RT Journal Article
SR Electronic
T1 Emergence and suppression of cooperation by action visibility in transparent games
JF bioRxiv
FD Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory
SP 314500
DO 10.1101/314500
A1 Anton M. Unakafov
A1 Thomas Schultze
A1 Igor Kagan
A1 Alexander Gail
A1 Sebastian Moeller
A1 Stephan Eule
A1 Fred Wolf
YR 2019
UL http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2019/03/27/314500.abstract
AB Real-world agents, humans as well as animals, observe each other during interactions and choose their own actions taking the partners’ ongoing behaviour into account. Yet, classical game theory assumes that players act either strictly sequentially or strictly simultaneously without knowing each other’s current choices. To account for action visibility and provide a more realistic model of interactions under time constraints, we introduce a new game-theoretic setting called transparent game, where each player has a certain probability of observing the partner’s choice before deciding on its own action. By means of evolutionary simulations, we demonstrate that even a small probability of seeing the partner’s choice before one’s own decision substantially changes evolutionary successful strategies. Action visibility enhances cooperation in an iterated coordination game, but disrupts cooperation in a more competitive iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In both games, “Win–stay, lose–shift” and “Tit-for-tat” strategies are predominant for moderate transparency, while “Leader-Follower” strategy emerges for high transparency. Our results have implications for studies of human and animal social behaviour, especially for the analysis of dyadic and group interactions.Author summary Humans and animals constantly make social decisions. Should an animal during group foraging or a human at the buffet try to obtain an attractive food item but risk a confrontation with a dominant conspecific, or is it better to opt for a less attractive but non-confrontational choice, especially when considering that the situation will repeat in future? To model decision-making in such situations game theory is widely used. However, classic game theory assumes that agents act either at the same time, without knowing each other’s choices, or one after another. In contrast, humans and animals usually try to take the behaviour of their opponents and partners into account, to instantaneously adjust their own actions if possible. To provide a more realistic model of decision making in a social setting, we here introduce the concept of transparent games. It integrates the probability of observing the partner’s instantaneous actions into the game-theoretic framework of knowing previous choice outcomes. We find that such “transparency” has a direct influence on the emergence of cooperative behaviours in classic iterated games. The transparent games contribute to a deeper understanding of the social behaviour and decision-making of humans and animals.