Abstract
As a result of the process of descent with modification, closely related species tend to be similar to one another in a myriad different ways. In statistical terms, this means that traits measured on one species will not be independent of traits measured on others. Since their introduction in the 1980s, phylogenetic comparative methods (PCMs) have been framed as a solution to this problem. In this paper, we argue that this way of thinking about PCMs is deeply misleading. Not only has this sowed widespread confusion in the literature about what PCMs are doing but has led us to develop methods that are susceptible to the very thing we sought to build defenses against — unreplicated evolutionary events. Through three Case Studies, we demonstrate that the susceptibility to singular events indeed a recurring problem in comparative biology that links several seemingly unrelated controversies. In each Case Study we propose a potential solution to the problem. While the details of our proposed solutions differ, they share a common theme: unifying hypothesis testing with data-driven approaches (which we term “phylogenetic natural history”) to disentangle the impact of singular evolutionary events from that of the factors we are investigating. More broadly, we argue that our field has, at times, been sloppy when weighing evidence in support of causal hypotheses. We suggest that one way to refine our inferences is to re-imagine phylogenies as probabilistic graphical models; adopting this way of thinking will help clarify precisely what we are testing and what evidence supports our claims.
