RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Coordination games in cancer
JF bioRxiv
FD Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
SP 2021.06.22.449436
DO 10.1101/2021.06.22.449436
A1 Péter Bayer
A1 Robert A. Gatenby
A1 Patricia H. McDonald
A1 Derek R. Duckett
A1 Kateřina Staňková
A1 Joel S. Brown
YR 2021
UL http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2021/06/24/2021.06.22.449436.abstract
AB We propose a model of cancer initiation and progression where tumor growth is modulated by an evolutionary coordination game. Evolutionary games of cancer are widely used to model frequency-dependent cell interactions with the most studied games being the Prisoner’s Dilemma and public goods games. Coordination games, by their more obscure and less evocative nature, are left understudied, despite the fact that, as we argue, they offer great potential in understanding and treating cancer. In this paper we present the conditions under which coordination games between cancer cells evolve, we propose aspects of cancer that can be modeled as results of coordination games, and explore the ways through which coordination games of cancer can be exploited for therapy.Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest.