Skip to main content

Thank you for visiting nature.com. You are using a browser version with limited support for CSS. To obtain the best experience, we recommend you use a more up to date browser (or turn off compatibility mode in Internet Explorer). In the meantime, to ensure continued support, we are displaying the site without styles and JavaScript.

  • Letter
  • Published:

Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity

Nature volume 414, pages 441–443 (2001)Cite this article

Abstract

A long-standing problem in biological and social sciences is to understand the conditions required for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in evolving populations. For many situations, kin selection1 is an adequate explanation, although kin-recognition may still be a problem. Explanations of cooperation between non-kin include continuing interactions that provide a shadow of the future (that is, the expectation of an ongoing relationship) that can sustain reciprocity2,3,4, possibly supported by mechanisms to bias interactions such as embedding the agents in a two-dimensional space4,5,6 or other context-preserving networks7. Another explanation, indirect reciprocity8, applies when benevolence to one agent increases the chance of receiving help from others. Here we use computer simulations to show that cooperation can arise when agents donate to others who are sufficiently similar to themselves in some arbitrary characteristic. Such a characteristic, or ‘tag’, can be a marking, display, or other observable trait. Tag-based donation can lead to the emergence of cooperation among agents who have only rudimentary ability to detect environmental signals and, unlike models of direct3,4 or indirect reciprocity9,10, no memory of past encounters is required.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution

Access options

Buy this article

  • Purchase on Springer Link
  • Instant access to full article PDF
Buy now

Prices may be subject to local taxes which are calculated during checkout

Figure 1: Population dynamics for the first 500 generations of a typical run.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Hamilton, W. D. The genetical evolution of social behaviour, I and II. J. Theor. Biol. 7, 1–52 (1964).

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  2. Trivers, R. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol. 46, 35–57 (1971).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. D. The evolution of cooperation. Science 211, 1390–1396 (1981).

    Article  MathSciNet  CAS  ADS  Google Scholar 

  4. Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, New York, 1984).

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  5. Nowak, M. A. & May, R. M. Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature 359, 826–829 (1992).

    Article  ADS  Google Scholar 

  6. Lomborg, B. Nucleus and shield: the evolution of social structure in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Am. Soc. Rev. 61, 278–307 (1996).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Cohen, M. D., Riolo, R. L. & Axelrod, R. The role of social structure in the maintenance of cooperative regimes. Rationality Soc. 13, 5–32 (2001).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Alexander, R. D. The Biology of Moral Systems (Aldine de Gruyter, New York, 1987).

    Google Scholar 

  9. Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. The evolution of indirect reciprocity. Social Networks 11, 213–236 (1989).

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  10. Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature 393, 573–577 (1998).

    Article  CAS  ADS  Google Scholar 

  11. Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation 146–150 (Basic Books, New York, 1984).

    Google Scholar 

  12. Holland, J. H. Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds Complexity (Addison Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1995).

    Google Scholar 

  13. Riolo, R. L. in Proc. 7th Int. Conf. Genetic Algorithms (ICGA97) (ed. Bäck, T.) 378–385 (Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, 1997).

    Google Scholar 

  14. Cohen, M. D., Riolo, R. L. & Axelrod, R. The emergence of social organization in the prisoner's dilemma: how context preservation and other factors promote cooperation. Working paper 99-01-002 (Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico, 1999).

  15. Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 137, 21–26 (1989).

    Article  MathSciNet  CAS  Google Scholar 

  16. Lindgren, K. in Artificial Life II (eds Langton, C. G. et al.) 295–312 (Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1991).

    Google Scholar 

  17. Linster, B. Evolutionary stability in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma played by two-state Moore machines. South. Econ. J. 58, 880–903 (1992).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Allison, P. D. The cultural evolution of beneficent norms. Social Forces 71, 279–301 (1992).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. Robson, A. J. Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, Nash and the secret handshake. J. Theor. Biol. 144, 379–396 (1990).

    Article  MathSciNet  CAS  Google Scholar 

  20. Dawkins, R. The Selfish Gene 96 (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1976).

    Google Scholar 

  21. Haig, D. Gestational drive and the green-bearded placenta. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 93, 6547–6551 (1996).

    Article  CAS  ADS  Google Scholar 

  22. Grafen, A. Evolutionary biology—green beard as death warrant. Nature 394, 521–523 (1998).

    Article  CAS  ADS  Google Scholar 

  23. Keller, L. & Ross, K. G. Selfish genes: a green beard in the red fire ant. Nature 394, 573–575 (1998).

    Article  CAS  ADS  Google Scholar 

  24. Dawkins, R. The Extended Phenotype 146–151 (Freeman, San Francisco, 1982).

    Google Scholar 

  25. Hauber, M. E., Sherman, P. W. & Paprika, D. Self-referent phenotype matching in a brood-parasite: the armpit effect in brown-headed cowbirds (Molothrus ater). Anim. Cogn. 3, 113–117 (2000).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  26. Hauber, M. E. & Sherman, P. W. The armpit effect in hamster kin recognition. Trends Ecol. Evol. 15, 349–350 (2000).

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  27. Mateo, J. M. & Johnston, R. E. Kin recognition and the ‘armpit effect’: evidence of self-referent phenotype matching. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 267, 695–700 (2000).

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  28. Isles, A. R., Baum, M. J., Ma, D., Keverne, E. B. & Allen, N. D. Genetic imprinting—urinary odour preferences in mice. Nature 409, 783–784 (2001).

    Article  CAS  ADS  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

For financial support we thank the Intel Corporation and the University of Michigan College of Literature, Science and the Arts Enrichment Fund. For computing facilities we thank the University of Michigan Center for the Study of Complex Systems.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for the Study of Complex Systems, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48109, USA

    Rick L. Riolo

  2. School of Information, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48109, USA

    Michael D. Cohen

  3. Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 48109, Michigan, USA

    Robert Axelrod

Authors
  1. Rick L. Riolo
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Michael D. Cohen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Robert Axelrod
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rick L. Riolo.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Riolo, R., Cohen, M. & Axelrod, R. Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity. Nature 414, 441–443 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1038/35106555

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/35106555

This article is cited by

Comments

By submitting a comment you agree to abide by our Terms and Community Guidelines. If you find something abusive or that does not comply with our terms or guidelines please flag it as inappropriate.

Search

Advanced search

Quick links

Nature Briefing

Sign up for the Nature Briefing newsletter — what matters in science, free to your inbox daily.

Get the most important science stories of the day, free in your inbox. Sign up for Nature Briefing