PT  - JOURNAL ARTICLE
AU  - Sarah Hammarlund
AU  - Brian D. Connelly
AU  - Katherine J. Dickinson
AU  - Benjamin Kerr
TI  - The Evolution of Cooperation by the Hankshaw Effect
AID  - 10.1101/016667
DP  - 2015 Jan 01
TA  - bioRxiv
PG  - 016667
4099  - http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2015/04/01/016667.short
4100  - http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2015/04/01/016667.full
AB  - The evolution of cooperation—costly behavior that benefits others—faces one clear obstacle. Namely, cooperators are always at a competitive disadvantage relative to defectors, individuals that reap the same social benefits, but evade the personal cost. One solution to this problem involves genetic hitchhiking, where the allele encoding cooperative behavior becomes linked to a beneficial mutation. While traditionally seen as a passive process driven purely by chance, here we explore a more active form of hitchhiking. Specifically, we model hitchhiking in the context of adaptation to a stressful environment by cooperators and defectors with spatially limited dispersal. Under such conditions, clustered cooperators reach higher local densities, thereby experiencing more opportunities for mutations than defectors. Thus, the allele encoding cooperation has a greater probability of hitchhiking with alleles conferring stress adaptation. We label this probabilistic enhancement the “Hankshaw effect” after the character Sissy Hankshaw, whose anomalously large thumbs made her a singularly effective hitchhiker. Using an agent-based model, we demonstrate that there exists a broad set of conditions allowing the evolution of cooperation through the Hankshaw effect. We discuss the feasibility of our theoretical assumptions for natural systems, not only for the case of cooperation, but also for other costly social behaviors such as spite. The primary elements of our model, including genetic hitchhiking and population structure, have been discussed separately in previous models exploring the evolution of cooperation. However, the combination of these elements has not been appreciated as a solution to the problem of cooperation.