RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Game theory of vaccination and depopulation for managing avian influenza on poultry farms
JF bioRxiv
FD Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
SP 348813
DO 10.1101/348813
A1 Delabouglise, Alexis
A1 Boni, Maciej F
YR 2018
UL http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2018/06/17/348813.abstract
AB Highly pathogenic avian influenza is endemic in domestic poultry populations in East and South Asia and is a major threat to human health, animal health, and the poultry production industry. The behavioral response of farmers to the disease and its epidemiological effects are still poorly understood. We considered a symmetric game in a region with widespread smallholder poultry production, where the players are broiler poultry farmers and between-farm disease transmission is both environmental (local) and mediated by the trade of infected birds. Three types of farmer behaviors were modelled: vaccination, depopulation, and cessation of poultry farming. We found that the transmission level of avian influenza through trade networks had strong qualitative effects on the system’s epidemiological-economic equilibria. In the case of low trade-based transmission, when the monetary cost of infection is sufficiently high, depopulation behavior persists and maintains a disease-free equilibrium. In the case of high trade-based transmission, depopulation behavior has perverse epidemiological effects - as it accelerates the spread of disease via poultry traders - but has a high enough payoff to farmers that it persists at the system’s game theoretic equilibrium. In this situation, state interventions should focus on making effective vaccination technologies available at a low price rather than penalizing infected farms. Our results emphasize the need in endemic countries to further investigate the commercial circuits through which birds from infected farms are traded.