Abstract
“Can we find a pair of extensive form games that give rise to the same strategic form game such that, when played by a reasonable subject population, there is a statistically significant difference in how the games are played?” (Kreps, 1990, p. 112). And if yes, “can we organize these significant differences according to some principles that reflect recognizable differences in the extensive forms?” Both questions are answered positively by reporting results from three different experiments on public goods provision, resource dilemmas, and pure coordination games.
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Rapoport, A. Order of play in strategically equivalent games in extensive form. Int J Game Theory 26, 113–136 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01262516
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01262516