cognitive control into a task, people need

606   to consider whether this control is necessary and/or sufficient for achieving their desired

607   outcome (i.e., whether these efforts are worthwhile). A critical determinant of the

608   worthwhileness of control is performance efficacy, the extent to which performance on a control-

609   demanding task matters for outcome attainment versus those outcomes being determined by

610   performance-unrelated factors. However, the mechanisms through which people estimate the

611   efficacy of their performance based on previous experience are largely unknown. Here, we

612   identified the computational and neural mechanism through which efficacy is learned and used to

613   guide the allocation of cognitive control. Across two experiments, we found that participants

614   dynamically updated expectations of the efficacy of their task performance (i.e., the likelihood

615   that this performance will determine reward attainment), and used those expectations to adjust

616   how much control they allocated. The feedback-based updating of efficacy was well-captured by

617   a prediction error-based learning algorithm. Model-based estimates of efficacy and efficacy

618   prediction errors were encoded by canonical neural signatures of effort allocation and belief

619   updating, respectively. Importantly, these findings cannot be explained by variability in reward,

620   as reward rate was held constant across efficacy levels, and the subjective reward rate was

621   controlled for statistically. Further, our model-based analysis revealed that people allocated more

622   control when they learned that they had more efficacy, extending our previous findings on

623   instructed efficacy (Frömer et al., 2021a). Taken together, our results uncover the mechanism

624   through which efficacy estimates are learned and used to inform mental effort investment within

625   a given task environment.

626   Previous research has characterized the learning algorithms people use to learn the reward

627   value of different states and actions in their environment (Gläscher et al. 2010; Sutton and Barto

628   2018). Recent theoretical (Jiang et al. 2014; Lieder et al. 2018; Verbeke and Verguts 2019) and

629   empirical (Bejjani et al. 2018; Otto and Daw 2019; Jiang et al. 2020; Bustamante et al. 2021 Jan

630   6) work has extended this research to show how similar algorithms guide learning and adaptation

631   of cognitive control under varying rewards and task demands within a given task environment.

632   Our findings extend this work further in several ways. First, we show that people leverage

633   weighted prediction errors when learning about the efficacy of task performance, independently

634   of potential reward and task difficulty. Second, we show that they update their efficacy

635   expectations differently depending on whether performance was more efficacious or less

636   efficacious than they expected, demonstrating a striking parallel with dual learning rate models

637   that have been found to prevail in research on reward learning (Collins and Frank 2013; Lefebvre

638   et al. 2017; Garrett and Daw 2020), including in our own reward rate data. Third, we show that

639   participants dynamically adjust their control allocation based on learned efficacy, just as they do

640   for learned rewards and task demands (Bugg et al. 2011; Jiang et al. 2014; Lieder et al. 2018).

641   Our neural findings build further on past research on learning and control adaptation. The

642   P3b component has been shown to track prediction-error based learning from action-relevant

643   outcome values (Fischer and Ullsperger 2013; Nassar et al. 2019; Lohse et al. 2020). Here we

644   show that this neural marker tracks learning about efficacy in the same way as it tracks learning

645   about rewards. We found increased P3b amplitudes when people experienced feedback about

646   outcome contingencies that was less expected given their current estimate of efficacy (e.g.,

647   expecting low efficacy, but getting performance-contingent feedback), relative to when these

648   contingencies were more expected (e.g., expecting low efficacy and getting random feedback).

649   Our additional finding that P3b amplitude was overall larger for efficacy compared to no efficacy

650   feedback demonstrates that our participants were not just tracking the frequency of the two types

651   of feedback, as predicted by an oddball account. Instead this finding suggests that they were

652   actively learning from the feedback.

653   Extending previous findings on cueing efficacy and/or reward (Schevernels et al. 2014b;

654   Frömer et al. 2021a), our CNV and behavioral results further show that participants used these

655   learned efficacy estimates to calibrate their effort and their performance. Notably, unlike in

656   previous work, our study shows effort-related changes in CNV amplitude entirely divorced from

657   perceptual cues, providing evidence that this activity truly reflects adjustments in control, rather

658   than reactive processing of features associated with the cue. Taken together, our findings suggest

659   that similar neural mechanisms underlie learning and control adaptation in response to variability

660   in one's efficacy in a task environment, as they do in response to variability in expected rewards

661   (Leng et al., 2021; Otto & Daw, 2019). By fitting behavioral data from this task to a drift

662   diffusion model (Study 2), we were able to further demonstrate that participants were adapting to

663   changes in expected efficacy by enhancing the processing of stimuli (i.e., increasing their rate of

664   evidence accumulation) - potentially via attentional control mechanisms – rather than by

665   adjusting their threshold for responding. This particular pattern of control adjustments was

666   predicted for the current task because performance-contingent rewards depended on responses

667   being *both* fast and accurate (as in Frömer et al., 2021a), but future work should test the

668   prediction that different control adjustments should emerge under different performance

669   contingencies (cf. Leng et al., 2021; Ritz et al., 2021).

670   Our findings build on previous research on how people learn about controllability of their

671   environment. Studies have examined the neural and computational mechanisms by which

672   humans and other animals learn about the contingencies between an action and its associated

673   outcome, and demonstrated that these learned action-outcomes contingencies influence which

674   actions are selected and how vigorously they are enacted (Dickinson and Balleine 1995;

675   Liljeholm et al. 2011; Manohar et al. 2017; Moscarello and Hartley 2017; Ly et al. 2019). Our

676   work extends this research into the domain of cognitive control, where the contingencies

677   between actions (i.e., control adjustments) and outcomes (e.g., reward) depend both on whether

678   control adjustments predicts better performance and whether better performance predicts better

679   outcomes (Shenhav et al., 2021). Learning control-outcome contingencies therefore requires

680   learning about how control states map onto performance (control efficacy) as well as how

681   performance maps onto outcomes (performance efficacy). By describing the mechanisms by

682   which people solve the latter part of this learning problem, and demonstrating that these are

683   comparable to those engaged during action-outcome learning, our study lays critical groundwork

684   for better understanding the links between selection of actions and control states.

685   Our efficacy-updating results are a reminder that many aspects of feedback are reflected in

686   prediction error signals (Langdon et al. 2018; Frömer et al. 2021b). In the present study, we

687   intentionally separated feedback about reward and efficacy to isolate the cognitive and neural

688   learning mechanisms associated with each. In doing so, we have taken an important first step

689   towards understanding the updating mechanisms underlying each. Further work is needed to

690   understand how they are inferred in more naturalistic settings, in which different forms of

691   feedback are often multiplexed, containing information about the values of actions that were

692   taken as well as about the features and structure of the environment (cf. Dorfman et al., 2019;

693   2021).

694   Another distinct element of more complex naturalistic environments is that the same

695   feedback can be used to evaluate multiple targets, internal ones, such as the selected response

696   and its predicted outcome, or external ones, such as the source of feedback/environment

697   (Carlebach and Yeung 2020). Such multi-level prediction error signals might for instance

698   explain, why despite close links between P3b and behavioral adaptation (Yeung and Sanfey

699   2004; Chase et al. 2011; Fischer and Ullsperger 2013), this link is context dependent and

700   attempts to link the P3b uniquely to behavioral updating have failed (Nassar et al., 2019).

701   Reinforcement learning, and predictive inference more generally, have been proposed to not only

702   support the selection of individual actions, but also extended sequences of actions and control

703   signals (Holroyd and Yeung 2012; Lieder et al. 2018). Alongside evaluations of actions and

704   environmental states, neural signatures of feedback-based learning could thus further reflect

705   evaluations of control signals, their quality or intensity. Given the many potential causes a given

706   outcome can have, and the flexibility that people have in how they use the feedback, it is easy to

707   see how feedback could be misattributed and lead to inaccurate beliefs about performance

708   efficacy. Such beliefs about environmental statistics can drive changes in feedback-processing

709   and behavioral adaptation, above and beyond the true statistics (Schiffer et al. 2017), and are thus

710   of particular importance for understanding some of the cognitive symptoms of mental disorders.

711   Understanding how efficacy estimates develop based on previous experiences is crucial for

712   understanding why people differ in how much cognitive control they allocate in different

713   situations (Shenhav et al.). People differ in their beliefs about how much control they have over

714   their environments (Leotti et al. 2010; Moscarello and Hartley 2017), and in their ability to

715   estimate their efficacy (Cohen et al. 2020). Further, many mental disorders, including depression

716   and schizophrenia, have been linked with one's estimates of their ability to control potential

717   outcomes in their environment, including through allocation of control (Huys and Dayan 2009;

718   Maier and Seligman 2016), and we have recently proposed that such changes can drive

719   impairments of motivation and control in those populations (Grahek et al. 2019). As we show in

720   this study, when people have learned to expect low efficacy, they will allocate less cognitive

721   control, which can manifest as apparent control deficits. The experimental and modeling

722   approach taken in our study helps uncover a more fine-grained view of how components of

723   motivation are learned and used to support the allocation of cognitive resources. In this way, our

724   study takes a first step toward a better computational and neural account of efficacy learning,

725   which can aid the understanding of individual differences in the willingness to exert mental

726   effort, as well as the development of interventions aimed at teaching individuals when these

727   efforts truly matter.

728

729

730   **Supplementary materials**

Figure S1. Parameter recovery study for the two learning rate models for the efficacy and reward learning. We simulated 200 subjects with the range of learning rates matched to the empirically observed range. The noise and the intercept parameters were fixed to match the empirically observed mean value. The number of trials and subjective estimates, as well as the sequence of efficacy and reward feedbacks were based on Experiment 1. **A. Learning rates for efficacy.** Simulated and recovered learning rates were highly correlated both in the case of positive ($r = 0.93$, $p<0.001$) and negative learning rates ($r = 0.94$, p<0.001). **B. Learning rates for reward.** Simulated and recovered learning rates were highly correlated both in the case of positive ($r = 0.88$, $p<0.001$) and negative learning rates ($r = 0.96$, $p<0.001$).

731

732

Figure S2. Efficacy drifts and the unsupervised clustering of the efficacy learning rates in Study 2. A. Efficacy drifts used in Study 2. The probability drifts of contingent feedback presented to the first (top) and second (bottom) half of the participants. **B. The results of the winning Gaussian mixture model for clustering of the efficacy learning rates.** One of the clusters (blue dots) included only the subjects with extremely small learning rates (all learning rates < 0.03; N=20; group 1 – blue dots). These subjects were excluded from the further analyses with the assumption that they did not pay attention to the feedbacks or that they were giving random answers to the probes. **C. Histograms of the positive and negative learning rates and their clusters.** For both then negative (left) and positive (right) learning rates cluster 1 included only the participants with very low learning rates.

Figure S3. Self-reported and model-based efficacy estimates for subjects excluded from Study 2 based on very low learning rates. Subjective efficacy estimates (grey) and model-based efficacy estimates for each of the 19 subjects identified to form a cluster due to very low learning rates (both learning rates < 0.03) based on the unsupervised clustering algorithm using Gaussian mixture models. These subjects had low variance in their self-reported efficacy estimates, or did not appear to update their efficacy estimates based on feedbacks, suggesting that they were not paying attention to the feedbacks, or always providing very similar efficacy estimates.

Table S1

Study 1 regression weights for the models predicting subjective efficacy and reward rate estimates based on efficacy and reward feedback 5 trials back.

| Parameter	Estimate	95% Credible interval	Posterior probability (p<0)	BF_{10}
Subjective efficacy				
Intercept	0.52	0.49, 0.55	0.00	
T1 Performance-Based - Random	0.14	0.12, 0.16	0.00	>100
T2 Performance-Based - Random	0.12	0.10, 0.14	0.00	>100
T3 Performance-Based - Random	0.08	0.05, 0.10	0.00	>100
T4 Performance-Based - Random	0.03	0.01, 0.05	0.00	2.20
T5 Performance-Based - Random	0.03	0.01, 0.05	0.00	1.72
T1 Reward - No Reward	0.02	0.00, 0.04	0.02	0.37
T2 Reward - No Reward	0.03	0.01, 0.05	0.00	4.23
T3 Reward - No Reward	0.03	0.01, 0.05	0.01	0.95
T4 Reward - No Reward	0.02	0.00, 0.04	0.02	0.39
T5 Reward - No Reward	0.00	-0.02, 0.02	0.46	0.05
Subjective reward rate				
Intercept	0.50	0.46, 0.54	0.00	
T1 Reward - No Reward	0.19	0.17, 0.21	0.00	>100
T2 Reward - No Reward	0.16	0.14, 0.18	0.00	>100
T3 Reward - No Reward	0.09	0.07, 0.11	0.00	>100
T4 Reward - No Reward	0.05	0.03, 0.06	0.00	30.86
T5 Reward - No Reward	0.05	0.03, 0.07	0.00	>100
T1 Performance-Based - Random	-0.01	-0.03, 0.01	0.73	0.06
T2 Performance-Based - Random	0.00	-0.01, 0.02	0.33	0.05
T3 Performance-Based - Random	0.01	-0.01, 0.03	0.00	0.05
T4 Performance-Based - Random	0.02	-0.01, 0.03	0.20	0.08
T5 Performance-Based - Random	0.02	0.00, 0.03	0.04	0.20

734

Figure S4. Efficacy learning in Study 1 – the effect of different feedback probability drifts on learning. **A.** The probability drift of contingent feedback presented to the first half of subjects. **B.** Learning rates for contingent and random feedback for the first half of subjects. Learning rates for the contingent and random feedback did not differ ($b = 0.01$; 95% CrI [-0.06, 0.08]; $p_{b<0} = 0.38$; $BF_{10} = 0.09$). **C.** The inversed probability drift of contingent feedback presented to the second half of participants. **D.** Learning rates for contingent and random feedback did not differ ($b = 0.02$; 95% CrI [-0.06, 0.11]; $p_{b<0} = 0.31$; $BF_{10} = 0.10$).

735

736

Figure S5. The influence of efficacy estimates on efficacy feedback processing and proactive cognitive control allocation. A. Means for the P3b amplitude in response to performance-based and random feedbacks across each quartile of the model-based efficacy estimates calculated for each subject. The P3b amplitude in response to performance-based feedback is higher when efficacy estimates are lower, suggesting more updating based on feedback. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. **B.** Means for the CNV amplitude pre target onset across quartiles of the model-based efficacy estimates calculated for each subject. The CNV amplitude is more negative (more proactive control allocation) when efficacy estimates are higher. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.

737

Figure S6. The influence of efficacy estimates on behavioral performance. A. Means for the reaction times (left) and accuracy (right) across quartiles of model-based efficacy estimates in Experiment 1. Reaction times are faster when efficacy estimates are higher, while there is no consistent pattern in accuracy data. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. **B.** Means for the reaction times (left) and accuracy (right) across quartiles of model-based efficacy estimates in Experiment 2. Participants are faster to respond and more accurate when efficacy estimates are high relative to low. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.

738

Figure S7. Behavioral effects of congruency in Study 1 and Study 2. A. In comparison to the neutral trials in Study 1, participants were faster to respond to congruent ($b = 9.95$; 95% CrI [3.33, 16.59]; $p_{b<0} = 0.00$; BF = 1.60) and slower to respond to incongruent trials ($b = 61.24$; 95% CrI [49.50, 72.59]; $p_{b<0} = 0.00$; BF = 6.73). **B.** In comparison to the neutral trials in Study 1, participants were equally likely to be correct when responding to congruent ($b = -0.11$; 95% CrI [-0.29, 0.06]; $p_{b>0} = 0.091$; BF = 0.01) and less likely to be correct when responding to incongruent trials ($b = -0.48$; 95% CrI [-0.64, -0.33]; $p_{b>0} = 0.00$; BF > 8.22). The regression weights for the accuracy analysis are in log odds. **C.** In Study 2 participants were slower to respond to incongruent relative to congruent trials ($b = 47.48$; 95% CrI [40.69, 52.22]; $p_{b<0} = 0.001$; BF = 50). **D.** In Study 2 participants were less accurate when responding to incongruent compared to congruent trials ($b = -0.48$; 95% CrI [-0.57, -0.39]; $p_{b<0} = 1$; BF > 100).

739

Table S2

Study 1 regression weights for the models predicting the P3b to efficacy feedback.

Parameter	Estimate	95% Credible interval	Posterior probability (p<0)	BF$_{10}$
Efficacy feedback				
Intercept	1.38	0.67, 2.09	0.00	
Model-based efficacy	-0.29	-1.56, 0.97	0.68	0.23
Efficacy feedback type (PB-R)	0.86	0.42, 1.31	0.00	30.86
Model-based reward rate	-0.19	-1.50, 1.18	0.62	0.23
Model-based efficacy × Efficacy feedback type	-2.40	-4.07, -0.74	1.00	24.40
Model-based efficacy slope for Performance-Based feedback	-1.49	-2.72, -0.27	0.97	1.52
Model-based efficacy slope for Random feedback	0.91	-0.34, 2.21	0.12	0.44
Predictions errors and learning rates				
Intercept	1.31	0.51, 2.09	0.00	
Unsigned prediction error	1.25	0.35, 2.15	0.01	5.84
Learning rate	2.00	-2.21, 6.04	0.17	1.08
Model-based reward rate	-0.09	-1.48, 1.34	0.55	0.23
Unsigned prediction error ×Learning rate	0.57	-4.87, 6.14	0.41	0.91

740

Table S3

Study 1 regression weights for the models predicting reaction times and accuracy based on efficacy and reward rate estimates.

Parameter	Estimate	95% Credible interval	Posterior probability $(p<0)$	BF_{01}
Reaction times				
Intercept	655.37	635.09, 675.51	0.00	
Facilitation	9.95	3.33, 16.59	0.00	1.60
Interference	61.24	49.50, 72.59	0.00	6.73
Model-based efficacy	-16.00	-34.91, 2.96	0.95	1.68
Model-based reward rate	-1.56	-27.66, 24.04	0.54	1.36
Accuracy				
Intercept	1.56	1.33, 1.80	0.00	
Facilitation	-0.11	-0.29, 0.06	0.91	0.01
Interference	-0.48	-0.64, -0.33	1.00	8.22
Model-based efficacy	0.12	-0.20, 0.44	0.23	1.99
Model-based reward rate	-0.36	-0.73, 0.03	0.97	0.29

741

742

743

Table S4

Study 1 regression weights for the models predicting the CNV based on efficacy and reward rate.

Parameter	Estimate	95% Credible interval	Posterior probability $(p<0)$	BF_{01}
CNV				
Intercept	-0.37	-0.58, -0.16	0.00	
Model-based efficacy	-0.35	-0.85, 0.16	0.09	2.73
Model-based reward rate	-0.09	-0.72, 0.55	0.38	2.19

Table S5   744

Study 1 regression weights for the models predicting reaction times and accuracy 745
based on the CNV.

Parameter	Estimate	95% Credible interval	Posterior probability $(p<0)$	BF_{10}
Reaction times				
Intercept	655.28	635.44, 675.91	0.00	
CNV amplitude	11.41	8.09, 14.72	0.00	>100
Accuracy				
Intercept	1.33	1.11, 1.53	0.00	
CNV amplitude	-0.07	-0.12, -0.01	0.99	3.14

746

Figure S8. Reward rate learning – model-based analyses for Study 1. A. Regression weights for the influence of the current (t) and previous feedbacks on the subjective estimates of reward rate (left) and efficacy (right). Reward rate estimates are strongly predicted by the previous reward feedbacks, but not efficacy feedbacks. The reverse is true for the subjective efficacy estimates. Error bars represent 50% and 95% highest density intervals. **B.** Model comparison between the fitted learning models for the reward rate learning model. **C.** Positive and negative learning rate estimates for all subjects for the reward rate learning model. Negative learning rates were numerically, but not statistically larger than positive ones ($b = 0.01$; 95% CrI [-0.07, 0.09]; $p_{b < 0} = 0.38$; $BF_{10} = 0.09$)

747 **ERP analyses of the reward rate feedback in Study 1**

748   To investigate the effect of the model-based reward rate estimates on the processing of

749 reward, we performed complementary analyses on the P3b related to the processing of the

750 reward feedback (Figure S9A). We expected that a similar learning mechanism should operate

751 on both reward and efficacy feedback, but that the neural markers of feedback processing should

752 be sensitive to different model-based estimates. Thus, we expected the reward-locked P3b to be

753 sensitive to reward-rate estimates, but not to efficacy estimates.

754   Our results showed larger P3b amplitudes to no reward compared to reward feedback

755 (note that reward rate was approximately .80 and negative feedback less expected overall), and

756 the processing of the reward feedback was influenced by reward-rate estimates, although to

757 lesser extent than for the P3b (Figure S9B; Table S6). Probing the effects of learning directly, we

758 found robust effects of the prediction errors and learning rates (Figure S9C). The P3b to reward

759 feedback was not influenced by the model-based efficacy estimates in either of these analyses.

760

Figure S9. Learning reward rate estimate from reward feedback in Study 1. A. ERP average for the P3b locked to the onset of reward feedback. **B.** Interaction between reward feedback and the model-based reward rate estimate. **C.** The effects of unsigned prediction errors (left) and learning rates (right) on the P3b.

761

Table S6

Study 1 regression weights for the models predicting the P3b to reward feedback.

| Parameter	Estimate	95% Credible interval	Posterior probability (p<0)	BF$_{10}$
Efficacy feedback				
Intercept	0.93	0.08, 1.74	0.02	
Model-based efficacy	0.45	-0.45, 1.32	0.16	0.15
Reward feedback type (R-NR)	-0.35	-0.90, 0.18	0.90	0.12
Model-based reward rate	-0.15	-1.55, 1.23	0.59	0.14
Model-based reward ×Reward feedback type	-1.26	-3.73, 1.19	0.85	0.41
Model-based efficacy slope for No Reward feedback	0.48	-1.34, 2.34	0.87	0.23
Model-based efficacy slope for Reward feedback	-0.78	-1.96, 0.39	0.32	0.21
Predictions errors and learning rates				
Intercept	0.89	0.15, 1.64	0.01	
Unsigned prediction error	1.09	0.38, 1.81	0.00	4.82
Learning rate	6.68	-0.07, 12.99	0.03	4.72
Model-based efficacy	0.39	-0.47, 1.24	0.19	0.13
Unsigned prediction error ×Learning rate	0.94	-8.06, 9.71	0.42	0.92

762

763

764

Figure S10. Efficacy and reward learning – model-based analyses for Study 2. A. Regression weights for the influence of the current (t) and previous feedbacks on the subjective estimates of reward rate (left) and efficacy (right). Reward rate estimates are strongly influenced by the previous reward feedbacks, and the reverse is true for the subjective efficacy estimates. Error bars represent 50% and 95% highest density intervals. **B.** Model comparison between the fitted learning models for the reward learning model. **C.** Positive and negative learning rate estimates for all subjects for the reward learning model. Positive learning rates were numerically, but not statistically larger than negative ones ($b = 0.02$; 95% CrI [-0.01, 0.05]; $p_{b < 0} = 0.11$; $BF_{10} = 0.06$)

Table S7

Study 2 regression weights for the models predicting subjective efficacy and reward rate estimates based on efficacy and reward feedback 5 trials back.

Parameter	Estimate	95% Credible interval	Posterior probability (p<0)	BF_{10}
Subjective efficacy				
Intercept	0.43	0.37, 0.49	0.00	
T1 Performance-Based - Random	0.17	0.16, 0.19	0.00	>100
T2 Performance-Based - Random	0.15	0.13, 0.18	0.00	>100
T3 Performance-Based - Random	0.10	0.08, 0.12	0.00	>100
T4 Performance-Based - Random	0.06	0.04, 0.08	0.00	>100
T5 Performance-Based - Random	0.04	0.02, 0.06	0.00	>100
T1 Reward - No Reward	0.06	0.02, 0.10	0.00	5.42
T2 Reward - No Reward	0.06	0.01, 0.11	0.01	2.23
T3 Reward - No Reward	0.03	-0.02, 0.07	0.11	0.23
T4 Reward - No Reward	0.00	-0.05, 0.04	0.54	0.11
T5 Reward - No Reward	0.06	0.01, 0.10	0.01	1.69
Subjective reward rate				
Intercept	0.36	0.29, 0.43	0.00	
T1 Reward - No Reward	0.21	0.17, 0.25	0.00	>100
T2 Reward - No Reward	0.13	0.09, 0.17	0.00	>100
T3 Reward - No Reward	0.12	0.07, 0.16	0.00	>100
T4 Reward - No Reward	0.03	-0.01, 0.06	0.09	0.21
T5 Reward - No Reward	0.09	0.05, 0.13	0.00	>100
T1 Performance-Based - Random	0.05	0.03, 0.07	0.00	0.06
T2 Performance-Based - Random	0.05	0.03, 0.06	0.00	0.05
T3 Performance-Based - Random	0.00	-0.02, 0.02	0.51	0.05
T4 Performance-Based - Random	0.03	0.02, 0.05	0.00	0.08
T5 Performance-Based - Random	0.02	0.00, 0.03	0.03	0.20

Table S8

Study 2 regression weights for the models predicting reaction times and accuracy based on efficacy and reward rate estimates. Bayes Factors calculated only for the parameters with informative priors. Posteriors from Study 1 were used as priors for the effects of congruency, efficacy, and reward.

Parameter	Estimate	95% Credible interval	Posterior probability $(p<0)$	BF_{01}
Reaction times				
Intercept	643.02	625.42, 661.81	0.00	
Incongruent-Congruent	47.48	40.69, 55.22	0.00	0.02
Model-based efficacy	-10.25	-19.86, -0.20	0.98	2.33
Model-based reward	-0.17	-21.15, 20.34	0.51	1.24
Interval length	-1.76	-2.73, -0.83	1.00	
Interval congruency	-5.34	-6.69, -4.00	1.00	
Accuracy				
Intercept	2.35	2.16, 2.52	0.00	
Incongruent-Congruent	-0.48	-0.57, -0.39	1.00	>100
Model-based efficacy	0.23	0.03, 0.43	0.01	>100
Model-based reward	-0.29	-0.57, -0.01	0.98	1.07
Interval length	-0.13	-0.16, -0.10	1.00	
Interval congruency	0.04	0.00, 0.08	0.03	

765

Table S9
Drift Diffusion model estimates.

Parameter	Estimate	95% Credible interval	Posterior probability *(p<0)*
Drift rate			
Congruent-Incongruent	0.82	0.74, 0.92	0.00
Model-based efficacy	0.29	0.14, 0.40	0.00
Model-based reward	0.20	-0.39, 0.04	0.50
Threshold			
Model-based efficacy	-0.00	-0.04, 0.04	0.57
Model-based reward rate	-0.04	-0.14, 0.05	0.81

766

767

Acknowledgements

Data availability

Analysis scripts are available on this link: https://github.com/igrahek/LFXC_EEG_2022.git Please contact the authors for raw data.

784   **References**

785   Atkinson JW, Feather NT, Others. 1966. A theory of achievement motivation. Wiley New York.

786   Balleine, B. W., & O'doherty, J. P. 2010. Human and rodent homologies in action control:
787   corticostriatal determinants of goal-directed and habitual action. *Neuropsychopharmacology*,
788   *35*(1), 48-69.

789   Bejjani C, Zhang Z, Egner T. 2018. Control by association: Transfer of implicitly primed
790   attentional states across linked stimuli. Psychon Bull Rev. 25(2):617–626. doi:10.3758/s13423-
791   018-1445-6.

792   Botvinick MM, Cohen JD. 2014. The computational and neural basis of cognitive control:
793   Charted territory and new frontiers. Cogn Sci. 38(6):1249–1285. doi:10.1111/cogs.12126.

794   Brainard DH. 1997. The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spat Vis. 10(4):433–436.

795   Bugg JM, Jacoby LL, Chanani S. 2011. Why it is too early to lose control in accounts of item-
796   specific proportion congruency effects. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform. 37(3):844–859.
797   doi:10.1037/a0019957.

798   Bürkner P-C. 2016. brms: An R package for Bayesian multilevel models using Stan. J Stat
799   Softw. 80(1):1–28.

800   Bürkner P-C. 2017. Advanced Bayesian Multilevel Modeling with the R Package brms.
801   arXiv:170511123.

802   Bustamante L, Lieder F, Musslick S, Shenhav A, Cohen J. 2021 Jan 6. Learning to Overexert
803   Cognitive Control in a Stroop Task. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci. doi:10.3758/s13415-020-
804   00845-x.

805   Carlebach N, Yeung N. 2020. Flexible use of confidence to guide advice requests. PsyArXiv.

806   Carpenter B, Gelman A, Hoffman M, Lee D, Goodrich B, Betancourt M, Brubaker MA, Guo J,
807   Li P, Riddell A. 2016. Stan: A probabilistic programming language. J Stat Softw. 2(20):1–37.

808   Chambon V, Théro H, Vidal M, Vandendriessche H, Haggard P, Palminteri S. 2020. Information
809   about action outcomes differentially affects learning from self-determined versus imposed
810   choices. Nat Hum Behav. doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0919-5.

811   Chase HW, Swainson R, Durham L, Benham L, Cools R. 2011. Feedback-related negativity
812   codes prediction error but not behavioral adjustment during probabilistic reversal learning. J
813   Cogn Neurosci. 23(4):936–946. doi:10.1162/jocn.2010.21456.

814   Chiu, Y. C., & Egner, T. (2019). Cortical and subcortical contributions to context-control
815   learning. Neurosc & Biobeh Rev, 99: 33-41.

816   Cohen A, Nussenbaum K, Dorfman HM, Gershman SJ, Hartley CA. 2020. The rational use of
817   causal inference to guide reinforcement learning strengthens with age. Npj Sci Learn.

818   Collins AGE, Frank MJ. 2013. Cognitive control over learning: creating, clustering, and
819   generalizing task-set structure. Psychol Rev. 120(1):190–229. doi:10.1037/a0030852.

820   Collins AGE, Frank MJ. 2014. Opponent actor learning (OpAL): Modeling interactive effects of
821   striatal dopamine on reinforcement learning and choice incentive. Psychol Rev. 121(3):337–66.
822   doi:10.1037/a0037015.

823   Delorme A, Makeig S. 2004. EEGLAB: an open sorce toolbox for analysis of single-trail EEG
824   dynamics including independent component anlaysis. J Neurosci Methods. 134:9–21.
825   doi:10.1016/j.jneumeth.2003.10.009.

826   Dickinson A, Balleine B. 1995. Motivational Control of Instrumental Action. Curr Dir Psychol
827   Sci. 4(5):162–167. doi:10.1111/1467-8721.ep11512272.

828   Dorfman, H. M., Bhui, R., Hughes, B. L., & Gershman, S. J. 2019. Causal inference about good
829   and bad outcomes. Psychological science, 30(4): 516-525.

830   Dorfman, H. M., Tomov, M. S., Cheung, B., Clarke, D., Gershman, S. J., & Hughes, B. L.
831   (2021). Causal inference gates corticostriatal learning. Journal of Neuroscience, 41(32): 6892-
832   6904.

833   Eldar E, Hauser TU, Dayan P, Dolan RJ. 2016. Striatal structure and function predict individual
834   biases in learning to avoid pain. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 113(17):4812–4817.
835   doi:10.1073/pnas.1519829113.

836   Fischer AG, Ullsperger M. 2013. Real and fictive outcomes are processed differently but
837   converge on a common adaptive mechanism. Neuron. 79(6):1243–1255.
838   doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2013.07.006.

839   Frömer R, Lin H, Dean Wolf CK, Inzlicht M, Shenhav A. 2021a. Expectations of reward and
840   efficacy guide cognitive control allocation. Nat Commun. 12(1). doi:10.1038/s41467-021-21315-
841   z.

842   Frömer, R., Nassar, M. R., Bruckner, R., Stürmer, B., Sommer, W., & Yeung, N. 2021b.
843   Response-based outcome predictions and confidence regulate feedback processing and learning.
844   Elife, 10, e62825.

845   Frömer R, Maier M, Rahman RA. 2018. Group-level EEG-processing pipeline for flexible single
846   trial-based analyses including linear mixed models. Front Neurosci. 12(48).
847   doi:10.3389/fnins.2018.00048.

848   Frömer R, Stürmer B, Sommer W. 2016. (Don't) Mind the effort: Effects of contextual
849   interference on ERP indicators of motor preparation. Psychophysiology. 53(10):1577–1586.
850   doi:10.1111/psyp.12703.

851   Garrett N, Daw ND. 2020. Biased belief updating and suboptimal choice in foraging decisions.
852   Nat Commun. 11(1):1–12. doi:10.1038/s41467-020-16964-5.

853   Gelman A, Rubin DB. 1992. Inference from Iterative Simulation Using Multiple Sequences. Stat
854   Sci. 7(4):457–472. doi:10.1214/ss/1177011136.

855 Gläscher J, Daw N, Dayan P, O'Doherty JP. 2010. States versus rewards: Dissociable neural
856 prediction error signals underlying model-based and model-free reinforcement learning. Neuron.
857 66(4):585–595. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.04.016.

858 Grahek I, Shenhav A, Musslick S, Krebs RM, Koster EHW. 2019. Motivation and cognitive
859 control in depression. Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 102(March):371–381.
860 doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.04.011.

861 Grent-'t-Jong T, Woldorff MG. 2007. Timing and sequence of brain activity in top-down control
862 of visual-spatial attention. PLoS Biol. 5(1):0114–0126. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050012.

863 Holroyd CB, Yeung N. 2012. Motivation of extended behaviors by anterior cingulate cortex.
864 Trends Cogn Sci. 16(2):122–128. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.12.008.

865 Huys QJM, Dayan P. 2009. A Bayesian formulation of behavioral control. Cognition.
866 113(3):314–328. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.01.008.

867 Ille N, Berg P, Scherg M. 2002. Artifact Correction of the Ongoing EEG Using Spatial Filters
868 Based on Artifact and Brain Signal Topographies. J Clin Neurophysiol. 19(2):113–124.
869 doi:10.1097/00004691-200203000-00002.

870 Jiang J, Bramão I, Khazenzon A, Wang SF, Johansson M, Wagner AD. 2020. Temporal
871 Dynamics of Memory-guided Cognitive Control and Generalization of Control via Overlapping
872 Associative Memories. J Neurosci. 40(10):2343–2356. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1869-19.2020.

873 Jiang J, Heller K, Egner T. 2014. Bayesian modeling of flexible cognitive control. Neurosci
874 Biobehav Rev. 46(P1):30–43. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.06.001.

875 Kleiner M, Brainard D, Pelli D. 2007. What's new in Psychtoolbox-3. In: Perception 36 ECVP
876 Abstract Supplement.

877 Kool W, Botvinick M. 2018. Mental labour. Nat Hum Behav. doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0401-9.

878 Krebs, R. M., Boehler, C. N., Roberts, K. C., Song, A. W., & Woldorff, M. G. 2012. The
879 involvement of the dopaminergic midbrain and cortico-striatal-thalamic circuits in the integration
880 of reward prospect and attentional task demands. *Cereb cortex*, 22(3): 607-615.
881
882 Kruschke JK. 2013. Bayesian estimation supersedes the T test. J Exp Psychol Gen. 142(2):573–
883 588. doi:10.1037/a0029177.

884 Langdon AJ, Sharpe MJ, Schoenbaum G, Niv Y. 2018. Model-based predictions for dopamine.
885 Curr Opin Neurobiol. 49:1–7. doi:10.1016/j.conb.2017.10.006.

886 Lefebvre G, Lebreton M, Meyniel F, Bourgeois-Gironde S, Palminteri S. 2017. Behavioural and
887 neural characterization of optimistic reinforcement learning. Nat Hum Behav. 1(4):1–9.
888 doi:10.1038/s41562-017-0067.

889 Leng, X., Yee, D., Ritz, H., & Shenhav, A. 2021. Dissociable influences of reward and
890 punishment on adaptive cognitive control. PLoS computational biology, 17(12), e1009737.

891 Leotti LA, Iyengar SS, Ochsner KN. 2010. Born to choose: The origins and value of the need for
892 control. Trends Cogn Sci. 14(10):457–463. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2010.08.001.

893 Lieder F, Shenhav A, Musslick S, Griffiths TL. 2018. Rational metareasoning and the plasticity
894 of cognitive control. Plos Comput Biol. 14(4). doi:10.13140/RG.2.2.24500.14721.

895 Ligneul, R., Mainen, Z. F., Ly, V., & Cools, R. 2022. Stress-sensitive inference of task
896 controllability. *Nat Hum Beh*. 1-11.

897 Liljeholm M, Tricomi E, O'Doherty JP, Balleine BW. 2011. Neural Correlates of Instrumental
898 Contingency Learning: Differential Effects of Action-Reward Conjunction and Disjunction. J
899 Neurosci. 31(7):2474–2480. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3354-10.2011.

900 Lohse KR, Miller MW, Daou M, Valerius W, Jones M. 2020. Dissociating the contributions of
901 reward-prediction errors to trial-level adaptation and long-term learning. Biol Psychol.
902 149(January 2019). doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2019.107775.

903 Ly V, Wang KS, Bhanji J, Delgado MR. 2019. A Reward-Based Framework of Perceived
904 Control. Front Neurosci. 13(February):1–11. doi:10.3389/fnins.2019.00065.

905 Maier SF, Seligman MEP. 2016. Learned helplessness at fifty: Insights from neuroscience.
906 Psychol Rev. 123(4):1–19. doi:10.1037/rev0000033.

907 Manohar SG, Chong TTJ, Apps MAJ, Batla A, Stamelou M, Jarman PR, Bhatia KP, Husain M.
908 2015. Reward Pays the Cost of Noise Reduction in Motor and Cognitive Control. Curr Biol.
909 25(13):1707–1716. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2015.05.038.

910 Manohar SG, Finzi RD, Drew D, Husain M. 2017. Distinct Motivational Effects of Contingent
911 and Noncontingent Rewards. Psychol Sci. 28(7):1016–1026. doi:10.1177/0956797617693326.

912 Morris, R. W., Dezfouli, A., Griffiths, K. R., Le Pelley, M. E., & Balleine, B. W. 2022. The
913 neural bases of action-outcome learning in humans. *J Neuro*, 42(17), 3636-3647.

914 Moscarello JM, Hartley CA. 2017. Agency and the Calibration of Motivated Behavior. Trends
915 Cogn Sci. 21(10):725–735. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.06.008.

916 Nagase AM, Onoda K, Foo JC, Haji T, Akaishi R, Yamaguchi S, Sakai K, Morita K. 2018.
917 Neural mechanisms for adaptive learned avoidance of mental effort. J Neurosci. 38(10):2631–
918 2651. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1995-17.2018.

919 Nalborczyk L, Bürkner P-C. 2019. An Introduction to Bayesian Multilevel Models Using brms:
920 A Case Study of Gender Effects on Vowel Variability in Standard Indonesian. J Speech Lang
921 Hear Res.

922 Nassar MR, Bruckner R, Frank MJ. 2019. Statistical context dictates the relationship between
923 feedback-related EEG signals and learning. eLife. 8:1–26. doi:10.7554/eLife.46975.

924 Nigbur, R., Schneider, J., Sommer, W., Dimigen, O., & Stürmer, B. (2015). Ad-hoc and context-
925 dependent adjustments of selective attention in conflict control: An ERP study with visual
926 probes. NeuroImage, 107: 76-84.

927 Niv Y, Edlund JA, Dayan P, O'Doherty JP. 2012. Neural prediction errors reveal a risk-sensitive
928 reinforcement-learning process in the human brain. J Neurosci. 32(2):551–562.
929 doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5498-10.2012.

930 Norton, K. G., & Liljeholm, M. 2020. The Rostrolateral Prefrontal Cortex Mediates a Preference
931 for High-Agency Environments. J Neurosci, 40(22): 4401-4409.

932 Otto AR, Daw ND. 2019. The opportunity cost of time modulates cognitive effort.
933 Neuropsychologia. 123:92–105. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2018.05.006.

934 Parro, C., Dixon, M. L., & Christoff, K. 2018. The neural basis of motivational influences on
935 cognitive control. Human Brain Mapping, 39(12), 5097–5111

936 Pelli DD. 1997. The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics: transforming numbers
937 into movies. Spat Vis. 10(4):437–442.

938 R Core Team. 2017. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing.

939 Ritz, H., Leng, X., & Shenhav, A. (2022). Cognitive control as a multivariate optimization
940 problem. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 1-23.

941 Rutledge RB, Skandali N, Dayan P, Dolan RJ. 2014. A computational and neural model of
942 momentary subjective well-being. Proc Natl Acad Sci. 111(33):12252–12257.
943 doi:10.1073/pnas.1407535111.

944 Schevernels H, Krebs RM, Santens P, Woldorff MG, Boehler CN. 2014a. Task preparation
945 processes related to reward prediction precede those related to task-difficulty expectation.
946 NeuroImage. 84:639–647. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.09.039.

947 Schevernels H, Krebs RM, Santens P, Woldorff MG, Boehler CN. 2014b. Task preparation
948 processes related to reward prediction precede those related to task-difficulty expectation.
949 NeuroImage. 84:639–647. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.09.039.

950 Schiffer AM, Siletti K, Waszak F, Yeung N. 2017. Adaptive behaviour and feedback processing
951 integrate experience and instruction in reinforcement learning. NeuroImage. 146:626–641.
952 doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.08.057.

953 Shenhav A, Botvinick M, Cohen J. 2013. The expected value of control: An integrative theory of
954 anterior cingulate cortex function. Neuron. 79(2):217–240. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2013.07.007.

955 Shenhav A, Musslick S, Lieder F, Kool W, Griffiths TL, Cohen JD, Botvinick MM. 2017.
956 Toward a Rational and Mechanistic Account of Mental Effort. Annu Rev Neurosci. 40(1):99–
957 124. doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-072116-031526.

958 Shenhav A, Prater Fahey M, Grahek I. 2021. Decomposing the motivation to exert mental effort.
959 *Curr Dir Psych Sci*. 30(4), 307-314.

960 Sutton RS, Barto AG. 2018. Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. MIT Press.

961 Vassena, E., Silvetti, M., Boehler, C. N., Achten, E., Fias, W., & Verguts, T. 2014. Overlapping
962 neural systems represent cognitive effort and reward anticipation. *PLoS One*, 9(3).

963 Verbeke P, Verguts T. 2019. Learning to synchronize: How biological agents can couple neural
964 task modules for dealing with the stability-plasticity dilemma. PLoS Comput Biol. 15(8):1–25.
965 doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006604.

966 Verguts T, Vassena E, Silvetti M. 2015. Adaptive effort investment in cognitive and physical
967 tasks: a neurocomputational model. Front Behav Neurosci. 9(March).
968 doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00057.

969 Wagenmakers EJ, Lodewyckx T, Kuriyal H, Grasman R. 2010. Bayesian hypothesis testing for
970 psychologists: A tutorial on the Savage-Dickey method. Cognit Psychol. 60(3):158–189.
971 doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2009.12.001.

972 Yeung N, Sanfey AG. 2004. Independent coding of reward magnitude and valence in the human
973 brain. J Neurosci. 24(28):6258–6264. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4537-03.2004.

974

975